

Was it Karamanlis who won it or Papandreou who lost it?

The impact of leaders' image in the 2004 Greek election

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Abstract

The electoral landslide of the Greek right-wing party in the 2004 election engendered an extensive discussion about the reasons which brought the party into office after more than ten years in the opposition. Political commentators stressed, among other factors, the role of leaders' appeal, especially during the campaign period. Although this belief seems to be treated as unquestionably true by both public opinion and the media, there has been, until now, no rigorous effort to test this claim against the empirical evidence. With data from a preelection survey, the paper examines the magnitude of leadership evaluations on the 2004 election. According to its findings, although leaders' personal qualities mattered a lot on vote choice, their very close rating prevented any considerable impact of comparative leadership perceptions to the overall result. However, what seemed to be of great importance for the election outcome was the debate. Its powerful aggregate impact demonstrates that a great portion of the electorate established a definite view about the two leaders only after debate was held. And this perception appeared to influence considerably their vote decision.

Acknowledgements

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“It is often claimed that victory has many fathers whereas defeat is orphan. Yesterday’s battle is an exception to this rule. Both friends and enemies of New Democracy are obliged to recognise the fact that the victory bears the personal stamp of its leader [Kostas Karamanlis].” Papakonstantinou (08/03/2004)

“There is no doubt that father of the defeat is Kostas Simitis. Yet, in the beginning of the campaign period, the loss seemed to be much smaller. The fact that it, eventually, took such dimensions is due to the errors of Papandreou during the campaign period.” Ligeros (08/03/2004)

Party competition in almost every democratic country seems to have acquired a dominant presidential character. Elections are viewed ‘as if they were gladiatorial combats between two generals rather than battles between two armies’ (Bartle and Crewe, 2002:72). In other words, leaders are thought to matter. Their personalities are deemed to play a crucial role in voters’ choices and to affect, potentially, the electoral outcome. Both journalists and campaign consultants tend to take it as axiomatic that leaders’ physical appearance, the clothes they wear, their accent and their tone of voice all help to create positive or negative impressions. And, as it seems to be the case in all recent electoral battles, they have convinced politicians that such issues do indeed matter and the latter are willing to undergo ‘makeovers’ in order to improve their appeal (Bartle and Crewe, 2002:71).

This consensus among media consultants, pollsters and campaign managers – all asserting the importance of their contribution by emphasising the role of leaders’ qualities on vote decision (Miller and Shanks, 1996:415) – is justified on the grounds of certain fundamental changes in the social and political context within which party competition takes place. The most impressive one is, undoubtedly, the increasing political importance of mass media. Television has taken a leading role in the dissemination of political information and in the structuring of political discussion. Consequently, party leaders become the principal means by which political parties project themselves and shape their popular images (Bean and Mughan, 1989:1165).¹ In this way, the public more easily associates power and authority with a readily identifiable political personality rather than an abstract institution or political ideal (Graetz and McAllister, 1987a:44).

The parties, in turn, have been rapidly adjusted to this new political reality and have altered profoundly their campaign strategies, encouraging this new tendency. Parties fight

¹ For the presidentialisation of British and German politics see respectively Mughan (1994) and Kaase (1993). For an opposite view in the British case and a theoretical analysis of the dimensions that presidentialisation can take see Crewe and King (1994a;1994b).

nowadays centrally organised leader-centred campaigns. The development of opinion poll techniques and the advent of focus groups in conjunction with the dominance of television have forced parties to re-orientate their campaigns towards their leaders (King, 2002b:217). The latter have for long ceased to be the mouthpieces for the party's values and policies but have become part of the message. Their personality is managed and manufactured by the party organization to project an image of the party they lead. Parties and the media are locked into an interdependent relationship. 'Television craves pictures. The parties, craving exposure for their leaders, provide them' (Bartle and Crewe, 2002:73).

To this rule, Greece is no exception. It is hardly possible to watch, or even participate in, any political conversation which does not, at least at some point, revolve around the traits of the party leaders. The latter become the central point of focus during the whole campaign period. Even in the poll-day, the way, the place and the exact time in which they cast their ballot is given several, thought-to-be important, political interpretations (Bistika, 2004). This tendency was particularly obvious in the last general election, which was held in early March of 2004. Yet, so far there has been no systematic effort to test empirically the common belief, that leadership evaluations shape party support, in the current electoral context. Purporting to cover this gap, the aim of the proposed paper is twofold: first, to evaluate the impact of party leaders on individual vote choice and, second, to estimate the influence of leadership evaluations on the aggregate outcome of the 2004 election. Section I provides a brief description of the major Greek parties which compete for the office and portrays the political setting within which the election took place. The proposed analytical strategies are reviewed in section II and the data used and the exact model specification are presented in section III. Section IV summarises my empirical findings and section V concludes.

I. Political Change in Greece: New Democracy's landslide

Greek political system is dominated by the two parties which emerged immediately after the transition of the country to democracy, in the mid-seventies. On the one side of the political space lies the major socialist party, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (P.A.S.O.K). Founded in 1974 by Andreas Papandreu, it managed to assert itself as the main centre-left party of political spectrum and only four years after its foundation, it succeeded in taking the role of

the main opposition party.² By doubling its share of the vote in three successive elections, the third general election in which the party took part, in 1981, was proven a landslide and provided it with a very comfortable majority in the parliament. Since then, PASOK occupies a key position in Greek political context. With the exception of a short-lived parenthesis (1990-1993), the party remained in office for the whole period between 1981 and 2004. During these years it won five general elections, the first three led by its historical leader, Andreas Papandreu, and the others, after the founder's death in 1996, led by his successor, Kostas Simitis. The latter, following nine years in office, was replaced three months before the poll-day by the then minister of foreign affairs, George Papandreu, who led the party to the election.³ Despite the defeat, the first-born son of the party's initiator is, still, its current leader.

The other side of the political space is covered by the right wing party, New Democracy (ND). Founded by Konstantinos Karamanlis, immediately after the end of the military dictatorship in 1974, it can be seen as the logical successor of the major postwar right-wing parties (Greek Rally in 1952 and National Radical Union – ERE – in 1956).⁴ ND has managed to uphold its hegemony of the centre-right political space in a way unmatched by most European conservative parties. Yet, it has failed to translate this hegemony into broader political domination (Kalyvas, 1998:86).⁵ Although it was constantly in power from 1974 to 1981, until the last general election, it had remained in opposition for twenty two out of the last twenty five years. Since the retirement of its founder, in 1980, the party has experienced five successions in its leadership and is currently headed by Karamanlis' nephew, Kostas Karamanlis. The latter took the lead of the party after its defeat in the 1996 election and drove it into the 2000 election with considerable success. He raised the party's vote share by 4 percentage points, but, still, did not succeed in leading it to office. In one of the most intriguing elections of the last thirty years, PASOK enjoyed what was the most marginal victory of its history and renewed its maintenance in office.

That pattern was not repeated in March of 2004. The last general election concealed no serious surprise. Since, the June of 2000 and during the mid-term period, ND enjoyed a safe

² For a comprehensive review of the first term in the party's political trajectory see Spourdalakis (1988). For a critical view of the party's ideological evolution see Grabaris (1998) and Papagarufallou (2002).

³ In a politically intensive period, three months before the poll-day, PASOK, and personally Kostas Simitis, were severely criticised with regard to the procedure by which the succession took place (Iordanidis 2003; Agelopoulos 2003).

⁴ Apart from the clear partisan roots that connect the two parties whose political story ends before the *Junta*, with the ND, this political continuity is also made obvious by the leading figure of Konstantinos Karamanlis, who having entered in politics with Greek Rally, went on to found E.R.E. and returned to Greek politics with ND

⁵ For a review of the right-wing party's political trajectory see indicatively Katsoudas (1987), Kalyvas (1998) and Loulis (1981).

lead in vote intention, as that was captured by opinion-polls.⁶ No significant change qualified this established picture after the campaign period. The same party that was viewed as the most likely to win the election before the campaign was the one that celebrated in the night of the 7th of March its return to office after eleven consecutive years in opposition.⁷ With an increase of 4 percentage points, ND's 45.36 share of the vote was sufficient to give to the party a safe majority of 178 out of 300 seats, whereas PASOK's 40.55 per cent was its lowest share of the national vote since 1990 and gave to the party no more than 112 MPs. A new era in Greek politics had just opened.

Several remarkable aspects of this electoral battle make it a very fertile field to test the perception that leadership evaluations determine vote choice. First, the increased belief of many Greek electoral analysts that the influence of ideological predispositions and party identification has weakened considerably during the last decade, has forced students of Greek politics to focus on short term electoral factors (Loulis, 2001). Consequently, as is already the case in many other European countries (indicatively see for the British case Graetz and McAllister, 1987b; Clarke et al., 2004), party leaders and political issues (as basic components of the dynamic elements of voting behaviour) have gradually acquired an enhanced role in determining political outcomes. In the last general election, both parties' campaigns concentrated on their leaders to an unprecedented degree. It is thus an interesting task to examine whether the decline of sociopsychological forces gave room to the emergence of leadership effects to such an extent that it can justify the increased focus on leaders' appeal.

The second reason is related to the particular role of Karamanlis. The latter was projected as the strongest electoral asset of ND. His friendly and conversational image matched with his ability to present himself as a strong and competent leader made him the factor upon which the party sustained its electoral fortune. Thus, even intuitively, great portion of the electorate has largely attributed the party's landslide to its leader. Finally, the change of leader by the socialist party in the beginning of the campaign was implemented on the grounds that it would alter radically the image of the party, improving in this way its chances to reverse public opinion on its favour.⁸ On its own, this fact reveals the consensus within the bosom of

⁶ See indicatively Mauris (2000b;2003), Fanaras (2003).

⁷ In a critique against the extraordinarily great concentration of the media and politicians on the electoral campaign, a political commentator noted that, during the nearly thirty years of the third Greek republic there has been no instance in which the winner of a general election was different from the one that was seen as the most likely to win before the campaign period (Pretenderis, 2004).

⁸ Such a tactical manoeuvre took place for the first time in Greek parliamentary history. It is not something totally new for other European voters, such as the British, though, since they have already experienced it a couple of times, most notably in 1990 with the change of the Conservative leader. However, there are again serious differences. In the case of Margaret Thatcher, she left the party much earlier before the election than Simitis did.

PASOK that leadership evaluations are important and may potentially affect the overall outcome.⁹ Under that perspective, it might be useful to estimate not only the absolute impact of the new leader's appeal on the overall outcome, but also to assess whether this choice had any substantial effect at all on socialists' share of the vote. Would the result be any different, had Simitis run the party until the election?

II. Analytical strategies

In their path-breaking work, Butler and Stokes justified their concern about leadership effects on the grounds that it constitutes a potentially significant determinant of vote choice, since it meets all preconditions for a political issue or object to influence the individual voter. Party leaders are undoubtedly extraordinarily salient in modern Greek politics: electors are not only aware of them and differentiate between them on a party basis but they also have some strength of feeling, or what Butler and Stokes name a 'genuine attitude' (1974:360). Thus, potentially leaders' perceived personal qualities are capable of affecting the individual vote. And to the extent that they produce unbalanced evaluations about their relative personal qualities, the 'pull of the leaders' is potentially capable of affecting the aggregate outcome.

Under that perspective, the principal aim of electoral students has been to examine the net effect of leadership evaluations at both the individual vote and the aggregate outcome. That can be principally done with individual-level data, since they provide an insight about the causal processes that link beliefs, attitudes and behaviour (Sanders, 1997).¹⁰ Within the micro-level framework, two different but complementary strategies have been employed. Both

That gave to the new Conservative leader much more time to expose his political ideas and reveal his personal leadership virtues than Papandreou had. Perhaps this might be one reason that whereas this move resulted in the 1992 third consecutive Conservative victory, it was not crown with success for the party that inspired it in the Greek case. Apart from that, in the case of the Conservatives Thatcher did not leave the party voluntarily; she was rather ousted by the party. On the contrary, in PASOK the change was simply a voluntary 'sacrifice' of its leader as a final effort to secure that the party will retain its limited chances to win the election.

⁹ Of course, such a move had also other motives apart from the need to propose for the election a popular politician whose image had not been eroded seriously by the socialists' long period in office. On its own, such a decision could potentially serve as a useful heuristic device, capable of producing an immense political shock in the wake of the campaign. Especially during the first days that it was announced, PASOK seemed to be the principal agenda setter since its change of leader was the primary focus of media coverage. Thus, such a move was assumed to have a pertinent positive effect on its own, without accounting for the relatively more positive evaluations of voters toward the new leader.

¹⁰ Fairly recently, many scholars have purported to capture the dynamics of leadership effects by the use of aggregate (or pooled cross-sectional) time series data. (Clarke and Stewart 1995; Clarke et al. 1997;1998; 2000; Lanoue and Headrick 1996; Nadeau et al. 1996). Government popularity is regarded as a function of prime minister's popularity while controlling for other variables (typically indicators of subjective or objective economy and other non-economic factors). These models have been originally driven by the extremely good fit of the series of prime ministerial approval to government popularity (Clarke and Stewart, 1995:156). Their findings though speak ambiguously about the impact of leadership evaluations on individual voting behaviour.

of them are used in this study. The most common one has been called the ‘improved prediction.’¹¹ It has its roots in the notion of the ‘funnel of causality,’ which was first introduced by the authors of the *American Voter*, and further developed by Miller and Shanks (1990; 1991; 1996). The principal assumption in this multistage approach is that there is considerable continuity in voters’ political preferences, such that they approach an election already predisposed toward one party rather than another (Bartle, 2002:79). The potential determinants of vote are classified in causal stages, according to their long term stability and distance from vote decision (Bartle, 1998:504). So, the choices of individual voters are best understood as the cumulative consequences of temporally ordered sets of factors (Miller and Shanks, 1996:192). Within this structure, all of the variables in a given stage may have been influenced by variables in earlier stages, (as well as by other variables in the same stage), and may have had some direct or unmediated impact on the vote, which is supposed to be a function of all the explanatory variables.¹²

The alternative strategy, which has been called ‘thought experiment strategy’, approaches the question of leader effects from another angle. It weights the appeals of individual party leaders not against other aspects of their party’s appeal to individual voters, but against the appeal that their party would have had if it had been led by someone else. This strategy emphasises the asking and answering of explicit ‘what if?’ questions, exploiting what the historians call ‘counterfactuals’ (King, 2002:19; Crewe and King 1994a; 1994b). The questions usually asked in that approach are: What if the competing leaders were evaluated equally or (which is the logical equivalent) had no perceived personal characteristics at all? What if the two rival parties interchanged their leaders (Bean and Bughan, 1989)? In general, the questions this approach purports to answer evolve around the pattern: ‘How would election X have turned out if A or B, rather than C, had been the party leader or the presidential candidate at the time?’ (Crewe and King, 1994a:187) What would be for example the outcome of the 2004 election if Kostas Simitis rather than George Papandreou had led PASOK or, alternatively, what would have happened in 2000 election if Souflias or Bakoyanni rather than Karamanlis had been the leader of ND?

Both methods, though, irrespectively of which does better in assessing the relative influence of leaders’ appeal on voting behaviour, share the same flaw: they both make the ques-

¹¹ The distinction between different methodologies follows precisely King’s framework (see King 2002a; Crewe and King 1994a; 1994b and Bartle et al. 1997). The same terminology has been also employed.

¹² The basic difference of this recursive multi-stage model with the conventional regression approach is that in the latter vote is considered to be an effect of a list of explanatory variables – most of them based on largely different and, essentially contradicting, theoretical underpinnings – which are assumed to be spatially and temporally coordinate that is, none is supposed to be the cause of the other (Bartle, 1998:503).

tionable assumption that causal flow is only one-way, from leader-preference to party-preference. Yet, the causal arrow may just as easily point to the other way, from party preference to leader-preference. As it is logical to assume that a party leader might well affect a voter in her final voting decision, it is equally plausible to argue that voters tend to offer assessments of candidates' personal qualities, which are biased by their prior partisan sympathies. Voters do not form their evaluations about leaders in an intellectual and emotional near-vacuum (King, 2002a:14). On the contrary, most of time they enter in the campaign period with already well-shaped perceptions about the parties and their policies. In many cases, the relevant aspects of a given candidate are either invisible or, at least, not well known, so that voters' evaluations of that candidate concerning those qualities are influenced by voters' own partisan affiliations (Miller and Shanks, 1996:417). As Bartle et al. (1997:9) put it,

'Every survey reveals a very strong association between leader preference and party preference: given the intimate association between leader and party, any other statistical pattern would be surprising. Cause and effect is almost certainly two-way: in 1997 some voters came to support Labour because they admired Blair while others admired Blair because they had become – perhaps years or decades before – Labour supporters'.

Having outlined the methodological techniques which are employed in this study, and having acknowledged their inherent limitations which stem from the assumption of causal priority, I now proceed to the empirical analysis.

III. Data, model specification and measurement

The extent of leadership evaluations' influence on the March election is tested by using data from a nationwide preelection survey, which was conducted in early February of 2004, that is, less than a month before the poll day.¹³ Examining the impact of leaders by the use of preelection data has certain advantages. First it avoids the problem of rationalization, whereby voters bring their reported attitudes, opinions and evaluations into line with their vote decision (Bartle, 2004:325). Apart from that, respondents' answers are not affected by the election outcome as may be the case in postelection surveys in which voters are prompted to overrate the leader whose party has won the election and underestimate the qualities of the leader of the

¹³ The study, implemented by the research company OPINION, was funded by the National Centre of Social Research (EKKE), as the result of its participation in the Comparative National Elections Project. I am grateful to the research group of the Centre for proving me with the data. Neither OPINION nor EKKE are responsible for the data analyses and interpretations of the data presented here.

opposition, since their own personalities might be deemed to have played an important role in the electoral fortunes of their parties. The chosen data, though, are far from being without flaws. Their basic limitation regards the lack of items which are of great theoretical interest in analyses of electoral behaviour. To begin with, no questions of economic evaluations are included, yielding thus impossible to gauge the impact of leaders net of such influences. Apart from that, the survey contains neither retrospective evaluations of governmental performance nor indicators of issue proximities. The omission of all these sets of variables naturally produces suspicions of serious specification error which might inflate estimates of leaders' image net effect. Finally, and most importantly, assessment of leaders is captured only through a synoptic measure of the extent to which voters like each of the two candidates. Unfortunately, no battery of questions about specific leadership traits is available and, consequently, there is no opportunity to examine which exact qualities are most influential in vote decision, a research topic of increasing academic interest (see Mughan, 1993; Stewart and Clarke, 1997; Bean and Mughan 1989; Jones and Hudson 1996). Moreover, since one single item is hardly sufficient to tap the multidimensional aspects of personality, the measurement of the key variable is of rather questionable validity.

