

‘EUROPEANISATION’ AND GREECE

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC DOMAINS OF GREECE

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Abstract

This paper endeavours to present a rigorous examination of the impact of the Europeanisation process on the foreign and security policy of Greece. It attempts to access this impact on the state's diplomatic and security domains by highlighting and analysing the following key issues: the behavioural patterns of Greece and European integration; the distinctive elements of Greece's role, contribution and attitude in the European Political Co-operation framework; the institutional impact of the Maastricht Treaty as a vehicle for the Europeanisation of Greece's foreign policy; and Greece's foreign policy in the nineties.

In order to measure the impact of Europeanisation on the country's high politics the paper also examines distinctive structural and procedural developments, policy initiatives and the institutional framework.

Europeanisation and high politics: the case of Greece

EU membership is now widely recognised as an important factor in shaping a nation's political scene. It tends to blur the distinction between domestic politics and external foreign policy and to create new patterns of political behaviour. It encourages new institutional and administrative structures and interactions by redistributing power and competencies and reorienting political objectives. Membership has redefined territorial political relations, produced new governmental networks, given rise to new demands and pressures and has provoked new ideological tensions and conflicts. All these tendencies are encapsulated in the term 'Europeanisation'. According to the writer, R. Ladrech: *Europeanisation is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making.*¹

The ideological acceptance of the objectives of European integration undoubtedly constitutes a vital precondition for the Europeanisation process to take hold. It would, of course, be wrong to assume that rhetorical advocacy of European integration automatically denotes the internalisation of all EU logic, discipline and behaviour.

The process has effects on every field of a member state's economic, political, social and cultural structures, however, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of 'Europeanisation' on the area of high politics having Greece as a case study.

It attempts to assess this impact on the diplomatic and security domains of Greece by highlighting and analysing the following key issues:

- The behavioural patterns of Greece and European integration;
- Greece in the European Political Co-operation framework;

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- The Maastricht Treaty as a vehicle for the Europeanisation of Greece's foreign policy; and
 - Greece's foreign policy in the nineties.

The Greek case suggests that a discrepancy might well exist between the rhetorical adherence to the integration logic and the actual behaviour in terms of defining objectives and carrying out policies.

Greece offers a good case study to analyse attempts to Europeanise a country's foreign policy, to resolve the post-Cold War foreign policy and security dilemmas, and to participate actively in all West European security organisations (NATO, WEU, EU/CFSP). Its proximity to three former Communist countries (Albania, former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria), that in the 1990s experienced a period of instability and economic restructuring, its uneasy relationship with fellow NATO member Turkey, its exposed geographic location in the Balkans as well as the fact that it is not connected by land to any of the other European Union countries make this case unique. Apart from that, the country's imbroglio on the issue of the recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the dilemmas this issue presented to Greece and its allies in the Union or NATO and the fact that it is a weak state that has historically been involved in great power games, but which has everything to lose from new instabilities and confrontations in its neighbourhood, constituted major challenges for the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy in the 1990s.

Greece tried to respond to these challenges by participating in the European Political Co-operation. However, its EPC participation, produced a double dilemma. Firstly, the New Democracy government which had paved Greece's way to the European Community lost the elections of October 1981 and was replaced by an administration

of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which was ‘anti-European’ at that time. What followed was a critical process of adaptation and a ‘Europeanisation’ of the new political elite which led to considerable friction with the country’s European partners.

Secondly, at the end of the 1980s, the very pro-European government of Constantine Mitsotakis got its chance to improve relations with the EC partners and the USA. Then, however, came the end of the Cold-War, bringing chances, but also dislocations and disputes which destabilised the Balkans and once again separated Greece from its European partners. As far as its vital interests in the Balkans, and vis-à-vis Turkey were concerned, Greece followed a policy which its partners found hard to understand and to accept.

The transformation of EPC to CFSP presented new challenges for the country and found Greece to be more involved in EU’s political co-operation process with a ‘pro-European’ attitude and coherence in its foreign policy formulation. However, in order to evaluate Greece’s attempts to ‘Europeanise’ its foreign policy it is necessary to clarify first that for Greece there was never what we call ‘formulation of foreign policy’. There was what the Greeks called a bloc of ‘national issues’² that considered of the utmost importance: the Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, and relations with the Balkan countries. Although circumstances and political parties in government were different, it seems that there were some common characteristics in both cases. All governments in Greece follow a rather unified policy when so-called ‘national interests’ are at stake. This holds true with respect to Turkey and Cyprus, but also to the Balkans.

Behavioural patterns of Greece and European integration

Greece signed the first Association Agreement with the European Community (EC) in 1961, aiming at the acquisition of full membership status within 22 years. But at the Commission's initiative, the 'accession process' was partly frozen for seven years (1967-74), as a reaction to the military regime. Immediately after its collapse, however, the Karamanlis administration crowned its novel political project 'bourgeois modernisation' which included the country's entry into the Community.

