Research Students (Political Science and Political Economy)

Helen Addison 

Supervisor: Dr Jonathan Hopkin| & Dr Joachim Wehner
|Contact:

Kate Alexander   

The economics of New Labour - a discourse analysis:

Supervisor: Dr Jonathan Hopkin
|Contact: k.i.alexander@lse.ac.uk|

Holke Brammer 

Supervisor:
Contact:

Chelsea Byers    

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix| & Dr Paul Mitchell
|Contact: c.r.byers@lse.ac.uk|

Conor Clarke

Supervisor: Dr Valentino Larcinese
|Contact: c.j.clarke1@lse.ac.uk|

Jan-Emmanuel De Neve

Essays in Political Economy and Voting Behavior

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix| & Dr Jonathan Hopkin|
Contact: j.c.de-neve@lse.ac.uk|
Personal Website: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/deneve|

Jens Flanding

The Survival of European Labour Market Flexibility  

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix| & Dr Jonathan Hopkin|

Contact: j.p.flanding@lse.ac.uk|

Ninfa Fuentes

Supervisor: Dr Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
|Contact: n.m.fuentes@lse.ac.uk|

Christopher Gandrud

Knowing the Unknowns: Financial Policymaking in Uncertainty : How do policymakers make decisions during financial market uncertainty? I develop a straightforward framework of policymaking in uncertainty. To overcome uncertainty, policymakers gather information using strategies discussed across a variety of political science disciplines. They need information to be able to make goal-oriented decisions. The information strategies actors choose are conditioned on the uncertainty problems they face. In turn, the information they receive impacts their policy decisions. My three empirical papers investigate what strategies are likely to be chosen in different types of uncertainty and how these choices affect policy decisions. My first paper, co-written with Mícheál O'Keeffe, develops a signaling game that policymakers play when they perceive data uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about economic fundamentals. The model is supported empirically with analytical narratives of recent crises in Korea and Ireland. My following two papers deal with situations of increasing causal uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about how actions cause outcomes. In both of these papers I use Multi-state Event History Analysis. I find that when there is high causal uncertainty policymakers tend to use learning strategies that start with international-level policy recommendations. These are updated with the experiences of regional peers. Beyond creating and finding evidence for a parsimonious framework of decision-making in uncertainty, I make a number of other contributions to political economy. I extend the empirical tools researchers can use to understand decisions in complex choice environments. I provide evidence that making financial bureaucrats "independent" does not ensure positive outcomes. Specifically, it does not guarantee that financial bureaucrats will provide accurate information needed for effective policymaking. The data sets I create could be used to further examine relationships between de jure independence and outcomes. Finally, I find empirical evidence for how international reformers can affect domestic changes. 
Supervisor: Dr Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
|Contact: c.gandrud@lse.ac.uk|

Julio A Gonzalez 

The Politics and Institutions of the Informal Sector in Mexico: The Case of Mexico City: At some point over the past four decades, the relationship between Latin Americans and their State broke down. Sensing that law and regulations were not serving them well, they began to go informal, choosing what to comply with and what to ignore. As of 2006, the informal sector (defined by De Soto (1989) as "the collection of firms, workers and activities that operate outside of the legal and regulatory framework.") in Latin America represented an astonishing 45 percent of the region's GDP. Its size, however, widely varies across countries. The informal sector accounts for about 30 percent of GDP in Mexico. Informality is often associated with small-scale, semi-legal, low-productivity, and frequently family-based enterprises. A collective perception that the State's action is ineffective, inefficient, and unfair may partly help explain Latin America's "culture of informality." Empirical evidence also tends to show that informality is a reflection of the presence of forces that exclude large segments of the citizenry from basic services such as education, health care, and judiciary services, and from economic opportunities. Segmented labour markets and factor market imperfections highly contribute to this exclusion. Other factors contributing to this exclusionary process encompass high and persistent levels of inequality, which are rooted in differences in power, voice, and influence. While the phenomenon of the informal sector has been analyzed from a strictly economic point of view, this research aims to analyze informality in Mexico, particularly in Mexico City (one of the largest cities in the world) as a political process. The research will aim to give a view of political processes that provides new theoretical and/or empirical insights into the understanding of social movements, State and local institutions, and politics at the margins of society, where legality blurs into illegality and the informal economy intersects with its political counterpart, namely informal politics. By studying political processes at the street level and then tracing them up the political structure, the research will intend to reveal the basic processes by which the Mexican State operates, particularly after the political transition of 1997 at city level, and of 2000 at federal level. The research will intend to develop a systematic analysis/theory of the political economy of the informal economy, while raising new questions and theories about the State and social movements. Though the direct research is limited to the Mexican case, particularly the case of Mexico City, the conclusions chapter may suggest ways (external validity) in which these conclusions can be applied to other developing areas in the third world.
Supervisor: Professor George Philip
|Contact: j.a.gonzalez@lse.ac.uk|