Besides assessments of the two leaders, the main explanatory variables used in this analysis are voters' proximity with the parties in the left-right scale; party identification, as it is usually measured in Greek studies;¹⁴ and degree of religious commitment.¹⁵ There are substantive theoretical and empirical reasons to include the first two variables in a model of vote choice. Ideological predispositions constitute a relatively stable electoral factor which has a steady bearing on political attitudes. Party attachment, viewed either under the traditional spectrum of the Michigan School (Campbell et al. 1960) or under the valence perspective of the revisionist school (Fiorina, 1981; Clarke et al., 2004) is considered to shape voting behaviour in a long-term fashion. Furthermore, over the past half-century previous research has accorded pride of place to both variables. The religious factor is added for two reasons. First,

¹⁴ Party identification in most Greek surveys is measured by how close a voter feels to each party. In this study, voters were classified as either PASOK or ND identifiers (from a scale of -1 to +1) according to their relative closeness between the two parties. So, for instance a voter that felt very close to PASOK and very far from ND scored '-1'. If a respondent showed to be equally far from or close to both parties s/he scored '0'. Since the questions for each party included four options (very close/close/far/very far) the term of partisanship also captures the relative *strength* of closeness to each of the two parties.

¹⁵ Degree of religious commitment is measured by frequency of church attendance. Following Achen's (1992) argumentation I do not add in either vote or leaders' models demographic indicators. I, thus, implicitly assume that vote (and leadership evaluations) is formed by beliefs and attitudes (such as party identification, ideology and policy issue perceptions) and those beliefs are, in turn, formed by political socialization and experience with the parties and not by purely positional indicators (Achen, 1992:206). As Franklin (1984: 467, quoted in Achen, 1992) puts it, 'occupying a particular social niche may help us guess the voter's experiences and beliefs, but they are not themselves explanatory.'

unlike most western democracies, where the separation between church and state is well established and embedded in both the political system and the political culture of the countries, in Greece the church still retains an intervening role in political affairs. That, in conjunction with the fact that the Greek church has managed to project itself on a cultural and historical rather than dogmatic base (Nikolakopoulos and Georgiadou, 2000), makes its influence on political attitudes much stronger than it would be predicted on the basis of religiosity within Greek society. Second, the dispute between the clergy and the government, which started in June 2000 and lasted almost during the whole interelection period, with respect to the appearance of religious denomination in the new identity cards, polarised public opinion in terms of this issue and made religion a potentially pivotal factor of this election (Mauris, 2000a). It is believed that the power of all three parameters in predicting the probability of voting either ND or PASOK is sufficient enough to compensate for the lack of other covariates so that the proposed model does not suffer from serious omitted variable bias. Yet, due to the small number of control variables, it is logical to assume that what is estimated here is probably the upper limits of leadership effects.

Before proceeding to the analysis a final point needs to be made. Respondents from the preelection survey of February were also interviewed two months after the election. Yet, the second wave of the panel is not very useful in this study since it primarily focused on media campaign effects. Therefore, no questions about either closeness to a party or church attendance were used. However, an interesting aspect of this survey regards voters' perceptions of the performance of leaders in the debate that took place only a couple of weeks before the election and was not captured by the first wave of the panel. Consequently I only make use of the postelection wave in order to gauge the impact of the leaders' debate both in individual vote decision and the aggregate electoral outcome.

From a preliminary analysis the survey does not seem to suffer from serious sampling error. As it would be expected from a preelection survey, it substantially underestimates the eventual level of both major parties, since more than seven per cent of the respondents either declared that they did not know what they would vote (2.4 per cent) or refused to reveal their intentions (5 per cent). That said, the relative share of the sample vote was matched well with the actual share of the vote either PASOK or ND received in the March elections. Indeed, coding the undecided voters as missing, the percentages obtained by the survey are:

ND 44.4 (official result: 45.36)

PASOK 39.9 (official result 40.55)

KKE¹⁶ 6.4 (official result 5.9)

Synaspismos¹⁷ 3.5 (official result 3.26)

Since my aim is to focus only on the leaders of the two major parties, I follow previous research (Finkel 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995; Bartels 2002; Bartle 1998; 2004; Bartle and Crewe 2002) and restrict my analysis to the 995 respondents who claimed that they would vote only for one of the two major parties. All explanatory variables are scaled from +1 (the most pro ND option) to -1 (the most pro PASOK option), with '0' representing a theoretical neutral point on the scale. Vote was coded 1 if ND and 0 if PASOK.

IV. Results

The position of leaders in the causal chain


Figure 1 presents the distribution of voters' perceptions about each of the two leaders. The most striking feature of the graph is the great degree of similarity which characterises evaluations about the two leaders. Of course, judging from their mean values (6.39 for Karamanlis and 6.42 for Papandreou), it can be argued that if either of them is to be treated as more favourably assessed by voters, this would be Papandreou and not Karamanlis. But since the average difference in voters' evaluations is so minuscule (and, thus, within the bounds of sampling error), it would be too risky to make such counterintuitive out-of-sample inferences. For the moment it is sufficient to highlight the extreme balance of views for the two candidates, which were both slightly positively evaluated by the public.

However, as Bartels notes, those modest aggregate differences might conceal a good deal of disagreement *among* survey respondents (2002:50, emphasis in the original). The most important source of such differences is, undoubtedly, respondents' more general political predispositions. In trying to evaluate short-term electoral influences, such as party leaders' personal qualities, voters are likely to make use of political cues which stem from their more stable and general political attitudes (party identification, ideology, issue evaluations). Consequently, their assessment of leaders' personalities is very likely to suffer from such partisan

¹⁶ KKE stands for Greek Communist Party.

¹⁷ Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left, the Social Movements and the Ecology) is a leftist party which is primarily distinguished by its postmaterialist views and its focus on new politics. It could be roughly regarded as the equivalent of the German Greens in Greek politics, in the sense that it is located to the left of the socialist party but it clearly distinguishes itself from the Communist left (at least that was the case until its change of leader which took place after the election). However, its electoral appeal is much smaller than that of the German party.

Figure 1: Distribution of respondents' evaluations about Karamanlis and Papandreou (1-10 scale)




bias. That is evident in Figure 2, which presents leadership evaluations in terms of strength of party bias. It is clear from the figure that impressions of leaders are strongly conditioned by prior political loyalties.

The effect of ideological predispositions and religious commitment on candidates' assessments is presented in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. Again, the distribution of voters' perceptions about both Papandreou and Karamanlis seems to have been strongly affected by their ideological long-standing views. Under that perspective, respondents did not evaluate the two leaders only with respect to their personality characteristics but seem to have based their assessments, even partially, to the fact that the two politicians lead the centre-left and centre-right party respectively. On the other hand, religious commitment does not seem to exert any significant impact on the evaluations of the two candidates. Figure 4 shows that church attendance, as a proxy for the intensity of religious beliefs, did not appear to have played a crucial role in judgements of leaders.

The influence of political biases on leadership evaluations becomes evident by regressing relative leaders' rating against the three key variables which represent general political predispositions: party identification, ideology and church attendance. The results of this OLS regression are presented in the second column of Table 1. As was indicated by the Figures 2-3, party identification and ideological proximity exert a very significant impact on leadership evaluations. Religious commitment also constitutes a significant predictor of evaluations

Figure 2: Percentage of voters giving to Papandreou/Karamanlis a score greater than 6 by level of closeness to PASOK/ND



about the leaders and is also correctly signed. Its relative impact though is rather limited in comparison with the indicators of political predispositions. In total, the fit of the model is quite impressive, implying that more than seventy per cent of the variance in leadership evaluations can be attributed to voters' enduring political biases.

Another interesting aspect of column 2 of Table 1 regards the sign and the magnitude of the intercept. Given the coding of the variables (from -1, pro PASOK, to 1, pro ND), the constant of this regression reflects relative leaders' ratings by voters who score '0' in all other three independent variables (see for similar approaches Achen, 1982; Bartels, 2002; Finkel 1993; Markus 1982). So, among 'neutrals', i.e., non identified voters who have moderate ideological views and retain an ordinary relationship with church, Karamanlis is shown to be more highly evaluated than Papandreou, a result which is in line with widespread political intuition. The same pattern is also observed when two separate regressions are run, one for each leader. By comparing columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, the intercept of the regression which examines views about Karamanlis is higher than the equivalent estimate for his counterpart, reflecting, in this way, the lead of the ND's leader among neutral voters.¹⁸

These two separate regressions can be also employed to test another hypothesis about the relative influence of political predispositions on voters' assessments. Since Papandreou took

¹⁸ The intercept of column 2 measures the relative evaluations of neutrals about the two leaders. Since the dependent variable ranges from -1 to 1, the positive value of the constant implies that evaluations of 'neutrals' towards the two leaders were slightly skewed towards Karamanlis. Columns 3 and 4, which measure voters' perceptions about each leader separately (again ranging from -1 to +1 for each leader) imply that although both leaders were evaluated slightly positively by voters of ND and PASOK, Karamanlis did somewhat better.

Figure 3: Distribution of respondents' evaluations about Papandreou and Karamanlis by ideological predispositions.





Figure 4: Distribution of respondents' evaluations about Papandreou and Karamanlis by frequency of church attendance.



the lead of the party only three months before the election, it is logical to assume that he did not have enough time to elaborate and present to the public certain characteristics of his personality. Consequently, it is likely to presume that voters had not acquired until the poll day a complete picture of his leadership qualities. On the contrary, by the time of the election the opposition leader had already fulfilled almost eight years in that post and, hence, the electorate had already established a more thorough view about his personality traits. If this argumentation is true then we should observe greater tendency by voters to assess personal qualities by

Table 1: OLS estimates of relative leadership ratings/evaluations of Karamanlis/evaluations of Papandreou against party identification, ideological proximity and intensity of religious beliefs

| | Comparative Evaluations B (Std.E) | Evaluations towards Karamanlis B (Std.E) | Evaluations towards Papandreou B (Std.E) |
|------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Party Identification | .611* (.017) | .587* (.026) | -.635* (.027) |
| Ideological proximity | .224* (.037) | .264* (.057) | -.190* (.080) |
| Church attendance | .033* (.016) | .134* (.025) | .070* (.026) |
| Intercept | .013 (.010) | .237* (.015) | .213* (.015) |
| N (Adjusted R ²) | 1128 (.737) | 1128 (.538) | 1128 (.517) |

Note: All variables range from pro-PASOK to pro-ND values. Entries are unstandardised coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.05

making use of political cues offered by partisan biases in the case of Papandreou than in the case of Karamanlis. Yet, as columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 indicate, political predispositions are no better predictors of evaluations toward Papandreou than toward Karamanlis. Whereas party identification and church attendance seem to be approximately equally important in evaluating both leaders,¹⁹ ideological proximity appears to affect leader ratings much more strongly in the case of Karamanlis than in the case of Papandreou. The unclear political views of PASOK's new leader, together with his decision to extend the political appeal of the party towards both to the left and the right of the political spectrum, seems to have confused the electorate making ideological proximity a not so adequate cue for the assessment of his personality.²⁰

¹⁹ Church attendance appears to improve Papandreou rating, something which seems contrary both to the assumption that religiosity is positively correlated with the conservative party and leader and to what is indicated by Figure 4. The figure shows that although for Karamanlis the relationship can be regarded approximately as linear and is clearly positive, the relationship between Papandreou rating and frequency of church attendance shows to be bell-shaped, implying that it cannot be adequately estimated if assumed to be linear. Thus, I also run a regression of feelings toward Papandreou in which apart from the three explanatory variables entered here, a variable of squared church attendance was added in order to capture the possibility of non-linearity. Guided by the graph, my expectation is that this new variable will be negative (as it has to be so long as the bell-shaped pattern in Figure 4 is significant). Indeed, the parameter proved to be significant and negative, increasing the adjusted R² to .521. Hence, the positive sign of the term of church attendance here is most probably an artefact of specification error.

²⁰ The most striking example of Papandreou's effort to broaden the appeal of his party both toward the left and right of the political centre was to incorporate in the bosom of the party two of the most prominent neo-liberal ex-members of ND (Andrianopoulos and Manos) together with two distinguished political figures of the non-communist left (Androulakis and Damanaki). That move, though, did not seem to yield any substantial electoral benefit to PASOK since instead of extending its electoral base it rather provoked a chain of reactions within the grassroots of the party.

The results presented so far imply that leadership evaluations are not entirely the outcome of voters' idiosyncratic reactions to candidates' personal traits, since they seem to be strongly affected by more basic political predispositions. Thus, following the logic of the funnel of causality which was outlined above, the estimation of the impact of leadership evaluations on vote choice will have to take into account all these general political attitudes which are regarded as causally prior to leaders' image, on the grounds that they constitute more stable and persistent influences on vote choice. Yet, before moving to that step, a final point needs to be made. An alternative reading of the observed pattern so far would be that assessments of leaders' qualities are shown to be conditioned by partisan and political predispositions because they shape such attitudes rather than are affected by them. As Bartle and Crewe state, leaders represent relatively enduring elements in the political context and since they control party organization, they shape their parties' images (2002:81). Under that perspective, it could be argued that personal impressions of leaders influence prospective voters' partisanship and their political predispositions. If that were the case, then trying to estimate the magnitude of leadership influences on vote by controlling for all these political attitudes would understate the final impact of leaders' images by misattributing to party identification and ideological proximities a portion of leadership qualities' direct effects (Bartels, 2002:58).

Yet, as appendix shows, exogeneity testing between voters' assessments about the two candidates and ideological proximity gives no credit to this alternative hypothesis. In line with common belief, evaluations of leaders' qualities seem to be endogenous to ideological views.²¹ That constitutes a good sign that the findings presented up to now show that leaders' ratings are influenced by voters' predispositions rather than the other way round.

The impact of leadership evaluations on individual voting behaviour

The analysis follows at this point the 'improved prediction' strategy in trying to assess the impact of candidates' ratings after controlling for prior influences on vote. However, in contrast with Miller and Shanks' multistage analyses, the model tested here bears resemblance to that of Bartels (2002) and does not distinguish between more than two causal categories of potential influences on vote. The three control variables – partisanship, ideology and religious commitment – are located at the same causal block which encompasses parameters of political

²¹ Given the relative complexity and the space needed to describe properly the exogeneity test, I prefer to report only the outcome of the test in the main text and provide the whole analysis of the procedure in the appendix in order to save space and avoid moving the discussion to more technical issues.

predispositions. This is the only block of variables which is used in order to control for all the determinants of vote decision that can be regarded as causally prior to leadership evaluations. Both practical and methodological reasons impose this formulation. On the one hand, the lack of data impedes the inclusion of other potential predictors of vote. On the other hand, the construction of a much richer causal model with finer differences between the causal stages can only be done at the cost of making problematic assumptions about causal ordering (Bartels 2002, 58).²²

Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, OLS is no longer appropriate for the estimation of the parameters.²³ Instead, I use probit analysis which is a more adequate technique for the efficient estimation of binary response models, at the cost, though, of a more complex presentation and interpretation of the estimates (see Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). Table 2 presents the results. As it is noted by column 2, which presents the probit b-coefficients, with the exception of church attendance, all other parameters are non-trivially significant and correctly, as predicted by theory, signed.²⁴ With respect to the term of relative leadership traits, it appears to exert a significant impact on vote choice even when more stable political values which influence feelings about leaders are taken into account. However, on its own, this observation does not say anything about the magnitude of leadership effects on individual voting behaviour. How strongly did evaluations of leaders' qualities affect voters' decisions?

Given the nonlinear nature of probit analysis, the column 2 of table 2 cannot give a faithful answer to this question. In fact the b-coefficients can only inform us about the statistical

²² For instance, Miller and Shanks' models contain six temporally ordered sets of factors. In sequence these are: 1) stable social and economic characteristics; 2) partisan identification and policy-related predispositions; 3) preferences concerning current policy issues and perceptions of current conditions; 4) retrospective evaluations of the incumbent leader; 5) evaluations of the personal qualities of the candidates and 6) prospective evaluations of the potential future effectiveness of the two parties and candidates. However, the treatment, for example, of retrospective evaluations of parties as potential causes and not consequences of leadership impressions is not very convincing on the base, solely, of theoretical speculation. The same is also true for the assumed causal ordering in the relationship between leaders' and parties' images. As Bartels notes, 'in the absence of good evidence' it might be preferable to limit the number of causal stages, making thus fewer assumptions about causal priority.

²³ Since the effects of independent variables on the probability of a given outcome are often assumed to be dependent of the value of P(the probability that the dependent variable attains a specific value, say y), logit or probit models are more adequate depictions of the underlying process than the linear specification (Finkel and Denk, 1992: 788). Using the Linear Probability Model produces unreliable standard errors and 'floor' and 'ceiling effects' as a result of the non-linear nature of the relationships (Bartle, 2004:328).

²⁴ With respect to model diagnostics, the Likelihood ratio test, which can be roughly regarded as the equivalent of the F-test in OLS, shows that the model, as a whole, is significant. MacFadden R², which constitutes a measure of the goodness-of-fit of the model and ranges, as the OLS R², between 0 and 1 (for a detailed interpretation of the logic upon which it is based see Wooldridge 2003:560), shows that the explanatory power of the model is indeed impressive. As a way to deduct possible specification error, I run the regression without the term of leaders. LR remained highly significant and MacFadden R² remained to surprisingly high levels (.68), designating that leadership evaluations enter in an already well specified model. Thus, it is fair to believe that only small portion of its predicting power is likely to be an artefact of omitted variable bias.

Table 2: Probit estimates of vote intention against leadership evaluations, party identification, ideological proximity and church attendance

| | B (Std.E) | dFx/dx, marginal effects (Std.E) |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Leaders | 2.31* (.396) | .898* (.155) |
| Party Identification | 1.90* (.275) | .739* (.105) |
| Ideological proximity | 2.31* (.396) | .704* (.177) |
| Church attendance | .156 (.236) | .060 (.092) |
| Intercept | .363* (.126) | — |
| N (MacFadden pseudo-R ²) | | 880 (.86) |
| LR (Likelihood ratio) | | 1053.41* |

Note: All variables range from pro-PASOK to pro-ND values. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05

significance and the direction of the impact of each explanatory variable on the probability of voting ND (Nelson and Aldrich, 1984:43-44). In order to have an insight about the relative impact of each variable on individual vote decision I focus on column 3 which presents the rate of change in the probability of voting ND as a result of a unit change in each explanatory variable.²⁵ As this column indicates, the effect of leaders on vote choice is the greatest among all other independent variables. According to the model, other things being equal, one unit increase in the rating of Karamanlis relatively to Papandreou boosts the probability of voting ND by almost 90 percent. This effect exceeds the effects of both party identification and ideological proximity. Thus, it seems that, at least at the individual level, leadership effects did play a significant role among the electorate.

