Professor Richard Bradley

Title

Professor in Philosophy

Research interests

Decision Theory, Social Choice theory, Conditionals and hypothetical reasoning

Publications

Publications include:

  • Revising Incomplete Attitudes, Synthese, 171 (2): 235-256, 2009
  • Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 8(2): 223-242, 2009
  • Belief as Desire Revisited (with Christian List), Analysis, 69: 29-35, 2009
  • Comparing Evaluations, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1): 85-100, 2008
  • The Kinematics of Belief and Desire, Synthese, 56 (3): 513-535, 2007
  • A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory, Theory and Decision , 2007
  • A Defence of the Ramsey Test, Mind, 116: 1-21, 2007
  • Taking Advantage of Difference of Opinion, Episteme, 3 (3): 141-155, 2006
  • Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities, Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 15: 65 - 81, 2006
  • Radical Probabilism and Mental Kinematics, Philosophy of Science, 72: 342-364, 2005
  • Axiomatic Utilitarianism and Probability Homogeneity, Social Choice and Welfare, 24: 221-251, 2005
  • Ramsey's Representation Theorem, Dialectica, 4: 484-497, 2004
  • Indicative Conditionals, Erkenntnis 56: 345-378, 2002
  • Ramsey and the Measurement of Belief, in D. Corfield and J. Williamson (eds) Foundations of Bayesianism, 273-299, 2001
  • A Preservation Condition for Conditionals, Analysis 60 (3) 219-22, July 2000
  • Conditionals and the Logic of Decision, Philosophy of Science 67 (Proceedings), S18-S32, 2000
  • More Triviality, Journal of Philosophical Logic 28: 129-139, 1999
  • Conditional Desirability, Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55, 1999
  • A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals, Synthese 116: 187-229, 1998.

Biographical details

I became interested in philosophy while studying economics, politics and sociology at the University of Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg. As a way of moving from the social sciences to philosophy, I did an MSc in Social Philosophy at the LSE, and then, after a two-year break from university studies (more than enough), went on to the University of Chicago to do my PhD. At Chicago I developed an interest in the connection between rationality and the interpretation of behaviour, working initially with Jon Elster and Russell Hardin, and then, as my research focused on problems in decision theory, more actively with Richard Jeffrey and David Malament. My PhD thesis presented a decision theory that incorporated a quantitative representation of agent's attitudes to the sorts of conditional possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences.

After Chicago I moved to Paris, where I spent a number of years as a post-doc at the CREA. I joined the department at LSE in 1997 and have become involved mainly with the Philosophy and Economics degree programs here. I continue to do research in decision theory, hypothetical reasoning and the logic of conditionals, but have new interests in the foundations of both Social Choice and Game Theory. Studying the latter are steps in my longer term research goal of understanding the structure and dynamics of different types of rational social interaction.

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