

Democracy and Dictatorship in Greece

Research Question:

From its independence in 1821 until 1974 democracy in Greece witnessed several different types of military interventions. In 1909, the military initiated a short-coup and quickly returned to its barracks, allowing democracy to function until the 1920s. During the 1920s, the armed forces intervened in politics frequently, without establishing any form of dictatorship. This trend has changed in 1936, when the Greek military set up an authoritarian regime that lasted until the Second World War. In 1967, again, the Generals established a dictatorship, only to be replaced by democracy in 1974. Since then, the Armed Forces in Greece do not intervene in politics, permitting democracy to be consolidated. What explains the different behaviors of the military in Greece and the consequent regime types? This is the central puzzle this paper will try to solve.


Studying Greece is important for several reasons. First, this case highlights an often understudied phenomenon, namely military behavior. Second, analyzing Greece longitudinally is critical: military behavior varied within the country in time. What explains the divergent actions of the same institution in the same polity? Looking at Greece's wider history will allow showing how the same coalitional partners and how continuous economic growth led to different outcomes in different circumstances and what those different circumstances were. Finally, studying the divergent behavior of the Greek military helps to understand democratic consolidation in this country. Even though Greece has a record of military interventions and unstable democracies, since 1974, it is considered to have a consolidated democracy. Democracy's stability in Greece is at least partly explained by military's non-intervention to politics. Thus, explaining the armies' behavior in Greece emphasizes important reasons behind the country's rough road to democratic consolidation.

Argument:

Along with the military, the bourgeoisie, its interests, and perceptions are vital for understanding the nature of military interventions in Greece. Specifically, coalitions that formed between the bourgeoisie and the military determined whether the military would

intervene for a short period of time or establish an authoritarian regime (see Figure 1 for the causal argument). The bourgeoisie and the military form coalitions depending on their interests.

Figure 1 – Casual Chain



Interests:

Before examining coalitions and how they determined which form the interventions took, it is crucial to ask why the military and the bourgeoisie would have an interest in forming coalitions and intervening in politics. In this paper, following Gerard Alexander, it will be argued that actors choose which regime or which type of military action they prefer according to their induced preferences:

In all rationalist theories, people with ‘basic preferences’ ... form ‘induced preferences’ for one course of action or events over another (or others) when they believe that option is likely to have the most advantageous (or least advantageous) consequences for their basic preferences... [A]ctors form an induced preference for the regime [and the type of military intervention] they believe will produce what can variously and interchangeably be described as the overall outcomes more advantageous to them, the outcomes closer to their ‘most preferred’ (or ideal) point, or the greater payoff to them... (Alexander 32).

Actors have two types of basic preferences: first, they are concerned with their “well-being” and second, they want to be “secure”. Well-being for the bourgeoisie means advancing “material and non-material interests –for example, to preserve property rights or boost income” (33). Well-being for the military means retaining the internal coherence, autonomy, and prestige of the armed forces, in addition to boosting income. Security means both for the bourgeoisie and the military wanting “to experience the lowest possible risk of physical coercion, imprisonment, torture, murder, or any other form of violence” that can come from domestic groups (33).

Given this definition of basic and induced preferences, the military intervenes in democracy and the bourgeoisie supports this intervention if both groups' basic preferences are challenged by threats rival social classes (landlords or workers and the parties that represent them) pose. When the well-being and the security of the military and the bourgeoisie are under threat, both the military and the bourgeoisie would have an induced preference of intervening in democracy. The various degrees of perceived threats for both actors determine whether the military and the bourgeoisie will form a coalition and favor a dictatorship or short intervention.

Robert Dahl's analysis of costs is useful to address the question how threats and interests lead to coalitions and hence different regime outcomes. According to Dahl, "a government is more likely to tolerate an opposition as the expected costs of suppression increase and as the expected costs of toleration decrease" (48). If the costs of toleration are low, the probability of democratization increases. However, if the costs of toleration are high, the probability of creating and sustaining a dictatorship increases. Thus, the inherent causes of military interventions are threats and costs democracy poses to the basic preferences of actors.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens use Dahl's cost of toleration and cost of suppression model. Rueschemeyer et al. argue that "capitalist development is associated with the rise of democracy because of two structural effects: it strengthens the working class as well as other subordinate classes, and it weakens large landowners," who are inherently against democracy (58). Capitalism allows workers to become organizationally strong, helps the labor to overcome collective action problems and therefore, creates "a countervailing force against unrestrained and autonomous state power (and) ... install(s)... democratic institutions" (297). Thus, Rueschemeyer et al. believe that the stronger the subordinate classes, the better. This is because as their power increase, the cost of suppressing them also increases creating a favorable environment for democracy.


What happens if the dominant classes feel threatened as subordinate classes increase their strength? In other words, how does the cost of toleration change? Rueschemeyer et al. acknowledges that the threat factor plays an important role. According to them in advanced capitalist countries (chapter 4) "where the working class was well organized and committed to a moderate to radical socialist party, it hindered the

development of democracy” (142). This is because workers’ “demands for socialism ... [were] perceived as a threat and provoked an upper-class reaction” (142). Similarly, in the Latin America (chapter 5) “for progress towards democracy to be made... pressures from subordinate classes for inclusion had to emerge... [However] if these pressures were highly threatening to elites, they tended to meet with authoritarian reactions” (163). Thus, Rueschemeyer et al. argue that even though it is important for workers to mobilize and demand inclusion, increasing the cost of suppression and hence leading to democracy, if they are too threatening, they might increase the cost of toleration and therefore, cause democracy to breakdown. This paper agrees and borrows from Rueschemeyer et al.’s case studies.

Different social classes pose different degrees of threat to the bourgeoisie and the military (see Figure 2). If lower classes are active, they pose the greatest threat to the well-being and security of the military and the bourgeoisie. As Rueschemeyer et al. argue, if the masses demand a socialist regime with a strong radical political party, they are challenging the material interests of the bourgeoisie. A regime change would threaten the military too since it would disturb the institutional structure of the country. Lower classes might also use violence against the bourgeoisie and the military and challenge their security.

Upper classes (either the landlords or political elites) can also pose a threat to the military and the bourgeoisie. Their challenge would, however, be more moderate when compared with the lower classes. This is because the demands of the upper classes on the well-being of the bourgeoisie and the military (assuming that all upper classes enjoy high levels of income and welfare) would not be as high as the lower classes.

Figure 2 –Degrees of Threat



Since levels of threat are highly contingent on socioeconomic conditions, this paper argues that broad socioeconomic structures determined which group at what time in Greece was able to exert a threat to the military and the bourgeoisie.


If for the military the costs of tolerating democracy are high because its well-being and/or security are challenged, it can initiate a coup, independent of the bourgeoisie. In Greece, in 1967, the military's well-being and security were threatened by workers and political parties that represented lower classes. The degree of threat was perceived by the military as high. Fearing that communism was inevitable and the autonomy of the military was in danger, the military established a dictatorship. Because the military wanted to repress a highly threatening social class and to prevent political parties that represented them to emerge again, it initiated a dictatorship, instead of a short lived coup. A return to democracy would not have guaranteed the military the interests it was hoping to preserve because the costs that were associated with a return to democracy were too high.

When a military establishes an authoritarian regime on its own, however, the problems are usually far from over. First, the dictatorship is likely to face challenges from all quarters of the society because it is allied with no social classes. As the military tries to eliminate the threats the society and/or the parties pose, it would face fierce resistance. If the military is attacking one group, other social classes are likely to support the repressed group (see Poulantzas 55-60 for a similar argument). When the cost of tolerating democracy for the bourgeoisie is low, it would neither form a coalition with the military and back up its intervention nor support the military once it establishes a dictatorship. Since all quarters of the society would be against the regime, the costs of suppression for the military would increase.

Second, faced with difficulties in governing the country, fierce resistance from all societal groups and increasing cost of suppression, the military itself is likely to split into two. Societal resistance "leads [military] regimes into an amazingly incoherent muddle of policies ... towards the popular classes, and in the long run this incoherence actually degenerates into open conflicts among their leading circles over the tactics to adopt towards the masses, whose weight makes itself heavily felt" (Poulantzas 84). The "hard-

liners” would persist to keep the dictatorship as is while the “soft-liners,” who observe that the regime cannot provide the necessary support for its survival and repress opposition, would advocate liberalization in order to consolidate the regime or a transition to democracy (see O’Donnell and Schmitter). This split within the dictatorship would further drain the power of the authoritarian regime. As long as the societal resistance continues, the “soft-liners” would likely to gain the upper hand in the military and facilitate the path towards democracy. An exogenous shock, such as an external war could hasten the process by even further weakening the position of the “hard-liners,” who now have to fight not just against the societal groups and “soft-liners” but also the external enemy.

Figure 3



Coalitions:

Coalitions, as intervening variables, are crucial in studying military interventions (see Figure 3). When the bourgeoisie and the military see a challenge to their interests, they would want to form a coalition. The bourgeoisie, in Greece, lack the resources to

initiate a military coup on its own. The military, on the other hand, need the support of the bourgeoisie to sustain its dictatorship.

Rueschemeyer et al. make a similar point on the coalitions that involve the military. First, they point out that “if the organizations of coercion and violence... are strong within the overall state apparatus, the situation is quite unfavorable to democracy... Not only is the ethos of the armed forces... typically at odds with democratic values, but their organizational interests and often their class position as well also predispose them against rule of the people” (67). In other words, Rueschemeyer et al. would argue that having an autonomous military in Greece made this country inherently prone to military intervention. Second, besides the military wanting to protect its own interests, social forces might see the military as an option to form an anti-democratic coalition with:

The stronger the perceived threat to stability from the lower classes, the more anti-democratic the posture of the middle classes, and the stronger the calls for intervention from economic elites, the more likely it was that the military would support oligarchic efforts to assert control or, ... that it would intervene in a moderator role or establish a military dominant regime (Rueschemeyer et al. 197).

If we replace “the middle classes” and the “economic elites” with the bourgeoisie, the central hypothesis of this paper resembles the above quotation. As has been suggested above, this paper highly borrows from Rueschemeyer et al.’s work.

The military and the bourgeoisie favor coups only when they observe a threat to their interests from rival social classes and therefore, the cost of tolerating democracy is high.¹ Depending on the nature of the threat and different possibilities to solve it, the military and the bourgeoisie, either favor dictatorships or short interventions. The military and the bourgeoisie favor a dictatorship, if they perceive the threat they are facing as too great to be repressed with a short lived intervention.

The military and the bourgeoisie can also initiate short interventions in democracy. This happens when both groups believe that they can achieve what their interests dictate in a short period of time, perhaps with small changes in the functioning of democracy. In these cases, the threat the bourgeoisie and the military face are not great enough (coming from rival upper classes) and the costs of tolerating democracy are not

¹ Note that the military and the bourgeoisie can have different interests and can perceive different threats.

too high to establish dictatorships. Rather, both sides believe that democracy is safe enough for their interests to continue.

*Consolidated Democracy*²:

How do different costs associated with democracy and coalitional structures affect consolidation of democracy? Alexander defines consolidated democracies “as ones in which nearly all actors have pro-democratic regime preferences that are highly unlikely to be reversed as a result of routine events” (59). According to this definition and as Figure 3 shows, a consolidated democracy happens only if the military and the bourgeoisie believe that their interests are not threatened by democracy. In other words, when the military and the bourgeoisie have low costs of tolerating democracy, that democracy will be consolidated. Since the 1974 transition in Greece the bourgeoisie and the military perceive costs of tolerating democracy as low.

In sum, this paper argues that when the military and the bourgeoisie form a coalition, military coups and/or dictatorships follow depending on the degree of the perceived threat. In Greece, the military once acted alone to establish a dictatorship. However, shortly after the initiation of the regime, the Colonels faced fierce resistance from all societal groups resulting in a split within the army. As resistance grew, the “soft-liners” gained the upper hand and made a transition to democracy.

Greece:

This section of the paper will explain the paths Greece and its military took by dividing its history into six periods, each of which marked by transitions to dictatorship or democracy. The first period, which extends from 1821 to 1909, will be referred to as the oligarchic democracy, whereas the period running from 1909 to 1936 will be named the bourgeoisie democracy. Following the 1941-1949 occupation and civil war, a return to bourgeoisie democracy in 1950 until the 1967 military coup will be examined.

² I define democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting independently through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (Karl and Schmitter 40) and “combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association” (Collier and Levitsky 434).

Transition to democracy in 1974 and its consolidation will be the last two sub-sections of this paper.

Independence and Oligarchic Democracy:

When Greece won its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821 Attica, Euboea (middle east) and Ionia (midwest) were dominated by big landholdings (Mouzelis 1978, 14, Mavrogordatos 122, 14). Even though at the time of independence agriculture was more developed than commerce and industry, Greece, also, had a fragile commercial and industrial bourgeoisie class (Mouzelis 1978, 7, 10-11).

The institutional structure of the newly independent Greece was initially a monarchy, established under King Otto of Bavaria (Collier 38). Soon, however, a clash between the monarchy and the powerful landlords developed, in which the latter resisted the centralizing tendencies of the former. “King Otto’s efforts to establish an absolutist system of government were eventually thwarted by an oligarchy which found in the recently imported Western libertarian ideas of ‘freedom’ and democracy a convenient ideological vehicle for the maintenance and promotion of its interests” (Mouzelis 1978, 106). In 1843, the King was forced to grant a constitution, which defined the regime as a constitutional monarchy. A bicameral assembly was created with the powers to appoint and dismiss the government and to dissolve the assembly still given to the King (Clogg 1987, 1). In 1864, due to an uprising led by landlords, the new King ratified a new “democratic” constitution, which granted universal male suffrage and popular sovereignty (Veremis xi-xii, 3 and Collier, R., 40). The last democratic reform came in 1875 when King George recognized the rule that parties, which controlled the majority in the parliament, would be given the right to form the government (Clogg 1987, 5 and Veremis xii). Because these democratic reforms were the results of landlord – monarchy clashes, they “cannot be seen as popular victories” (Mouzelis 16).

The democratic period that emerged after the initiation of reforms is referred to as the “oligarchic democracy” because the local powers that ensured democratization also ensured their dominance in the parliament. Landlords saw in democracy the opportunity “for undermining the monarchy and establishing their own political autonomy and means to rule, given their potential influence over the local vote” (Collier 39). Local landlords,

through patronage and clientage networks, successfully tied peasants and the small landowners of the center and south to their oligarchic system. The parties that emerged were “loose agglomerations,” transferring the parliament into an arena of personal conflict over the distribution of spoils. This institutional system did not only allow landlord-controlled parties electoral votes, but also kept peasants under control and away from radicalization (Clogg 1987, 1,3 and Mouzelis 1978, 16, 17, 101).

1909 Military Coup and Bourgeoisie Democracy:

The socioeconomic structure of landlord dominance under the period of oligarchic democracy was detrimental to the interests of the weak but rising bourgeoisie. In 1881, the government implemented “a tariff policy for the protection of cereal production –a policy which resulted in an increase in the cost of living and a rise in industrial wages” and thereby showed its open hostility towards both the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie (Mouzelis 1978, 78). Even though the oligarchic democracy was a threat to the bourgeoisie interests, it was not in high levels. Rather, since the threatening class was other elites, rather than the lower classes, the properties and the privileges of the bourgeoisie were not under threat. Besides, in some regions landlords and ship-builders were intertwined, where families engaged with both agriculture and industry. Therefore, in the oligarchic democracy period what the bourgeoisie needed was a more favorable environment for its business. A short intervention that would “fix” the democracy by entrenching the bourgeoisie into the parliament was enough.

There were not many available options for the bourgeoisie to further its self-interest. A “democratic” coalition between the bourgeoisie and the small landowners of the south and center was not a viable alternative due to the incorporation of small landowners to the oligarchic democracy with patronage networks. In time, however, an autonomous military posed itself as a great coalitional partner. After the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1897, the military was ready to curtail the power of the landed elites, who sent the army to fight wars (Veremis 6). It should be noted that similar to the bourgeoisie, the military was not under high threat from the landlords. Neither their internal organization, nor their autonomy was under threat. Rather, the armed forces were looking for a quick “fix” to democracy, which would allow them to rest from costly wars.

A gradual convergence of the military and the bourgeoisie, in order to further their interests and eliminate moderate threats, took place culminating in the 1909 coup. The period after this coup is referred in the literature as the “bourgeoisie democracy” because bourgeoisie parties dominated the parliament.

A solid evidence for the fact that the military – bourgeoisie coalition was against the landlords is the land reforms that were enacted after the coup. The first blow to the landed estates came in 1917 when a series of laws initiated land distribution (Mouzelis 1978, 19). Due to these reforms, 1724 estates were annexed and 130,000 landless families were settled (Mavrogordatos 160). In 1922, land reform gained momentum as a result of the exchange of populations with Turkey. Several thousand families coming from Asia Minor were given the land of big estates. “By 1936, a total of 425,000 acres had been distributed to 305,000 families” (Mouzelis 1978, 22 and Mavrogordatos 160).

The fact that the landlords posed only a moderate, instead of a high degree of threat, to the bourgeoisie and the military during the oligarchic period is evidenced by the survival of a weak landlord coalition in the parliament. After the 1909 military coup two political camps emerged in Greece. The Venizelist coalition, named after its most prominent leader, was comprised of pro-bourgeoisie fractions. Commercial and industrial bourgeoisie as well as storekeepers, who were willing to sell both imported and domestic products, were the natural supporters of the 1909 coup and Venizelos’ electoral victory in its aftermath. The Venizelist coalition, however, also included, especially after 1922, the new small landowners, who were given by Venizelos the land of the big estates. The Venizelist bloc was, also, able to bring refugees into the coalition. These refugees from Turkey were settled in urban centers as labor power to the industrialists (Mouzelis 1978, 22-23). Thus, the Venizelist bloc and the Liberal Party that represented it became a popular (in their own rhetoric “nationalist”), pro-Republic coalition bringing the bourgeoisie, shopkeepers, new small landowners, and labor together (Clogg 1987, 10 and Mavrogordatos, 25-26, 111 -171).

The Liberal Party and the Venizelists controlled the parliament during most of this bourgeoisie democracy period. However, a weak but resistant coalition under the People’s Party emerging from the old oligarchic regime formed a parliamentary bloc against the bourgeoisie. This Antivenizelist coalition consisted of the privileged and

“happy” partners of the previous oligarchic regime: old small landowners, who were tied to the parties of the oligarchic period through cliental networks; monarchy, who was threatened by the bourgeoisie more than it has ever been by the landlords; artisans, who are inherently anti-capitalist; and some of the politicians and financiers of the old regime (Mavrogordatos 25-28, 116, 132-171).

If the parliament was divided along the lines of Venizelists and Antivenizelists, the military was no exception. This bourgeoisie democracy period signifies the only time in Greek history, in which the army was not autonomous from political forces (Mouzelis 1978, 109). After their successful coup against the landlords, the military divided within itself into pro-bourgeoisie and anti-bourgeoisie camps, the former being stronger than the latter during most of this period. Political parties and the blocs in the parliament “could not hold power without officers, while the latter could not preserve and promote their own interests unless they attached themselves to a party” (Mavrogordatos 305). Both fractions of the military and the bourgeoisie were threatened from each other, but these threats were moderate. Similar to the 1909 coup, the threat was coming from another elite class, rather than the lower classes. Thus, the basic preferences, the property, and the privileges of both the bourgeoisie and the landlord fractions were not under serious threat. Under these circumstances, the quick “fixes” and short interventions in democracy were seen more favorable than establishing costly dictatorships.