Of course, the results presented in Table 2 are the outcome of a very simple model which makes some rather dubious assumptions regarding the uniformity of the magnitude of leadership effects among the electorate. Apart from that, each candidate is assumed to exert an equally salient impact on the electorate regardless whether he runs its party three months or eight years. Trying to examine such differences, I also estimated some complementary models in which some of these assumptions were relaxed. First, two interactions were introduced: the first was between leaders' rating and level of decidedness by the respondent about what to vote, allowing undecided and decided voters to attach different weights to leaders' qualities; the second was between leaders' ratings and strength of party identification testing whether independents are more likely than partisans to base their vote upon their perceptions of lead-

²⁵ For a formal representation of this procedure see Aldrich and Nelson (1984:41-44).

ership differences. Then, a model in which the term of leaders' rating is replaced by two terms that measure feelings toward each leader separately is tested in order to examine whether the effect of candidates' evaluations is not uniform between the two leaders. However none of these alternative models showed to perform significantly better than the simple model presented here.²⁶ Apart from that, none of these specifications alters significantly the magnitude of leadership effects that was found in the core model.

²⁶ Table 3: Alternative models of leadership effects on vote choice

| | 1 st model B (Std.E) | 2 nd model B(std.E) | 3 rd model† dF/dx (Std.E) |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Leadership evaluations | 1.67* (.439) | 2.19* (.432) | – |
| Party Identification | 1.89* (.280) | 1.95* (.291) | .948* (.092) |
| Ideological proximity | 1.89* (.467) | 1.78* (.452) | .791* (.149) |
| Church attendance | .206 (.239) | .158 (.238) | .166 (.382) |
| Leadership evaluations*level of decidedness about which party to vote | -1.25* (.527) | – | – |
| Leadership evalua- tions*strength of party identi- fication | – | .340 (.665) | – |
| Evaluations toward Papandreou | – | – | -.531* (.092) |
| Evaluations toward Karamanlis | – | – | .503* (.095) |
| Intercept | .377* (.127) | .371* (.127) | – |
| N (MacFadden pseudo-R ²) | 880 (.87) | 875 (.86) | 880 (.87) |
| LR (Likelihood Ratio) | 1058.27 | 1048.01 | 1055.23 |

† Since the model tests the hypothesis of different weights attributed to each leader's qualities, the change of rate in P by a unit change in each variable is reported, since it is more appropriate measure of the relative magnitude of effects than b coefficients

Note: Estimates are Probit coefficients. All variables range from pro-PASOK to pro-ND values. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05

Table 3 below shows the results from these alternative specifications. First, the importance attached to party leaders varies between decided and undecided voters. The interaction between leadership evaluations and level of decidedness seems to exert a significant effect on vote choice but improves the fit of the model only modestly since it produces only a small increase in McFadden R². Yet, strength of party identification does not seem to distinguish the weight people attach to leaders' qualities in their vote decision. The term shows to be non-significant and its contribution to the model is infinitesimal. Moreover, the replacement of the term of leaders' ratings by two separate terms which measure voters' assessments for each leader shows that the assumption of different weights attached to either of the two leaders (most likely to Karamanlis since he was a more stable agent in Greek political environment) is not confirmed by the empirical evidence. Voters appear to weight equally their evaluations about both leaders.

The aggregate impact of leadership evaluations on the 2004 election

The identification of considerable leadership effects on individual vote choice, although useful on its own right, says nothing about the role both leaders played in the outcome of the March election. This is because affecting individual voting behaviour does not, and should not, automatically imply any influence on the overall outcome. As King points out, ‘large number of individual voters may be influenced by an issue, but their individual votes will not affect the overall outcome if, in effect, they cancel each other out’ (King, 2002a:11). Under that perspective, we should expect discernible effects of ‘image’ considerations only when public opinion is sufficiently skewed toward one of the candidates. Yet, as was indicated by Figure 1, views about the leaders were particularly balanced among the electorate, making thus plausible to expect only modest leadership effects on the overall electoral outcome.

Since probit coefficients cannot be interpreted as if they were normal OLS coefficients, it is impossible to gauge the aggregate impact of leadership evaluations by simply connecting a variable’s estimated coefficient with its sample mean.²⁷ For that reason, I resort to the method of counterfactuals. In specific, I follow Bartels (2002:64) in trying to estimate the impact of leaders’ ratings by examining the difference that it would make to the overall outcome if both leaders were equally liked or disliked by the electorate. Did Karamanlis’ more favourable rating among ‘neutrals’ have any substantial effect on his party’s landslide? The answer to that question requires the comparison of the probability of casting a ballot for ND, as that can be predicted by the simple model described above, with the probability of opting for the party that the same model would predict given that both leaders were equally rated by all voters. The difference between these two predicted probabilities for each voter is, then, regarded as the net effect of leaders’ personal qualities on individual vote choice and the sample mean difference of these two probabilities is taken to be the net aggregate impact of leaders’ ratings

²⁷ Coding the variables in such a way that ‘0’ reflects a neutral population, it is relatively easy to evaluate each variables effect on the ‘level’ of the dependent variable by multiplying its unstandardised coefficient with its mean (See Achen, 1982; Finkel and Denk, 1993:789). In that way, the estimation can be viewed as an implicit comparison between the outcome on the overall vote produced by the independent variable against a population which remains neutral with respect to the specific variable. Furthermore, authors engaging in the analytic strategy of the ‘funnel of causality’ recognise that the distribution of every variable on public opinion is, at least in part, the result of the distribution of causally prior variables. Consequently they do not multiply the unstandardised coefficient with the mean of the variable but with what they call ‘adjusted residual’ which is taken as follows: after regressing the variable in question against all its preceding variables one saves its residuals which constitute the variance in that variable that cannot be attributed to causally prior influences. The mean of that residual constitutes the ‘adjusted residual’. This approach is feasible in the linear probability model since the model is linear and the effect of X_k on $P(Y=1)$ is taken to be the same for all values of X_k . In probit analysis, though, the nonlinearity of the relationship between $P(Y=1)$ and X_k impedes such an interpretation of the coefficients (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:42).

Table 4: Impact of leadership evaluations on the overall outcome of the 2004 Greek election

| Estimated share of ND vote* with real leaders' ratings | Estimated share of ND vote* if leaders' ratings identical | Estimated ND loss | Decisive Impact |
|--|---|-------------------|-----------------|
| 50.8 | 52.5 | 1.7 | No |

*This is an estimation of ND's vote share if the election were held only between the two major parties.

on the electoral outcome. Table 4 presents the result of this counterfactual at the aggregate level. As it is seen, leaders' ratings seem to have had only a modest contribution to the election. Bearing in mind that the limited number of regressors should raise suspicions about the potentially inflated estimation of candidates' ratings impact on vote choice, the aggregate net effect of only 1.5 per cent is rather trivial and can by no means be regarded as decisive in an election which ended with a margin of almost five percentage points. Even more intriguingly, the net electoral impact of leaders appears to favour Papandreou and that indicates that, if not anything else, the reason for the defeat of the socialist party cannot be found in its leader's personal appeal.²⁸

However, given the almost equally favourable public picture of the two leaders, any estimation of the impact of their relative personal appeal on the election would be bound to produce only moderate leadership effects. A potentially more interesting, then, task would be to evaluate the extent to which the change of leader by PASOK had any substantial impact on its electoral performance. Since its former leader was unanimously its greatest electoral asset until his replacement by Papandreou, it is interesting to test whether the need for a preelectional shock had as a result the party to lose in terms of the direct appeal of its leader. Fortunately, the preelection wave of the survey asks people to locate their feelings toward the ex-Prime minister, Kostas Simitis, in a 1-10 scale. By making use of this question, we can test the aggregate effect of the socialist party's change of leader.

Even by first sight, Figure 5 implies that the clear lead that Karamanlis (mean value 6.39) enjoyed over Simitis (mean value 5.07) among the electorate is good sign that we could expect clearer aggregate leadership effects in this counterfactual. This expectation is somewhat

²⁸ It has to be noted though that this finding is to be treated with caution since it is likely that it is partly produced because of serious sampling error with regard to the distribution of voters' assessments about the leaders. This is because the preelection survey has not captured people's feelings about the performance of leaders in the televised debate. Since PASOK's leader was only recently placed in this post, it is logical to expect that his first debate as leader of the party would influence substantively voters' evaluations toward him. As is demonstrated below, his performance in the debate was quite disappointing and there are good reasons to believe that this poor performance resulted in a sharp fall of his rating. So, since the debate effect is missed by the preelection survey, estimates about leadership evaluations are likely to be biased in favour of Papandreou.

Figure 5: Distribution of respondents' evaluations toward Kostas Simitis and Kostas Karamanlis




Table 5: Probit estimates of vote intention against leadership evaluations, party identification, ideological proximity and church attendance

| | B (Std.E) | dFx/dx, marginal effects (Std.E) |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Leadership evaluations† | 1.37* (.279) | .535 (.109) |
| Party Identification | 2.28* (.248) | .887 (.094) |
| Ideological proximity | 1.69* (.412) | .658 (.159) |
| Church attendance | -.134 (.180) | -.052 (.070) |
| Intercept | .170 (.118) | — |
| N (MacFadden pseudo-R ²) | | 886 (.84) |
| LR (Likelihood ratio) | | 1030.30* |

† In this analysis the term of leadership evaluations measures voters' relative rating between Karamanlis and Simitis.

Note: All variables range from pro-PASOK to pro-ND values. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05

Table 6: Impact of leadership evaluations on the overall outcome of the 2004 Greek election

| Estimated share of ND vote* with real leaders' ratings | Estimated share of ND vote* if PASOK had fought the election with Simitis | Estimated ND gain | Decisive Impact |
|--|---|-------------------|-----------------|
| 50.8 | 51.4 | 0.6 | No |

*This is an estimation of ND's vote share if the election were held only between the two major parties.

qualified by the findings of Table 5, though, which show that the impact of relative rating between Karamanlis and Simitis was not so influential on vote choice as was the case for Kara-

manlis and Papandreou.²⁹ The result of the mean sample difference in the estimated probabilities is shown in Table 6. Indeed, the difference between the two probabilities is strikingly small. Although Karamanlis appears to be the net winner in terms of leaders' personal characteristics, the extremely small effect of his more favourable relative rating is a very good demonstration of the limited potential of leadership traits to determine electoral outcomes. That said, the same finding reveals that the change of leader might have improved PASOK's image in other aspects, but the new pattern that it produced in relative leadership ratings did not alter substantially its electoral position. According to the model, its share of the vote increases by less than one point as a result of change in leader. It is clear that the difference of five percentage points in the share of the vote between the two parties could by no means be compensated for by such a marginal improvement in its leader's perceived personal qualities.

The effect of the debate

Similarly to other western democracies, during the last decade the debate between the party leaders has been deemed a constant feature of the campaign period in Greek parliamentary elections. In the case of the last election, the debate did not constitute a battle between the leaders of the two major parties, but included the leaders of all five parties that enjoyed representation in either the national or the European parliament. Since the preelection wave of the panel was held few days before the debate took place, it could not capture either explicitly with a separate question or indirectly via respondents' leadership assessments, the impact of this event on voters' perceptions about the leaders. However, since the postelection wave of the panel incorporated a relevant question, we can gauge the effect of this television battle, regarding it as an indirect way of measuring the influence of leaders' appeal to the electorate.³⁰

²⁹ This finding is not surprising since at the time of the interview voters had an already established idea about who were the two competing leaders and thus were consciously evaluating Simitis under a different, and not so competitive, perspective, which might not have had a crucial effect on vote decision. However, different weight does not mean that these men were evaluated in a relatively less comparative sense than Karamanlis and Papandreou (for the argument that leaders are assessed under a comparative perspective see Nadeau et al. 1996). In fact, as is shown by the data, assessments between Karamanlis and Simitis were more zero-sum than between the former and Papandreou, since correlations between the first pair of leaders (-.381) appears to be higher than the correlation between the second pair (-.348).

³⁰ The first wave of the survey was implemented to a sample of 1639 respondents whereas the second wave had a sample of 1307. Preliminary data exploration indicated that panel attrition was not a serious problem since the loss of about 20 per cent of all cases by the second panel did not seem to have created new biases to the data (in terms of gender, educational level, and cohort). Yet, the postelection wave, as would be expected if seen under the political context within which it was held, significantly boosted the ND's lead over PASOK with respect to the share of the vote. That bias might be partially responsible for some of the results shown below.

Table 7 depicts the distribution of respondents' assessments about the performance of the two leaders. It is clear that the balanced view which characterised voters' synoptic evaluations of the two leaders bears little resemblance to their perceptions about leaders' performance in the debate. Electorate was clearly skewed toward Karamanlis, indicating that ND's leader performed much better than his counterpart of the socialist party. Unfortunately, the lack of party identification item makes it impossible to examine whether the observed pattern of table 8 is an artefact of prior partisan biases. Yet, since the same people who rated both leaders so closely in the preelection panel are shown to evaluate Karamanlis much more favourably than Papandreou with respect to the debate, it is logical to assume that great part of this difference is most likely due to the perceptions of voters about the leaders' relative performance in the night of the debate rather than an artefact of a rapid change in the distribution of party identifiers.³¹

Given this large difference in people's perceptions, the debate must have exerted a positive influence on ND's share of the vote. A precondition for that, though, is that it affected individual voting behaviour. In trying to assess the impact of the debate on party support, I employ the following specification:

$$V_t = f(\text{Leaders}_{t-1}; \text{Pid}_{t-1}; \text{Ideology}_{t-1}; \text{Church}_{t-1}; \text{Debate}_t)^{32}$$

where

V: Recalled vote from the postelection survey

Leaders: Voters' relative leadership evaluations as measured before the election

Pid: Party identification before the election

Ideology: Ideological proximity between voters' and parties as measured before the election

Church: Frequency of Church attendance as measured before the election

³¹ That said, it has to be noted that the results of the postelection wave might be somewhat biased in favour of the final winner since respondents are prompted to believe that his own personal appearance must have been an important factor for the victory of his party. Thus, the estimate of satisfaction with the performance of the two leaders in the debate is probable to inflate in a postelection survey the relative lead of Karamanlis if compared to a survey that measured voters' perceptions of the two leaders' appearance the following day of the debate.

³² I also employed another specification which follows more closely the causal logic of Finkel (1995). In specific, vote intention, as measured before the election, is assumed to differ from postelection reported vote (besides from measurement error) only to the degree that the debate had any impact on voters' decisions. Unfortunately, there are no other relevant items in the post election survey that could help control for other short-term influences on vote. That makes the results exaggerate about the impact of the debate. Yet, the underlying logic that drives this specification is straightforward: Since vote intention encompasses all pre-debate influences on vote, any substantial difference of recalled vote must have been produced by events that took place after the preelection wave. Unfortunately, here we can only control for the debate. This specification, which is sustained on the same logic with the specification that is proposed in the main part of the text, gives identical results regarding the influence of the debate on both individual vote and aggregate electoral outcome and thus it is not presented here for reasons of brevity. The results can be made available by the author upon request.

Debate: -1 Papandreou did better in the debate; 0 neither did better; +1 Karamanlis did better

The argumentation for the proposition of that model is again based on the logic of ‘the improved prediction’ strategy which implies that in order to estimate the net impact of the debate on voters’ perceptions, we need to control for all other prior influences that might shape reactions to the leaders’ performance on the debate. Thus, to see whether voters’ judgements about the debate had any net substantial impact on vote choice, there is need to account for their, causally prior, assessments of the leaders. People do not watch the debate free from partisan and other political biases. Besides, it is likely that they are predisposed to overestimate the performance of the leader that they already prefer. Thus, the estimation of its net impact has to take all these prior influences into consideration. Under that perspective, I let the influence of the debate appear as adding some more information about voters’ electoral choice once having accounted for pre-debate political predispositions and evaluations of leaders’ qualities.

The results shown in Table 8 indicate that, even when voters’ partisan and leadership biases are taken into account, the debate still exerts a very significant impact on vote choice. Even more interestingly, column 3 of the table implies that with the exception of party identification, the effect of the debate is the strongest in the model, implying that a unit increase in voters’ evaluations about the performance of Karamanlis is capable of enhancing the probability of voting ND by almost forty per cent. Yet, this result has to be viewed with caution because of the fact that the debate is the only variable that enters the model at time t and that is highly likely to overestimate its impact. It is logical, for instance, to expect the effect of leadership evaluations to appear seriously deflated since they are now added in the model with a lag, something which diminishes their impact on the response variable. That said, the picture in Table 8 makes it impossible to resist the interpretation that this decline of the variable’s magnitude once the term of voters’ perceptions about the debate has been added is a good indication that the effect of leadership evaluations on vote choice is strongly mediated by their assessments of leaders’ performance in the debate and, thus, their exaggerated direct impact in vote intention was, in part, the outcome of the omission of this variable.

Up to now, leaders’ debate satisfies both conditions in order to affect the overall electoral outcome. Not only does it exert a strong influence on electoral choice, but it also produces highly skewed reactions by the public. But did it really exert a substantial impact on the election? The answer to that question is based again on a counterfactual. The hypothesis which will serve as a baseline for the comparison regards the extent to which the aggregate outcome

Table 7: Distribution of voters' perceptions about leaders' performance on the debate.

| <i>Voters perceptions about who did better on the debate</i> | % |
|--|------------|
| Karamanlis did better | 47.1 (460) |
| Neither Karamanlis nor Papandreou did better | 31.9 (311) |
| Papandreou did better | 21 (205) |

Table 8: Probit estimates of recalled vote against evaluations of leaders' performance on the debate, leadership evaluations, party identification, ideological proximity and church attendance.

| | B (Std.E) | dFx/dx, marginal effects (Std.E) |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Debate | .880* (.115) | .339* (.045) |
| Leadership evaluations | .674* (.254) | .259* (.097) |
| Party Identification | 1.05* (.203) | .406* (.077) |
| Ideological proximity | .591 (.340) | .227 (.130) |
| Church attendance | .292* (.144) | .113* (.055) |
| Intercept | .036 (.092) | — |
| N (MacFadden pseudo-R ²) | | 735 (.69) |
| LR (Likelihood Ratio) | | 696.55* |

Note: All variables range from pro-PASOK to pro-ND values. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05

Table 9: Impact of leaders' performance on the debate on the overall outcome of the 2004 Greek election

| Estimated share of ND vote* with real leaders' debate performance ratings | Estimated share of ND vote* if leaders' performed equally on the debate | Estimated ND gain | Decisive Impact |
|---|---|-------------------|-----------------|
| 53.69 | 48.08 | 5.61 | Yes |

*This is an estimation of ND's vote share if the election were held only between the two major parties.

would be significantly different, had leaders' performances in the debate been evaluated equally by the electorate. The difference in the mean probabilities for voting ND is presented in Table 9. Indeed, the finding is quite impressive. According to the proposed model, ND's share of the vote increased by more than five percentage points because of the difference in people's views about the Karamanlis' and Papandreou's performance on the debate. That estimate is large enough to have determined the overall outcome. However, before reaching to

inferences about the importance of the debate on the 2004 election, several points need to be made.

