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‘The human geography of PASOK: 1974-1981

Abstract (research in progress)

INDRODUCTION

The research project focuses on the democratization period and the creation of PASOK up to party’s victory in 1981 elections. For the period under examination the ‘*PASOK phenomenon*’ had been studied in terms of its populist ideology, organizational particularity, or A. Papandreou’s ‘charisma’¹. In the literature about political parties PASOK is considered an exceptional case as it managed to reach power so fast. The present effort is trying to add to the relevant literature a new perspective focusing on the importance of the party’s organizational base that enabled the rise to power in 1981. It is the first academic research concerning PASOK’s creation and success that is expanding the level of analysis to the party’s supporting base. The leading hypothesis is that PASOK had the opportunity to redefine those social cleavages that divided Greek society. We do not claim that it was a unique factor that changed Greek society. Political parties have a dialectic relationship with society. What is implied is that the redefinition of political cleavages through party discourse and political practices proved effective for the integration of members and voters.

In some cases the redefinition served, through the post-junta period, as unification factor in a country marked by political divisions. As the only new party in the political spectrum people didn’t have a clear idea about its political profile, in contrast with the pre-junta parties with which the electorate was already identified². PASOK didn’t follow the traditional political divisions, as those between liberals and monarchist or left and right, and managed to integrate supporters through its political discourse with even contradictory interests. Through the first post-junta years the

¹ -I. Papadopoulos: “Dynamique du discours politique et conquete du pover: Le cas du PA.SO.K. 1974-81” Editions Peter Lang, Berue 1989.

-G. Mavrogordatos: “Rise of the Greek sun”, Center of Contemporary Greek Studies, London: King’s College, 1983.

-M. Spourdalakis: “The rise of the Greek socialist party” Routledge, 1988.

-Lyrintzis, Ch. (1984), ‘Between socialism and populism: the rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA.SO.K.)’, PhD thesis University of London LSE.

-Elephantis, A. (1981), “PA.SO.K. and the elections of 1977: The rise of the populist movement”, in Penniman, H.R. (ed.) *Greece at the polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

² Mavrogordatos, G. (1984), ‘The Greek party system: A case of limited but polarised pluralism?’, *West European Politics*, vol.7 no.4: 156-169.

consolidation of the young democracy was insecure. An incitement of the social cleavages, especially concerning those groups at the periphery of the political system, could prove disastrous for the consolidation process. The unification role was a prerequisite for the creation of a large 'tank' in which PASOK could find its future voters and supporters. The significance of this role becomes more obvious taking under consideration the importance of political parties in Greece as the only institutions that could guarantee democracy, in contrast with other southern democracies where military, church or the bourgeois served the same goal.

A second analytical dimension is to specify the different conceptions of the supporters of the Greek periphery about PASOK's political thesis and programme that brought it to power. For that reason we are trying to investigate the social characteristics of the party's supporters in terms of education, social status, family political background and age. The social characteristics are understood through the different political and historical perspective of each geographical area. This process is necessary in order to follow the evolution of the social cleavages in Greece and their dialectic relationship with the political parties. It is a presupposition for the understanding of the policy issues that have been important and gave the base for support of PASOK in each periphery. The aim of the research contributes to the creation of a map concerning the human geography of the organizational and electoral base of the party in terms of social characteristics and to the provision of the empirical data that were missing for the study of PASOK.

For this reason the project examines three peripheries Florina, Mytilini and Hrakleion, characterized by different historical experiences and the related social cleavages. Florina has been selected as a periphery with a conservative and right wing electoral behaviour, seriously affected by the civil war, experienced violence, suppression of political freedoms and massive immigration. Furthermore, in Florina coexist the local part of the population characterized by the Slavic dialect and a large percentage of refugees from the Asia Minor. The conflict between the two parts offered the opportunity to study PASOK's role in relevance to social cleavages in more dimensions. Mytilini is one of the peripheries characterized by a high percentage of leftist vote that didn't get affected after the civil war, as it is normally the case. For this reason it offers the opportunity to follow the creation of PASOK's character in a place that leftist political tradition has been hegemonic. Heraklion was a typical centrist periphery following the Venizelist tradition. In this periphery the question under examination is the way by which PASOK managed to distinguish itself from the centrist political family and to win its supporters.

The party's organizational character, in each periphery, was different adjusted to local history and social composition. Pre-junta parties had a shaped image through the country, more or less unified and identified by historical political choices. They had a political record from which they couldn't escape. PASOK's party functionaries had the flexibility to adjust party's image to the local political culture much more easily. The working process for the creation of the party branches, the local political campaigns, the political discourse, the way that party functionaries interacted with each other, the process for the integration of new members, were seriously affected by the 'microclimate' of each geographical area. As a result several different types of party branches co-existed into PASOK's organization. We propose that this aspect had served as a unification factor for the country and for the integration of different social categories, even those existing at the periphery of the post-junta political system.

