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Methodological and Conceptual Problems Concerning Analysis of Political Participation of Greek Farmers

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to delineate some of the problems encountered in formulating a critical model for assessing the political participation of farmers in Greece. In as much as Greece has embarked on an economic modernization project at least since the devaluation of the drachma in the middle 1980s, followed by an upswing in the service sector, it nonetheless retains elements of its economic past that relentlessly trouble its future. The persistence of the family farm and the smallish composition of agribusiness put Greece squarely in the category of countries – unlike Ireland or France and like Romania and Poland – which are under-transformed and strong agriculture labor countries. Though efforts are being made in the countryside to render it more efficient and to attract young farmers, under both EU auspices and Greek auspices, it is clear, in the midst of higher than 3% GDP growth over the last three years and a history-making cultural splash in the international arena best represented by the Olympiad of 2004, that Greece still struggles with its agrarian identity, its agrarian past and its agrarian political predicament, which is to say there isn't one.

Where are Greece's farmers politically today? How does one make sense of a scholarly literature on Greek farmers that is scant and the opinions of four Greek experts in the areas of political economy, political history, agricultural research and, law, who when asked the question of whether farmers matter politically in Greece today, registered the following answers: "Oh yes"; "It is not my area of expertise"; "Ah, they're all PASOK"; and, "Do you mean *agrotes*? There is no issue." This absence can only mean one thing: That farmers do matter, but in what way?

In the course of research to frame an issue that has no real fixed contours, I turned to existing historical, anthropological, political-economic and political science models of farmer – or, indeed, peasant – analysis, for they are not the same thing. What I will try to lay out in the following pages is the journey I took, the conditions that make Greece a unique case, and the solution I found to "measure", we might say, the political role – or "demand-making role" – of Greek farmers.

Overview of Operational Themes

`"The most dramatic and far-reaching social change of the second half of this century, and the one which cuts us off for ever from the world of the past, is the death of the peasantry," wrote Eric Hobsbawm about the twentieth century.[i] While this clearly is a historical observation, there are political implications too compelling to ignore. Hobsbawm's declaration of the ongoing decline of farming as an occupation -- and a way of life -- in the industrialized world revealed a simple truth. While farmers were once dominant in numbers, their access to social and political power was both limited and facilitated by their class. The case is obviously different today, but not everywhere. Alongside the shrinking numbers of people who work the land there has evolved, though unevenly, a disproportionate elevation in their political and social power – and, more so, access to wealth. One reason for this, in the "old world", is the concerted interest among unified European states since the 1950s to protect their farmers with incentives to growth or stability.

There are two main universes therefore within which we can assess Greek farmers, the first in the national domain, and the second in the "Europeanized" domain of the European Union. Greece has the most farmers as a percentage of the active workforce among the member states of the European Union excluding those who joined in May 2004. Inasmuch as one can say Greece is therefore an upper classman to the newcomers, the experience of Greek farmers may be instructive for farmers in some of the new EU countries whose farming sector is much larger, and less "developed", than Greece's. There are enough socio-economic attributes among farmers, after all, which ring true universally. Similar to their brethren in other fast-changing economies, Greek farmers straddle the dueling destinies of growth and decline. Greece's full membership in the European Union since 1981 has brought farmers into the fold of its subsidy regime, and they are therefore members of the club that affords them privileged access to opportunities for efficiency and modernization, but not for all of them. Paradoxically, nearly a quarter century after membership, most of Greece's farmers remain small-scale subsistence farmers, who are marginal to the market and therefore receive few if any of the benefits the EU offers commercial farmers or those with larger holdings.[ii] And despite a creeping downward trend, Greek farmers produce the largest share of GDP relative to population among all EU-15 countries.[iii]

It stands to reason that as a sector, farmers have much to gain and little to lose by organizing in voluntary associations and by engaging with the market.[iv] That the Greek state, and farmers themselves, have both helped and hindered these endeavors underscores the uneven status farmers hold as political actors and economic contributors. Both pluralist and corporatist impulses in Greek society have linked political parties and governments with farmers' groups, yet Greek farmers have traditionally not had the political clout of their counterparts in, for example, France, a founding member of the EU, or in Poland, a newcomer to the EU.[v]

Because farming subsidies once granted by the Greek state were largely replaced by subsidies originating from the EU after 1981, the production structure in the agriculture sector across the two periods has shown to be stable. Despite efforts to maximize labor productivity and reform land holdings, subsidies have contributed to overproduction and inefficiencies in the farming sector since protection isolates farmers from market competition.[vi] This is slowly being changed with the January 2005 implementation of a reformed agriculture policy emanating from the European Union, decoupling subsidy payouts from production. Nonetheless, without advocating a strict political-economy theory, one could argue that disincentives therefore exist for farmer activism or political party courtship of the farming sector, since their relationship is overridden by policies originating in EU concertation. And one could further argue that farmer politics at the national level in Greece are in disarray because of EU-level competencies which affect the farmer's daily life more than do Greek national competencies.[vii]

Greek Agriculture in Historical Context

Unlike land tenure patterns of northern Europe or Latin America for whom large estates have defined much of their social, political and economic histories, Greek land holdings have tended to reflect the Greek ideal of enabling every denizen the right to hold

private property, with a view not of large estates or latifundia, which were common only briefly in the regions of Macedonia and Thrace in the north and in Attica, but of small plots. This was a terrestrial version of a chicken in every pot policy designed to afford landless peasants the object of their agitation. Land distribution began in this vein in 1871. After Greek independence from the Ottoman Turks, which began in earnest in 1821, land seizure took the form of a national acquisition, the results of which became recognized internationally as "national lands." Arable earth therefore was the state's to give away, with plots averaging one hectare in size, granted to some 80% of the rural population.