Micheal O'keeffe

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix
|Contact: m.a.o'keefe@lse.ac.uk|

Philipp Krause

Supervisor: Professor Patrick Dunleavy|  &  Dr Joachim Wehner
|Contact: p.krause@lse.ac.uk|

Verena E. Kroth

Political Budget Cycles in a Dominant Party Framework: Empirical Evidence from South Africa: My research focuses on the relationship between electoral competition and political budget cycles in South African provinces. The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset comprising SA's 9 provinces over the period from 1995 to 2007. It generated the following results. First, total provincial expenditure increases with electoral competition in the year before an election. Second, the incumbent government provides higher conditional grants for more competitive provinces, which generates pre-electoral increases in total provincial revenue. Third, in more competitive provinces there is evidence of compositional patterns, with increased spending on welfare, roads and safety in the year before an election. Overall, this analysis helps to shed light on how both the level and composition of PBCs vary with electoral competition and offers a first analysis of PBCs in South Africa. Moreover, my research exemplifies a first step towards identifying fiscal policy strategies in a dominant party framework  
Supervisor: Dr Joachim Wehner
|Contact: v.e.kroth@lse.ac.uk|

Suhjin Lee

Party Structure/Competition. Quantitative & formal analysis.

Supervisor:   Dr Torun Dewan|
Contact: s.j.lee@lse.ac.uk|

Ting Luo

The political space for non-party members in Chinese rural politics - Evidence from Rural Guangdong: A substantial amount of research on Chinese village elections focuses on the electoral process of the village elections and the influence of the electoral process on village governance, while little effort has been devoted to the role of those candidates running for village committee posts in village elections. While institutions lay the foundations for rural politics, people, more specifically rural elites, play a much more important role in village elections and the post-election village governance. Hence, this research is intended to study a subset of players in rural politics, namely those candidates who are running for the VC posts. What counts for the successful election of those candidates, party membership, political or economic background, campaign efforts or their demographic characteristics? For those elected members of village committees, is there any difference between party members and non-party members on their ideology (opinions towards market reform in China) ? This research is intended to answer these questions by using both first hand data through a random survey on about 300 candidates at 50 villages at the county and second hand data providing by the county government. Besides, some qualitative evidence were collected through interviews during my three-month internship at the County Civil Affair Bureau as an election observer in 2008. Given the fact that elites play a very important role in rural politics, by researching on those rural elites, we are able to unravel the dynamics of power structure in rural China and explain why similar institutional arrangements lead to different governance outcomes.
Supervisor:  Dr Valentino Larcinese
|Contact: t.luo2@lse.ac.uk|
Personal Website:  http://personal.lse.ac.uk/luot1/ |

David Marshall

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix|
Contact: d.j.marshall@lse.ac.uk|

Diane Maurice 

Supervisor: Dr Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
|Contact: d.r.maurice@lse.ac.uk| 

