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"The Self-Reflection of the Greek I.R. Community: the decade of the 1990s"

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1. The Discipline of I.R.: The Case of the Greek Community

The substantial rise of interest in the historiography of International Relations (I.R.) and in the development of the field on different national or supra-national settings can hardly be denied. It has been a while ago since I.R. was depicted as a field whose theoretical core was being produced (certainly by no chance) in a single country, that is the superpower (and winner) of the Cold War: the U.S. (Hoffmann, 1977, Holsti, 1985, Smith, 1987, 2002. Cf. Kahler, 1993). Leaving aside the general contribution of post-structuralism and the recent rise of confidence with regard to English School as an intellectual project, various inquiries have been pursued on the basis of determining the nature, persistence and consequences of the theoretical dependence of the field on one specific community. So, it may be that: a) the thrust for diversity in the field is here and doing well although for good reason it is characterized itself by diversity (Crawford, Jarvis, 2001), b) alternative readings of interwar I.R. scholarship are possible and conventional readings are not without crucial consequences for the identity of the field (Schmidt, 1998, 2002, Thies, 2002), c) research in Europe entails a rather distinct distancing from the dominant rationalist ontology in the West side of the Atlantic (Waever, 1998, Jorgensen, 2000), d) non Western-centric conceptualisations of international politics may be carried through confidently (Chan et. al. 2001) and finally e) the development of the field in different countries entails a range of intellectual and political factors which may be examined through a methodological variety (Giesen, 1995, Drulak, Drulakova, 2000, Pursiainen, 2000, Sergounin, 2000, Friedrichs, 2001, Lucarelli, Menotti, 2002).

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As far as International Studies in Greece is concerned, non-Greek observers affirm that the field has met a substantial growth during the last years (Groom, 1994: 229-30, Groom, Mandaville, 2001: 158). This is indeed true in terms of respective institutions and of the theoretical or empirical research as well as policy recommendations produced in the name of I.R. by Greeks living in Greece. Moreover, Greek I.R. scholars have engaged themselves into a serious and contentious discussion about the field's identity, social use and meta-theoretical features with regard to its development in the country. For example, in 1995 a respective round-table discussion is held under the auspices of the Institute of I.R. (Fatouros, 1996, Ifestos, 1996, Rozakis, 1996. See also Tsakonas, 1996), while a respective forum is hosted in an issue of Canada-based Hellenic Studies in 1997 (v. 5. 2. Especially Constantinides, 1997, Constas, 1997, Couloumbis, 1997, Ifestos, 1997) as a follow-up of an article published on the same journal (Constantinides, 1996). Other inquiries also attest to the institutional growth of the field (Varvarousis, 1993) or its connection with policy making (Greco, 2002) or even the institutional failure of the latter (Ioakimides, 1999) and attempt the connection of Political Theory with I.R. in explicit defence of the classical paradigm (Ifestos, 2001, 2003) or the critical evaluation of Greek foreign policy with respect to identity construction (Heraklides, 2001a).

The result of those inquiries is a range of thoughtful insights. For the majority of Greek international relationists, their community is characterized by great ordeal, despite its institutional development. One cannot but stand on the growing concern about the discrepancy between the expanding community and the lack of paradigmatic embedening, at least as a common rhetorical alternative. For Sociology of Knowledge this is not a problem *per se* (Valle, 1997: 94). Moreover, debates do not pose a problem as such, since they ''are also expressions of coherence'' (Waever, 1998:716). On the other hand, an interesting issue arises when it is often taken too readily for granted what the debate has been about. In that vain, O. Waever has warned that the typical depictions of disciplinary developments rest on a perhaps reasonable but not uncontroversial tendency of engaging into these depictions on the basis of who was right, who was wrong and why a new approach should be followed 'now'. This bares the risk of adopting a typical whigish disciplinary history, which ''assumes a progress where the winning line is also the best, and the past should be measured on the standards of the

present" (Waever, 1998: 690). Here his warning is taken seriously (perhaps too much), since it is about how the progressive account of the development of I.R. in the country may serve not only as a frame but also as a frame-up.

The paper re-constructs the recent discussions among Greek I.R. scholars about the field's development, while the reflection of the !990s is schematically described as the re-entry of the discursive neglect of I.R. of *metapoliteysis* (1974-) with regard to its past. Moreover, it is argued that the field has been heavily embedded during *metapoliteysis* with a social role that conventional fields of the past departed from gradually, at least in part. This embodiment has allowed for the development of various sub-fields, however an open question was left of how cognitive inter-action would take place in a meta-level. Inter-discursive disdain is thus linked to the issue of inter-disciplinarity and taken seriously instead as a mere rhetorical move, bearing implications for any attempt to re-construct I.R. as a scientific field in Greece.

2. The Study of International Interaction Prior to 'Metapoliteysis' (1974-)

Although the paper does not aim to refer comprehensively to the study of international interaction prior to *metapoliteysis* in terms of either literature or socio-political circumstances, a short account is necessary since the appreciation of the recent self-reflection can take place, in part four (4) of this paper, only in view of such account. On the one hand, the end of the World Wars marks mainly (albeit not uniquely) for the Anglo-saxonic countries significant landmarks for the study of I.R., although the nature of those landmarks may be controversial. Is this the case in Greece and if not can this be attributed to its being a continental (by the term 'Continent', we mean 'obviously' Europe) country? If indeed the major change to the conceptualisation of international politics, related to Great War, is the shake of the liberal belief "that modern industrial society had outgrown such violent and irrational patterns of behaviour" (Brown, 2001, 206), then the subjects of this shaking were "a relatively small number of thinkers most of whom were to be found in the English-speaking democracies" (207). In the Greek case, scholars had built ties mainly with Continental Europe, e.g. France and especially Germany. Generally, despite the fact that Greek Independence had been based on a brave movement of enlightenment the dilemmas that arose after its achievement were resolved through romanticism, while that movement remained unfulfilled (see Kitromilides, 1978). Certain of those dilemmas were: a) the discrepancy of the

state's borders with perceived national borders, b) the construction of a predominantly agrarian society, while the nation's middle class forces have and are being developed mainly outside the state and c) the need for tracing antiquity and linking Greek 'reality' to it, which is done through History and Philosophy. So, during interwar the country had already been independent for nearly 100 years, but it was still the general question of the nature of liberal democracy upon which intense social and political conflicts were centred. In particular, activist intellectuals were preoccupied with other issues such as internal institutional (e.g. educational) reforms.

On the other hand, a sizeable literature is developed a little while before and after the end of World War I, concerning Greek claims over the Eastern Question's resolution (see Kitsikis, 1963), e.g. if and how it could consist of a kind of Balkan alliance or a supranational formation. Most crucially, the disaster (at least from a Greek point of view) of 1922 does not result to 'lessons to be learned' discussions in the name of science. Even History is relatively put aside as the major contributor to nation-building for the shake of art and literature. However there are certain contributions (articles, dissertations and books), on behalf of Greek intellectuals, which constitute a varied and non-Greece or Greeks-centric perspective of international politics. Sooner or later many of them get engaged into politics (Papanastasiou, 1916, 1934, Papandreou, 1916, Canellopoulos, 1926a, 1926b, 1927, Sofianopoulos, 1927, Averrof, 1932, Papaligouras, 1941). There is also the development of an economic-sociological thought, which consists of a geopolitical dimension (see Vergopoulos, 1978: 141-149, Meletopoulos, 1999). Moreover, certain diplomats investigate the possibility and necessity of international organization (Hatzivasiliou, 1932, Christopoulos, 1935). However, N. Politis, that is the most prominent Greek scholar who contributes to early I.R. debates (e.g. Politis, 1935), acts mainly abroad. The radical ontology, with which he is associated, is met inside Greece with relative suspicion (Streit, 1928). Most importantly, those contributions are disparate and a respective dialogue is not established.

What follows the new Great War is a discourse of vindication on behalf of politicians and historians or economists (see Chatzivasiliou, 2002). Unlike previous claims in the name of the (in)famous 'Great Idea', there is an appeal for greatness not for the shake of the nation's grandeur but for an avoidance of more

poverty or loss of security. Crucially, the country's turn to communism (or socialism for that matter) is included to such loss. This discourse is also characterized by suspicion towards diplomacy, as an institution of serving interests. It is not about a pessimistic view of human nature, probably military thought aside, but about a forensic reasoning which is based on a general disappointment for the perceived diplomatic intervention to Greek politics as well as for foreign insensitivity to Greece's security agenda. On the other hand, diplomatic officials offer soon accounts of Greek foreign policy. Most importantly, a problematic is formed over the challenges and opportunities of 'small states' such as Greece. It is characterized by the recognition of specific rules of the diplomatic game, as it may be discerned in the journal *International Relations: Review of Foreign Policy* (which was published since 1963 but was rather short-lived). Yet moral idealism is on the fore, i.e. not one according to which harmony of interests is feasible but one where *realpolitik* as such is not an acceptable alternative. It is striking how sharply one of the few sociologists in the country, that is the conservative P. Stamatiades, refutes in one of the first extensive but neglected explicit accounts of I.R. both "the violence and crudeness of the Mongolian spirit" and the "Machiavellianism of the Roman spirit" (Stamatiades, 1964: 22).

It is in the first years of *metapoliteysis* when introductions to I.R. are published by scholars with rather diverse backgrounds (D. Constas, T. Couloumbis, J. Kinnas, G. Tenekides, P. Varvarousis). They are all characterized by a more or less discrete adoption, if at all, of a specific theoretical perspective. Moreover, in their introductory notes, short reference is made to the gap that these contributions aim to fill. G. Tenekides, a prominent expert in International Law, puts the issue thickly in his "Subjects of Sociology of International Relations" (1976). There had already been certain attempts of going beyond "common experience, competence in public relations, polyglottism, knowledge of what is going on behind political scenes and reference in legal or legalist criteria of international law" (9). Nevertheless, what was lacking anyway was the theoretical embodiment of the fact that international reality is "the result of the function of certain social laws which the political scientist has to pinpoint and analyse" (10). According to this methodological turn, it is a short of empirical and circumstantial approach to international politics which is to be blamed for the fact that Greek history lessons were not learned, no matter how rich and painful they had been.

Not unsurprisingly enough, when giving certain examples Tenekides' last example refers to Cyprus tragedy (10-11). What follows those contributions sooner or later are analyses of European Integration, emphasizing Greece's prospects in the E.E.C., as well as analyses of (Greek) Foreign Policy, Law of the Sea, Strategic and Defence Studies, emphasizing Greek-Turkish relations, but other sub-fields as well such as Area Studies and Conflict Resolution.

3. The Debate About Realism in Greek Foreign Policy Since the 1990s

During *metapoliteysis* a cognitive layer develops legitimately in the name of I.R. Nevertheless for the majority of Greek international relationists, their community is characterized primarily by great ordeal, despite its institutional development. The focus of the dispute is both (Greek) foreign policy and the conceptualisation of world politics, but there is no agreement over 'what' its participants are or even 'who' they should be. Interestingly enough, it takes a migrant Cypriot scholar and a Greek-Italian historian post-graduate student to trace it implicitly, but nevertheless distinctively, to specific I.R. debates such as inter-paradigm debate (Constantinides, 1996) or neo-neo debate (Greco, 2002). In contrast to S. Constaninides' sharp depiction of the main opponents of political realists as transnationalists, T. Couloumbis has frequently attempted a description of the study of (Greek) foreign policy through identifying the dispute as one among realists, namely between a rather strong version and a 'hedged' one. So, reference is occasionally made to a debate between proponents of soft security or power and hard ones, Ulysseans and Achilleans, optimists and pessimists. In particular, it is about multilateral and semi-optimist realists who in terms of policy making adopt a euro-centric view, that is they give emphasis to the country's participation to alliances and international organizations or collective security systems, and about unilateral and rather pessimist realists who in terms of policy making adopt a nation-centric view, i.e. they emphasize self-help as a reality of international politics charging the former for not taking it seriously enough (Couloumbis, 1997: 49). In addition, the dominant approach is the multilateralist one, being challenged by the revisionist unilateralist (56). P. Ifestos is in partial agreement with him. He does see a dominant approach that has definitely to be challenged. Nevertheless, in implicit agreement with Constaninides, it is about a dispute between realists and non-realists i.e. the revisionist (for the Greek case) proponents of the classical paradigm and their non-realist opponents who

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dominate public and scientific discourse that is, according to Ifestos, a relatively varied but nevertheless distinctively internationalist approach which is expressed mainly in newspaper columns by politicians and various scientists, notwithstanding international relationists (Ifestos, 1997).

Moreover, "realists [not hedged ones] are presented as moderate Europeanists or even rationalists and, by their opponents, as ethnopopulists" (Constantinides, 1996: 50). However, the attribution to (at least one kind of) realism of nation-centricity or even "Scientific Nationalism" (Heraclides, 2001b) leads to the complaint about how the predominant characterization of (part of) realism as nation-centric, as opposed to euro-centric, marginalizes it (Constas, 1997, 42-3). A respective theoretical move is the development of an explicitly Thucydidean reading of international politics. Such perspective is appraised in the name of its varied explanation of state behaviour and the systemic explanation of the causes of war (Platias, 1999, Ifestos, 2001, 2002).

Interestingly enough, if it is Couloumbis who pinpoints that "when self-critique reaches the limits of unnatural masochism, it can be used as a means of exploitation of the Greek people by domestic and foreign saviours" (Couloumbis, 1978: 171), it is Ifestos who constructs a problematic the core of which is the linkage of hegemonism with ''Fetishist Internationalism'', that is neo-liberal approaches and cosmopolitanism (Ifestos, 1997), as well as specific versions of realism, when gradually expanding his argument (Ifestos, 2001). His complaint against those approaches is that they engage in foreign policy making, offering the wrong short of services, being construed on suspicious or invalid theoretical, meta-theoretical or even social bases. His own vivid demand for setting and specifying rules on the community's function (that is group identity, attitudes and norms) relies implicitly on a Mertonian sociological account (Ifestos, 1996, 2003). Moreover, according to his foundationalist and eclectic line of reasoning it is value-freeness that provides the adequate framework for confronting this linkage. To that end he draws from the Greek Historian of Ideas P. Kondylis (1991), in one of the first extensive references of Greek I.R. to Political Theory. Yet, he develops a practical notion of science and political realism that differs from a technical one, while at the same time he remains (rather too overtly) highly suspicious of critical thought, by pursuing a rather textualist approach to I.R. Theory. In particular, Ifestos has yet to

leave margin for a discussion of the hegemonic character of political realism or I.R. Theory not only as not value-free enough but in other terms as well.