First, the inability of the model to control for other factors which could potentially affect vote at the same time-period, boosts the effect of the debate on individual voting behaviour and, effectively, measures what could be called as the ‘upper limits’ of this term’s impact on vote.³³ Furthermore, the problems of rationalization and intuitive inflation of the characteristics of the winner that are evident in every postelection survey are partly responsible for the great difference in the public’s views about the appearance of the leaders in the debate. This overestimation of Karamanlis’ performance is bound to have attributed considerably greater aggregate effect to the debate than it would have been the case if voters’ reactions were measured before the election. All these problems in the measurement of the parameters and the specification of the model might be responsible for the exaggeration of the debate’s aggregate impact.

However, even accounting for these caveats, the estimate is surprisingly large to ignore it. If leaders had any considerable impact on the March election, this was mediated through voters’ assessments about the debate. It seems that for some voters the debate served as a device to establish a clear comparative view about the two competing leaders. And that had two consequences. First, it must have changed sufficiently people’s view about the two leaders’ relative personal qualities. Second, it seems to have helped some undecided voters form an opinion about the relative competencies of the two leaders and base upon this judgement their personal vote. The fact that Karamanlis appeared to be more confident and with better knowledge of the problems than the, essentially not very well prepared in this new role, socialist leader, was most probably important enough to facilitate voters already inclined to switch to ND to do so.

³³ In effect, the impact of the debate would have been very unlikely to remain so large, once control for contemporary leadership evaluations could have been made. This is because perceptions about the debate are bound to affect the vote by influencing voters’ leadership perceptions. So, in the absence of a postelectoral question about the leaders, what is observed here is probably the upper limit of leadership effects at time t , as measured by voters’ assessments of leaders’ performance on the debate. That said, the debate is very important on its own right since it seems to be the most important reason for differences in leadership evaluations during the campaign. In other words, given this pattern with regard to the debate, it is highly unlikely to expect from a postelectoral question about leaders’ qualities to bear much resemblance to the preelection pattern. Without being able to make use of such a question, we can certainly assume that since public distribution about the two leaders’ appearance on the debate was so different from the preelection distribution of voters’ leadership assessments, leadership evaluations have changed during the campaign period in favour of Karamanlis. The debate seems to have mattered a lot in that change.

V. Conclusion

The idea that leaders determine elections is embedded in Greek party competition. In both serious commentary and saloon bar conversation, electoral contests between the two major political parties are transmogrified into contests between the two parties' leaders (King et al., 2001:3). Nevertheless, arguing that leaders matter is totally different from demonstrating that they, indeed, matter. And political scientists are obliged to do the second. However, any effort to gauge the net impact of evaluations towards party leaders on elections is bound to sustain its findings on certain assumptions, many of which might be of questionable validity. In this analysis, the effects of leaders may have been treated as endogenous to partisan and ideological biases but were regarded as exogenous to vote. Consequently the results presented here can be considered reliable only if we previously accept the hypothesis that voters' perceptions of leaders only influence – and are not, simultaneously, influenced by – party support. Furthermore, the lack of various theoretically important variables makes leadership effects seem somewhat overrated. Finally, the adoption of the counterfactual strategy for the estimation of leaders' aggregate impact is not without flaws since it implicitly assumes that all other factors remain constant. As Fiorina (1975:155) nicely puts it, in social life, 'other things are rarely equal.' A change in voters' evaluations of leaders can never be attributed only to leaders themselves. Causally prior variables, such as the balance of identifiers or voters' judgements of the incumbent record are likely to have been altered as well. All these changes cannot be captured by simply concentrating on voters' rating of leaders. In other words, if Simitis had fought the election instead of Papandreou then many other factors in voters' perspectives would have changed (or would have not changed as they did after the succession). All these caveats indicate that, as is often the case in electoral modelling, the findings of this analysis can only serve as (either good or not) approximations of real political life.

That said, some interesting conclusions can be drawn about the role of the two leaders in the last general election. First of all, the direct personal appeal of either of them did not prove to have determined either the victory or the defeat of his party. New Democracy would have won the election even if it was led by a relatively less charismatic leader. Maybe that would have cost to the party some seats, but no more than that. Other more politically substantial reasons would have secured the party's return to office anyway. On the other hand, the preelectoral succession in PASOK may well have served as a way to set the agenda and deviate public concern from other campaign issues, but was by no means sufficient to alter the electoral stream simply because Papandreou was more likeable than Simitis. The electoral

benefit for the party on these grounds seems to be rather trivial. So, a general pattern emerges. Despite the fact that leadership evaluations appear to be strong predictors of individual voting behaviour, they cannot determine electoral outcomes. The reason for that, I suspect, lies on the fact that parties are rational enough to promote to their presidency persons who, if not anything else, acquire a minimum of communication skills. Consequently, public opinion can never be seriously skewed towards either one of the two leaders.

That said, the great impact of the debate in the electoral outcome, even though exaggerated, is a good indication that Greek voters pay attention and may be potentially influenced by leaders' campaign activities. It is probable that this effect of 5.5 percentage points captures more general reactions of voters towards the appearance of the leaders during the whole campaign period. Even so, personal qualities of the leaders attain a great potential to affect swing voters. Thus, to the extent that one of them seriously outstrips the other, a charismatic president can provide its party with a substantial electoral advantage. And that seems to have been the case in the 2004 election. Karamanlis' imposing appearance in the debate seems to have convinced even the most suspicious voters about his competencies, whereas the picture of Papandreou answering by reading from his notes was a rather strong disappointment for a great portion of undecided voters. If Karamanlis won it and if Papandreou lost it, then they both did it by their performance in the debate.

Unfortunately this analysis is very limited in order to facilitate conclusions about the role of leadership evaluations in Greek politics. It is impossible to assess the relative magnitude of the impact of leaders on the 2004 election unless we can compare it with previous findings of the same context or with other findings in different settings. That is a good sign that further research is needed. Only when a series of elections are studied, will we be able to ascertain whether Greek elections become more presidentialised or not. Apart from that, the extent of leadership effects in the Greek case cannot be compared with existing findings in other parliamentary systems unless a good deal of relevant cases are analysed. It is only in this way that the comparative method will reach to safe inferences, without being conditioned on outliers, as could be, for example, the weight of the debate in this case. To know if what has been found here is a constant characteristic of Greek politics or the outcome of a series of idiosyncratic reasons, there is great need for systematic future research. That research could also give answers to questions about which particular aspects of personality seem to be weighted most by voters. Do integrity and competence constitute, as they do in other countries, the two principal dimensions according to which Greek leaders are evaluated? Is one of these dimensions more powerful than the other in the Greek case? Are voters' evaluations comparative in na-

ture, as previous research implies for other parliamentary countries or do Greek voters form their evaluations under a certain schema of what would make an ideal leader? Only further research can give robust answers to these admittedly interesting theoretical questions.

A final point needs to be made. The aim of this paper was to examine leaders' immediate effects, those that stem from their personalities and images. Leaders, though, do not only affect voting behaviour by virtue of who they are and how they comport themselves publicly (Crewe and King, 1994b:127a, fig.8.1) but, most importantly, of what they do (King, 2002a:5). So, a leader can determine the electoral outcome by changing the image and the policies of the party s/he leads. Under that perspective, the case of Kostas Karamanlis acquires a special interest in the analysis of the 2004 election. Arguing that his personal appeal did not affect the victory of his party leaves unanswered the question about his indirect effect, that is, his contribution to the improvement of the party image. Indeed, if someone looks for a Karamanlis-effect on the ND's landslide that would be principally found on his great contribution to the moderation of the party's discourse and its allocation towards the centre of the political spectrum, the success in setting the agenda and introducing and making salient a new dimension of moral values in Greek politics. All these initiatives might have convinced unsatisfied PA.SO.K. voters that now, in contrast with the election of 2000, there is a credible political alternative which can be trusted to run office. Under that perspective, Papakonstantinou might be correct. The father of the victory is probably Karamanlis but not by virtue of his image rather than of his record in the opposition.

Appendix: Exogeneity test between assessments of leaders' qualities and political predispositions

It is notoriously difficult to examine causal order by use of cross-sectional data, since causal priority is only tested properly when a time-dimension is taken into account. However, since the postelection wave of the panel survey does not include measures of predispositions, I try to disentangle the causal arrow between leadership evaluations and political predispositions by conducting a Hausman test of weak exogeneity between these variables. This test, which can be employed with cross-sectional data, is widely used in economics but is still of controversial value in political science.³⁴ It is, in principle, capable of determining the causal structure of two (or more) variables which from a purely theoretical point of view are likely to influence each other (Sanders, 2004:3).

In a quite intuitive sense, a variable X is said to be weakly exogenous to a variable Y if when regressing Y on X , Y also does not, at the same time, explain X . In this case, estimation and testing of the regression model can be done, conditionally on the values of X (Gujarati, 2003:701).³⁵ If the conventional view that enduring electoral influences, such as party identification and ideological beliefs, are causally prior to more volatile electoral forces, such as voters' assessments of the leaders, is true, then the latter will have to appear weakly exogenous to the latter.

Hausman test of weak exogeneity is based on the idea of avoiding simultaneity bias. The procedure is the following (Wooldridge, 2003:483): after regressing X on the reduced form equation of the system (which includes all predetermined variables of both structural equations) and saving the residuals of X , one adds the residual from the equation of X in the structural equation of Y . Then, the focus is concentrated on the residuals. If the coefficient of V attains statistical significance, the unmeasured influences of X (which are encompassed in the error term) are correlated with the error term of Y , that is, with the unmeasured influences on Y . So, Y and X are affected by the same omitted variables. Consequently, X cannot be weakly

³⁴ For a demonstration of the inherent weaknesses of exogeneity tests with political data see Sanders (2004).

³⁵ More formally, a variable x is said to be weakly exogenous for a set of parameters of interest, say ψ , if the marginal process for x contains no useful information for the estimation of ψ , that is, if an inference for ψ can be efficiently made conditionally on x alone and its marginal process contains no relevant information (Charemza and Deadman, 1997:225). Weak exogeneity is all that is needed for unbiased estimation and thus it constitutes the focus of this study. Other kinds of exogeneity are strong- and super-exogeneity (for a distinction between the three types of exogeneity see Engel et al. 1983). However since the strong exogeneity is only required for forecasting purposes and super-exogeneity is primarily needed for policy analysis, neither of them will be further examined in this analysis.

exogenous to Y. The opposite is of course true if the residual of the X equation is non-significant in the equation for Y (Sanders, 2004:6; Wooldridge, 2003:483).³⁶

The test involves the term of relative leaders' rating and ideological predispositions (as a proxy of enduring political attitudes). Given the serious data limitations, the proposed specifications are entirely based on methodological concerns. In particular, in simultaneous equations systems like the ones employed here, the equation of each endogenous variable has to include at least one instrumental variable in order the system to be identified. Those instrumental variables (IVs) have to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be significantly associated with the endogenous variable in whose equation they are included. When poor instruments are used, the estimation of the parameters is likely to suffer from inconsistency (Wooldridge, 2003:470). Second, IVs must not be correlated with the endogenous variable in whose equation they are not included. Again, failure to meet this condition produces inefficient estimates and invalidates any inference.³⁷

Under that perspective, the proposed specifications are presented in equation form below:

Leaders = f(Ideology; Pid; Church; Europe; Bakoyanni)

where

Europe: Feelings toward Europe

Bakoyanni: Feelings toward Dora Bakoyanni³⁸

and

Ideology = f(leaders; Pid; church; police; Synaspismos)

where

Police: Feelings toward police

Synaspismos: Feelings toward Synaspismos³⁹

³⁶ A slightly different version of the test can be found in Gujarati (2003:701) and Brooks (2002:312). The difference in that approach is that in the reduced form equation of X one saves both the residual and the fitted values of X. Then these two terms (Xhat and Vhat) replace the actual term of X. Again, inference about exogeneity depends on the t-test of Vhat. The virtue of this version is that it overcomes the problem of collinearity between X and its residual (Xhat is much less correlated with Vhat than X is). However, as Pindyck and Rubinfeld (Gujarati, 2003: 754) show, regressing Y on X and not on Xhat produces more efficient estimation of the parameters. In this analysis, Hausman test for weak exogeneity is implemented as it is described in the main part of the text and follows precisely the method presented in Wooldridge.

³⁷ Bartels (1991) refers to these two conditions as the efficiency and exogeneity criteria respectively. As he demonstrates, failure to satisfy the second provides greater bias to the estimates than failure to satisfy the second (783-84).

³⁸ Evaluations (-1 to +1 in a ten-point scale) of the ND politician Dora Bakoyanni.

³⁹ Evaluations (-1 to +1 in a ten-point scale) of the left party Synaspismos.

The selection of the instrumental variables is primarily based on the methodological criteria described above. Given data limitations, the selection of variables which could both satisfy, at least partially, these criteria and, at the same time, have a substantial explanatory power in each model was not possible. So, since the aim of this analysis is not the proposition of meaningful models of ideological proximity and leadership evaluations, but the efficient implementation of the test, my priority was to adhere to these methodological rules at the cost of adding analytically uninteresting parameters.

Each model contains two instruments (one would be sufficient for the test) because this is the minimum number of IVs that can be used in each equation so as to be able and test empirically the adequacy of the instruments, with respect to the criterion of exogeneity.⁴⁰ That is done with the following procedure: Let X,Y be two endogenous variables. After regressing, with 2SLS procedure, Y on its structural equation (in which X as the independent endogenous variable is “constructed” by its instruments), one saves the residual of that regression and regresses it against all exogenous variables of the system. Then, by multiplying the resulting R^2 with the total number of cases, under the null hypothesis that all IVs are uncorrelated with the error term, one compares the final number with the critical value of an X^2 distribution with the number of degrees of freedom being the number of overidentifying restrictions, that is, the number of IVs minus the number of the endogenous independent variables (see Wooldridge, 2003:484-86).⁴¹

Table I presents the results of Hausman test. As it is seen in column 3 of the table, the residual of the regression of Leaders against all the predetermined variables of the system is significant when it enters in the core equation of Ideology. Thus, the two terms are affected by the same omitted variables. On the other hand, the disturbance of the reduced form equation of Ideology is non-significant when it is added in the core equation of Leaders. That yields Ideology weakly exogenous to Leaders. So simultaneity bias in the estimation of the parameters should be taken into account only in the case of Leaders. Furthermore, the tests of overidentifying restrictions show that in both cases the instruments were valid since, in each

⁴⁰ The criterion of efficiency can be easily tested by correlating the potential instruments with the endogenous variable. Here, all IVs are significantly correlated with the dependent variable in whose equation they are added.

⁴¹ The intuition of this procedure is straightforward. The assumption of no correlation between the instruments of X and Y means, practically, no correlation between these instruments and the error of the equation of Y (since, by definition, the error term represents all non-measured influences on Y). So, by running a 2SLS regression of Y, in which X is constructed by its instruments, the residual represents all the other influences (apart from those which have been controlled for) which affect Y. If this residual is even slightly explained by the exogenous variables of the system (and basically the IVs which are the only exogenous variables which were not included as independent variables in the 2SLS regression) the IVs are taken to be correlated with the error of Y and thus can be regarded as inadequate instruments.

Table I: Hausman tests of models of leadership evaluations and ideological proximity

| | Core Leadership Model | Hausman-test for leaders→ideology hypothesis | Core Ideological proximity model | Hausman test for leaders→ideology hypothesis |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| Leadership evaluations | | .312* (.087) | .149* (.024) | |
| Ideological proximity | .200* (.035) | | | .634* (.239) |
| Party Identification | .539* (.018) | .092* (.039) | .203* (.019) | .414* (.070) |
| Church attendance | .016 (.015) | .013 (.013) | .018 (.013) | .006 (.016) |
| Attitudes toward Europe | .200* (.035) | | | -.001 (.001) |
| Attitudes toward Bakoyanni | .035* (.004) | | | .031* (.004) |
| Attitudes toward Police | | -.003 (.003) | -.003 (.003) | |
| Attitudes toward Police | | -.012* (.003) | -.012* (.003) | |
| Intercept | -.219* (.028) | -.010 (.024) | -.009 (.024) | -.153* (.044) |
| What Leadership evaluations | | -.178* (.081) | | |
| What of Ideological proximity | | | | -.438 (.242) |
| N (Adjusted R ²) | 1127 (.756) | 1092 (.489) | 1093 (.488) | 1092 (.757) |
| N*R ² ~X _q ² † | 1092*.001=1.09<X ² (3.84 for 1 df) Null not rejected. IVs valid | | R ² from the OLS regression of the residual infinitesimal (8,34e-005). So, N*R ² <X ² . IVs valid | |
| Result | Leaders endogenous to Ideology | | Ideology exogenous to Leaders | |

Note: All variables range from pro-PASOK to pro-ND values. Estimates are OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05

† The Null hypothesis is tested at .05 level of significance.

equation, the resulting R² of the OLS regression of the residual (from the 2SLS regression of Ideology/Leaders) against all exogenous variables is small enough so that when multiplied by the number of observations does not exceed the critical value (at .05 level of significance) of a X² distribution with one degree of freedom (two instruments minus one endogenous explanatory variable). The findings of Hausman test, thus, are in accordance to widespread belief: evaluations toward leaders are causally affected by political predispositions rather than the other way round.

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Electoral Defeat as stimulus for party change: The consolidation of PASOK's internal change process from the extraordinary to the 7th congress

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Abstract

The end of the 2000-2004 Greek socialist government and the party's electoral defeat in March 2004 elections introduces a new long lasting period of change in PASOK's life. The February 2004 extraordinary congress symbolizes the beginning of a new political culture, marked by the principle of associative democracy that will only be consolidated formally one year later by the party's 7th congress. The aim of this paper is to examine the degree of the party change process, beginning in the electoral campaign period, the impact of the campaign and of the electoral defeat, the role of the new leader in the operation and the dynamics produced by the public opinion.

Based on party change theoretical frames provided by Panebianco, Wilson, Harmel and Janda, we proceed in this presentation with the hypothesis that the electoral campaign being used as a stimulus for party change, it has provoked serious engagements to the new leadership, accentuated by the electoral defeat. The performance of the new leader is highly related with the persistence to the process of change.

We will examine the party's change during the campaign, against a backdrop of the following issues: the party's new vocabulary, the political alliances, the internal organization, the policy making, the means of communication, the role of other parties' strategies. As for the evolution of the process of change we will combine the leader's propositions by his arrival with the changes voted during the 7th congress. As the party during this period is in opposition we will mainly examine changes in the internal organization field, opting to configure the degree and the nature of the party's evolution.

The research object

The subject proposed seeks to explore the procedure of internal change of a political party based on the means and the techniques that can offer an electoral campaign, as well as the dynamics of change provided by an electoral defeat. Research of political science on party change object figures quite recently, the first bibliography appearing in the late 1980's. It examines a series of factors and independent variables the one to the other in order to show how changes take place inside a political party. According to Harmel and Janda(1994)., "party change is any variation, alteration or modification in how parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do".