Linnea Mills

Curbing Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa:  This PhD project takes the form of three journal-style research articles, all focusing on corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. In each article, I empirically research corruption, using various research methods, in relation to popular policy practises. In the first article, Coffee and Corruption: the Transformation of Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, I look at economic policy and assess the effect of economic liberalisation on levels and forms of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. I use a mixed method approach combining cross-section regression analysis on a sub-Saharan African country sample with a case study analysis on the political evolution of the Rwandan coffee sector. In the second article, Catching the 'Big Fish': Does Prosecution End Impunity or Merely Eliminate Political Rivals? I focus on judiciary policy and assess the effects of tacking corruption through punitive action in the political context of sub-Saharan Africa. The research methods comprise descriptive statistics, media analysis and regression analysis. In the third article, Long Live the President! Constitutional Amendments and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, I assess, using cross-section and panel regression analyses, the association between leadership length and corruption across sub-Saharan Africa in the light of political moves towards extending presidential term limits. 
Supervisor: Dr Joachim Wehner
|Contact: l.c.jonsson@lse.ac.uk|

Mona Morgan-Collins

Strategic voting under simple plurality and runoff systems.

Supervisor: Dr Torun Dewan| and Dr Rafael Hortala-Vallve|
Contact: M.Morgan-Collins@lse.ac.uk|

Ju Nam 

Supervisor: Professor Patrick Dunleavy|
Contact: j.h.nam@lse.ac.uk|

Julia Pomares

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix|
Contact: j.s.pomares@lse.ac.uk|

Ed Gareth Poole

Does Devolution Matter? Divergence and Continuity in Decentralized Political Systems

• Comparative Fiscal Decentralization
• Public Budgeting
• Devolution in the United Kingdom

Supervisor: Dr Joachim Wehner|
Advisor: Professor Simon Hix
|Contact: e.g.poole@lse.ac.uk|

Philippine Rudolf

The Influence of Political Ideologies on Public Evaluation of sensitive technologies: While it is appreciated that scientific research and new scientific developments are not politically neutral, the influence of political values and ideas on public opinion about sensitive technologies, such as animal cloning, synthetic biology or nanotechnology is understudied. This thesis aims to identify relevant political values both at the individual and the national level that may influence whether new technologies are accepted or not. 
Supervisor: Prof. George Gaskell & Dr Michael Bruter
|Contact: p.rudolf@lse.ac.uk|

Michael Seiferling

Supervisor: Dr Valentino Larcinese
|Contact: m.l.seiferling@lse.ac.uk|

Jessica Tarlov

Lies, Sex and Money: Political Scandal in the 1997 and 2010 General Elections: My research addresses the effect of political scandal on individual MPs' General Election vote share and decision to stand down from Parliament. It measures whether British voters hold their MPs personally accountable for their actions inside and outside the House of Commons. It also analyzes individual MP accountability in light of the strength of party politics in the UK. This study utilizes data on MP specific scandals between the 1992 and 1997 and 2005 and 2010 General Elections. Information on scandals was sourced from The Times and The Guardian newspapers. It finds that political scandal has a negative and significant effect on the vote share for MPs across all parties in both 1997 and 2010 with Conservative MPs in 1997 suffering more than other members. It also demonstrates that MP characteristics such as educational background and profession before entering Parliament have an effect on their vote. In addition, it finds that political scandal is a strong predictor of an MP's decision to not seek reelection in both the 1997 and 2010 General Elections. The results indicate that British voters hold their MPs individually accountable for their behavior, but that, ultimately, party affiliation in British politics is a stronger predictor of electoral success or failure. This assertion is in line with traditional analyses of the strength of party politics in the UK.   
Supervisor: Dr Torun Dewan
|Contact: j.b.tarlov@lse.ac.uk|

