

#### The Future Role of Financial Markets in Creating Affluence

Howard Davies Director, LSE


LSE Asia Forum 2010

Beijing

26 March 2010

#### Debt grew in most mature economies

Domestic private and public sector debt<sup>1</sup> by country, % of GDP




2 Compound annual growth rate. Where data are unavailable, the longest possible period is used.

3 Even after removing foreign lending by UK banks, UK debt/GDP remains higher than every country except Japan.

#### The historical composition of debt differs across economies

LSE

Debt by country, % of GDP, 2008




1 The UK financial sector was adjusted to reflect its position as a financial hub. See the technical appendix for details. 2 Data for Switzerland represent year-end 2007.

### The nonbank financial system has surpassed the banking system in size



Size of components of US leveraged financial institutions




1 IFSL estimates (assets under management, unleveraged) from hedge fund industry report, Q2 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated as the difference between the total size of the "nonbank" financial system (via fed funds) and agency, broker-dealer, hedge fund estimates.
<sup>3</sup> Compound annual growth rate.

Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.

# Asset-based securitisation expanded dramatically






Source: The Turner Review. A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009).

#### In contrast, banks have provided the majority of the credit in the eurozone and the UK



Credit outstanding, \$ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years



<sup>1</sup> Other financial institutions include finance companies, broker-dealers, funding corporations, REITs, insurers, and pension/retirement funds.
<sup>2</sup> Includes loans from households, nonfinancial corporations, and foreign institutions.


3 Computed over 2005-2008 since data is unavailable for 2000.

Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.

#### Global financial assets fell by \$16 trillion in 2008



Global financial assets, \$ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years



<sup>1</sup> Excludes debt write-downs of \$0.28 trillion in 2007 and \$0.98 trillion in 2008.


<sup>2</sup> In current exchange rate terms the drop in global financial assets would have been \$22 trillion in 2008, or 11 percent of global financial assets.

Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.

## Financial assets decreased in all regions except the UK



Total financial assets per major region, \$ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years




<sup>1</sup> Assets increase primarily due to an increase in international financial institution debt, reflecting a surge of securitization activity in response to the Bank of England's accepting securitized assets as collateral for repurchase agreements. Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.

## Financial sector leverage has fallen below the historic average in most countries



Historic average (1993-2007)

Cross-country comparison of financial sector leverage, tangible assets/tangible common equity



1 Includes Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch as of Q4 2008.

2 Leverage based on an estimate of GAAP assets (converted from IFRS).

#### Cross-border capital flows have reversed, falling by 82 percent

Total cross-border capital inflows, \$ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates


12 10.5 10 8 **+15.0%** 6 5.3 4 +8.8% 3.0 1.9 2 1.0 0.5 0 2008 1980 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 % of global 4.5 3.7 4.5 3.6 6.5 11.9 3.2 GDP

1 Compound annual growth rate.

Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Global Capital Markets: Entering a New Era (September 2009).



🔀 CAGR<sup>1</sup>



1 Canada includes noncorporate business, which exaggerates its relative size compared to other countries.

Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Debt and Deleveraging: The Global Bubble and its Economic Consequences (January 2010).

#### Household leverage measured as debt/income increased in most countries



# The deleveraging process has only just begun




Change, 1Q-2Q 2009 Total debt by country, % of GDP, as of Q2 2009 % of real p.p. of GDP % of GDP credit 480 Japan +0.9-2.0 +4.1 460 UK -3.6 -2.9 -13.9440 420 400 380 Spain +3.5 +12.4+2.4 360 S. Korea -3.0 -10.3 -0.1 340 +1.8 +5.9 +1.3 France 320 +1.2 +1.1Italy +3.7300 US -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 280 0.0 0.0 0.0 Germany 260 +1.8 +4.7 +0.8Canada 240 220 Reduction in debt/GDP Stable debt/GDP 200 Increase in debt/GDP 1Q 2Q 3Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 4Q 1Q 2006 2007 2008 2009

### The fall in global capital flows in 2008 was driven by a decrease in bank lending



Total cross-border capital inflows<sup>1</sup>, \$ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years




<sup>1</sup> Capital inflows represent net purchases by foreigners of FDI, equity, and debt securities, as well as deposits and loans to local banks.

Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.

## In China, the banking system remains dominant




Financial assets by region, \$ Trillion, %, 2008




1 Compound annual growth rate using 2008 exchange rates.

Note: Some numbers do not sum due to rounding.

#### Financial markets in most emerging economies have significant room for growth





1 Log scale.

#### **Post crisis questions for China**



-Does the overall reform strategy need to be rethought?

-What is the appropriate balance between bank and non-bank credit sources in the future?

-How can financial market growth be promoted without generating new imbalances and new risks?

-What lessons does the crisis offer for regulation, both content and structure?



#### The Future Role of Financial Markets in Creating Affluence

Howard Davies Director, LSE

LSE Asia Forum 2010

Beijing

26 March 2010