Under the Lausanne settlement of 1923 authorizing the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, Greece, underpopulated but with a high level of land stress and limited arable land, repatriated some 1.5 million refugees. Coutsoumaris has noted that "without risk of major deviation," it is safely assumed, based on Greek official statistics and other secondary accounts, that most of the Greek refugees settled in the countryside. For the 20-year period between 1920 and 1940, taking into account natural increases in "farm people" of about 1.2 million from a1920 stock of 3.7 million, and a rural outmigration of about 450,000 persons, refugees brought the farm population in 1940 to 4.6 million.[viii] Allotted parcels were larger, averaging 4-6 plots per family or sometimes 10-18, but they were not contiguous and rarely in the same general region. This land grant system created a patchwork of holdings, making family land management inefficient and unnecessarily labor intensive, if only for the time involved in traveling from one plot to another. Greek agriculture today, with its emphasis on the family farm as the core of agricultural production, is the direct heir of policies designed in times of crisis, some 80 and 150 years ago.[ix]

During the same epoch of the population exchange, the southern region of the Peloponnese organized a national party representing the peasants. Agricultural cooperatives there formed the Panhellenic Agrarian Congress which in turn formed the Greek Agrarian Party in 1923, a victim, ultimately, of the polarization in Greek society at the time between the Venizelist Liberal Party and the People's Party of the royalists, and a lack of harmonizing, ideological vision for the farmers' cause. It was, all told, a wayward fish in the parting sea of Greek partisanship, with its highest membership at 20,000 in 1936, and garnering, in its moment, 6.17% of the vote and 11 of 250 parliamentary seats, a performance similar to that of the Communist Party of Greece today.[x]

In the post-war period, there was an enormous rural exodus of approximately 1.5 million persons, a number nearly equal to the influx of refugees a quarter century earlier. Many of the post-war generation found work in Germany, which was receptive to guest workers, and others settled in Greek metropoles including Athens. This phenomenon signaled the need to reform the countryside, and between the 1960's and 1981, when Greece became a full member of the EU, the national agriculture policy adopted price supports designed to reduce economic class and regional divisions and to generally raise the standard of living in the countryside. In the thirty years however between 1961 and 1991, continued outmigration reduced the agriculture population by more than half, from 45% to about 17%. Nevertheless, the Greek farming sector remains the largest in the EU, with the family farm dominant and the "self-employed" category in agriculture increasing over the years, to 68% in 1991. Yet this marks a change from family-run farms to farms

run by individuals, meaning that yield that once required a family to produce is now produced by fewer individuals. Nonetheless, 39% of the total income of households in Greece comes from agriculture. Agribusiness includes about 22,800 manufacturing establishments, employs about 131,000 persons (in other words, agribusiness is *not* labor intensive), about 20% of the employment in the manufacturing sector. The food industry is the largest industry in the agribusiness sector at 80% of employment.[xi]

There are many cross-cutting demographic and labor characteristics among farmers and regions in Greece that pose methodological problems. For example, the Northern Aegean and Ionian Islands, Epirus (northwestern Greece), Attica, and the Peloponnese, have a high ratio of older farmers. Macedonia and Thrace, in the north and northeast, and the Southern Aegean Islands are populated with younger farmers. In Epirus, Thrace and Macedonia is a larger concentration of farmers whose farm work occupies more than 75% of their time. Regions specializing in high-value production such as cash crops, fruits or early vegetables under cover have the highest share of gross domestic product. Such regions include Thessaly, the Peloponnese and Crete. Those three regions happen to have the largest percentage contribution of agriculture to regional output. And the largest share of farm mechanization, as measured by number of tractors per thousand households, is located in the north, from Macedonia to Thrace.[xii] Agribusiness operations include the production of maize, cotton and sugar beet in Thessaly, peaches in Macedonia, horticulture in the Pelion area, in east central Greece, oriental tobacco in Thebes, and superb quality olives on Crete and in the Peloponnese.[xiii] In the olive sector alone, oil is extracted in more than 3000 small or medium outfits in addition to more than 90 factories producing canned olives.[xiv]