Jessica Templeton

Framing Elite Policy Discourse: Science and the Stockholm Convention on POP's: Rising levels of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the environment have spurred policymakers around the world to call for global cooperative action to control those chemicals which pose the greatest threats to human health and the environment. However, political efforts to mitigate the risks posed by POPs have been impeded by the technical complexity of the problem, causing policymakers to turn to scientists with expertise in fields such as chemistry and toxicology for guidance on risk assessment and management. Policymakers' reliance on scientific expertise has reduced their control over policy and has given scientists increasing power to determine socially acceptable levels of risk, thus blurring the boundaries between science and politics. Conversely, the implications of science-based decision-making has increased the interest, and potentially the involvement, of political actors in a phase of evaluation that is often seen as objective, fact-based, and free of political interest. This thesis presents the findings of a study analyzing the ways in which various actors with scientific expertise – representatives of governments, industry, and environmental/public health NGOs – working under the auspices of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants have attempted to use strategic issue framing tactics to promote predetermined policy agendas during the scientific review of chemicals proposed for regulation.     
Supervisor: Dr Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
| Contact: j.b.templeton@lse.ac.uk|

Robert Van Geffen

The European Parliament and lobbying activity 

Supervisor: Professor Simon Hix|
Contact:

Derek William Vallès

Theory and Design of Deliberative Democracy: Deliberative democracy is, minimally construed, a doctrine within democratic theory that requires collective decision making to be conducted through a communicative exchange comprised of reasoned and other-regarding arguments. As it has been translated from theoretical expositions to empirical examinations, we have begun to ask questions about the quality of that deliberation. Addressing what I find to be serious absences in the literature -- most notably, a focus on the content of deliberation itself -- I look to legislatures for answers to questions about the temporal and multidimensional nature of deliberative exchange. I employ a co-occurrence analysis methodology in order to excavate dominant rhetorical patterns in floor debates, looking particularly at recent debates over healthcare and financial regulatory reform in the 111th Congress
Supervisor: Dr Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
|Contact: d.w.valles@lse.ac.uk|

Clara Volintiru

Clientelism, Patronage Networks and Party Politics:  Clientelism has evolved from a personalistic, dyadic relationship into a complex, pyramidal structure of electoral mobilization. While instances of clientelism can be found in most of the contemporary polities, it is in the less institutionalized political systems, that clientelism may have the greatest effect on electoral outcomes and parties' survival. It thus becomes a key feature of electoral success in many new democracies. My research assesses the lineage of patronage networks in Romania, and the extent to which clientelistic practices influence the survival and success of political parties in this country.     
Supervisor: Dr Vesselin Dimitrov| & Dr Jonathan Hopkin|
Contact: c.a.darabont@lse.ac.uk|

Andrew Yorke

The Kremlin Proxy in Contemporary Russia: Explaining the role of ultra-loyal private business actors in state-dominated strategic sectors:  Accounts of contemporary trends in Russian big business-state relations have focused on the phenomenon of expanding state ownership in the economy, particularly in sectors viewed as "strategic" by the political leadership. This thesis will demonstrate that an important role in the same sectors is played by a select group of private business actors, referred to here as "Kremlin proxies": indeed, some of the recent major acquisitions thought to have been made by state-owned companies are shown to have in fact been made by these private actors. They are characterised by close ties to the Kremlin and a strong loyalty to their political allies, and they enjoy a high level of trust on the part of the political leadership. The project will seek to explain why the state allows such private actors to play an important role in sensitive sectors, in an environment that has otherwise been dominated by state ownership and state interventionism. The preliminary hypothesis is that the state uses the "proxies", as well as state-owned companies, to help fulfil tasks aimed at national security-enhancing economic development. A weak bureaucracy and limited state capacity mean that state-owned companies cannot achieve this goal alone. "Subcontracting" tasks to "proxies" can also provide clear advantages in certain circumstances, for example by helping to overcome regulatory obstacles or limiting reputational damage. Alternative explanations for the phenomenon will also be considered, such as those based on corruption and venal political elites, or crony capitalism as an attempt to solve the "commitment problem".
Supervisor: Dr David Woodruff
|Contact: a.c.yorke@lse.ac.uk|