Thus, politicians, due to the threats each bloc posed to one another (rather than the leftist groups), allied with different fractions of the military. This split in the military and the resulting power balance explains why military interventions were common practice during this period. Except for 1920-1922 and 1933-1936, the Venizelist bloc and the pro-bourgeoisie coalition controlled the government and the parliament from 1909 to the 1936 Metaxas dictatorship.³ Even though Antivenizelists won the elections in 1920, they were deposed from power by the Venizelist coup of 1922 (Mavrogordatos 29). Although a year later Antivenizelists launched an unsuccessful coup, Venizelists were able to push their agenda forward by abolishing the monarchy and declaring Greece a republic (Clogg 1992, 108). A coup in 1925, by Venizelist General Pangalos, impaired the parliament

³ During the 1915-1917 period Greece entered the First World War on the side of the Entente. Venizelos established his government in Thessalonica against the King, who favored neutrality. The “capital” was moved back to Athens and the King was defeated with the help of the Entente powers.

until 1928. In 1928, Liberal Party and the pro-bourgeoisie coalition in the National Assembly won the elections and initiated what often termed as the “Golden Age” of Venizelism (for more details see Mavrogordatos 28-37).

This unstable democracy of 1909 came to an end due to three socioeconomic reasons, which threatened the bourgeoisie. First, the bourgeoisie, by being in control of the government, was able to generate industrial growth, especially in textiles and food processing. The government used several mechanisms, such as “enormous state subsidies to big industry, scandalous credit facilities, indiscriminate tariff protection enabling highly inefficient industrial firms to achieve quasi-monopolistic positions,” and heavy taxation, to generate economic growth (Mouzelis 1978, 24). As a result of these economic changes, the labor class grew, radicalized, and started to shift their political allegiance from the Venizelists to the Communist Party (Mavrogordatos 54).

Second, the bad harvest years of the late 1920s, the Great Depression, increase in the price of industrial goods, and heavy taxation caused the small landowners to become indebted and vulnerable to the market (Mouzelis 1978, 92 and Mavrogordatos 40, 173-175). As a consequence, like labor, peasants too became radical and opposed the Venizelist coalition, shifting their support to the Agrarian Party. The threat of labor and peasant radicalization grew when in the spring of 1936, organizational unity between the Communist and Agrarian Parties was achieved in a new federation, escalating into massive revolts in Thessalonica (Mavrogordatos 147, 178).

Third, if labor and peasants were defecting from the Venizelist coalition, commercial and industrial bourgeoisie were in an inherent conflict over protectionism (Mavrogordatos 134). Thus, the Venizelist coalition came to a breaking point, losing elections to the Antivenizelists in 1932 and 1933 (Clogg 1992, 109, 111).

Even though the radicalization of labor and peasants was alarming to bourgeoisie, the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936 could still have been prevented if the Venizelist political leaders did not ally with the Communist and Agrarian parties with the hope of holding the coalition together (Mavrogordatos 346-347). For the bourgeoisie, a possible government with the communists proved to be more threatening than just the socioeconomic rise of the subordinate classes. So, the Venizelist Liberal Party increased the cost of toleration for the bourgeoisie by allying with the Communists. As a result,

frustrated bourgeoisie shifted its alliance to the military and established a dictatorship under Metaxas (Mavrogordatos 113, 131-135).

If the bourgeoisie was threatened and therefore allied with the military, the military was also threatened. Even though the military during this period was divided into two groups (the landlord and bourgeoisie supporters), they were supportive of the upper class domination. Thus, activism of the lower classes increased the costs of toleration for the military similar to the bourgeoisie interests. A possible Venizelist come back in the parliament with the communists would be detrimental for the interests of the pro-elite army officers (Clogg 1992, 53). Besides, the Venizelist fraction within the military that tried to place two coups, in 1933 and 1935 (when the parliament was controlled by Antivenizelists, who were against the rise of lower classes), threatened the elite-based internal unity of the organization (111, 113).

Why did this coalition lead to a dictatorship, instead of a short intervention, like the previous coups? The reason is high costs of toleration. The 1936 dictatorship was the first coup against a threat from the lower classes, rather than other elites. The landlords and bourgeoisie can pose threats to each other, but these threats would be moderate when compared with lower classes trying to establish communism. The elites would not seriously consider abolishing the rights of holding property. While the workers and peasants would be willing to take the property of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the elites in Greece have not threatened each other that far.

In sum, the bourgeoisie democracy was established in 1909 due to an alliance between the military and the bourgeoisie. After the successful installation of the new regime, both the military and the parliament divided into two rival coalitions. Politicians hedged and allied with different fractions of the military in order to counterbalance the moderate threat the opposing elite coalition posed. As the socioeconomic conditions gave rise to the radicalization of labor and peasants, and as in the parliament the institutional power shifted to the Communist and Agrarian Parties, the cost of toleration for the bourgeoisie and the military increased to an extent that made dictatorship a safer alternative than short lived coups. Thus, even though the previous army interventions in Greece were results of intra-upper class tensions, for the first time in Greek history the

threat from the lower classes played the biggest role in the military intervention (Diamandouros 141-142 and Mouzelis 1978, 26).

1941-1949 Civil War:

The Metaxas dictatorship was consolidated because it had support from the bourgeoisie and hence, power to repress the lower classes. It did not come to an end because it was not consolidated or because the initial reason that caused it to come to power (i.e. radicalization of labor and peasants) disappeared. Thus, at no point in time the dictatorship tried to liberalize or split into “soft” and “hard-liners.” Rather, the dictatorship came to an end, in 23 April 1941 due to an exogenous event, when Athens fell to the Germans and Greece came under Italian, Bulgarian, and German occupation (Clogg 1992, 121).

During the German occupation, peasants and workers found the opportunity to escape from the dictate of the past dictatorship (Mouzelis 1978, 26). In September 1941, they were organized under the communist resistance armies of National Liberation Front (EAM) and National People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) fighting not only against the occupiers but also the right-wing resistance groups. When the German troops withdrew from Greece in October 1944, these communist groups continued to exert their influence (Clogg 1992, 125-136 and Veremis xiv). Soon, “a fully-fledged Civil War ... fought between the Communist-controlled ‘Democratic Army’ in northern Greece and” a military-bourgeoisie coalition emerged. Due to the support Soviet Bloc gave to the Greek communists, the Civil War lasted until 1949 -probably longer than it would have normally taken given the combination of coercion and capital the bourgeoisie – military coalition entailed.

One of the important consequences of the Civil War was the change in military’s perception of cost of toleration. Because it fought an almost nine year battle against the communists, the military -more than the bourgeoisie- in the subsequent years started to perceive the subordinate classes and the left as a threat. Also, this Civil War allowed the military to gain back its autonomy from the political forces, to which it was so attached during the bourgeoisie democracy (Veremis 9, 10 and Diamandouros 143).

Return to Democracy and 1967 Military Coup:

Greece returned to democracy with the 1950 elections. The reason why Greece returned to democracy, instead of dictatorship, is explained by Stepan (1986):

In October 1949, when the remnants of the Democratic Army of the resistance fled across the border to Albania, the resulting ‘democratic reformulation,’ which grew directly out of the civil war emergency powers, outlawed the Communist party, virtually excluded the Left from employment in the state apparatus, and gave great prerogatives to the Greek army (69).

In other words, the Civil War gave the opportunity to completely crush the previously threatening forces. With the elimination of the Communist party, the cost of toleration was low enough to allow for democracy.

Even though until 1963 the pro-bourgeoisie Radical Union (ERE), under the leadership of Karamanlis, controlled the government, politics during this period was polarized between the moderate left and right. In 1963, the victory of Center Union and George Papandreou marked the victory of center for the first time in Greece (Clogg 1987, 22-51 and Mouzelis 1978, 111).

This brief democratic period came to an end in 1967 with an autonomous military coup. The costs associated with democracy were too high for the armed forces and therefore, they initiated a dictatorship. The military’s cost of toleration before 1967 increased due to three developments. First, the years after the Civil War saw considerable economic growth. Under Karamanlis’ rule, per capita income grew from 305 to 565 dollars, the volume of foreign investment increased five times in four years, and “three years preceding the coup, the number of new production facilities increased 72 percent” (Bermeo 1995, 439, for foreign aid see Adelman and Chenery). In 1962, for the first time in Greek history, the contribution of industry to GNP exceeded the contribution of agriculture (Mouzelis 1978, 28). These economic conditions led to inequalities between the middle classes and the lower classes, causing the latter to become active. Labor demonstrations, strikes, and student movements were common during the 1960s (Clogg 1987, 57-58, and Veremis 155). However, as Bermeo notes “the period of high mobilization had ended long before the military intervention occurred” (1995, 438). The main reason for the coup seems to be about the parliament.

Second, subordinate class activation was not only in the streets. In the parliament too George Papandreou's son, Andreas, became vocal in support of the rising lower classes (Mouzelis 112). In 1965, allegations that Andreas Papandreou was preparing a leftist coup in the military alarmed the latter (Clogg 1987, 125). Combined with labor radicalization in the streets and the historical experience of Civil War, these institutional developments changed the risk assessment of the military. In a study conducted in 1968-1969, "although the interviewed officers gave many reasons for political intervention, the majority of them felt that the most salient causes were: communist threat, political decay, and decadence of society at large" (Kourvetaris 117). Officers, also, pointed at signs that Papandreou's party was adopting communist ideology (118). Clearly, then, the military acted on its perception of leftist threat aggravated by what it perceived as a radical socialist party.

Third, starting from the 1960s, institutional power struggles between the monarch and the parliament reached to a level, where it started to threaten the autonomy of the military. In 1965, George Papandreou and King Constantine II started to publicly argue who would control the military. This altered, as the rise of the left also did, the risk assessment of the armed forces (Clogg 1987, 152-153 and Veremis 154, 156).

As it has been already mentioned, the armed forces, for the first time in Greek history, acted on their own in establishing the dictatorship. The threat from below was not as threatening to the bourgeoisie, who was benefiting from the fruits of economic growth, as it was for the military. The military perceived high levels of cost of toleration, while the bourgeoisie had low cost of toleration associated with democracy.

Bermeo argues that the Greek bourgeoisie was not facing any economic crisis "or a serious challenge to capitalism from the state" (1995, 438). Indeed, "capitalists were still quite willing to expand and even initiate new productive facilities on the eve of colonels' coup" (439). On the political front, when the coup was initiated the parliament was controlled by a right-wing, pro-bourgeoisie party. Not surprisingly, the leader of the party, Kanellopoulos, "was unambiguously opposed to the coup" (441). There seems to be an agreement among Greek scholars that the bourgeoisie before the coup did not face high costs of toleration.

Nicos Mouzelis [for instance] argues that the formation of a more open parliamentary regime led by the Center Union ‘posed no substantial danger for the bourgeoisie.’ The bourgeoisie may have viewed George Papandreaou’s ‘liberalization policies’ with ‘apprehension,’ but it ‘was not sufficiently alarmed to opt for a dictatorial solution’ (quoted in Bermeo 1995, 442).

The 1967 dictatorship after it came to power did not enact pro-bourgeoisie policies that would be expected from an alliance of the two forces (see Bermeo 1995, 444-447). In addition, most of the capitalists openly criticized the military coup: “The majority of ERE [right-wing Radical Union] deputies refused any cooperation with the colonels, and many publicly opposed the dictatorship from its inception through appeals to the Council of Europe and American government” (444). The junta, also, put leaders of the right-wing parties in prison (444). Thus, this hostility towards the right-wing shows that from the start, the dictatorship did not receive any support from any societal forces –including the bourgeoisie.

1974 Transition to Democracy:

The 1967 coup shows that an autonomous military, based on its own perception of threat, can act alone, without a coalitional partner. However, the coup’s aftermath also shows, as has been argued above, how impossible it is to last a dictatorship without any coalitional partners and with resistance from the society (Poulantzas 59, Karakatsanis 16). “With the right itself divided, the military regime was unable to establish either a solid base or political legitimacy” (Collier, 158).

The dictatorship, until 1973, tried to convince and get the support of the right and the bourgeoisie through discussions. When that proved to be fruitless, the dictatorship declared a “presidential parliamentary republic” in 1973 in order to sustain and consolidate itself. The state lifted the state of siege, freed political prisoners, gave civil liberties, and set a future date for elections (Diamandouros 147, 148, 152,153). This liberalization, however, provided a political opportunity for the students of National Polytechnic to revolt in November 1973.

This uprising “coming as it did during the most delicate moment, shook the regime to its foundations ... and led to an internal coup which imposed the rule of the ‘hard-liners’ and the military police over the moderates within the Greek junta”

(Diamandouros 153). The inability of the Greek junta to act during the July 1974 confrontation with Turkey over Cyprus gave back the power advantage to the “soft-liners”. Faced with an ultimatum by the Third Army Corps in Northern Greece, the “hard-liners” agreed to liberalize the regime (Diamandouros 153 and Veremis 167). Shortly after the “hard-liner” defection, “soft-liners” and the moderate opposition agreed on Karamanlis, the pre-coup pro-bourgeoisie leader, to lead the transition to democracy (Diamandouros 158).

The process in which Greece made a transition to democracy should be seen in a coalitional perspective. The dictatorial regime was doomed to fail when the bourgeoisie did not support its intervention and as a result, when it was not consolidated. Thus, the Cyprus crisis should not be seen as independent causal variable, but rather should be seen as an event determining the *timing* of the transition by “intensifying the contradictions within the dictatorships themselves” (Poulantzas 77). Also, transition to democracy was not due to skillful agency, but it was due to actions within given structural constraints, i.e. lack of support from the bourgeoisie, resistance from the society, and unconsolidated dictatorship.

Consolidation of Democracy:

The Greek democracy after 1974 is consolidated because both the bourgeoisie and the military have pro-democratic regime preferences. This is the case because mostly due to changes in socioeconomic conditions, the cost of toleration declined for the bourgeoisie and the military.

After 1974, Greek economy went through structural changes due especially to its accession to the European Union. Contrary to what has been argued (see for example Kaloudis 74-75), EU membership does not guarantee democracy because it requires democracy for membership. If EU were a deterrent, the 1967 military coup, before which Greece’s timetable for successful accession was set, would also be prevented. EU’s influence was more indirect. Because of the structural funds and EU aid amounting to 4% of GDP, the economy grew and structurally changed. Tourism became the leading sector, disqualifying the claim that Greece is an agricultural country. Currently, contribution of services to GDP is 64.4%, whereas agriculture constitutes 8.3% and industry makes up

27.3% of the economy. As a result of these developments, urban and rural labor forces declined to a great extent: by occupation, services comprise 59.2% of the labor force, whereas agriculture and industry each cover around 20% of the employed (Greece: Economy). These structural changes, by increasing the well being of labor and shrinking its size, decreased the threat they posed to the bourgeoisie. Thus, in Greece, the right does not feel the need to ally with the military anymore, and the military does not see a leftist rise causing the armed forces to take action on their own.

This structural shift was reflected in the parliament and parties as well. Moderate parties explicitly appeased the military so that it would not intervene in democracy. New Democracy Party, taking office in 1974 until 1981, treated the officers “with caution” and enacted a law in 1977 that gave autonomy to the army, air force, and navy⁴ (Veremis 173, 174). Thus, the military’s interests were safeguarded. Also, New Democracy, as the heir of the Radical Union before the 1967 coup, continued to represent the interests of the right and the bourgeoisie. Thus, in the crucial years of transition, New Democracy became a stabilizing factor guaranteeing the interests of the military and the bourgeoisie (for more information on the Radical Union and New Democracy see Katsoudas). Similarly, when in 1981 PASOK won the elections and succeeded to the government, Karamanlis ascended to the Presidency, balancing the rule of moderate left and right.

Not surprisingly, with the socioeconomic structural shift Greece experienced, radical leftist parties lost their support and PASOK, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, rose as the moderate left. Even though PASOK, at first, claimed to represent the “non-privileged” against the “privileged” and adopted radical “socialist” rhetoric, after 1977 it has undergone considerable moderation, drawing support relatively evenly from all social classes (see Karakatsanis chapter 6 on the moderation of PASOK). Because PASOK has established a clientelistic version of populism, it rests its continued governmental power on distribution of patronage (Mouzelis 1995), rather than following leftist appeals. As a result, it does not pose any threats to the right. Once in power PASOK, indeed, announced programs (such as devaluation, cuts in wages and public expenditures, and restrictions in imports) that clearly benefited the bourgeoisie at the

⁴ Even though a law in 1995 declared that the Ministry of Defense has the final say in security matters and decreased the autonomy of the military vis-à-vis the government (Veremis 180), Greek armed forces are still more autonomous than their Western European counterparts.

expense of the lower classes (for more information on PASOK see Featherstone and Clogg 1987, 94-149). Hence, PASOK's moderate position does not signal threat to the bourgeoisie and the military, like the pre-1967 center government did to the military.

Apart from this decline in cost of toleration, the military in Greece, after the 1967 coup, has learned about costs associated with suppression as well. For, as the 1967 transition to dictatorship has showed the military can perceive threats to its autonomy from the lower classes, even when the bourgeoisie does not. Allegations of a leftist coup or peaceful demonstrations in the streets can be seen as threats by the military and reasons for establishing a dictatorship. Thus, a real decline of cost of toleration might not be enough to consolidate democracy. In Greece, the 1967 coup was a historical opportunity. The armed forces have "learned" and have "changed their evaluations of the alternatives to democratic rule" (Bermeo 1992, 274). The military knows that today if it establishes a dictatorship without the help of the bourgeoisie, it would face fierce resistance from the society and have problems in sustaining its rule. This realization is not due to ideational or cultural changes as Bermeo might argue; rather the military, due to past experiences, knows that the costs of suppression are too high if it intervenes in democracy alone. Thus, the change of perception is due to the military's learning that under some conditions its interests would not be served by an intervention. Therefore, in today's Greece the military stays at the sidelines choosing not to intervene to democracy and allowing Greece to experience a consolidated regime (see also Karakatsanis chapter 7 on the changes of military's attitudes).

Conclusion:

This paper has asked the following question: how can we explain the regime changes and different military interventions Greece experienced in its history? Two independent variables were crucial in this analysis: perceptions of threats and coalitions. Degrees of perceived threats alter the cost-benefit analysis the military and the bourgeoisie make. If both groups feel highly threatened by the rise of the lower classes, they form coalitions and respond by establishing dictatorships. This is what happened in 1936. If, on the other hand, the military and the bourgeoisie perceive moderate levels of

threat (from the upper classes), they respond with short interventions. This is what happened in 1909 and in the 1920s.