The methodology in use is interdisciplinary combining research tools from social anthropology and political science. Local history and culture, local political identities, study visits and extended interviews from key persons and party functionaries of the period but also from party supporters from remote villages, are in use. The systematic analysis of the archives of PASOK's Organization Sector, that have never been conducted before by any academic researcher, electoral results and relevant statistical data, in combination with the local press, are providing the main sources in order to investigate the leading question. We propose this approach as a methodological contribution that is trying to follow a path of research characterized by a 'bottom-up approach'. Besides the management of the party's image at the national level and the efficiency that it had in electoral gains, it was the political activity of the party functionaries in each periphery that created the party image at the local level through a network of interpersonal relations. Since the direction followed by the academic researchers has followed the 'up-bottom approach' there were several questions about the party character that were solved by employing 'common sense' or intuition because of lack of evidence. It is on this point that the present project contributes, in methodological terms.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis is based on the sociological model of explanation, which focuses on the relationship between social groups and political parties. Different parties represent different groups with different interests. Interacting with citizens and interest organisations, parties organise political demand and support in relation to social cleavages³. The social nature of political parties is interpreted through two variables: underlying cleavages and political discourse; that is the extent to which the political issues raised by the party corresponded to distinct social interests⁴. A cleavage is a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organisations among whom conflict may arise. The concept of cleavage is not identical with the concept of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but they do not need always be attended by conflict⁵. In the case of national politics, however, we take the view- following Lipset's and Rokkan's lead- that political parties construct their ideology and organise themselves by emphasising certain cleavages, through which the alignment of the electorate takes place. However, explaining parties by cleavages is in danger of becoming circular: we explain parties by cleavages, but we assess the political relevance of cleavages by the existence of corresponding parties. Parties are not just passive repositories of social cleavages but autonomous actors that also play a large part in defining them.

In the present research focus is mainly on historic and economic cleavages. One can identify the existence of main cleavages in Greece such as: i) refugees versus natives (ethnicity and class); ii) old Greece versus new lands; iii) Orthodox Greeks versus

³ Lipset S. M. and S. Rokkan (eds.), (1990), *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross national perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

⁴ Spourdalakis, M., (1992), 'A petty bourgeois party with a populist ideology and catch- all party structure: PASOK', in N. Merkel et al., *Socialist Parties in Europe II*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques I Socials.

⁵ Lane, J. E. and S. O. Ersson (1987), *Politics and society in Western Europe*. London: SAGE, p.39.

minorities (nationality, ethnicity, and religion)⁶. The strongest political divisions that the entire country experienced were those between liberals and monarchists through the mid-war period and between left and right during and after the civil war. In the same time there were secondary cleavages that were particularly important in certain peripheries on the base of characteristics such as ethnicity, community or religion.

Particularly in the Greek case the political influence of patron-client ties should be noted. Patron-client ties typically mask, modify, or even neutralise class cleavages and establish vertical and interclass links. Clientelism may also develop and function within the limits or constraints set by the major cleavages. This is so because patrons and clients may well share certain social identities -such as kinship, ethnicity, religion, community, region, rural residence- which place them in the same camp as others identified, along some dimensions of potential social conflict⁷.

2. SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The roots of the most important cleavages in Greece are to be found in two successive historical conflicts of the previous century. The first was the ‘national schism’ between Venizelists and Antivenizelists over Greek participation in the First World War, which was transformed and perpetuated in the inter-war period as an irreconcilable conflict between republicans and royalists. The second was the schism between the bourgeois parties and a Communist-dominated left, which erupted during the Second World War and culminated in the Civil War of 1946-49. The succession and super-imposition of these two historical cleavages has produced a deeply rooted and lasting division into three political camps or ‘families’, the centre, the right and the left, as they have been called since the post-war period⁸.

On the eve of the dictatorship, in 1967, each of these three historical political families had been assembled under the roof of a single party: the Centre Union (EK), the National Radical Union (ERE), and the United Democratic Left (EDA) respectively (the latter effectively controlled by the Communist Party). A short time before the 1967 coup, the Centre Union’s centre-left faction led by Andreas Papandreou emerged as a radical force representing newly mobilised groups. The so-called ‘*apostates*’ government marked the beginning of a period of governmental instability, and at the same time sparked off a process of political radicalisation which found a symbol and a leader in Andreas Papandreou, son of George Papandreou, who had entered Greek politics in 1964. The elections scheduled for May 1967 were expected to result in a comfortable majority for the Centre Union dominated by its centre-Left faction led by Andreas Papandreou.⁹ This faction became in the middle

⁶ Mavrogordatos (1984), op.cit.

⁷ Scott, J. (1972), Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, p. 10.

⁸ Mavrogordatos, op.cit.

⁹ The appeal that Andreas Papandreou had even from the 60’s is evident in an opinion poll for March of 1967 in Athens (*Anti*, 3 December 1977, vol.87:6), about the electoral behaviour of the Greek voters before the arranged elections. The central question designed to measure the appeal of the politicians was: “Lets suppose that it was up to you to choose the next Prime Minister. Despite the party that is going to win the elections, who is the one that you would like to see as Prime Minister after the elections?” The outcome was 21% for K. Karamanlis, 16% for Andrea Papandreou, and 13% for George Papandreou. It is obvious that the appeal of A. Papandreou was higher than for his father and that already most of the supporters of the Centre Union wanted to see him and his centre-left faction dominant. In the question “Who of the present politicians do you believe is going to rule the country

60's the representative of the newly mobilised radical forces - the middle and lower classes that became ready to shift their allegiance towards parties that advocated policies, which seemed beneficial to their interests. Since the communist left had no real chance of gaining power, the centre-left emerged as the only force whose message - consistent and quite radical for the standards of that period - rallied support for 'democracy' and social and political reforms. The military coup of April 1967 pre-empted such an outcome and temporarily destroyed any hope of political change¹⁰.

