

Proposing a Model for a National Hellenic Strategic Culture

Contributors

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Abstract: The study of the role that “strategic culture” has in the formation of the states’ security policies is growing importantly in the field of Security Studies. The difference in actors’ cultures reflect the basis on which they act and the source from which they gain their motivations. Consequently, a great part of the interaction between the several actors of the international arena can be importantly influenced by factors inherent within them.

A perpetual dynamic process of the social factors’ perceptions and consequently their influence on the management of “high-politics” issues is now obvious. In the proposed paper we will initially examine the factors that framed security culture in Greece throughout the post-1974 period. Institutions, legacies, stereotypes and enduring beliefs within the society and the political community, attitudes and symbols that introduce specific security aims are some of the elements that framed the security and, consequently, the strategic culture of Modern Greece. Moreover, after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 created an image of Turkey in Greece, as the first national security threat.

Even though that Greece hasn’t made yet a brave effort for a strategic analysis, understanding and answering the abovementioned questions, time has come, with the new political researchers be willing and ready to respond to these challenges of modern Greece’s political culture. This is the first step in order to be considered as a part of a continuing national strategic security culture procedure in Greece. Needless to say, we are interested not only in strategic culture, in the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive national experience, but also in national style in behaviour.

The use and parallel the challenge from the building a Hellenic Strategic Culture is to assert at least the following potential benefits: a) an improved understanding of our own, and other cultures in local terms, b) an improved ability to discern enduring policy motivations and to make predictions, c) an improved ability to communicate what is intended to be communicated and d) an improved ability to understand the meaning of events in the assessment of the Others.

Prologue

From the traditional security concept of political realism to the post-Cold War concept of global security and national comprehensive security, both connotation and extension of security have fairly changed. Owing to the change of the conception of security, consideration on national security interests is miscellaneous. After World War II, especially after the states' interdependence, various aspects of security have indicated their interrelated and transactional relations, gradually constructing an all-directional, dynamic and multi-dimensional security concept: a) Political security, b) Military security, c) Economic security and d) Cultural Security.

Strategic culture is a fluid and elusive concept first introduced in 1977 by Jack Snyder's RAND essay on the dominant USSR. Ken Booth probably provides the most detailed definition of the concept, noting down that strategic culture "*refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.*" In short, strategic culture defines a set of patterns of a nation's behaviour on issues related to war and peace. Furthermore, it is derived from a nation's history, geography, and political culture, and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behaviour of influential parties (i.e., the political and military elites) (Booth, 1979:121).

As with many concepts alleged to have explanatory power, strategic culture lends itself to abuse; to be useful it has to be corralled and employed in a disciplined way or, at the least, it has to be used with an awareness of the pitfalls that await the unwary. Needless to say, we are interested not only in strategic culture, the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive national experience, but also in the national style in behaviour. In this paper, we will examine the role of culture and national identities that shape the political culture of the Modern Greek state, looking into two very famous case studies: the Imia incident and the Macedonian issue. After this review we will conclude with some policy proposals for constructing a model applied to Greek reality.

The Role of National Identities and National Perspectives

The role of identities has reappeared in the international relations' analysis and the examination of the states' national policies by the constructivist approaches in the last two decades. The introduction of the identities' role has been placed in the context of social practices, which were underestimated by the mainstream theories. Therefore, the reflectivist approaches and thus constructivism also concern about identity and interest formation (Wendt, 1992: 393) in a '*sociological social psychological form of systemic theories in which identities and interests are the dependent variable*' (Wendt, 1992: 394), introducing the solution of Giddens about the agent-structure problem (Zehfuss. 2002: 12).

The importance of identities' role derives from the perspective that the states are not rational actors in the international arena of the states-system and therefore the formation of the states' foreign policies is based on certain assumptions shaped by factors either from the 'systemic' or the 'sub-state' level. This suggests that in this work we will take into consideration the influence of both of the international society upon to identities and interests and also the internal sources of state identity.

Working on the role of identities and interests, which are nothing else than collective meanings, as Wendt argues (Wendt. 1992: 397), we can recognize their importance by the fact that '*the intersubjective constituted structures of identities and interests in the system*' connect structures to actions (Wendt. 1992: 401) and therefore give substantive explanatory tools of the states' actions. Furthermore, it is

the vicious circle of reciprocal interaction that forms the intersubjective knowledge in the framework of which states interact, appointing a shift of the established institutions difficult (Wendt. 1992: 407). Institutional transformations seem at least difficult, if not unfeasible, due to ‘systemic and “psychological” reasons’ (Wendt. 1992: 411). The anxiety that such shifts would bring and the cost of breaking commitments of the relative stable and already known structures intercept changes.

The goal would be to find the way out of the constraints of the so-called reality (Zehfuss. 2002: 36), the institutions in which states have set by themselves, otherwise, to ‘break the chain’ and stop the vicious circle of insecurity and conspicuousness. Such an aim cannot have as a starting point a unilateral action, either in domestic politics or in the system, without an equal response by the ‘other’. Therefore, unlike to Wendt’s work, we have to delve into domestic factors as well, in order to seek the trigger for institutions’ transformations, an argument, which is also recognized by Wendt (1992: 425).

Without bracketing systemic factors and international norms, social and legal norms within states and their relationship with culture, identities and states’ interests are of great importance in Katzenstein’s work about the shaping of national security policies (Reus-Smit. 2001: 220). After recognizing the two-sided relationship and influence between states and environments, our main aim is to draw attention to the effects that environments have on actors’ behaviour and identities (Katzenstein. 1996: 40-1). Setting as a starting point the international security environment instead of the domestic one, we can recognize three factors that influence states’ security policies. In particular, formal institutions or security regimes, world politics culture and international patterns of amity and enmity are the main factors that affect states’ identities and interests (Katzenstein. 1996: 34).

Initially, it is necessary to conceive the meaning of the norms and identities’ idioms. Norms are the established beliefs about the existence of certain actors in specific environments, as well as the beliefs about actors’ behaviour within these environments. Otherwise, norms either describe identities or prescribe behaviours (Katzenstein. 1996: 54). But what are the identities? To illustrate the implication of the term we have to delve into the existence of actors within an environment and its interrelations with the ‘other’. The term refers to the separation of the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ and the impression of uniqueness within the system of interaction.

Furthermore, identity can be the framework under which different constructions of nationhood and statehood are shaped (Katzenstein. 1996: 59). Even though there are probably no states that are consisted of only one ethnic group and therefore they embody several identities, the national ‘we-feeling’¹ – the common identity within a cohesive state society – that originally exists or has been created through the domestic institutions and hosts the identities of the social sub-state groups, has provided most of the societies of the developed world with close ties and relative coherence.