Since the military in Greece has been relatively powerful and autonomous, its alliance with the bourgeoisie was occasional. The military had its own perception of threats, which could diverge from the bourgeoisie's. In 1967 even though the military thought that its well-being and security were threatened, the bourgeoisie did not perceive any costs associated with democracy. As a result, the military acted alone in establishing the dictatorship. This authoritarian rule, however, did not last very long. Without any support from the society, the costs of suppression for the military became too high. The armed forces split into two and soft-liners led the transition to democracy. This is why coalitions matter: without them, dictatorships can be established, but they cannot be sustained. In sum, the best way to explain the behavior of the military in Greece and the consequent regimes is through analyzing threats social classes pose to each other, their coalitions, and the relative powers coalitions have.

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Institutions and Political Culture in the 1990s:
Explaining PA.SO.K's modernization process

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WORK IN PROGRESS

Synopsis of the paper

The discussion about the nature, role and organization of political parties is continuous and classic. The party remains the basic component of modern representative society, the necessary entity for political representation and the crucial component that binds together citizens and political power in the quest for political interaction and active participation in the political sphere. Moving from the industrial to the post-industrial model of political membership the party is undergoing a crisis of representation.

The transformation of the character of parties in the field of ideas, programs, initiatives, message, symbols and political rhetoric constitutes an expression of societal response in different periods of time. It is an important signal that relates with the historical route, the class structure and the perspectives of its society, with the credibility and reliability of politics and of democracy in every socio-political framework.

The transition from the 20th to the 21st century signals alone, one new "symbolic" dynamic process for the development of party formations. The shift from the industrial to the post-industrial society and the consequences of modernity¹ in social,

¹ One way of defining *modernity or modernization* is to see it in association with social processes and arrangements that were institutionalized on a large scale in Western Europe after the English Industrial and French Revolutions. These entailed unprecedented social mobilization as the various exiting pre-industrial localisms were weakened or destroyed and the majority of people brought into the more encompassing arenas of the national market and the nation state. The terms *modernity* and *modernization* are not used in the Parsonian, neo-evolutionist sense in this thesis. But rather, they are used as historically oriented sociologists [R. Bendix, B. Moore] or sociologically-orientated historians [E. Hobsbawn] have used

economic, political and –particularly - ideological sphere are paradigmatic in the way that we have to reinvent conceptual and methodological tools to study the transformations that are taking place in the institutional realm of the parties.

Moreover, in the Greek case we can add extra reasons that characterize that institutional makeover that is taking place especially in the 1990s and the beginning of 2000: accession to EMU (*the European project*) as landmark, the completion of 26 years and more from the establishment of the Third Greek republic, in 1974, and also the wide societal demand for the need to modernize and enhance the political culture² further. The parties at least those that are connected organically with the history and politics of one's country are not enterprises, are not simple players in a competitive game or simple expressions of social forces. They are historical, cultural institutions, and they conceive reality and political competition through complex ideological structures. They do not 'just exist' but they contribute substantially in the configuration of environment in which they are acting and they 'construct' and 're-create' *identities*.

Therefore, in an era of rapid transformations and change, we need to invent a new *modus operandi* in order to decode the physiognomy and the organizational structure of the modern party.

them in trying to identify the qualitative differences between industrial and pre-industrial societies. See R. Bendix, *Nation building and Citizenhip*. New York: Action Books, 1970.

² In this paper *political culture* is considered to be the complex set of orientations and discourses that actors use while trying to make sense of, to account for, or to legitimize/delegitimize prevailing political arrangements. See Mouzelis N.: *Sociological theory: What went wrong? Diagnosis and Remedies*. London 1995.pp. 50-8.

This thesis, consequently, will try to decode and analyze the characteristics of *modernization* of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA.SO.K) (especially in the period from 1996-2002).

The analysis and interpretation of PA.SO.K's new physiognomy contributes to the debate within comparative politics about the models and typologies that can best explain the nature and functioning of political parties (see the relevant bibliography: Weber and Michels, Duverger, Sartori, Katz, Mair etc.; sociologists like Huntington, LaPalombara, Mouzelis studying the politics of 'developed or 'underdeveloped-peripheral' countries). This study aims to define and analyze the concepts involved in the study of Greek politics and to formulate a theoretical framework within which they can best be understood and interpreted. '*Modernization*', '*organizational reform*', the '*open-party thesis*' are discussed as distinct models, which are relevant in the study and understanding of the post-1996 PA.SO.K.

Moreover, the period analyzed is characterized by the structural changes that occurred especially in the level of party's leadership formation (July 1996: PA.SO.K's 4th Congress becomes the landmark of that transition. Costas Simitis is the newly elected leader of the party, winning all the crucial debates within the different conflicting groups and becomes the key player that controls all the critical political and organizational matters within the party) as well as in the level of PA.SO.K's ideological reorganization (new form of ideological representation: the concept of *modernization-eksynchronismos*).

Thus, the new personality of the party can be analyzed in the following method: between its resolutely catch-all programmatic/ideological profile, the interclassist structure of its organization and electorate, between 'programmatic minimalism' and 'electoral maximalism' and its relationship with civil society (knowledge

institutions³). I propose that because it is based on this schema, the new ‘*modernization*’ identity of PASOK is not merely conjectural in character.

Finally, samples of fundamental thematic questions that are addressed in the thesis are the following:

What is the significance of *modernization* as a political discourse? What is its empirical documentation and how its methodological use will help us to study and to decipher the role of this political ideology in conjunction with PASOK’s new character, organizational structure (change of party cadres and its social base) and its affiliation with civil society (NGO’s-Knowledge Institutions)?

³ Knowledge Institutions (as potential agents of policy transfer) are defined as organisations which are distinct from government, which have as an objective to provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues through the use of cognitive and elite mobilisation

Full Version of the Paper

Institutions and Political Culture in the 1990s:

Explaining P.A.S.O.K's modernization process

As we mention above, the transition from the 20th to the 21st century signals a new “symbolic” potential on the evolution of party formations and politics in general. The transition from the industrial to the post-industrial era and the consequences of modernity in the social, economic, political and -especially- ideological areas are presented as of high importance and require analysis and interpretation.

With reference to the Greek example, there are additional points to be taken into consideration when we are analysing ‘*transitions*’, like the EMU accession as a benchmark for a new era, the “*Europeanization*” of party system, the completion of more than 26 years after the political changeover (*Metapolitefsi*), the recent confirmation, through elections, of the bipolar system, existing since 1977, and also the wide realization of the need for novel, more attractive and innovative things in political life which could mobilize the interest in politics and show its critical role in the outcome of vital issues.

Greece, together with other countries, had to face a New World as soon as communism collapsed and the bipolar system ended. People, parties, leaders were called to orient themselves in a new horizon, based on their experiences and their course in history. The newly formed Third Greek Republic (*Metapolitefsi*), was

giving her place to Greece of the post-bipolar system and the ‘Europeanization’ of its character in the 90s.

Parties -at least those which are organically linked with the history and the political culture of one’s country- are neither businesses, nor simple players in a competitive game or simple expressions of social powers. They are historical and cultural institutions, which can perceive reality and political competition through complex ideological structures and which can make policy within the limits imposed by the political and historical culture. (Spourdalakis,1990). Their uniqueness stands on their capacity to mobilize citizens, to recruit and renew the political personnel, to articulate diverse and/or competing interests and through social revisions to fulfill the necessary requirements for providing the citizenry with alternative policies for running public affairs. Parties therefore, become an object of identification and affection for the citizens and contribute to the necessary political cohesion, which is at the heart of contemporary democracy. After the fall of the Military Dictatorship in 1974, this prowess of political parties, in combination with the absence of any other agencies with similar capacities, confirmed them as key actors in the strategy to the transition to democracy.

Since its formation in 1974, PA.SO.K was a party with strong cross-class electoral support, much more so than the social democratic parties of central and northern Europe. PA.SO.K received a high level of support from the farmers and among the traditional petit bourgeois class, two classes that are particularly strong in Greece and often hostile towards the left in other European countries. During the 80s, and particularly after 1984 PA.SO.K’s ‘*catch all*’ character weakened. From 1981-1993,

the structure of the party was of a catch-all nature that enjoyed heavy support within the lower classes. The elections of 1996 and 2000 and the strategy of the *modernised* PA.SO.K were altering its character and structure in a significant manner. The election (January 1996) of Simitis, leader of the ‘*modernizing wing*’ of PA.SO.K and opponent of Andreas Papandreou, as prime minister by the parliamentary caucus (in place of the seriously ill Papandreou), was the starting point for the overturning of internal party relations. It led to the election of Simitis as president of the party 4th Congress (July 1996), after Papandreou’s death. The intense and passionate but democratic confrontation over succession between the ‘*modernizing*’ and ‘*traditional*’ factions during the 4th congress symbolically ‘*liberated*’ the organisation from its past. The ‘age of *modernisation-eksychnismos* and the age of Simitis’ mark a shift in the organisational tradition of PA.SO.K. The end of the cult of leadership, the legitimization of internal dissent and the logic of the majority and of the minority shape the new organisational culture of the party. The party’s executive bodies function more collectively. The same applies to the governmental level, for the cabinet and the various collective, governmental organs, the role of which in a system of ‘prime minister-centrism’ has obviously been strengthened (Moschonas, 2002). The victory of PA.SO.K in the elections of September 1996 contributed to the stabilization of the new power bloc of the party and the *motto of modernisation* (*εκσυγχρονισμός*) appeals as the new ideological drive of the party.

This paper, accordingly, will try to decode and analyze the physiognomy of *modernization-eksychnismos* of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA.SO.K) from 1996. The basic thematic questions of this paper are the following: What is the meaning of *modernization* as a political ideology? How we can analyse its empirical

substantiation and how its methodological use can help us study and “decode” the role of this political ideology, in relation to the organizational and ideological evolution of PA.SO.K in the above period as well as its connection with ‘knowledge institutions’- ‘citizens associations’ that helped (and how?) the new character of PA.SO.K to be assimilated within the Greek Society?

Methodological steps towards the Semantic Definition of the Political Ideology of Modernization (ΕΚΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ)

The historical framework of modernization

My methodological argument begins with the following thesis: the left has been linked with two basic notions: that of modernity/modernization, and that of the distribution of rights (political, socio-economic, cultural) to the unprivileged. One way of defining *modernity or modernization* is to see it in association with social processes and arrangements that were institutionalized on a large scale in Western Europe after the English Industrial and French Revolutions. These entailed unprecedented social mobilization as the various existing pre-industrial localisms were weakened or destroyed and the majority of people brought into the more encompassing arenas of the national market and the nation state. Not only was the ‘bringing in’ process extremely uneven, it also took both autonomous and heteronomous forms (Mouzelis, 1998). In the autonomous case, political and socio-economic rights-which during the *ancien regime*-period had been limited to a small minority-gradually seeped down to the bottom of the social pyramid, and by doing so

created new levels of prosperity, political freedom, and relative social justice. In the more heteronomous process, the popular classes became irreversibly implicated in the mechanisms of national markets and state bureaucracies, but were by-passed as far as the acquisition of fundamental rights was concerned. (Mouzelis, 1998)

In other words the Left was from its very beginning in favour of modernisation plus the broad distribution of rights-for a relative autonomous integration of the lower classes in the national centre. The Right, on the other hand, was either completely against modernisation, or later when it became obvious that the process was irreversible strove to heteronymous tope of social mobilisation, which would bring 'in' the lower classes as far as linkages with the various national arenas were concerned (in respect to military conscription), but kept them 'out' in terms of popular rights.

If we focus on Greece's post-war era we can divide it into two relatively homogeneous periods (I use Tsakalotos, 1990 chronology). The first one spans the period between 1950 and 1980 and the second one from 1981 until today. The rise of PA.SO.K to power is used as the delimitation line between the two periods, due to important political changes, which followed. The main characteristic of the first period concerns the remarkable economic growth of the country. This growth is achieved through the process of industrialization. Yet, as is true for all industrially newly ascending countries, the industrialization of Greece was not the outcome of a spontaneous procedure. It was a result of a conscious effort of the state, which envisaged the modernization of an agricultural economy into an industrial country (see Johnson 1982 and White 1984 for more on the notion and the role of the developmental state). Within this framework, the state followed an interventionist

policy based on the following axes: Protection of the internal market, development of the industrial infrastructures and cheap credit capitals (through inspection of the credit system), supply of export aid, subsidization of the industrial inflow of primary origin and other inflows, according to each case, (e.g. energy) and finally, inspection of the employment through a combination of civic prosecution and controlled trade unionism. The interventionist policy of the state was not limited to the management of some macro-economic variables or the taking of administrative measures to support industrialization. On the contrary, it expanded in the sector of institutional organization, i.e. in the creation of a large number of state organizations, which aimed firstly at the increase of the available sources of the economy and secondly at the distribution of these sources according to the priorities of industrialization. This status was essentially maintained intact until the beginning of 1970 and until 1980 there were some minor changes. The nationalization of a great number of large economic units and the creation of a mining/ industrial complex under the state control are typical examples of the developmental view of the state, even after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974.

The distinctive trait of the Greek developmental (*anaptyksiako kratos*) state, which is relevant to our discussion, relates to its ideological composition. It was all about an oppressive state which dominated for approximately thirty years and whose official ideology was anti-communism (Mouzelis, 1986). Despite all these, or even because of all these facts, the state functioned in a very effective way. From 1950 up until the beginning of 1970 the rate of growth of the Greek economy was among the highest ones of the countries of OECD*, with the single exception of Japan. This success must be primarily attributed to the fact that the bureaucracy was asked to serve a clear and

* Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

defined social target and it was linked to the developmental view of the state. The political homogeneity, the continuity of services and the strict, hierarchical structure of the state bureaucracy acted as additional factors in favour of its efficiency (Leftwich 1994, p.378).

When PA.SO.K became government in 1981, it had to confront two facts. On the one hand, country's accession to the EEC in 1980 which together with the gradual liberalization of the world system signalled the end of the post-war status quo of accumulation (καθεστώς συσσώρευσης). Gradually, the state was losing its decisive role in the creation of wealth. The state intervention could only be expanded in the area of wealth distribution. PA.SO.K government moved indeed towards this direction by creating a substandard welfare state (Tsakalotos, 1990). On the other hand, however, it kept out of the reorganization process, the development of state institutions. This took place in order to confront the second limitation, which related to the ideological composition of the state bureaucracy. To all intents, PA.SO.K used the structure of the developmental state as a mechanism to occupy state power. The obvious way to achieve that was to expand the public services. A large number of state organizations, business and institutions linked to the developmental state were burdened with additional employees instead of being shrunk, merged or even broken up. The target was the reversal of the political correlation in the inner parts of the state bureaucracy. The additional employment stemmed from the area of the wider Left in an overwhelming percentage.

This policy had major political and social side effects. The precipitous fall of efficiency in the public sector was one. It is a naive explanation to say that this was simply due to the expansion of employment beyond the limits of rationalism. Even the bypassing of the principle of meritocracy through the ideological control of

employment constitutes no sufficient interpretation of this case. Both these facts were characteristic of the period of the developmental state. The most decisive factor though, which exerted a long-term, disorganizing effect on the efficiency of the public sector, was the total disconnection of the public administration from its social targets. PA.SO.K failed to give a new set of social aspirations to the state above and beyond its own ideological and political definitions. It was all about an outspoken submission of the public sphere in the service of the political procedure. This fact deprived the state from its legalizing function as an expression of the *social interest*. The political antagonism was transferred to the inside of the state and shakes the strict hierarchical structure of the state bureaucracy (Kastanidis 1998). The consequences on the efficiency of the public sector were destructive. When it comes to crucial political issues, the public servants outflank the hierarchical structure of the state bureaucracy and they report directly to their supporting political parties. So, the notion of personal responsibility is substituted by political coverage and the devotion to the party rises to a leading principle of one's career.

The majority of the new measures that the government implements, aims to overcome the above-described phenomenon. Namely, it aims to establish a socially related behaviour in the state bureaucracy, which is above any political divisions. The characterization of *modernization-eksychnismos* as a *national* target is working in that direction. Country's accession to the EMU functions towards this direction. The application of a meritocratic public sector results at the same viewpoint, as well. It is not about a rule whose adoption will improve the efficiency of the public sector in the short run. On the contrary, it is used as an evidence of the "de-politicisation" of the procedures, which regulate the public sector and aim at the consolidation of a new

social ethos, which will reward any effort. The reforms in vital sectors (like education) reflect and also strengthen this policy.

During the 80s important issues arise which are characteristic for PASOK'S physiognomy. These issues concern the power relationships which formed within the public sector and which resulted from PASOK's policy to conquer state power. In practise, this was implemented with the creation of powerful trade unions, which were controlled by the governing party. The government-union relationship advanced according to the pattern of a contemporary version of *neo-patrimonialism* (Clapham 1985, 57). The perpetuation of corporatist benefits rewarded the political support of the unions to the government. However, the huge macro-economic imbalances of the Greek economy disturbed this relationship. Gradually, the unions distanced themselves from the governmental choices and placed obstacles in the reform of the public sector. In reality, the unions behaved as *quasi owners* of the state businesses and organizations. The government, as it was facing this situation, had two options: either to pursue with the reorganization of the public sector through changes in the ownership regime (privatisations and powerful financial/ structural interventions) or to proceed into the overthrowing of the political relations in the public sector without affecting the ownership regime. Based on mainly ideological reasons, the government of Simitis choose the second alternative. This choice was about a policy of reform and restructuring within the limits of the public sector.

The demand for *modernization* as a political indispensability

According to the historical approach that we apply in this paper, modernization is not formed as an ideological trend (at least at the beginning), which pursues abstract political targets. This means that the demand for political reforms does not originate from the theoretical verification that the organization of the country's political system is old-fashioned (*parochial system*) when compared to the model of the developed western economies (for more on the political theory of modernization: Randal and Tehobald 1985 and Taylor 1979). On the contrary this is about a trend, which is defined by the political history of the country and its strategy is to overcome specific political mistakes and practises of the past.

The inefficiency of the public sector and public administration in general is the primary goal which *modernisation* targets. This characteristic trait, therefore, enables *modernization* to collect its ideological facts from all aspects of social life: the relations between the state and the citizens, the inability of the police to deal with modern delinquency, the incompetence to eradicate tax evasion, the inability to cope with natural disasters and prevent accidents etc. Despite all these issues, its basic target remains to improve the performance of the economy.

It is not hard to say that the need for the materialization of reforms is connected to the dramatic change in the conditions of accumulation and growth of the post-war era. This change has two starting points. Primarily, comes the integration of the country in the EEC then (EU now) and secondly, the liberalization of the world economy. The common factor in both these influences was the exposure of an industrially newly developing country in the relentless logic of international competition. The improvement in competitiveness was nominated as the corner stone for economic growth.

In this framework, the reform of the political relations in the public sector and organizations is of paramount importance for three reasons. First, because it contributes to the survival and further development of these institutions. The internationalisation of the capital in the service domain has undermined the monopolistic condition of the public businesses to such an extent that their survival is dependent on their restructuring and their collaboration with other public or private businesses (Fine, 1998). Second, because the competitiveness of the remaining sectors of the economy depends, to some extent, on the progress marked by the public sector. And third, because the opening of the markets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans constitutes a challenge for these public enterprises to expand and grow even further.

It is obvious that the materialization of these functions is inconceivable within the traditional regime of the public service. The politically appointed management have no political power, a power that would allow them to proceed into structural changes. They are unable to enforce a strategic plan and introduce the required organization and technological innovations. The trade unions, from their point of view, strongly resist to any possible change, which may affect the status quo.