Political Crossroads: Farmer vs. Farmer

Two scenarios may help illustrate the dilemma of Greek farmer politics now, based on the most superficial of demographic characteristics listed above: "old" vs. "young" farmer. While a secure and viable pension might be the overriding concern for an ageing farmer, the interest set of younger farmers might comprise environmental issues or subsidy payouts over pensions. These two examples of farmer interests tap into different governmental and legislative pools: In the case of the older farmer, his priorities lie with the national government of Greece, as it retains sovereignty over pension policy decision-making. In the March 7, 2004, national elections, the older farmer would have had a choice between the two main competing parties of New Democracy, whose farmer pension plan promised 330 Euros per month secured until 2008, or PASOK's pension plan which promised 300 Euros per month secured for the following four years. As there were no real differences between the two platforms, whether the older farmer voted for the former or the latter had no real bearing on his pension future. Enough Greek polls at the time reported that Greek voters were tired of one long-serving regime and simply voted for change, replacing the left-centrist party with the right-centrist party. The older farmer could have thumbed his nose at the major players altogether and cast his vote for the Communist Party, whose platform remains dedicated to traditional Marxist worker (not farmer) interests, or one of the smaller fringe parties, though the effects of such a vote would have privileged symbolism over pragmatism.

In the case of the younger farmer, his interests in the environment and in subsidies fall within the decision-making competency of European Union institutions, which govern the common agricultural policy, or CAP. So his vote in the national elections likely would have been determined by issues other than his immediate farm-related issues, unless he chose to vote with his farmer interest group out of solidarity. And yet, solidarity with whom? Subsistence farmers, agribusiness entrepreneurs, or large-farm holders all are conceivably members of different socio-economic classes. Where, then, does the farmer stand as an interest group in Greece, given the variety – and disparity -- of interests and given the equally many choices in fora where farmers can express their demands?

Inasmuch as Greece retains a lively subsistence farming subsector as well as midrange commercial farmers and agribusinesses, empirical and theoretical research must address both categories of rural cultivators -- peasants *and* market farmers. In the late 1990's one observer noted that particularly among Mediterranean countries, "the central issue for the immediate future is the fate of the unreformed [agriculture] sectors,"[xv] and this is no less true today.

Interlude: Two Models

Peasant Studies…

Whether scholars, or societies, view the decline in the primary sector as an incidental epiphenomenon accompanying industrialization's expansion, or whether they mourn the intended whittling away of the traditional economy, depends on the variegated ideal types of the peasant available to us in scholarship and in other cultural forms. Evocations might be the homely peasant as depicted in Van Gogh's "The Potato Eaters", an emblem of dimly lit village life, in contrast to mechanization and the aggressive tools of modernity.[xvi] Historical icons include the insurrectionist revolutionary peasant of, for example, Mexico in the early 1900s or China in the mid 1900s, legendarily demanding land reform from monopolizing landholders. Scholarly characterizations of the peasant include the backward looking, conservative little man of history, the "class of low-classness"[xvii]; or the collectivized or pre-enclosed peasant, who shared in a communal network. There is also the farmer of the mid-20th century or the 21st century, more likely to express "special interest" than be a member of a discrete peasants' or agrarian party whose platform would represent farmers as a class.

The vast majority of *peasant* studies today is concentrated around geographic areas to which industrialization arrived after the early period or which have not yet completed their industrialization. These areas include, not surprisingly, India, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, China, Africa, and southeast Asia.[xviii] Developed European countries are typically not the subject of peasant studies. The reason for this is self evident: though one is not hard pressed to locate a peasant -- defined in the classical minimalist sense as someone who is a rural cultivator -- the task grows more difficult with the layering of other attributes that most scholars apply, such as the following: the derivation of subsistence from a family economy, social subordination to a rural dominant class, or collectivity as a social feature, often linked to cultural distinctiveness.[xix]

The underlying burden for investigators into peasant life writ large, whether at the sociological, anthropological, historical or political level, spelled out 30 years ago in the lead article of the charter issue of *Journal of Peasant Studies,* was, and perhaps remains, the following:

> [b]eyond a certain point in the socio-economic differentiation of the agrarian population the term 'peasantry' is no longer applicable. *That point itself is often difficult to establish*….[emphasis added][xx]

One of the leading and still controversial approaches to peasant studies concerns the theory of "moral economy".[xxi] The perspective of moral economists privileges the subsistence level of peasants -- to what extent livelihood is threatened routinely -- as a key determining factor in the style of political engagement to which peasants, individually or collectively, might subscribe. By definition, the moral economy approach also addresses the moral disposition of the peasant, commonly characterized by his pre-capitalist, small-scale economy, in contrast to the forces of capitalism or modernity that threaten his existence.

Recent challenges to moral economy have included a prominently placed appeal to re-introduce both the theories and tools of economics to political-scientific analysis,[xxii] while another critique addresses the commodification of *social goods* as a replacement variable for the focus placed by moral economists on pre-capitalist or non-capitalist peoples. This view stresses the historical timelessness and variable economic applicability of a social good as a category of possible catalysts to social change. It also addresses the collectivity as a variable, rather than the individuality stressed by classical moral economists. Proponents of this view argue that legitimacy for political practices can be shaped by a people's political identity in relation to nested social goods.[xxiii] Finally, within the broad framework of peasant studies, is the transitional phase between the family-economy farmer and the large landholder or mechanized farmer considered alongside land tenure and land reform agendas, with a view toward a presumed transformation of political interests on the part of people who work the land in one form or another.