On the other hand if Ifestos is aware of the "ambivalence of multifarious reality of international life" (Ifestos, 2002β: 41), heavy doubts are expressed whether such ambivalence is taken seriously enough and about how such proposed rules, concerning the community's social layer, mark a distinction of a specific core in I.R. by certain sub-fields, marginalizing the latter and reifying the former (Fatouros, 1996). Most crucially, it is A. Heraclides (2001a) who associates what he regards as a conservative and even dangerous political realist perspective to foreign policy, with respect to the country's relations with Turkey. Even though he does not adhere explicitly to a post-positivist point of view, his approach is one of the most critical towards Greek self-image. On the other hand, although it is not that a comprehensive comparative analysis should have been pursued, such sharp division of labour in conducting strict critique bares the risk of losing sight of the dialectical nature of Greek-Turkish dispute.

Two distinct moves have been discerned so far. There is a realist attempt on theory building, including rules that should govern Greek I.R. community. On the other hand, there is a critical approach towards realism as participant in the construction of Greek identity. Both are part of a series of (re)action to discussions about I.R. and especially realism. Another indicative and more general move is the acceptance of a division of labour in a frame of complementarity (Couloumbis, 1997: 58, Constas, 1997: 43-4). Moreover, it is noted that "nor 'Europeanists' support what they are accused of by 'nationalists', nor 'nationalists' what they are on their turn accused of" (Fatouros, 1996: 62). But that is a relief as far as the 'support' part is concerned and not the 'accuse' part. At the same time, it is suggested that a rather strong version of liberalism may be to the fore (Greco, 2002: 9, n. 52) and it is noted that if the field is characterized by lack of scholarly productivity, this is no unique of I.R. communities in countries ''classified in the category of small, less economically developed, internally divided and strategically located" (Couloumbis, 1997: 50). Indeed, it is asserted that the failure of rationalization of Greek politics has led to the predominance of the personality factor over institutional structures (Platias, 1996: 164, Ioakimides, 1999). Equally importantly, a reference is evoked with regard to the level of abstractness of the field. So while it is rather early that appeals are made to "link scientific research

with the constantly changing theoretical problematic of the field" (Constas, 1983, 5-6), the embryonic state of theoretical production published in the country is still asserted (Varvarousis, 1993: 343, Tsakonas, 1996, Constantinides, 1996: 55) along with the troubled extroversion of Greek I.R. community (Rozakis, 1996: 54).

Finally, from the point of view of the so-called unilateralist approach, a strong affinity of the alleged dominant approach with marginal I.R. of the 1970s is affirmed (Ifestos, 1996: 75, 1999: 123). The truth is that a pluralist perspective, which emphasizes interdependence, is pursued in early *metapoliteysis* (Ioakimides, 1980, Kinnas, 1980) and it is not neglected later (e.g. Canellopoulos, Fragonikolopoulos, 1995, Tsinisizelis, Ifantis, 2000). Moreover, an issue of the journal of *Law and Politics* (issue five), which acts as a predecessor of *International Law and International Politics*, emphasizes on multinational corporations. Indicatively enough, however, in the articles of that journal very few refer explicitly to the pluralist problematic, not to mention the Marxist. Most crucially, when it is postulated by a pluralist analyst that in Greek Foreign Policy the ''Neo-liberal Paradigm is Followed'' (Kinnas, 1979/1977) and predominates a nationalist or a realist one, it is interesting to observe that the terms in this case are assigned particular meanings. They do not refer to I.R. Theory but to the relations of foreign policy and domestic policy. In particular, what is meant here is that foreign policy considerations are no longer as subsumed to domestic policy as before. In any case, the denotation of the affinity of such internationalist dominant approach with I.R. of the 1970s is accurate to the degree that any suspicions against realism have indeed taken place mainly in a rather foundationalist vain (albeit not behaviourist), as far as I.R. is concerned. Specifically, the entry of post-positivism into the debate was rather delayed, compared to other continental communities, although the Greek case is not unique in that (see Lucarelli, Menotti, 2002). For example, it may be that sophisticated theoretical inquiries are highly thoughtful of the connection of hegemonism with particular theoretical approaches such as realism (Heraclides, 2000: 110) or liberalism (Ifestos, 2001: 223), but those inquiries do not attempt an explicit connection with the post-positivist agenda. Nevertheless, the publications in Greek of holders of recent Ph.D.s or post-graduate students, usually having studied abroad, have contributed to the qualification of the Greek I.R. post-positivist neglect.

The aim in this part was to re-construct briefly the discussion among Greek I.R. scholars, with regard to the field's development in the country. It was argued that for Greek scholars a rather sharp discussion has developed since the 1990s, focusing on foreign policy and the nature of international politics. On the one hand, there is nothing peculiar *per se* about the simultaneous appearance of strong realists who ''adopt realist premises in a way that allows only modest space for politically salient 'non-realist' concerns'' or ''present realism as a positive theory of (international) politics or statesmanship'' and hedged realists who ''accept the realist definition of the problem of 'international' politics –anarchy and egoism- but show varying degrees of discomfort with the 'solution' of power politics'', gradually merging ''into views that are fundamentally something else'' (Donnelly, 2000: 12-3). Equally importantly, the strong and simultaneous preoccupation of scholars with the cognitive worlds of both science and society, at least at an early stage, do not constitute as such a paradox or an anomaly, from the point of Sociology of Knowledge (Gunnarsson, 1997: 118-20). So a presumed sharpness may indeed be attributed to certain circumstances. In fact, the source of this intensity is located to various factors such as the lack of theoretical basis of Greek empirical research or the dominance of sharp public discourse concerning foreign policy. Leaving aside any probable hilarious reflection on behalf of an external observer (a Greek as well) to such sharpness, inter-discursive disdain is not a mere rhetorical move. What is important about the sharp marking and probably exclusion of a piece of analysis (as well as scholars for that matter) as nationalist or hard-liner and utopian or no expert is not that such marking exists, but its function to the communication of sub-fields in a meta-level and to the handling of high task uncertainty, that is the discrepancy between the need to provide new knowledge and the need to connect it to previous pieces of knowledge, which is more difficult when such connection takes place between sub-fields (see Waever, 1998, 717-9).

4. What to make out of the Debate: The Re-entry of the Landmark of 'Metapoliteysis'

Although one cannot (and need not for that matter) to speak of a distinguishingly Greek national perspective in I.R., the field has not emerged irrespectively of specific socio-political circumstances, which have been emphasized in the recent local self-reflection. In this part of the paper it is argued that such reflection runs the risk of being a presentist disciplinary account that

resorts to contextualist explanations to constitute a disciplinary embarrassment and then to proposed textualist readings of I.R. or Political Theory or Greek nationalism for the resolve of that embarrassment. This frame may function also as a frame-up, not taking seriously enough the fact that if recent discussions about I.R. realism in Greece have not been 'easy' this is not irrelevant of how it was difficult to speak of it, perhaps even modern (not to mention post-modern) political and social theory, prior to *metapoliteysis.*

In the recent Greek I.R. self-reflection, common emphasis is given to the fact that it was only during *metapoliteysis* when I.R. was introduced as a scientific field not confined to International Law and Diplomatic History (Varvarousis, 1993: 332, Constantinides, 1996: 44, Rozakis, 1996: 52, Couloumbis, 1997: 49-50, Konstas, 1997: 31, Heraclides, 2000: 13, Greco, 2002: 1). This is right in terms of self-conscious understanding of participating to the formal study of I.R. No chairs of I.R. were assigned and probably those of International Law proved to be very few, despite the fact that for a long period of the early cold war in Panteion University 2 out of about 15 chairs of regular professors were assigned to International Law and International Law plus Diplomatic History. The most often mentioned factors, which are attributed to the respective change, are: a) the variation of academic freedom and social critique, b) the return or coming of researchers from abroad (both Europe and the American Continent), c) the rise of interest for foreign policy in view of two major challenges (Cyprus and the rising Greek-Turkish dispute on the one hand and Greece's European dimension on the other), along with the concomitant demand for experts, d) institutional changes in the educational system which allow a more vibrant development for various scientific fields or scientific research and mitigate relatively the past hierarchical nature or localization of science and finally e) the intellectual shaking of a legalist approach as the dominant one in social sciences in Greece.

This approach to the development of the field traces a particular change in view of a specific political development that has shaked significantly political and intellectual elites. By referring mainly to the social context of the field's development, it usefully and bravely traces significant socio-political factors which, however, are more about why the field developed during *metapoliteysis* and less about how it had not developed prior to it. In addition, it constitutes a latent correspondence of viewing the end of World War I as a landmark of I.R. in general

to the beginning of *metapoliteysis* as a landmark of Greek I.R. The need for such landmark would hardly be considered as unreasonable. In view of a reality of politics whose (lack of) rationalization has been and is still discussed as well as of a not so often pluralistic previous social science, the progressive evaluation of the field's institutional development has constituted an element of its identity, enhancing Greek international relationists' confidence as well as their embarrassment when this lack of rationalization is still asserted.

On the other hand, less is mentioned about the 'real' debates that have actually taken place. Indeed, the intellectual predominance of the sciences of Law has been put into scrutiny and references to this predominance might have made it easier for I.R. to develop as a Political Science or later (to Ifestos' view) even as a field which is based on a specific Philosophy of International Relations. However, the breakthrough of *metapoliteysis* is that it was no longer disputed that foreign policy had to be taken seriously or to be put on at least an equal footing with domestic politics, in the name of respective laws. The positive effect is that research was not confined to denouncements of the past, while interdisciplinary communication was enhanced between scientists who formed institutions of communication such the *Greek Society of International Law and International Relations* (albeit not International Studies) or certain journals such as the *Hellenic Review of International Relations* or *International Law and International Politics* (although they have often proven to be short-lived). The controversial effect relates to the growing discrepancy between the social role for I.R., as a contributor to Greek society or foreign policy, by claiming authority about how officials or people should either act or think (in view of scientific value-neutrality), and the critical introspection of Greek nationalism that has taken place within I.R. and especially History or even Political Science. In other words, I.R. in Greece was rather consensually developed as an explicitly national science, at the same time that Greek nation(alism) was put gradually into serious scrutiny. Most crucially, no matter how tempting it is to deny, qualify or discredit one such move or the other, the important point is how this co-existence is missed in recent self-reflection.

In particular, introspection to the intellectual past did not take place neither for Law nor (most crucially) for more neglected past insights about international interaction which, as suggested (albeit not proven) in the second part of the essay, took place prior to *metapoliteysis* (cf. the economist Vergopoulos, 1978: 141-9 and

the sociologist Meletopoulos, 1999). To be sure, it is neither about the shortage of references to the intellectual past nor about a demand made here in favour of a theoretical development based on past Greek discourse. The point is that there was no extensive appraisal or disdain towards specific scientific discourses of the past, while the point of departure from metapoliteysis is methodological. Thus a margin for inter-discursive disdain, *vis a vis* the delay of the community's departure from the field's extroversion, was left open. However, If *metapoliteysis* is seen as a landmark that primarily marks a distinction with respect to the previous predominance of International Law and Diplomatic History in International Studies, then it is missed that the crux of the respective turn was the culmination of the abandonment (in the name of methodology) of forensic reasoning that made national issues unfold as issues of right and not of interest. And in reverse, if this crux is missed, then that predominance is emphasized.

However, such predominance may be misleading to the degree that International Law prior to *metapoliteysis* did not function (at least uniquely) dominantly in International Studies but also in a 'positive' way of expanding it by giving it a kind of sociological and historical perspective, no matter how restrictive, in light of History's and Philosophy's relative neglect (cf. Kougeas, 1928). Given that prior to *metapoliteysis* from History's point of view (reflected in Ph.D.s and university chairs) there were scarce inquiries in international politics in the name of Diplomatic and World History, Balkan studies being an exception, it is only too recently that historians have been engaged self-critically to the study of the 'inter-national'. In addition, it is present-day international relationists and historians, having engaged themselves often with research over (Greek) nationalism, who have denunciated often the discursive predominance of foreign policy and security issues as 'national issues' (Ioakimides, 1999: 73-4, Gianoulopoulos, 2001: 56, Heralcides, 2001: 73-4). From the same point of view, a somewhat anti-realist stance is usually adopted as well as suspicion of a presumed nation-centric I.R., tending to treat radical versions of I.R. realism as such. No matter how one is to evaluate that nation-centricity has tended to be the focal point of serious charges and vehement suspicion against certain realist versions, such move cannot be dumped as merely rhetorical, since it reflects genuine concerns on the linkage between scientific discourse and nationalism. On the other hand, in view of the (rightful) denigration of *ethnikofrosyne* (the past belief in the nation as a political

dogma) during *metapoliteysis*, pinpointing certain versions of I.R. realism as nation-centric has indeed had similar effects of another denigration, that of appeasement in public discourse as a strategic alternative (ascertained by Platias, 1992: 45, n. 36). Then it was to be followed by an equally vehement resort to responses of both sociological and theoretical nature, while the issue has evolved primarily as one of the predominance of a kind of internationalism and not as the past inheritance of a general intellectual suspicion against *realpolitik*, i.e. a suspicion that was shown prior to *metapoliteysis* through nation-centric public discourse and during it by scholars highly critical of nation-centrism and nationalism.

Finally, if a dispute is constructed among those who are accused of not being realist or strong enough realists (or realists at all) and not realistic or hedged enough realists, then the socio-political circumstances that had been recognized as crucial for the development of the field are put aside and it is too easily presumed that various factors are something of a noise or extra-scientific. I.R. Theory then is read rather textually, i.e. emerging as a revelation out of an eternal wisdom (see Bell, 2003: 153), while at the same time texts are cut through from an intellectual or social environment. So, missing the infeasibility of present-day 'realism' prior to *metapoliteysis,* to which present-day 'idealism' cannot be held responsible for, frames (up) the difficulty of discussing realism as an issue reduced to that ontology or epistemology was not gotten right. Such textualist readings take place in the name of resolving the embarrassment about the field's development, which has been constituted by specific contextualist explanations, and thus frame (up) the dispute as one between idealists and too sentimental realists (or realistic realists and real scientists).