The political reform of the second level corresponds to the same reasoning: the recognition of the decisive role that the efficiency for economic growth and prosperity acquires. The interference of political criteria in the distribution of resources is a major disadvantage of the Greek capitalism. The distribution of credits, the nature and the geographical organization of the infrastructure, the motivation system and finally the human capital must all obey to a common principle: the improvement of competitiveness.

There is also an additional view of the meaning that the efficiency of the public sector is of paramount importance. After the collapse of the Eastern economies, a majority of

Greek companies develop activities in these countries. This perspective creates a primary field for the economic intervention of the Greek State in the specific countries. The support of Greek enterprises, which invest abroad, and especially in the markets of Eastern Europe, presupposes the undertaking by the Greek State of such initiatives that were until now the privilege of the developed countries. The state response to these new functions is of vital importance, as the expectations for the future of the Greek economy have been linked to the successful infiltration of the Greek businesses in the markets of the Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Papantoniou 1994).

The political ideology of *Modernization* (ΕΚΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ)

Despite the fact that the concept of the modernization of the political system –but also of the whole Greek society - is “artistically” spread within the political rhetoric throughout the period following the political changeover⁴ (Third Greek Republic), modernization is openly expressed as a request in the inside of a homonymous, active and par excellence political ideology only after the general elections in 1996. PA.SO.K’s modernization policy, constructed around Greek membership in the European Union and programmatic and political priorities inspired by the neo-liberal

⁴ During the initial phases of the period following the political changeover (*metapolitefsi*), the demand for modernization was escorted and covered by coordinate requests like the one for the joining of the EEC and later, the request for “*Allagi- Change*”. In the middle of the 1980s and within the framework of the splitting of the KKE Esoterikou (Inland) and the formation of the EAR, the demand for modernization is placed in relation to the pre-election rhetoric of the reformative Left. The question remaining for further investigation is how much the political use of the “modernization demand” played an important role during the democratic consolidation period. Diamantouros Transition to and Consolidation of Democratic Politics in Greece 1974 – 83: A Tentative Assessment”, in G. Pridham [ed], *The New Mediterranean Democracies. Regime Transitions in Spain, Greece and Portugal*, Frank Cass, London, 1984, pp. 50-71 και R. Gunther N. Dimantouros – H.J. Puhle [eds], *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1995.

paradigm, strengthened PA.SO.K's influence among higher social strata and an important section of capital, as well as intellectuals traditionally distrustful of Papandreou's 'nationalist' and 'demagogic' discourse. Thus, the PASOK of Costas Simitis has gradually become *the party of the 'contentment society'*, while retaining a significant influence among disadvantaged sections of the population, even if it is significantly reduced today. On the basis of this demand for political modernization, it appears also that not only the re-election of PA.SO.K in government is effective, but also the initiation of the cognate attempt to renew the features and the party's political program. Henceforth, the demand for political modernization is used not only as a connective tissue in the pre-election speech for PA.SO.K, but mainly as a *legitimizing* reference of the state policy itself. Therefore, the aim now is to examine and to present this reference with the examination of some defined components and facts of the ideology – as yet we can call it - of the *political modernization*⁵.

Yet, even though the issue of “when” and “by whom” the request for political modernization is phrased and it is characterized by sufficient clarity, this is not the case for the issue, which relates to the contents of this demand. So, despite the five-year (+) “tenure in office” and the frequent use of the term “political modernization”, its contents remain of dual meaning and on sight undefined. A second methodological position which is vital for our analysis is the definition and maybe the elucidation not of the term “political modernization” itself, but of the contents that this term has acquired during its defined ideological use.

⁵ The material composing the analysis of this ideology derives from empirical research on the speeches delivered by the Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and other members of the so-called “modernizers group” and by articles and texts which have been published in the daily or periodic press of the period 1996-2002.

The bibliographic data of the 1950s and 1960s⁶ forms a primary source of notional delimitation. Even in that case, it is possible to say that the discovery of the notion of political modernization being created inside an expressly theoretical-sociological framework (*structural functionalism-development theory*) and that this notion is orientated to an equally clear area of reference: the Third World societies.

More specifically, the harnessing of various elements from the political systems of the developed societies with the societies of the Third World constitutes one of the basic demands of such views. The fundamental distinction between “*traditional*” and “*modern*” is meaningful only as differentiation between the ‘developed’ and the “Third World-underdeveloped” views. The ideological use of the term “political modernization” today orientates and channels its legitimised references to the political systems of the developed societies and this is how the strategic distinction between the “traditional” and the “modern” intersects these societies and especially their political systems. So, in the broader framework of a cold war ideology, if the demand for political modernization coincides with the “outreaching of the West”⁷, then, on the other side, in the framework of a post-cold war ideology, the demand for political modernization corresponds *to* and is signalled *by* the demand of the “overcoming” of

⁶ D. Apter, *The Politics Of Modernization*, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965. G. Almond – B. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Little Brown, Boston, 1966. G. Almond – S. Verba, *Civic Culture*, Little Brown, Boston, 1965. C. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, Harper and Row, New York, 1966. L. Pye – S. Verba [eds], *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1965. L. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development*. P. Terleksis, *The Political System: Sociological View of the Political Life* EKKE, Athens, 1973, in which the approach to the political development and modernization of the 1950s and 1960s is presented and N. Diamantouros, *Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece*, translated by D. Sotiropoulos, Alexandria, Athens, 2000, where this thesis is revoked in order to approach the subject of the modernization process in relation to the obstacles arising on the way of Greece to its period after the political changeover. Here, the contradistinction between the “traditional” on the one hand and the “modern” on the other, develops under the form of the dual political culture.

⁷ N. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece, Facets of Underdevelopment*, Exantas, Athens, 1978.

the so-called industrial society and the transition to the “information-global society”⁸. So, the ideological use of the term “modernization” and, in particular, “political modernization” is entirely distinct and differentiated.

Even though the above argument marks a discontinuity or some kind of sectioning in the ideological uses of the term “political modernization”, the function of any political ideology remains always the same as long as its main aim is its appearance under a united form. This aim, in turn, can be break down in the following objectives:

- (1) Re-formulation and re-definition of the *general interest*.
- (2) Political mobilization of social forces and
- (3) Re-definition of the major social and political cleavages.

More specifically, as far it concerns the first objective, the ideology of political modernization is called to rejoin different social interests under one hierarchical form in such a way that the hierarchical relationship appears and is anticipated as if it was the general interest of society. By adopting the Gramscian terminology, we could support that this objective corresponds to the hegemonic “function” of the political ideology. Under these presuppositions, one can consider the two remaining objectives as two separate levels of the first one. More specifically, the political mobilization of the social forces represents this hierarchical relationship of the various social interests as far it concerns the possible or probable ways of their participation in the political system, whereas the re-definition of the major socio-political cleavages represents this hierarchical relationship on its comparison to the “rival”- and for this reason they are regarded as pathogenic - hierarchical relationships. So, the ideology of the political modernization is identical to any other political ideology regarding its form.

⁸ A. Giddens, *The Third Way, The renewal of Social Democracy*, translated by A. Takis-K. Georgopoulou, Polis, Athens, 1998.

However, this is not the case, if the extension turns to the contents of the ideology of political modernization. In addition, the examination of these contents sheds light on the particular character of this ideology. The contents of the ‘*identity*’ of political modernization are initially presented as joint-statements of the term and crop up during the use of the request for political modernization. We are talking about partial and on sight self-contained references to aspects of society and also to essential aspects of the political system, which operate in the form of legitimised references. Such legitimising references are observed during the conjunction of the demand for political modernization with phrases like “*Information-Global Society*”, “*Civil Society*” “*Governance - New Public Management*” and “*Centre-Left*”, all parts of rhetoric commonly used and presented in the speeches delivered by the “*modernizer’s team*”. The alterations of PA.SO.K’s political rhetoric during the period in question (1996-2002) are various and determinative of its need/effort to create an ideological-programmatic formula which attempts to synthesize and combine three basic thematic configurations. The first, which originates within the classical social democratic tradition, is oriented towards development and the traditional values and goals of the left, including social equality, the welfare state and the strengthening of employment. The second is inspired by the neo-liberal agenda (priority to the market, currency stabilization, reform of the public sector, a rigorous discourse that encourages sacrifice). The third is inspired by the agenda of cultural liberalism and post-materialism (Moschonas 2002).

While the above references of political modernization ideology (*Information Society, from the party of the ‘non-privilege’ to the party of the ‘contentment society’, Civil Society, Governance- New Public Management* (unfortunately I don’t have the time to analyze every concept in this paper)) attempt to correlate this ideology with the

“hard cell” of the political system, i.e. with the state and state-society relationships, the legitimising reference which arises from the use of the term “Centre-Left” attempts to correlate the ideology of political modernization with the “political market” which is the sphere where the political parties compete over the people’s vote.

The use of the term “ Centre-Left ” in the framework of the ideology of political modernization can be approached by two distinct viewpoints, from which the first refers to the *stricto sensu* ideological use of the term and the second refers to its correlation with a new form of party organization. So, even though the first approach brings forward the operation of the ‘identity’ of political modernization that refers to the re-definition of the major dividing sections, the second one shows the operation of this ideology regarding the ways of mobilization of the social forces, in a very persuasive manner.

In the Greek political life of the post-war era until the end of the 1980s, the competition between the political forces, the practices of the political parties and the political behaviour of the citizens was over-defined by the major cleavage “Right – Anti-Right”. Despite its simplistic character the cleavage “Right-Anti-Right” echoed typical traits of the Greek political life, like the Civil War, the post-civil war political system with its usual deviations from the rules of parliamentary system, the seven-year dictatorship (1967 – 1974) and the demand of a functional rehabilitation of a *fair and democratic state* with the elevation to the government of the winners of the B’ World War who, at the same time, were the losers of the Civil War (see G. Moschonas: [Moschonas. G. (1994) “The Right-Anti-Right” Cleavage in the Post-Dictatorship Period (1974-1990), in Demertzis, N. (ed.), *The Greek Political Culture Today, Athens:Odysseas (in GreeK)*]). So, in the divisional scheme of “Right-Anti-

Right” there exists the demand for democratisation of the Greek political system with the participation of all those who had been excluded by the structures and the operation of the post-civil war state. This demand appeared to be satisfied during “*Allagi (Change)*” (*Allagi* was a motto -that signified a whole era- that was used by Andreas Papandreou to denote the transition from the old *corrupted regime* to the *new, democratic* political environment that he had envisaged) period in 1981, with the elevation of PA.SO.K. to government, which is what the government called upon for the representation of these excluded forces (see Ch. Lyrintzis: *A Crisis in politics (?) New political trends and the possibilities of modernization*). In *PA.SO.K.: Party – State - Society 1998*, Spourdalakis (ed) and also Ch. Lyrintzis: *Sygrisi kai Ermineia 2002*).

Democratisation, however, was limited to the guarantee of the form of the fair state and to the smooth operation of parliamentary system, without expanding at the same time to the reforming of the structures of the state policy, inherited intact by the post-civil war political system.⁹ On the contrary, the practice of PA.SO.K’s governments during the 1980s clearly shows the use of such state policy structures to achieve and realize its own, this time, targets. In this framework, the use of the cleavage “Right-Anti- Right” produces “an utopia excess”, i.e. of all those which remained to be fulfilled so that the “Allagi” program would be fully accomplished.

The introduction of the term “Centre-Left” as a political and ideological compass for PA.SO.K from 1996, aims firstly to weaken and secondly to neutralize the major

⁹ D. Gravaris, “The construction of the Welfare State: from party rhetoric to the State Policies” in M.Spourdalakis[editor], *PA.SO.K.:Party-State-Society*, Patakis, Athens, 1998, p. 91-120.

cleavage of “Right-Anti-Right”¹⁰ as a “traditional” trend and, as will be seen later, to silence the demand for democratisation.

A first differentiation in the ideological function of the two cleavages, the “*traditional*” and the “*modern*” one, is that the cleavage “Right-Anti/Right” aimed at the gathering of the voters and the legitimization of PASOK’s rhetoric. Irrespective of its governmental practice – and this is where the democratic deficit of the policy for popular radicalism stands- while the cleavage “Centre -Left vs. Centre-Right” aims primarily at the legalization of the governmental choices of PASOK and secondly at the gathering of the voters.

The two new elements that the term “Centre-Left” brings to the ideology of political modernization are the following: first its self-definition as a post-cold war ideology and second, the semantic identification of the first synthetic “Centre-” with the famous “New Social Centre”- *Neuen Mitte*. The self-definition of the ideological domain of reference of the term “Centre-Left” as a post-cold war term contains the significant reasons why the cleavage “Right-Counter/Right” is rejected as “traditional”. The first of these reasons lies on the fact that the end of the post-cold war era is exclusively defined by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and is thus internalised by the ideology of political modernization as a self-explained loss of the left or socialistic ideology and policy. The second reason, which is a result of the first, lies on the fact that this same collapse leaves the “Right- Anti/ Right” cleavage without a meaning, and this is because the latter is conceived

¹⁰ In political science, the term “cleavage” –a more precise description would be schism- is introduced for the first time by S.M. Lipset and St. Rokkan (mainly by the second) in their book *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross – National Perspectives*, Free Press, New York, 1967. In the Greek bibliography, the use of this term with particular reference to the “schism Right-Anti/Right” is initially held in the book of St. Alexandropoulos “Parties and Social Reform in face of the year 2000” in E. Katsoulis’ book (editor) *Greece facing 2000*, Papazissis, Athens and by the same author, “Trends of Corporatist Representation and Greek Reality” in *Parliamentary Review*, No 4, 1990. See also G. Moschonas (1994).

primarily by the events and the developments of the post-civil war period, which in turn is defined by the political and ideological expediencies of the Cold War period. Amongst these reasons, we ought to include the conservative turn of the labour and social democratic parties of Western Europe, so that the use of the term “Centre-left” comes to legalize this conservative turn. Within this framework, the semantic meaning of the second synthetic “- left” is weakened in favour of the first synthetic “Centre-”.

If in the attempt to self-define the term “centre-left” as a post-cold war ideology, the semantic relationship between the two synthetics seems like a zero sum game, then, in the attempt to identify semantically the second synthetic with the notorious “Middle Wing”, the ideological castration of the second synthetic “-Left” is completed, as it is now out of the game. The turn here is not to the forces of the Centre, “traditionally counter-right”, but to the artificial domain which created in a characteristically naïve manner and on whose settings they construct their questionnaires and hypotheses in order to attract “the median voter”. In the political market, this voter is equally fictitious to the consumer who appears as a dominant force in the financial market. From this artificial term “middle wing”, to the concept of the “median voter” there is very little distance to be covered and the limits separating all these terms are indistinguishable. In the specific use of the term “Centre-left”, the ideology of the political modernization accepts uncritically as a self-evident fact that competition between political parties is just the political market, so that the social forces are split into individual voters / consumers of political programs, whereas the political parties are not only considered as businesses but moreover, they must act as ones. In this case, the political modernization adopts an ideological fact as if it were its own, even though it was “born-created” by the polls, and internalised by them. Using this “ghosts” or better “facades”, the legalizing reference of the term “Centre-left” remains

on the surface of the political rivalry incidence, leaving intact the relation of the political system with the competitive and opposing social interests, in other words leaving intact the fact that remains to be modernized: the post- civil war (and for this reason “traditional”) structures of state policy.

This deficit of democratisation that characterises the use of the term “Centre-Left” in the context of political modernisation ideology becomes more evident, if the use of this term is approached regarding its correlation to the ideal for it “and therefore modern” form of party organization. If there existed a “traditional” form of party organization that coincided with the “mass-party” type and which corresponded to the “traditional” heretical cleavage “Right-Counter/Right”, then a “modern” type of party corresponds to the “modern” cleavage of “CenterLeft-CenterRight”, which tends to coincide with the types of the “network-party” or the “cartel-party”¹¹ model. This equivalence implies two different forms of mobilization of the social forces. In this way, the mobilization of social forces for the “mass-party” within the party organization is intense and dense. In spite of the oligarchic structure in which this massive participation¹² is being finally crystallized, the operation of the mass-party requires the active participation of the citizens/party members in the political life. The cleavage “Right-Anti / Right” and its cognate form of the mass-party type shows the need for the continuous mobilization of the party base, but also for the presence of such a type of party organization which would have primary functions to educate and appoint political executives, who would have initially been tested as party executives.

¹¹ B. Georgiadou, “From the party of the entrenched members to the network-party. Aspects of the organizational reform of the political parties in late-modernity”. *Science and Society*, autumn 2000 - spring 2001, issue 5-6μ, pp. 203-235, where the relevant foreign bibliography is presented and examined.

¹² See R. Michels, *The Sociology of Political Parties*, translated by G. Androulidakis, Gnessi, Athens, 1987.

On the contrary, the party form of organization coinciding that of the party-network, is of a horizontal organization form without a broad party base. The latter is mobilized occasionally and only in a ceremonial manner (party conventions, pre-election manifestations). Allocated executives or organizations outside the party mechanism here perform the ceremonies that were organized and the roles played by the party basis in the case of the mass-party type. The latter is limited to the top executives, while its relation with the citizens / voters are mediated by opinion poll companies, advertising offices, communication consultants and mass media. The participation of the citizens in the organization of the party is no longer required for the choice of political executives, as the latter are selected from a network, which is reachable for all the range of the party's potential.

The disregard to the "Right – Anti / Right" cleavage as "traditional" and its following distancing from the organizational form of the mass-party type, was attempted by the ideology of political modernization through the criticism that political modernization exerted on populism as a practice lacking clarity and defined targets and bypassing the institutions in the name of the people. However, even in this case, the exerted criticism was consumed in the forms rather than the essence of populism. And this is because if the general and unclear appeal '*to the people*' as the top subject of politics contains certainly the imaginative element of fake conscience and of the distortion, thus the demand for democratisation, then this appeal would echo not only in a fake way, but also in a vital one, the request for democratisation of the political system and the construction of institutions for democratic control for both the political and the economical aspect. Finally, under the prism of the time distance that has been covered, popular radicalism which characterized P.A.S.O.K from approximately the middle 1970s until the end of the 1980s was a distorted recognition of political rights,

which had been limited with respect to their power by the governments of the “Right” until that time. The limit and the truth in popular radicalism lies on the absence of mobilization of the social forces that had interests involved in the democratic modernization of the political system. On the other hand, the priorities inside the ideology of political modernization seem to have been reversed, despite the fact that the political result is identical. So, even though the primary target is the modernization of the political system, this attempt shows that there is need of not only the mobilization of these social forces that would gain from the democratic modernization, but also of all the social forces, in general. This remains one of the basic elements that require substantiation and interpretation in this thesis.

The last point for this paper is the specific role of PA.SO.K and its affiliation with “knowledge institutions-citizens associations” which also contributes as an important variable to the study PA.SO.K’s modernization process and it is a useful conceptual tool to decode the identity of political modernization. The three case studies (OPEK, ISTAME, PAREMVASI) that this thesis will conduct in depth (organization, ideology, program analysis) are characteristic of the relationship of PA.SO.K’s new ideological formation –eksynchronismos~modernization-with civil society.