The theoretical field

Research on the object of party change is converging on the fact that there can be no single reason explaining a party's transformation; however, no unanimity is observed concerning the specific impact of each factor inducing the process of party change. Among scientists exploring party change trends, we can distinguish two different theoretical groups.

The first tendency perceives mutation in a party's organization as the result of external factors. Such causes can have socioeconomic origins, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) outline or derive from across-party competition. This point of view implies that a party watching its force diminishing would proceed to all necessary changes that could modify its image and improve its position. This hypothesis finds its origins in Down's (1957) model, who considers parties to act as vote maximizers. Change can also result from mutations in the political culture, in constitutional and institutional factors (Wilson 1994). Finally, party change could turn out after transformations in the party system (Sartori 1976).

The second approach in party change research explores the impact of internal factors in the function of political parties. It observes how parameters such as party's organization, physiognomy, leadership's role, relationship between leaders and members of the party, as well as its general style function in the procedure under question. One of the basic hypotheses forwarded is that leaders make a continuous effort in relating their performance with the party's electoral success, taking into consideration the internal coherence, according to the willing of cadres, militants and members (Rose and Mackie 1988). Actually leaders face on permanent basis obstacles

inside the party, which they have to get beyond in order to realize the changes they support (Harmel and Janda 1994). Changes in the leadership or changes in the dominant coalition are likely to produce party change (Harmel and Janda 1994). Hirschman (1970) presents another hypothesis concerning internal changes. According to his model, users generally seem to choose the less costly solution between exit, voice or loyalty, if their attachment to the organization providing the service is not quite strong. “In communist parties, for instance, the exit solution presents advantages for the party’s direction, supposing that those who stay express satisfaction or loyalty...Communist parties that have experienced most of the loss in terms of membership are those who have proceeded to the minimum changes” (Marantzidis 2003).

However, a third approach analyzing simultaneously internal and external factors in the study of party change process is offered by Harmel & Janda’s (1994) research, considering the parties’ objectives as the decisive parameter to explain their mutations. In agreement with Panebianco (1988), they accept the premise that parties are basically conservative organizations, which will not change simply for the sake of change. Following Panebianco’s (1988) work, three main questions are shaping the basic theoretical issues on the research field of party change theory. On the first place, whether the procedure of party change is ‘evolutionary’ or ‘developmental’; on the second one, whether it is intentional or non intentional; and thirdly, if the origins of the transformation are exogenous or endogenous. As far as the two first issues are concerned, the thesis of Panebianco (1988) seems to converge with Harmel & Janda’s (1994) approach: they both defend the ‘developmental view’, claiming that there is no obligatory path to organizational change, but itself is reflecting “the effect of changes in alliances among organizational actors, not as stemming from an organization’s necessary development” (Panebianco 1988). As for the second issue, they agree that there is no single reason- intentional or non-intentional- explaining the organizational change, itself being “the fruit of both choices and, because of the actor’s bounded rationality and the multiplicity of organizational pressures, unforeseeable effects” (Panebianco 1988). Little agreement however seems to exist on whether organizational change is primarily the result of environmental change, internal change or a combination of both forces. While Panebianco (1988) asserts that “in most cases, it results from the effect of an external stimulus (environmental and/or technological) which joins forces with internal factors which were themselves undermining the

power structure”, his two fellows argue that some party change can be explained only by internal factors (Harmel and Janda 1994). Their model develops explicitly and fully the concept and the role of the ‘external stimulus’, founded in three preliminary suppositions:

1. Each party has a primary goal, and the primary goal varies among parties- and perhaps within parties among time. Such goals can be vote maximizing, office maximizing, representation/participation of members and policy/ideology advocacy.
2. The most dramatic and broadest changes will occur only when the party has experienced an external ‘shock’.
3. External shocks are external stimuli that impact on the party’s primary goal. Such a shock could be the electoral defeat of a party that is a vote maximizing organization.

Finally, in order to understand when, why and how changes in the party are produced, we will follow Wilson’s (1980) model. The model shows clearly that there is no single reason bringing the party’s transformation; on the contrary, change is on the grounds of multiple incentives: the socioeconomic environment, the political culture, the political institutions and the competitive situation across parties. The longer the distance each factor has from leaders and reformers the less impact it can have on the party’s transformation. However, all factors could produce indirectly an important effect on party change, through the alterations of the competitive situation between the parties, this last parameter producing the stronger impact on parties, motivating or obliging the transformation, introducing new rivals, disappearing old ones, inventing new tactics and approaches between parties etc.

The model also indicates that parties are not passive receivers of the impact produced by these factors; on the contrary, what seems to be fundamental in political parties’ transformation is the role of leaders and reformers, from who depends the decision of forwarding a change, as well as the choice of a change in stead of another. According to Wilson (1994), leadership plays the key role of responding to the external changes mentioned previously; they are the ones to decide whether a change is possible or desired. Thus, Wilson perceives change as an internal affair in a party’s life; the initiative, the method, the degree and the orientation of the change depending from the leaders’ skills and behavior.




Fig. 1 *F. Wilson's model on the transformation of a political party*

The hypothesis being that PASOK's new leader has opted for two goals during the campaign, the electoral success and the party transformation, the challenge of the subject is to understand how the party- actually its leader- has used the campaign environment to accomplish the party's transformation and how this engagement further determined the route of the socialist party.

Election campaigns: an instrument of party change?

By definition, election campaigns are "processes of interaction between strategically orientated interpretations of the political situation with a destiny of influence to the collective definition" (Gerstlé 2001). They aim to mobilisation in order to gather votes, to inform, to defend political perceptions, to persuade voters in order to define the holder of an elective function, to decide or consult by referendum (Gerstlé 2001). The act of voting is thus demonstrated as the principal or ultimate objective in the operation of an election campaign.

As far as bibliography on election campaigns is concerned, no other similar case of making a party change by the means provided by a campaign frame were found. Parties usually recognise to campaigns one and only dimension, this one being the electoral goal. Each party focuses on it in order to gain profits related to its primary goal; this one varying from the victory that allows getting a government mandate, to a good performance permitting to participate in government coalitions, or

even to elevating their electoral force in order to be able to make pressure for policy issues through the parliament.

Furthermore, the vast majority of parties enter on campaign periods having accomplished all “changing tasks”. The collective study (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell and Semetko 1999) of the Labours’ 1997 campaign is quite representative regarding this aspect: “...by the time of long and short campaign, much of it involves the repetition of familiar and well-rehearsed party positions, with few genuine surprises, rather than providing genuinely new or unexpected information. In this regard, election campaigns can be seen as largely ritualistic devices, where all the actors go through the familiar steps”.

Moreover, very few parties take the initiative to change their leader while him being the Prime Minister. An exception to the rule may be perceived the leadership change from M.Thatcher to J.Major. But even in this case, the change has taken place in the institutional frame of the Conservatives’ ordinary congress, and in any case not during the pre-elections’ period. In the Greek socialists’ case the Prime Minister’s, K.Simitis, resignation from the party’s presidency marks the beginning of the campaign. And last but not least, the party begins the change process in the beginning of the campaign period, without any knowledge or warning on behalf of its cadres, militants, members or voters, who happen to follow the changes introduced by the new leader.

The changes introduced by the new leader

The exploration of the changes proposed, were structured on six different fields of mutations: the appearance of a new terminology, a new mentality of coalitions, changes on the field of internal organization, in policy making, a new use of communication means and the impact of rival parties’ strategies.

A. Appearance of a new terminology

The arrival of the new leader is directly linked with the appearance of new political terms in the socialist vocabulary. I have structured the political terminology in three essential groups.

The first category, named the “traditional socialist vocabulary” groups all characteristic notions of the greek socialist party during the period from democratic transition and consolidation and the years after 1981. The second group, named the “new terms” consists of the vocabulary introduced by G.Papandreou by his arrival on

the head of the party. It comprises terms that not only appear for the first time in the greek political context and on the moment of an election campaign, but also find their roots outside the political tradition of the socialist left. Thus, the new leader employs ideas and terms proposed by theorists as Paul Hirst, Antony Giddens or by the American Democratic Party and the “new democrats”. The third group covers the vocabulary that however belonging to the old political tradition and, in some cases, pre-existing to the greek socialists, gets during the campaign different connotations. This vocabulary, so on named the “re-dressed terms”.

In order to observe the dynamics created by the leader’s use of the new terms, we have tested the frequency of appearance of certain words in his political speeches. Context analysis was realised on a sample of Papandreou’s 74 speeches during the campaign period taking place from 7th of January to 8th of March 2004. Further word elaboration concluded to the division of 29 terms. In the following table we present the three vocabulary categories on a cumulative way. Each counted term’s frequency contains all derivatives coming from the word’s root.

| Traditional socialist vocabulary | | New terms | | Re-dressed terms | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| State | 332 | New Era | 543 | Movement | 348 |
| People | 427 | Citizen | 882 | Struggle | 417 |
| Socialist/ socialism | 51 | Assent /Cooperation /Collaboration | 409 | Democratic Camp | 272 |
| Democracy | 302 | Participation/ Associative Democracy | 618 | Change | 552 |
| Party | 268 | Multiculturalism | 29 | Progressive/ Progress | 123 |
| Right | 82 | Renovation | 112 | | |
| Conservative/Conservatism/ | 58 | Political Civilisation | 6 | | |
| | | Dialogue | 109 | | |
| | | Youth/New Generation | 764 | | |
| TOTAL | 1520 | | 3472 | | 1712 |

Fig. 2 Table indicating the frequency of political terms in G.Papandreou’s speeches

The table clearly shows the dynamic of the new terms through the leader's speeches, not only being the terms mostly used but also employed two times more than the "re-dressed" terms; the traditional socialist vocabulary is the less brought into play in terms of total frequency.

B. A new mentality of political coalitions

G.Papandreou's arrival on the head of the party is marked by a new spirit in coalition making, opting to change the socialist party to a broader political family and organization, named the democratic group. This new mentality finds its roots in the values of political liberalism and aims to the reverse of the old polarized mentality "against the right" to the politics of assent, collaboration and enlargement of the representative spectrum. The strategic choice of including two ex-ministers of the conservative party and two ex-politicians of the reformatory communist party in the party's voting list seeks to bring gains to both goals determined by the socialist leader. However, it has the opposite results, as nor the party's members, neither the public opinion seem to approve such a movement, essentially for the part of cooperation with the liberal politicians.

C. The new internal organization

The party change process could not leave immutable the internal organization that extended centralized power, factionalism characteristics and bureaucratic structure. All initiatives taken by the new leadership intend to break up with these old-fashioned organizational characteristics and to create a new open party, which would not only facilitate the members' participation, but the citizens' involvement as well.

The first step towards this political formation is taken by the open leadership's election, inciting members and friends of the party to express their validation or disapproval relating the leader proposed. The proposition concerning the role of the leader is inspired by the American democratic party, where the leader is beyond the party, having a direct relationship with citizens. Furthermore, internal changes are constructed according to the philosophy of associative democracy, which implies that a number of decisions should be transferred to the regions and to local organizations, firstly among the party in order to be adopted eventually by the whole of the society. Open assemblies should encourage citizens' participation to decide for policy making matters and for persons by whom they will be governed. Other voting procedures adopted within the party are referendums concerning political decisions, universal

voting for party issues', the promotion of electronic democracy, the institutionalization of different factions with a spirit of reciprocal respect. Youth, women, immigrants, social movements, marginalized social groups: they all become equal and respective interlocutors as well as active reformers of the new open party. Moreover, the party institutionalises the equal participation of men and women to all voting lists. And last but not least, the leader proposes the construction of an enlarged political organisation following the model of the Italian Elia, where people from different political orientations wanting to cooperate with PASOK would participate, PASOK being the main composing part of this political family.

D. New values and ideas in policy making

The new socialist philosophy is constructed on the values of political liberalism, transferring the values' importance a. from the state to the citizen, b. from the collective dimension to the individual, c. from equality to freedom. Following the neoprogressive path, introduced by Antony Giddens, supports the creation of "a strong public sphere, coupled to a thriving market economy; a pluralist, but inclusive society; and a cosmopolitan wider world, founded upon principles of international law" (Giddens 2003).

All changes proposed follow the logic and the mentality of associative democracy, as this one is inspired and presented by Paul Hirst (1994). The most radical propositions are the creation of non-state universities; the reform of the state's administration by reduction of a number of ministries and the reinforcement of the organisation of the periphery, in order to limit bureaucratic effects and power centralisation; the equal employment of male and female sex in the superior administrative posts; the fusion of ministries of employment and education; the adoption of a new form of employment without expenses for social security in the beginning of a person's career, in order to face the problem of youth unemployment.

E. Another use of communication means

The domination of communication means and new technologies in the socialist campaign is dressed with a new philosophy for the socialist camp, no longer considering communication as a mean to bring forth politics or policy issues, but as the essence of political life. Thus, the socialist communication during the campaign seeks to respond to the three dimensions of political communication: the structural, the symbolic and the pragmatic (Gerstlé 1993). The organization of the party's congress and the leader's election by a communication company mark the era of the

dominance of political consultants in the party's life. The overall public image and communication that the leader promotes are representative of the party he wants to create. Party's renovation in communication terms is also observed through slogans, spots, contacts with the public (small group of people in houses, internet cafés etc). The new leadership also proposes the change of the party's logo and name, but this proposition is withdrawn under the pressure of public opinion's critics and member's objections.

F. Party change and rival parties' strategies

The essential part on election campaigns derives from the interaction between competitive operations; the campaigns are, thus, transformed in arena of competition following the principle of tactic interdependence (Gerstlé 2001). The one's resources become the other's duties and the campaigns can be resumed as the "battle of agendas" (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell and Semetko 1999). However, in our study rival parties' strategies are taken into consideration only in the dimension of feed-back that they produce in the party's change process, since our research object concerns the party's transformation using the means and the frame of the campaign.

G.Papandreou's arrival at the head of the party, his domination among the media and the announcement of "radical changes everywhere" automatically transform the agenda context. The dilemma produced for all parties is whether to remain on the communication strategy adopted since that moment or to adapt their campaigns on the issues proposed by the socialist leader. Despite the fact that the second choice could be perceived as an indication of flexibility and acquired political maturity independently of the frame of political juncture, it contains the risk of giving to the socialist leader the predominance of defining the collective situation.

One could affirm that rival party strategies, essentially the one operated by the conservatives since 2000, influenced the socialist party's campaign and accelerated the change project, by promoting the message of the end of socialists' utility and the need of political change. However, the coordination of the two goals at the same time provokes a supplementary interaction between them, coming from external stimuli like the rival political actors, trying to affect through media the public opinion. The following plan describes the complex situation of the socialist change, influenced by the dynamics of actors participating to the campaign.




Fig.3 *The implication of actors participating to the campaign in the party change process*

In following table I regrouped the change project, making discrimination on the basis of changes that were realised, those that were not realised, and changes introduced but not finished during the short-term campaign period.

Organizational changes Changes in policy making Changes on politics

Fig.4 *Synthesizing table of changes and public opinion's disposition*

| | Realized changes | Not realized changes | Changes introduced but not finished | Public opinion's expression for changes through surveys |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------------------|---|--|
| PASOK's change | Open election for the new leader | | | Positive |
| | Special congress for the announce of GP's candidature | | | Positive |
| | | | Change of political personnel | Positive |
| | | | Regional organization of the party's internal mechanism | Positive |
| | | Change of the name | | Negative |
| | | Change of the logo | | Negative |
| | Employment without social security | | | Negative |
| | Regional state organization | | | Positive |
| | Non state universities | | | Positive |
| | | | Associative democracy | Positive |
| | Enlargement | | | Negative |
| | | | Communication: means and mentality | Positive |

The table clearly states the important role played by the public opinion in the party's transformation. In most realised changes we observe its positive disposition, whereas in all changes withdrawn can see the negative expression of the public opinion. As for the two changes introduced that received the public's disapproval – the enlargement and the employment without paying fees of social security – we have to stress that the first one was followed by the leader's solid argumentation reassuring that such an operation doesn't signify identity mutation nor marginalization of old members and the second one was almost abandoned, after receiving strong criticism

from multiple sides. We can thus claim that there is a certain correlation between the public opinion's disposition face to a change and the evolution of this change in the process of transformation. This relation derives from the juncture of the campaign and underlines a dimension of the campaign implication in the party's change procedure.

Furthermore, one could mention that the changes proposed and being immediately realized are those that could have a direct positive impact in the election's result: the special congress announcing the leader, the open election stimulating citizen's representation and the party's enlargement with personalities coming from the left and the right.

In general terms, public opinion plays a permanent role in the leader's initiative, not only because of the elections' period but also because of the special position that it has on the leader's participative values and democratic principles. However, this permanent implication in the party's affaires provokes dynamics and incidents that were not foreseen by the leader. Thus, the change operation and the limits of the socialist leader's movements are determined by public opinion's disposition. Besides, the image of a new leader determining his strategy according to the surveys' results, while at the same time introducing changes that have left origins, others expressing liberal positions, and some deriving from the agenda of the social movements doesn't give the impression of a leader that has a determined project for his party's transform.

In addition, the public opinion's conquest constitutes the concurrence field among political parties; hence, campaigns and strategies of rival parties are implicated in PASOK's transformation. As the parties' messages affect strongly citizens during the campaign, the socialist leader had to face a delicate situation: he had to relate the change process with the strategies of rival parties. Moreover, institutional factors (leaflets distributed by the Greek Orthodox Church) and unpredictable incidents (economic scandals, bad weather, debate negotiations and leader's weak performance) affecting the campaign, the leader had to face them adapting his strategy and style to the newly promoted mentality.

In fact, the external stimuli, being by definition in interaction during the campaign period under the principle of tactic interdependence, contain an additional power regarding their role in the party's change process. Not only they compose the catalyst forces, the stimuli that promote the initialization of transformation, as the theory of Harmel and Janda indicates, but additionally they constitute sources of

influence during all the campaign period; this means during all the party's mutation phase. Therefore, since these external forces are competitive in the frame of electoral antagonism, they seek to hamper rival parties' strategies, especially those of the major parties; and so they impede the socialists' transformation.

Following Wilson's model, we placed on a chart all forces influencing the party's change.




Fig.5 Party change process in the frame of the election campaign: external stimuli and implicated actors

We therefore validate that the two goals opted by the socialist leader, the electoral victory and the party's transformation, provoke reciprocity effects and continuous interaction. This relation is bilateral; but since our concern is focused in the change process by the means of the campaign, we can affirm that apart the acceleration of the process in the cases of the open election and the enlargement, this fact being due to the limited campaign time, for the rest of the effects the campaign has undermined the change's operation. For this conclusion we also have to take into account the fact that the change during the campaign undergoes effects of distortion

because of the accentuated role of media, which function as zoom lens, emphasizing every change during the same period.