Having a concrete view of the concepts of norms and identities we can scrutinize how they affect the national security policies. There is dual effect of the norms. Initially, the first, suggests that ‘*Cultural or institutional elements of states’ environments (norms) shape the national security interests or security policies of states*’. The norms, otherwise collective meanings, given specific interests, ‘*change the transaction costs or information requirements for certain policies*’. They might

¹ The term ‘nation’ here should not be confused with the terms ‘peoples’ or ‘ethnic groups’. It is treated as the population of a state, in which the moral consciousness brings homogenous or relatively homogenous people to the decision to live in the same political entity [Renan, E., ‘What is Nation?’, in Zimmern, A., ‘Modern Political Doctrines’ (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp.202-5] or just in the meaning that the UN Secretariat provided, that nation is the constitutive population of a state [Musgrave, T., ‘Self-Determination and National Minorities’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.155].

also influence and transform interests themselves (Katzenstein. 1996: 54, original italics). However, norms are not permanent. Old and new norms compete with each other until a new cultural-institutional element of states' environment prevails, making new policies possible. Some interesting examples for the role of norms are the ones of the *'liberal reformers within the USSR'*, which led to a shift in the interpretation of the world order and that of the adoption of a defensive military doctrine by the French army in the interwar period, based on that country's culture² (Katzenstein. 1996: 56-7).

The second role of the norms is to shape a state's identity (*'Cultural or institutional elements of states' global, or domestic environments, shape state identity'*). Such transformations of states' identities might have their roots either in international or in domestic structures. For instance, states adopt different armament policies, which have often little to do with the real threats, based on the statehood that have enact (Katzenstein. 1996: 58, original italics). Such a shift is also well illustrated in Germany and Japan's cases, in which the global environment affected the *'domestic political process of reconstructing identity'* (Berger. 1996: 339, in Katzenstein. 1996, original italics).

Similarly with the dual effect of norms, there is also a dual effect of identity. *'Variation in state identity or changes in state identity, which affect the national security interests or policies of states'*, is the one effect. The process of security policy planning and making in a great degree arises from states' identities. Identities, shaped by the interaction with the 'other', develop states' interests³ and ultimately the national security policies. As a consequence, any change in states' identities leads to an analogous shift in interests and security policies (Katzenstein. 1996: 60-1, original italics). It appears that the starting point is the position of a state towards the 'other' and the perceptions and culture that such an interaction generates along with the already existing identity elements. Maoist Chinas' strategic culture illustrates the formation of perceptions towards the 'other' and the process of shaping the Chinese security policy (Johnston. 1996: .216-256, in Katzenstein. 1996).




Chart 1: The interaction that takes place between the states' identities and interests with the environmental structure and finally shape the national policies (Katzenstein. 1996: 53).

However, this aforementioned process appears to be a vicious circle with consequences to the international institutions. *'State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure'* (Katzenstein. 1996: 63, original italics). This implies that while exploring the whole progression, the already existing cultural and institutional structures cannot be marginalized. Such an attempt would have limited analytical merit.

² The term culture is generally contested, but in this work means the tools with which other actors and actions are evaluated and perceived.

³ Though, there are interests existing outside of social relationships and identities.

The cultural dimension- cultural distinctiveness in strategic thought and foreign policy

Culture constitutes of a new factor related to International Relations and Political Sciences' Studies. Up to now, culture exists as a reference (related to politics and not archeology and history) to bibliography mostly represented by the term of "cultural heritage". So, it would be better to distinguish the terms that refer generally to "culture"; Besides the term *culture*⁴ there is also the term *civilization*,⁵ but translated into Greek language, the meaning is one and unique: /*politismos*/. In the field of humanistic sciences there are some particular forms of culture in research. Studying Culture firstly under the frame of cultural diplomacy and cultural politics, the Otherness and cultural diversities, the political and strategic culture (all related to political theories) either studying culture as *civilization* or *civilizations'* "clash" (Huntington 1993: 22) one thing is documentarily obvious: Research on culture and its aspects is continually transformed, and a "cultural turn" (Valbjørn 2004: 2) is evident in its study. Relatively, Culture could be of research interest to International Relations through Cosmopolitan Culture, Global Culture, Diplomatic Culture, or Political Culture.

Culture's study in a more pivotal part, related to power and to today global Information Age (Nye 2004: 90), has been approached by the term of "soft power"⁶ (Nye 2004: 120). Contrary to the hard power's (military power) term, *soft* –or *attractive*- elements that affect interstates' policies and balances now exist. There are also two parts of culture connected to this pattern, *high* (art, literature, music and intellectual expressions) and *popular* (popular art, music, cinema,) *culture*. Therefore the role of soft power's variables, as this of culture, is increasing, so the states have been obliged to include these *attractive* (Nye 2004: 128) clues in their foreign policy goals in order to be easier not to *coerce* but to *set the agenda* by this soft behavior (Nye 2004: 31). So it is clearly defined that there is a need to study specific regional issues, not only from their economic, military, energy aspects, but also in the 21st century, by their cultural resources, such as history, religion, and language, adjusted to every state's separate region. Globalization has made non state actors to increase their influence in all boards of international politics, a fact that cannot be controlled today by any government (Nye 2004: 142).

Culture socially comprises the persisting and socially transmitted ideas, ideals, values, attitudes, traditions, habits or people's (patterns of) behavior. Foreign policies are formed by the governments and governments are elected by the people. Public opinion so actually "forms" foreign policy by "legitimizing" its leader's decisions. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, institutions and their behavior is shaped by their cultural preferences, commonalities and differences. It is proved so, *that culture represents the prominent criterion for the people in order to judge and decide*.

A state's foreign policy is normally followed by a national strategy. National strategy concludes a state's foreign policy goals and national interests. Each

⁴(a) Art, literature, music and their intellectual expressions of a particular society or time. (b) The customs, arts, social institutions, etc of a particular group or nation, (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, p.285, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995).

⁵ (a) An advanced and organized state of human social development. (b) a society, its culture and its way of life during a particular period of time or in a particular part of the world. (c) The human race, (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, p.202, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995).

⁶ Bibliography for soft power: Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft power*, 2004, Joseph Nye Jr., *Power in the global information Age*, Routledge, 2004, Joseph Nye Jr., "Propaganda isn't the way: soft power", (*International Herald Tribune*, 10 January 2003).

individual state's national political culture is continually being applied indirectly to its strategic culture, which forms its policy. Detecting and justifying a state's or a nation's special cultural features through the study of its policy and history, leads to find out some key points that produce wisdom for statecraft for the future as long-term strategy goals.