The distinctive birth (most of them came into action from 1991,1995 onwards) of these institutions together with their ideological impetus (modernization agenda) helped to strengthen PASOK’s modernization thesis further to the societal core. Their key objective is that in order to further promote social-democratic goals today requires new means. The conceptualization of modernity proposed by these institutions is constructed in such a way that it refers directly to actors and their rights (see mission statements Appendix 2) (i.e. To the problem of spreading rights

downwards), and to institutional spheres or subsystems and their imbalances (i.e. The problem of *decolorizing the life world*, Habermas 2000). It suggests the lines along which a modern social democratic project should be processed at present.

From an actors' perspective it points to the need to combine the old but unfinished economic and political struggles with the new ones that focus on the spread of cultural rights downwards (Mouzelis, 2000). From a systemic point of view it points also to the need to reduce the marked new imbalances between the major institutional spheres of late-modern societies. This entails efforts at achieving a balance between the logic of productivity/competition in the economic sphere, the logic of democracy in the political, the logic of solidarity in the social, the logic of self-actualization in the cultural and the logic of respect for nature in the ecological sphere. Never has a balance been achieved between the values of these spheres, not in early or in late modernity. Therefore the modernization of the society and its connection with its civil core is the main issue and its prerequisite for the party qualitative evolution and renewal.

Concluding remarks: The “modernized” post-1996 PA.SO.K.

To conclude, according to the modernization wing within PA.SO.K, the modernization of the country requires the reform of the party itself and its transition into a ‘new’ modern party. The common subtitle “human face” has a different political substance wherever it may be found in the historical course of the ideology of the movement. In the version of socialism, the “human face” referred to the faith of

PA.S.OK of the 1980s, to the political pluralism of the parliamentary democracy and the personal freedoms that were connected to it. In the case of modernization, the “human face” is used as a declaration for the social sensitivity of the government for the effects of the stabilization policy on the poor classes of the population. In this sense, it can be interpreted as an attempt to detach the political modernization policy from that of the policy of neo - liberalism.

Another element, which differentiates the PA.SO.K of today from the one of the past, is the area of its social (base) reference. The concept of ‘*the people*’ as a subject for history is lost together with the vision of socialism. The ‘*nation*’ now takes the place of the ‘*people*’. An elucidating example of the new ideology is the characterization of the policy regarding the accession to the EMU, as a *national* policy. Taking into account this perspective, the mutual recessions and the social compromises are considered as conditions for the salvage of the nation, rather than the people.

Of course, we should note that the meaning of ‘*the people*’ has no clearer social substance than the one of ‘*the nation*’. However, it is unquestionable that the social segregations were self-obvious in the old PA.SO.K, which identified itself with only one part of the people, namely the non-privileged one. In today’s political rhetoric of PA.SO.K, such social divisions and references are rare. An additional element that characterizes PA.SO.K today is its internal organizational reform. The aim of this attempt is the breaking of the old party structure, which was orientated towards the state power and its benefits. This structure was organised in such a way that the easy communication between the party and the government power was guaranteed; this structure was responsible for the nepotism phenomena of the 1980s. In the ‘new PA.SO.K’, the members and the executives of the party are asked to support the governmental policy without an eye to direct political or financial gains (Lakopoulos,

1996). That is to say that what is aimed at, through the organization re-structuring of PASOK, is a new, more rational relationship amongst the party, the government and the society (with reference to civil-society).

Consequently, the dominance of radicalism gave way to the 'national populism' of the 1980s and the domination of European pragmatisms and modernisation after 1993, and primarily in 1996, under Simitis leadership. PA.SO.K has been a party of many faces -often giving the impression of a political chameleon -something that denotes its strong and dynamic identity. (Moschonas, 2002)

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Appendix 1

Democracy and modernisation theory

I) Democracy as an outcome of development

1. The assumptions of modernisation theory:

- Directionality: from traditional to modern society
 - A phased process with pre-determined stages (Communist and non-communist manifestos)
 - A small number of laws apply to all societies
 - Irreversibility and desirability
 - Homogenisation: Modernisation as Westernisation?
-
- *A dualistic model:* Development as the modernisation of “traditional” societies through the establishment of **social, economic, political and cultural processes** and *institutions* similar to those of advanced industrial societies.
 - *An evolutionist theory:* Economic development should follow the same unilinear path of the industrialised nations (Rostow’s five stages of growth).
 - *An integrative assumption:* Economic development is a generally benign process that generates the wealth, social conditions and cultural values conducive to (liberal) democracy.
 - *Policy implications:* Economic aid, technical assistance and institution building would lead to democracy.

1.2) Specific claims

- “Evolutionary Universals” (Talcott Parsons):
Social stratification, cultural legitimation, bureaucratic organisation, money and markets, generalised universalistic norms, democracy
- *technological change, high rates of investment, centralised power structures, modernising elite (W.W. Rostow)*
- *psychic mobility (empathy) (Daniel Lerner)*

2. Development as a condition for democracy.

Democracies are much frequent in developed countries and dictatorships in poor ones. Why?

“The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (S. M. Lipset)

Democracy requires a high level of literacy, communication and education, an established and secure middle class; a vibrant civil society; relatively limited forms of material and social inequality and a broader secular ideology.

*Economic development largely determines the form of the **class struggle**.*

Underdeveloped societies tend to be more **unequal**.

Developed societies have a larger **middle class**

A larger **civil society**

More economic security, more **tolerance**

Distributional struggles are **less extreme** (the rich has less to fear) in more affluent countries.

Economic development **reduces political tensions**, weakens correlation between class position and party allegiance and moderates working class politics.

Economic development favours **political cosmopolitanism**.

3.) The Critique of modernisation theory

- **Complex sequencing** There is no “ground zero” for economic and political underdevelopment in contemporary societies. : (Alexander Gerschenkron).
- **Comparative Historicism**: Favourable conditions for democracy are rooted in particular historical constellations (Barrington Moore)
- **Dependency theory** Dependent capitalist development fosters underdevelopment, polarisation, conflict and authoritarianism (Andre Gunder Frank, Guillermo O’ Donnell)
- **Innovation = marginalisation**. An expanded middle class may evolve simultaneously with marginalisation, polarisation and political instability (David Apter).

4. “Good governance”: democracy as condition of development

4.1 The emergence of the “good governance” model:

- The end of the cold war
- The changing role of the IFI
- The third wave of democratisation
- The failure of the first generation reforms.

4.2 The assumption of “good governance”.

- There are no special preconditions for a stable democracy
- Democracy can be instituted at any stage in the development process
- Democracy will enhance, not hinder, economic development
- There are no inherent tensions or trade offs between the various goals of economic and political development.

4.3 The principles of “good governance”

- An accountable and transparent administration
- An open and efficient civil service
- Rule of law
- Independent judiciary
- A market economy
- “good governance” as liberal democracy
- free and fair elections
- a pluralist polity
- free press
- human rights
-

4.4 The critique of “good governance”

- The foundations of most modern advanced industrial economies were laid under non-democratic or highly restricted democratic conditions.
- Most success stories of economic growth (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China, Mexico) have not occurred under conditions of democracy.
- The “premature” introduction of democracy may actually hamper development.

- Government (politics) comes first, “governance” later.
- It is far from clear that economic liberalism can produce sustained economic development.

5). Conclusions

- There is *no necessary relationship* between **regime type** and **economic performance**
- There is *no economic threshold for the emergency of democracy*: Rich countries tend to be more democratic not because democracy emerges as a consequence of economic development but because democracies are more likely to survive in affluent societies.
- *Per capita income* is by far the best predictor of the **survival of democracies** (Przeworski).
- *Politics matter*: Democratisation is the result of **political engineering** and **elites negotiations**. (Di Palma, Schmitter, O’ Donnell et al)
- **Class revisionism**: Class interests are historical and socially constructed.
- **Institutions matter** The state is a key actor both for democracy and economic development.

Key texts on modernisation theory

Talcott Parsons (1964) Evolutionary Universals in Society

W.W. Rostow (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto

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Appendix 2

Mission Statements from the three NGO's that I use as case studies for my thesis

***Citizens' Union PAREMVASSI:** *(INTERVENTION) is a non-profit, non-party association founded in 1995, with a present membership of around 300. The Union aims to promote the modernization of the country's political, economic, cultural and diplomatic processes, within the framework of the European Union. An aim that can only be achieved by reviving the Greek civil society, which remains in a relatively undeveloped condition. For this reason, the support and protection of citizens against a state that demonstrates little respect for them is central to our activities. We also believe however, that an organized civil society has its own independent responsibilities and obligations for the achievement of the country's progress.*

One of the main directions of our activities is the support of the newly-founded institution of the Ombudsman because we believe that its consolidation in our society will cause the creation of similar institutions in other sectors of public life.

***ISTAME (Institute for Strategic and Development Studies Andres Papandreou)**
The main elements that create the conceptual and practical framework within which the range of theoretical research and activities of ISTAME - Andreas Papandreou takes place is political pluralism, democratic deliberation, economic development, social cohesion, as well as fulfilment of national goals.

This framework provides the inspiration and within this are endorsed all the theoretical principles presented in the initiatives, the conferences, the round tables, the scientific research and the publications that are taking place as activities of ISTAME.

Being consistent in his founding principles, ISTAME is trying to respond positively in the challenges of our times and to the various realignments that are taking place in the international political, economic and social scene, through the ideology of democratic socialism and scientific documentation.

The plan of the future activities of ISTAME - Andreas Papandreou includes:

- *The development of co-operation networks with Institutes and institutions in Europe of similar political and ideological orientation. The realisation of this aim intends to facilitate the exchange of political and ideological views, as well as the determination of a common strategy, in order to resolve problems of the international community through the prism of democratic socialism.*
- *The study of the problems of the Greek society aiming at presenting feasible political proposals, using the international experience, as well as the Greek tradition and history.*
- *The organisational and structural presence of the Institute throughout Greece with the establishment of additional branches. This policy aims at maximising the potential of the scientific expertise and generally the active human resources existing in the region, at creating structures for research and political thinking, in order to politicise the public statements and thus spreading knowledge to a wider scale.*

***OPEK** (Citizens assembly for the modernization of Society)

Our activities are directed towards :

- *The in-depth study of the country's main problems and the proposal of effective solutions directed towards its modernization through the organization of work-groups, public discussions, conferences etc.*
- *Promoting the dissemination of valid and accurate information on major issues of public concern, often in short supply in public communications, through press-conferences, public events, a quarterly magazine, and particularly through regular informational bulletins that aim to promote well-founded and focused public debates.*
- *Judicial and extra-judicial protection of institutions and citizens' rights against excesses of state power.*

“PASOK: From Protest to Hegemony”

Chrisanthos D. Tassis

University of Athens

The thesis of this paper is that PASOK has become a hegemonic party. By the term hegemonic I mean a political party that dominates the party system, sets the agenda of the political issues, frames the political dialogue, creates a structural model which seems to be imitated by the other political parties, appears to have the most capable political personnel and even an absence from government does not influence its dominant position¹. Although the hypothesis of the dissertation can be applied in various fields such as party system, social policy, foreign policy, for the purpose of this paper, the analysis will focus on economic policy in the period 1974-1996. During this period PASOK was transformed from a protest movement, to a hegemonic political party. PASOK sets the priorities of the political and economic issues that guarantee both economic and social reproduction. Being or not being in government, PASOK plays a dominant role into shaping the political agenda and framing the political debates. Moreover, it seems to be the most capable political party to run the state affairs, as its political personnel appears most experienced and efficient. Finally, its possible electoral failure in the next year election it seems unlikely that will alter its political positions.

1974 – 1981: The movement of protest:

¹ The theoretical framework of our definition on hegemonic party comes from a comprehensive understanding of the works of Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems*, Cambridge University Press, USA, 1976, Gramsci, A., *The Prison Notebooks*, New York, International Publishers, 1978, Grupi, L., *The Meaning of Hegemony in Gramsci*, Themelio, Athens, 1977, Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C., *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, London, Verso 1985, Poulantzas, N., *For Gramsci*, Politipo, Athens, 1980, Bottomore T., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, Great Britain, 1983, Williams R., *Keywords*, Great Britain, Flamingo, 1983, Jary D., & Jary J., *Dictionary of sociology*, Great Britain, Harper Collins, 1991.

In 1974 PASOK appeared with a radical economic policy. Its main targets were the “large companies’ socialisation” of the foreign monopolies, as well as the introduction of the “democratic planning”.² After the 1974 elections, PASOK began to moderate its political thoughts on economic policy. The first step was to come closer to small businesses declaring that “*small businesses were the allies in the struggle for national independence*”.³ For PASOK “*Greece had never had a real Greek economic policy*”.⁴ Therefore, it put as the main targets of its program a) the modernisation of the economy, b) the import of new technology, and c) the increase of productivity. As a result, in 1975 in a Parliamentary voting PASOK voted (with all the other parties except KKE) in favor of the expansion of the privileges of the foreign capital.⁵

PASOK’s criticism to the ND government focused on issues such as the high rate of inflation, the increase of the indirect taxation at the expense of the direct progressive taxation, accusing the conservative government that it had not had an efficient economic policy. The economic orientation of PASOK was not referred to issues such as transformation of the economic model and the means of production. It tried to appear as a “responsible party”, which had solutions on the main problems of the Greek economy.

In 1976, while PASOK maintained its rhetoric about the creation of a Mediterranean Common Market,⁶ at the same time it adopted a European orientation, declaring that PASOK’s policy towards European Economic Community was the

² *What PASOK seeks*, KEMEDIA, Athens, 1974, p.25. See also *The Declaration of the Third of September 1974*, KEMEDIA, Athens 3/9/1974.

³ Papandreou, A., “Speech of the President of PASOK at the First Central Committee”, in Papandreou A., *From PAK to PASOK*, Ladas, Athens, 1976, p.113.

⁴ Papandreou, A., “Speech of the President of PASOK at a Gathering at Larissa on 5/7/1975”, in Papandreou A., *εισηγήσεις για ζύμωση (α)*, KEMEDIA, Athens, A11/78, p.6.

⁵ Spourdalakis, M., *PASOK: Structure, Inter-party Crises and Gathering of Power*, Exantas, Athens, 1988, p.179. It has been published as *The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party*, Routledge, London & New York, 1988.

⁶ Resolution of the Secretariat of PASOK on 1/3/1976, *Greece and EEC*, KEMEDIA, B2/78, p.76. See also “The Mediterranean Common Market: A Proposal by Andreas Papandreou”, *Eleftherotypia*, 2/2/1976.

same as Norway's,⁷ which indicated its eventual European orientation and commitment.

The economic policy of PASOK in the 1977 elections was presented with the title "*Creating the Economic Democracy*". This program indicated the moderated shift of PASOK. Only few things were in common with the economic program of 1974. The 1974 criticism to the market economy (that could not satisfy the needs of the society) had now been replaced by the target of economic development. Moreover, the role of the private capital was considered equally important in that policy and the policy of socialisation of the huge companies and the foreign capital had now a limited range only in banking, and in energy and transportation sectors.⁸

After the national elections in 1977 when PASOK became the leading oppositionist party and the perspectives of becoming government seemed not so far away, the main goal became the effort to embrace a great part of the Greek society. Its economic program was referring to a "Stable and Fulfilled Policy on Economic Development". Thus, PASOK tried to appear as a political party which had the knowledge and the will to give responsible solutions on the major issues of the Greek economy. It announced the creation of the "Committee of Analysis and Program", consisted of scientists and specialists on economic matters.⁹ In this way, PASOK tried to appear as a political party with technocratic orientation. In 1979 PASOK voted, along with the conservative government, a new law which was referring to the labor relations in the Greek shipping. There was no doubt about the privileges that the new law gave to the ship-owners at the expense of the workers, but PASOK seemed to give priority to the "*efficiency and the international competitiveness of our commercial ships*".¹⁰

Before the 1981 national elections, PASOK tried to increase its influence (and thus to gain support) at the petty bourgeois small owners, who were considered as

⁷ Papandreou, A., "Interview at Oikonomikos Tahydromos (September 1977)", *Greece and EEC*, KEMEDIA, B2/78, p.210.

⁸ "PASOK: Directing Lines of the Governmental Policies", *Exormisi*, (Special Edition without date, few days before the national elections in 1977), 1977, p.2.

⁹ Kouloglou, S., *The Trace of the Third Road of PASOK 1974-1986*, Odysseus, Athens, 1986, pp.53-54.

¹⁰ For the reasons of that decision, see the newspaper *Exormisi* on 4th of October 1979.

“allies for the peaceful road to socialism”.¹¹ In order to gain as much support as it could, PASOK moderated its economic policy while its leadership was trying to gain wider support and consensus among the Greek society, by coming closer to the necessities of the state. Thus, PASOK declared that “ *it would not discourage the private capital, but, in contrast, it planned to encourage it, through a new policy of economic incentives with the support of public investment*”.¹² Moreover, in this period, private capital was considered as the basic element of economic development and the foreign investments were welcome when they were in accordance with Greek capital.¹³

In 1981 the Greek economy had a very poor performance. The inflation was at its highest rate (24.5%), the Gross Domestic Product was negative (-1.6%), the real wages were decreased, the competitiveness of the economy was a difficult case and the deficits of the public sector were rapidly increased.¹⁴ As a result, the government of ND was in a difficult position because it could not guarantee the economic reproduction. PASOK now seemed to be the most appropriate political party to come to power and also seemed to have a political leadership which knew the main problems of the Greek economy and how to solve them. Moreover, the will of the major part of the Greek society for “Change”, economic redistribution, “economic democracy”, and the skepticism about the European Communities gave PASOK the opportunity to become government. But PASOK was a different political party, in comparison to 1974.

1981 – 1985: PASOK in Government:

At the beginning of the 1980’s the post war economic model had reached its limits. Inflation went up and there was a considerable decrease at the profits of the enterprises. When PASOK came to power, it had 2 main goals: a) economic

¹¹ Papandreou, A., “The Greek Road to Socialism”, in Papasarantopoulos, P., (ed.), *PASOK and Power*, Paratiritis, Athens, 1980, p.43.

¹² Spourdalakis, M., *PASOK: Structure, Inter-party Relations and Gathering of Power*, Exantas, Athens, 1988, p.237. It has been published as *The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party*, Routledge, London & New York, 1988.

¹³ Papandreou, A., “The Speech – Contract of the President of PASOK with the Democratic People of Athens”, *Ta Nea*, 16/10/1981, p.5.

efficiency in a new economic environment as Greece became a full member in the EEC, b) to satisfy the demand of the Left for economic redistribution.¹⁵ PASOK set the income redistribution as the main target of its policy. Adopting a Keynesian economic model, the socialist government put at the top of its priorities the overcoming of the economic depression and the control of the high rates of inflation.¹⁶ Moreover, it tried to give important increases to the wages of the working class and at the same time it tried to increase the productive investments, since PASOK's leadership considered that "*an increase of the private capital profits would lead into a future prosperity for all*".¹⁷

On 22/11/1981 Andreas Papandreou announced the program of the "limited socialisation". The Supervisory Councils seemed to be the important element for the socialist government in order to get together the private sector with the public sector in a national economic plan, with the purpose to rationalise the state incentives to industry.¹⁸ "*They would consist of representatives from the management and workers of supervised firms, the local authorities and the State*".¹⁹ While on 3/1/1982 the government decided the introduction of the Supervisory Councils, on 20/3/1982 it announced that they would act "up and outside" the enterprises.²⁰ With the Law 1262/82 the socialist government tried to give incentives to the private capital to make productive investments in new technology, applied research, human resource management, and technological innovation, with the purpose that the private sector should have a decisive role in a future economic development.²¹

¹⁴ Kazakos, P., *Between the State and the Market*, Patakis, Athens, 2001, p.316.