Indeed, G.Papandreou’s decision to correlate the party’s change with the electoral goal has created four ideal types of voters:




Fig.6 4 ideal-types of voters and their relation with the socialist change

Relating the change with the campaign, the leader fixed two goals at the same time: as far as the electoral dimension is concerned, the movement of voters from the area D to the area A, and acting among members or voters of the party, the production of a flow of citizens from B to A. In reality and according to opinion polls and election results, opposite results were formed, voters moving from A to D and from B to C.

We can so assert that combining these two goals of major importance to a party’s life was a risky decision. All hopes, for victory or for change, derived and were founded on the dynamics of the leader’s personality, being very popular and having a natural contact with the public. This kind of risk couldn’t however take into account the leader’s decay or mistakes during the campaign, such as the debate, that would automatically cancel all the “consolidated convictions” regarding his capacity of governing or leading. Thus, the dynamics of each objective have fatally undermined the evolution of the other’s, whereas the one’s reinforcement by the other’s means has scarcely occurred.

The road to the 7th Congress

The electoral defeat of the socialist party on the 7th march 2004 was interpreted as a strong message concerning the need of deep change in the socialist camp. The reasons explaining the defeat were mainly concentrated in the long lasting stay of PASOK in power, the tiredness of the electorate face to the persons of the executive, as well as a consolidated conviction of socialist corruption.

As the theoretical frame provided by Harmel and Janda (1994) indicates, the electoral defeat of a party that is a vote maximizing organization is an external shock that is highly probable to produce change in the party. In addition, the electoral campaign being used as a stimulus for party change, it has provoked serious engagements to the new leadership, accentuated by the electoral defeat. The performance of the new leader is highly related with the persistence to the process of change.

However, one could affirm that however PASOK's change line is ascending since the day of the defeat, George Papandreou is clearly orientated to the internal change; the argument being that a party wishing to change everything has firstly to begin by its own transformation. Thus, one can observe that the leader no longer promotes the idea of change in the policy making, nor emphasizes in the opposition role of the party. Most forces focus to the internal change.

The socialists' voting list for the elections for the European Parliament, held in Greece on 18th June 2005, only three months after the national elections, confirm the persistence in the concept of change. The voting list, presented by the leader, follows the principle of renovation, the European ideal and the equal representation of all the peripheries, social classes and the collective functioning of the team. The renovation percentage reaches 100%, having for the first time as a leading figure a woman, aged 30 years old. Coming from the syndicates, her leading position symbolizes the priority given to the active participation of women and young people. Twelve out of twenty-four candidates are women and five of them are proposed in the first ten positions. The medium of the candidates' age rises to thirty-nine years old and only two out of twenty-four personalities have performed in the party's mechanisms or have mandated in parliamentary representation. One could affirm that the absence of candidates related with the ex-President's milieu constitutes a sign of rupture with all

signs of the past, while at the same time two close colleagues of G. Papandreou are included in the list. According to the new leader, the choice of the list is following the willing of the Greek society, as well as the principle of associative democracy, which became the arsenal of the new philosophy of the party since the electoral period. For this reason, an on-line consultation of members and friends of the party was realized before the European elections, as to express their willing and ideas and to reinforce democracy in the party's affairs.

Yet the leader's choices concerning the persons proposed, failed to convince the electorate, as the party was defeated for a second time in three months period, even if it managed to increase its support compared to the 1999 European elections. Such a result is nevertheless attended or in other terms the most probable: empirical research of Greek elections has shown that when European elections follow or take place very closely to the legislative elections, the electorate has the tendency of reproducing and confirming the choice made in National elections. Despite that fact, the luck of appeal of the innovating voting list expressed by the voters shows two things at the same time: firstly, that it is too early for the socialists to prove that they will change or that they are on the way of changing; secondly, the electorate is not seduced by new persons who are not known for their political propositions, their beliefs, or that are not recognizable in general terms for their political past. Evidence from opinion surveys before the European elections converges in these arguments. In other terms, change for the sake of change, without political frame and general orientation is not what citizens waited from PASOK.

The period beginning after the European elections and finishing by the 7th Congress on March 2005 is a phase of intense work for the socialist camp, as to prepare the new Statute of the party. Dialogue is opened to anyone wishing to participate through the pages of the site constructed especially for the congress preparation. All documents, opinions and ideas are welcomed to be presented. The preparation of the new open party's organization is put forth by the National Council of Reconstruction, which is an open instrument, structured in the Coordination Council, the Secretary of this Council, working groups and sub- working groups.

The importance given by the party to the operation is clear by the campaign organized through media as to motivate people to assist in the election of representatives for the Congress. Three radio spots and a poster were diffused through media as to inform for the dialogue on the way to the congress through the site

“democracy.pasok.gr”. Citizens’ massive participation in the elections validate the interest for the party’s change process, demonstrates their perception about PASOK’s need of political change, as well as the need of people to participate in politics and feel closer to political parties. However, the new members and friends participating did not produce new movements of ideas, but were integrated in the existing correlations. Despite the fact that the conceptualization of the operation was quite radical and ambitious, opting for an open dialogue, with original ideas brought by new powers coming from other progressive political families and the civil society, radical propositions were put aside and the discussion got a formal or academic character. The few new ideas were welcomed, but political debate was limited between the same persons and groups. Nonetheless it was an important step needed after two electoral defeats as to reactivate the party’s forces, to heal the moral of the socialist camp and to release tensions.

Changes voted by the new Statute: the prevalence of organizational change

The changes established by the Statute voted during the 7th Congress mark the willing of creation of an open party to society and of increase of participation and interest for socialist affairs. As the exhaustive enumeration of internal changes cannot be satisfied in the time limits of this presentation, we will keep to mentioning the most radical changes, as well as the evolution of those introduced since the campaign period.

According to the new statute voted during the Congress on the 3rd march 2005:

- The logo and the name of the party remain the same, following the dynamic expressed by the public opinion and by socialist cadres and militants since the electoral campaign.
- The principle of associative democracy is formally adopted in the very beginning of the document. The party states the establishment of an open relationship with the citizens and the society and opts, among other things, for the development of the “participative” democracy. It announces the radical decentralization of the state, as well as the development of the periphery following the frame of progressive and participative governance.
- Furthermore, it affirms being the movement that defends everybody’s equal participation in politics, civilization, communication, in a society of cohesion

and security, in possibilities and chances of development and progress, in employment, in an open economy of fair, qualitative and innovative access, in the education of an open society of knowledge and information that recognizes as the basic source of capital the human being.

- PASOK incites the support and fortification of initiatives undertaken by the civil society, as well as any form of voluntarism in social life. It looks after the cooperation with any movement or organization that shares the same goals and values.
- In the chapter concerning the principles of democratic function it promotes the citizens' substantial participation by the development of direct and indirect democratic institutions.
- Internal democracy is consolidated by the fully development and circulation of opposed opinions, tendencies or movements of ideas, without however their organization being structured, disciplined or represented separately.
- Member's representation in Congresses, Conferences and other collective processes of the party is correlated to the number of each organization's members. Peripheries' representation is fully supported and reassured to the major possible extent.
- The friends and the members of the party are registered in different files, the second ones having a more active participation than the first. They all participate in the Local Organizations, they can organize and vote in the local, territorial and national referendums organized by the party and they can have a role in the PASOK's political, educational, cultural, scientific organizations that function in the level of the prefecture or the periphery, as well as in Initiative Commissions activated for special issues. The Initiative Commissions can be organized by the party in the local level, but the party can as well participate in other autonomous movements and initiatives.
- Networks of citizens' initiatives can be activated for political, social, scientific, educational, professional issues or syndicalism's affairs, as well as for the promotion of solidarity towards sensible categories of citizens.
- The party's organization towards friends and members is outlined by the principle of associative democracy, decentralization and of decision making processes being as closest as possible to them.

- The local organizations deliberate with the local society, institutions and non governmental organizations as to determine and configure politics and initiatives of the party. Local organizations arrange open assemblies at least once a year and can organize as well referendums having a local interest or an internal character.
- An important role is attributed to possibilities provided via internet, as well as to technology means, as to strengthen communication, participation, organization, consultation, decision making and transparency.
- The direct election of the President by friends and members of the party is confirmed by the new Statute.
- What is more interesting though and constitutes an important evolution towards the rise of citizens' participation is the institutionalization of primaries for the indication of deputy candidates, as well as candidates for the local administration. As far as the new deputy candidates are concerned, the election is held among members and friends of the party. As for the indication of Prefects and Mayors, all citizens of the periphery concerned have the right to vote. All the process and the evaluation of the results are guaranteed by a Commission of Voting Processes, which is voted by the National Council.

Though our concern is focused in internal change of the party, one cannot neglect that during the Congress, the participants were divided in two groups, the one working for the Statute and the other for the political Platform and positions. At the same time, a third level of discussions with multiple subjects took place by representatives of non governmental organizations. Three final documents were so voted: the Statute, the Political Declaration and the Political Positions. In the end the Congress voted for the representatives of the National Council.

In general terms the socialist congress succeeded in the field of initialization of organizational change, as well as to the renovation of personalities since 50% of the voted members to the National Council of the party were elected for the first time. Voting lists existed, but the limited percentage of 10% of using a preference cross impeded the severe reproduction of existing correlations. All old groups were represented and all persons related personally to the President were also elected, even though the President did not show any special preference. Women's representation

was pre-determined to 40% and for the first time in PASOK's affairs were elected three immigrants. Personalities that were ex-members of other parties and had integrated PASOK in the past were also elected.

We have to observe that most of concern and attention was given to the organizational change. Political documents and propositions were quite general and did not produce controversies. All documents were voted in unanimity, not expressing a creative compromise, but rather postponing concrete answers to critical dilemmas of the socialist left to the future. For the accomplishment of the organizational transformation to be made there are several steps that have to be taken after the Congress, such as the realization of 850 originator Municipal Assemblies and the election of their representatives. For this reason the party has again operated a media campaign calling for participation via radio, newspapers and internet. Further procedures will follow in the level of Prefectures and Peripheries.

Thus, one can affirm that the Congress did not finally culminate the process of renovation and change, but constituted the necessary step as to begin institutionally what was announced and initiated in symbolic terms since the campaign. In structural and organizational terms, it advanced by the accomplishment of all decisions for the formation of the new party, whereas in all other domains it delegated the leader to realize changes. Consequently, not only the leader is not contested, but his role is empowered by consensual support in order to succeed in the operation of change. Less than a matter of personality cult, the institution of the President during this phase of transition marks the equilibrium between the existing correlations of forces and incarnates the political desire of change and participation.

Concluding remarks: some research hypothesis

As the process of internal change is still evolving, it is early for one to make conclusions about the nature of the new organization model, as well as for the efficiency of such a structure regarding the target of associative democracy and the establishment of an open and direct relation of citizens and the party. It is equally precipitated to configure the new relations produced in the party, or the appeal of this model to its members and friends, since the major changes introduced, such as the primaries or the referendums haven't yet been deployed or tested empirically.

What one can however develop for the study of the party change is a number of hypotheses orientating the research. In the first place, we can assume that the

electoral losses of the Greek socialist party reinforce the leader's strategy concerning the change process, not only because of the commitments created, but as to confute and face eventual contestation to his posture from the inner party milieu. Thus, he uses party change as to consolidate his leadership through internal change. All forces of the party being concentrated to the preparation of the new statute and the physiognomy of the new party, the leader manages to ward off internal opposition and to redistribute power in the party by giving certain roles to everybody in the process of change.

Furthermore, the question created is what kind of relations this organizational model produces between the leader and the traditional elites of the party, in the long run; the old factions existing. G.Papandreou's political profile was gradually built, carrying however the symbolic and historic value of his family name. His successful mandate since he was given the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and especially the progress marked on the field of Greek-Turkish relations were immediately attributed to his personality. And last but not least, one could not ignore the fact that G.Papandreou had a personal political route in the party that was a way ahead of any internal controversy or factionalism. Despite the fact that many voices in the party argued that his choice in the Presidency was a matter of "pay-off" from K.Simitis to G.Papandreou, as the last one supported his candidature on the 1996 party congress, going on the contrary to his father's preferences, one cannot neglect the very high scores of popularity that Papandreou concentrates in all opinion surveys since 2002. He seemed to be the most appreciated deputy of the socialist camp and disposed the highest scores of popularity among Greek politicians at the moment that Simitis inaugurated his plan of resignation and vote for the new President on January 2004. Besides and according to the surveys, he wasn't personally charged of the governmental responsibilities and inadequacies; on the contrary, he even concentrated the highest scores among the most underprivileged socio-professional segments of the population. He never had a group of personal influence and rejected such mechanisms, as he considered that they trap the party in introversion and lack of internal democracy. As a president, he practices a leadership of incarnate synthesis or superior to cleavages. He embodies the spirit of peace making, maintaining equal distances and good relations with all the tendencies in the party. For this reason, he supports pluralism, expression of all propositions, participation, a political game well defined by rules and transparency in internal electoral processes and open relations

between the party and society. This type of leadership drafts its strength from the direct election of the President by the citizens, friends and members of the party. The 1.000.000 of persons that approved the candidature of G.Papandreou provides him with an incontestable power, as to begin the process of party change and to overcome the criticism of electoral loss, counterbalancing the insecurity of not having a group of faithful cadres protecting and assuring a personal mechanism.

However, the pragmatism of a party's leadership requires support, especially in an operation of radical innovations introduced, which need cohesion and loyalty in order to bring successful results. We will forward the hypothesis that the result of this concrete party change in the internal level is that old correlations of internal relations are reformed in a way that gives the advantage to the President to reshuffle the cards, in other words, to redistribute power and roles in the party. Thus, the leader not only increases his power, but also creates gradually a new leading group that in the short term period of reconstruction of the party has a role of management, but in the long run can form a new pole of power in internal affairs. The critical parameter in this hypothesis will be the ideology of the new leading group. Will it respect results of political reconstruction, local referendums and decision making by the new organizations that will be created in all the party's levels or will it try to influence in certain political orientations? It is a question that may configure the identity of the new party.

It is quite clear at the same time that the President expresses a sort of perseverance for the organizational renaissance of the party and leaves aside the opposition role and discussion concerning political issues of everyday juncture. Such a choice is part of the leader's strategy in order to stabilize his leadership, without exposing himself to any political cost or criticism, in spite of the fact that he receives every day pressure by media, public opinion and socialist cadres. The concept being that organizational change is a privileged field for the leader to accomplish the transformation- as adaptation of the Statute's procedure needed is quite a technical issue- he opts to finish this phase of change as to further strengthen and consolidate his power. As soon as this goal is achieved, he can deplore his political argumentation, eliminating thus inner party contestation and opposition to his opinions.

Consequently, the main hypothesis that will orientate our research in the evolution of PASOK's internal change concentrate on the role of the leadership in the

operation. The central idea is that the persistence of G.Papandreou in the organizational transformation derives and results at the same time by the need of consolidating his power in the party, due to the lack of personal influence in the party's affairs, as well as to the cost of counting two electoral defeats during his mandate.

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PASOK'S SOURCES

www.pasok.gr

www.democracy.pasok.gr

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‘The human geography of PASOK: 1974-1981

Abstract (research in progress)

INDRODUCTION

The research project focuses on the democratization period and the creation of PASOK up to party’s victory in 1981 elections. For the period under examination the ‘*PASOK phenomenon*’ had been studied in terms of its populist ideology, organizational particularity, or A. Papandreou’s ‘charisma’¹. In the literature about political parties PASOK is considered an exceptional case as it managed to reach power so fast. The present effort is trying to add to the relevant literature a new perspective focusing on the importance of the party’s organizational base that enabled the rise to power in 1981. It is the first academic research concerning PASOK’s creation and success that is expanding the level of analysis to the party’s supporting base. The leading hypothesis is that PASOK had the opportunity to redefine those social cleavages that divided Greek society. We do not claim that it was a unique factor that changed Greek society. Political parties have a dialectic relationship with society. What is implied is that the redefinition of political cleavages through party discourse and political practices proved effective for the integration of members and voters.

In some cases the redefinition served, through the post-junta period, as unification factor in a country marked by political divisions. As the only new party in the political spectrum people didn’t have a clear idea about its political profile, in contrast with the pre-junta parties with which the electorate was already identified². PASOK didn’t follow the traditional political divisions, as those between liberals and monarchist or left and right, and managed to integrate supporters through its political discourse with even contradictory interests. Through the first post-junta years the

¹ -I. Papadopoulos: “Dynamique du discours politique et conquete du pover: Le cas du PA.SO.K. 1974-81” Editions Peter Lang, Berue 1989.

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² Mavrogordatos, G. (1984), ‘The Greek party system: A case of limited but polarised pluralism?’, *West European Politics*, vol.7 no.4: 156-169.

consolidation of the young democracy was insecure. An incitement of the social cleavages, especially concerning those groups at the periphery of the political system, could prove disastrous for the consolidation process. The unification role was a prerequisite for the creation of a large 'tank' in which PASOK could find its future voters and supporters. The significance of this role becomes more obvious taking under consideration the importance of political parties in Greece as the only institutions that could guarantee democracy, in contrast with other southern democracies where military, church or the bourgeois served the same goal.

A second analytical dimension is to specify the different conceptions of the supporters of the Greek periphery about PASOK's political thesis and programme that brought it to power. For that reason we are trying to investigate the social characteristics of the party's supporters in terms of education, social status, family political background and age. The social characteristics are understood through the different political and historical perspective of each geographical area. This process is necessary in order to follow the evolution of the social cleavages in Greece and their dialectic relationship with the political parties. It is a presupposition for the understanding of the policy issues that have been important and gave the base for support of PASOK in each periphery. The aim of the research contributes to the creation of a map concerning the human geography of the organizational and electoral base of the party in terms of social characteristics and to the provision of the empirical data that were missing for the study of PASOK.

For this reason the project examines three peripheries Florina, Mytilini and Hrakleion, characterized by different historical experiences and the related social cleavages. Florina has been selected as a periphery with a conservative and right wing electoral behaviour, seriously affected by the civil war, experienced violence, suppression of political freedoms and massive immigration. Furthermore, in Florina coexist the local part of the population characterized by the Slavic dialect and a large percentage of refugees from the Asia Minor. The conflict between the two parts offered the opportunity to study PASOK's role in relevance to social cleavages in more dimensions. Mytilini is one of the peripheries characterized by a high percentage of leftist vote that didn't get affected after the civil war, as it is normally the case. For this reason it offers the opportunity to follow the creation of PASOK's character in a place that leftist political tradition has been hegemonic. Heraklion was a typical centrist periphery following the Venizelist tradition. In this periphery the question under examination is the way by which PASOK managed to distinguish itself from the centrist political family and to win its supporters.

The party's organizational character, in each periphery, was different adjusted to local history and social composition. Pre-junta parties had a shaped image through the country, more or less unified and identified by historical political choices. They had a political record from which they couldn't escape. PASOK's party functionaries had the flexibility to adjust party's image to the local political culture much more easily. The working process for the creation of the party branches, the local political campaigns, the political discourse, the way that party functionaries interacted with each other, the process for the integration of new members, were seriously affected by the 'microclimate' of each geographical area. As a result several different types of party branches co-existed into PASOK's organization. We propose that this aspect had served as a unification factor for the country and for the integration of different social categories, even those existing at the periphery of the post-junta political system.