…And Corporatism

There are two main types of farmer groups in Greece: *cooperatives*, which by law are economic organizations, and *agricultural associations*, which are theoretically concerned with "associational, syndicalist and professional actions and with struggles for the general improvement of prices, incomes and living and working conditions in rural areas."[xxiv] The cooperative movement grew throughout the 1960s, '70s and '80s, and by 1984 there were 7,817 co-ops with 929,927 members (roughly half the agricultural workforce), averaging 119 members per co-op. The cooperatives largely became the bureaucracy through which the state and the Agricultural Bank of Greece channeled funds to agriculture. [xxv]

Today, the strongest association for farmers in Greece is the Panhellenic Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives (PASEGES), a non-political organization which represents Greece at the EU level in COPA of COPA-COGECA (Committee of

Agricultural Organizations and General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union). GESASE and SYDASE, two farmer "trade union" organizations, represent Greece under COGECA , though the differences among these three unions is vague to the outsider. PASEGES currently represents about 750,000 farmers, more than 6,000 agricultural cooperatives, and more than 100 unions of agricultural cooperatives, with a permanent staff of 62, including 10 agronomists and seven economists, an administrative staff of 28, an elected general assembly from all the cooperative organization members of PASEGES and an administration (presidium and general directorship) which are comprised of experienced unionists. [xxvi] It receives financial support from subscriptions from member organizations, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, and the Agricultural Insurance Organization. Other larger cooperatives exist for specific products, including, for example, KYDEP for cereals**,** KSOS for sultanas, SYKIKI for dried figs, EDK for tobacco, and ELEOURGIKI for olive oil, one of the more recognized cooperatives outside of Greece.

Studies of past decades have pointed toward the corporatist and state-heavy influences over Greek agriculture, leaving little room for autonomy among farmers' organizations.[xxvii] Dimitris Perlepes has shown in an unpublished dissertation that

> [t]he state was … fundamental in sustaining and reproducing the [farmers'] co-operatives which are, to a large extent, beset by organizational problems….The activities of co-operatives were restrained and the small farmers had little or no bargaining power in their dealings with merchants, who supplied farm inputs or purchased farm products.[xxviii]

The corporate arrangements had two consequences with similar results: On the one hand, farmers, were reluctant to join associations that were steered, or comanaged, by the state, leaving farmers as a group fragmented and underorganized and therefore in a weak position to negotiate political or economic issues of common interest. On the other hand, those agricultural workers who did participate in economic or political associations suffered from a lack of autonomy within a wider civil society. It is unclear, however, based on data available concerning the Greek case whether an autonomous, pluralist arrangement yields a more receptive path for Greek farmers to channel their demands or whether it is in their better interest to remain closely related to state governance and directed by state institutions.[xxix]

The case of French farmers – who are activist and prone to incidences of effective collective action -- is instructive to the Greek case. Where corporatism was once correlated with the strong arm of authoritarian regimes demanding a top-down organization of groups by the state, John T. S. Keeler showed in his 1987 study that the Fifth Republic (1958) ushered in a partnership between French farmers and the state through the right-centrist government's oversight of the *Federation Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles*, granting it a monopoly over farmers' interests. Under this monopoly, infrastructure and capital in the countryside developed and modernized, and farmers enjoyed a full and thriving enfranchisement. This marriage of interests became threatened, however, in what Keeler called an "anti-pluralist revolt". In the early 1980s, farmers militantly rose up against the incoming socialist regime of Francois Mitterand, whose Minister of Agriculture Edith Cresson announced the government's

plan to dismantle the corporatist structure in the countryside and pluralize and widen opportunities for membership in a variety of farmers' associations.[xxx]

Keeler argued that the Gaullists at the national level in negotiation with a variety of interest groups came to calculated agreements about arrangements that would be mutually beneficial to them. Thus the French brand of neocorporatism developed in an "ad-hoc, uneven way" through the agency of those "above" and those "below".[xxxi] Not surprisingly, between 1970 and 1980, the membership density of France's largest farmers' union was much higher than that of all labor unions, at 44-65% and 23% respectively.[xxxii]

Corporatism was a much less defined variable in Suzanne Berger's earlier study of French *peasants* in Brittany in the 1970s. In this case, peasants were trying to get to the state, to hear and be heard in the national political arena, but they were shut out by their marginality to the market, their geographic isolation, the syndicates' undifferentiation of peasant interests, and exploitation by traders and other middlemen. Though participation in regional syndicates in the countryside was high, the organizations' inability to draw other social groups to their interests and form alliances left them in the provincial lurch, without access to Paris. .[xxxiii] France's centralization was not insignificant to the problem. Wrote Berger:

> Peasant organizations were handicapped not only by their social origins, but also by the political world into which they were born. The one great advantage agricultural organizations should have enjoyed in politics was the electoral strength of the peasantry, but, in order to exploit this resource, they needed political parties willing and able to transmit rural demands into the centers of national decision for electoral strength is not automatically translated into political power….Agricultural groups could not use the parties to arrange alliances of interests; they had either to negotiate by themselves or to find means of self-defense.[xxxiv]