The post-1974 situation in the neighbourhood of the country necessitated additional structures of support in its external affairs, all converging to the idea of a close European 'partnership' to counterweight successive military threats by Turkey. The EC was seen as an additional platform for the newly re-established parliamentary regime to consolidate its strength. It was also perceived as the most appropriate context to facilitate national economic development. Karamanlis' strategy implied that Greece should adjust to its more competitive European environment.

However, EC membership became the object of political rivalries in Greece. Being for or against Europe was an instrument in the internal competition among Greek parties. The Conservatives had been pro-European since 1974, whereas the then rapidly growing Socialists (PASOK) presented themselves as anti-European. In terms of rhetoric, the Community was a welcome scapegoat for the leftists or populists among the Socialists for nearly the whole decade.

The antipathy of the major parties of the broad left to the question of membership was manifested during the discussion on the ratification of the Accession Treaty in 1979.

But Karamanlis' consummate statesmanship was decisive and instrumental in the success of the Greek application in 1981.

Accession to the EC undoubtedly constitutes the greatest post-war achievement in Greek international relations. At the beginning, it was a catalyst and engine for modernisation.³ Under the leadership of Karamanlis, Greece capitalised on a particularly favourable international climate and became, as mentioned above, the tenth member of the EC. The accession was not only a net benefit in economic terms and an added assurance for the country's democratic institutions, but above all, it also enhanced Greece's feeling of security and independence. It has been referred to as *the greatest achievement of Greek foreign policy since independence, as important as independence itself*⁴.

However, as soon as Greece became member of the EC, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the national elections. This irony of history brought into power a party that was elected on a ticket to withdraw from the EC. It did not take very long for Greece to become the 'odd man out' of the Community under the new political leadership or 'a limited ally'.⁵ As a result, the country entered a stage of 'diplomatic isolation' from its European partners.

PASOK's years in government (1981-1988) went through a number of phases. Initially, the leadership of the party was caught in a north-south paradigm that almost naturally resulted to the rejection of the 'Community solution' to national economic problems. The pillars of PASOK's electoral manifesto were three-fold: national independence, popular sovereignty and social engulfment. The EC was seen as conflicting with at least the first. Electoral considerations aside, the dogma of national independence has acted as a major obstacle to changing PASOK's European policy. Somehow, the national feeling of a people being eternally persecuted and patronised

was translated into unconditional support for Papandreou, facilitating his re-election in 1985.

The second phase was marked with the memorandum of March 1982 on the special problems facing the Greek economy after the accession. This document was a clear sign that the Greek government was contemplating the idea of staying in the EC on the terms of the Accession Treaty, rather than seeking alternative routes of action. It also projected the framework of future Greek-EC relations by requesting temporary deviations from the rules of both the Rome Treaty and the Accession Treaty. Finally, it called for a redistribution of costs and benefits resulting from the Common Market.

The third phase came with the government's support of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. The 'trade off' took the form of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes which were under consideration by the Commission at the time. What seemed to encapsulate the mood of this phase was that the central question asked by party members was no more whether Greece should stay in the EC, but how to improve the conditions of membership. The inclusion in the SEA of the social and economic cohesion provisions was regarded by many 'moderate socialists' as an important European social conquest - the first ever to be reported as such in the EC. Whether a 'breakthrough' or not, for those that were largely to bear the burden of this policy, these provisions became the 'carrot' for PASOK's acceptable European behaviour. Essentially, they had been in favour of the European Community just as much as the Conservatives since the middle of the 1980s. The 'stick', however, took the form of various threats on the part of the Commission about the management of European financial resources by Greek governmental authorities. The Greek attitude towards the EU, was characterised by a lack of confidence, whereas, the source of all

problems seemed to be deeply rooted misconceptions and ignorance of the real character of the EU.⁶

These inadequacies, in certain cases continued to shape the quality of Greek-EU relations. As Fatouros argues, the issue of the country's entry to the EC was entangled in the cleavage between 'westernisers' and 'traditionalists'⁷. This assumption results from the period before the independence of the Greek state in 1831. It refers to the age-old question of whether Greece belongs to the 'east' or to the 'west'. The 'westernisers' have been historically identified, *grosso modo*, with the rational inquiry and the political liberalism of the continent whereas the easterners' have adamantly advocated the defence of the *status quo*⁸. These reflections suggest that the Greek case in the EC in the first years after accession was a problematic one, not least due to the fact that the country joined the Community on political, rather than economic grounds.

An evaluation of Greece's EPC participation

It is beyond doubt that membership in EC / EU institutions and participation in the European Political Co-operation (EPC) process for co-ordinating the foreign policy of the member states on international issues considerably broadened weak members' foreign policy objectives and 'area concerns'. According to Featherstone, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are the three countries that the EPC/CFSP institutional development had the most significant impact upon⁹ since participation in its framework involved the articulation and presentation of well-defined, concrete positions, and perhaps taking sides in diplomatic conflicts. Ireland, Portugal and Greece were no longer able to confine their foreign policy and activities solely to issues of immediate national interest. They had to deal with all issues arising in the international system and formulate views and present positions on all of them.