¹⁵ Ioakimoglou, E., "The Variations of PASOK's Economic Policy", in Spourdalakis, M., "*PASOK: Party, State, Society*", Patakis, Athens, 1998, pp.121-122.

¹⁶ "The Programmatic Declaration of the Socialist Government", Athens, General Secretary of Press and Information, 1981, in Spourdalakis, M., *PASOK: Structure, Inter-party Crises and Gathering of Power*, Exantas, Athens, 1988, p.55. It has been published as *The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party*, Routledge, London & New York, 1988.

¹⁷ Ioakimoglou, E., "The Variations of PASOK's Economic Policy", in Spourdalakis, M., "*PASOK: Party, State, Society*", Patakis, Athens, 1998, p.129.

¹⁸ Tsakalotos, E., *Alternative Economic Strategies. The Case of Greece*, Athenaeum Press Ltd, Great Britain, 1991, p.236.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Papandreou, A., "Speech at the gathering of the MPs of the Socialist Party on 2/2/1983", in *Speeches of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou*, General Secretary of Press and Information, Athens, 1983, p.24.

²¹ *Policies of Investments in Greece*, General Secretary of Press and Information, Athens, 1983, p.8.

The economic policy of 1981-1982 led to the increase of imports, and the increase of the prices of goods, while the high rate of inflation advanced the buying of cheap imported goods. The fall of the investments and the decrease of productivity, led to the reconsideration of the economic policy in 1983.²² The international economic factor was in favor of restrictive macro-economic policies, especially inside the European Monetary System. At the same time, in France, the socialist government of F. Mitteran abandoned the Keynesian economic model and focused on monetary stability policies.²³

PASOK oriented its policy towards EEC. By making the 1982 negotiations with the European Communities, PASOK managed to satisfy both the capitalist class in the sense that there was no chance for Greece to get out of EEC and the working class (generally the society as a whole) by giving the impression that PASOK fought for the positive perspective of the national interests.

In 1983 PASOK changed its economic policy. The main goal was considered to be the increase of productivity. Moreover the socialist government devalued the Greek drachma in order to increase exports. The introduction of article 4, about the restriction of striking in the Public Sector, indicated the new philosophy.²⁴ The 1386/83 Law, established the Business Reconstruction Organisation (OAE). Until 1985, 44 problematic firms were members of OAE. The economic and financial policies of the socialist government tried to encourage both small and big enterprises with the goal to increase the productivity of the Greek economy. At the same time PASOK called the trade unions to accept no increases, because “*the issue of the reconstruction of the Greek economy is NATIONAL*”.²⁵

²² Chorafas, V., “The Economic Policy of PASOK and the Leftist Criticisms”, *Filladio for the Socialist Movement*, No.7, November 1983 – January 1984, p.15.

²³ Kazakos, P., *Between the State and the Market*, Patakis, Athens, 2001, pp.353-354.

²⁴ “What Arsenis and the representatives of the strikers said about the socialisations and the article 4”, *Anti*, 233, 10/6/1985, pp.11-12. See also Spourdalakis, M., *PASOK: Structure, Inter-party crises and Gathering of Power*, Exantas, Athens, 1988, p.294. It has been published as *The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party*, Routledge, London & New York, 1988.

²⁵ Papandreou, A., “Speech at the 48th International Exhibition in Thessaloniki on 10/9/1983”, in *Speeches of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou*, General Secretary of Press and Information, Athens, 1983, p.165.

PASOK tried to appear as a European party which played an important role in European affairs. As a result, Andreas Papandreou declared at the Socialist Group of the European Parliament in Athens, that all the socialist parties together had to fight against unemployment and they also had to make a reorganisation of the production. Moreover, he focused on the modernisation of the huge companies with the introduction of the new technology. And this effort also would be a matter of joint action and cooperation.²⁶ With this action, Andreas Papandreou confirmed the European orientation of PASOK and came closer to the necessities of the State and the big companies as well. At the same time, A. Papandreou considered the small entrepreneurs as the most important element in the Greek economy.²⁷ Therefore, the main target of the socialist government was the efficient function of the “mixed economy”, the cooperation between the private and the public sector.²⁸

In 1984, during the 1st Congress of PASOK, the transformation of the economic policy of the socialist party was confirmed. Andreas Papandreou called both the Trade Unions and the Businessmen in a “*Common National Effort*”²⁹. The private sector had now the privilege to undertake the problematic firms because “*the productivity and the competitiveness of the Greek economy is a matter that concerns the whole population*”.³⁰ The poor results of the Keynesian economic policy of the socialist government not only led PASOK to change its economic orientation, but also led the socialist party closer to the State.³¹ Thus, now for PASOK the state was considered as neutral which would bring together the working class with the businessmen. PASOK satisfied the necessities of the State by adopting the priorities of the economic development. Moreover, the Prime Minister declared that the investments of the foreign capital were welcome in Greece and the policy of the

²⁶ Papandreou, A., “Speech to the Presidency of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament at Zappio on 8/11/1983”, in *Speeches of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou*, General Secretary of Press and Information, Athens, 1983, pp.215-216.

²⁷ *Speeches of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou*, General Secretary of Press and Information, Athens, 1984, p.92.

²⁸ Papandreou, A., “Interview to the Journalists at Zappio on 27/7/1984, Towards the 1st Congress of PASOK”, in *Speeches of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou*, General Secretary of Press and Information, Athens, 1984, p.272.

²⁹ “The Government and the Route of the Allagi”, *Filladio for the Socialist Movement*, (Special Edition for the 1st Congress of PASOK), No.9, May – July 1984, p.19. See also “The Views of the Central Committee of PASOK for the 1st Congress”, KE.ME.DIA, Athens 1984, pp.114-118.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Chorafas, V., “The Economic Policy of PASOK and the Leftist Criticisms”, *Filladio for the Socialist Movement*, No.7, November 1983 – January 1984, p.15.

socialist government did not intent to nationalise the private companies. In addition, it would emphasise in an economic policy with central planning similar to that of the socialist government in France, because “*the top priority of the socialist government is the issue of productivity*”.³²

During the period 1981-1985 PASOK started to build the social base of its hegemony as the working class was satisfied by the increase of the wages, the small entrepreneurs gained incentives for new investments and the old businessmen since their firms did not get socialised. PASOK was becoming a truly national party. In addition, in the political arena, the basic elements of the PASOK’s economic policy were dominant. On the one hand, the Communist Party (KKE) had no big differences with the economic policy of the years 1981-1983 and the Communist Party of the interior (KKE es) seemed to accept the core of the austere program in 1983-1985 and on the other hand, the Conservative Party (ND) had no differences about the modernisation of the economy, the pivotal role of the private sector and the policy of economic incentives to the private capital that PASOK had emphasised.³³

1985-1989: Serving the States Objectives:

In October of 1985, the socialist government adopted a “stabilising economic program”.³⁴ The main characteristics of this program were: a) 15% devaluation of the Greek drachma, b) economic incentives of the foreign and Greek capital, c) restriction of the welfare state, d) undermining of ATA. The basic goal was the decrease of the cost of production through the decrease of the wages.³⁵ The economic policy had no common elements with the declaration of the Third of September.³⁶ With the “ stabilising economic program” PASOK came closer to the monetarist policies, which were followed by the Western European countries and as a result, closer to the necessities of the state.

³² “The Interview of Andreas”, Andreas Papandreou’s Interview at New York Times, in *Eleftherotypia*, 29/5/1985, p.13.

³³ Chorafas, V., “The Economic Policy of PASOK and the Leftist Criticisms”, *Filladio for the Socialist Movement*, No.7, November 1983 – January 1984, pp.16-18.

³⁴ This Policy was not a Surprise. See the Interview of Andreas Papandreou, at the Newspaper *To Vima*, 23/7/1985.

³⁵ Simitis, K., *The Policy of the Economic Stabilisation*, Gnosi, Athens, 1989, pp.13-14.

PASOK built its hegemony against both the conservative party, which had no disagreement on PASOK's economic policy and the left parties, which seemed to have no convincing alternative. The main target of PASOK was the "United National Effort". The priorities of the economic policy were on economic development through productive investments, the decrease of the inflation and the increase of productivity and the competitiveness of the Greek economy. PASOK seemed to be the only political party in the Greek political arena which was capable to lead Greece in a "National Effort for Economic Development". Moreover, it was the first time that the issue of modernisation of the economy became the central issue in the political agenda. PASOK declared that the modernisation of the economy is a decisive factor for the economic development of Greece. In addition, the issue of productivity was "*a matter that concerns everyone*".³⁷ For the socialist government the private foreign capital was welcome either in direct, or in indirect forms of investment. Special incentives were given in investments in new technology, innovation and especially to those which would increase the rate of employment.³⁸ The socialist government emphasised on the private sector, because it was considered as the crucial factor for the "governmental goals for the transformation of the Greek economy". The "stabilising economic program" was far from the Keynesian economic model, because in the period 1985-1986 this policy "*was not efficient*".³⁹

The economic policy changed in 1988-1989. PASOK wanted to satisfy the middle and the working class, which constituted the electoral basis of PASOK. But the main aspects of the stabilisation program and the issue of modernisation were already dominant at the political agenda in the Greek political system. With the economic policy in 1988-1989 PASOK managed to ensure its hegemony.⁴⁰

1989 – 1993: PASOK in Opposition:

³⁶ Papamargaris, Th., "The End of a Route: 11/10/1985", *Anti*, No.302, 25/10/1985, p.25.

³⁷ "Decision of the 2nd Central Committee of PASOK", *Exormisi*, No.397, 18-24/10/1985, pp.3-5.

³⁸ "Welcome Under Condition the Foreign Investments", *Exormisi*, No.427, 16-22/5/1986, p.11.

³⁹ Simitis, K., "The Targets for 1987", *Exormisi*, No.460, 4/1/1987, p.48.

⁴⁰ Simitis, K., "For a Socialist Modernised Solution", *Oikonomikos Tachidromos*, 23/2/1989, pp.24-34, "Plan for the Left", *Elliniki Aristera*, Athens 1988, p.11, *Elliniki Aristera, Programmatic Declaration, Statute, Political Solution*, 1st Congress of EAR, 1986, pp.5-6.

With the National elections in 1989, PASOK came to opposition. At the same time the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe influenced the political agenda everywhere and Greece was no exception. Gradually, the neo-liberal economic model became a one-way street, with policies such as the privatisation of the Public Enterprises and flexible labor relations. The basic goal was focused on the decrease of the cost of productivity and the increase of the competitiveness of the Greek economy.⁴¹ The government of New Democracy adopted a neo-liberal stabilising economic program during the period 1991-1993 which focused on the privatisation of the public enterprises, the abolition of ATA and the lowering of the production cost through the reduction of the real wages. At the end of the day (1993), it was obvious that it had only negative consequences in the Greek economy: Inflation was at 14,4%, the rate of GDP was negative (-1,6%), the unemployment reached at 10% and the public deficits went up.⁴² Despite the poor performance of the Greek economy, the liberal economic theory remained at the center of the political agenda.

PASOK had to deal with two major aspects: a) the negative political atmosphere of the Koskotas' affair and b) the negative international economic environment. PASOK tried to adjust and declared that the role of the private enterprises in the strategy for economic development had to be pivotal. Its policy focused on political stability, which guaranteed the economic stability.⁴³ For PASOK the Key for the economic development should be the modernization of the Greek economy. The main target remained the decrease of the inflation and the monetary discipline.⁴⁴

The new vision that PASOK tried to give to the Greek society was the equal participation of Greece in the EEC based on the criteria of the treaty of Maastricht. PASOK guaranteed a frame that would indicate the rules of the Greek economy. On the one hand the working class had to accept increase of the wages lower than the

⁴¹ "Stabilisation and Development of the Greek Economy", *Oikonomikos Tahidromos*, 3/5/1990, pp.49-56.

⁴² Papaspiliopoulos, S., "Confusions and Disorientations about the Condition of Greek Economy", in Papaspiliopoulos, S., (ed.), *PASOK: Conquest and Practice of Power*, Sideris, Athens, 1996, pp.214.

⁴³ *The Program of the Third Government*, PASOK, Athens, 1989, p.24.

⁴⁴ Papandreou, A., "Statement about the First Actions of the Economic Policy of the Conservative Government", *Exormisi*, No.633, 29/4/1990, p.1

enterprises' profits and on the other hand, to give economic incentives for productive investments to the Greek capitalists. The strategy of PASOK focused on how the socialist party would become a "responsible" political party (because the negative consequences of the Koskotas' affair had not disappeared), which had the solutions for the basic economic issues. Moreover, during this period, PASOK did not formally participate in leading the strikes of the working class, but its policy focused on a parliamentary programmatic opposition.⁴⁵ PASOK adopted a program of "National Strategy" which had three main characteristics: a) political stability, b) economic development and c) social protection.⁴⁶ This program was to be applied to the Greek society as a whole. The inefficiency of the economic program of ND gave PASOK the opportunity to build a dominant position in the Greek party system, since it appeared to be the only political party in the Greek political arena that could manage to provide a stable basis for an economic and social reproduction.

PASOK changed its orientation about the social democracy. From the end of 1980, it began to have close ties with the European social democratic parties. Its attempt to be transformed into a modern European social democratic party takes place at the same time with the new vision of the Greek society: the equal participation of Greece in the European Union. PASOK seemed to be the only political party that could guarantee this route, by bringing the socialist party closer to the necessities of the state. Moreover, PASOK built its hegemony in comparison to the left wing political parties, which seemed to have no alternative and they supported the same socio-economic policy.⁴⁷

1993 – 1996: Building a hegemonic party.

When PASOK came back to power, Andreas Papandreou declared that Greece must have a common route with the Western European Countries. Therefore, the socialist government made for the next five years, an economic program based on the

⁴⁵ Papandreou, A., "Statement about the First Actions of the Economic Policy of the Conservative Government", *Exormisi*, No.633, 29/4/1990, p.1.

⁴⁶ Papandreou, A., "Statement at the 3rd Central Committee of PASOK on 23-24/2/1991, *Exormisi*, No.677, 24/2/1991, pp.3-4, and Papandreou, A., "The Views and the Suggestions of PASOK for the 1990's", (Speech at the National Convention on 21/6/1991), *Exormisi*, No.694, 23/6/1991, p.24.

criteria of the treaty of Maastricht, with the purpose of the equal participation of Greece in the EU.⁴⁸ The economic policy of PASOK was focused on “economic development and productive reorganisation”. The basic targets were the improvement of competitiveness, the introduction of new technology and foreign investments, the increase of productivity, the human resource management and the support of the small businesses.⁴⁹ Moreover, the economic program had a deflationary philosophy, constituted by the introduction of “hard drachma” and an effort to decrease the public deficit and the deficit of the central government.⁵⁰

With the “National Social Agreement”, PASOK indicated as its priorities the economic development, the political stability and the social protection. The context of that policy was that PASOK could provide a solid basis for bringing together the private sector with the Trade Unions and the State as a neutral coordinator with the purpose that all the major economic and social issues had to be solved under consensus. The main target of the socialist government focused on the stability of the government in economic policy, with the introduction of a set of clear rules that determined the economic field. Moreover, emphasised on the economic development process, to ensure first of all the competitiveness of the private and the public sector and thus, to improve the competitiveness of the Greek economy in the international scene. The wages would increase only if the profits of the private sector were increased with the modernisation of the tax system. In addition, another commitment of PASOK was its effort to modernise and rationalise the public sector.⁵¹ Instead of the privatization of the public companies that the government of New Democracy had focused on, PASOK provided as an alternative a shareholding policy up to 49% for the public companies such as OTE, Peraiki Patraiki, etc.⁵² That meant that PASOK had been adjusted to the international tendencies and also had adopted the predominance of the economic liberalism.

⁴⁷ “The Programmatic Choices of Synaspismos”, *Dialogue*, No.13, 12/7/1992, p.1-3.

⁴⁸ “Interview with Andreas Papandreou”, *Kathimerini*, 23/1/1994, p.1.

⁴⁹ Ministry of National Economy, *Restructured Program of the Transformation of the Greek Economy 1994-1999*, Athens, 21/6/1994, p.14.

⁵⁰ Kazakos, P., *Between the State and the Market*, Patakis, Athens, 2001, p.483.

⁵¹ Papandreou, A., “The Programmatic Declarations of the Greek Government”, *Exormisi*, No.813, 28/10/1993, p.20-22.

⁵² Stratoulis, D., “The Privatisation of DECO”, *Alpha*, No.1, February 1995, p.32.

PASOK appeared to be a political party with European orientation as a member of Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists. Being a part of the European social democracy indicated its will to be transformed into a “modern” political party, which followed the international economic and political trends with the emphasis given on the modernisation of the economy and the society. PASOK appeared to have the appropriate economic program in comparison to the other political parties. The Communist Party was not a real threat for PASOK because its power and its influence were decreased, since it could not realise that the Greek society had changed. Moreover, it seemed to lose power after the collapse of the East European economic and political system. For Synaspismos, its economic policy was almost identical to PASOK’s economic program, adopting the pivotal role of the private sector, the privatization of the public companies and the economic support to the small businesses with the policy of economic incentives.⁵³ The party of New Democracy had no substantial differences in the economic policy. Moreover under the pressure of the public opinion about the poor performance of the Greek economy during its government, declared that “*we are a political party neither socialistic, nor neo liberal... The economic development has to come together with the social justice*”.⁵⁴

The main goals of PASOK’s economic policy appeared to guarantee the economic and social reproduction of the country’s model of development. Moreover, it managed its policy to become acceptable both from the businessmen, and from the working class. For the businessmen, the policy of PASOK seemed to be the appropriate one for increasing their profits and for the working class it was better than the neo-liberal economic policy of the conservative party. Thus PASOK came even closer to the state, its policy was considered as the most appropriate for the society as a whole, guaranteed the equal participation in the EU, and seemed to have capable leadership. In 1996 the victory of Kostas Simitis underlined this development. PASOK was now completely transformed from a movement of protest in 1974, to a hegemonic party which was dominating the Greek party system in 1996.

⁵³ “Resolutions of the Central Political Committee towards the 2nd Congress of Synaspismos”, *Kiriakatiki Avgi*, 10/12/1995, pp,6-8.

⁵⁴ New Democracy, “Analysis of Ideological Principals of ND”, 3rd Congress, in Chalkidiki, Athens 1994, p.12. See also “1996 Elections. The Differences in Programs are Limited”, *Kathimerini*, 22/9/1996, p.4.