5. Concluding Remarks

The aim here was to provide an account for the development of International Studies in Greece through the re-construction of recent accounts of disciplinary developments. According to the recent self-reflection of the field a harsh debate, focusing on foreign policy and the conceptualisation of world politics, has arisen in rather sharp terms and has been met with a sort of disappointment about the state of the art in the country, despite an undeniable institutional growth. Then, serious attempts towards theory building or critical self-reflection as well as appeals for setting group norms have taken place to come to terms with this

disappointment. As far as Greek I.R. is concerned, it has indeed taken some time for general theory to play the role of prioritising and systematizing different specialties, while social localization of science (e.g. chair system) has been dealt with delay. However the Greek community has not been unique in that, if one considers France or Germany.

The point of departure of this paper from similar accounts, about the Greek case, was to avoid both treating theoretical content as the field of resolution of problems of social nature and proposing new thick labels. In particular, it was attempted to take inter-discursive disdain seriously and not as a mere rhetorical move, linking it with the issue of inter-disciplinarity. In addition, it was argued that Greek sharpness is based on the neglect of the growing discrepancy between the social role for I.R., as a contributor to society or foreign policy, and the critical introspection of Greek nationalism which has taken place within I.R. and especially History or Political Science. It is indeed true that the 1990s have been a crucial challenge for I.R. scholarship with regard to end of the cold war. Greek scholarship could hardly be an exception, especially since Greece was heavily influenced by the Balkan uprisings. However, the 1990s have been important for Greek scholarship not only due to the 'challenges of reality' but from a sociological point of view as well. The respective debate has been formed as one where someone has not taken 'our' 'theory' 'right', not including how it was difficult to take 'theory' 'right' before. In that way it has been taken too readily for granted what the debate has been about by damping, rightly but rather easily, its sharpness to the lack of distinctive theoretical embodiment of pieces of analysis or the predominance of public discourse over scientific one and not to the repetition during that decade of the discursive neglect on its behalf with regard to its past, which has been emphasized here as the re-entry of *metapoliteysis*.

Where do all these leave us? Is it that Greek Scholars should stop informing students that prior to *metapoliteysis* International Studies was reduced essentially to International Law? No, unless of course an archaeological inquiry verified the existence of a university chair of I.R., which we were unaware of. However, the decade of the 1970s rightly or wrongly was not crucial because the study of international interaction started to be discussed extensively in the name of I.R. as a Political Science, although that happened as well. Instead, this is so because of the culmination of the field's embodiment with a social role that

conventional fields of the past departed from gradually, at least in part. The neglect of the discrepancy of the field's emergence as a national science, at a time that the nation itself has been dealt self-critically, has had consequences for inter-disciplinary communication. That this was seen since the 1990s as debate between a kind of not a realist enough realism (or not realism at all) and a not realistic enough realism is not unusual. In fact, it confirms the establishment of I.R. in the country and thus it is to be appreciated, until it leads too readily to proclamations of the short 'lets get back to the usual staff', without seeing that for good or bad *this* might be the usual staff.

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TITLE

"The Role of the Press in a 'Conflict': the Greek press coverage of

the Greek-Turkish dispute"

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Conflict is a complex phenomenon. There is a wide variety of factors which provide a basis for a different characterization of the conflict. In this context the mass media's role in the diffusion of information about individuals, groups and events, and the construction of a conflict is of highly significance. In order to understand the role of the media and more precisely the role of the press in the construction of a conflict, I examine the Greek press coverage of the Greek-Turkish dispute.   The interest in this dispute lies in its protracted political and emotional, characteristics, as well as in the lack of any research on the role of the press in such situations.

My analysis of the role of the Greek press is founded on the premise that its own role and significance in the Greek foreign policy is important. It is through the press that the interaction of different agendas (public, policy, press) take place and shape the outcome of the foreign policy. Its role is significant in the construction and distribution of the dominant discourse in foreign policy. The construction of the dominant discourse comes as a result both from the public opinion and the political elites agendas. The press does not seek exclusively a mediation role between those two poles but it equally preserves an autonomous role, contributing to the process of the construction of the dominant discourse. As Thompson points out, mass media should not be regarded simply as channels for the circulation and diffusion of symbolic forms, but also as mechanism which creates new kinds of actions and interactions, and contributes to the establishment of new kinds of social relations[1]. Mass media affect the ways that we participate in the political sphere, since they do not only provide cognitive knowledge informing us about what is happening but also order and structure political reality.

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[1] Thompson J.B: <u>Ideology and Modern Culture</u> p.265Cambridge: Polity 1990

Methodology

In order to evaluate the role of the Greek press in Greek-Turkish relations, both in situations of confrontation and attempted resolution, I will examine the coverage of the press of the 1987 and 1996 crisis, and the Helsinki accord of 1999. The first two were chosen because they represent the most serious crises between the two countries, in different decades and in a different socio-economic environments. The Helsinki accord is the most important initiative for rapprochement, whilst it signals the ongoing effort to resolve the 'conflict'.

The analysis comprises 4 mainstream newspapers which are:: 1) Vima-Nea 2) Eleftherotypia 3) Eleftheros Typos 4) Kathimerini 5) Rizospastis.

A three-month period will be examined in order to evaluate the interest in and coverage of Greek-Turkish relations by the Greek press, commencing a month before and ending a month.

In the analysis of the Greek press headlines the following hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis 1: Negative stereotypes of the Turks seem to overwhelm the positive ones. This coverage works towards the continuation of the dispute, since it constructs a negative image of the 'Other', drawing upon nationalistic stereotypes. This hypothesis aims to discover the role of the press in the construction of the Greek-Turkish disputes, and to highlight its importance in the diffusion of it.

Hypothesis 2: The news coverage by the selected newspapers is more favourable towards Greek foreign policy decisions in times of conflict than on efforts to defuse it. This hypothesis aims to measure the stance of the press and its ability to be critical even in moments that are considered important for the nation.

Hypothesis 3: The existent press coverage tends to favour and extend national stereotypes for the 'Other'. It is 'constant' in general across time, while political and

economical changes do have an impact upon the way that the Greek-Turkish relations are viewed. Little change over two times suggests that adversarial relations with Turkey are part of the national identity, which in turn is an important factor among others, behind the images.

Hypothesis 4: Greek press coverage is affected by emotional representations of third parties. As a result the images that are conveyed to the public do not represent the complexities of international relations and are easily exploited.

With regards to the influence of the press, on the public and the decisions-makers, I adopt the agenda-setting model as has been modified by Rogers and Dearing[2]. I use critical discourse analysis and the agenda-setting model, in order to evaluate how the Greek press constructs the public and policy agenda. My premise is that the Greek press sets the public and policy agenda. It both prioritises themes for public debate and determines the terms in which the themes are discussed.

Critical discourse analysis will reveal the content of this proposed agenda, and especially the construction of a discourse. It will provide a comprehensive account of the context and implications of the words, sentences, statements and arguments used in the sampled newspapers headlines The combination of agenda-setting model and discourse analysis will contribute further to our understanding of the role of the press in the construction of the public sphere. As Hall states: "Precisely because identities are constructed within not outside discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific denunciative strategies".[3] It is

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[2] Everett Rogers & James Dearing : "Agenda-setting research where it has been where it is going" in James Anderson(eds): <u>Communication Yearbook/11</u> Sage Publications pp. 550-560
[3] Hall : introduction: Who needs 'identity'? p. 4 in S. Hall and R. Gay (eds): <u>Questions of Cultural identity</u>, 1996 London: Sage

therefore particularly useful in analyzing how significantly the other side is reported in the press, and the importance of these representations in the public agenda.

Since "newspapers are constitutive of the social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief they represent a particularly important site for the production, reproduction and/or resistance to discourse on and around notions of 'We-dom' and 'They-dom'"[4]. Discourse analysis investigates how 'Their' negativity is constructed and maintained.

2. <u>Greek-Turkish Relations 1974-2000</u>

No crisis can be understood without its social context. The historical reservoir of negative images, prejudices and stereotypes about the "other" is very critical in the emergence and the escalation of crisis. It is necessary to understand that Greece and Turkey are two countries that achieved their sovereignty as a result of wars of liberation fought against each other. The collective memory in both Greece and Turkey is continuously nourished by reminders of past enmity in history textbooks and the media.

<u>1987 Crisis</u>

This crisis, as the one that took place in 1976, hinged on proposed oil explorations in disputed waters and likewise involved the survey ship Sismik. The Greek government tabled a bill to take control of Canadian-owned North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC) that exploited the Prinos oilfield off the Greek island of Thasos.

Turkish government granted further exploration and exploitation licenses to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation in international waters near the Greek island

Samothrace. At the same time, Turkey accused Greece of having violated the Berne Protocol of November 1976.

On 28 March 1987, when the Turkish survey ship Sismik under naval escort set sail for the Aegean sea, Greek and Turkish forces were placed on alert and Papandreou declared that all necessary measures would be taken to safeguard Greece's sovereign rights. Holding NATO and, in particular, the United States responsible for the crisis, Papandreou ordered the suspension of communication facilities at the American base at Nea Makri. It also promptly dispatched his foreign minister to Sofia to brief the Bulgarian leader Tudor Jivkov. In a calculated snub, the ambassadors of Warsaw Pact countries in Athens were briefed on the crisis in advance of their NATO counterparts.[5] The threat of outright hostilities was averted only when Ozal declared that Sismik would operate only in Turkish territorial seas, while Greece likewise declared that no drilling would take place in disputed waters. After the crisis of 1987 a secret dialogue was established between Ozal and Papandreou that lead to a breakthrough that materialized in Davos in February 1988.

Imia/Kardak Crisis 1996

In 1996 Papandreou, the founder of PASOK and Prime Minister of the time, resigned and in his position K.Simitis was elected. His election signaled an effort for 'modernization' and change in domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy, and more specifically the policy towards Turkey, ceased to be viewed as a zero-sum game.

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[4] Hartley: "Critical Discourse analysis p.145 in Van Dijk (ed): Discourse and Communication : New approaches to the analysis of mass media discourse and communication Berlin, New York: W de Gruytez 1985

[5] Richard Clogg: Greek-Turkish relations in the post 1974 period, p. 15 in Dimitris Constas (edit): The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s:Domestic and External influences Macmillan London 1991

In late December 1995, a Turkish merchant vessel ran aground on the coast of the rocky islet Imia/Kardak in the Aegean Sea. This incident was followed by a small but silent exchange of diplomatic papers between the Greek and Turkish authorities as to who was to rescue the ship. The Turkish government in a verbal note argued that Imia/Kardak belonged to Turkish territory which was disputed by Athens. After an exchange of notes, the Greek authorities finally sent a Greek tugboat to the aid of the vessel. On 25 of January the mayor of Kalymnos (an island situated next to Imia in the Aegean) took action and planted the Greek flag on the rocky soil of the island. This was the spark that inspired the Turkish newspaper "Hürriyet" to fly a helicopter with a team of journalists and photographers to the tiny islet, to remove the Greek flag and hoist the Turkish one.

Things took a more serious turn from that moment on. The Greek navy changed the flag within 24 hours and by January 30/31-1996 Greek and Turkish naval forces stood opposite each other in Aegean.[6] The crisis escalated further when Turkish special forces landed and occupied one of the isles that was not been guarded by the Greek army. The intervention of USA and especially a phone call by the President of the United States in person to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey averted further escalation of the already dangerous situation. A deal under the auspices of the United States was achieved and the two countries withdrew their armies from the area.

Helsinki Accords 1999

The significant domestic changes- cultural and international- that both Greece and Turkey were experiencing, has raised awareness among reformers on both sides of the Aegean that resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute was necessary.

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[6]Ibid p.135

During the second half of 1999, Greek-Turkish relations entered a phase of détente. An important factor has been the establishment of a working relationship between G. Papandreou and Ismail Gem, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers respectively.

The ongoing rapprochement has been further prompted by the solidarity exhibited by the Greek and Turkish people in the face of the humanitarian disaster caused by devastating earthquakes in both countries on August and September 1999. "In the EU summit at Helsinki on 10 December of 1999 all member states agreed to grant Turkey candidate status for future membership under the condition that it could meet the Copenhagen criteria. These criteria adopted in 1993, specified that prospective EU members must 1) be democratic and respect human rights; 2) have basic macroeconomic stability and an ability to deal with market competition and 3) be able to adopt the body of EU law. In addition Turkey was expected to make progress in relations with Greece especially over Cyprus."[7]

Helsinki accords heralds a new prospect for relations between the two states and introduces the EU as a major factor of pacification in the troubled region. The decision by the EU to consider Turkey as a candidate for accession, further contributed to the process of dialogue.

1987 CRISIS

The Greek press during the 1987 crisis supported what is perceived as a decisive stance of the government towards the Turkish 'provocations' *(Decisive stance against Turkey Kath 25/02).* The word 'decisive' that appears in most of the headlines justifies the use of military means, as appropriate towards Turkish 'provocations'. It also serves as an approval from the press of this policy that is 'decisive' in contrast

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[7] Paul Kubicek : The Earthquake, Europe, and prospects for political change in Turkey Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.52, No 2 Summer 2001

with other policies (like rapprochement) that from before are set to be non-decisive or to constitute signs of retreat.

During the crisis the headlines become dramatic in their tone *(Zero Hour Eleft.28/03.)* The 'dramatization' of the events aimed at evoking feelings of insecurity, extreme danger and threat. Thus the use of relevant metaphors mobilized these feelings and prompted a unified stance by the public towards the danger **Turkey's 'aggressiveness' is frequently employed by the headlines.** It is suggested that it is an inherent characteristic of the Turkish policy, especially manifest in the stance of the Turkish politicians toward Greece. *(Don't play with the fire. Turkey is dropping the glove (Eleyft.22-23/03 Ozal attacks: Andreas imprudent-unreliable (on his way to USA he had made of power threatening and insulting (Rizo.04/02), Ozal Provocation. He is threatening having the backing of Reagan. (E.T. 05/02).*

Turkey's policy is presented as posing a threat to the stability of the whole region. *(Divested effects the Turkish provocations (Kath21/03)*. Through the use of words like 'divested' the 'Turkish threat' is magnified, while the responsibility from the beginning is placed upon the Turkish side. Turkish moves are characterised as 'provocations', while the Greek ones are 'defending acts' (*Ankara escalates the provocations Kath14/03*), *Turkish ultimatum, while 'Hora' is departing for the Aegean Rizo 15/03.)*. It is a method that constructs an ideology of victimization, and justifies the use of all means necessary to protect the nation from its 'opponent expansionism'. Oppositional newspapers continued to be critical towards the government and the handling of the crisis (*War climate, while government is fuelling a national disunity E.T. 26/03. A deception and a sale (of the national rights). A secret deal between the deputy Foreign Ministers Akiman-Kapsis. E.T.30/03. You should go. You have surrendered the Aegean to the Turks, Mitsotakis accusations as*

tomorrows Prime Minister. Sub. Title: They have surrendered the Aegean without a dialogue E.T. 31/03.)