What dictatorship did not destroy was the centre-left as a political force. Most of its leading members, together with new political activists, joined the 'Panhellenic Liberation Movement' (P.A.K.), one of the major resistance organisations, founded by Andreas Papandreou in May 1967. During his absence abroad through the dictatorship, Andreas Papandreou dissociated himself and PAK from the Centre Union and chose not to take the leadership of the party after the death of his father - George Papandreou, the leader of Centre Union- in 1968. Instead he concentrated his efforts on making PAK an effective political force with a radical programme for change, which could become the basis of a new political party.

On his return to Greece, A. Papandreou refused to join a refounded Centre Union. Instead he founded PASOK as a new political party, which distinguished itself from both the old centre and the traditional left. PASOK was the only new party in the elections of 1974, a fact that determined the priorities the party would have during the first years of its existence. The priorities were first the creation of a strong identity (it was the only party that people did not have clear ideas about), the creation of channels of communication with different classes, and the expression of the hidden radicalism of the people¹¹; and, parallel to this, the construction of a strong organisation. PASOK's organisational structure and practice has been the key to keeping its diverse social and political base in functional unity¹².

Transformation of an old cleavage

It has been supported that the cleavage between the right and the democratic forces of the pre-dictatorship era was transformed into an 'anti-right / pro-right' cleavage in the 1970's¹³. The reasons for that were not only the experience of the dictatorship and the economic developments of the period, but also the experience of the post-civil war years. It was a common place for the anti-right forces (PASOK, EDIK, KKE, and KKE interior) that they should co-operate -whereas not in election level- in order to create the image of the right as the 'enemy'. Effective electoral political discourse of this period demanded strong opposition and conflict with N.D. The forces that had

for the next years?" the outcome was 30% Andreas Papandreou, 12% K. Karamanlis, and 2% George Papandreou.

¹⁰ Lyrintzis, Ch. (1984), 'Political parties in post-junta Greece: A case of bureaucratic clientelism?', West European Politics, vol.7 no3: 97-118.

¹¹ - V. Papandreou, interview contacted in Athens 7/1998. Vaso Papandreou, was a member of the committee charged with the development of ideology during the seven years under examination and chaired it from 1979 to 1982. She was a minister in PASOK governments and also on the European Commission from 1988 to 1994.

-K. Skandalidis, interview contacted in Athens 7/1998. Kostas Skandalidis, was Secretary of the Central Committee of PASOK and during the years under investigation a functionary in the party organisations concerned with youth and university students.

¹² Spourdalakis, M. (1994), 'The telling story of a unique organisational structure', Academic paper, p. 165.

¹³ Moschonas, G. (1996), 'Perceptions of the "Right" and anti-right syndrome: The division "Democratic Forces-Right"1974-1981', Parliamentary Review, issue 25-26:71-104 (in Greek).

less aggressive attitudes towards the right (EDIK, KKE interior) lost in electoral terms, whereas PASOK and KKE became the main representatives of people's frustration. The conflict arose along three main lines: social issues; the international place and orientation of the country; and the democratization of the political system¹⁴. PASOK tried to be at the forefront of this 'political family'. The issue of cooperation of the democratic forces was dominant, and several appeals for cooperation can be found in the party's official press and the brochures of this period. But at the same time PASOK did not lose any chance to stress that 'electoral co-operation has no meaning'¹⁵.

One can also claim that it was K. Karamanlis that helped to create the image of PASOK as the main anti-right wing party. As G. Notaras, leading party functionary of the period, pointed out: "*it was Karamanlis that, by facing PASOK as his main opponent, made it seem the most reliable opposition*"¹⁶. New Democracy sought to convince the electorate that PASOK was a threat to liberal institutions and that '*PASOK's victory would lead to chaos and possibly to Communism*'. Thus, New Democracy intensified the polarisation between the two camps and turned elections into a straight choice between right and left. As the elections were to prove, this strategy benefited in the long run PASOK rather than ND¹⁷. Moreover, Karamanlis' move to the Greek presidency in 1980 was a guarantee for stability and thus ND's propaganda became less effective¹⁸.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF PASOK

On September 3rd in 1974, Andreas Papandreou together with his close associates of the pre-dictatorship period and cadres of the resistance organizations - *Democratic Defense* and the *Panhellenic Liberation Movement* (PAK) – announced the foundation and 'Declaration of Principles' of the *Panhellenic Socialist Movement* (PASOK). Subsequently, PASOK showed spectacular organisational growth. It succeeded in rallying a significant number of politicians of the former Center Union and Communist left. It did the best job of mass mobilisation compared to any party of the left. PASOK's election rallies and Papandreou's public appearances were invariably occasions for mass demonstrations with pronounced youth participation.¹⁹

¹⁴ Moschonas 1996:88, op. cit.

¹⁵ See, for instance: 'Common attitude of the parties in front of the national danger of joining the E.E.C.', *Exormisi*, 28 January 1977; 'The democratic co-operation became reality', *Exormisi*, 10 December 1976.

¹⁶ G. Notaras, interview. Contacted in Athens 7/1998. Gerasimos Notaras, is a sociologist, and a professor of the French Ecole Politique et Sciences Sociales. He is not currently a member of PASOK; he was expelled in 1976 together with about a fifth of upper level functionaries of PASOK, in a Papandreou's effort to secure his own ideological hegemony and 'purity'. He was also one of the founders of the 'Democratike Amina' (Democratic Defence), one of the most important resistance groups during the dictatorship.