As far as Greece is concerned it has extended the geographical and thematic substance of its foreign policy. Before EC membership and before participation in the EPC mechanisms, Greek 'foreign policy makers' used rhetoric as statements and nationalist declarations as their diplomatic tools in order to have success on 'national issues'. In consequence, there was no significant effect. What EPC did was to force Greece to 'acquire a foreign policy'¹⁰ of some kind and give up its past spasmodic actions.

As a member of the EPC process, Greece had been called upon or had been forced to deal with a wide range of international issues far beyond its traditional, immediate, 'foreign policy concerns'. Included among those issues were major items on the international agenda such as East-West relations, the Middle East crisis, the Iran/Iraq

conflict, trans-Atlantic relations, the OSCE, the Afghanistan crisis, the Falklands crisis, and combating terrorism; other issues were geographically remote from what was traditionally perceived to be of 'Greek interest', such as, for instance, the situation in Philippines and in Latin and Central America, the conflicts in Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and the Sudan, to name but a few.

In addition to markedly extending the scope of foreign policy, participation in the EPC had the related effect of fundamentally changing the content of that policy. It was not only that the agenda of foreign policy became more extensive, it was also the nature and content of the subjects brought onto the agenda that added a new dimension to foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been vested with the overall responsibility for co-ordinating Community policy, formulating positions, forwarding them to Brussels, and communicating with Community institutions. This should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting a perception that 'Community policy' is part of the foreign policy. It rather follows the pattern of other member states in organising their Community affairs. As a result of this process, the Greek foreign policy-making process changed in a number of respects:

- *Structures*. There had been a significant reordering of departments in the internal hierarchy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department of European Community Affairs and the European Political Co-operation Department (EPC) had acquired predominance in policy-making. In practice, the European Political Co-operation department exercised control over all other departments dealing with political affairs, either on a bilateral or multilateral level. The same, though in a rather informal way, happened with the department of European Community Affairs in relation to other economic departments of the Ministry.

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- *Nature /Style.* Foreign policy-making had become more of a collective exercise involving a wider number of actors (diplomats, technocrats, experts, officials) drawn either from inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or from other specialised ministries. It had also become more open and transparent merely by involving a larger number of actors. In short, as a result of EPC participation, the process of foreign policy-making became more institutionalised and less personally dominated.

Apart from that, the common commercial policy and the external economic relations of the Community embodied in a vast network of agreements (trade, association, co-operation, etc.) all instilled a strong economic element into Greece's foreign policy. Consequently, Greek foreign policy was forced, for the first time, to address economic policy issues and global economic questions. This marked a change in Greece's foreign policy which had previously been centred on relations with Turkey and the Cyprus problem. EPC participation forced Greek leaders to change that attitude.

The Maastricht Treaty as a vehicle for the ‘Europeanisation’ of Greece’s foreign policy

The institutional developments and Greece’s attitudes

The Maastricht Treaty pledged the Union and its Member States to put into effect the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This was to be pursued by establishing systematic co-operation between Member States, gradually implementing joint action. The Member States were required to inform and consult each other within the Council of Ministers on matters of foreign and security policy, and the Council would adopt common positions where necessary. Member States were to ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions, and were to co-ordinate their action within international organisations. The European Council was to define general guidelines for joint action and the Council would decide, by unanimity, whether an area or issue should be the subject of joint action. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of joint action would be decided by qualified majority.

Greece's contribution with respect to the Maastricht Treaty can best be described by two consecutive memorandums in 1990 and 1991. The first supported the idea of European Union and the need for cohesion, whereas the second concentrated on security aspects. During the IGC on the Political Union, it was made clear from the outset that Greece placed a special emphasis on defence; no real progress was thought possible in the IGCs on both the EMU and Political Union without parallel progress in

defence.¹¹ To the Greek government, defence meant above all that the country's borders would be 'guaranteed' against air external attack. Greece expected its participation in a politically united Europe to act as a deterrent against expansionist neighbours and as a platform for the 'Europeanisation' of its security problems; moreover, if deterrence failed, the EU 'would certainly help' through political and military support (provision of equipment, for example), economic sanctions against the aggressor, and perhaps even through the dispatch of a future EU/WEU Rapid Reaction Force. The inclusion of the security/defence dimension into European integration was seen necessary as the most logical step towards European Union, and the membership composition of the EC rendered it politically more attractive to Greece in comparison with other security institutions. It was believed that an EC common security policy would guarantee Greece's territorial integrity.