The Political Concept of Culture: The Tool of Political Culture

Understanding culture is more than “primordial differences” or “natural habits” with its physical relation to politics; the point is that that politics forms culture. Many scholars of comparative politics have written about culture as a defining feature of political outcomes. In 1980s, political scientist Aaron Wildavsky was a major voice in the “cultural” camp. Wildavsky wanted to develop a theory of culture that could explain political outcomes by positing “cultural rationality” (Wildavsky 1987: 3-21).

The political concept of culture is closely related to the concept of nation. Both emerged in the same historical period, developed in parallel and spread from Europe to all over the world⁷. Paul Gilroy speaks of a “fatal junction” of the concept of culture related to the concept of nationality (Gilroy 1995: 2). The formation of this unholy alliance which originated from Herder required a change in the concept of culture which pluralized culture in a way similar to the later reconceptualization by Boas within anthropology. Previously, culture was understood in the sense of ‘being cultured’. Culture was a value and a characteristic applied to individual and which was acquired by formation and education in the fullest sense (Markus 1993: 6ff.; Williams 1988: 88f). Culture referred to the goal in a process of development, a higher stage of being, which then, consonant with the latter understanding of Tylor, could not only be attributed to individuals but also to the human history in general. Culture was opposed to nature; it was the dimension which raised humanity above animals. In an anticipated evolutionism European culture was definitely culture in the purest instance, the final stage of the human kind development. But in an equally anticipated relativism, Herder demanded to refrain from claiming European superiority in the sense that only what was European could be cultured. Non-Europeans had culture too (Williams, *ibid.*).

Thereby the pluralisation of the concept of culture became necessary even if - as Markus emphasizes - Herder himself never used culture in plural (Markus 1993: 23). However, Herder at the same time started to objectify culture by distinguishing elements of culture (for example language, art, science, but also political and juridical institutions and economic systems, cf. Markus 1993: 19f.). Here too an implicit pluralization of culture occurred because all these elements exist only in multiplicity. Herder's equation of people (defined by culture) and nation (defined politically) finally produced the concept of the cultural nation (*Kulturnation*) - or national culture. Here, the political boundaries of the nation are conceptualized as congruent with the boundaries of the related culture. The individuals who belong to a nation do not only share a political system, a state, but also a culture. Considering the extremely successful career of the concept of the nation it is not at all surprising that cultural

⁷ Considering the dissemination of the concept of culture, Virginia Dominguez writes: "... I am further struck by the apparent success European countries have had over the past 100 to 150 years convincing the rest of the world that culture is a 'thing', that it has value, and that any self-respecting group or people must have it. People may contest the extent to which the content of culture must be European in origin in order to be of value, but they are still overwhelmingly buying into the elite European idea that there is such a thing as culture and that it is through culture that one's value is judged" (Dominguez 1992: 36).

boundaries are frequently taken to be just as clear and objectifiable as are political boundaries.

In more specific terms, we can look at the interaction of politics and culture through the concept of *political culture*. Political culture is defined by those elements of culture that reveal our attitudes or by behaviour toward political institutions and processes. Among the things we notice under the rubric of political culture are:

a) deference to authority; b) obedience to law; c) belief in the core values that constitute the political system; d) trust in political actors and agencies; e) the way and intensity of participation in political affairs; and finally f) an overall sense of “connectedness” with the political process.

Political culture refers to the distinguishing attitudes, habits, and behavior patterns that characterize a political community. Researchers of politics can observe important distinctions between the values and beliefs that dominate to a society. In the United States, for instance, there is a great emphasis placed on individual freedom. Other cultures may be more concerned of collective equality or less enamored with the idea of personal freedom. The concept of political culture exerts significant influence over the structure and behavior of society.

A political culture is significantly influenced by a number of factors. Climate, kinds of natural resources and population affect political culture’s frame. A nation’s historical experience and memory clearly shape its culture, as do its language, religion, art, literature, and social mores. Economics and geography also influence the cultural ethos. Cultural framework is important because it provides the fundamental agreement-and therefore trust-without which politics cannot advance into a civilizing process. It provides sound rules for the political game. This agreement on fundamentals does not require, however, that all citizens agree on all aspects of life.

International relations involve more than power politics among states. States’ interests and policies must be regarded at a deeper level; one needs to understand the culture that conditions policymakers and society into having such interests. Human beings, singly and collectively, comprise the source of all international politics (Hudson, 1997:5). Hence, studying culture is significant to understanding the similarities and differences in people’s experiences of political systems. Culture is understood as “any interpersonally shared system of meanings, perceptions, and values”. In this way, culture is a template for human action, ultimately explaining the driving force behind a nation’s identity and direction. Postmodernist studies suggest that all things “political” have their roots in broad systems of shared meaning (Hudson, 1997:10). Insofar as politics reflects the broader societal culture, political culture may be understood as “*all of the discourse, values and implicit rules that express and shape political actions and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another and ultimately provide a logic of political action*” (Hudson, 1997:10).

Political culture studies sprung from the cultural anthropology research of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Harold Lasswell, and others who sought to understand how children’ socialisation might relate to political identity. However, while such work influenced studies of ‘national character’ in the World War II, they soon proved unconvincing in explaining the political behaviour of Germany, Japan, and the United States (Almond, 1993:9-10.). By the 1980s and 1990s, political scientists retreated from reductionist tendencies and decided to research institutions, recognising the need to understand rational self-interest in comparative contexts of laws, rules, ideas, beliefs, and values, which explain the political identity of different countries. Thus, political culture studies are now more rigorously researched, including historical and descriptive analysis as well as important theoretical explanations allowing for a better understanding of economic growth and democratisation in different cultural contexts (Almond, 1993: 12).

The end of the Cold War highlighted the significance of cultural identity as tracked down in the hegemony of Western culture, capitalism, and liberal democratic order that was imposed on the culture of most societies (Murden, 2001:460). Democracy is said to require a distinctive set of political values in its citizens: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, and participation (Diamond, 1993:1, 8-10). However, a society's orientation towards democracy depends on their distinct culture. In this way, political culture involves the knowledge, beliefs, feelings, and value judgements of a political system (Diamond, 1993:8). Notably, political culture is not a static phenomenon but dynamically conditioned by such factors as economic change, civil society, institutional practice, the international climate of ideas, and national security. Indeed, the last of these introduces political culture's offshoot in the form of strategic culture. Nations display a distinctive and strategically evolving style of digesting the problems of national security: "Strategic realities are therefore in part culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated" (Booth 1990:124 quoted in Dellios, 1997:204). Differences in values are reflected in how culture influences economic development, with some cultures possessing distinct advantage because of their values.