The use of words like 'surrender' and 'sale' creates the impression of an ongoing war between the two countries, while it constitutes a division line between patriots and traitors. The former are characterised by their decisive stance and firmness towards Turkey while the latter, by their 'appeasing and retreating stance'. The oppositional newspapers are critical towards the Greek government. They accuse the government of apathy towards Turkish 'provocations and challenges' of Greek sovereignty. In these cases the antithetical scheme Greek mildness stance versus Turkeys provocation, and aggressiveness is employed. (*Government watching in apathy as Piri-Reis comes out in the Aegean Kath.12/03*) *The crisis is under control. The government either worries or assuring excessively Kath 24/03).*

The same newspapers used the Greek-Turkish relations for political exploitation in two ways.1) They accused the government of yielding to Turkish claims, while the oppositional parties declared their firmness (*We dare. Mitsotakis (*then leader of the New Democracy Party) *quote that he will proceed with the drilling E.T. 7-8/03)* (*Unacceptable retreats towards Turkey (Rizo) (Turkey is 'threshing' to Aegean. A Turkish submarine was found close to Athens E.T.. 23/03*) 2) Quotes from Turkish officials that negatively characterized the Greek political opponent of the newspaper, were used in order to expose the 'incapability' of the government. *(Ozal attacks: Andreas is imprudent-unreliable. E.T. 04/02)*

The perseverance of the use of the name 'Hora', or 'Piri Reis' instead of the new name of the same ship 'Sismik', emphasizes in what is seen as a continuation along the time of the Turkish aggressiveness. (*Government watching in apathy as Piri-Reis comes out in the Aegean Kath. 12/03*). *They have taken Hora out in the Aegean again*

(Eleyft.20/03 Turkish ultimatum, while 'Hora' is departing for the Aegean (Vima 20/03).

When faced with the prospect of a Greek-Turkish dialogue, the Greek press maintains a cautious stance as can be seen from titles like *First talks with Turkey, Exchange of letters between the two prime ministers. Eleft. 03/04)*. Dialogue is seen as part of the zero-sum game. In this context, as long as 'we win' there is a neutral-to-positive stance as shown by the above headlines.

In the proposed ways for resolution of the tension the Greek stance is praised as in accordance with international law while Turkey's proposals are presented as residing outside of lawful solutions. According to the headlines, the Greek side is looking at ways to resolve the conflict through addressing to the International Court of Justice while Turkey proposes a dialogue that leads to the bargaining away of Greek rights. The antithetical scheme employed in this case is Greece's rightful claims as against claims that are based on threats which are sought to be justified through bargaining. *(End at bargaining (Eleft 05/04), Turkey is looking forwards to the division of the Aegean. Turkey reacts in the suggestion from the European Parliament (to commit the dispute in Hague) adhering to the bilateral talks (Kath 06/04).*

The USA is presented with a colonial image 'dictating' both countries. Additionally, it is considered as backing Turkey. Turkey is presented to be more valuable than Greece in the American interest calculation, and its claims to be heard and 'understood' are met, while the Greek ones are bypassed (*USA is aiming at the stability in Aegean, despite the phrases excessive in favor of Turkey (Kath18/03). (We are not taking any other slap in the face, Eleft. Ozal Provocation. He is threatening having the backing of Reagan.)* In order to understand the USA representation in the Greek press we have to bear in mind that it is heavily influenced by the following: 1)

It is widely believed that the Turkish invasion in Cyprus took place with the American acquiescence 2) antagonistic relations between the Reagan administration and the socialist government in Greece. Therefore any efforts by the USA in the long term to intervene as a honest broker between the two countries would be viewed by Greece with suspicion

An anti-American stance is adopted by the majority of the press, even by newspapers that belongs to the right of the political spectrum, which traditionally kept a pro-American stance. The language and rhetoric used is in contrast to the collective experiences, memory and ideology of their predominantly politically and socially conservative public. This change signified the growth of anti-Americanism that covers the entire political spectrum.

In contrast the way that USA is represented, Greek press adopts a more positive stance towards Europe and European institutions like the European Parliament. *(In favor of commit to Hague the European Parliament Kath. 10/03) it refers to the commit of the dispute to the International Court in Hague)*. This positive stance signals the beginning of a shift in foreign policy from the USA to the EU as a forum where Greek interests are best served.

The case of Rizospastis differs from the other newspapers, since it reflects the official position of the Greek Communist Party. Rizospastis adopted a Marxist analysis of the crisis which views conflicts in general as a by-product of capitalism and imperialism. The same applies to the Greek-Turkish tension whish was considered to be the product of NATO and USA intervention in the region in order to promote their interests. A way out of the conflict would be if both countries break their ties with American imperialism. Turkish aggressiveness was attributed to America's guidance (*Ozal Provocation. He is threatening having the backing of Reagan. The American*

Pentagon supports the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. A blackmailing gung (The Americans behind Evren in the steering wheel of 'Hora'. Dangerous games by the Americans in the Aegean Sea. They support Turkish chauvinism) At the same time 'Rizospastis' favored a friendship between the two nations, separating the people of Turkey from the political-military complex that was in power and which profited from the continuous tension. This stance was a result of the fact that the Greek Communist Party was the only Greek party which had direct talks with its illegal counterpart in Turkey, even in times close to or after a crisis. *(Bridge of friendship between the two nations. Interview with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey. Rizo. 14/02)*

3.2 <u>Imia/Kardak crisis 1996</u>

The headlines of this period represent a general 'disappointment' over the handling of the crisis by the Greek government. More specifically there is a sense of humiliation and retreat from the Greek government and a victory of Turkish 'aggression'. *(And now what we will do if Turkey hits back again? (Eleft. 01/02) Shame on us, we have been humiliated by the Turks. Subtitle: They placed the Turkish flag in Imia. E.T 29/01.)* Turkey is presented as rejecting any resolution of the crisis based upon means like the International Court of Justicet, favouring instead a dialogue based on its own terms. *(No to Hague, because we will loose Turkey responds, Eleft15/02). Ankara does not promote the Hague solution, Kath 10/02).* Instead of addressing the dispute to the ICJ, Turkey chooses the use of threats of war. *(Tsiler is threatening with another war, Eleft 05/02).*

Turkey is accused of insolvency, *(Turkey is insolvent Eleft 06/02).* In another headline with a similar context the reader is informed that *(Turkey should respect its signature E.T.12/02).* The general context of the phrase, presents Turkey as a country

that cannot be trusted, since it does not respect any agreements or laws. This in turn leaves no space for compromise, since Turkey has been presented as morally bankrupt. War, or the continuation of the conflict, seems the only solution in order for Greece to safeguard its sovereignty rights.

Another characteristic that is attributed to Turkey is that of a continuous demand that is not easily satisfied. *(Turkey is pushing to the limits E.T.13/02)* Desite the 'gains' that it got over the latest incident, Turkey is presented as still demanding and pushing the Greek 'patience' to the limit. The only appropriate response is a military one, since appeasement fails to respond to the continuation of provocations. Representations of this kind lead to the creation of a more pro-war prone public opinion, since it moves from the scene any other response. The Greek public is led to believe in the need for a continuous rearment to counteract the direct threat of Turkey's permanent and repetitive claims against the Greek sovereignty.

The selective presentation and the emphasis on "irrational", "offensive" and "aggressive" aspects of the events are crucial in the creation of a series of stereotypes of the "other" which in turn are frequently employed in further press coverage.

Even some Turks recognize the justness of the Greek claims as the headline of 'Eleftherotypia' informs the reader *(You are right in the name of Allah Eleft17/02)*. The use of the word Allah is employed in order to support the truthfulness of the sentence while it gives the impression that it has been made to a virtual court. This recognition promotes the 'objective' character of the Greek claims while undermines Turkish claims as unjustified. As a result any dialogue between the two countries will lead to Greek losses.

In this crisis the oppositional press stance is very critical of the Greek government *(To the Death squad Simitis and Pagkalos. Simitis is letting Tsiler and attacking Andreas.*

E.T. 03/02) This 'humiliation' is paralleled to the one in 1922 between Greece and Turkey. Metaphors as to the 'death squad' are used in order for the historic analogies to be drawn by the reader. Then, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs minister were charged with treason, because of the capture of the islet by the Turks and their decision to disengage instead of escalating the crisis.

Metaphors like (*To the Death squad Simitis and Pagkalos, Pagkalos with fesi (Turkish hat), E.T. 05/02)* create an atmosphere that pose as a threat to future agreements for disengagement, making the potential for a war more likely. Any appeals or propositions for an approach with the 'Other' are 'banned', since they are being equated with treason. The only solution is the use of military force.

The criticism against the government escalates by representing the Greek government as having completely 'surrendered' to Turkey *(Greece is being left ungoverned while the Turks are cruising. Another slap in the face: Simitis in Brussels have surrendered totally to the Turks. Three juntas are fighting against each other. The country has been left at the mercy of the Americans and the Turks. E.T. 10/02.)*

The perpetuation of the conflict is reflected in headlines that are calling to 'reorganize our capabilities'. *(It's time to rally to reorganize our capabilities (Kath 04/02).* There is a call to the nation to be prepared for a second round in the near future while it presents hostility in the relations between the two nations as something normal. War preparations are to be considered 'normal', and the right reaction to be followed by the political leadership. Dialogue and a policy to diffuse the conflict are pushed out from the dominant discourse as not the appropriate approach towards an 'unreliable, 'expansionist, 'brutal' Other. Implicit is the message that only military preparations, and even the will to use military force will provide Greece with the necessary security, and will not allow the repetition of the Cyprus tragedy.

Turkish claims are undermined through the use of the following tactics: 1) ironic headlines *(Operation goats Eleft 20/02)*. 2) references made to articles in the Western press. In this case, the Western media is used in order to add to the rightness of the Greek claims and unlawfunessl of the Turkish ones. *(Tsilers' claims are brazen, reproduction of the New York Times article. Eleft.12/03)*

The reproduction of articles from Western newspapers that are considered to be influential serves the claim that 'although our allies realize the rightfulness of the Greek claims, they turn a blind eye to them.' *(French and British do not have a clear stance. British torpedo to Greece. Eleft 14-15/03)*. This emotional representation of relations among these countries has a big affect, and it might explain the anti-American or even sometimes anti-Western stances of the Greek public opinion.

The disappointment over failure to deal with the last incident leaves a feeling of Greece having being betrayed by its allies, and most notably the USA (*Now we are looking for allies. Eleft 17/03*) The image of the USA, as in the previous crisis, is of a country that favours Turkish expansionism against Greece This representation does not allow the USA to be seen as a honest broker while it serves the emotional reporting that masks the complexities of international relations. USA according to this representations adopts a double standard policy, pressuring Greece to accept a settlement, while recommending that Turkey accept the committing of the dispute to the Hague *(Clinton to Demirel: Promoted Turkey but recommended to go to Hague. Eleft. 22/02). Washington is trying to restore, Kath22/02)*. Only the newspaper Vima is more keen towards American intervention for a compromise between the two countries (*Clinton intervenes in order to succeed a compromise in the ongoing disputes. Dayton for the Aegean Sea. Rizo.18/02)*. The Greek government is presented as obeying to the Americans and abolishing Greek rights *(They have given away the*

12 miles in the night of the big treason. A cynical intervention by the Americans: Orders in the style of Piourifoy[8], The country has been left at the mercy of the Americans and the Turks. Bargaining between Clinton and Demirel for our islands, E.T. 14/02) Humiliation and submission to American imperialism Rizo 17/02).

The stance of the Greek press is more favourable towards Europe, although that the USA was the one that intervened to ensure the de-escalation of the crisis. Imia/Kardak crisis symbolized a political turn towards Europe and its institutions in order to secure Greece's rights. This turn in the political level was reflected in the headlines as well, which in general welcomed it. In contrast to the USA's image the EU's is by far better. *(Help from Europe,Eleft23/02), Solidarity to Greece by the European Union, Kath 24/02). Europe is our shield in Aegean. "New Democracy" achievements overcome government's failures. A Foreign Policy success by Evert in Strasburg. E.T. 26/02).* The appealing to others represents a common way of reinforcing the sense of justification of Greek claims. It is contradictory though, since in decisions favouring Turkey the same newspapers accuse the EU or its member of favouritism. This manner of reporting fails to reflect the complexities of international relations in order to facilitate the exploitation of public opinion.

For Rizospastis, pursuing a policy of divide and rule by imperialist America is the major explanation of this crisis, as well as the previous one. American imperialism that favours the military expansionism of Turkey should be the target of both countries policy rather than working against each other. *(NATOI (in Greeks means they referring to NATO) the enemies of peace in the Aegean. The Division and ruling is the enemy. A continuous threat the politics of subordination. (Rizo31/02)* The Greek

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[8] American ambassador that served in Greece during the fifties, and he has became synonymus with American interventionism in Greek politics. His term is the highlights of the American interventionism in Greece since he had a saying even in the composition of the cabinet.

government is being accused of following a policy of subordination. (*A new "thank you" this time to Brussels28/02*). Rizospastis, in contrast, favours through its headlines, the friendship between the two nations on the pretext that they would be liberated from imperialistic interventions.

4. A change in the Greek foreign policy and the stance of the Greek press

4.1 Helsinki Accords 1999

The stance of the Greek newspapers, as in the previous incidents, was informed by their political preferences, although common elements between them could be found. Eleftherotypia, Vima, Kathimerini tended to support the government decision to lift the veto on Turkey's nomination as candidate EU member.