In the Greek eyes, enlarging the scope of European integration to incorporate a security and/or defence dimension appeared to be an eminently rational development. The existence of a community of nations sharing the same values and interests and integrating their various policies into collective ones provided the best and most promising environment: the comprehensive net of interdependence created during years of progressive integration was expected to culminate in the co-ordination and step-by-step orchestration of the security policies of the Twelve.¹²

The foundation of Greece's EC strategy in relation to security affairs had traditionally rested on perceived advantages involving a European framework with regard to external challenges and most particularly in relation to the perceived Turkish threat. The prevailing argumentation in favour of a Europeanised security system went mostly along the following lines: if a common defence policy was created within the EPU, it would by definition protect all twelve members against external threats.

Given that Turkey posed a serious threat to Greece, the latter would be able to count on the support of a collective deterrence mechanism that would discourage a potential Turkish incursion. Because of the slow progress of security consultations within the EC, even after the SEA, accession to the WEU was increasingly perceived as the true key to Greece's future security needs. PASOK's anti-nuclear policy during the 1980s had unfortunately excluded Greece from this increasingly important forum and was thus threatening to marginalise this country in the debate on the future of European security.

The New Democracy administration, therefore, pursued the goal of WEU accession as a top priority. It adroitly put forward its credentials as an EC member (as a basis for a differentiated treatment vis-à-vis Turkey), and it demonstrated its eagerness to join the security component of EC integration. For the Mitsotakis government, it *a conditio sine qua non* that any treaty on European Union was only to be accepted if it included Greece's accession to the WEU. As became evident later, Greece was ready to veto the whole outcome of the IGC on Political Union if these conditions were not met.¹³

‘Security first, economy second’, - that was the strategy of Karamanlis when he led Greece into the 1970s. That was also the primary option of the Mitsotakis Government when negotiations concentrated on Political Union, especially in 1991.¹⁴

The difference was, however, that ‘security’ in the 1970s was not only external, such as the Turkish threat, but also internal and concerned the stabilisation of the democratic system revitalised in 1974. For Greece, internal security challenges ceased to exist in the late 1970s, whereas the external ones had two dimensions in the early 1990s: the traditional one concerning Turkey and a new one with respect to the northern neighbours.

When an invitation to EC member states still outside to join the WEU was expressed it was received with joy. Greece was an associate member of the WEU and this declaration was an open invitation for membership which was conceived as a great benefit. Accession to the WEU was for the New Democracy government a 'victory for Greece'.

However, WEU Member States were not at all willing to let Greece use the WEU as a shield against Turkey in order to decrease its 'security risk'. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Portugal had been in the forefront trying to prevent a bilateral Greek-Turkish conflict from becoming a matter for the WEU.¹⁵ Even Germany, which was in favour of the Greek entry to the WEU, was not willing to let the WEU become an instrument for dealing with bilateral regional problems. In addition, taking into account the Anglo-Italian Initiative on Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy of 5 October 1991, it was clear that Greek expectations of forming a WEU alliance for the benefit of Greece against Turkey were totally unfounded. Greek government's expectations that Maastricht would be a guarantee of Greek borders were frustrated.

What could be anticipated from the Maastricht Treaty was confirmed by the Petersberg Declaration on 19 June 1992. The nine partners were not willing to take sides in Greek-Turkish differences. As was anticipated, such a position could only weaken the Western Alliance in a strategically important region. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty was interpreted and altered so as not to be applicable to any form of Greek-Turkish conflict. As Greek observers have noted, even an unprovoked attack by Turkey on Greece would not be a case for WEU assistance. The WEU Treaty was modified in the sense that obligations to assist a partner were seen as mutual and equal regardless of whether they originated from the NATO or the WEU Treaty.

The explanation for Greece's reaction to the Petersberg Declaration can best be understood by the over-optimistic perception of the benefits of the TEU. The Greek side had interpreted the Maastricht Treaty and the attitudes of EC member states as a panacea in its security problems. The disappointment that followed the Petersberg Declaration was perceived in Greece as 'a slap in its face'. When Greece signed the accession treaty to WEU in November 1992, the Greek authorities were obviously disappointed that Turkey had become an associated member of the WEU and that Article V had been modified. Nevertheless, despite its frustration regarding security, the Greek government, as mentioned before, did not realise its threat to veto ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

The end of 'Europhoria'

By 1993 Europhoria - the striking attribute of the early period of the Mitsotakis government - was a phenomenon of the past. Two aspects were primarily responsible for the change of behaviour in Greece.

Firstly, Greece had enormous aspirations as to what European Union could imply for the country. As negotiations proceeded, it became obvious that essential parts of these hopes were not fulfilled. What frustrated the Greeks most was the fact that the partners were not willing to develop Greek membership in the WEU into an automatic security guarantee of Greek borders, especially against Turkey. Having realised that, Greece's interest in the European Union decreased substantially.