The political culture of Modern Greece and the absence of strategic culture

Greece is a modern state established in 1832, a full member of the European Union (since 1981) and NATO (since 1952), but not actually belonging to the West. This comprises a fundamental question for Greece, while sometimes not following "western" foreign policies, such this of NATO's past intervention in Kosovo in 1999; and Greece's diplomatically support to the also Orthodox Serbians (Huntington 1996:

163). Greece's foreign policy towards its Balkan neighbors, Arab states is indeed deviant to Greece's allies and causes misunderstandings and sometimes also may engender crises. But what has affected political culture of a European Union member and a NATO ally to adopt such policies? Many western scholars allege that Greece does not consist of a clear Western state. But this is a reductionism of Greek political culture. The answer to that question is quite more complicated. But first of all, there must be a chronological separation to the periods that have formed Modern Greek political culture.

After the end of the World War II and before 1967 there was in Greece a "Right party fear" that was due to the civil war (1945-1949) *after* syndromes, but also the "Communist fear". Since 1967 a military junta governed Greece (April 21st 1967-1974) a fact that influenced Greece's modern political thought as few other matters (with that of Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 and the United Nations contemporaneous stance to that). After the "*colonel's*" government fall- because of the events in Cyprus- *Constantinos Karamanlis* flew to Athens from Paris, to become the first Prime Minister of the "*metapoliteysi*" period in Greece. The "right party fear" was increasingly high during all this period and that led to Karamanlis defeat in the 1981 national elections (after recent Greece's membership in the European Union as the tenth member) from the socialist party of *PASOK* and *Andreas Papandreou*. Orthodoxy and offensive stance of Greece against "*the danger from the East*" (meaning Turkey) characterize this period of Greece's history. New national disputes, as this of Macedonia appear, and Greece is unable to react properly, no matter which party controls the government, combined with nationalistic syndromes of the public opinion that stamped country's foreign policy.

After 1996, when *Constantinos Simitis* won the national elections there was a "*turn*" in foreign policy (firstly regarding Greece's relation to Turkey) but also domestically, with a direct conflict between the State and the Greek Church led by

Archbishop Christodoulos, a really charismatic personality and leader, for an identification cards issue (Kalyvas 2000). The end of this “fight”, unusual for the Greek social, religious and political status quo, was the “defeat” and pullback of the Church. The relation with Turkey, after the Imia Crisis on 1996, has been accommodated with the planning of foreign policy by Andreas Papandreou’ son, George Papandreou, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs (from 1997 to 2004) with the doctrine of foreign policy to have fundamentally changed (non state actors and their role have been upgraded and a *détente* approach to Turkey was a reality). This is the contribution of the last PASOK government (1996-2004).

The modern Greek state -and its political life- is characterized –unfortunately- by some detrimental aspects. Clientism, populism, introversion, religious nationalism, a “siege” mentality, economic protectionism and state corporatism are some of these. The reluctant aspects are the modernizing European forces, which have conducted to Greece’s integration to the European Union and in the Monetary Union and also are trying to disembarrass Greece from all these false characteristics of its political culture.

A factor that mainly affects Modern Greek political Culture is Orthodoxy. After the disjunction from the Patriarchate of Constantinople the Autocephalous Church of Greece has actually politicized religion that has influenced Greece’s national educational system. Greeks consider themselves as the “spear carriers of Christianity” (Huntington 1996: 193) that –unlikely the other European states- *have transferred their nationalism from a normal type of “civic” nationalism to a religious-Orthodox-one*. Greek students are brought up within a *Hellene-centric educational system that delineates an idol of modern-Classical Greece*. Greek education emphasizes on Classical Greece and its glory, Hellenistic Period with Alexander the Great and Macedonia and finally Byzantium. There are few references to Greece’s close past, as the period of Ottoman “Yoke” (1453-1821). This applies also as an issue of Greece’s modern foreign policy: past, present and –most important- the future relation with Turkey. In the Greek school books, superiority of the Greek against this of Turkish nation, combined with the icon of the Muslim, Asiatic, barbaric, power-hungry neighbor, has generated not only a stereotype in Greek society, too difficult to be surpassed, but also a foreign policy aspect that may explain Greece’s stance opposite Turkey during the last 30 years (with small brakes after 1996). The religious aspect of Greece’s national identity is an issue that cannot be discussed in this essay, but only to be referred, as a reality that attains Orthodoxy’s hegemonic status in the Greek political culture.

Greek foreign policy has transcended its drags and managed –during the last years- to modernize. European integration has softened foreign policy and broadened national security towards low politics and economics⁸. Greek modern political culture faces a dualism: the modern European section and the Hellene centric traditional one. Greece is also said to suffer from an “underdog culture”, because of Greece’s glorious historical tradition. Greece’s insecurity over its Balkan past and European future has bred a defensive attitude within the international institutions.

History and Mass Media in the Balkan region are interpreted in ways that banish actually cultural diversity and the “Otherness” by defending the national interests and promoting a national ideology that sometimes outflanks each state’s propaganda. In the case of Greek negative images of “the other”, stereotypes and “hate speech” cultivate a false sense of superiority. These syndromes in Greece are directed mainly towards the Macedonian issue and also through the relation to Turkey. A strategic culture’s absence from Greece is broadly viewed in these two

⁸ Political Culture and Foreign Policy: *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization* A NATO Fellowship Final Report.

paradigms: The decision making process and the national strategy during the Macedonian issue in the early '90s but more deliberately the crisis management in the Imia case in January 1996.

The Concept of Strategic Culture

The strategic culture thesis has its roots in a concern that was flagged informatively by Snyder. He wrote as follows:

"It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique "strategic culture." Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of "culture" rather than mere "policy." Of course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture" (Snyder, 1977: 5).

According to Gray the concept of strategic culture is a direct descendant of the concept of political culture, which has been debated, developed, variously employed, and even more variously defined by political scientists since the early 1950s (Kavanaugh, 1972). The idea of national style is derived logically from the concept of political culture: a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thought and action (Gray, 1984: 27). Strategic culture refers to a whole set of society of macro-strategic concepts. The basic contents of the society are identified by state decision-makers, and accordingly a long-term state strategic choice orientation is set up (Johnston, 1995: 32-64). Johnston believes that strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (i.e., causal axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-standing strategic preferences by formulating concepts of roles and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs (Johnston, in Katzenstein, 1996: 222). Strategic culture includes the basic assumption about the orderliness of the strategic environment and the state decision-makers understanding of the international conflicts and their resolving methods, especially the understanding concerning use of force. To a large extent, strategic culture decides strategic choice.

