Volume 8 (2012)
1. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology|
2. List, C. and Rabinowicz, W. Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Endorsement|
3. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective|
Volume 7 (2011)
1. Perote-Peña, J. and Piggins, A. A Model of Deliberative and Aggregative Democracy|
2. List, C. Free Will, Determinism & The Possibility to Do Otherwise|
3. Pacuit, E. and Roy, O. A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality |
4. Hájek A. A Poisoned Dart for Conditionals|
Volume 6 (2010)
1. List, C. The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review|
2. Cook, P. and Heilmann, C. Censorship and Two Types of Self-Censorship|
3. Baigent, N. Topological Theories of Social Choice|
4. Bradley, R. Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals|
5. List, C. and Vermeule, A. Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive|
6. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. Independent Opinions?|
7. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises|
8. Nissan, I. Can An Irrational Agent Reason Himself to Rationality? A Triviality Result|
9. Nissan, I. (Being fair as) Doing the Best One Can |
10. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Where Do Preferences Come From?|
Volume 5 (2009)
1. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change|
2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation|
3. Bach, C.W. and Heilmann, C. Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction|
4. Moscati, I. and Tubaro, P. Random Behavior and the as-if Defense of Rational Choice Theory in Demand Experiments|
5. Dietrich, F. Bayesian Group Belief |
6. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice|
7. Douven, I. and Romeijn, J.-W. A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem|
8. Gajdos, T. and Vergnaud, J.-C. Decisions with Conflicting and Imprecise Information|
9. Fleurbaey, M. Assessing Risky Social Situations|
Volume 4 (2008)
1. Bradley, R. Beckers Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change|
2. Dietrich, F. The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem are not Simultaneously Justified|
3. Bradley, R. and List, C. Desire-as-belief revisited|
4. Dietrich, F and List, C. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory|
5. Dietrich, F.: Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework|
6. Heilmann, C.: Measurement-Theoretic Foundations of Time Discounting|
Volume 3 (2007)
1. Dietrich, F. Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism|
2. Voorhoeve, A. Heuristics and Biases in a Purported Counterexample to the Acyclicity of "Better Than"|
3. Bradley, R. Reaching a Consensus|
4. Voorhoeve, A. Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility|
5. Rabinowicz, W. Modeling Parity and Incomparability|
6. Moscati, I. Interactive and Common Knowledge of Information Partitions|
Volume 2 (2006)
1. van der Rijt, J. The Ruin of Homo Economicus|
2. Rossi, M. Two Platitudes about Interpersonal Comparisons|
3. Dietrich, F. and List, C. The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation|
4. Bradley, R., Dietrich, F. and List, C. Aggregating Causal Judgements|
5. Voorhoeve, A. Should Losses Count? A Critical Examination of the Complaint Model|
Volume 1 (2005)
1. Bradley, R. A Unified Bayesian Theory of Decision|
2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Strategy-proof Judgement Aggregation|
3. Voorhoeve, A. Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare|
4. Voorhoeve, A. and Binmore, K. Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-Based Reasoning|
5. Mongin, P. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle|
6. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Liberal Paradox for Judgement Aggregation|
7. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation|
8. Davies, G. Rethinking Risk Attitude: Aspiration as Pure Risk|