Secondly, as the Inter-Governmental Conferences progressed, the Yugoslav crisis turned into war, and Greece was included in the conflict because of the 'Macedonian question'. While discussing the target of a 'common' foreign security and defence

policy, Greece's expectations were extremely high that the partners would understand the obligation of 'solidarity' in the same way as the Greeks did: more or less as unilateral support for the Greek demands against the newly established state, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¹⁶ Although the Community showed itself extremely compliant to the Greek position, this was not enough for the Greek government. Greece expected too much of the Community, with the result that frustration spread within the country when hopes were not fulfilled. As a backlash, nationalism grew and Europeanism declined. Furthermore, during 1991-1996 the handling of the Macedonian question and continuing Greek support for the Serbs dissociated Greece from the rest of the Community.

The Greek Prime Minister declared that his government was of the opinion that the Maastricht Treaty 'was more than incomplete' and aimed at a 'Europe simply concerned with the monetary system,' and therefore the Greek government favoured the revision of the Maastricht Treaty planned for 1996.¹⁷ The fact that Papandreu stressed at the same time that 'Europe needs to be strengthened in its weakest regions,' accusing the European Union of being 'responsible for the current tragedy in former Yugoslavia,' and stating that Greece did not feel European solidarity or support in the case of Skopie, was an indication of two trends coming from the past and even determining the future. First, that the Greek government regarded the Community after the Maastricht Treaty primarily as a lever for the development of the backward regions and countries, and second, that Greek politicians believe that solidarity in the Community should favour their country.

Greece's Foreign Policy in the Nineties

General observations - old problems - new prospects

It is an irony of history that during the Cold War, Greece was separated geographically from the rest of the European Community by non-western States (Warsaw Pact countries and also Yugoslavia and Albania). After the end of East-West antagonism, Greece was isolated once again - this time by an arc of conflicts and crises which started in Albania, included the former Yugoslavia and reached to the former Soviet Union. Greece obviously has not yet found a way to deal with this difficult situation and adopt the EU logic and rationale on its foreign and security policy. In addition, Greece's geo-strategic location, as NATO's 'shield' in south-east Europe, lost its significance after the end of the Cold War, whereas Turkey's was strengthened, since strategic interests moved to the Gulf area and Caucasus.¹⁸

Summarising Greece's situation in the period from 1990 to 1996 with regard to what extent its foreign and security policy followed a 'Europe-oriented' pattern, the following aspects constitute the most important structures and developments.

Greece's Policy centred on Turkey, whereas, the post-Communist era is perceived as an encirclement by the eastern neighbour.

As other countries and regions, Greece is reverting to history. Differences and disputes from the past which seemed to be settled somehow reappeared. What had not been an object of major concern during the Cold War had become so in the

nineties. This is true with respect to the ‘Macedonian question’ and to ‘Northern Epirus’, as the Greeks call the southern part of contemporary Albania.

Greece's security seemed to have been challenged more than ever during the last forty years and on nearly all ‘fronts.’ Differences with Turkey relating to the complex conflict in the Aegean, the Cyprus question, and the minorities were still unsolved. The problem of refugees and the treatment of the Greek minority divided Greece and Albania. Because of a disputed name and anticipated expansionist tendencies there was no *détente* with the FYROM. Relations with Bulgaria no longer had a privileged status, and it was feared in Greece that some day even territorial claims could arise, as happened in the past during the two Balkan Wars in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

The fact that the Balkans as well as Turkey were and still are areas of unsettled disputes overstrained the capacity of the multidimensional foreign policy traditionally followed by Greece. Greece had not been able to develop a clear strategy for managing disputes on nearly all fronts. After 1993 Greece tried to ‘Europeanise’ the Cyprus issue¹⁹ and at the same time in the Council of Ministers and at the European Councils also tried to convince its partners that the Greek-Turkish dispute is not a bilateral but a European one, based on the assumption that when a member state is under constant threat there is an effect on the Union itself²⁰.

Albania and the FYROM did not constitute significant security threats for Greece in the nineties. Furthermore, in contrast to all other northern Balkan neighbours, Greece was a member of NATO and WEU which created a favourable security status. Security guarantees provided by these organisations were valid against any threat from the north, but not, of course, against Turkey.

What Greece feared most was that the northern neighbours might form alliances with Turkey. Until 1996 such a constellation was not in sight. However, perceptions in Greece were different. Turkey was seen to be collecting allies all around Greece. The 'worst case scenario' seemed to exert an influence on domestic politics, too. To some extent, this explains harsh reactions in Greece towards the Balkan states and the feeling of being 'threatened' by neighbours. The result was a disparity of perception between Greece and the rest of the EU. Western partners did not regard the behaviour of Greece's northern neighbours as threatening, as the Greeks did. In the language of International Relations, what others saw as 'capability' or 'probability,' the Greek government might regard as 'intention.'