¹⁷ Lyrantzis, Ch. (1983), 'The rise of PASOK: The Greek election of 1981', *West European Politics*, vol.5.

¹⁸ Mavrogordatos, G. (1983), *Stillborn Republic: Social coalitions and party strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*. University of California Press, p. 24.

¹⁹ Referring to the youth mobilisation K. Karamanlis declared before the elections "We should not be afraid of PASOK. They have a lot of people, but their people do not vote." Meaning that many of PASOK's supporters were under the age limit for voting.

However, the vitality of PASOK's electoral rallies and the apparently positive responses to the Movement were not translated into votes, at least in the first elections of 1974. Even so, seventy-five days after its creation it won 13.5 percent of the vote and 13 seats, claiming third place in the parliament. According to the party functionaries²⁰ interviewed impressions from the period: "*PASOK was very radical for the democratisation period and even if people wanted to vote for it they were afraid that if the PASOK won the elections the U.S. was going to impose a new coup. That is why they preferred the safe way of K. Karamanlis who was U.S.'s beloved*".²¹

In the elections of 1977 PASOK's share arose to 25 percent (93 seats). Its success came largely at the expense of the declining Center Union, which split into factions shortly after. PASOK's slogan of 'change' struck a cord with the Greek people's search for a new way after forty years of conservative rule²².

In the 1981 elections, PASOK swept into power with 48 percent of the popular vote (172 seats). Between the 1977 and 1981 elections, PASOK and its leader continued to move away from its initial image as a Marxist-based, class-oriented party, in order to reassure centrist voters. The election result meant that, for first time in Greek history, an explicitly left-wing party held the reigns of government.

4. ORGANISATION

A fundamental fact about PASOK's organisation is that it served as a medium through which Papandreou maintained complete control of the party's political course²³. Thus, although the party constitution extols at great length the virtues of democratic procedures, in practice members were essentially excluded from participation in decision-making. The organisational structure of PASOK was almost identical to those of communist parties. Differences concerned the role of the party president and the role of the parliamentary group.

Its founding document – 'Declaration of the 3rd of September 1974' – promises amongst others, an intra-party 'democratic procedure'; a commitment of a democratic organisation based on a decentralized concept of membership participation. Before the 1974 elections PASOK made an open appeal to the 'Greek people' for self-organisation. This appeal was remarkably successful and the movement rapidly acquired a nation-wide organisational network. Grass roots organisations of the movement mushroomed in all urban centers, even in large villages, in all trades and professions, in trade and student unions. The party structure also proved very effective in organising support and validating the claim that the party was not based,

²⁰ K. Skandalidis, interview, op. cit.

V. Papandreou, interview, op. cit.

²¹ The Central Committee of the party declared on 22/11/1974 that "the reasons for the low percent of 13% were 1) the fake dilemma 'Karamanlis or tank', 2) the sudden way that the elections took place and the electoral law, 3) the slander rumors that created insecurity, and 4) the political mistake of those who by participating in this government legitimated it (here the functionaries of the Centre Union are implied)". *Agonistis*, 3 December 1974(3):1-15.

²² Spourdalakis, M. (1995), 'Securing democracy in post-authoritarian Greece: The role of political parties', in Lewis, P. and Pridham G. (eds.), *Rooting fragile democracies*. London: Routledge, p.78.

²³ Elephantis, A. (1981), 'PASOK and the elections of 1977: The rise of the populist movement', in Penniman, H.R. (ed.), *Greece at the polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, p. 122.

like the others, on networks of patronage²⁴. The present research is focusing on the effort for self-organisation in three peripheries and is following the procedures followed in local and central level for the creation of party branches.

PASOK carried the heritage of three resistance 'generations'. The 1940's anti-fascist movement; the 1960's generation which fought against the crown's unconstitutional initiatives and generally sought the termination of exclusionist post-civil war political practices; and the generation of the resistance against the regime of junta. Functionaries from these generations formed different tendencies: the 'left', the 'conformist', and the 'technocratic' tendency²⁵. As K. Skandalides claims: *'Each one of us, during this period, was defining 'socialism' according to his/hers experiences.'* This flexibility in the interpretation of ideological terms was stronger among party functionaries and supporters in local level.

PASOK's organisational development strategy constructed after the 1974 elections. Although under different circumstances the result of 13 percent would have been considered a victory, many in the movement were shocked.²⁶ It was then that the leadership seems to decide that the party had to seek power at a much faster pace. This meant a gradual but steady undermining of its promise to develop along the lines of a mass democratic and institutionalised party, capable of braking away from the traditional patterns of political mobilisation. The decision to expedite the pursuit of power, regardless of the cost for the party's intra-democracy, was accompanied by a watering down of its radicalism. It was during this period that 20 percent of the upper party functionaries and members of the Central Committee were expelled. As Gerasimos Notaras, who was one of them, notes:

"Our differences with Papandreou were not at ideological level. It was just that he wanted to gain the power right away and for this reason he had to 'please everybody' avoiding conflicts with every social category that could support the opponent parties. It was not even that we disagreed about organisational rules. Papandreou did not want intra-party rules because they could destroy his plan for the fastest possible raise in power" (interview).