Eleftheros Typos and Rizospastis are against the accords, which they consider to be negative for Greece. The image of Turkey as portrayed during and after the Helsinki accords remains the same as in the previous crises. It is upon this enemy image that they build their critical stance against the Helsinki accords. In the newspapers that are supportive of the accords, there is a small change in Turkey's image. There is still the aggressive, arrogant, and non-democratic image implicitly included in headlines *(From now on the pressure will come from Europe,Kath 14/12),* but there is an optimism that it might be the beginning of a new era in Greek-Turkish relations. *(A new era marked by hopes and bargain Eleft.11/12)*

Greek-Turkish relations are viewed as a zero-sum game, something that all newspapers share. In that sense, for some Greek newspapers, the Helsinki accords are portrayed as a Greek victory while for others it is a Greek loss and a Turkish gain.

The newspapers that have a more positive stance, are still cautious about Turkey's behaviour (*Greece says Yes, but.. Greece got want it wanted, Kath.10/12) A new era marked by hopes and bargains The big chance Elefth. 11/12)*

In contrast Eleftheros Typos and Rizospastis transmit a negative image of the Helsinki accords *(Three gifts to Ankara by Simitis. Article: They gave away everything without getting anything in return 6 reasons against and 1 in favour of Helsinki Accord Negative future affects are behind the triumphal. E.T. 12-14/12) People will 'pay' for the Helsinki Accords Rizo.14/12)* The use of the word 'gift' in conjunction with 'gave away', signifies the 'unacceptable' retreat of the Greek government. A retreat that has being dictated by the USA (*Yes to everything, Simitis accepts everything by Clinton's order (E.T.10/12)* and obeyed by a 'willing' government. Rizospastis adopts the same view (*People are ready to act against the 'New Order''12/12).* For this newspaper the Helsinki accords are viewed as part of the plan that was announced by president Bush after the Gulf war. In this context the American superpower imposed its will to achieve a Greek-Turkish settlement that would promote Turkey's candidacy for EU membership and its status in general as a regional power. There is a repetition as in the crisis of 1987 and 1996, of the representation of the USA as having a pro-Turkish stance. The same scheme is employed, the one of the Great Power that dictating its will to Greece. A scheme easily recognized and probably adopted by the reader.

The image of Greece giving away everything without getting anything in return is highlighted by (*Simitis confession: Turkey still poses a threat even after Helsinki accords. E. T.15/12)*. The threat that the 'Other' posses is used in order to reinforce the opposition to policies like this one. The reader is lead to accept that the only successful policies are the ones that vanquish the Turkish threat. Long-term policies like the ones that are needed between countries engaged in protracted tension relations, are not considered applicable. This kind of reporting should be seen as part of the same context that misleads the reader when covering international relations

issues and tends to oversimplify and categorise power relations inside and amongst countries.

Fostering expectations that long-term animosity can be extinguished in a short-term period is creating expectations that are difficult to meet. This usually has negative effects on public opinions' support for rapprochement policies, as shown from the Palestian-Israeli peace talks after the Oslo agreement.

5. <u>CONCLUSIONS</u>

As a first of my paper I made some hypotheses concerning the Greek press coverage. My first hypothesis was that negative stereotypes of Turks seem to overwhelm the positive ones. This coverage works towards the continuation of the dispute, since it constructs a negative image of the 'Other', drawing upon nationalistic stereotypes. The hypothesis has proven to be correct. Turkey is presented as 'aggressive' and 'expansionist', with a 'provokative behaviour' which poses a threat to regional stability. Turkish 'expansionism' is continuous and aims at the takeover of Greek territory. This claim is connected with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and is reinforced after the Turkish takeover of the islet during the Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996. Turkeys 'aggressiveness' is frequent employed by the headlines which deem it to be inherent in Turkish policy. The image of the Turks through at the whole public sphere is the one of the 'principal' and 'eternal enemy'. The historical background (the Ottoman empire, the War of Liberation, the Asia Minor disaster, the war in Cyprus) and the present tension provide the basis for attributing imaginary and non-imaginary perceptions to any fact regarding Turkey and the Turks. The emphasis on Turkish aggressiveness in contrast with the Greek 'defending' stance leads to the construction of an ideology of victimization, and justifies the use of all means necessary to protect Greece from its 'expansionist opponent'.

The press provides the body of information background for the formation of perceptions of Turkey. This information does not derive from the public's experience of direct contact with the Turks; rather it is information processed by the press and therefore structured by the particular constraints under which the Greek national press has to operate. Through the overwhelming negative representation of Turkey, the Greek press plays a major role in "undermining" their discourse, and divesting their actions of any rational or moral basis.

My second hypothesis was that news coverage by the selected newspapers is more favourable toward Greek foreign policy decisions in times of conflict than on efforts to defuse it. This hypothesis aims to measure the stance of the press and its ability to be critical even in moments that considered important for the nation. This hypothesis is less valid. The Greek press's stance is affected by its political party affiliations, which results to be critical or supportive towards the handling of the Greek-Turkish relations. The critical stance adopted by the oppositional newspapers though does not doubt the dominant discourse about Greece rights etc, but is directed at the Greek government calling for no compromises.

We must note here that in very rare cases the Greek press tends to critically evaluate the Greek position and let the positions of the 'Other' be transmitted. The criticism against the government policy is in between the lines of the Greek position. Besides the characterisation of Greek-Turkish relations as 'National issues' does not leave much space for a critical evaluation.

Thirdly I hypothesized that the existing coverage tends to favour and extend national stereotypes of the 'Other'. It is 'constant' in general across time, while political and economical changes do not have an impact upon the way that the Greek-Turkish relations are viewed. Little change over two time periods suggests that

adversarial relations with Turkey are part of the national identity, which in turn is an important, among others, factor behind the images of the 'Other'. This hypothesis has to a great extent, been proven. Press coverage tends to be constant and promotes the national stereotypes of Turkey. But it seems that political and economic changes in Greece had an impact upon press coverage.

With respect to the image of third parties, my hypothesis was that their portrayal in the Greek press is affected by emotional appeal. As a result, the images that are conveyed to the public do not represent the complexities of international relations, and are easily exploited.

The analysis of the Greek press revealed a number of discursive strategies that present the 'Other/Enemy' as a homogeneous, internally undifferentiated entity intending to deprive Greece of her identity and territory. Equating through dissimulation the representations of the 'Other's' citizens, political forces, government, with ultra nationalists is a commonly used strategy. Based on these representations the perception of the 'Other' as being the embodiment of internal and external opposition appears in the form of the 'principal' and 'eternal enemy'. The nation is established as a pure, moral and internally homogenous entity with its own rights, through the symbolic exclusion of dissidents.

The Greek press plays a significant role in the construction and distribution of the dominant discourse in foreign policy. The construction of the dominant discourse comes as a result of both the public opinion and from the political elites. The role of the press is not just that of mediation between these two poles but it preserves an autonomous role, contributing to the process of the construction of the dominant discourse.

The stance of the Greek press cannot be attributed only to the national identity. In the construction of these images other factors of equal importance contribute as well. In the case of the Greek press much of its representations influenced by the newspaper's political affiliation. Also bearing in mind the promotional role that the headlines play in the Greek press, some of the representations or more accurately, the dramatization of the events, can be attributed to their aim to increase their circulation.

The Greek press does not usually determine the foreign policy agenda, but it clearly wields a large amount of influence, as it has been shown through the cases that I studied. The press plays a crucial role in defining "success" and "failure" insofar as the public is concerned. It provides meaning and mediates the meaning of the action in foreign policy. Its influence is greater in foreign policy issues because of the lack of personal experience, and consequently, the public's reliance upon the information that receives from the mass media in general. A very important survey conducted in both countries underlies the importance of the above. Ninety-five(95) percent of Turkish people feel that the Greeks are not to be trusted, although ninety-three (93) percent have never met a Greek; at the same time seventy three(73) percent of Greek people feel that Turks are not to be trusted although seventy (70) percent of the Greeks have never actually met a Turk.[9]

The role of the press is important in any case and especially if we want to move forward and break this cycle of confrontation. It is important because the press can possibly provide a critical stance that would break the dominant national stereotypes and move to the construction of a collective identity based on a future of regional peace and mutual trust and respect, rather than on the divisions of the past.

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[9]Piar of Turkey and ICAP of Greece: Perceptions from the two shores of the Aegean, Private View, 1997 Vol. 1 no.3 p.45

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The Relationship between Science, Ideology and Politics in Modern Greece: the case of the scientific discourse during the Kosovo "war"

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"The relationship between science, ideology and politics in modern Greece:

The case of the scientific discourse during the Kosovo "war""

The study deals with the role and the influence of intellectuals in public opinion during the Kosovo conflict. More specifically, it focuses on the political, social and ideological implication of the scientific discourse of Greek intellectuals during the above period, not only in the construction of a social consensus on national issues related to national stereotypes, but also in the external policy.

This study refers to the procedures through which the Greek scientists intellectuals as political and social subjects influenced specifically the public sphere in Greece during the Kosovo conflict. The examined period includes the 78 days of bombardment and is extended from 22nd of March 1999 up to end of June 1999. The scientific discourse of Greek intellectuals is analysed and interpreted through a selective corpus of articles, texts and publications in press during the above period.

This effort doesn't concern the study of the "real" question -in material terms-that results from the NATO "intervention" in ex-Yugoslavia or in a more general frame from the complex situation in the Balkans, and therefore it won't implicate an analysis on the level of international relations or political science in the strict sense. On the contrary, it will be focused on the examination, analysis and deconstruction of the different discourses that were articulated round this question.

The research aims to explore the ideological aspect of the scientific discourse in question related to the construction of a national identity and a social consensus on national matters, offering often rational alibis to nationalist manifestations. Furthermore, the analysis is focused on the mechanism through which the intellectuals, taking advantage of their social status and image as

scientists, who work for official institutions such as universities, centres of research, etc, comment on national matters having a privileged relation with the mass media and a significant influence on public opinion. Their discourse as political subjects either in the form of rational arguments or in a more ideological form, enjoys a wide importance in the social and political system and the public sphere.

The choice of examining the scientific discourse concerning national topics, especially through the analysis of texts referring to Kosovo crisis, arose from three reasons. Firstly, the period in question is characterized by particular interest, because of the qualitative particularity of NATO "military intervention" in former Yugoslavia, which was characterized and was nominated as a "humanitarian intervention" on behalf of NATO, imposing thus substantially a "new military humanism". Secondly, this intervention raised various and particularly intense reactions of an important part of the Greek population and generally the Greek political environment for two reasons. On the one hand, there was the threat that war (and especially ethnic war) pose to neighbouring countries. On the other hand, there was a certain polarisation of Greek public opinion against the "military intervention" of NATO and a "sympathy" in favour of the Serbs, for historical, cultural and geopolitical reasons, mythological constructions and ideological stereotypes as the historical relationship with the orthodox Serbs and a nominally "anti-imperialist" ideological construction ("ideologeme") of profoundly nationalist orientations. We should also notice the particular interest of the discourse certain intellectuals (not only scientists), so much in Greece as in other western countries, who through rational arguments and alibis, not only influenced and formed public opinion (with the "help" of the media), in favour or against NATO's intervention, but furthermore, they offered to NATO the theoretical and ideological necessary support to justify and legitimate its actions or on the contrary demolished every arguments in favour of the "humanitarian character" of the above intervention. The analysis, is

expected to examine questions concerning the institutional dimension of intellectuals and the ideological conditions of production of the academic discourse, the hegemony of their discourse in academic, social and political level and the opposition between sovereignty and justice (Mill, Kant). Thirdly, this case study constitutes fertile ground for the examination of certain issues such as identity and nationalism, because of the above-mentioned role of the intellectuals, and of the disguised and inconspicuous ideological even nationalistic elements that often structure their discourse.

The analysis aims to explore the relationship between science (social science) and ideology as different aspects of discourse. The analysis is based on theoretical formulations regarding ideology, truth, power, politics and intellectuals. Therefore, different topics that extend over wider theoretical scientific areas come into question. It won't be possible to choose and apply one and pure theoretical model "X", but the effort will be concentrate on the selection, synthesis and adjustment of different formulations and conceptual schemas. This alternative is expected to bend on a more complete approach.

More specifically, there are three main hypotheses, which constitute the principal axes of the analysis:

1. *Scientific discourse and ideology*

Scientific discourse is considered as a political discourse. The emphasis is given to the study and articulation of power relations inside this discourse, in combination with the ideological conditions of production and hegemony at the scientific, social and political level.

The specific scientific discourse, since it is enunciated from a political subject, is constituted also as an ideological discourse. Because this political subject has been constituted and functions as such, in other words is acting and interacting

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politically in a particular social formation, in a political, economic system and in a specific environment of cultural values, it also produces ideology. It produces knowledge in a specific political and socio-economic system, which means that it both implicates and creates power relations. But this fact doesn't affect negatively its scientificity and doesn't transform it into something non-scientific, non-real or untruthful. So, beyond its strictly scientific role, it exercises also another wider role in relation with the social reality, an ideological role. In this context, the research will concentrate on the power relations within discourse, in its internal structure, as well as on the ideological conditions of production and hegemony on a scientific, social and political level.

Paraphrasing Louis Althusser's position on ideology, and considering that politics is structured through power relations and confrontation, which means a way of acting over the others' actions according to Foucault's analysis[1], *the concept of ideology* is contemplated as the political aspect of discourse. This means that it is interpreted as the exercise of power by means of discourse, and as political conflict and social confrontation within discourse. The concept of subject constitution through ideology, the examination of the ideological enclosure as a narrative process and the analysis of power relations within discourse as a narration make up some of the analytical and theoretical tools of this study[2].

Furthermore, the *concepts of knowledge, truth, power* and their correlation define the background of the analysis. The concept of power isn't approached only negatively as repression but also positively as something productive. Power relations extend beyond the government area all over society. So, we approach knowledge as something that produces power and constitutes a "regime of truth". This "regime of truth" is not only a discursive order but is more

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[1] Foucault Michel, "The subject and Power", in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics,* Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982, pp. 208-226.