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**The *Metapolitefsi* that Never Was:
a Re-evaluation of the 1973 ‘Markezinis Experiment’**

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The next year marks the 30th anniversary of the collapse of the dictatorship in Greece. In all that time, little attention has been paid to the attempts of its elites to transform it into some kind of democracy in 1973. The ‘Markezinis experiment’ is presented as a mere farce on behalf of the regime to continue under a parliamentary mask, and discredited ever since the actual *Metapolitefsi* of 1974, mainly due to the violent suppression of the Polytechnic uprising. In a comparative framework with other similar cases, however, a different picture of the attempt can take place. It will be the scope of this paper to deal with this issue, using data that already exist, as well as information coming up through recent research. Its main position will be that the ‘Markezinis experiment’ was not necessary to collapse; rather, there were actors making certain choices that doomed this attempt to failure and retreat to authoritarianism.

Some theoretical points on democratic transitions by *reforma*

The main factors that determine democratisation by regime transformation are the nature of the regime, interest differentiation, institutionalisation and the existence of an elite or institution to supervise the democratising process unchallenged by the rest of the elites and/or the civil society. The regime will, at some point, become dispensable for its elites (or part of them), depending on their perception that they can equally serve their interests under a democratic institutional environment, thus avoiding internal and international opposition, possible future splits or economic problems. From this point the success or failure is also a problem of tactics adopted by actors, and is mainly a game of co-operation and bargaining between regime elites and counter-elites. The civil society has an important role in the final stages of the game, especially the first elections; however, in the inter-elite negotiation its absence rather than dynamic presence is more likely to help the process of peaceful *reforma*, appeasing the potential hard-liners or convincing the regime elites that they can embark on the institutional changes unchallenged and sure that they can surrender power to civilians without jeopardising their interests. The whole process is contingent and open-ended, and it is not necessary that democracy will prevail. Thus the importance of agency to transform the structural necessity of democratisation into reality appears equally important. The case of regime transformation in Spain in 1976-77 had a different outcome from the Greek one, based on the above characteristics, and will be comparatively tested according to this model.

Nature of the dictatorial regime

The 21st of April coup was made not by the military-as-institution, but by various groups of mid-ranking officers, from captains to colonels. The latter acted for their own interests to save the position of the army in the power structure of the country, endangered as they saw it by the balance shift that had occurred in Greek politics from the early 1960’s onwards by the rise of political and social forces that questioned the post-civil war status quo.

The regime was not bureaucratic-authoritarian like the Latin American dictatorships,¹ nor fascist, due to the absence of organised corporatist institutions in the country, the lack of any links between regime and people, and of any movement or party to offer support and votes. Veremis, based on the typologies of Clapham and Philip, has spoken of a dictatorship similar to ‘a veto regime’ with some diversions, due to the quite low degree of military unity, as the colonels were cut off from the higher officers and the rest of the armed forces. And gradually, as Veremis notes, ‘the regime was later degraded to the level of a one group regime....[it] did not dispose of either military unity or political clientele, elements sine qua non for its transformation to a clientelistic authoritarian regime.’² This isolation and fragmentation would haunt all attempts of the dictatorial elites to gain legitimacy and broader support, and eventually would greatly contribute to the failure of the attempt of Papadopoulos, the only really politically thinking among the insurgents,³ to hold the regime together and come to terms with the politicians in an attempt of a compromise, as well as to its actual downfall in 1974. The various factions of officers were constantly on an underground struggle for more powerful governmental posts and promotions in the army. One of the insurgents said, years afterwards, that ‘the causes of Papadopoulos’ s downfall and the failure of the Revolution were created from the morning of the 22nd of April on....[the insurgents] instead of looking forward, just had in mind how to undermine each other’⁴. Spain on the other hand was a case of authoritarianism where the church, the landed aristocracy, the army and the bourgeoisie converged in supporting the July 1936 Francoist coup; later, the regime saw new interest groups added, such as the *Opus Dei* and the middle classes, which assured broader links with the Spanish society and a peculiar pluralism on behalf of the regime elites.

The Greek dictatorship was characterised by continuous clashes among the regime factions, producing one crisis after another⁵. The most serious one came in September 1971, after a plot to replace Papadopoulos with another officer, probably Makarezos⁶. The attempt was frustrated by the rising strong man of the regime, colonel Ioannidis, who established himself as trustworthy in the eyes of Papadopoulos. Ioannidis was the only officer among the insurgents never to occupy a governmental post; he was totally committed to the control of the army.⁷ ‘As Papadopoulos was ascending the climax of offices, he was becoming more and more dependent on Ioannidis, who assured for him the commitment of the army, and especially the seven important units stationing in Athens and its periphery’⁸. At the same time, he was meticulously gathering support from many lower officers complaining about the behaviour of the regime leaders and the way they were (ab)using their office, ruling through nepotism, corruption and contempt for meritocracy, and worried about the future of the ‘Revolution’. Papadopoulos would pay dearly for his trust to Ioannidis two years later...

Because of its dictatorial nature, the lack of any links with the civil society, and the obsolete ideology of its elites, the regime was everything but welcomed by the people. The colonels used state propaganda and attempted to mobilise the Greeks to make up for their

¹ This is the opinion of Korizis 56-98. For a typical example of the literature classifying the regime as one of Latin-American style, see Rodakis 10-14.

² For those comments see Veremis 268-69.

³ Haralambis 252.

⁴ Quoted in Kakaounakis A’ 185.

⁵ Grigoriadis 141-174 speaks of one serious crisis per year from 1969 to 1973.

⁶ Makarezos, however, denies any involvement in this attempt.

⁷ Details of this inner-regime coup are given in Grigoriadis, 181-82; Kakaounakis 315-25; and Psicharis 13-15. See also Woodhouse 188-89.

⁸ Veremis 267.

isolation and lack of social support.⁹ In spite of that, the regime failed to gain anything more than acquiescence. There was no acceptance, but there was passivity; there was rejection, but there was no considerable resistance. This is also explained by the initial economic success that contained the people's discontent. Its economic policies boosted growth in industry, construction, and small and medium enterprises. The average rhythm of growth during the first five years of the dictatorship was more than 10% per year. The average unemployment was about 5%. The average inflation at the same period was less than 2.3%¹⁰. On the other hand, taxation was over-burdening mostly non-privileged groups and relieving certain well to do others¹¹. Also, the country's productive basis was still of low potential, and the high demand led to a rise of imports after 1970. At the same time, the public deficit started rising, and so did inflation¹². As long as its model was successful, the regime was able to channel and check symptoms of discontent. It failed, however, to capitalise on those successes by refusing to extricate itself. And from the time that growth gave its place to stagnation, this simmering discontent started becoming evident. In any case, the economic boom was ending with 1972,¹³ but the economy was not in crisis. Furthermore, in 1973, 'politics was absolutely predominant, setting the economic policies in the background¹⁴.' The democratic transition is a *political* process and as such should it be studied and explained.

Regime and political elites: a rapprochement made impossible

The colonels failed to establish any links with the pre-1967 political class, with very few exceptions, one of which was Markezinis himself. Efforts for compromise were failing either because of the hard-liners refusing to concede power, or because the very few politicians that would accept to negotiate would be stigmatised in the eyes of the elites and the people. The most prominent leaders like Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou were either hoping to return to the favourable for them pre-1967 status or pressing for utopian revolutionary opposition. G. Mavros, heir of G. Papandreou to the leadership of the Centre, and P. Kanellopoulos, the Prime Minister overthrown by the coup, adopted a position of vehement rejection of the regime, and opposed any compromise with Papadopoulos. The king, self-exiled after his failed counter-coup of December 1967, did nothing active against the regime, nor made any open condemning statements, probably hoping for a future development that would open the way for his return to Greece. The only figure openly searching for a compromise was E. Averoff, ex Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Karamanlis governments, searching for 'bridges' between the regime and pre-1967 leaders. Reportedly there was American interference in these negotiations, as the then US Ambassador to Athens Tasca was in touch with Karamanlis and the king. However, as British and US diplomats in Greece were noticing, these attempts were constantly facing the opposition of the regime

⁹ See Korizis 56-58 for this point.

¹⁰ Numbers taken from tables of the National Statistical Service of Greece. See also Theodorakopoulos 209-211; Zournatzis and Mihalopoulos 268-320 for a positive account of the regime's economic performance.

¹¹ See Pesmatzoglou 154 for this argument.

¹² All this information is based on data supplied by Meletopoulos 402-406 and provided by OECD Reports. Mouzelis 290, agrees on the rapid growth. For the deficit, see Pesmatzoglou 153, 178.

¹³ Meletopoulos 426, Mouzelis 291. This is why Makarezos, the coup leader responsible for the economy, claims to have warned the other leaders that they should leave office by the end of 1971 *at the latest*.

¹⁴ Meletopoulos, 409. He also argues (411) that "the impact of political turmoil to political life had a destabilising effect in economic life."

hard-liners and the politicians¹⁵. The first attempt of Papadopoulos to start a process of *reforma* occurred in the spring of 1968. He was claiming that if the 'Revolution' stayed more than a certain time in power, it would lose its dynamics and transform into a 'regime,' which was not in his intentions. He tried to implicate Markezinis in the attempt; however, he met the stiff resistance of the hard-liners. Another attempt was again frustrated in the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970; Papadopoulos was then disappointed and complaining 'I am being subverted by my fellow Evelpides cadets!' As a result of this second failure, he considered resigning in the summer of 1970, complaining that he lacked any support from other leading figures, his own closest followers included. But the rest of the faction leaders renewed their trust to him.¹⁶

As far as relations between the political elites are concerned, they remained cold throughout the dictatorship years. Suspicion and distrust in the opposition did not cease to hinder the attempts for common action against the regime. The pre-dictatorial divisions were not easy to overcome in a climate of mutual doubt and divergence on how to deal with the regime, and what to do about a future democracy, its goals and inclusiveness; this is not irrelevant to the cleavages caused by the civil war and its difficult aftermath. Everyone was acting on behalf of his own political interest, in order to secure his privileged position in a future democracy that was not near¹⁷. The only solution for a viable return of democracy was a negotiated transition involving mutual concessions between regime elites and counter-elites that would isolate the hard-liners and gain the approval of the civil society and international community, like it happened in Spain, where the opposition elites eventually overcame their divisions and converged, just after Franco's death; however, they were much more coherent in the final stage of the Franco, and, furthermore, ready to accept that negotiations are the only way to bring down a regime supported by tanks and military police.

The conjuncture of 1973

By the end of 1972 Papadopoulos and members of the 'inner cabinet' decided to meet regularly, discuss the situation, and plan their future moves in face of transferring power to a non-military government. Papadopoulos was urging his followers to speed up the process of restoring some form of parliamentary democracy, saying 'we must definitely leave office this year and surrender power to civilians!'¹⁸ He was aware of the difficulties that a new government would have to face with regard to the economy, which started showing signs of stagnation, so it was logical for him to want to withdraw in good times. He must also have wanted to finish off with the reaction of the hard-liners, who had at least twice in the past blocked his attempts for *reforma*, as well as to catch up with any possible developments within the opposition, lest it finally presented a united front against him.

However, it became obvious that he had problems at home. Student unrest started in February, when the students of Athens clustered in the Law School and refused to leave, and long negotiations had to be carried out with the police to secure a peaceful evacuation on

¹⁵ Some of the Foreign Office archives that have seen the light so far confirm this. See FO reports published in the Greek dailies *Eleftherotypia*, *Kathimerini* and *Ta Nea* of the 2nd and 3rd of January 2002.

¹⁶ The interview with Zournatzis, 20/09/2001 is revealing for those events. He interestingly notes the Greek Military Academy cadets (the Evelpides) that graduated the same year with Papadopoulos: Makarezos, Aslanidis, and Ladas, the presumed representatives of the hard-liners opposing any opening of the regime.

¹⁷ For a good account of splits among the pre-1967 political elites see Theodorakopoulos 219-21. For accusations on Papandreou's behaviour, undermining other anti-regime organisations, see Murtagh 207, 225.

¹⁸ Interview with Zournatzis, 20/09/2001.

the night of the 22nd while demonstrators and police were clashing elsewhere in Athens.¹⁹ These events showed that patience was running out for the regime in the most sensitive social groups like the students. Six years of dictatorship had been enough for a people tired by military rule and willing to see its freedoms restored. But also Papadopoulos was losing the toleration of other elites in the country. This was proven in May, when the naval officers tried to overthrow the regime. The attempt was condemned, however, because of the tight control that regime security were maintaining over the armed forces. On May 23rd it was announced that a conspiracy among a number of naval officers was revealed and frustrated. It was claimed that this was a proof that the majority of the armed forces were now against the dictatorship, and the former politicians were starting to co-operate; it was becoming obvious that the political situation was turning to an impasse²⁰.

The failure of the naval coup attempt marks the turning point in the way for the *reforma* of 1973. Although frustrated, it alarmed Papadopoulos to speed up the pace of the transition. He realised he had nothing to expect from either the king or the politicians he was previously in contact with. Just a few days after the frustration of the coup, on June 1, 1973, he addressed to the people, announcing his decision to transform the regime to a Republic. At the same time, he called a plebiscite for the approval of the constitutional change, and said that the country would pass to an interim government charged with organising elections no later than the end of 1974. He also amended the 1968 constitution and tried to amass as many powers in his hands as a constitution could possibly allow. By the same token, a series of measures were introduced, which aimed at convincing the civil society and the international community of the good intentions of the regime: a general amnesty to all ‘political criminals’ was granted, and thus the last three hundred political prisoners were released; martial law was lifted throughout the country; and strict censorship was seriously eased. The plebiscite, which took place on July 29th, granted the regime change with 78,4% favourable votes against 21,6% negative²¹. The politicians were mostly negative to these developments, some calling for abstention, denouncing the whole process as a farce. The same more or less process of opening was adopted by Suarez in Spain, and the legitimacy of the December 1976 plebiscite went unchallenged.

Development and failure of the ‘Markezinis experiment’

On August 19th Papadopoulos was sworn in as President of the Republic. Negotiations between him and Markezinis on the formation of the civilian government started almost immediately after the declaration of democracy, focusing on the issues of the formation of the interim government, the constitutional amendment and the preparations that would lead to elections. During the summer of 1973 there took place three such meetings; they were not easy to accomplish, as Markezinis recalls. He was pressing Papadopoulos to accept less powers as President, and the opening to all political forces to participate in the elections, the KKE included. The negotiations were inconclusive, but an agreement was reached that gradually, after the elections, the constitution would be amended, and the political game would open to all parties. However, precious time was lost: Papadopoulos and Markezinis were in no position to surprise the hard-liners, as rumours were spread that

¹⁹ See Papazoglou 72 for detailed accounts of these events.

²⁰ For the impact of the failed coup see Papadimitriou 504.

²¹ Results in Grigoriadis B’ 273.

Markezinis was to take office²². On October 1st, he was officially given the mandate to form the first non-military government after the 21st of April 1967, and on the 8th he was sworn in.

‘The international reactions to the constitutional change were unexpectedly positive. Nowhere was the issue of a *de jure* recognition of the new democracy raised.’²³ As far as the Europeans were concerned, there is evidence Markezinis was successful enough, if not anything else, to achieve their non-adversary position. There were some positive albeit cautious comments on his government in some European states; and certain EEC officials were even expressing content with him assuming office. Markezinis had very good links with some European leaders in the past and was trusted as a negotiator and statesman. The Dutch ambassador Barkman wrote on the 18th of October that the ambassadors of the EEC countries, who were meeting regularly to discuss the situation in Greece, agreed that ‘the leaders of the ERE and the Centre Union would not act in the best interests of Greek democracy if they were to abstain from the general elections.’²⁴

However, the international situation degenerated with the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur war and the subsequent crisis. The Americans asked the Greek government to allow the use of their bases in Greek territory and air space to supply Israel; Markezinis, backed by Papadopoulos, denied on the grounds of maintaining good relations with the Arab countries. This denial is said to have turned the US against Papadopoulos and Markezinis. The latter would insist until the end of his life that subversion on behalf of the Americans, especially of the then Secretary of the State Kissinger was the main reason for his downfall a few weeks later²⁵. Markezinis was known for his independence to the US interests.²⁶ There can not be a definitive account on whether the US administration did turn against Papadopoulos-Markezinis; it seems nevertheless that, if not anything else, the Americans would not actively oppose a change of government in Greece.²⁷ However, those who moved military units on November 25th 1973 were not the Americans, but rather Greek officers.²⁸

The serious danger for the *reforma* was the majority of the lower officers worrying about corruption among the military as government, and expressing concern on what they thought of as ‘the abandonment of the 21st of April’²⁹, which was giving its place to the same political class it had overthrown six years before. In that situation Ioannidis was emerging as a solution for the officers, in sharp contrast to Papadopoulos, whose accumulation ‘of so many offices and titles (President of Republic, Prime Minister, minister of Defence) was harming the seriousness of the regime and giving it an unacceptable image, which was not left

²² Some blame Markezinis for this. See, for instance, Passas 542-43. Also interview with Zournatzis, 20/09/01.

²³ Woodhouse 1983, 177.

²⁴ Ibid. 121.

²⁵ Markezinis would say characteristically twenty years after his overthrow, that “it was not the Polytechnic uprising that brought me down; rather, it was Kissinger himself!” (*Kathimerini*, 20/2/1993). Haralambis 286 also claims that from this point ‘one of the most important reasons of US foreign policy support to the military dictatorship had ceased to exist.’

²⁶ It is interesting that Markezinis interviewed early in 1973 on the question of the homeporting of the 6th US Fleet in Greece said that it is wise to say ‘no’ to the Americans from time to time! See Markezinis 1979, 192.

²⁷ ‘There is certainly some truth in the opinion that the Americans knew at least by 1972 that Ioannidis could at any moment overthrow Papadopoulos...and also that they encouraged him in the action of the 25th of November.’ Psicharis 30.

²⁸ ‘They would have deposed us even if it had not been for Kissinger... I refuse to believe that Greek officers took orders from the US Foreign Minister to proceed to such a move’ (Zournatzis).

²⁹ The attitudes of junior officers against Papadopoulos and his associates are well presented in Theodorakopoulos 225.

un-exploited by its opponents.³⁰ Ioannidis was able to capitalise on groups opposing Papadopoulos, as well as neutral but unsatisfied with the situation.³¹ Conspiracies were already brewing by the time Markezinis was sworn in. And, unfortunately for him and Papadopoulos, they were tolerated by the military-as- institution, which would not accept their submission to civilian rule. The majority of the higher echelons of the military backed and covered the conspirators, despite that Papadopoulos had placed men of his trust in the higher ranks of the army. In sharp opposition to that, in Spain the hard-liners were kept away from the centres of decision.