The Greek case is different, though in some ways Greek farmers are today where French farmers were 20 years ago. In his 2001 study of Greek convergence with EU policy implementation, Paraskevopoulos argued that intergovernmental relations in Greece are *constrained* by a neocorporatist structure with inhibits institutional accommodation of collective action which, free to thrive, in turn would facilitate policy implementation in the countryside. Paraskevopoulos demonstrated that the state's reluctance to de facto decentralize and make efficient the civil service bureaucracy, regardless of regime, perpetuated the longstanding dependence of what he called the periphery, or the subnational levels of government in the municipalities and communes, on the core, or the prefecture, regional and national levels of government, since, he argued, "the various bottom up features are abrogated by the final control of the central state."[xxxv]

The Greek agriculture portfolio is administered by the national government and the prefecture councils primarily, with limited functional participation at the regional council level (usually concerning strategic regional planning), and very little to no policy decision making at the local, or municipality, level.[xxxvi] The Lesvos Farmers'

Association illustrates the byzantine intergovernmental hindrances in implementing EU agriculture policy. Located on the island of Mytilene in the North Aegean Island prefecture, it is the second most important private-interest institutional actor in the prefecture, having been established in 1931, with approximately 13,500 current members, most of whom are olive-oil producers. Members cite, however, a lack of communication and collective action at the local level as a primary hindrance to the association's role in the adaptation process of structural reform in the agricultural sector.[xxxvii]

Though liberalization initiatives in voluntary associations were encouraged in the 1980's under the socialist regime of PASOK, the lobbying strength of Greek agriculture remained constrained not only by the long-held corporatist/clientelist political culture, but by a lack of cohesion, networks for collective action and "entropots" within the various levels of governmental to access the system. PASOK's democratization of the unions in the 1980's, bypassing legislation (Law No. 1541/85) that regulated the structure and internal workings of the interest groups, including the enforcement of proportional representation as the system for association elections (which simply mimicked the national elections) backfired dramatically with the government's intervention through the courts when union elections strayed from the mandated formula. What this meant was that the government was not only tinkering with union membership but was, through standardization and liberalization, reinforcing its own power at the "voluntary" level. By the 1990's, PASOK was no longer able to control the main unions, though it retained influence over the civil service associations and PASEGES, the farmers' association while PASEGES nonetheless was controlled by New Democracy. These contradictions in influence in the agriculture movement need to be explored and understood.[xxxviii]

Farmers Tangled in the Centrist Net

It is hard to tell at this precise moment where Greek farmers stand as a political force in Greece. The elections of March 7, 2004, brought to power the right-centrist party of New Democracy (ND), after some 15 years of rule by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The PASEGES agricultural union reported after the elections that the shift of allegiances in the countryside amounted to 1-2.5% whereas in the urban areas it was as high as 10%, so it is doubtful that a rural decamping helped bring New Democracy to its 5% advantage, though it must be borne in mind that one percentage point separated the PASOK victors from ND in the national elections four years earlier. Most of the voter districts which carried PASOK are heavy agricultural areas. They include the whole of Crete and Achaios region in the Peloponnese.[xxxix] The caveat is however that other regions identified by Damianos et al as being strong farm economies, such as Trikala, Grevena, Magnesias, Larissa and most of the Peloponnese, were carried by New Democracy. The Communist Party had a small but expected showing at 5%, with about 10% in the strong farm economy regions except on Crete where the communists carried about 5% of the vote. There is therefore no pattern that would allow us to correlate farm voters with one party of the other, except to suggest possibly that the center-right ND has recaptured some of its former base since the national elections of 1981, 1993 and 1996.[xl] The more likely explanation might be simply a pendulum effect between the two major parties. The pressure of the farmer on politics appears to move nonlinearly – it both swells and contracts

After the elections, farmer cooperative leaders of PASEGES, the General Co-federation of Agricultural Unions of Greece (GESASE), and the Co-federation of Democratic Agricultural Unions of Greece (SYDASE), pledged full cooperation with the new center-right government. Opposition leader George Papandreou has wasted no time condemning the government for its "betray[al]" and creating a sense of "insecurity" in Greek farmers. But his rhetoric also targeted the EU, suggesting that the times now demand that Greek farmers take matters into their own hands and "make our own decisions."[xli]

The Majoritarian Tradition

Let us proceed under the hypothesis that there is no farmer political identity in Greece today. Whom do we blame – the parties, the party system, farmers themselves, the cooperatives, or EU competencies in the agricultural sector?

Diamandouros et al., have argued that the polarization of Greek political parties in the latter part of the twentieth century, with a durable majoritarian tradition under a proportional representation system, reflects a similar polarization at the start of the twentieth century, though today, they argue, any voter cleavages that once existed have been eroded by EU membership. This is to say that centrism, not without the company of minor fringe parties, has captured the electorate's imagination. The farming sector, it seems, is awash in this centrist phenomenon. The process by which latter-day Greek politics has come to mirror some of the more bland dynamics of other democratically consolidated nations is not, however, without its own unique story.

