

G.W.F. Hegel, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (1820) (Oxford World's Classics, 2008).

142. Ethical life is the *Idea of freedom* in that, on the one hand, it is the living good — the good endowed in self-consciousness with knowing and willing and actualized by self-conscious action — while, on the other hand, self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its foundation in and for itself and its motivating end. Thus ethical life is the concept of freedom *developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness*.

144. (α) The objective ethical order, which comes on the scene in place of good in the abstract, is substance made *concrete* by subjectivity as *infinite form*. Hence it posits within itself distinctions whose specific character is thereby determined by the concept, and which endow the ethical order with a stable content which is necessary for itself and whose existence [*Bestehen*] is exalted above subjective opinion and caprice. These distinctions are *laws and institutions that have being in and for themselves*.

145. It is the fact that the ethical order is the system of these specific determinations of the Idea which constitutes its *rationality*. Hence the ethical order is freedom or the will in and for itself as what is objective, a circle of necessity whose moments are the ethical powers which govern the life of individuals. To these powers individuals are related as accidents to substance, and it is in individuals that these powers are represented, have the shape of appearance, and become actualized.

146. (β) The substantial order, in this its *actual self-consciousness*, knows itself and so is an object of knowledge. This ethical substance and its laws and powers are, on the one hand, an object over against the subject, and from the latter's point of view they *are* — 'are' in the highest sense of self-subsistent being. This is an absolute authority and power infinitely more firmly established than the being of nature.

147. On the other hand, they are not something alien to the subject. On the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as to *its own essence*, the essence in which he has a *feeling of his selfhood*, and in which he lives as in his own element which is not distinguished from himself. The subject is thus directly linked to the ethical order by a relation which is closer to identity than even the relation of faith or trust.

Faith and trust emerge along with reflection; they presuppose the power of forming ideas and making distinctions. For example, it is one thing to be a pagan, a different thing to believe in a pagan religion. That relation, or rather this relationless identity, in which the ethical order is the actual life of self-consciousness, can no doubt pass over into a relation of faith and conviction and into a relation produced by means of further reflection, i.e. into an insight due to reasoning starting perhaps from some particular purposes, interests, and considerations, from fear or hope, or from historical conditions. But *adequate knowledge* of this identity depends on thinking in terms of the concept.

148. As substantial in character, these laws and institutions are *duties* binding on the will of the individual, because as subjective, as inherently undetermined, or determined as particular, he distinguishes himself from them and hence stands related to them as to the substance of his own being.

149. The bond of duty can appear as a *restriction* only on indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom, and on the impulses either of the natural will or of the moral will which determines its indeterminate good arbitrarily. The truth is, however, that in duty the individual finds his *liberation*; first, liberation from dependence on mere natural impulse and from the depression which as a particular subject he cannot escape in his moral reflections on what ought to be and what might be [or what he would like to do]; secondly, liberation from the indeterminate subjectivity which, never

reaching reality or the objective determinacy of action, remains self-enclosed [*in sich*] and devoid of actuality. In duty the individual liberates himself so as to acquire his substantial freedom.

153. The *right of individuals* to be *subjectively determined* as free is fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical order, because their certainty of their freedom finds its truth in such an objective order, and it is in an ethical order that they are actually in possession of their *own* essence or their own inner universality (see § 147).

When a father inquired about the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean replied: 'Make him a citizen of a state with good laws.' (The phrase has also been attributed to others [e.g. Socrates]).

154. The right of individuals to their *particularity* is also contained in the ethical substantial order, since particularity is the outward appearance of the ethical order — a mode in which that order exists.

156. The ethical substance, as containing self-consciousness that is for itself and united with its concept, is the *actual spirit* of a family and a people.

Addition: Ethical life is not abstract like the good, but is intensely actual. Spirit has actuality, and individuals are accidents of this actuality. Thus in dealing with ethical life, only two views are possible: either we start from the substantiality of the ethical order, or else we proceed atomistically and build on the basis of individuality. This second point of view lacks spirit because it leads only to an aggregation, whereas spirit is not something individual, but is the unity of the individual and the universal.

268. The political *disposition*, patriotism pure and simple, is certainly based on *truth* — mere subjective certainty is not the outcome of truth but is only opinion — and volition which has become *habitual*. As such, it is simply a product of the institutions subsisting in the state, since rationality is *actually* present in the state, while action in conformity with these institutions gives rationality practical expression. This disposition is, in general, *trust* (which may pass over into a greater or lesser degree of educated insight), or the consciousness that my interest, both substantial and particular, is contained and preserved in another's (i.e. in the state's) interest and end, i.e. in the other's relation to me as an individual. In this way, this very other is immediately not an other in my eyes, and in being conscious of this fact, I am free.

Patriotism is often understood to mean only a readiness for *exceptional* sacrifices and actions. Essentially, however, it is the disposition which, in the relationships of our daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognizes that the community is one's substantial basis and end. It is out of this consciousness, which during life's daily round stands the test in all circumstances, that there subsequently also arises the readiness for extraordinary exertions. But just as people would often rather be magnanimous than law-abiding, so do they readily persuade themselves that they possess this exceptional patriotism in order to exempt themselves from the genuine disposition or to excuse their lack of it. If again this disposition is looked upon as that which may begin of itself and arise from subjective ideas and thoughts, it is being confused with opinion, because so regarded it is deprived of its true ground, objective reality.

Addition: [...] We trust that the state must subsist and that in it alone particular interests can be secured. But habit blinds us to that on which our whole existence depends. When we walk the streets at night in safety, it does not strike us that this might be otherwise. This habit of feeling safe has become second nature, and we do not reflect on just how this is due solely to the working of particular institutions. Representational thought [*Vorstellung*] often has the impression that force holds the state together, but in fact its only bond is the fundamental sense of order which everyone possesses.