[2] Doxiadis Kyrkos, "Foucault, ideology, communication", in Hellenic review of Social Research, issue 71, 1988, pp. 18-43.

extensively an institutional, political and economical regime related to its equivalent political, economical, ideological mechanisms such as the university, the army, the mass media... This indicates the existence of a whole system of rules, which separate and determine the following dipoles: truth - false, scientific - non-scientific. According to Foucaults' analysis there is always a battle for the truth or about truth. This battle aims to ensure the status and role of truth on political and social becoming[3].

2. Intellectuals and power

The intellectuals' role and function, as a particular social category, enjoying a privileged position through power relations over a wide social configuration, will substantially constitute a central topic of this inquiring effort. In fact, because of the above particularity, their ideological function influences not only what we called "public opinion" but often the entire political system. Their privileged position inside/within the system of power social relations results substantially from their symbolic identity as political subjects.

In the case of Greece, the particular role of intellectuals as subjects of scientific discourse is closely related to their ambiguous identity: they are considered as "specific intellectuals" in their scientific area and as "universal intellectuals" in the political and social system. This analysis focuses on this particularity of the identity and the role of the *scientist intellectuals* as "specific" and "universal" intellectuals according to Foucaults' approach[4] in relation with Gramsci's theory and the dipole organic-traditional intellectuals. Their ideological function and institutional form, as well as their privileged relation with the mass media appear as an essential aspect of this approach. So that, on the one hand specific intellectuals are also regarded as organic

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[3] Foucault Michel, "Truth and Power", in *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980, pp. 109-133.
[4] Ibid. pp. 109-133.

intellectuals, having some common characteristics with this second category and a specialisation directly related to a particular social formation and very often, liable to a governmental, political, ideological mechanism such as university even if the latter gains a particular autonomy. On the other hand, universal intellectuals are closely related to traditional intellectuals as they are characterised by a continuous presence and enjoy universal approval.

The ideological dimension of their discourse as political subjects tends to be underestimated, but because of their status and authority as "specific intellectuals"-scientists, their discourse is widely accepted, having a significant influence on public opinion.

In this context, the discourse of "specific" and also "universal" intellectuals concerning national questions, is deeply ideological, is articulated through undeniably ideological elements and involves certain ideological components. In others words, every time that, through the scientific discourse, the subjects in question express a personal opinion at the same time they proceed in an evaluative judgement. Comparing this particular discourse (scientific discourse) with a purely ideological discourse, we certainly distinguish qualitative but also quantitative differences between them. But, even if we classified it in a qualitatively different category of ideological discourse, this would not reverse its ideological dimension, since it constitutes a discourse of political subjects who function in a particular social configuration. More specifically, regarding the Greek case we could, completely empirically and more instinctually (for the moment), classify the discourses of the Greek intellectuals scientists in six basic categories, without disregarding the proportional qualitative fluctuations in their interior.

1. Condemnation both of the NATO military intervention and of the "Albanian genocide", but finally in favour of the "Right of the most Powerful".
2. Condemnation of the NATO military intervention, which is considered worse than the "Albanian genocide".

3. Condemnation of the NATO military intervention and justification of Milosevic.

4. Against both of the NATO military intervention and of Milosevic's policy.

5. Theoretically in favour of the NATO military intervention, as a "humanitarian intervention", but expressing at the same time an intense criticism and disapproval concerning the way of its realisation, and also against the "Albanian genocide".

6. In favour the NATO military intervention, as the inevitable way of avoiding the unacceptable "Albanian genocide".

3. Nationalism and social consensus

Another aspect of this analysis deals with *nationalism* and the articulation of the scientific discourse with ideological, nationalist elements in combination with the double dimension of Greek identity. The intellectuals play an important role in the formation of a social consensus. In fact, because of their ambiguous identity, they offer very often a rational alibi to nationalist manifestations. The double dimension of the Greek (neo-Hellenic) identity: Hellenism, admiration of antiquity and orthodoxy, confront the occidental model and conclude in the well-known contradiction: we vs. others. Regarding globalisation, the Greek intellectual community in all its components (academics, journalists, politicians, prominent scientists, members of the clergy, artists), has largely consolidated itself around a nominally "anti-imperialist" ideologeme of profoundly nationalist orientations – and this holds true regarding the whole of the political spectrum, from the extreme left to the extreme right. The sympathy, mainly in favour of Serbs, considering them like "brothers", for historical, cultural, religious[5], political and geo-political reasons in relation with anti-imperialistic and especially anti-American sentiments, inspired by the "common belief" on NATO's

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[5] The common Orthodox confession between Greeks and Serbs in relation with an also common "dislike" against Albanians, for different economic, political, social and religious reasons in both States, leads crucially to the particular position of the Greek media with reference to the Kosovo crisis.

implication in Greek national affairs, mainly during the Civil War in the period 1946-1949, the establishment of the seven-year military dictatorship in Greece in 1967, as well as the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army in 1974, influenced decisively the discourse of the Greek media, despite the variations and the differences concerning not only the rhetoric but also the ideological level of enunciation.

It was not the first time that the Greek intellectuals and media, faced with "national crisis" and "ethnic confrontations", contributed to the creation (with some exceptions, of course) of such a nationalistic and ethnocentric climate. In 1991, with the "Macedonian affair", concerning the parentage and the use of the name "Macedonia", which was supposed to be an ancient and historical heritage of Northern Greece, and in the mid 1990s with the "crisis of Imia", when Greece and Turkey claimed the ownership of a tiny uninhabited island in the Eastern Aegean Sea. Before the Kosovo crisis, there were the ethnic and nationalist wars in Bosnia and Croatia that awoke "national" and "anti-Occidental" sentiments and increased their impact for the balance on the Balkan Peninsula.

The "globalisation vs. nation-state dilemma" therefore in the case of Greece has acquired dramatic political proportions, and presents a strong challenge to any person who believes that things could be seen otherwise. Greece has the particularity of being both in the European Union and one of the Balkan countries; so its status in political and ideological terms can at best serve as a linkage between the two, and at worst may become a hindrance to the integration of the latter within the former.

In this context, there will arise various theoretical issues concerning sovereignty and the right to self-determination. In the Kosovo case, the question to answer is whether and to what extent, the Kosovo problem and the crisis in former Yugoslavia, is one of internal administrative status, in which case

sovereign rights of Serbia over the territory of Kosovo should take precedence over the rights of the majority population of the region. Or, whether it concerns a clear case of self-determination, involving the secession of the local population (mainly ethnic Albanian population), in which case the international state borders of probably three or four, states might be affected[6]. Therefore, the "new" "humanitarian" role of NATO as "defender" of the Human Rights and the astonishing, for the international community, circumvention of the Security Council and the violation of the Chart of the United Nations, bring to the fore a fundamental contradiction of Liberalism. On the one hand, a sovereign nation and people's right to self-determination, and on the other hand, the universality of the human rights regardless of national borders. This contradiction leads to thematics concerning the Law/Ethic, the rights of minorities, the change of the borders, the right of intervention for humanitarian reasons in the interior of a state, the role of NATO and the European Union in similar crises, etc. Furthermore, it brings up to the discussion of the question of the maintenance, of the Nation-State in its existing form.

The central issue therefore is how these questions and problems are represented and diffused in Greek society through the role of the intellectuals and what are the implications of this process.

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[6] Veremis, Thanos and Kofos, Evangelos, *Kosovo: Avoiding another Balkan war,* ELIAMEP-University of Athens, Athens, 1998, pp.43-49.

METHODS

In this study the methodological approach is focused on discourse analysis of the above publications and is closely related to Foucault's analysis (which appears in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*). There will be four axes of analysis[7]:

1. *Axis of objects*

This axis corresponds to the objective elements of reality, the elements, which exist independently of the discourse itself. In this case study and depending on the text that is examined each time, such elements can be considered as the geographic borders of Greece, the historical period to which each scientific discourse, refers the Greek language, the actual developments of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, certain socio-economic data, etc.

2. *Axis of modes of enunciation*

In this axis there are two levels of analysis: The first level is related to the external conditions of enunciation (e.g. the conditions of production of the particular discourse). In the research in question, elements such as the scientific status of the writer, the selected means of communication such as radio and TV programme or a particular newspaper, the political backup of this newspaper, the fact that the writer has a regular co-operation or not with the selected press, or the articles of opinion as particular category, constitute certain external conditions which offer to the discourse that is examined an additional specification.

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[7] I refer to the analysis of Kyrkos Doxiadis in Syllabus of Postgraduate Course in Political Science and Sociology, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens, Academic Year 2001-2002, Course description: *Discourse Analysis*, pp. 33-37.

The second level is related to the internal conditions of enunciation. More specifically, it refers to the position that the subject of enunciation holds in the internal structure of discourse, in other words, within discourse, mainly in relation with its narrative function. The discourse is faced as structured and articulated conceptual system. The three modes of narration according to Tzvetan Todorov[8], the omniscient, the objective and the subjective mode of narration, depending on the relation that exists between the narrator and the characters in a particular text, constitute some of the elements of analysis on this first level. Seeing that the scientific discourse does not consist a fiction, it would be inadmissible and very risky or problematic to use and to apply thoughtless by the above typology. In the analysis in question the subjectivity of the writer (we could consider him as the narrator), the fact that he also constitutes a subject of science, the mode of articulation of his discourse, for example if he writes on the 1stor the 3rd person singular or plural form, they are elements that should be analysed on this axis. In general terms and considering all the hesitations mentioned above, at a first level of analysis one can distinguish an objective dimension of the subject-writer (e.g. scientific concepts or some historical information), we could also perceive certain elements equivalent with the omniscient type of narration.

3. Axis of concepts

This axis consists in the relation of the particular discourse with other discourses (e.g. technical and scientific terms, rhetorical schemas…). It refers to scientific concepts and theoretical propositions situated in a discourse, such as the formulation of "historical continuity" in historiography, "purity of the Greek language" in linguistics, "geopolitical strategy" in international relations or " self-determination" in political science. The concepts of "nation", "history", «international legitimacy", "legitimate order", " Lechtsstaat ", "International

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[8] Tzvetan Todorov, *The Poetics of Prose*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, New York 1977μ pp. 27-28.

Law", "clash of civilisations" and "religion/orthodoxy", constitute some of the elements analysed through this axis.

4. Axis of thematics

This axis refers to a distinction of the different notional thematics of the particular discourse. It examines the relation of the discourse in question with power and it's closely related to ideology, since it is dealing with issues that are at stake within the discourse, with questions of controversy and conflict. Among others, the role of Greece in Balkans, Greek identity, the unifying role of the church, the historical and cultural links with the Serbs, the ideologeme of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, the idea that Turkey is a long standing enemy, are some of the thematics arising from the particular analysis.

SOURCES OF THE EMPIRICAL DATA

This research will be conducted through a selective corpus of different articles and texts published in the press and magazines during the war, and furthermore some publications and books concerning the above period. More precisely, it will focus on the most important and widely distributed daily, weekly and Sunday newspapers, which cover a more or less wide political spectrum. These newspapers enjoy a great influence on public opinion by condensing comments of the most important weekly events and more detailed and analytical publications as articles of opinion. Moreover, this particular type of press contains a significant number of articles written by intellectuals, who comment on the subjects in question. An examination of the Greek media coverage (especially the press) and interpretation of the events during the Kosovo crisis, despite any differences concerning the political or other factors (e.g. variations in the phrasing and in emphasis), demonstrates the particularity of the Greek position, which differed from the vast majority of NATO and other western countries[9]. More specifically, it shows a more or less unanimous but not uniform opposition to the bombing campaign, resulting from a dislike towards NATO, a manifest mistrust towards the Kosovo-Abanian factor and a sympathy for Serbs, that originated from different historical, cultural and geopolitical reasons[10]. According to a limited and a first level analysis of the scientific discourse of the Greek intellectuals, the first impression doesn't reflect totally the above image. There are some similarities with the mass media position around the Kosovo crisis (like the anti-NATO sentiments), but also a lot of qualitative differences, concerning not only the style but also the substance of their

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[9] According to Stefanos Pesmazoglou, during the NATO's bombardment western public opinion, influenced from the " image of the refugees" that was shown by the western media, identified with NATO humanitarian intervention, and regarded the human, environmental and material losses as "collateral damages", Pezmantzoglou Stefanos, *Kosovo: the Double Insult. Surveillance and Punishment,* Athens, Pataki, 2001, pp.12-13.

[10] Kondopoulou, Margarita, "The Greek Media and the Kosovo Crisis", p. 1 Conflict and Communication Online, vol 1 no 2, 2002, Verlag Irena Regent, Berlin, p.2-9 and especially

discourse. Regarding the sources (press and magazines) the following are indicatively mentioned:

Press:

1. Eleftherotypia
2. Ethnos
3. Kathimerini
4. Rizospastis
5. Ta Nea
6. To Vima
7. Kathimerini tis Kyriakis (Sunday Kathimerini)
8. Kyriakatiki Avgi (Sunday Avgi)
9. Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, (Sunday Eleftherotypia)
10. To Kyriakatiko Vima (Sunday Vima), etc.

Magazines:

1. Sychrona Themata
2. Nea Estia
3. Nemecis
4. Politis
5. Anti, etc.

Giallouridis, K. Christoforos and Kefala D.Vivi, *Kosovo: the picture of the war. Aspects of the modern militaristic humanitarianism,* Athens, Sideris, 2001 pp.149-154.

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The Interaction between Politics, Communication and the Media Examined through the Spectrum of Game Theory: a case study of the Greek- Turkish relationship

Introduction

This research attempts to clarify the role of communication and the media in the political process and the influence this is likely to have on the procedure of decision making and ultimately, on the formation of foreign policy, using as a case study the press coverage of two relatively recent Greek-Turkish crises. The basic research question is, to what extent and under what conditions the media can turn into active participants in the political process and foreign policy, particularly in political crises that have occurred in the Balkans region, without the involvement of USA and the American media, where study has focused so far. For this question, the employment of game theory will help create a systematic framework based on which the political process will be analysed and ultimately the media will be placed in order to test their potential role. Attention will be paid on the extent to which the different political situation prevailing in Greece and Turkey and the different conditions of each crisis defined the space allowed to the media and the role played by them, accordingly. Through the application of Game theory on the two crises, there will be an attempt to draw inferences about the degree to which the media no longer constitute an external but an internal, active player in the game.

