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Very preliminary, not to quote.

**Are financial crises similar during periods of 'hegemonic power'
as compared to periods of 'struggle for power'?
The common good effect**

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Abstract

An examination of the historical record reveals distinct cycles in financial crises. There are periods characterized by a 'contagion' effect, where financial crises swiftly traverse borders and sectors. Conversely, there are also periods typified by 'isolation,' where the financial system adopts measures to prevent the spread of crises, keeping markets and nations separate.

This paper contends that these cycles in financial crises are intricately linked to shifts in the international power structure.

The historical record of the international power structure over the past 350 years discloses cycles featuring periods of a dominant nation-state exercising leadership and alternating with 'struggle for power' phases when no single state holds dominance, and many nations share similar levels of power.

The aim of this paper is to establish the correlation between these two distinct cycles: hegemony is associated with 'isolation' periods, while 'contagion' tends to occur during phases of 'struggle for power', since hegemony fosters 'isolation'.

The second part of this paper delves into an explanation of this correlation, grounded in theories concerning common good of the foreign reserves. This paper will show that in periods of crisis, isolation results from the implementation of international global policies that circumvent the propagation of crises in periods of an hegemonic power.

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I. Introduction

The literature on regulation highlights a pendulum dynamic between deregulation and financial crises in the Western world. Periodically, public discontent with excessive bureaucracy prompts government initiatives to deregulate, often leading to financial crises. Subsequently, in response to the crises, governments implement stricter regulations, prompting further public backlash, thus perpetuating the cycle.

However, another pendulum dynamic exists in relation to financial crises, characterized by contagion and heavily influenced by the international power structure. This paper aims to examine the cycles inherent in financial crises. Over the past 350 years, historical data reveals alternating periods marked by "contagion," where crises swiftly propagate across countries and sectors, and "isolation," where policies are implemented to prevent crisis spread, maintaining separation between markets and nations.

This paper argues that these financial crisis cycles are intricately linked to shifts in the international power structure. Historical analysis spanning the past 350 years indicates alternating cycles wherein a single nation-state assumes dominance and leadership, followed by periods of "struggle for power," characterized by the absence of a dominant state and a more balanced distribution of power among nations.

The purpose of this paper is to show that these two cycles are correlated: Hegemony is related to periods of 'isolation', while 'contagion' occurs in periods of balance of power. The main element which leads to a different outcome depending on the international system is the common good effect of international foreign reserves.

First, the paper presents data on these both cycles. Some could claim that the existence of hegemonic power which is correlated with free trade periods would lead to a period of contagion. This paper will show that it has the opposite effect. It is periods of 'struggle for power' which lead to financial contagion, while hegemony leads to 'isolation'. This paper will show that periods of isolation of a crisis are taking place since the propagation of crisis is circumvented by international global policy.

The second part of the paper is devoted to explaining this correlation. The arguments are based on theories related to 'power and cooperation in regulation'. These arguments serve to provide theoretical underpinnings for the observed relationship between international power dynamics and the contagion or isolation of financial crises.

About the international system, the historical record of the last 350 years reveals recurring cycles during which certain nation-states rise to dominance and assume leadership roles. In the 18th century, the Dutch is a dominant country, but it is not an hegemonic power. However, from 1850 to 1910, the UK is the dominant country in the

world. It is *Pax Britannica*; the UK has leapfrogged the Dutch and is the hegemonic power. This period is not only a period of peace, but also a period of increasing free trade. This paper will show that this is a period of 'isolation' of financial crisis, in which policy of the hegemonic power permits to circumvent big financial crisis. In periods of hegemony, there is room for coordination.

Between 1910 and 1945, the world faces a period of balance of power/struggle for power, where many countries fight for reaching hegemony, while there is a bloody war all over the globe, but also a trade war between the power nations. This paper shows that it is a period of contagion in financial crisis. A small crisis in one country is propagating to other countries, and there is no general policy to contain the crisis.

After 1945, the world faces the rise of a new hegemonic power – the US. From 1945 to 20210, it is a period of *Pax Americana*, and the US has leapfrogged the UK. From 1945 until 2010, the US is the hegemonic power of the world. It is a period of peace, and also of free trade. This paper will show that this is a period of isolation of crisis, in which the propagation of crisis is circumvented by international policy.