Greece has been majoritarian since the end of the Civil War (1946-1949). All except three post-civil-war elections have yielded a single-party government. The consensus in the literature points toward the reinforced proportional representation electoral system (in use since 1958; 3% threshold) as the main force behind Greece's post-war stability, engendering as it has the emergence of large parties and the discouragement of multipartyism. Greece has thus been dominated by two parties both before and after the seven-year divide of the junta, between 1967-74. The Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis (National Radical Union, ERE) on the right, and the Enosis Kentrou (Center Union, EK) near the center, dominated the issues in the pre-junta period. Extreme leftism in the form of the Kommunistikon Komma tis Ellados (KKE, Marxists; Euro-communism emerged after the junta) was left out the mix due to its illegality since the period of the civil war (1947). The monarchy, however, and the military exercised extraparliamentary power and meddling before the junta, and, quite dramatically, at the moment of the junta.

Upon restoration of democratic institutions after the dictatorship in 1974, two new parties emerged, New Democracy, the party of the right, and the Pahnellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the dynamic populist party of the anti-American left. Both parties were founded by charismatic figures, in 1974, Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou, respectively. Karamanlis had earlier also founded the National Radical Union. PASOK and ND's joint average share of the electoral spoils was about 84.6 percent, almost the mirror image of the spoils shared by the two pre-junta parties of ERE and EK.

Majoritarianism has strengthened in the post-junta period. The polarizing partisanship that defined the post-war period was virtually wiped clean with the legalization of the KKE, the communists, in 1974, and by intragovernmental cooperation between PASOK and ND, particularly in the 1980's when Karamanlis (ND) served as the president in the government of Papandreou (PASOK). As well, the traditional monarchicial-republican cleavage of the past was obliterated with a referendum outlawing the monarchy in 1974. In a most striking symbolic and pragmatic interlude in the majoritarian system, observers of Greek politics note the short-lived coalition government in 1989 between New Democracy, the party of the right, and a left coalition of traditional and Euro-communists as giving closure to the widest and most damaging cleavage of the past.[xlii]

At the regional level, of which there are 13 in Greece (NUTSII Level), Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, the Peloponnese , and Crete have the highest percentage of agricultural workers per population (at 43%, 45.5% and 45%, respectively, according to the 1991 Census).[xliii] In consideration of potential political cleavages among regions, Gunther and Montero have found the Greek population, unlike its Mediterranean counterparts in the EU, to be homogenous in terms of wealth and religion and to have an "absence of a significant regional cleavage." Taking this finding as a given could allow for a methodological control for regional difference in voting patterns and hold the variable as insignificant for the time being. Further research may bear this finding out or it may be disproved or challenged, but this finding surely warrants further testing.[xliv]

Greece in EU Context

Two years after the founding of the European Economic Community, the initial entity of what is now called the European Union, Greece applied for associate membership in the union, submitting its proposal on June 8, 1959, in accordance with Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.[xlv] It was signed into being in Athens on July 9, 1961, and enforced as of November 1, 1962, under ratification by the six existing members of the Community and Greece. This association membership was the first of its kind, designed to promote continuous and balanced trade and economic relations between the Community and Greece while encouraging accelerated development of the Greek economy and living standards. This was to be accomplished through a customs union (tariff reduction), affecting industrial imports and exports first, and through policy harmonization and making financial resources available to Greece to encourage economic growth. Symmetry in customs unions between Greece and the Community were not guaranteed under associate membership. Since CAP was not fully in place in the early stages of the Community, agricultural policy harmonization vis-a-vis Greece was flexible but slow. Greece argued for full institutional harmonization that the Community was hesitant to grant since its own six full members were divergent enough in their demands to endanger ongoing negotiations, and the financial burden to be borne by six full members in support of an associate member was not readily forthcoming.

In the meantime, Greece's strengthening post-war democracy suffered a setback when, on April 21, 1967, a military junta installed itself through a NATO maneuver, undemocratically occupying the country for seven years. Greece became an isolated nation in the world held afloat by a regime condemned. Not surprisingly, the association

agreement between Athens and the Community was frozen by the Commission based on a recommendation from the European Parliament, normal relations between the two contract holders thereby indefinitely stymied.