Since then, PASOK's story became a series of internal crises and splits.²⁷ Every internal crisis resulted in a further consolidation of unprincipled organisational practices and consolidation of power in the hands of A. Papandreou and the Executive Bureau, which he had appointed. PASOK's organisational strategy had as a central goal the quantitative expansion of its members at any cost. In the party document *'Proposal for the future organisation march of the movement'*,²⁸ the whole concept of the Movement's organisational development is based on achieving a certain ratio between electoral support and membership. It is a document full of numerical examples and a complete absence of any statements concerning the principles

²⁴ Spourdalakis, M. (1995), 'PASOK's second chance', *Mediterranean Politics*, n. 3:1-33.

²⁵ *Anti*, 12 May 1979, vol.125:18-19.

²⁶ Interesting here is the testimony of G. Notaras (interview) who was with A. Papandreou on election night: "A. Papandreou was so disappointed that he did not even want to make a public appearances on the election night. He could not believe that PASOK was not even the leading opposition. We almost forced him to appear on the T.V." Similar events in Spourdalakis, 1988:91, and Kouloglou, 1986:17.

²⁷ For a detailed analysis of the significance of these crises see: M. Spourdalakis, 'The rise of the Greek sun' 1988, p.114-162.

²⁸ Proposal for the future organisational march of the Movement, Athens: December 7, 1977.

governing these recruitments. The enunciation, during the February 1978 meeting of PASOK's Central Committee, of the new strategy of 'National Popular Unity', was designed to take PASOK beyond the 'narrow class boundaries' of the first years²⁹. Thus, it seems that the underlying strategy of this hyper-organisational activity was the unconditional expansion of electoral support for the movement. Papandreou had the opportunity to allocate in the higher organs of the party, those who enjoyed his absolute trust. Once appointed by the president, these cadres could in turn act in his name without regard to constitutional formalities³⁰.

5. PASOK'S SOCIAL BASE

Between 1977 and 1981 the electoral swing from the centre-right to the left amounted about 25 percent - and virtually all of it went to PASOK. With a total of 5.6 million voters, at least 1.3 million, that had voted in 1977 either for the Centre Union, New Democracy, or the National Alignment, shifted their votes to PASOK. More than half of those votes came from New Democracy and National Alignment. At all districts where the Centre Union had scored above its national average in the 1974 and 1977 elections, PASOK scored higher than its own national average in 1981; it absorbed the centrist strongholds almost everywhere. In some regions - Crete for instance - where the liberal-centrist vote had been traditionally strong, PASOK also exceeded its national average.³¹ The dependence of PASOK on centrist votes was also suggested by the results of a KPEE poll in September 1981: only 12.6 percent described themselves as 'Marxist-socialists' whereas PASOK officially described itself as being 'non-dogmatic Marxist-socialists'. In a Eurobarometer survey before the 1981 elections, PASOK is the only party (especially compared to the parties of the left) whose voters distributed themselves over the whole spectrum of the 'self- placement left-right scale' (Table 1). Large numbers of the people who voted for PASOK were not identified with the Marxist-socialist ideology.

Table 1. SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE BY PARTY

	Left									Right
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
N.D.	0.3	-	0.3	1.0	4.0	5.3	14.3	26.8	17.5	30.8

²⁹ National Popular Unity- The meeting of the Second Session of the Central Committee of PASOK. Athens: Publication Beraue, KE.ME.DIA/PASOK, B1/1978

³⁰ Elefantis, A. (1981), 'PASOK and the elections of 1977: The rise of the populist movement', in Penniman, H.R. (ed.), *Greece at the polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, p. 134.

³¹ The hypothesis that 'those areas that have supported PASOK since 1974 were also supported the Centre Union in the 1963 and 1964 elections' was tested and confirmed in a survey made by K. Featherstone and D. Katsoudas (1985).

EDIC	-	-	-	6.5	61.3	22.6	9.7	-	-	-
PASOK	3.6	4.3	13.2	27.5	29.7	12.2	4.1	2.4	2.2	1.0
KKE	54.1	24.5	14.3	5.1	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-
KKE (int.)	27.3	27.3	40.9	-	-	-	-	4.5	-	-

Source: Eurobarometer vols. 14 and 15 (cumulated), 1981.

The most impressive characteristic of PASOK's electoral performance in 1981 was its class-cross nation-wide appeal. Opinion surveys conducted at the time indicate how uniform PASOK's appeal was across a range of social groups.³² Whilst 41 percent of men voted for the party, the proportion of women doing so was less than 4 percent fewer. The urban-rural division also produced little contrast: 52 percent of voters in urban areas voted for PASOK, and 47 percent in rural districts. Moreover, whilst 39 percent of 'unskilled workers' voted for PASOK, 37 percent of 'upper-middle class' voters did the same (Table 2). All classes supported PASOK to a similar degree. However, what the data cannot show is how far PASOK's support amongst the higher social classes was a legacy bequeathed by leading figures of the old Center Union joining the 1981 PASOK campaign. Differences are slight also by educational level: 37 percent of voters with primary education voted for PASOK, and 38 percent with higher. The evidence suggests that only age made a difference to support: 50 percent of 25-34 year olds voted for PASOK, whereas a 26 percent of 45-54 year olds supported the party.