This paper shows that in times of hegemonic power, contagion is contained, while in periods of balance of power the crisis spreads from one country to another. Why?

Hegemony exhibits characteristics akin to those of a "lender of last resort" due to the externalities associated with its foreign reserves, which transform into a common good during hegemonic periods. This understanding permeates global perceptions, ensuring that crises in one region or country do not trigger contagion effects elsewhere. This common good effect bears semblance to the principle of "too big to fail" observed in banking systems, wherein the presence of large banks enhances stability, as they are less susceptible to destabilization by individual crises.¹ Similarly, hegemonic powers exert a stabilizing influence, fostering periods of crisis isolation through the implementation of international policies aimed at curtailing crisis propagation.

¹ The term "too big to fail" carries a negative connotation, implying that excessive size can incentivize irresponsible behavior. For instance, large financial institutions may engage in unethical practices knowing that their failure could have severe repercussions for the public. However, this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper.

In this paper, we examine the positive aspects of "bigness" and "too big to fail." When an entity, such as a bank or a neighbor, is significant in size, it can contribute to the safety and security of its surroundings. This concept illustrates the external benefits of hegemony, wherein the collective or common good is enhanced. For instance, having a large dog or a formidable neighbor can deter potential threats, thereby safeguarding one's home and community.

Conversely, during periods of struggle for power, the absence of such a common good exposes countries to the contagion effect, leading to heightened frequency of financial crises, as depicted in Figure 4. Essentially, this paper posits that during hegemonic eras, a singular entity stands prepared to assist other countries, whereas in times of power struggle, the prevailing ethos revolves around conflict, sovereignty, and individualism, fostering susceptibility to speculative attacks. Consequently, each country guards its reserves jealously, rendering it more vulnerable to such attacks. This dynamic is evidenced by the frequency of contagion during periods of balance of power, such as between wars, where intervention for the collective good is scarce.

The subsequent section delineates a taxonomy of financial crises, followed by the presentation of a concise model in the third part. Finally, Part IV offers concluding remarks.

II. A Taxonomy of Financial Crises (Preliminary)

Research on financial crises has revealed a myriad of cases, each seemingly unique. The sheer volume of these cases often leads to the feeling that one "can't see the forest through the trees."

On one hand, exhaustive studies delve into various types of crises, offering comprehensive insights into the data landscape. A seminal work in this domain is Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's book titled 'This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.' From this body of research, we can construct a taxonomy of financial crises, encompassing sovereign debt default, crises within the banking and private sectors, and currency-related issues (such as pegging).

Let's examine these different types of crises:

1. excessive debt accumulation by government
2. excessive debt accumulation by banks and corporations
3. Problems of currency crisis. Attack on the exchange rate.
4. excessive debt accumulation by consumers

1. Excessive debt accumulation by government

These crises manifest as government debt defaults, where concerns arise regarding the government's ability to repay its debts. Countries accumulate significant debt due to prolonged deficits. We categorize these crises based on the nature of the debt, distinguishing between debt denominated in the country's own currency (1A) and debt denominated in foreign currency (1B).

A seminal paper on this topic is Krugman (2014), where he scrutinizes cases like Greece and compares them to historical examples like France in the 1920s. His central argument posits that a loss of foreign confidence triggers a sudden stop—a rapid decline in the capital account. The adjustment mechanism crucially depends on the currency regime. Under fixed exchange rates, interest rates must rise to stimulate import compression, while under floating rates, adjustment occurs through currency depreciation and export growth.

Krugman contends that crises akin to those experienced by Greece are improbable for countries like the United States or the United Kingdom. He concludes that the distinction between short-term and long-term interest rates does not seem to offer any pathway through which a nation with an independent currency could experience output decline due to reduced foreign willingness to hold its debt.