The methodology in use is interdisciplinary combining research tools from social anthropology and political science. Local history and culture, local political identities, study visits and extended interviews from key persons and party functionaries of the period but also from party supporters from remote villages, are in use. The systematic analysis of the archives of PASOK's Organization Sector, that have never been conducted before by any academic researcher, electoral results and relevant statistical data, in combination with the local press, are providing the main sources in order to investigate the leading question. We propose this approach as a methodological contribution that is trying to follow a path of research characterized by a 'bottom-up approach'. Besides the management of the party's image at the national level and the efficiency that it had in electoral gains, it was the political activity of the party functionaries in each periphery that created the party image at the local level through a network of interpersonal relations. Since the direction followed by the academic researchers has followed the 'up-bottom approach' there were several questions about the party character that were solved by employing 'common sense' or intuition because of lack of evidence. It is on this point that the present project contributes, in methodological terms.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis is based on the sociological model of explanation, which focuses on the relationship between social groups and political parties. Different parties represent different groups with different interests. Interacting with citizens and interest organisations, parties organise political demand and support in relation to social cleavages³. The social nature of political parties is interpreted through two variables: underlying cleavages and political discourse; that is the extent to which the political issues raised by the party corresponded to distinct social interests⁴. A cleavage is a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organisations among whom conflict may arise. The concept of cleavage is not identical with the concept of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but they do not need always be attended by conflict⁵. In the case of national politics, however, we take the view- following Lipset's and Rokkan's lead- that political parties construct their ideology and organise themselves by emphasising certain cleavages, through which the alignment of the electorate takes place. However, explaining parties by cleavages is in danger of becoming circular: we explain parties by cleavages, but we assess the political relevance of cleavages by the existence of corresponding parties. Parties are not just passive repositories of social cleavages but autonomous actors that also play a large part in defining them.

In the present research focus is mainly on historic and economic cleavages. One can identify the existence of main cleavages in Greece such as: i) refugees versus natives (ethnicity and class); ii) old Greece versus new lands; iii) Orthodox Greeks versus

³ Lipset S. M. and S. Rokkan (eds.), (1990), *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross national perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

⁴ Spourdalakis, M., (1992), 'A petty bourgeois party with a populist ideology and catch- all party structure: PASOK', in N. Merkel et al., *Socialist Parties in Europe II*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques I Socials.

⁵ Lane, J. E. and S. O. Ersson (1987), *Politics and society in Western Europe*. London: SAGE, p.39.

minorities (nationality, ethnicity, and religion)⁶. The strongest political divisions that the entire country experienced were those between liberals and monarchists through the mid-war period and between left and right during and after the civil war. In the same time there were secondary cleavages that were particularly important in certain peripheries on the base of characteristics such as ethnicity, community or religion.

Particularly in the Greek case the political influence of patron-client ties should be noted. Patron-client ties typically mask, modify, or even neutralise class cleavages and establish vertical and interclass links. Clientelism may also develop and function within the limits or constraints set by the major cleavages. This is so because patrons and clients may well share certain social identities -such as kinship, ethnicity, religion, community, region, rural residence- which place them in the same camp as others identified, along some dimensions of potential social conflict⁷.

2. SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The roots of the most important cleavages in Greece are to be found in two successive historical conflicts of the previous century. The first was the 'national schism' between Venizelists and Antivenizelists over Greek participation in the First World War, which was transformed and perpetuated in the inter-war period as an irreconcilable conflict between republicans and royalists. The second was the schism between the bourgeois parties and a Communist-dominated left, which erupted during the Second World War and culminated in the Civil War of 1946-49. The succession and super-imposition of these two historical cleavages has produced a deeply rooted and lasting division into three political camps or 'families', the centre, the right and the left, as they have been called since the post-war period⁸.

On the eve of the dictatorship, in 1967, each of these three historical political families had been assembled under the roof of a single party: the Centre Union (EK), the National Radical Union (ERE), and the United Democratic Left (EDA) respectively (the latter effectively controlled by the Communist Party). A short time before the 1967 coup, the Centre Union's centre-left faction led by Andreas Papandreou emerged as a radical force representing newly mobilised groups. The so-called '*apostates*' government marked the beginning of a period of governmental instability, and at the same time sparked off a process of political radicalisation which found a symbol and a leader in Andreas Papandreou, son of George Papandreou, who had entered Greek politics in 1964. The elections scheduled for May 1967 were expected to result in a comfortable majority for the Centre Union dominated by its centre-Left faction led by Andreas Papandreou.⁹ This faction became in the middle

⁶ Mavrogordatos (1984), op.cit.

⁷ Scott, J. (1972), Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, p. 10.

⁸ Mavrogordatos, op.cit.

⁹ The appeal that Andreas Papandreou had even from the 60's is evident in an opinion poll for March of 1967 in Athens (*Anti*, 3 December 1977, vol.87:6), about the electoral behaviour of the Greek voters before the arranged elections. The central question designed to measure the appeal of the politicians was: "Lets suppose that it was up to you to choose the next Prime Minister. Despite the party that is going to win the elections, who is the one that you would like to see as Prime Minister after the elections?" The outcome was 21% for K. Karamanlis, 16% for Andrea Papandreou, and 13% for George Papandreou. It is obvious that the appeal of A. Papandreou was higher than for his father and that already most of the supporters of the Centre Union wanted to see him and his centre-left faction dominant. In the question "Who of the present politicians do you believe is going to rule the country

60's the representative of the newly mobilised radical forces - the middle and lower classes that became ready to shift their allegiance towards parties that advocated policies, which seemed beneficial to their interests. Since the communist left had no real chance of gaining power, the centre-left emerged as the only force whose message - consistent and quite radical for the standards of that period - rallied support for 'democracy' and social and political reforms. The military coup of April 1967 pre-empted such an outcome and temporarily destroyed any hope of political change¹⁰.

What dictatorship did not destroy was the centre-left as a political force. Most of its leading members, together with new political activists, joined the 'Panhellenic Liberation Movement' (P.A.K.), one of the major resistance organisations, founded by Andreas Papandreou in May 1967. During his absence abroad through the dictatorship, Andreas Papandreou dissociated himself and PAK from the Centre Union and chose not to take the leadership of the party after the death of his father - George Papandreou, the leader of Centre Union- in 1968. Instead he concentrated his efforts on making PAK an effective political force with a radical programme for change, which could become the basis of a new political party.

On his return to Greece, A. Papandreou refused to join a refounded Centre Union. Instead he founded PASOK as a new political party, which distinguished itself from both the old centre and the traditional left. PASOK was the only new party in the elections of 1974, a fact that determined the priorities the party would have during the first years of its existence. The priorities were first the creation of a strong identity (it was the only party that people did not have clear ideas about), the creation of channels of communication with different classes, and the expression of the hidden radicalism of the people¹¹; and, parallel to this, the construction of a strong organisation. PASOK's organisational structure and practice has been the key to keeping its diverse social and political base in functional unity¹².

Transformation of an old cleavage

It has been supported that the cleavage between the right and the democratic forces of the pre-dictatorship era was transformed into an 'anti-right / pro-right' cleavage in the 1970's¹³. The reasons for that were not only the experience of the dictatorship and the economic developments of the period, but also the experience of the post-civil war years. It was a common place for the anti-right forces (PASOK, EDIK, KKE, and KKE interior) that they should co-operate -whereas not in election level- in order to create the image of the right as the 'enemy'. Effective electoral political discourse of this period demanded strong opposition and conflict with N.D. The forces that had

for the next years?" the outcome was 30% Andreas Papandreou, 12% K. Karamanlis, and 2% George Papandreou.

¹⁰ Lyrintzis, Ch. (1984), 'Political parties in post-junta Greece: A case of bureaucratic clientelism?', West European Politics, vol.7 no3: 97-118.

¹¹ - V. Papandreou, interview contacted in Athens 7/1998. Vaso Papandreou, was a member of the committee charged with the development of ideology during the seven years under examination and chaired it from 1979 to 1982. She was a minister in PASOK governments and also on the European Commission from 1988 to 1994.

-K. Skandalidis, interview contacted in Athens 7/1998. Kostas Skandalidis, was Secretary of the Central Committee of PASOK and during the years under investigation a functionary in the party organisations concerned with youth and university students.

¹² Spourdalakis, M. (1994), 'The telling story of a unique organisational structure', Academic paper, p. 165.

¹³ Moschonas, G. (1996), 'Perceptions of the "Right" and anti-right syndrome: The division "Democratic Forces-Right"1974-1981', Parliamentary Review, issue 25-26:71-104 (in Greek).

less aggressive attitudes towards the right (EDIK, KKE interior) lost in electoral terms, whereas PASOK and KKE became the main representatives of people's frustration. The conflict arose along three main lines: social issues; the international place and orientation of the country; and the democratization of the political system¹⁴. PASOK tried to be at the forefront of this 'political family'. The issue of cooperation of the democratic forces was dominant, and several appeals for cooperation can be found in the party's official press and the brochures of this period. But at the same time PASOK did not lose any chance to stress that 'electoral co-operation has no meaning'¹⁵.

One can also claim that it was K. Karamanlis that helped to create the image of PASOK as the main anti-right wing party. As G. Notaras, leading party functionary of the period, pointed out: "*it was Karamanlis that, by facing PASOK as his main opponent, made it seem the most reliable opposition*"¹⁶. New Democracy sought to convince the electorate that PASOK was a threat to liberal institutions and that '*PASOK's victory would lead to chaos and possibly to Communism*'. Thus, New Democracy intensified the polarisation between the two camps and turned elections into a straight choice between right and left. As the elections were to prove, this strategy benefited in the long run PASOK rather than ND¹⁷. Moreover, Karamanlis' move to the Greek presidency in 1980 was a guarantee for stability and thus ND's propaganda became less effective¹⁸.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF PASOK

On September 3rd in 1974, Andreas Papandreou together with his close associates of the pre-dictatorship period and cadres of the resistance organizations - *Democratic Defense* and the *Panhellenic Liberation Movement* (PAK) – announced the foundation and 'Declaration of Principles' of the *Panhellenic Socialist Movement* (PASOK). Subsequently, PASOK showed spectacular organisational growth. It succeeded in rallying a significant number of politicians of the former Center Union and Communist left. It did the best job of mass mobilisation compared to any party of the left. PASOK's election rallies and Papandreou's public appearances were invariably occasions for mass demonstrations with pronounced youth participation.¹⁹

¹⁴ Moschonas 1996:88, op. cit.

¹⁵ See, for instance: 'Common attitude of the parties in front of the national danger of joining the E.E.C.', *Exormisi*, 28 January 1977; 'The democratic co-operation became reality', *Exormisi*, 10 December 1976.

¹⁶ G. Notaras, interview. Contacted in Athens 7/1998. Gerasimos Notaras, is a sociologist, and a professor of the French Ecole Politique et Sciences Sociales. He is not currently a member of PASOK; he was expelled in 1976 together with about a fifth of upper level functionaries of PASOK, in a Papandreou's effort to secure his own ideological hegemony and 'purity'. He was also one of the founders of the 'Democratike Amina' (Democratic Defence), one of the most important resistance groups during the dictatorship.

¹⁷ Lyrantzis, Ch. (1983), 'The rise of PASOK: The Greek election of 1981', *West European Politics*, vol.5.

¹⁸ Mavrogordatos, G. (1983), *Stillborn Republic: Social coalitions and party strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*. University of California Press, p. 24.

¹⁹ Referring to the youth mobilisation K. Karamanlis declared before the elections "We should not be afraid of PASOK. They have a lot of people, but their people do not vote." Meaning that many of PASOK's supporters were under the age limit for voting.

However, the vitality of PASOK's electoral rallies and the apparently positive responses to the Movement were not translated into votes, at least in the first elections of 1974. Even so, seventy-five days after its creation it won 13.5 percent of the vote and 13 seats, claiming third place in the parliament. According to the party functionaries²⁰ interviewed impressions from the period: "*PASOK was very radical for the democratisation period and even if people wanted to vote for it they were afraid that if the PASOK won the elections the U.S. was going to impose a new coup. That is why they preferred the safe way of K. Karamanlis who was U.S.'s beloved*".²¹

In the elections of 1977 PASOK's share arose to 25 percent (93 seats). Its success came largely at the expense of the declining Center Union, which split into factions shortly after. PASOK's slogan of 'change' struck a cord with the Greek people's search for a new way after forty years of conservative rule²².

In the 1981 elections, PASOK swept into power with 48 percent of the popular vote (172 seats). Between the 1977 and 1981 elections, PASOK and its leader continued to move away from its initial image as a Marxist-based, class-oriented party, in order to reassure centrist voters. The election result meant that, for first time in Greek history, an explicitly left-wing party held the reigns of government.

4. ORGANISATION

A fundamental fact about PASOK's organisation is that it served as a medium through which Papandreou maintained complete control of the party's political course²³. Thus, although the party constitution extols at great length the virtues of democratic procedures, in practice members were essentially excluded from participation in decision-making. The organisational structure of PASOK was almost identical to those of communist parties. Differences concerned the role of the party president and the role of the parliamentary group.

Its founding document – 'Declaration of the 3rd of September 1974' – promises amongst others, an intra-party 'democratic procedure'; a commitment of a democratic organisation based on a decentralized concept of membership participation. Before the 1974 elections PASOK made an open appeal to the 'Greek people' for self-organisation. This appeal was remarkably successful and the movement rapidly acquired a nation-wide organisational network. Grass roots organisations of the movement mushroomed in all urban centers, even in large villages, in all trades and professions, in trade and student unions. The party structure also proved very effective in organising support and validating the claim that the party was not based,

²⁰ K. Skandalidis, interview, op. cit.

V. Papandreou, interview, op. cit.

²¹ The Central Committee of the party declared on 22/11/1974 that "the reasons for the low percent of 13% were 1) the fake dilemma 'Karamanlis or tank', 2) the sudden way that the elections took place and the electoral law, 3) the slander rumors that created insecurity, and 4) the political mistake of those who by participating in this government legitimated it (here the functionaries of the Centre Union are implied)". *Agonistis*, 3 December 1974(3):1-15.

²² Spourdalakis, M. (1995), 'Securing democracy in post-authoritarian Greece: The role of political parties', in Lewis, P. and Pridham G. (eds.), *Rooting fragile democracies*. London: Routledge, p.78.

²³ Elephantis, A. (1981), 'PASOK and the elections of 1977: The rise of the populist movement', in Penniman, H.R. (ed.), *Greece at the polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, p. 122.

like the others, on networks of patronage²⁴. The present research is focusing on the effort for self-organisation in three peripheries and is following the procedures followed in local and central level for the creation of party branches.

PASOK carried the heritage of three resistance 'generations'. The 1940's anti-fascist movement; the 1960's generation which fought against the crown's unconstitutional initiatives and generally sought the termination of exclusionist post-civil war political practices; and the generation of the resistance against the regime of junta. Functionaries from these generations formed different tendencies: the 'left', the 'conformist', and the 'technocratic' tendency²⁵. As K. Skandalides claims: *'Each one of us, during this period, was defining 'socialism' according to his/hers experiences.'* This flexibility in the interpretation of ideological terms was stronger among party functionaries and supporters in local level.

PASOK's organisational development strategy constructed after the 1974 elections. Although under different circumstances the result of 13 percent would have been considered a victory, many in the movement were shocked.²⁶ It was then that the leadership seems to decide that the party had to seek power at a much faster pace. This meant a gradual but steady undermining of its promise to develop along the lines of a mass democratic and institutionalised party, capable of braking away from the traditional patterns of political mobilisation. The decision to expedite the pursuit of power, regardless of the cost for the party's intra-democracy, was accompanied by a watering down of its radicalism. It was during this period that 20 percent of the upper party functionaries and members of the Central Committee were expelled. As Gerasimos Notaras, who was one of them, notes:

"Our differences with Papandreou were not at ideological level. It was just that he wanted to gain the power right away and for this reason he had to 'please everybody' avoiding conflicts with every social category that could support the opponent parties. It was not even that we disagreed about organisational rules. Papandreou did not want intra-party rules because they could destroy his plan for the fastest possible raise in power" (interview).

Since then, PASOK's story became a series of internal crises and splits.²⁷ Every internal crisis resulted in a further consolidation of unprincipled organisational practices and consolidation of power in the hands of A. Papandreou and the Executive Bureau, which he had appointed. PASOK's organisational strategy had as a central goal the quantitative expansion of its members at any cost. In the party document *'Proposal for the future organisation march of the movement'*,²⁸ the whole concept of the Movement's organisational development is based on achieving a certain ratio between electoral support and membership. It is a document full of numerical examples and a complete absence of any statements concerning the principles

²⁴ Spourdalakis, M. (1995), 'PASOK's second chance', *Mediterranean Politics*, n. 3:1-33.

²⁵ *Anti*, 12 May 1979, vol.125:18-19.

²⁶ Interesting here is the testimony of G. Notaras (interview) who was with A. Papandreou on election night: "A. Papandreou was so disappointed that he did not even want to make a public appearances on the election night. He could not believe that PASOK was not even the leading opposition. We almost forced him to appear on the T.V." Similar events in Spourdalakis, 1988:91, and Kouloglou, 1986:17.

²⁷ For a detailed analysis of the significance of these crises see: M. Spourdalakis, 'The rise of the Greek sun' 1988, p.114-162.

²⁸ Proposal for the future organisational march of the Movement, Athens: December 7, 1977.

governing these recruitments. The enunciation, during the February 1978 meeting of PASOK's Central Committee, of the new strategy of 'National Popular Unity', was designed to take PASOK beyond the 'narrow class boundaries' of the first years²⁹. Thus, it seems that the underlying strategy of this hyper-organisational activity was the unconditional expansion of electoral support for the movement. Papandreou had the opportunity to allocate in the higher organs of the party, those who enjoyed his absolute trust. Once appointed by the president, these cadres could in turn act in his name without regard to constitutional formalities³⁰.

5. PASOK'S SOCIAL BASE

Between 1977 and 1981 the electoral swing from the centre-right to the left amounted about 25 percent - and virtually all of it went to PASOK. With a total of 5.6 million voters, at least 1.3 million, that had voted in 1977 either for the Centre Union, New Democracy, or the National Alignment, shifted their votes to PASOK. More than half of those votes came from New Democracy and National Alignment. At all districts where the Centre Union had scored above its national average in the 1974 and 1977 elections, PASOK scored higher than its own national average in 1981; it absorbed the centrist strongholds almost everywhere. In some regions - Crete for instance - where the liberal-centrist vote had been traditionally strong, PASOK also exceeded its national average.³¹ The dependence of PASOK on centrist votes was also suggested by the results of a KPEE poll in September 1981: only 12.6 percent described themselves as 'Marxist-socialists' whereas PASOK officially described itself as being 'non-dogmatic Marxist-socialists'. In a Eurobarometer survey before the 1981 elections, PASOK is the only party (especially compared to the parties of the left) whose voters distributed themselves over the whole spectrum of the 'self- placement left-right scale' (Table 1). Large numbers of the people who voted for PASOK were not identified with the Marxist-socialist ideology.