The resumption of EEC-Greek relations occurred within a swift dejuntification context in 1974, after a smooth, constitutional transfer of power from the junta to Constantine Karamanlis, who returned to Greece from his Parisian self-imposed exile to be sworn in as the new Prime Minister. Remarkably, and with the expertise of a statesman fully cognizant of Greece's precarious international standing and unresolved partisan patrimony, Karamanlis did all the right things to give Greece another chance. He reinstated all political parties, including the communists (outlawed since 1947), put the monarchy question to referendum, and got to work applying for Greece's full membership in the European Union, with a determined objective of bringing the West – and modernity with all its trappings-- to Greece's door. The formal application was submitted June 12, 1975, and Greece became the 10th member of the European Union on January 1, 1981. One observer noted that "[a]ccession was expected to have a number of important implications for Greek agriculture; they involved the patterns of production, the volume and pattern of trade, the income of farmers, agricultural structures, and budgetary flows. [But]...budgetary considerations tended to overshadow all others and hence distort their relative weight."[xlvi]

Greek Farmers in EU Context: Where They Matter

European agriculture since the late 1950's witnessed the inception of the Common Market and a common agriculture policy, whose objectives, established in Paragraph 1, Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, were designed to counteract the vagaries of climate affecting annual yields. The purpose was also to maintain and protect agriculture as a necessary sector alongside the sunset secondary, or manufacturing, sector. French agricultural growth and output far outpaced that of other Europeans in the post-war period. With France's historical competitor and nemesis, Germany, lagging behind and fearing a glut of French imports, it was in the interest of at least these two founding nations of the customs union to implement pricing guarantees as a measure to approach equitability in market share and profit margins between France and Germany.[xlvii]

Since CAP has relied to a great deal on price support systems, since 1993, a combination of market intervention and direct pay-outs, and sionce the latest 2002-2003 reforms, implemented January 1, 2005, a decoupling of production and payouts, more people have been kept working the land throughout the European Union than would be the case under a less regulated, laissez-faire system.[xlviii] Recent statistics show that on average among the EU-15, 42% of total land is used for agricultural purposes, with the UK at the high end with 70.4% and Sweden and Finland at the low end with 7.5% and 7.7%, respectively[xlix]. And yet a smallish percentage of the EU-15 population is employed on this near majority of land: in England, 1% of the labor force of 29.7 million; in Germany 2.8% of a labor force of 41.9 million; in France, Austria and Denmark, 4% of the labor forces of 26.6 million, 4.3 million, and 2.8 million, respectively; and in Greece, 20% of a labor force of 4.3 million.[l] Greek arable land measured at 26% in 1953 has remained unchanged at the same ration today.[li]

The overall profile of select EU-15 countries lends credence to reasonable conclusions that where industrialization outpaced agricultural growth earlier in the epoch of modernization, the percentage of the total labor force that is gainfully employed in the primary sector is smaller than in those countries that experienced industrialization at a later period or which are still considered emerging markets or developing economies. There is no question that Greece qualifies as a “late-late” industrializer.[lii]

The internationalization of farmers under the auspices of COPA-COGECA at the EU level leaves open the question of to what degree national farmers in turn have the capacity to influence agriculture policy. John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg note that since the EU Council (made up of member state representatives) fixes most CAP pricing, farmers have been most likely to lobby their national capitals rather than Brussels, while Grant has argued that the influence of the farm lobby has been exaggerated[liii]

Greeks appear receptive to EU agricultural policies and yet Greek civil society – customs, pathways, citizen-government relations – seems to pose barriers to political change, or at least to citizen involvement outside acts of collective action, which Greeks generally are prone to. Consider two sets of data:

a) Greek responses to a Eurobarometer poll about the common agriculture policy showed a marked upward trend compared to 2004 on the questions of whether they are in favor of CAP, whether the CAP supports organic production, if the CAP encourages product diversification, whether CAP helps farmers adapt their production to consumer expectations, and whether CAP improves life in the countryside.[liv]

b) A recent multi-center study comparing so-called cohesion countries (countries whose GDP is less than 90% the EU average and who receive EU monies for regional and structural growth; Portugal, Ireland and Greece) with two newcomer countries (Poland and Hungary) in the area of institutional learning found Greece lacking in the areas of development of civil society and social partnership[lv] Greece was found to have a mostly barrier-inducing infrastructure for political change and implementation of policy, with a high degree of clientelism, a poor administrative tradition, lack of decision-making consensus, weak civil society, low citizen involvement and limited awareness by the public of their rights and obligations, low level of participation by non-state actors, lack of social capital (trust, norms and networks), limited NGO participation, poorly informed and fragmented trade unions and a centralized Greek state that has militated against successful adoption to EU regional policy.

Conclusion

The pressures of EU membership, and demands for political, economic and cultural readjustment, have been documented for decades and there is an appreciably large body of literature attendant to the issue. National political experiences notwithstanding, the union of political interests as reflected in the EU body designed to encompass and recast national interests into European interests writ large, namely the EU Parliament, is the institution which will no doubt feel the effects of a freshman class of nations whose farming sector far outpaces in numbers those of the existing 15 EU nations. It is telling that of the 83 members of the current Committee on Agriculture of Europarliament, Poland holds eight seats, as much as Italy, and one more than the UK,

both early members of the EU. France and Germany each hold 11 seats, and Greece and the Netherlands each hold three.[lvi] The farmers of Poland and Romania combined amount to 7.5 million, almost as many as the EU-15, at 8.2 million, and more than three times as many as the other eight combined.[lvii]

Having said that, where are we left with the dilemma of analyzing the political participation of Greek farmers today? Let me offer this conclusion: If we can assume the phenomenon of the Greek majoritarian system in combination with centrist parties whose once differentiated ideologies have lost their symbolism and leave little choice for the farmer given their similar agricultural policies, which are largely constrained by EU agricultural policies, leaving voting patterns at the national level unremarkable, it would appear more rewarding to examine the political participation of farmers at the EU level, where competencies in the area of agricultural policy are wider and more determinative of outcome.