Table 2. PARTY IDENTIFICATION, percentage support for PASOK

<i>Education:</i>	<i>Social</i>		35-44	38
Primary	<i>class:</i>		45-54	27
37	A/B	37	55-64	29
Secondary	C1	39	64+	28
43	C2	40	<i>Sex:</i>	
Higher	D/E	39	Male	41
38	<i>Age:</i>		Female	37
	20-24	44		
	25-34	51		

Source: KPEE poll, September 1981

6. THE CASE OF FLORINA

The following chapter is a part of the research. Following the process of collecting, analysing, and presenting the data, will it be possible to give an account for the method in use. In order to investigate the main hypothesis concerning the

³² Survey evidence taken from KPEE Poll, Centre for Political Research and Information, Athens, September 1981.

connection between the opportunity of redefinition of the social cleavages that PASOK had and the gaining of power, we are going to test the electoral results and the creation of party branches in the area in reference to its cultural character and origins. We are going to follow the development of the organisation in Florina under the perspective of the cleavages that were present in the intra-party conflicts. We will examine the organization's character, its way of working and describe supporters social characteristics.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since our analysis takes into account the main social cleavages, a short introduction in the history of Florina is necessary. After 1922, a variety of groups settled the area³³. Their conflicts with the local part of the population, characterised by a Slavic dialect, were strong and violent, focused mainly around the claiming of the land that used to belong to the Turks in the past³⁴. The conflict took a political expression in the pre-war period as the largest part of the local group, that was still approximately 77% of the total population, was supporting the anti-venizelist side. They were accusing Venizelos of being the responsible for the arrival of the refugees. On the other hand, the refugees had placed all their hopes at the Venizelist party for their future recovery³⁵. After the refugees' arrival the locals started feeling as second-class citizens since the state treated the refugees as representatives of the Greek nationalism in the area, and never trusted the locals. The language difference gave to the refugees the opportunity to develop. Combined with the fact that they took the most productive part of the land, a strong cleavage arose³⁶. The Metaxas dictatorship reinforced the alienation of the locals from the Greek state, since a central strategy of suppression of their language was imposed.

However, it would be a mistake to face those groups as totally unified. One of the most violent aspects of the conflict was the one created among the locals who decided to co-operate with the nationalistic forces and enjoy the state protection, called '*gregomanoi*', and those that experienced the suppression which were the majority by far³⁷. For this majority the struggle of EAM against the Germans was the opportunity for a double liberation: liberation from the German army but also from the suppression of the Greek state. EAM treated the local culture and language with respect and gave them a dream about the 'future society'³⁸. Some refugees also supported EAM, but for another part of them the propaganda about the treacherous role of EAM was convincing, so they supported the anti-communist, nationalistic forces³⁹.

³³ Amongst others, Slavophones, Pontioi, Vlachoï, Refugees from Asia Minor, Arvanites, Kafkasioi, Muslims, Gypsies.

³⁴ I. Michailidis, (1997), 'Slavic-speakers and refugees', in *Identities in Macedonia*, ed. V. Gounaris, I. Michailidis, G. Aggelopoulos, Papazisis.

³⁵ G. Mavrogordatos, (1983), *Social coalitions and party strategies in Greece: 1922-1936*, University of California Press, p. 247-251.

³⁶ For the partiality of the state in support of the refugees: V. Gounaris, (1990), 'Vouleftes kai Kapetanaioi: clientistic networks in mid-war Macedonia', *Ellinika*, vol.41:331-335.

³⁷ M. Giannisopoulou, (1998), 'The anthropological perspective', in *Macedonia and the Balkan*, EKKE, Alexandria, p.356.

³⁸ E. Kofos, 'The Macedonian problem through the period of B' World War', in *Modern and contemporary Macedonia*, Vol.B, ed. I. Koliopoulos-I. Chasiotis.

T. Kostopoulos, (2002), *The forbidden language*, Mavri Lista, p.205-209.

³⁹ M. Giannisopoulou, 1998:407-8, op. cit.

The political preferences of the two groups were not totally homogenous. Even though, it is possible to support the view that the conflicting economic interests created the frame into which alternating and striking political identities were created. The conflict during the mid-war between venizelist refugees and royalist locals was transformed during the 1940's in a cleavage between right wing refugees and left wing locals.

POLITICAL MICROCLIMATE: ELECTORAL RESULTS AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

During the 1950s Florina was one of the top peripheries for ERE in terms of electoral results (over 50%)⁴⁰. The same was true for the 1974 elections when New Democracy reached the percentage of 70.6%. Nevertheless, the volatility of the electoral behaviour became obvious during the 1977 elections, where the percentage drop at 55.1%. Shrinking of power for the right was a continuous tendency during the 80's⁴¹. In order to understand the shifting of the voters from New Democracy to PASOK it is necessary to follow the creation of the organisation branches of PASOK in Florina and the political image that its members managed to construct and communicate to the people. Before reaching this point few words about the political geography of the periphery are necessary. The effort of the research was to localize the areas of residence for the different groups. This effort proved to be difficult, as the data have never been published because of political reasons. Fieldwork for the collection of the data was the only solution. The comparison of the data referring to the origins of the villages and the electoral behaviour proved that the origins are not the most important variable for the explanation of the political behaviour in the post-junta period. A closer look to the map suggests that differences in political behaviour can be found in sub-divisions of Florina. It seems that there is a line dividing the periphery in North/West part and South/East part. In the first one people vote mainly for the right, whereas in the South/East part the highest results for PASOK and KKE are found. Which is more the few party branches for PASOK and KKE existed only in this area⁴². The reasons for this division are various. In the North/West part the immigration was huge. A big part of the local population crossed the borders towards Yugoslavia or emigrated to western countries⁴³, in order to survive. The people left behind were frightened or have been already collaborators of the state. At the same time, the border placement and the mountainous nature of the area made trade and communication with the mainland difficult and increased the fear. Indicant of the influence that fear and suppression had on political behaviour in the area, is an excerpt from the interview of the person responsible for Florina on behalf of the central Organization Sector of PASOK⁴⁴: *'We were organizing visits to the*

⁴⁰ H. Nikolakopoulos, (2000), Parties and parliamentary elections in Greece 1946-1964, EKKE, Athens.