Basically, we can divide strategic culture into two categories: conflictual strategic culture and cooperative strategic culture. In order to make the concept of strategic culture operable, we can further define three kinds of recognition: Recognition of war, of conflict and of efficacy of use of force (Johnston, 1998: 9). As Johnston argues: "Different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree, by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites", (Johnston, 1995: 32-64). According to Longhurst, strategic culture today can be best defined as 'a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process (Longhurst, 2000: 200). Gray in his late works who defines strategic culture as: "the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience" (Gray, 1999: 51). Carnes Lord creates his own version of strategic culture not just in terms of military practice but in terms of the social, political and ideological characteristics 'centrally constitutive of a state'. Lord identifies six factors which created a strategic culture: the geopolitical setting, military history, international relationships, political culture and ideology, the nature of civil-military relations and military technology (Lord, in Longhurst, 2000: 303). Katzenstein used a mixture of

political-military cultural elements and based his theory on two main aspects of security- the cultural/institutional and the national identity dimension (Katzenstein, 1996). As Alan Macmillan suggests: “The decision making process in matters of defence is not an abstract construct based purely in the present moment but is, rather, steeped in the beliefs, biases, traditions and cultural identity of the individual country- all of which feeds into its strategic culture”(Macmillan, in Katzenstein, 1996). This culture is shaped by formative episodes in times of crisis and is highly influenced by experiences of the past. Furthermore, change in strategic culture is gradual in nature and is most likely to occur in the forms of adjustments so long as the core values stay intact. Beliefs, feelings, fears, aims, stereotypes, hate speech and ambitions are the unobservable aspects of each strategic culture. They are the core values that form the foundational elements of it, giving it its quality and characteristics. These foundational elements are derived directly from formative experiences and have been internalised, creating a fairly consensual or centripetal nature to the strategic culture.

Different scholars use different components in order to define strategic culture. For instance, Kerry Longhurst identifies three main components of strategic culture. The ‘foundational elements’ (basic beliefs regarding the use of force that give a strategic culture its core characteristics), the ‘security policy standpoints’ (the contemporary, widely accepted interpretations as to how best core values should be promoted through policy channels, in the sense that they set the preferences for policy choices) and the ‘regulatory practices’(the long-standing policies and practices that actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture’s core to the external environment) (Longhurst, 2000). On the other hand, Jones gives us an alternative account of strategic culture elements when he argues that there were three levels of inputs into a state’s strategic culture: a macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics and history, a societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society, and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations (Johnston, 1995: 32-64).

The Macedonian issue in the early ‘90s

The Balkan subsystem has been characterized centuries ago, by shifting boundaries, diverse traditions and cultural groups and, therefore, by numerous conflicts. The term “Macedonia” refers to a broader area which is actually being geographically shared by three states (Greece, FYROM, and Bulgaria). These actors raise different political and cultural claims in order to legitimize themselves and justify their “possession”. The “Macedonian” dispute is typical paradigm of the ethnic diversities and complexities that characterize the Balkan Peninsula.

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s raised an issue that was concealed for more than forty five years under the federation of that Balkan state; the Macedonian issue, which instantly came up with the declaration of independence by the *former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* having as a constitutional name ‘Republic of Macedonia’. The newly established state declared independence after the referendum that took place in the 8th September 1991, in which the Macedonian people and the rest of the population -Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities-, (Constitution of Republic of Macedonia. 1991: 1) decided the secession of the southern part of the former Yugoslavia. One would have expected Greece to play a crucial role, this of the arbitrator, thus confirming her regional role. A hypothesis far from reality; instead of acting as a mediator, Greece was contributing to the explosive potential of the region... Mainly, Greek Foreign Policy was suffering from what Christos Rozakis called as “*Macedonization*” of her foreign policy. The

use of term “Macedonia” involves a set of cultural elements. The use of these elements as distinctive features of the national identity of a new state does not premise a simple appropriation of the name, but rather an appropriation of the culture and the tradition this name signifies. Almost even every side of Greek political elite had become obsessed with the “name issue” and the alleged “Macedonian irredentism”. Hence, every policy decision had to take into account Greece’s intransigent attitude towards that latest arrival in Southern Balkan statehood. As a result, Greece ended up with only one “ally” in the region, Orthodox Serbia.

The analysis of the Macedonian issue with the constructivist approach aims at a better understanding of the emergence of a Modern Greek type of “nationalism”. The claims of Greece with reference to FYROM are based on cultural, historical and to a certain extent, geographical arguments. *Macedonia*, meaning the region where the kingdom of Alexander the Great started, has ‘a fundamental place in the Greek political psyche’ (Pettifer. 1992: 478). However, the claims of the other side, the so-called today Macedonians, referring to the people of the FYROM as descendants of Alexander the Great, colonized by a Greek-speaking elite class (Pettifer. 1992: 478), the use of an emblem of the Macedonian Empire as a flag and mostly chapters of the constitution of FYROM referred to Macedonians in the neighboring states, shattered the Greek society and the Greek authorities. Therefore, the majority of the population and authorities either neglected or undermined the role of the name Macedonia for the coherence of the newly established state, which until nowadays struggles in the difficult task of the nation-building (Roudometof. 1996: 253).

Albeit that, the Macedonian controversy is mainly of a political nature. The use of Greece’s historical symbols by a different nationality’s group, threatens the identity of the in-group. This led Greek people to redefine their sense of “We” in contrast to the “Others” which becomes a concrete outgroup, in this instance a weak and alone state, FYROM. They thus emphasize the distinctiveness of their culture and the uniqueness of their trajectory through history. Moreover, their arguments find their concrete expression in the numerous monuments and “poetic spaces” found within the Greek territory. By the course of time those ruins which became a second nature to the Greek landscape were “charged” with a new function: to serve as constant reminders of the nation’s descent (Smith, 1986).

The nationalist feelings of the population have however been manipulated by political parties as a campaigning device, namely as a means of discrediting one another while keeping the voter’s attention away from internal economic and social problems (Mouzelis, 1978: 135). A conservative government initially and later a socialist government simulated nationalist sentiments and simultaneously, acted to disorient the electorate in a period of economic and political crisis. National pride has systematically been emphasized in a political discourse which concentrates on the “injustice” caused by “foreigners”, i.e. FYROM or the international community. Thus, as often noticed, the glories of the past have been used to recompense for the failures and dissatisfaction of the present.