These differing perceptions had substantial consequences. Where Western partners favoured some form of 'institutional' arrangements and integration vis-à-vis Balkan states, Greece did not see the usefulness and legitimacy of such steps and, instead, in many cases opposed such strategies. Thus economic and financial co-operation with Balkan states, which was understood as a core element of this strategy, was blocked by Greece as far as the FYROM or Albania were concerned. Apart from that, Greece's attitude was still national centred. In the nineties, issues such as: relations with Turkey, the Cyprus issue and the Macedonian question, monopolised the Greek press; whereas, at the same time the European press mainly referred to the situations in Iraq and Ireland.²¹ In other words, there was no Europeanisation effect since there was no interest in Greece for important European or global events but only for developments related to the Greek so-called 'national issues': Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans.

However, it is very important to show that the patterns which had been evident in Greece's attitudes to EPC in the 1980s were confirmed with regard to Common

Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s for issues that Greece was indifferent towards them: the country followed its partners in nearly every declaration and action. In this respect there was no difference between the Mitsotakis government which was in office from 1990 to 1993 and the PASOK administration which came to power again in 1993. This can be demonstrated by the following selection of statements:

- supporting US policy vis-à-vis Haiti;²²
- demanding the withdrawal of troops from the frontier with Kuwait addressed to Iraq;²³
- welcoming of the development in South Africa;²⁴
- condemning all acts of violence in the Israel-Palestine area;²⁵
- assisting CFSP proposals on disarmament;²⁶
- demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries;²⁷
- expressing concern over the aggravation of the human rights situation in Turkey.²⁸

Whenever its vital interests were concerned, Greece found it difficult, more than any other member state, to follow its partners in CFSP. Greece hampered the development of the EU's relations with Turkey. As in the past, Athens blocked the Fourth Financial Protocol.²⁹ Greece was prepared to compromise when Turkish troops withdraw from Cyprus and a solution was found for the island. In September 1994, the Greek Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made it clear that tripartite talks within the EU/CFSP troika to study relations with Turkey could only take place if there was a reference to the problem of Cyprus.³⁰ Another conflict concerned the project of the Customs Union to be finalised with Turkey in 1996. Greece opposed these plans³¹ and tried to convince its partners in the Council of Foreign Ministers to

issue declarations on Turkey's unsuccessful application for membership in order to put pressure on the neighbouring state.

In contrast to the early 1980s, not even minimal criticism of US policy towards Third World countries was expressed, even over Haiti. Concerning Iraq, with which PASOK had had connections in the past, Greece took a firm stand on the Western camp. South Africa and even the Middle East also did not cause any friction. Greece had toned down its pro-Palestine position. Disarmament was no longer a matter of dispute. The same held true with regard to Russia. Having made progress in the 1980s, the adaptation of Greece's policy to the EU mainstream was speeded up after the end of the Cold War.

Papandreou's return to power and the recognition of FYROM in December 1993 by half the twelve EU member states, including the four most important states, marked a new phase in Greece's relations with the EU. Its three main features were a strengthening of relations with the US, which viewed in Athens as a stabilising element in the Balkans; a corresponding scaling down of expectations of the EU, a rejection of the 'Europeanisation' logic particularly as regards foreign policy and security; and a re-examination of Greece's position towards FYROM where PASOK had tacitly accepted the diplomatic *fait accompli*.

The Hellenic Presidency of 2003

The most important challenge that Greek foreign policy has faced after the millennium was the Presidency of the European Union in 2003.

The Hellenic Presidency of 2003 set five priorities as its main objective as there were highlighted in the official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- Enlargement: the Accession Treaty and the day after
- The Lisbon Process: competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability
- Immigration/Asylum: joint responsibility, comprehensive immigration policy
- The Future of Europe; The Outcome of the Convention
- **External relations: the new Europe as an international motor for peace and Cooperation**

According to the official document published by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs ³² a main aim for the Greek Presidency was to promote the EU's relations with the Balkan countries and to consolidate peace, stability and cooperation in Europe. Other parameters included the effective development and deepening of relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova the Caucasus region and the strengthening of the EU's cooperation with Mediterranean countries.

The Presidency aimed to promote political dialogue with all groups of countries and to give special emphasis to the respect of human rights and the rule of law and promised closer cooperation between the Union and the US in the fight against inequality, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, armaments control and

conflict prevention. The Presidency also aimed at a more active participation of the EU in the international community's fight against terrorism, promoting the development of capabilities and policies and supporting multilateral cooperation with third countries and international organizations, with the aim of eradicating this scourge, which has developed into a major international problem following September 11, 2001.

At the same time, they were proposals for stronger policies for combating poverty, protecting the environment, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resolving regional conflicts and facing the problem of drug trafficking.

The Greek Presidency's immediate priorities also included the strengthening of relations with the US and cooperation at all levels, so as to form a joint response to international challenges.