Game theory does not represent a description of reality and of every-day life situations. It reflects a certain matrix of action and behavior that is not possible to apply perfectly to reality; this is basically due to human weaknesses and time restrictions that render individuals unable to correspond to the norms of behavior and action it sets. Therefore, as a theory it is bound to undergo limitations when applied to reality. On the other hand, it is its systematic character that turns game theory into a useful tool to explain reality situations. In particular, in a case such as that of communications and its role in the political process, game theory can offer a substantial framework so as to assign/attribute roles to the participants, specify their action and their sources of motivation, examine their interaction in an organized and systematic way taking into account most, if not all, possible motives and clarify those factors and "qualifications" required for individuals to become active participants in this political game. In this research, game theory offers an instrument to specify the political framework in which the media turn into participants and to attribute a role to them according to the conditions prevailing in each certain political situation. The point of departure will be a hypothesis formulated according to previous studies related to the specific

topic. That is, when there is a firm, clear-cut policy followed by politicians, the media become less likely to interfere in the process of decision- making. This piece of work will attempt to examine the degree to which this assumption is valid, initially through the spectrum of Game Theory. Therefore it will help in examining the interaction between politicians and the media in a more unambiguous and systematic way.

In this paper the relationship between two traditional "enemies", Greece and Turkey, will be used as a solid basis on which game theory will be applied. There are certain features in this relationship that make the two Greek-Turkish crises a suitable case study in order to test the role of the media in the conduct of foreign policy. Apart from the fact that these two specific crises both fall under the scope of game theory, Greece and Turkey constitute two interesting examples of the way in which different regimes can define the action of such an important vehicle of influence in contemporary society and politics, as the media.

The Greek-Turkish crises 1987 and 1996

The crises that will function as cases studies for this paper are two relatively recent disputes that, in terms of game theory, they can be described as "Chicken Games". Both crises were short-term as none of the two lasted for more that seven days and, luckily, none of them ended into a war between the two countries. The two countries confronted each other using their strategies as weapons. The different way in which each crisis was escalated and resolved and the different policies that were followed by the two sides constitute some major factors as to when and under what conditions the media could "fit" in the political process.

The 1987 oil-drilling crisis

One of the events that have made their mark on the relationship between Greece and Turkey is the oil-drilling crisis 1987. The two countries went to the brink of war in March 1987 this time over mineral rights in the Aegean. The crisis was –ostensibly- generated by the Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company that had made plans to prospect for oil right outside Greece's territorial waters. The reason for the initiation of the crisis lies in the NAPC consortium's intention to proceed with further prospecting for new oil deposits in a position east of the island of Thasos and further than the six nautical miles. This decision was against the Bern Agreement, signed by Greece and Turkey (11.11.1986). According to Article 6, "both countries are obliged to refrain from any initiative or action related to the Aegean shelf that could offend the treatment" (Article 6, Bern Agreement).It has to be mentioned that in 1982 the Greek government proclaimed that they did not recognise the Bern Agreement. The reason was the ineffective negotiation process between Greece and Turkey concerning the shelf, as the Turkish government refused to accept the legal resolution of the issue in The Hague Court.

In order to prevent the NAPC consortium from proceeding with oil prospecting in the area, the Greek government attempted to buy the majority of the consortium's hold shares in the International Stock Markets, but with no success. At the same time, the Turkish government appeared to believe that further oil prospecting was imminent; and used that assumption as an excuse to authorize the Sismik II, a research vessel escorted by warships, to explore for oil in the disputed continent shelf around the islands of Lesvos, Lemnos and Samothrace. In other words, it seems that Turkey aimed at exploiting the controversy that arose between NAPC and the Greek governments so as to serve its own objectives in the Aegean and achieve the commencement of a new negotiation round regarding the shelf and the Aegean islands.

At this point it is useful to explain the role and the importance of the continental shelf of the islands, which is one of the reasons that creates further controversies between the two countries as while according to the Greek views and interests the shelf of the islands is a major issue, Turkey refuses to accept the existence of a shelf around the islands. According to the criteria that define the term "shelf" more than half of the Aegean Sea is supposed to constitute Turkish shelf. However, given the demand of the Greek side for the recognition and definition of the Greek shelf as well- this concerns the Greek islands situated near Anatolia -, this will inevitably restrict Turkey within a six-mile-narrow. Thus, the main reason of the disagreement concerning the shelf is the fact that any attempts to sort out the specific issue, in the long run it will lead to a legal border line that will define sovereign rights for each country. In other words, defining the shelf for both countries means dividing and distributing the Aegean Sea.

The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis

The second case to be examined is that of the Imia-Kardak crisis 1996, a quite interesting case, as it seemed to be generated out of a relatively unimportant event. The causes of the dispute are traced back in December 1995 and the crisis was escalated and resolved in the last days of January 1996. The specific crisis appears to differ from the previous ones in the sense that for the first time Turkey officially raised an issue of territorial claims within the boundaries of the Greek state. In particular, the claim was placed over the islets Imia-Kardak which are situated 2,5 miles away from the Greek island Kalolimnos and 3 miles away from the Turkish coast. The legal sovereignty of Greece over the two islets is stated in both the treaties of Lausanne and Paris.

Initially, according to the Lausanne Treaty 1923, Turkey assigned the Dodecanese to Italy. Due to a disagreement regarding the status of the ownership of the islets lying between the Turkish coasts and the Kastelorizo island, Turkey and Italy signed a supplementary agreement in order to fix the territorial waters between Kastelorizo island and the coasts of Anatolia. The agreement was signed on 28th December 1932 and fixed 37 pairs of reference points among which, the maritime boundary dividing Turkish and Italian territory (which at that time included the Dodecanese islands) was drawn. Of these points, it was point 30 which stated that the maritime frontier north of

Kalymnos passed at the median distance between the Imia-Kardak islets (on the Italian side) and Kato island (on the Turkish side). This specific point confirmed the Italian sovereignty over the Imia-Kardak rocks. The specific agreement was never registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations and this is what the Turkish government used as an argument in the specific crisis. However, according to the League of Nations, its validity is not at all affected by the fact that it was actually never registered.

In 1947 and after the end of World War II, the Paris Treaty was signed between Italy and the Allied Powers. According to this agreement, Italy proceeded with ceding the Dodecanese and the adjacent islets to Greece. Consequently and under international law, the successor state automatically assumed all the rights and obligations that had been established by international agreements between the possessor state and every third party that in this case was Italy and Turkey.

With regard to Turkey's legal assertions, the basic arguments of the Turkish government were firstly based on the fact that the legal procedure of the agreement of December 1932 was not completed and was not registered with the League of Nations. Secondly, according to the Turkish claims, the islets Imia-Kardak do not fall under the category of the islets adjoining the Dodecanese and therefore they were never made over to the Greek state. This statement was one more factor on which the Turkish government attempted to base their arguments, claiming that the islets Imia-Kardak constituted Turkish territory.

The cause for the initiation of the crisis was given on 25th December 1995 when the Turkish cargo boat "Figen Akat" ran aground the islets Imia-Kardak. The captain of the Turkish cargo boat refused assistance from the Greek authorities claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters. It was only on 28th December 1995 that the boat was finally freed and towed to the Turkish port Gulluk through the aid of a Greek salvage company, and only after a continuous exchange of verbal notes between the Greek and Turkish authorities on who were to rescue the ship. On 29th December 1995 a verbal note was sent to the Greek embassy in Ankara by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, claiming that the Imia-Kardak islets constitute a part of Turkey's territory and this move made by the Turkish side led to a new exchange of verbal notes between the two states. Form that day and until a month later the two sides occupied themselves with the exchange of verbal notes regarding the status of the islets. The Greek and Turkish diplomats were talking about "routine notes" and no one seemed to believe or even realize that the specific event would prove serious enough to bring the two states at the brink of a war only a month later.

The media-state relationship in Greece and Turkey

The way the media-state relationship is formed and the role that the press holds in the two countries is a fundamental aspect in analyzing and comprehending the different extent of influence that the media in likely to have in each country. The intervention of the state in the press reporting is often described by journalists as the "stick and carrot" policy, reflecting the treatment that the press receives from the state according to its compliance with the governmental line or not. Apparently, the implementation of the specific tactic differs significantly in the two countries.

In Turkey, under the suffocating regiment that was imposed in 1980, journalists were forbidden to write anything against the military governing. The press owners were forced either to comply with the military line or to close down their newspapers and most of them chose to do the former. The elections that were held in 1983 and were won by the party of Turgut Ozal, created better conditions for the performance of the press, which however lasted for a limited period of time. The press gradually became the main target of the state leaders and by the end of 1998, more than 40 journalists had been assassinated by state officials. The state's policy was obviously all sticks and no carrots other than for those newspapers that supported the regime totally.

The situation in Greece is significantly different and the stick and carrot policy is rarely implemented and only in cases of national taboos. Other than that, no Greek politician was ever recorded among the biggest enemies of the press. Moreover, since 1974 when democracy was re-established, there were no journalists reported imprisoned. It is true that the political parties in Greece are related to the media. This is why each government is helping the newspapers that support them, by offering them the carrot. But generally speaking, the government rarely shows preference to any of the media conveyors and most of the newspapers are actually privileged by the financial support of the government.

Interestingly, there seems to be no law against the performance of the press in Greece; while at the same time, a great number of restrictions prevent the Turkish journalists from writing the truth.

A general framework of game theory

As it was mentioned above, the two crises fall under the category of chicken game and will be examined through the spectrum of game theory. There will be an attempt to clarify the actors, the roles, the strategies, the outcomes and the pay offs for each side. This will help in pointing out the conditions that are likely to have allowed the participation of the media in the decisions made and the action that was taken in terms of the two crises. This will ultimately help in examining the interaction between politicians and the media in a significantly more systematic way.

If one attempted to define Game Theory, one could claim that it reflects a process of decision –making, based on which individuals are involved in a strategic exchange of moves, aiming at selecting the course of action and at making the decision that will lead them to the most desired outcome. Any decision problem falls under the scope of a game, under such conditions that it requires the interaction of two or more participants each one trying to select the strategy that will result in solving the problem in the most beneficial way to them. This project will concentrate on the way Game Theory is actually possible to explain the political process.

The game begins with one player making the first move choosing among a number of several specified alternatives. The game will be continued with the action taken by the second player who will respond to the first move with a second choice. The exchange of moves among actors reflects the formation and selection of a specified strategy, by each actor, based on which the players interact. The strategy selected by each actor is shaped according to his preferences, objectives, expectations and capabilities, always aiming at maximizing his interest and achieving the most desired outcome. Prior to selecting a strategy, an actor is expected to take into consideration the payoffs that each course of action is likely to have as well as the cost and benefit entailed in each outcome. Every play of a game ends in a certain situation that determines the payoffs to each player as a result of his action. Generally talking, game theory could be described as a decision making process according to which, actors are expected to make decisions based on selecting a course of action among several alternatives. In this process of strategy selection, actors behave rationally in the sense that they choose a course of action aiming at maximizing their interests.

Yet, it has to be mentioned that rational choice theory does not appear to take into consideration the possible constraints that actors are likely to face during the process of decision making, that render them incapable of acting fully rationally. As John Kingdon argues, the ability of human beings to process information is relatively limited and renders them unable to process many alternatives before they conclude in the best possible one.[1] This piece of writing does not negate the rationality entailed in actors' behaviour. Instead, it

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[1] John Kingdon, "Agendas, alternatives, and public policies", New York : HarperCollins College Publishers, c1995

will attempt to embody rational action in a collective game that will allow actors to achieve a more satisfactory outcome than through unilateral action. Therefore, game theory will be seen through the spectrum of the interaction of rational actors who will involve in a process of negotiations and in a bargaining game. In this game, rational actors are involved in cooperation, conflict and compromise with each other through which they attempt to reach an outcome that will serve their objectives but at the same time will be satisfactory to all sides.

In this piece of writing political process reflects a game/interaction among collective political actors aiming at maximizing their interest by making the best possible decision and achieving the most satisfactory outcome. Concerning the structure and character of a game played within the area of politics, it mainly depends on the political situation actors are involved in. This could either be a summit in which a number of actors are called upon to decide/agree on a political issue; or a situation where political actors are contesting/claiming certain rights from each other or power over each other, and this is usually translated into a conflict among political actors. Political actors are also involved in a bargaining process that enables them to exchange information about their preferences and expectations, as well as change their own interests and adjust to the new conditions that interaction is likely to create. Involving in a bargaining process also presupposes that the participants are actually involved in a game of incomplete/imperfect information and are therefore unaware of each other's preferences and intentions. This is what makes bargaining a necessity, giving actors the opportunity to communicate.

Communication and the exchange of information is a very crucial factor in a political bargaining game, especially when it comes to disputes similar to the Greek-Turkish crises. Therefore, it is essential to examine the ways in which information and communication can facilitate a political game and to the extent to which the media could serve the role as a communication channel.

Communication between political actors

One way for the role of information to be introduced in political cooperative games, is through the bargaining process and the employment of diplomacy. Bargaining encourages communication and it basically applies to situations of incomplete information since under conditions of complete information actors have nothing to communicate to each other. The collection of information by the players involved in a political game regards the preferences and intentions of the adversary. It is often done through the exchange of signals whose content may convey information that is likely to change the belief of one actor for the adversary and therefore influence and change the action of the former towards the latter.

The extent to which communication between political actors in a game succeeds depends on the way in which political actors are likely to interpret and "frame" the information they receive from the adversary. This is also related to previous knowledge that the two actors have about each other as

well as on the reputation attributed to them from past events. However, the harder it is for an actor to verify the information he receives from the adversary, the less likely it is that this piece of information will be credible. At this point it could be mentioned that one possible way for the information communicated to both actors to be verified is through the media, particularly the press. The possibility of the press contradicting the signals and threats transmitted from one front to the other creates space for the media to adopt their own role in the game.

The two-level game is another useful example of the way in which information is likely to influence the process of decision making between political actors as well as their pay offs. The basic idea of this theory lies in the assumption that the political process takes place in multiple arenas as actors might be participating in a principle game, for example on an international level, and in multiple other games that could represent their domestic arenas. These two levels, that is the international and domestic arena, interact with each other in the sense that all the action taken on an international level usually reflects the perceptions and preferences that political actors have in terms of their domestic affairs and vice versa. Robert D. Putnam offers an illustrating example of the function of the two-level game and he breaks it up into two stages or levels.[2] Level 1 reflects the bargaining and negotiations being held among negotiators on an international level that might lead to a tentative agreement. On level 2, it is the representatives of the domestic environment of each international negotiator that proceed with separate discussions about whether to ratify the agreement made previously on the international level, or not. Domestic support for a certain agreement is likely to lead to cooperation between international actors, such as states. On the contrary, failure to reach an agreement could lead to both international and domestic controversy. In this case, the negotiation process could be facilitated by the information exchanged between the two players with regard to the preferences of their domestic background.