About France in 1920, he wrote: "So what do we learn from France in the 1920s? Here we had a country that, if you believed currently dominant rhetoric, should have been primed for catastrophe: Public debt was over 200 percent of GDP, the political system was dysfunctional, and policymakers had little credibility. What actually happened, however, was a sharp fall in the franc, substantial inflation, but nothing like a Greek-style crisis, and in fact a quite good performance in terms of real output. Nothing in that story validates the conventional wisdom. Fear of a Greek-style fiscal and financial crisis has loomed over much of our policy discourse over the past four years, and has played a significant role in shaping actual policy, constituting the principal argument for austerity in countries that don't face any current difficulties in borrowing. However, despite repeated warnings that crises of confidence are imminent in floating-rate debtors – mainly the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan - these crises keep not happening. Part of the explanation for the failure of disaster to strike on schedule lies in the De-Grauwe point: countries that borrow in their own currencies are simply not vulnerable to the kind of self-fulfilling liquidity crises that have afflicted euro debtors."

2. Excessive debt accumulation by banks and corporations

Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) conducted an analysis of bank runs and found that approximately 40% of financial crises stem from debt accumulation by commercial and investment banks. These crises can arise due to either liquidity issues (2A) or solvency problems (2B).

Liquidity problems may stem from various factors such as expectations, short-term policy errors, and particularly the absence of a lender of last resort. On the other hand, solvency issues arise from poor firm policies. While solvency problems could potentially be resolved through a buyback, sometimes bank runs exacerbate the crisis.

Which of these factors is more prevalent? In the post-World War II era leading up to the current crisis, there have been five severe bank crises (Spain 1977, Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, Japan 1992) and thirteen milder bank-centered financial crises. This tally includes the 2008 crisis affecting the United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary, Iceland, and Ireland, alongside several episodes from the 1997-98 Asian crisis, Colombia 1998, and Argentina in 2001.

Regarding the 2008 crisis in the US, Bernanke et al. (2020) spotlight individuals such as Shafran and Dan Jester, both Goldman Sachs employees enlisted by Paulson to assist the Treasury, and Brian Deese, an attorney from President Obama's White House. They engaged in legal and financial battles against counterparts from various sectors.

(in the next version)

3. Currency Crises

(next version)

4. excessive debt accumulation by consumers

(next version)

III. The model

The objective of this model is to analyze the mechanisms underlying the spread of financial crises across countries. Specifically, we focus on the contagion dynamics associated with balance of payment crises and debt crises. For the sake of simplicity, our model centers on balance of payment crises, characterized by countries experiencing dwindling foreign reserves.

The model comprises two fundamental components: a macro model of crisis and a micro model of individual optimization and national sovereignty. The first segment elucidates how the foreign reserves of a hegemonic country influence the risk premium, thereby altering the exchange rate equilibrium and potentially averting reserve depletion and crisis.

In the second segment, we delve into how and why different phases of the international system give rise to varying risk premiums. We demonstrate that during periods of hegemony, the utility function of individuals within a nation-state differs from that during periods of balance of power or struggle for power. Integrating both segments, we elucidate that financial crises exhibit distinct dynamics during hegemonic eras compared to periods of power struggle.

Our model asserts that during hegemonic periods, the contagion element is relatively subdued, whereas during periods of balance of power, it becomes

pronounced. The framework also incorporates a snowball effect with an expectation dimension, further shaping crisis dynamics.

A The macro model of balance of payment crises

The model draws from established frameworks for exchange rate crises, as outlined by Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1986). Our aim is to offer a simplified version to enhance tractability. Primarily, we rely on the IS-LM-BP Mundell model, also known as the monetary approach to the balance of payments. This streamlined approach allows for a more accessible analysis of the dynamics at play.

There are three main equations: 1. The equilibrium in the money equation (LM) such that supply of money equals the demand for money, which is a function of domestic interest rate, i , and output, Y . (equation 1).

2. The interest rate parity equation (equation 2) means that due to perfect capital mobility, the domestic interest rate is equal to the foreign interest rate plus an expected devaluation, and since there is some imperfect asset substitutability, then we add a risk premium, ρ , which is function of the size of the debt of the country, its foreign reserves, and the externality of the international reserves of the hegemonic country (see next part).

3. The money supply, foreign reserves and internal money (domestic credit) are related by equation (3). In consequence foreign reserves, and changes in foreign reserves are given by equations (4) and (5).