The Greek Presidency aimed to strengthen the EU's capacity for effective political intervention in conflict areas, by improving and further developing existing institutional instruments (common strategies and joint actions). At a time in the EU's efforts to build new capabilities in the field of Security and Defence Cooperation, the Greek Presidency, in order to reinforce the institutional framework of the CFSP, responded by proposing the area of "Freedom, Security and Justice".

The Results of the Hellenic Presidency in the Foreign Policy Domain ³³

Dossier	Achievement	Policy objective	Comments
CFSP/ESDP	Significant progress was made towards better defined common policies on security, defence and foreign affairs,	The Security Strategy identifies three key objectives for the EU: Extending the zone of security around Europe; Strengthening	The Iraq crisis, as well as popular demand for a stronger EU voice on the international scene, have led the

Dossier	Achievement	Policy objective	Comments
<p>WMD / Terrorism</p>	<p>through the further development of military and crisis management capabilities and the launching of the European Security Strategy.</p> <p>A Joint Action Plan on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was adopted at the June 16 GAERC in Luxembourg</p> <p>An EU External Action in the fight against terrorism (including CFSP/ESDP) has been adopted at the June 16 GAERC.</p>	<p>the international order; Countering the new threats.</p> <p>The development of the first EU Security Strategy responds in a timely and structured way to the need for the EU to address major global security challenges, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organized crime. A clear Security Strategy will enable the EU to consider these new threats to international peace and security in a strategic manner, which in turn will facilitate a rapid, effective response to crises.</p> <p>In an era of globalisation, European security is increasingly effected by violent conflicts, failed states, and organised crime beyond the Union's borders. An effective policy to deal with these challenges is therefore an urgent priority.</p>	<p>EU to introduce a more strategic, coherent, capable and dynamic focus to the development of the common foreign and security policy and European security and defence policy.</p> <p>At the Gymnich meeting in Katellorizo in May, Foreign Ministers mandated SG/HR Javier Solana to produce the first draft of an EU Security Strategy, for consideration at the Thessaloniki European Council.</p> <p>At Kastellorizo, at the invitation of the Greek Presidency, ministers also began to discuss their respective national foreign policy objectives, with a view to reconciling differences and capitalising on convergences as far as possible, in the interests of building a more effective CFSP.</p>

Dossier	Achievement	Policy objective	Comments
Operational Capabilities	The Union declared at GAERC on 19 May, its operational capability across the full range of Petersburg tasks. During the Greek Presidency, the first three crisis management operations have been launched and are underway: EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina; CONCORDIA in FYROM; and ARTEMIS in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo.	This development marked an important step in the progressive creation of a common European Security and Defence Policy. The effort to develop effective European influence over international security issues is now matched by an ability to take rapid, effective action. Complementary action alongside NATO and other international partners will continue to produce mutual benefits and a fairer sharing of responsibility for dealing with security challenges.	Further development of the emerging common European security and defence policy has been one of the key priorities of the Greek Presidency. The deployment of EU forces in three crisis management operations will provide valuable lessons and experience for future missions, should they prove necessary.
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)	Rapid and systematic progress in implementing the ECAP, within the set timeframe of the end of 2003. The way ahead was defined by the establishment, among others, of the ECAP Project Groups.	The aim of the Action Plan was to identify and remedy capabilities shortfalls that would allow the full operationality of the EU's 60,000-strong crisis management force, through the creation of expert panels and working groups.	The Greek Presidency promoted the work of the ECAP panels alongside SG/HR Javier Solana, on behalf of the Council, and has mapped out the way ahead by the establishment of the ECAP Project Groups. The next crucial step will be to address outstanding financing and resourcing issues.
	The so-called	To enhance the	The conclusion and

Dossier	Achievement	Policy objective	Comments
	<p>‘permanent arrangements’ between the EU and NATO have been concluded, providing the framework for a strategic partnership in crisis management.</p>	<p>operational capability of the Union, and provide the framework of an effective partnership to meet global challenges.</p>	<p>implementation of EU-NATO permanent arrangements will also contribute to effective multilateral cooperation, which is the interests of the international community.</p>

Conclusions

Participation in EPC, EPU and CFSP presented new challenges and found Greece to be more involved in EU's political co-operation process with a 'pro-European' attitude and a more 'Europe-oriented' approach and coherence in its foreign policy formulation. However, again 'national issues': the Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, and relations with the Balkan countries, played a crucial role and made adaptation to the new situation complex. Also the disillusionment regarding expectations from the TEU in the field of security made 'European-oriented' structures, from 1994 and onwards, to look much less attractive than they did in 1992. This also applies to the WEU, which was seen as the ultimate prize for Greece during the 1992 IGC. This stemmed from a dual realisation, first that the WEU was largely a defence organisation without a nervous system and, therefore, incapable of addressing problems like those in the Balkans. Second, even if the WEU did possess real muscle, it was far from certain whether it would have rushed to Greece's side. It will be, therefore, an illusion to assume that the EU/CFSP would provide security for Greece against Turkey. Greece learnt the lesson at the latest in 1992 when the Petersberg agreement made it clear that membership in the Western European Union (WEU) does not imply any assistance for Greece in case of a military conflict with NATO member Turkey. After the TEU however, expectations from the WEU had been scaled down to a more realistic level. Although the Maastricht Treaty defines defence policy as a long-term responsibility of the EU, it seems not very likely that the EU will take over these responsibilities in the future.