Greece and Turkey playing the "Chicken"

As it was mentioned above, the two Greek-Turkish crises that this paper will focus on, fall under the spectrum of Game theory and constitute two illustrating examples of one of the four most famous cooperation games, the so-called "Chicken game". When applied to the political process, the Chicken game usually reflects a case where two political actors- such as the governments of two sovereign states- after having failed to reach a satisfactory agreement through bargaining and negotiation, they end up in conflict that is likely to break into war. The two actors refuse to change their preferences and adjust them accordingly, even if by remaining determined, they are likely to get the worst possible outcome. If both states remain determined to their threats and refuse to back off, then they are involved in the worst possible situation that the specific game can have, that is war. The resolution of such a game depends largely on the rationality of one of the

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[2] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games".

players, who, when facing the "political uses of madness"[3] from the adversary, will be the first to back down and prevent a state from involving into a national suicide.

Greece and Turkey were involved in this type of game in both crises 1987 and 1996. The two countries, representing the two political actors in the game matrix, were involved in a political game in which they could choose between two different strategies, Cooperation or Defection. The four possible outcomes of the strategic combinations the two actors could make are described in the matrix below.

Greece

		C	D
Turkey	C	3,3	2,4
	D	4,2	1,1

Matrix 1

The game of Chicken is closer to the intimidation implicit in a deterrence game in which Greece and Turkey would threaten each other with an all out war. The above figure describes the possible choices available to both players and the possible outcomes entailed in each combination. The players in the game are able to choose between strategies of cooperation (C) and non cooperation/defection (D). The choices of strategies by each player lead to four possible outcomes, ranked by the players from best (4) to worst (1). Thus, in case both sides defect and none of them backs down on time (D/D), the two countries will be involved in a war that is the worst possible outcome of the game. If Greece defects and refuses to withdraw while Turkey cooperates (D/C), the Greece is the winner of the game (2,4). Similarly, if Turkey defects and Greece cooperates (C/D), Turkey is the one that wins the game. The last strategic combination is that of both countries cooperating (C/C). The outcome is a compromise between the two actors. If one attempts to examine the two relevant crises through the spectrum of the chicken game, one can make the following inferences. Starting with the 1987 crisis, the outcome is 2,4 with Greece being the winner after having intimidated the adversary and forcing him to cooperate and withdraw on time. In the 1996 crisis both countries chose cooperation as their dominant strategy and therefore the outcome was a compromised achieved with the intervention of a third external actor, the USA government.

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[3] Andrew M. Colman, "Game Theory & its Applications, in the social and biological sciences", Pergamon Press, Kent, 1995, p.113

The main question of the paper lies in the importance of communication in these two Greek-Turkish games and the role that the media could possibly play in the resolution of the two games as well as the conditions under which this role is likely to be defined. One main feature of the games that actually proves the importance of communication and the exchange of information between the two actors is their "verbal" nature. More precisely, the two crises were resolved before an actual move or attack was made by any of the actors and after a series of "verbal actions", signals and threats that the two countries exchanged. Therefore, one of the main objectives of this paper is to examine the extent to which the media could fill the communication gaps in this game between the two countries.

The Greek-Turkish crises as "two-level" games

Breaking the Greek-Turkish crises in two separate games is a more accurate approach in order to create some space for the media as well, and detect its potential role in it. It was mentioned earlier that the two-level game consists of two separate levels, the domestic level and the international level. The domestic game of the crisis reflects those policy options and decisions the two governments make within their domestic environment always regarding the action they will adopt in the game against the main adversary. In this domestic environment the relationship between the political actors –Turkey and Greece- and the respective media is also formed. The two governments are expected to select tactics and proceed with decisions with or without considering the information supplied by the press. Whether and to what extent the policy line adopted by each government, against the main adversary, is ultimately influenced by the respective press coverage, will be an indicative factor based on which the role of the press will be defined in this game.

One way to test the role of the media in this crisis is by adding it in the game matrix that represents the domestic level/game of each crisis. Taking into consideration that the two political actors, Greece and Turkey, are involved in two separate game-one domestic and one international- the domestic game involves the relationship of each country with the respective press and can be depicted in the following game matrix.

Turkey/ Greece

		C	D
Media	C	3,3	2,4
	D	4,2	1,1

Matrix 2

Similar to the political game taking place between Turkey and Greece, the above figure depicts the two players being able to choose between strategies of cooperation (C) and non-cooperation/ defection (D). At this point it has to be mentioned that this cannot be a pure game in the sense that the two players are not actually confronting each other directly. Their objectives are not interrelated and their intentions derive from interests of a different nature and character. Yet, adding the media in this game figure will help in "measuring" the role of the press in this game and the extent to which it became influential on the decisions that were made during the crisis. The strategies for the two players are defined as follows. For the press Defection is interpreted as opposing the policy line and Cooperation as supporting the policy line. Similarly for the political actor, Turkey and Greece, Defection is defined as ignoring the press coverage on the issue while Cooperation is the case where the political actor takes into consideration the press coverage and position or even follows the media agenda.

The second game of this interaction constitutes the main crisis between the two basic adversaries, Greece and Turkey. In terms of the two-level game this is the main international arena where governments implement policies towards the opponent actors. These policies reflect positions and decisions that have already been made in the first game of this process in an attempt to solve the issue at stake. In both crises, Turkey and Greece are the main players of a pure chicken game with the two actors playing against each other and aiming at achieving the most favourable outcome. In this chicken game defection is the dominant strategy for both players provided that the adversary cooperates, as mutual defection gives the worst possible outcome, which is war. The main game taking place between Greece and Turkey in the international arena is depicted in *Matrix 1.*

The two games are practically running simultaneously and are likely to be in correlation with each other. However, one of the two was the first to commence leading to the generation of the second one as well. This is an indicative factor of the potential role of the press in the two crises. The possibility of the domestic game running first and contributing in the generation of the main, international game, increases the likelihood of the media turning into an active participant in the crisis. This is because, since this paper accepts the media as a participant in the domestic game, their role becomes crucial in the influence the domestic game could have on the international one.

Testing the role of the press in the Greek-Turkish relationship

The first inferences that can be made after a brief analysis of the press coverage of the two crises in relation to the political action adopted by the two political actors, are more or less verifying the main hypothesis of this paper. As it was mentioned in the beginning, based on previous studies regarding the role of the media in international crises, it is mainly in the absence of a policy agenda that the media can end up being catalytic. In particular, in terms of the media's role as a channel of communication between the two actors, when the actors involved in a political game follow a solid, clear-cut policy, which the adversary is aware of, there is little or no chance for the media's role to be judged essential. On the contrary, when the two actors do not appear to be confident enough about their action, communication could be facilitating their interaction and final decisions.

Yet, in order for communication to prove effective, the information conveyed by the media should be as neutral as objective and this is largely dependent on the specific state's regime and the position the media appear to have in that. In other words, the amount of freedom given to the media is expected to have an impact on the information that is finally communicated to the two actors as well as on the process of decision- making and strategy selection. The freedom the media enjoy in one country and the political line they seem to follow are two of the factors that determine the way they actually tend to frame the information they receive. Consequently, the way information is framed can affect political action; it can sometimes impose pressure on politicians to act promptly and can therefore influence the way policies are shaped. The above ideas conclude in the so-called "CNN effect", a relatively recent phenomenon that relates to the impact the media can have on policy making, and implies the loss of policy control on the part of government policy makers. Strobel summarizes the "CNN effect" by linking it

> *To everything from governments' loss of control over foreign policy decisions to a very public back channel for heads of state that seek alternatives to communicate their intentions to current and potential adversaries.* [4]

Let us now focus on the role that the Greek and Turkish press adopted in the two Greek-Turkish crises and the extent to which the CNN Effect was implemented. As a matter of fact, the different nature of the two crises in terms of the policies followed and the way they were resolved, render the two crises ideal for testing the validity of the above assumptions. This is because, based on a brief analysis of the political action in the two cases and the press coverage they attracted, one could clearly detect these conditions that are likely to allow the media to take up a role in a political situation.

In the 1987 oil-drilling crisis, one can notice that the main dispute between the two countries is officially initiated when the Canadian North Aegean

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[4] Warren P. Strobel, "Late breaking foreign policy: The news media's influence on Peace operations", Washington D.C, US Institute of Peace Press, 1997, page vii

Petroleum Company was ready to prospect for oil within Greece's territorial waters. The specific initiative, which was picked as an excuse from the Turkish government for further oil prospecting, was an issue that was instantly put in the policy agenda of both countries and led to the escalation of the crisis. They were ultimately involved in a bargaining game "contesting" the change or maintenance of the status quo regarding territorial waters. The bargaining game, with the Greek actor being more determined and Turkey eventually considering the change of status quo not as important as to risk its involvement in a war, ended with Greece defecting and being the winner and Turkey cooperating. The outcome of the game was a combination of moves that appeared to be based on planned strategies. On the one hand Greece responded to the Turkish provocative action with determined moves that increased the credibility of a war threat. On the other hand, Turkey acted rationally and decided to back down and avoid war for a "commodity" that was not so crucial.

Apparently, the press coverage appeared to be closely linked to the strategies followed by the political actors. The Greek newspapers largely reported the moves made by the Greek government, emphasizing those factors that the government considered more crucial and important, with very few instances of criticism exerted from the newspaper of the opposition. In general terms, it was quite obvious that the Greek press took no active role in the game as it basically followed the policy line and to a great extent the "mood" of the government too. Similar to the Greek press, the Turkish newspapers concentrated on the items of the policy agenda as well. The Turkish press supported the government's action throughout the game with no sign of criticism to the moves made by the Turkish Prime Minister. Once the crisis was resolved and the tempers in the circles of the government turned lower, the tone of the press coverage became "mild" too.

On the contrary, the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis constitutes a different case that presents a different aspect of the media's position in a political conflict. The paradox of this crisis lies in the fact that a seemingly unimportant event, the raising of a flag on a rock, flared up a crisis that nearly led the two countries to war. Interestingly, the diplomatic debate between the two countries, regarding the territorial rights over the two islets, was going on for a month. However, the crisis practically started on 25th January 1996 while, coincidentally or not, the diplomatic activities of the two countries had been aired by the Greek TV only the previous day. The two governments were suddenly faced with an unexpected dispute that the media had portrayed as crucial and to which the two governments were expected to react promptly. The main feature of this crisis was the series of spasmodic moves made by both sides, particularly by the Greek government. The two governments choose to defect throughout the game and it was only due to the entrance of USA in the game that the two sides decided to cooperate and the conflict was eventually resolved

Apparently, the paradox of the crisis lies in the role of the media in this game. Judging from the way in which the Greek and Turkish newspapers portrayed the "flag issue", presenting the adversary as ready for war, one could say it was the media that put the issue in the policy agenda too. The press was the

player that triggered off both the domestic games and the international game by controlling the media and policy agenda. This was achieved through the selection of the story as the item to be discussed and its presentation through certain frames that portrayed the issue as a particularly serious national problem that had created a crucial situation. However, the Greek and Turkish newspapers did not have the overall control of the game due to the entrance of an external actor, the USA government, which proved more influential on the policy line followed by the two governments. That was because, despite the increasing pressure the media put on the two actors regarding the cost they would have if they withdrew, the cost of the information conveyed by USA was much greater, threatening the two actors about the costly consequences they would have in case of a war.

Some general conclusions

One basic remark to make after the brief description of the two crises as games as the press coverage they attracted is the following: the media are likely to take up role in a political case, provided that certain conditions prevail. The above examples offer a verification of the CNN Effect proving that the absence of the media influence in the 1987 oil-drilling crisis was a result of the firm and clear-cut policy followed by the Greek government. The risky, yet determined, moves made by the Greek Prime Minister did not allow any space for defection either to the adversary or to the media. At the same time, the rational action of the Turkish government, which decided to withdraw from the game on time, was carefully planned also followed by the media agenda with no disruption by the press.

The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis presents the other side of the story and completes the theory regarding the role of the media depending on the policies followed by politicians. With the presentation of the story through certain frames, the press portrayed a particular issue, which had already been in debate behind the scenes, from a different angle that required a different approach by the political actors, and therefore put the issue on the policy agenda. The press turned into a constraining actor in the game, disrupting the policy making process. Whether the two governments felt forced to follow the line implied by the press or not, this depended mainly on the strategy that the two political actors had chosen to adopt. This is the reason why one can notice a different way of play of the media in the Greek and in the Turkish domestic games. The Greek officials caught off their guard by the crucial situation presented by the press and, lacking a policy agenda, they chose to respond to the pressure imposed by the press. On the contrary, on the Turkish front, apart from the initial stage where the press helped in putting the issue in the government's agenda, the Turkish newspapers were largely following the policy line. That was due to the fact that the Turkish Prime Minister picked the issue portrayed by the press quickly and adjusted it to her own interests.

However, apart from the absence of a solid policy being the main cause of the media's influence on the game, the comparison of the two crises between

Greece and Turkey brings other aspects of the media-policy relationship to light. In particular, as one can see in the Imia-Kardak crisis, despite the policy absence on both sides, it was only the Greek press that continued its defective role throughout the game, contrary to the Turkish press coverage that quickly complied with the governmental line. Of course, that was also due to the fact that the Turkish government appeared better prepared to respond to the unexpected crisis. Yet, one cannot neglect the importance of the media-state relationship in the formation of the role that the media can play in a political case. Undoubtedly, the gap regarding the freedom of the press in the two countries is wide enough to justify the different roles played by the media in those two countries, especially in the latter crisis. And while over the 9-year-period that intervened between the two crises the position of the press in Turkey has not changed significantly, the remarkably active and critical role of the press in Greece in the Imia-Kardak crisis is a piece of evidence for the democratic gap existing between the two countries as well as the power that the media can gain under conditions of democracy. The Greek-Turkish relationship constitutes an illustrating example of those factors that render the media a powerful actor in the political process.