⁴¹ H. Nikolakopoulos, 'The formation of the country's new electoral map after the new electoral law in each city, periphery and constituency', *Ta Nea* 18/5/1989.

⁴² Data from PASOK Organizational Archive.

⁴³ Mainly Australia, West Germany or Canada data from the local Press.

⁴⁴ D. Gaitanidis, interview contacted in Athens 3/2005. D. Gaitanidis, was member of the Organisation Sector of PASOK and the Person Responsible for Florina on behalf of the Organisation Sector during the under research period.

mountainous and western villages in order to communicate our political thesis and give strength to the people, but even though that we were a lot of members arriving the people stayed hidden. Few persons were moving slightly the curtains and waiving to us.'

The South/East part was much more involved in the mainland economic and social life; as a consequence the fear was less. The fact that part of the progressive immigrants that inhabited this area, was less frightened and oppressed compared to the locals, helped in the claim for freedom of political expression. The existence of the party's branches and agricultural co-operations helped the process. In PASOK's branches locals and refugees were equally participating. In the secondary offices of PASOK both groups of the population were elected but their villages of origin were always those from the South/East part. Nevertheless, the villages in which party branches existed didn't have the highest rate concerning the increasing of PASOK's votes. The reason for this, according to the interviews is that: *'were branches existed people became familiar with the intra-party conflicts and they were keeping off.'* The intra-party conflict is an important element for the understanding of the political character of the local branch.

THE ORGANISATION BRANCH OF PASOK IN FLORINA

The creation of PASOK in Florina took place into the most oppressive environment. The local organization conflicted in many ways with the established elite and the church, a fact that contributed to the creation of its political character. Many people that had supported the dictatorship were still in powerful positions during the 70s. For the people of Florina is common knowledge that: *'The process of social liberation that started for the rest of the country in 1974, for us began after 1979'*. Party functionaries of the first years stress the point that during that period they were working semi-illegal and people were so frightened that they wouldn't even talk to them in public places. The data suggest that the first active party members were mainly young people, students but also some older people coming from the centrist tradition that had conflicted with the establishment powers of the periphery during the previous years. Many of those people had returned from western countries after having lived and worked there for some years. That experience gave to them the necessary social inputs that encouraged them to demand political liberties. Through those years they came in touch with PAK and A. Papandreou and that proved to be an important variable for their future support for PASOK. In terms of professional occupation it seems that they were mainly farmers, labour workers and many young people who returned in their birthplace after their university studies, bringing new ideas.

Having analysed the electoral results of the period, it becomes obvious that the electoral gains for PASOK were mainly coming from New Democracy. The party functionaries stress that it was from New Democracy voters that they were trying to get support *'since many people where voting for the right because of fear and not of any kind of party identification'*. As far as the centre is concerned, after the joining of

D. Theocharidis, the traditional MP elected from Centre Union, to the New Democracy, PASOK left alone as a choice accountable for the centrist vote.

Gaining support from KKE it was much more difficult. After the civil war the exiles and pogroms that its members suffered created a strong political identity: *'For the oldest it was almost impossible to leave KKE, for them it was a dogma, a religion. Up to 1981 just few people came from KKE to PASOK. In small communities people felt embarrassed. My family, which also had a communist background, was saying to me that I should feel embarrassed to support PASOK after all their struggles and sufferings⁴⁵.'* Yet, the relationship between PASOK and KKE organisations was characterised by support and co-operation in many aspects. The creation of a common front against oppression was important for both. Common announcements in the local press⁴⁶, common political actions⁴⁷ and a more or less common political discourse⁴⁸ characterised them through the period. The question that arises is why radical and leftist people preferred to support PASOK instead of the traditional communist party. It seems that being a member of KKE in Florina was an extreme risk. PASOK offered the opportunity to be progressive without the 'anathema' of communism. Furthermore, during the 30's, KKE had supported the claim for autonomy of the slavophones, but later, under the accusation of 'national treachery' it changed its perspective started to claim 'respect for the minority rights'. Many slavophones were strongly disappointed. When PASOK actively supported the repatriation of the slavophones many people placed to the party all their hopes.

POLITICAL THESIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

In all interviews from party functionaries and supporters one point was strongly stressed, the main political issue for the people of Florina was freedom and human rights. It was around those issues that PASOK constructed its campaign in the district. The person responsible for Florina on behalf of PASOK claims⁴⁹: *'Now that I am looking back I realise that neither I, nor the functionaries had the background to make serious policy proposals. At the beginning we were just trying to bring a feeling of freedom in order to make people talk to us'*. Issues such as quality of life and agricultural policy were discussed in some cases. In the question how people understood concepts as *socialism, self-management*, or EEC, the answer was that *'people were not understanding. Socialism, for instance, got confused in their minds with communism. Hearing the word they were looking around to check if there is anybody hearing. Some were frightened that they would lose their property.'*⁵⁰

⁴⁵ M. Gaitanidis, Responsible for Florina from PASOK Organization Sector, interview op.cit.