However, even though the European Union did not go as far as to integrate the defence policies of the member states, the Community framework and even more so the EPU process entailed a series of important assets for Greek security, above all the web of interdependence and solidarity among the fifteen partners. Participation in the CFSP decision-making structure also guaranteed an increased and timely flow of information critical for foreign policy decision-making. It contributed simultaneously to the modernisation of Greece's foreign policy mechanism and bureaucratic structures (educational effects through intensive consultation, etc.).

As a member of the EU, Greece could have enjoyed, up to certain extent, the support of the other member states even though this support was not automatic and was subject to a certain code of conduct based on shared values. It is very important to emphasise that with regard to Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s, what was said about EPC in the late 1980s had to be confirmed: Greece followed its partners in nearly every declaration and action that did not conflict with its interests.

However, although Greece had demonstrated such a 'pro-European' attitude after 1990, instead of 'Europeanising' its foreign policy, it tried to 'Europeanise' its foreign policy goals and as a result, suddenly found itself isolated from its EU/CFSP partners. This became obvious in two cases in Greece's foreign policy in the Balkans. First, in the 'Macedonian question' where Athens for two years had gone through the agony of fighting a diplomatic battle against recognition which it had no realistic prospects of winning. The only thing in which it succeeded was to seriously impair its place in the Union. Second, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, Greece also disassociated itself from its partners by adopting a pro-Serbian attitude and continuously sabotaged UN sanctions purely for national interest reasons.

Greece's policy in both cases was catastrophic. The Greek government conducted its EU's policy vis-à-vis FYROM and Serbia, frequently making use of vetoes and of the requirement of consensus in CFSP. The result was that the EU could no longer play the role of mediator and that efforts failed to stabilise the situation in this part of the Balkans through intensified economic and political co-operation. Apart from that, Greece hampered the development of the EU's relations with Turkey and as a result, it found it difficult to follow its partners in CFSP.

We can conclude that mere participation in the EU/CFSP provided Greece with many opportunities, that still need to be explored, for advancing, directly or indirectly, its political and security interests. However, as far as foreign policy is concerned Greece used the EPC/CFSP and EPU frameworks mainly for satisfying its national interests, or when that was not possible, for stopping unpleasant developments imposed by its partners instead of using them as stages and platforms for adapting its foreign policy to the integration and Europeanisation logic.

One should observe though that the shift in the Greek foreign policy towards its relations with Turkey and the way that the EU Presidency of 2003 was administered changed the perceptions of Greece to its European partners to a great extent. Greece is not anymore politically isolated and more important it has convinced the other EU member states that it can provide excellent liaison services to the southeast European countries as an emerging regional power. In this framework, there are still lessons to be learned and a lot of perspectives to be explored.

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⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

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¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See the Greek proposals in the Southeast European Yearbook 1990, in ELIAMEP 1991, pp. 345-352.

¹² This position was very clear in the Commission's ideas. See Political Union, European Commission's Opinion about the IGC, in *Europe Documents*, 31 October 1990, 1659, p. 2.

¹³ 'Greece demands accession to the WEU as condition for its acceptance of Political Union' in *Macedonia*, 13 November 1991.

¹⁴ See article of Panayiotis Ioakimidis in *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, 27 June 1991, pp. 21-22.

¹⁵ Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur on the enlargement of the WEU for the WEU's Parliamentary Assembly, had pleaded, for instance, in favour of the simultaneous membership of Greece and Turkey. See *Agence Europe*, 4 December 1991, p. 6.

¹⁶ Some Greek newspapers warned that the prevailing opinion in Greece is that the partners have to follow the path set by the Athens government. If this is not done, the Greeks are quick to accuse the Community of 'betraying' Greece. See anonymous author in *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, 30 January 1991, p. 20.

¹⁷ See *Agence Europe*, 6/7 June 1994, p. 4.

¹⁸ Meeting with Prof. N. Christodoulakis, Minister of Finance, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].

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²⁷ *Ibid.*, 21-22 March 1994, p. 6.

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²⁹ This was confirmed in July 1992. Reservations were dropped by Greece only with respect to some finances in the context of the Mediterranean policy. See *Agence Europe*, 27 July 1991, p. 3. The question was on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council whether Greece was willing to drop its veto. As is known Greece was not ready to do so.

³⁰ *Agence Europe*, 28 September 1994, p. 3.

³¹ *Agence Europe*, 3 November 1994, p. 6.

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