Table 1. SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE BY PARTY

| | Left | | | | | | | | | Right |
|------|------|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|-------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| N.D. | 0.3 | - | 0.3 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 14.3 | 26.8 | 17.5 | 30.8 |

²⁹ National Popular Unity- The meeting of the Second Session of the Central Committee of PASOK. Athens: Publication Beraue, KE.ME.DIA/PASOK, B1/1978

³⁰ Elefantis, A. (1981), 'PASOK and the elections of 1977: The rise of the populist movement', in Penniman, H.R. (ed.), *Greece at the polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, p. 134.

³¹ The hypothesis that 'those areas that have supported PASOK since 1974 were also supported the Centre Union in the 1963 and 1964 elections' was tested and confirmed in a survey made by K. Featherstone and D. Katsoudas (1985).

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| EDIC | - | - | - | 6.5 | 61.3 | 22.6 | 9.7 | - | - | - |
| PASOK | 3.6 | 4.3 | 13.2 | 27.5 | 29.7 | 12.2 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.0 |
| KKE | 54.1 | 24.5 | 14.3 | 5.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | - | - | - | - |
| KKE (int.) | 27.3 | 27.3 | 40.9 | - | - | - | - | 4.5 | - | - |

Source: Eurobarometer vols. 14 and 15 (cumulated), 1981.

The most impressive characteristic of PASOK's electoral performance in 1981 was its class-cross nation-wide appeal. Opinion surveys conducted at the time indicate how uniform PASOK's appeal was across a range of social groups.³² Whilst 41 percent of men voted for the party, the proportion of women doing so was less than 4 percent fewer. The urban-rural division also produced little contrast: 52 percent of voters in urban areas voted for PASOK, and 47 percent in rural districts. Moreover, whilst 39 percent of 'unskilled workers' voted for PASOK, 37 percent of 'upper-middle class' voters did the same (Table 2). All classes supported PASOK to a similar degree. However, what the data cannot show is how far PASOK's support amongst the higher social classes was a legacy bequeathed by leading figures of the old Center Union joining the 1981 PASOK campaign. Differences are slight also by educational level: 37 percent of voters with primary education voted for PASOK, and 38 percent with higher. The evidence suggests that only age made a difference to support: 50 percent of 25-34 year olds voted for PASOK, whereas a 26 percent of 45-54 year olds supported the party.

Table 2. PARTY IDENTIFICATION, percentage support for PASOK

| | | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|----|---------------|----|
| <i>Education:</i> | <i>Social</i> | | 35-44 | 38 |
| Primary | <i>class:</i> | | 45-54 | 27 |
| 37 | A/B | 37 | 55-64 | 29 |
| Secondary | C1 | 39 | 64+ | 28 |
| 43 | C2 | 40 | <i>Sex:</i> | |
| Higher | D/E | 39 | Male | 41 |
| 38 | <i>Age:</i> | | Female | 37 |
| | 20-24 | 44 | | |
| | 25-34 | 51 | | |

Source: KPEE poll, September 1981

6. THE CASE OF FLORINA

The following chapter is a part of the research. Following the process of collecting, analysing, and presenting the data, will it be possible to give an account for the method in use. In order to investigate the main hypothesis concerning the

³² Survey evidence taken from KPEE Poll, Centre for Political Research and Information, Athens, September 1981.

connection between the opportunity of redefinition of the social cleavages that PASOK had and the gaining of power, we are going to test the electoral results and the creation of party branches in the area in reference to its cultural character and origins. We are going to follow the development of the organisation in Florina under the perspective of the cleavages that were present in the intra-party conflicts. We will examine the organization's character, its way of working and describe supporters social characteristics.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since our analysis takes into account the main social cleavages, a short introduction in the history of Florina is necessary. After 1922, a variety of groups settled the area³³. Their conflicts with the local part of the population, characterised by a Slavic dialect, were strong and violent, focused mainly around the claiming of the land that used to belong to the Turks in the past³⁴. The conflict took a political expression in the pre-war period as the largest part of the local group, that was still approximately 77% of the total population, was supporting the anti-venizelist side. They were accusing Venizelos of being the responsible for the arrival of the refugees. On the other hand, the refugees had placed all their hopes at the Venizelist party for their future recovery³⁵. After the refugees' arrival the locals started feeling as second-class citizens since the state treated the refugees as representatives of the Greek nationalism in the area, and never trusted the locals. The language difference gave to the refugees the opportunity to develop. Combined with the fact that they took the most productive part of the land, a strong cleavage arose³⁶. The Metaxas dictatorship reinforced the alienation of the locals from the Greek state, since a central strategy of suppression of their language was imposed.

However, it would be a mistake to face those groups as totally unified. One of the most violent aspects of the conflict was the one created among the locals who decided to co-operate with the nationalistic forces and enjoy the state protection, called '*gregomanoi*', and those that experienced the suppression which were the majority by far³⁷. For this majority the struggle of EAM against the Germans was the opportunity for a double liberation: liberation from the German army but also from the suppression of the Greek state. EAM treated the local culture and language with respect and gave them a dream about the 'future society'³⁸. Some refugees also supported EAM, but for another part of them the propaganda about the treacherous role of EAM was convincing, so they supported the anti-communist, nationalistic forces³⁹.

³³ Amongst others, Slavophones, Pontioi, Vlachoï, Refugees from Asia Minor, Arvanites, Kafkasioi, Muslims, Gypsies.

³⁴ I. Michailidis, (1997), 'Slavic-speakers and refugees', in *Identities in Macedonia*, ed. V. Gounaris, I. Michailidis, G. Aggelopoulos, Papazisis.

³⁵ G. Mavrogordatos, (1983), *Social coalitions and party strategies in Greece: 1922-1936*, University of California Press, p. 247-251.

³⁶ For the partiality of the state in support of the refugees: V. Gounaris, (1990), 'Vouleftes kai Kapetanaioi: clientistic networks in mid-war Macedonia', *Ellinika*, vol.41:331-335.

³⁷ M. Giannisopoulou, (1998), 'The anthropological perspective', in *Macedonia and the Balkan*, EKKE, Alexandria, p.356.

³⁸ E. Kofos, 'The Macedonian problem through the period of B' World War', in *Modern and contemporary Macedonia*, Vol.B, ed. I. Koliopoulos-I. Chasiotis.

T. Kostopoulos, (2002), *The forbidden language*, Mavri Lista, p.205-209.

³⁹ M. Giannisopoulou, 1998:407-8, op. cit.

The political preferences of the two groups were not totally homogenous. Even though, it is possible to support the view that the conflicting economic interests created the frame into which alternating and striking political identities were created. The conflict during the mid-war between venizelist refugees and royalist locals was transformed during the 1940's in a cleavage between right wing refugees and left wing locals.

POLITICAL MICROCLIMATE: ELECTORAL RESULTS AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

During the 1950s Florina was one of the top peripheries for ERE in terms of electoral results (over 50%)⁴⁰. The same was true for the 1974 elections when New Democracy reached the percentage of 70.6%. Nevertheless, the volatility of the electoral behaviour became obvious during the 1977 elections, where the percentage drop at 55.1%. Shrinking of power for the right was a continuous tendency during the 80's⁴¹. In order to understand the shifting of the voters from New Democracy to PASOK it is necessary to follow the creation of the organisation branches of PASOK in Florina and the political image that its members managed to construct and communicate to the people. Before reaching this point few words about the political geography of the periphery are necessary. The effort of the research was to localize the areas of residence for the different groups. This effort proved to be difficult, as the data have never been published because of political reasons. Fieldwork for the collection of the data was the only solution. The comparison of the data referring to the origins of the villages and the electoral behaviour proved that the origins are not the most important variable for the explanation of the political behaviour in the post-junta period. A closer look to the map suggests that differences in political behaviour can be found in sub-divisions of Florina. It seems that there is a line dividing the periphery in North/West part and South/East part. In the first one people vote mainly for the right, whereas in the South/East part the highest results for PASOK and KKE are found. Which is more the few party branches for PASOK and KKE existed only in this area⁴². The reasons for this division are various. In the North/West part the immigration was huge. A big part of the local population crossed the borders towards Yugoslavia or emigrated to western countries⁴³, in order to survive. The people left behind were frightened or have been already collaborators of the state. At the same time, the border placement and the mountainous nature of the area made trade and communication with the mainland difficult and increased the fear. Indicant of the influence that fear and suppression had on political behaviour in the area, is an excerpt from the interview of the person responsible for Florina on behalf of the central Organization Sector of PASOK⁴⁴: *'We were organizing visits to the*

⁴⁰ H. Nikolakopoulos, (2000), Parties and parliamentary elections in Greece 1946-1964, EKKE, Athens.

⁴¹ H. Nikolakopoulos, 'The formation of the country's new electoral map after the new electoral law in each city, periphery and constituency', *Ta Nea* 18/5/1989.

⁴² Data from PASOK Organizational Archive.

⁴³ Mainly Australia, West Germany or Canada data from the local Press.

⁴⁴ D. Gaitanidis, interview contacted in Athens 3/2005. D. Gaitanidis, was member of the Organisation Sector of PASOK and the Person Responsible for Florina on behalf of the Organisation Sector during the under research period.

mountainous and western villages in order to communicate our political thesis and give strength to the people, but even though that we were a lot of members arriving the people stayed hidden. Few persons were moving slightly the curtains and waiving to us.'

The South/East part was much more involved in the mainland economic and social life; as a consequence the fear was less. The fact that part of the progressive immigrants that inhabited this area, was less frightened and oppressed compared to the locals, helped in the claim for freedom of political expression. The existence of the party's branches and agricultural co-operations helped the process. In PASOK's branches locals and refugees were equally participating. In the secondary offices of PASOK both groups of the population were elected but their villages of origin were always those from the South/East part. Nevertheless, the villages in which party branches existed didn't have the highest rate concerning the increasing of PASOK's votes. The reason for this, according to the interviews is that: *'were branches existed people became familiar with the intra-party conflicts and they were keeping off.'* The intra-party conflict is an important element for the understanding of the political character of the local branch.

THE ORGANISATION BRANCH OF PASOK IN FLORINA

The creation of PASOK in Florina took place into the most oppressive environment. The local organization conflicted in many ways with the established elite and the church, a fact that contributed to the creation of its political character. Many people that had supported the dictatorship were still in powerful positions during the 70s. For the people of Florina is common knowledge that: *'The process of social liberation that started for the rest of the country in 1974, for us began after 1979'*. Party functionaries of the first years stress the point that during that period they were working semi-illegal and people were so frightened that they wouldn't even talk to them in public places. The data suggest that the first active party members were mainly young people, students but also some older people coming from the centrist tradition that had conflicted with the establishment powers of the periphery during the previous years. Many of those people had returned from western countries after having lived and worked there for some years. That experience gave to them the necessary social inputs that encouraged them to demand political liberties. Through those years they came in touch with PAK and A. Papandreou and that proved to be an important variable for their future support for PASOK. In terms of professional occupation it seems that they were mainly farmers, labour workers and many young people who returned in their birthplace after their university studies, bringing new ideas.

Having analysed the electoral results of the period, it becomes obvious that the electoral gains for PASOK were mainly coming from New Democracy. The party functionaries stress that it was from New Democracy voters that they were trying to get support *'since many people where voting for the right because of fear and not of any kind of party identification'*. As far as the centre is concerned, after the joining of

D. Theocharidis, the traditional MP elected from Centre Union, to the New Democracy, PASOK left alone as a choice accountable for the centrist vote.

Gaining support from KKE it was much more difficult. After the civil war the exiles and pogroms that its members suffered created a strong political identity: *'For the oldest it was almost impossible to leave KKE, for them it was a dogma, a religion. Up to 1981 just few people came from KKE to PASOK. In small communities people felt embarrassed. My family, which also had a communist background, was saying to me that I should feel embarrassed to support PASOK after all their struggles and sufferings'*⁴⁵. Yet, the relationship between PASOK and KKE organisations was characterised by support and co-operation in many aspects. The creation of a common front against oppression was important for both. Common announcements in the local press⁴⁶, common political actions⁴⁷ and a more or less common political discourse⁴⁸ characterised them through the period. The question that arises is why radical and leftist people preferred to support PASOK instead of the traditional communist party. It seems that being a member of KKE in Florina was an extreme risk. PASOK offered the opportunity to be progressive without the 'anathema' of communism. Furthermore, during the 30's, KKE had supported the claim for autonomy of the slavophones, but later, under the accusation of 'national treachery' it changed its perspective started to claim 'respect for the minority rights'. Many slavophones were strongly disappointed. When PASOK actively supported the repatriation of the slavophones many people placed to the party all their hopes.

POLITICAL THESIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

In all interviews from party functionaries and supporters one point was strongly stressed, the main political issue for the people of Florina was freedom and human rights. It was around those issues that PASOK constructed its campaign in the district. The person responsible for Florina on behalf of PASOK claims⁴⁹: *'Now that I am looking back I realise that neither I, nor the functionaries had the background to make serious policy proposals. At the beginning we were just trying to bring a feeling of freedom in order to make people talk to us'*. Issues such as quality of life and agricultural policy were discussed in some cases. In the question how people understood concepts as *socialism, self-management*, or EEC, the answer was that *'people were not understanding. Socialism, for instance, got confused in their minds with communism. Hearing the word they were looking around to check if there is anybody hearing. Some were frightened that they would lose their property.'*⁵⁰

⁴⁵ M. Gaitanidis, Responsible for Florina from PASOK Organization Sector, interview op.cit.

⁴⁶ For instance, *'Common denunciation against violence from the youth of PASOK and KNE'*, Allagi, 8/12/1979 vol.401/241.

⁴⁷ Typical of this kind was the placement of a poster in the central square of Florina in 12/2/1979, where the 'Battle of Florina' was celebrated. In this occasion the local authorities were celebrating the massacre of the Democratic Army from the army in 1948, by the presence of Prime Minister K. Karamanlis. On the poster it was written 'Say NO to the Celebrations of Hate / National Popular Unity', the responsible persons were prosecuted by the authorities.

⁴⁸ For instance the callings of PASOKs Youth and KNE to their Youth Political Festivals are surprising similar in terms of discourse. *'Announcement of the District Committee of KNE'*, Allagi, 2/8/1980, vol.433/273. *'PASOKs Youth Festival'*, Allagi, 13/9/1980, vol.439/279.

⁴⁹ D. Gaitanidis, interview op. cit..

⁵⁰ Ch. Papalazarou, interview contacted in Florina 3/2005. Ch. Papalazarou, was a member of PASOK in Florina during the 70's, active in agricultural partnerships.

It is important to mention that in the correspondence that the District Committee had with the central Organisation Sector, references to policy issues almost do not exist. The brochures and party publications arrived to Florina very rarely. Even when they did so, it was difficult to make use of them since they were not comprehensive for the majority of the people. The main source of information was *Exormisi*, the official newspaper, but the circulation was limited to 150 items per week⁵¹. Two of the party candidates, around whom the main intra-party arose, were publishing and distributing materials trying to popularise PASOK ideological thesis. The main way for recruiting new members and supporters was personal contact and discussion: *'our effort was to find some people from each village to give us a contact in order to arrive there and start a discussion'*. Importance of party functionaries activity get stressed by that point.

In 1975 there were two party branches in the biggest cities with 37 members in total. The first group was mainly around P. Stefanidis future MP of PASOK. By 1981 member number arose to 299 from 12 villages and cities⁵². P. Stefanidis and his supporter's political origins are to be found before the dictatorship in *Enosi Kentrou* (Centre Union). In 1977 a second leading group arose mainly from young scientists that returned to Florina after their university studies. A conflict between the two groups started for the control of the organisation and the power positions. This conflict influenced organisation's character and involved also the representatives from the central Organisation Sector that strongly supported the second group⁵³. Examining the main characteristics of those intra-party groups, we can support that whereas the first group (*'palaiokommatikoi'*) derived from the centrist tradition and was more mature in terms of age, the second one was more radical and younger in age. This conflict is present almost in the whole country into PASOK's organisations. The important point is that the division took also the form of conflict between locals and refugees in some aspects, as the leading persons of each group had their origins in those different cultures. The case is appropriately summarised by the words of the person responsible for Florina on behalf of the centre: *'Compared to other peripheries Florina organisation was problematic and very difficult. It was difficult to coordinate two different philosophies, two groups having their own culture. The same time the conflict between the two intra-party groups was strong, but 'palaiokomatismos' was different in the other peripheries. There it had to do just with political survival. In Florina the ethnotic division was intervening.'* The ethnotic division was mainly intervening at the times that the conflict was strong around the claim of power positions. The official discourse of the party, in central and local level, was supporting the argument that ethnotic divisions are false divisions that do not allow the people to realise and face class divisions.

The correspondence with the centre is full of accusations, and expulsions. At the end it is obvious that even though the conflict was a returning factor for the party in Florina, the party centre clearly decided to keep both fractions within the party being afraid that in any other case there will be a loss in local or refugee votes and support. Unfortunately it is not possible to count which of the two fractions and political styles has been more beneficial for the party. It seems that apart from the conflicts, the

⁵¹ Data from Archives of PASOK Organization Sector.

⁵² General Assembly/ Florina Branch, Archives of PASOK Organization Sector.

⁵³ Rapports from the sub-division of Florina 1975-1980, Archives of PASOK Organization Sector

intrigues and the undermining, a balance of the two on the edge was beneficial in electoral terms.

The intra-party evolution in Florina is characterised by a fundamental division that was common in the total of PASOK's organisations across the country. In one side there were people that were active in local political life before the dictatorship. Those people were mainly oriented from the centre. On the other side there were mainly young scientists that first appeared in local political life in the post-junta years. Since they did not have formulated supporting networks they put all their effort at the organisation level. For that reason they were important for the organisation evolution. Their political culture was, comparatively, radical. The central party committees supported the second group in most of the cases. However, the remaining of P. Stefanidis as the party candidate up to 1989 suggests that, a. on the base of electoral effectiveness the party decided that it was more important to maintain the formatted supporting networks than to invest in the maximum efficiency of the organisation, 2. even though that the upper party committees had strongly expressed their arguments against Stefanidis it was not on them to decide.

The other cleavages formulated into the party, under the influence of that main division. The division through the opposition years was mainly around the political character of the party and the control of the important party power positions. It was the President and his environment that were trying to balance the conflicting groups, and not the party committees, using the existence of one as a negotiable tool against the other. In the central level the conflict between them it was not important. As long as it was into the limits they were still contributed in the electoral success, they were weakened because of the conflicts making equalizing from the centre more important.

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