Finally, based on the model presented in the next section, the risk premium is also a function of the international reserves of the hegemonic country (equation 6).

$$\frac{M^s}{P} = L(i, Y) \quad (1)$$

$$i = i^* + \frac{E(e_{t+1})}{e_t} + \rho \quad (2)$$

$$M^S = \mu(F^* + A) \quad (3)$$

$$F^* = \frac{M^S}{\mu} - A = \frac{PL(i, Y)}{\mu} - A \quad (4)$$

$$\Delta F^* = \frac{\Delta PL(i, Y)}{\mu} - \Delta A \quad (5)$$

$$\rho = \rho(B + F^{h*} - A) \quad (\text{in case of hegemony}) \quad (6)$$

B National sovereignty and the common good of the hegemonic power

Based on the theories of national identity and national sovereignty, this segment of the model will show that during periods in which there is an hegemonic power, the foreign reserves of the hegemonic country is a common good which influences the risk premium of countries (equation 6). However, during periods of struggle for power, each country stays with its own foreign reserves, and there is no externality of the size of the foreign reserves of another country.

The main assumption of the model is that during period of hegemony, individuals' objective function is about consumption as the regular Samuelson model. But in periods of struggle for power, the values of national identity rise, leading countries to care not only about utility of consumption, but about their relative power with other nations. In consequence we get two different types of maximization which in consequence leads to a different optimal amount of foreign reserves.

What are the social identity and national sovereignty which affect the maximization of individuals, and lead to introduce in the model the symbols of nationalism, as 'national sovereignty' and power?

The social identity theory posits the fact that a person's self-concept and self-esteem derive not only from personal identity and accomplishments, but from the status and accomplishment of the groups to which s/he belongs (Tajnel and Turner, 1979). In their experiments, they have shown that humans have a need for 'us/them' distinctions. Thus, social identity theory suggests that people identify with groups in such a way as to *maximize positive distinctiveness*.

Tajnel and Turner (1979) have shown that social identity leads to discrimination.² And a clear grouping is the nation itself. One speaks today about the identity of being part of a nation-state. What are the 'markers' of social identity of a nation? Following Metzl (2019), the main elements defining nation's identity are the symbols of nationalism, which alongside sovereignty, is always part of the identity of the individuals. Thus national sovereignty and power influence the sense of well-being of the working class.

How national sovereignty and power affects the utility of individuals? In the appendix, I introduce the model showing that we get an equation, in which the relationship between nation-states affect the asset premium. In the appendix, (next

² When being divided into two groups, and asked to split budgets between the two groups, individuals had the choice between giving \$100 to each member of both groups, or receiving \$50 for each person in their group, but only \$10 to the other group. Most individuals chose the second option. Making the other group worse off is more important than making your group better. Moreover, it was shown that those who had been allowed to engage in intergroup discrimination had higher self-esteem than those who had not been given the opportunity to discriminate (Lemyre and Smith 1985, Oakes and Turner 1980).

version) I show that each country is represented by an individual which faces the following payoffs:

$$V_1 = \begin{cases} c_1 & PW1 \geq PW2, \\ c_1 - K & PW1 < PW2 \end{cases}, \quad (7)$$

We define c_i as the output allocated to consumption. Equation (7) emphasizes that the utility/payoff of a citizen is equal to its utility from consumption (assuming that $U(C) = C$). The workers care about consumption, but the workers care also about national sovereignty and power (this is their social identity).

What is the definition of power, PW ? In Appendix 1, I show that the power of a nation can take the following form:

$$PW_i = \text{Min} (c_i, R_i + y_i - c_i) \quad (8)$$

Since R affects the foreign reserves, we get:

$$\rho = \rho(B + F^{h*} - A) \quad (\text{in case of hegemony}) \quad (6)$$

C. Dynamics of the model (very preliminary)

The model including the two parts can be used now to analyze a balance of payment crisis (see Chart 1). Let us assume that country 1 had a strong shock in the demand for its exports, and the loss of its foreign reserves is such, that it leads to a serious crisis. What will happen now to other countries? The two main propositions (which will be proven in the next version) are:

Proposition 1

During periods of power struggle, the likelihood of contagion is elevated, resulting in multiple countries experiencing balance of payment crises and depleting their foreign reserves.