Even more unfortunate for the *reforma* would be the utter denial of the majority of the pre-1967 political elites to accept the opening altogether, in sharp contrast to what happened in Spain, where the opposition negotiated with the post-Franquist elites, eventually coming to a compromise on inclusive and free elections. This is what Markezinis was promising, but whether motivated by personal ambitions and calculations, or by real concern about the possibility of a fake democracy under military tutelage, most of the politicians refused even to discuss with him. Especially the leaders of the two bigger parties, Mavros and Kanellopoulos, were vehement in their rejection of what they called a farce³². Characteristically, Mavros stated ‘the planned elections have a single purpose: to legitimise the dictatorship covering it by a castrated Parliament which will not have the power to debate, let alone decide, any of the nation's vital matters.’³³ The same position was adopted by A. Papandreou, who said that ‘everyone who participates in the elections and, in general, in the political processes of the regime, will be a Quisling;’³⁴ so did the KKE, but not figures like Iliou, ex-president of EDA and L. Kyrkos of the KKE-es³⁵. Karamanlis, on his behalf, did not actually take a clear position: he kept silent through this time, obviously stalling, waiting to see how things would turn. According to his close associate and later minister Yannis Varvitsiotis, he would like the ‘Markezinis experiment’ to succeed,³⁶ but was too cautious to break his silence from the beginning. Also, if Karamanlis returned, he feared that the interest of the people would not last long, and would ease down after a short time without him achieving much. Karamanlis would by no means accept to become Prime Minister under Papadopoulos, as this would legitimate the dictatorship *a posteriori*.³⁷ Thus only a few politicians like ex-minister Rallis of the right, and ex-prime ministers Stefanopoulos and Novas of the centre, accepted that under the present circumstances there was no other way out of that situation³⁸. The latter, however, were not enough to ensure a tired and suspicious civil society that it was not to be a *facade* democracy on the making.

³⁰ Bonanos 110, 112. Also, Veremis 266-67.

³¹ Papadopoulos reportedly tried three times to remove Ioannidis from the ESA or totally from the army but met his stiff resistance and succumbed. See Bonanos 114-15; Theodorakopoulos 227-28; Arapakis 112-15.

³² Ironically, Markezinis 1979, 268 notes that for Kanellopoulos ‘legality meant the returning of the situation to the 20th of April 1967, that is, a Kanellopoulos cabinet that would proceed in organising elections.’ As for Mavros, in July 1973 is said to have urged Markezinis in a public meeting to accept the offer of Papadopoulos and immediately form a government. However, in October he would fiercely oppose the latter. See Zournatzis and Mihalopoulos 45.

³³ Quoted in Grigoriadis C, 38.

³⁴ See Papandreou 57.

³⁵ Interviews with Kyrkos and Farakos for more about the attitudes of the left.

³⁶ Interviews with Varvitsiotis. Rallis basically agrees but says Karamanlis was sceptical on the chance of success of his return to Greece.

³⁷ This comes from the recollections of Rallis.

³⁸ Theodorakopoulos. 230 gives an account of political figures that accepted to discuss the *reforma*.

The 'Markezinis experiment' started among a climate of suspicion and distrust for Papadopoulos' intentions, reflecting the six-year isolation of the regime from the people; the soft-liners failed to gain any credibility with their attitudes in the civil society; the latter would give much more credit to the negative stance of the politicians. The transition was entering its most difficult phase: the interim stage during which the slightest mishandling might cause the reaction of both hard-liners and sensitive social groups like the students. The presence of Papadopoulos as head of the democracy-to-be, and the wide powers he had, along with the army tutelage over Greek politics, was nullifying any positive aspects of the attempt. Still it seems that the Greeks failed to realise that the regime hard-liners were as unwilling as ever to surrender power, and bracing themselves for a reaction. Markezinis started giving interviews to the foreign press, trumpeting his intention to bring full and inclusive democracy. 'He claimed that he was fully maintaining his independence of opinion towards G. Papadopoulos and that in the new Parliament he would seek a radical amendment of the constitution, so that the powers of the President be reduced.'³⁹ In one of these interviews he said to the *Times*, 'if I do not agree with the President, I shall resign...there is no other solution.' But not only was he failing to convince the people of its good intentions; in this desperate attempt, Markezinis had gone beyond the limits of toleration of even the less radical in the army.⁴⁰ On the 17th of November he was to address a televised press conference to the people in which he would announce his decision to carry out free elections with participation 'of such hostile personalities as Andreas Papandreou' and other famous regime opponents. But this conference would never be, as from early November he was faced with large demonstrations, escalating after the 13th of November, with the occupation of the Polytechnic school by students demanding more reforms and calling for Papadopoulos and Markezinis to go⁴¹. After the situation degenerated to a point when police were unable to deal with the demonstrators, the army was called to intervene and martial law was declared, tanks and troops stormed the Polytechnic building, early in the morning of the 17th, forcing its evacuation. In the clashes twenty-three people were reported dead and hundreds wounded or arrested.

A factor that made the early stages of the Polytechnic uprising easier was indeed the relaxation of policing, especially in Athens, due to the lifting of most of the oppressive measures. As Kyrkos remarks, 'without the liberalisation of 1973 there could never have been the Polytechnic uprising.'⁴² It was this degeneration that did not happen in Spain because of the restraint that counter-elites, especially communists, and civil society showed. The non-organised students bypassed the parties' youth organisations and proceeded in occupying the campus almost despite their will. The latter, mainly the left wing, were quite suspicious in supporting an uprising made by students.⁴³ As many recall, 'the main reason for the student uprising were anti-dictatorial and anti-imperialist feelings and not student or economic problems, as many suggest.'⁴⁴ Interestingly the main slogan of the uprising was 'down with the junta:' this demonstrated that, in the level of political communication, the government had completely failed to convince it was not the continuation of the dictatorship, and was

³⁹ Grigoriadis C' 36.

⁴⁰ See characteristically Bonanos 128 for the reaction of the military to the Markezinis statements.

⁴¹ It is interesting to point that Kanellopoulos and Mavros, the fiercest opponents of Markezinis, were supporting and encouraging the students' uprising. See Theodorakopoulos, *op. cit.* 23.

⁴² Interview with Kyrkos, 24/9/2002. Zournatzis and Mihalopoulos 531 reach the same conclusion from a diametrically opposite point of view.

⁴³ Interview with Farakos, 18/9/2002.

⁴⁴ Mantoglou 218-19, hence the quotation.

preparing the ground for free and fair elections. As far as the regime is concerned, its elites acted very ambiguously. In the beginning they severely underestimated the dynamic of the students; then, they hesitated to take radical steps that might have at least hindered the escalation. When they eventually realised the seriousness of the situation, it had gone out of control.⁴⁵ Technically speaking, though, Markezinis did not have any authority upon the armed forces to order them to suppress the uprising; this was Papadopoulos' competence as President of the Republic. Markezinis offered *a posteriori* legitimacy to the army's intervention. As he wrote, his concern was to reach the elections as smoothly as possible and what disrupted this path was against the interests of the country. However, he was also anxious to appease the military, alarmed by what they saw as 'a communist comeback.' At any case, this attitude cost Markezinis dearly, even if he believed he could restore trust by presenting his plans for elections a few days later. The anti-elites tried to make the most of the situation to discredit Markezinis and succeeded, presenting his government as a continuation of the dictatorship under a pseudo-democratic mask. Markezinis regards the reaction to his government as an interest convergence from two opposite directions. On the one hand, the hard-liners willing to put an end to his government and the *reforma*; on the other hand, the ex-politicians, with Kanellopoulos and Mavros in the forefront, trying to discredit his measures and block the way to elections at any cost. Markezinis does not explicitly say that it was intended; but he leaves a hint that it eventually came as a perverse effect of the attitudes of both groups mentioned. His opinion was that 'the escalation of violence in the Polytechnic had the goal of cancelling the press conference.'⁴⁶ Thus the students 'had been played straight into the hands of Ioannidis, who looked upon the coming elections with a jaundiced eye. So had the irresponsible statements of Kanellopoulos and Mavros, two vain self-seeking men.'⁴⁷

Although Markezinis insisted that the timetable set for elections next February would be closely followed, he and Papadopoulos had hopelessly lost control of the situation. On the morning of the 25th of November, tanks were once again in the streets of Athens: Ioannidis and his hard-liners had performed their long-feared coup, bringing the 'Markezinis experiment' to an abrupt end. A note of a 'Revolutionary Committee' handed to Papadopoulos stipulated 'on demand of the Armed Forces, yourself, the vice-president and the Markezinis government have resigned. You will be informed on the developments from the television. The prestige of you and your family will be preserved.'⁴⁸ Ioannidis had powerful armour units and infantry battalions on his side, as well as commando and paratroopers, and of course, the omnipresent and fearful ESA.⁴⁹ His network was so large that, should he be able to mobilise it all at the same time, the chances of a failure were minimal. The date for the coup was set roughly around the 25th to 30th of November well before the Polytechnic events, and did not change because of them. Although both Papadopoulos and Markezinis were aware of the preparations of the conspirators, they let them get away with it. 'Rumours on an imminent coup were on the streets';⁵⁰ it was openly discussed even in the ministry of defence for some time. The British ambassador invited Markezinis and his wife to dinner and openly said to him 'are you sure you will still be able on Monday [the 26th, date in which Markezinis had said he would announce the date of a

⁴⁵ This blunder of Markezinis (again in contrast to what happened in Spain) is clearly depicted in the interview with Zournatzis.

⁴⁶ Markezinis 1979, 416. He refers to the conference he was about to give with details for the elections.

⁴⁷ Theodorakopoulos 234.

⁴⁸ The whole text in Kakaounakis *ibid.* 48.

⁴⁹ All the information comes from Arapakis110; Grigoriadis *ibid.* 119-130; Kakaounakis B' 102-109.

⁵⁰ Interview with Makarezos.

press conference to give details for his plans on elections] to proclaim the elections? I am afraid that you will not be in office by Sunday!’ Eventually the uncertainty of the situation and the flow of information or lack of it have to be taken into account. Papadopoulos was confused by the conflicting rumours and, even if he feared the hard-liners’ reaction, he could not be certain when it might occur, and what position Ioannidis might take in that. It seems he was not expecting a coup as early as in November, and in this he perhaps thought that he was aided by the declaration of martial law, which put all units in alert, regardless of whether their commanders were implicated in the coup. Thus he was overtaken by the lightening action of Ioannidis. As for Markezinis, he simply had no competence over the armed forces, which were a domain of responsibility of the ‘President of the Republic’ –Papadopoulos. In Spain it was exactly the opposite: the hard-liners were constantly surprised by the well-planned actions of Suarez and the soft-liners.

A new puppet government and ‘President of Republic’ were sworn in; the real power, however, was to be in the hands of Ioannidis, who became known as ‘the invisible dictator,’ and the military-as-institution. It is striking that the reaction of large parts of the ex-politicians and the civil society to the new dictatorship was positive. The Greeks had not realised exactly what the intentions of the new elite were. Soon, however, relief would give its place to concern, frustration and fear.⁵¹ The fact that a ‘worse dictatorship’⁵² had been imposed did not take long to show. Ioannidis said to Pattakos ‘we are not playing. We shall have a dictatorship, send all our opponents to exile on the islands and stay in power for thirty years!’⁵³ Greece would live under the new dictatorship for eight months until the ill-fated coup in Cyprus against Makarios in July 1974, which sounded its death knell.

Looking back: what caused the collapse of the ‘Markezinis experiment’?

Since the actual *Metapolitefsi*, the dominant argument concerning the ‘Markezinis experiment’ has been that it did not really mean to bring democracy to Greece; rather, all was but a mere trick on behalf of Papadopoulos to find a way to secure his position in a pseudo-democracy, having secured for himself the role of the ‘President of the Republic’ and a big margin of army intervention in political life.

It has to be accepted that Papadopoulos had in mind the perpetuation of his own privileges, in the sense of both controlling the democracy-to-be, and achieving impunity for his participation in the 1967 coup. But he was constantly losing support from inside the army and toleration from the people; and as the May naval coup had shown, he was even losing credibility in the eyes of the pre-1967 elites searching for a compromise. If he wanted a puppet democracy, not only would he have met their opposition and the resistance of the civil society, but he would also have to face the rejection of Markezinis, who would not accept to be his pawn. Let alone the reaction of the hard-liners opposing his absolute power disguised under a democratic facade. And this was the moment of his weakness: if the political elites could exploit his difficulty and accept, under conditions of freedom and fairness in the elections planned, to support his initiative for a negotiated transition, as happened in Spain, democracy might have a chance. Papadopoulos appeared to have realised that ‘the military oligarchy is not a complete regime. It has neither a comprehensive programme nor a

⁵¹ This change of heart is portrayed in Arapakis 117; Bonanos 149-50.

⁵² In Averoff’s words, quoted in Markezinis 1979, 393.

⁵³ Interview with Pattakos. Markezinis mistakenly says that Ioannidis spoke of elections, but not earlier than 1977 or 1978. Ioannidis said something similar to Bonanos (ibid. 145).

perspective into the future...it has no provision for succession,⁵⁴ and willing to make concessions. It is doubtful whether he had a clear idea of how much he should concede. But he could be pushed to open the regime as much as to save his own position in the new democracy-to-be. The question then was how much he would be prepared to sacrifice, and how much the democratic forces could win. Interestingly the Dutch ambassador records on December the 5th, after a meeting with Markezinis that he ‘was indeed impressed by what he [Markezinis] had been able to get Papadopoulos’ agreement for-even after the disturbances.’⁵⁵ This does not necessarily mean that the reaction of the hard-liners would have been overrun, or that a full democracy would have been restored, as Greece lacked a personality as Juan Carlos in Spain to take the transition risk from the relatively safe point of enjoying general acceptance among the regime elites. Papadopoulos had lost control of the army and never had any credit among the politicians. However, it was the only possibility for an attempt to democratise without risking the hard-liners’ reaction.

In contrast to the dominant argument of post-1974, a collapse of the *reforma* could not come from the pre-dictatorial elites, nor from the civil society: the former could just delegitimise it in the eyes of the people and the international community by refusing to cooperate, and the latter could react by taking to the streets. But they had no resources to topple a dictatorship supported by tanks and military police. In Greece in the autumn of 1973 the losers were the soft-liners; but this did not mean restoration of democracy, but a reverse to authoritarianism. As the situation got out of control for Papadopoulos-Markezinis, the final word was in the forces that controlled the army. And these were not friendly to Papadopoulos. This is exactly what has been overlooked by almost everybody in Greece since:⁵⁶ as Markezinis himself had quite prophetically said in an interview to the French daily *Le Monde* in September, ‘if I fail, power will pass into the hands of a Greek Qaddafi!’⁵⁷

There is also a problem of trust: Papadopoulos was untrustworthy in the eyes of both civil society and political elites. The assurances of Markezinis alone were not enough. The fact, however, that they were denouncing the *reforma* without accepting first to discuss, raised accusations that they had in mind their own personal interests, namely, that they feared an early retirement had Markezinis proceeded to elections to which many of their parties’ rank and file might participate but from which they would abstain. It was thus claimed that ‘none of the political leaders had realised that Papadopoulos was sincerely aiming to civilianisation and would gradually, through free elections, achieve full normalisation of political life, as it would be difficult and unwise on his behalf...to proceed to full restoration of democratic politics, given that the more numerous and more dynamic officers were hostile to civilianisation.’⁵⁸ Even if this is apologetic for Papadopoulos, it can not provide an excuse for the opportunity missed by the counter-elites; and gives reason to Schmitter’s aphorism on Greece ‘defying classification’ in democratisation studies. Again, such a situation was avoided in Spain with similar guarantees on behalf of the soft-liners, and an unpleasant but

⁵⁴ See Legg 241 for the quotation.

⁵⁵ Barkman 145.

⁵⁶ Except of Haralambis 345 ff, who still regards it unavoidable for this attempt to collapse, because of the nature of the regime.

⁵⁷ Quoted in Meletopoulos 34.

⁵⁸ Passas 546-47. See also Theodorakopoulos 230 for a positive approach to Papadopoulos’ goals.

necessary compromise on behalf of the democratic forces, which saved the transition from collapse in its early stages.⁵⁹

Apart from the question of the inertia of Papadopoulos to decisively handle their reaction, the fact remains that the soft-liners were constantly being surprised from the events, rather than themselves leading the developments. Markezinis lost the opportunity to organise elections in the autumn of 1973, surprising the hard-liners and convincing the politicians of his good intentions-just what Suarez did in Spain four years later. He also was too conspicuous of his intentions where he should have been reserved in alarming the hard-liners. Nobody can tell what might have happened had the officers been surprised by the announcement of elections as in Spain.⁶⁰ The factor of human agency thus appears important for a quick decision-making and implementing of plans: Markezinis was 'talking too much and doing too little.'⁶¹ However, notwithstanding all his mistakes and shortcomings, there is no doubt that he was well-meaning and sincere in his intention to get Greece out of the impasse it was in 1973.⁶² He is reported to have said three days before his downfall 'I did not and do not have any illusions: in the elections I will get 15%. I hoped, however, that finally the old parties would participate and we could come to terms on forming a government.'⁶³ As for Papadopoulos, interestingly the Dutch ambassador concludes that 'history may yet judge that it was [Papadopoulos'] misfortune-if not necessarily his country's- that the treachery of his own most trusted follower deprived him of the opportunity to undo the harm he had done to Greece.'⁶⁴ Had the 'Markezinis experiment' failed like Arias in Spain, because of the reluctance of the elites to democratise, it would have been totally different. But it was not the case: it collapsed because of the reaction of the military hard-liners, ironically the only group that took Papadopoulos and Markezinis seriously. Things would also be different if this had happened after elections had been announced with the guarantees that Markezinis was to set. The rapidity of the insurgents and their almost perfect information made the issue a historical assumption: 'a historic opportunity was lost...if a climate of understanding had prevailed then, democracy would have returned to Greece without a heavy price being paid...instead, democracy returned eight months later at the cost of thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands of homeless in Cyprus-developments which traumatised the Greek body politic for generations to come,' let alone the self-fulfilling argument of an omni-present and determining American interference in Greek politics.⁶⁵

Therefore, it can be claimed that there was nothing inevitable, necessary or predetermined either in the course of the 'Markezinis experiment', or in the actual breakdown of the dictatorship in 1974. The collapse of the *reforma* was a contingent outcome, which occurred because certain actors- the pre-1967 political class, Markezinis, Papadopoulos, the hard-liners- acted the way they did. They could have acted in another way. Regime transformation in such a situation demanded more willingness for a consensus and more

⁵⁹ Theodorakopoulos *ibid.* exaggerates, writing that Papadopoulos 'found himself caught between the Scylla of the politicians headed by Kanellopoulos and Mavros, and the Charybdis of the hawks within the armed forces, who watched his balancing act with increasing disillusionment.'

⁶⁰ 'Had the elections been proclaimed in the first five days of November, and had new developments got under way, then what took place [the Polytechnic events and the coup] would not have happened.' Bonanos 135.

⁶¹ Interview with Georgalas. The contrast to Suarez, not intellectual but a man of rapid action is sharp.

⁶² 'History will probably be kind to Markezinis, because no one tried harder to serve his country at a historic moment.' Theodorakopoulos 235.

⁶³ Quoted in Konofagos 113; also Markezinis 1979, 411.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 138. This opinion is the most balanced judgement brought on Papadopoulos' intentions.

⁶⁵ This is the dramatic but basically correct opinion of Theodorakopoulos 231.

agility in action than Papadopoulos, Markezinis and the politicians showed. Ironically, the only unwanted outcome was the one that finally prevailed: a reverse to authoritarianism. The regime of the 21st of April posed enough barriers to a democratic restoration on its own; the inexplicable failure of the elites to understand the impasse and offer a way out of it condemned the 1973 *reforma* to a mere six week parenthesis that is today despised, if at all mentioned. Remembering an abstract of *El Pais* written during the uncertain Spanish transition, ‘one of the most common fallacies when writing history is concluding that things in the past could not have happened otherwise.’

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