⁴⁶ For instance, *'Common denunciation against violence from the youth of PASOK and KNE'*, Allagi, 8/12/1979 vol.401/241.

⁴⁷ Typical of this kind was the placement of a poster in the central square of Florina in 12/2/1979, where the 'Battle of Florina' was celebrated. In this occasion the local authorities were celebrating the massacre of the Democratic Army from the army in 1948, by the presence of Prime Minister K. Karamanlis. On the poster it was written 'Say NO to the Celebrations of Hate / National Popular Unity', the responsible persons were prosecuted by the authorities.

⁴⁸ For instance the callings of PASOKs Youth and KNE to their Youth Political Festivals are surprising similar in terms of discourse. *'Announcement of the District Committee of KNE'*, Allagi, 2/8/1980, vol.433/273. *'PASOKs Youth Festival'*, Allagi, 13/9/1980, vol.439/279.

⁴⁹ D. Gaitanidis, interview op. cit..

⁵⁰ Ch. Papalazarou, interview contacted in Florina 3/2005. Ch. Papalazarou, was a member of PASOK in Florina during the 70's, active in agricultural partnerships.

It is important to mention that in the correspondence that the District Committee had with the central Organisation Sector, references to policy issues almost do not exist. The brochures and party publications arrived to Florina very rarely. Even when they did so, it was difficult to make use of them since they were not comprehensive for the majority of the people. The main source of information was *Exormisi*, the official newspaper, but the circulation was limited to 150 items per week⁵¹. Two of the party candidates, around whom the main intra-party arose, were publishing and distributing materials trying to popularise PASOK ideological thesis. The main way for recruiting new members and supporters was personal contact and discussion: *'our effort was to find some people from each village to give us a contact in order to arrive there and start a discussion'*. Importance of party functionaries activity get stressed by that point.

In 1975 there were two party branches in the biggest cities with 37 members in total. The first group was mainly around P. Stefanidis future MP of PASOK. By 1981 member number arose to 299 from 12 villages and cities⁵². P. Stefanidis and his supporter's political origins are to be found before the dictatorship in *Enosi Kentrou* (Centre Union). In 1977 a second leading group arose mainly from young scientists that returned to Florina after their university studies. A conflict between the two groups started for the control of the organisation and the power positions. This conflict influenced organisation's character and involved also the representatives from the central Organisation Sector that strongly supported the second group⁵³. Examining the main characteristics of those intra-party groups, we can support that whereas the first group (*'palaiokommatikoi'*) derived from the centrist tradition and was more mature in terms of age, the second one was more radical and younger in age. This conflict is present almost in the whole country into PASOK's organisations. The important point is that the division took also the form of conflict between locals and refugees in some aspects, as the leading persons of each group had their origins in those different cultures. The case is appropriately summarised by the words of the person responsible for Florina on behalf of the centre: *'Compared to other peripheries Florina organisation was problematic and very difficult. It was difficult to coordinate two different philosophies, two groups having their own culture. The same time the conflict between the two intra-party groups was strong, but 'palaiokomatismos' was different in the other peripheries. There it had to do just with political survival. In Florina the ethnotic division was intervening.'* The ethnotic division was mainly intervening at the times that the conflict was strong around the claim of power positions. The official discourse of the party, in central and local level, was supporting the argument that ethnotic divisions are false divisions that do not allow the people to realise and face class divisions.

The correspondence with the centre is full of accusations, and expulsions. At the end it is obvious that even though the conflict was a returning factor for the party in Florina, the party centre clearly decided to keep both fractions within the party being afraid that in any other case there will be a loss in local or refugee votes and support. Unfortunately it is not possible to count which of the two fractions and political styles has been more beneficial for the party. It seems that apart from the conflicts, the

⁵¹ Data from Archives of PASOK Organization Sector.

⁵² General Assembly/ Florina Branch, Archives of PASOK Organization Sector.

⁵³ Rapports from the sub-division of Florina 1975-1980, Archives of PASOK Organization Sector

intrigues and the undermining, a balance of the two on the edge was beneficial in electoral terms.

The intra-party evolution in Florina is characterised by a fundamental division that was common in the total of PASOK's organisations across the country. In one side there were people that were active in local political life before the dictatorship. Those people were mainly oriented from the centre. On the other side there were mainly young scientists that first appeared in local political life in the post-junta years. Since they did not have formulated supporting networks they put all their effort at the organisation level. For that reason they were important for the organisation evolution. Their political culture was, comparatively, radical. The central party committees supported the second group in most of the cases. However, the remaining of P. Stefanidis as the party candidate up to 1989 suggests that, a. on the base of electoral effectiveness the party decided that it was more important to maintain the formatted supporting networks than to invest in the maximum efficiency of the organisation, 2. even though that the upper party committees had strongly expressed their arguments against Stefanidis it was not on them to decide.

The other cleavages formulated into the party, under the influence of that main division. The division through the opposition years was mainly around the political character of the party and the control of the important party power positions. It was the President and his environment that were trying to balance the conflicting groups, and not the party committees, using the existence of one as a negotiable tool against the other. In the central level the conflict between them it was not important. As long as it was into the limits they were still contributed in the electoral success, they were weakened because of the conflicts making equalizing from the centre more important.

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