Proposition 2

When one of the countries holds hegemonic power, its reserves assume the role of common good, and the hegemonic country assumes the role of the lender of last resort for the entire international system, effectively halting the contagion effect. As a consequence, most countries are shielded from financial crises.

D. Conclusion of the model

The dynamics of a balance of payment crises presented in this model rests on the occurrence of an idiosyncratic shock in one country, precipitating a balance of payments crisis in this country. Importantly, this paper does not scrutinize the policies or external shocks of the initial country but rather focuses on the contagion effect.

Proposition 1 highlights that during periods of power struggle, the likelihood of contagion is elevated, resulting in multiple countries experiencing balance of payment crises and depleting their foreign reserves.

Proposition 2 underscores that when one of the countries holds hegemonic power, its reserves assume the role of the lender of last resort for the entire international system, effectively halting the contagion effect. As a consequence, most countries are shielded from financial crises.

IV Conclusion

One might assume that the existence of institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the UN today would mitigate contagion compared to the 1930s. With these multilateral institutions in place, one could expect them to prevent crises in one part of the world from spreading globally.

However, the underlying message of this paper contradicts such optimistic thinking. We are currently witnessing a power struggle among nations, particularly between China, Russia, and the US. This struggle for national sovereignty is likely to result in the contagion of financial crises between countries.

The central thesis of this paper posits that during periods of hegemony, a hegemon's foreign reserves are considered a common good, recognized as such by nations. Conversely, during times of balance of power, each country tends towards a more mercantilist stance, disregarding the concept of a common good. Consequently, when a country faces a crisis, there is little assistance offered to others, thereby diminishing the notion of a common good and leading to additional countries experiencing crises. This paper fundamentally revolves around the concept of the common good associated with foreign reserves.

This paper delves into the propagation of financial crises, steering clear of analyzing the specific triggers for such crises in individual countries. In this regard, two distinct approaches to historical analysis emerge. The first revolves around examining macroeconomic factors within the country where the crisis originated. For instance, one might scrutinize how various factors culminated in an event, akin to exploring the

impact of weather on the Challenger explosion, where a focus on the O-ring's susceptibility due to weather conditions led to the disaster (Kremer, 1993). Similarly, when analyzing the Great Depression, attention often shifts to elements like interest rates, and gold reserves.

Conversely, the second approach zooms in on the actions of bureaucrats, often elite figures. Rather than examining causality between elements, this approach scrutinizes decisions made by individuals. For instance, in Ahamed's analysis of the Great Depression, as depicted in his book "The Lords of Finance," he emphasizes the pivotal role of individuals in shaping crises. According to Ahamed, financial crises are not mere acts of fate; rather, they are crafted by human actions.

What sets Ahamed's strategy apart from conventional economic history narratives is his focus on individual agency. Rather than attributing crises to uncontrollable forces like monetary or fiscal policy, Ahamed underscores the decisions made by a select group of central bankers as the primary catalysts for economic meltdowns. In essence, it's not just external shocks but also the actions of bureaucrats and the elite that drive financial crises.

Applying this lens to the Challenger catastrophe, one could either analyze weather patterns and O-ring costs or delve into why CEOs at Morton Thiokol Corporation made erroneous decisions. Similarly, when examining the 2008-2009 crisis, rather than attributing it to regulation, one could trace its roots to the actions of a few financial magnates in the US, the five CEOs who testified before Congress that they did nothing wrong!!

However, such individual-centric analysis lies beyond the purview of this paper, which focuses instead on crisis dynamics, particularly the contagion effect. In this paper, I argue that during hegemonic periods, foreign reserves function as a common good, mitigating contagion, whereas during power struggles, emphasis on national sovereignty, identity, and mercantilist policies fosters contagion of financial crises.

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
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Figures and Charts

Figure 1: Hegemony of Britain: 1850-1910 – GDP per capita



Notes: The GDP per capita index is set at 100 for 1850. The UK is in yellow, Germany is in blue, France in red, and the US is the green line.

Source: Maddison

Figure 2: Hegemony of the US: 1945-2008.

Maddison Data - GDP per capita, index set at 100 for 1850




Figure 3. Balance of Power: 1910-1945.

Maddison data - 1910- 1960





Figure 4. Cycles in the number of countries subject to financial crises



Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a).