A rigid nationalist position was initially adopted by the conservative government of Constantinos Mitsotakis. The ruling party, which held a majority of one member only in the Greek Parliament, seems to have tried to increase its electoral appeal through the use of nationalist propaganda. Indeed, the government took up a number of cultural initiatives against the recognition of the “Republic of Macedonia”. Roundtables, workshops and public debates with the participation of the academic community and the media organised. Furthermore, the National Tourism Agency launched and advertising campaign promoting cultural trips to the Northern Greece, in the regions on Macedonia and Thrace. Nationalist messages written in English so that tourists would understand were stamped on T- shirts and stickers. “*First Learn History*” and “*The Spirit of Alexander the Great is Universal but his Homeland*”

Macedonia has been Greek for the past 3.000 Years”, were some of the most eloquent slogans.

The government’s initiatives were successful in mobilizing Greeks at home and abroad. A huge public rally took place in Athens in December 1992. Despite being organised by informal actors actually, this rally gathered approximately one million people. It seems that collective mobilization occurred quite spontaneously because of the perceived importance of the matter at stake. Another public demonstration was organised in Thessaloniki a few months later, as were others in most of the Greek diaspora communities in the US, Canada and Australia (Danforth, 1995). In parallel, the Greek argument has been disseminated in various ways from the Hellenic Diaspora all over the world, including full-page political advertisements in leading newspapers, travel advertisements inviting people to visit “Macedonia”, English-language material distributed by the Greek Embassies and pamphlets distributed in Greek Orthodox churches (Tsakonas, 1997). The adoption by Prime Minister Mitsotakis of a more flexible stance with regard to the Macedonian issue during the summer of 1993, was considered as a “nationally dangerous” behavior and led some MP’s from his party to withdraw from the government. Moreover a new party called “Political Spring” was created by the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs from Mitsotakis government, Antonis Samaras.

The disagreement between Greece and FYROM never really concerned the question of the name of the new republic as has been erroneously assumed. The real rivalry was always Greece’s refusal to recognize the existence of a Slavomacedonian ethnic group within (as a minority) and outside Greece’s frontiers (as a state). Greece’s foreign policy in the early ‘90s consisted and covert attempts to destabilize FYROM with the help from Milosevic’s Serbia, even from 1993.

Greece’s foreign policy on the Macedonian issue is plagued by serious contradictions and omissions. The first omission concerns the announcement from Greece the dogma of the “non-viability of multiethnic states”, the theoretical underpinning of its Balkan policy in the early ‘90s. The second contradiction in Greece’s policy towards Skopje consists in the fact that the Greek state refuse to recognise the existence of a Slavomacedonian ethnic group with its language, symbols and history. The contradictions and omissions that characterize the foreign policy of Greece towards Skopje are the result of the ideology of ethnic nationalism that has dominated Greek society since its inception. Abandoning the doctrine of “non-viability of multiethnic states” and recognizing at the same time the existence of a Slav-Macedonian ethnic group would have implications that would have had implications within Greece’s borders; recognizing the existence of a Slavomacedonian minority in Greece, whose existence would be vehemently denied. Such recognition would come up against to the templates of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic purity, which define Greek ethnic nationalism. In Greece, like in most states dominated by the ideology of ethnic nationalism, the “*right to exist*”, derives from the person’s belonging to the dominant ethnic group and not from his participation in the political community, his payment of taxes to the State or his obedience to the Constitution of the country.

The conflict between Greece and FYROM remains an unfortunate international dispute in a region that needs no further cause for unrest. The realities of politics and power have left it a debate characterised by resource to the legends of days gone by a battle of the historians. The brief attempt above at a legal analysis of the situation lends support to a prediction that the Macedonian issue will remain a political war of attrition, with a workable interim compromise perhaps stuck in the meantime on issues relating to the constitution and acceptable compound names.

The Imia Crisis

In January 1996 a group of Turkish “journalists” removed the Greek flag from the islet of Imia and hoisted a Turkish one. Greek troops immediately replaced the Greek flag. *Theodore Pangalos*, Greece’s Foreign Minister considered the affair closed until the Prime Minister of Turkey *Tansu Ciller* laid an official claim on that and many other Greek islets and commenced a confrontation that almost escalated to warfare. The crisis was defused through the intervention of US diplomats but yet another one item was added to the overburdened agenda of Greek- Turkish disputes in the Aegean (Veremis, in Keridis- Triantaphyllou, 2001: 44).

According to Wilkinson, Imia incident confirmed the Greeks' worst fears about broader Turkish assertions that undefined (“gray”) zones exist to Greece’s Aegean territorial waters. Athens adamantly denies any ambiguity and charges Ankara with infringing on non-negotiable sovereign Greek territory set by international treaties. Greeks uniformly interpret Turkish position as a new escalation and a demonstration of Turkey's “aggressiveness” (Wilkinson, 1999: 17).

Security dilemma, as a diagnostic and methodological tool of the realistic paradigm, refers to the notion that a state’s efforts to increase its security, by threatening another state which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state’s security (Jervis, 1978: 167-214). Ifanti’s analysis of the crisis seeks to reflect on the issue of the Imia crisis through the connection of the anarchic structure of the international system with the expansionist state conduct at the unit level of analysis. Charting the spiral of events that triggered the Imia case and brought the two countries to the edge of a war, he attributed this crisis to Turkish revisionism (Ifantis, 2002: 29- 48). Ifantis essentially voiced the view that the security dilemma in the Greek- Turkish conflict reflects a blend of inadvertent and deliberate types, being the product of two, seemingly contradictory, factors in combination. The Greek inability to consolidate the status quo and seek for security without being trapped in a dilemma of response, and the Turkish ability to maximize its power and secure more relative gains. In effect, according to Tsakona’s there exists a ‘deep security dilemma’, even though the implications could be contained or even ameliorated (Tsakonas, 2002: 10).

An offset to this argument, Ayman perceives in the Imia crisis a Greek effort to present a *fait accompli* with respect to what she calls a Greek expansionist policy in the Aegean (Ayman, 2002: 49-72). As a result, Turkey was forced to increase its security by arms built up, a fact that, thanks to the Greek ‘Greek non-security goals’, deepens the security dilemma further. According to Ayman, Turkey acted as a defender of the *status quo* who drew a line and tested – successfully- the validity of its deterrent strategy (Tsakonas, 2002: 10).

