

## The IMF and the Greek Crisis: myths and realities

#### Welcome: Louis Loizou

Chairman of the Hellenic Bankers Association UK.

#### **Poul Thomsen**

Director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund.

#### **Chair: Professor Kevin Featherstone**

Eleftherios Venizelos Professor in Contemporary Greek Studies and Professor in European Politics and the Director of the Hellenic Observatory

Hosted by the Hellenic Observatory and Hellenic Bankers Association-UK


## The IMF and the Greek Crisis: Myths and Realities

Hellenic Observatory London School of Economics September 30, 2019

**Poul M. Thomsen** Director, European Department International Monetary Fund




# Growth projections have been too optimistic and the length of a recovery unprecedented



2/ Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and Thailand.

### Public pension and income tax reforms remain critical for growthfriendly rebalancing of public finances

### **State Transfers to the Public Pension System** (2016, percent of GDP)




Sources: 2018 Aging Report; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: State transfer is defined as a difference between pension spending and actual employer and employee pension contributions as defined in the Aging Report, excluding third-party revenues and non-contributory state transfers.

#### **Personal Income Tax-Free Thresholds in the Euro Area**

(Percent of 2018 average wages and salaries per employment)




Sources: Deloitte; Eurostat; the Greek authorities; KPMG; OECD; and IMF staff calculatio 1/ Income tax reform pre-legislated in 2017, though subsequently cancelled. Note: national accounts concept of wages and salaries is used. The euro area average excludes Greece.

# Political crises led to confidence shocks that halved deposits and collapsed investment




**Greece: 10-Year Bond Yield Spread** 




Private Sector Bank Deposits Halved and the Share of Investment Declined by a Third During the Crisis

Sources: Bank of Greece; ELSTAT; and IMF staff calculations.

# Unbalanced structural reforms undermined credibility and broader support by imposing an excessive burden on labor




### Unprecedented PSI in 2012 as systemic concerns began to fade



### PSI and OSI significantly lowered the debt burden

#### **Interest Payments and Debt Maturity**

#### **General Government Average Effective Interest Rate** (Percent; 2018)



## THANK YOU