For both countries, the *Imia- Kardak* crisis marks the culmination of the uncertainty in strategic orientation of both countries in the post- Cold War Era. It is not easy to understand this crisis in materialistic terms; According to some scholars, it was a crisis over two tiny, barren islets inhabited only by goats. Indeed the challenge that this crisis posed for those who prefer to explain international relations in materialistic terms finds one of its most interesting expressions in the words of the US National Security Council Spokesman David Johnson: “*Sovereignty promotes people to do strange things*”.

The Imia crisis was an epitome of what Wendt calls the “*social construction of power politics*” (Wendt, 1992, 391- 425). This crisis cannot be understood without its social context. First, the historical reservoir of negative images, hate speech, prejudices and stereotypes about the “Other” is very critical in the emergence and escalation of the crisis. This is one of the main points in constructivist analysis of international relations, which puts a special emphasis on the social context of state behaviour (Kovert, in Kubakova- Onuf and Covert, 1998, 108). Similarly, it is

necessary to understand that Greece and Turkey are two countries which achieved their sovereignty as a result of the wars of liberation they fought against each other. The collective memory in both Greece and Turkey is continuously nourished by reminders of past enmity in history textbooks, literature and the media. These factors explain how a little island can turn into an issue of sovereignty bringing them to the verge of war (Millas, 1995). Second, it is important to consider the domestic context in explaining the Imia incident since the crisis coincided with domestic turbulence in both countries and a concern as to how the Western powers perceived this situation. The end of the era in which Greece led to growing concerns the West about the country's political stability according to the rise of Constantinos Simitis and the "modernizers" to the country leadership. Turkey was subject to similar concerns among Western partners due to the rise of Islamist politics, defined as one of the major threats to national security following the Welfare party's electoral victory in December 1995.

In this context, the Imia crisis can be seen partly as an effort by these two countries to disprove any domestic or Western perception that they were uncertain, unstable and weak at home or abroad. It is possible to argue that the failure of this attempt of reassertion was one of the strongest motives behind the "critical rethinking" in Greek and Turkish foreign policies.

Some have argued that Imia crisis strengthened negative perceptions and hostile feelings in both Greece and Turkey, thus bringing an increase in the security dilemma (Ayman, 1998: 111-119). It is possible to agree with this argument since the Imia crisis had a negative influence on Greek-Turkish relations, even promoting talk of a civilizational clash on both sides of the Aegean: Greece portrayed Turkey as "barbarian", "uncivilized" and "Asiatic." Turkey, on the other hand, argued that Greece was the "spoilt child of the West" (Lenkova, 1998) However, it is also possible to argue that the Imia crisis created the first motives toward a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. In other words, the crisis can be considered as a "blessing in disguise" since it generated strong pressure from the United States and the European Union, especially on Athens, to reach an understanding with Ankara, and compelled Simitis government to abandon Greece's long-held policy of 'no talks with Turkey' (Athanasopoulou, 1997, 97).

Policy Proposals for a Hellenic Strategic Culture

Contemporary international reality is characterized by the emergence of peripheral nationalisms and the reethnicization of politics (Calloni, 1995:96) which challenge the boundaries of the nation-state. The eclipse of the ideological discourse deprived entire societies from meaningful symbolic frames of reference, a development which certainly applies primarily in Eastern Europe. The development generated a vacuum which gave birth to syndromes of "romantic nostalgia" of old traditional values which provide a sense of collective security. The phenomenon is neither peculiar to the Southeastern Europe nor it is first manifested after 1989. Balkan nationalisms evolved first as ideologies which sought to reach the respective states came into existence. So nationalisms evolved first as ideologies which sought to reach collective ends, namely the generation of new nation states (Mouzelis, 1994: 37-39). More specifically, in the Balkans, where nations are perceived in ethnic terms, the states which succeeded the Ottoman Empire set the foundation for great illusions, namely that they represented ethnically homogeneous societies. In this sense, the "Others" were supposed to be outside the borders, and minorities within them were just neglected or disguised. Loyalty thus to the nation is interpreted as a form of symbolic support for a metaphysical essence which reflects the idealized "We".

A basic malign feature of Greek political culture is an “*afterwards*” approach to international processes and correlations, with an occasional and circumstantial approach to that result to a lack of credibility in Greece’s national foreign policy. Flexibility and efficiency in diplomatic maneuver should be based in a common and long term strategy plan. In the case of Greece there is no national interest, but national “matters” directly related with neighbors “scope” to Greek territorial, historical, legitimate and national rights.

Greek society is straightforward connected with the shaping and decision making, due to social effect to national political culture. Its aspects are fear for the foreign possible intervention to Greek national matters, a continuous threat for Turkey, and a “superiority” syndrome towards the foreigners, because of the glorious Greek classical culture. It is appropriate to underline the complex ethnic mix that characterizes Modern Greece. A major issue of international concern is the threatment of minority ethnic groups in Greece- Albanians, Turks and Slavomacedonians. Greece continues to deny the existence of all except a “Muslim Minority”, meaning Turkish speakers, and seems willing to acknowledge them only because they are specified in international treaties. There are also some who argue that potential unrest from its Slavomacedonian minority, or pressures for the return of exiled Macedonians to Greece and parallel for the resumption of confiscated lands. These aspects affect the decision makers as human (sociological and psychological factors) but also the client criteria and behavior of the Greek political system (policy makers, members of Parliament, rely on their electorate basis).

Colin Gray underlines three pillars, within which we should propose a national strategic culture: a) The concept of strategic culture is a useful tool for better understanding ourselves, others, and how others view us, b) Just as cultural awareness can enlighten, so the “fog of culture” can restrict understanding and c) Restricted understanding of the strategic culture of others can be very dangerous for international peace and security (Gray,1984:26). Thus, the classic Greek dichotomy between “Us” (Greeks) and “Others” (non-Greeks) is currently used within a new context. In antiquity it had served to distinguish between the Greek civilization and the “barbarian” populations⁹. In contemporary times the dichotomy acquired a new character. During the past two centuries the Turks have become the salient outgroup. Memories of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the Imia crisis are still too recent. In the early ‘90s, FYROM seemed to have the potential to also be identified as a significant “Other” given also its religious and political affiliations with Turkey (Poulton, 1995:203). A Hellenic strategic culture should be characterized from the break of the civic stereotypes and negative images of the “Others” and parallel the humanisation of the “Other”. Proposing a Hellenic Strategic Culture we should to assert the following potential benefits:

- An improved understanding of our own, and other, cultures in local terms.
- An improved ability to discern enduring policy motivations and to make predictions.
- An improved ability to communicate what is intended to be communicated.
- An improved ability to understand the meaning of events in the assessment of Others.

Greece is expected to have a special strategic culture because of its nature of foreign policy. State formation implied that state’s army had an important role to play in forming the identity of each state. However, Greece’s strategic goals should put on soft elements in external relations. We should also take into consideration that the division between ‘high’ and ‘low’ foreign policy has been blurred by latest

⁹ Those not enlightened by Greek thought, culture and civilization.

developments in the field with new works from scholars aiming at bridging the gap between the two camps. However this does not limit its role in strategic culture. For instance, it may be the case that a Hellenic Strategic Culture, although deals with questions of security and defence, is still based on the idea of the projection of the Greece as a primary civilian power. This can be also derived as a conclusion when the Hellenic Strategic Culture is studied in detail in terms of military power the use of force will likely resemble that of the doctrine of just war: military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law, and the use of force will be severely constrained.

- *Indemnity of continuance and consequence in the national strategy lining and national policy planning*, regardless of the governmental and political rotation. For the case of Greece, a creation of a National Policy and Strategic Plan. The enactment of a permanent, independent, Advisory Committee of National Strategy, Policy and Security, and parallel upgrade of the Council of Foreign Policy.
- *Cosmopolitanism, Modernization and Democratization of Greece's foreign policy*. Multilateralism in the diplomatic level, erasing the bureaucratic politics from the decision making process and parallel resetting of the agenda of Greece's Foreign Policy through the alternative types of diplomacy. Scientific approach to all national political matters, by recruitment of all governmental bodies, and contemporaneous staffing in all these institutions with members from the International Relations academic community. Adoption of a more "aggressive" foreign policy planning and win-win approaches to cases of national interest.
- *Utilization of Greece's "soft power"*. Greece has the ability of promoting its cultural characteristics, from which is most known in the global environment, that will allow the country to be more "attractive" and not so "cumbersome" as she is for all these years of national "tragedies". Greece should exploit the use of its development co- operational policy and economical diplomacy in the Balkan and Mediterranean subsystems such as to stabilize her role as regional power. Bilateral cooperation to further development, humanitarian aid, and the protection of human rights should be key principles to Greece's foreign policy. In parallel Greece should export its *know-how* on various issues concerning the European aquis. Besides, as a member of International and Interstate Organizations and Fora- i.e. the Presidency of the Security Council of the UN in July 2005- Greece could reach a more aggressive policy assisting its neighbors' effort to streamline and parallel to achieve better conditions and platforms for negotiations in case to provide the resolution of its National Cases. The ultimate national goal should be Greece's nomination to a regional power and as Peace and Stability guarantor in the Southeastern subsystem. . In the framework of the Balkan Stability Pact, Greece should take important initiatives to promote regional stability, by creating networks of cooperation, and by taking steps to actualize regional reconstruction.
- *Rationalization of Decision Making Process and in Crisis Management*. A creation of a backdrop for decision taking process and crisis prevention and of a permanent action mechanism for crisis analysis, interpretation and management. Gradual suppleness and bureaucracy casting out, in the decision making procedures. High risk policy specialists, analysts and advisors contribution educated for that purpose should be reached.
- *Europeanization and Socialization of Greece's Political Culture*. Minimization of the State interventionism, liberalization of the process of

decision making. Strengthening of the Civil Society and the Non State Actors -that apply to foreign policy matters- networking, after an immediate sorting out period from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- *The step-by-step social shifting of Sovereignty, Stereotypes, Syndromes and Negative images.* Attempt for humanizing the “Others”. Minimize the social phenomenon of “hate speech” (i.e. anti-Americanism, anti western syndrome). A more realistically and modern approach to educational system as a whole, but also in the role of the Mass Media. Including family, there should be a constructive and long term approach to the Others from these social factors that contribute to the new generation national cultural characteristics. The assistance from social sciences that apply to social matters (sociology, psychology) is necessary.
- *Reestablishment state and church relations.* Under a common platform from dialogue, this acute relation of the last years must be reexamined and approached under a new legal status quo, toward the best of the Greek political, legal and economical system.

Conclusion

In summary, Greek national identity has been reconstructed through the territorialization and politicization of ethnic and cultural traditions. Ethnic customs, linguistic ties and religious beliefs have been transformed into national sentiments. According to Smith’s distinction between ethnic and territorial nations, the Greek national community belongs clearly to the former type. Thus, any questioning of the “Hellenicity” is perceived as a threat to the very essence of the nation because it casts doubt on the continuity of the national community through history. Analysing the case of a Hellenic Strategic Culture we can highlight the Greek claims of “property” over certain cultural traditions and more specifically, the relationship between these claims and the ethno-cultural character of Greek national identity, also we can underline the cyclicistic strategic manipulation of these nationalist feelings by the Greek political elite. The role of political and cultural myths in redefining national identity and in drawing the boundaries, symbolic and territorial, between “Us” and the “Others” is investigated. The problems that may arise from such an ethnic conception of the nation state are discussed and as a “window of opportunity” a “constitutional model of patriotism” can be proposed as an alternative solution.

Conclusively, Greek public opinion and society reflects its cultural characteristics in Greek national foreign policy. Regarding also the term of national “matters” (Cyprus, Macedonia, Aegean Sea) and not national interests, demonstrates the dominance of domestic beliefs, priorities and policies and the possible political repercussion to any decision concerning foreign policy matters. The costs of this unconventional behavior of Greece is a static and no dynamic approach to today interdependent states’ relations and a simultaneous jostle for Greece from the international fora.

The republican tradition seems no longer able to provide solutions to conflicts emerging either at a local or an international level. Contemporary reality requires citizenship not to be restricted to groups which claim to be ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Greece may therefore reflect on the content but also on the form of its national identity. The heritage of the classical period, the ancient polis and the prototype of the Athenian democracy may become a stimulus for a critical reflection on the present situation. The past may be integrated into the present in a creative manner. Selective forgetting is a strategy which helps to reconstruct an idealised past

but does little for the future. The cultural heritage and the identity of a nation may be better preserved through peaceful collaboration and recognition of diversity rather than through rejection of the “Other”. Greece’s foreign policy and national strategy objective is clear: to carry forward fundamental, dynamic initiatives in order to establish a framework of principles and rules, of justice and democracy, which will take effect throughout our region. Greece is, and will continue to be, a model of democracy, stability and cooperation for the region. Greece’s regional policy is, in a sense, the answer to the new challenges of globalization. Greece’s inclusive foreign Policy in the 21st century needs economic, environmental, educational, and cultural dimensions too. The foremost political priority for Greece in the ever changing world of the 21st century should be the consolidation of cultural and educational diplomacy.

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