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Endnotes

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[i] Hobsbawm 1994, 289 and ff. He writes, "By the 1980s even the ancient strongholds of peasant agriculture in the east and south-east of the continent had no more than a third or so of their labour force in farming (Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece), and some had considerably less, notably Bulgaria (16.5 per cent in 1985)" (p. 291).

[ii] The average farm size in Greece is the smallest in the EU, at 4.3 hecatres, compared to the EU average of 16.4, and the UK, the largest among EU countries, at 67.3 hecatres. (Damianos et al, Fig. 2.1, 65)

"The European Community has not claimed responsibility for total Community welfare as the Treaty of Rome avoided any commitment for the achievement of economic and social cohesion among member states. In Greece, structural adjustment and change has been slow. For various reasons, farmers have been able to stay in agriculture by accepting lower farm incomes at a time when structural change in northern member states has already taken place to a great extent." (Damianos, et al. 161-162)

[iii] The primary sector in Greece contributed an estimated 8.3% to GDP in 2001, compared to an EU average of less than 3%. Agriculture-based products account for the largest proportion of exports among the EU 15, at 23.4% in 1997, the last year for which the Greek Central Bank had figures (The Economist Intelligence Unit online, "Economic Sectors: Agriculture and Fishing", http://db.eiu.com.

[iv] Eugen Weber, in his review of Suzanne Berger's study of French peasants in Brittany, reiterates the conclusions Berger drew for her subjects: that economic engagement means political engagement. "The organization that had long tried to protect its members from politics," Weber wrote, "now seeks to protect them through politics." See Weber, below.

[v] France is the largest agricultural producer and exporter in the EU. An astute assessment of the clout of French farmers is as follows: "One of the constant surprises of the past thirty years has been the ability of the narrow political interests of a relatively small number of French farmers to overcome the obvious national interest of France in exploiting its competitive position" (Ockenden et al. 29). Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent (May 29, 2005) "non" vote against the EU's draft constitution, where some 70% of French farmers voted against ratification of the document, according to *The New York Times*, "French No Vote on Constitution Rattles Europe," May 31, 2005, A1, A10 jump.

[vi] Zestos, 273.

[vii] While studies of farming communities in Greece are not uncommon among anthropologists (see Delamont), there is an underrepresentation of studies that investigate the nexus where political interests meet rural cultivation. Given Greece's high level of agriculture-based output – in that it has not undergone the structural adjustment that northern EU states have undergone -- the Greek case may offer comparative clues to the political behavior of farmers in other countries, particularly those which are new to the European Union and which have, by comparison, still sizeable farming sectors (i.e., Poland, at 27% of the labor force (CIA World Factbook Online).

[viii] Coutsoumaris, 32.

[ix] Damianos, 8-9; Mouzelis, 77-79; Close 50.

[x] Perlepes, 232-234.

[xi] Damianos, 9-13, 30, 40.

[xii] Damianos et al., 21, 24, 30-31, 32, 52.

[xiii] Vizantinopoulos interview.

[xiv] Damianos et al., 43.

[xv] Ockenden, et al., 33.

[xvi] Jansen, 623.

[xvii] Shanin (1966) as quoted in Hobsbawm (1973), 5.

[xviii] This finding is the result of numerous computer database searches including the following: Columbia Libraries holdings CLIO, search keywords "political parties Europe"; CLIO keywords "Europe, Eastern—Politics and Government—1989—", " Political Parties—Europe, Eastern"; CLIO keywords "Poland Peasantry", "farmers", "farmers Europe", "peasants" "peasants Europe 20th century"; CLIO keywords "European Agriculture", "agrarian parties". The most substantively relevant and extensive yield came from an online Social Science Citation Index search of Jim Scott's *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (1976), now a classic for pre-capitalist or transitional peasant studies, for the years 1998-2003. Hundreds of hits came up for these four years alone, most of which were for studies of the sort described above. Confirming this trend is the "Select Bibliography" of Leonard and Kaneff (2002) in their introductory chapter, 39-43. Their edited volume, while stressing anthropological work along the lines of identity, is nonetheless generous in reviewing the literature on peasant studies more generally across disciplines and geographical areas. Finally, as in all good initial research searches, one thing does lead to another rather quickly, and my eventual cursory review of the accumulated efforts of the writers included in *The Journal of Peasant Studies* leads to the same general conclusion. Of noted exception to all the searches conducted is the applicability of the term "peasant" to contemporary Eastern and Central Europe, particularly as it describes specific political parties in Poland.

[xix] See Shanin 1987 for an impassioned defense of the continuation of peasant studies. "[T]he analysis of peasants has broader significance for a number of other contemporary problems, especially those concerning family economies, from capitalist family-farming in the US to the 'second economy' of contemporary Italy or Hungary." Furthermore, writes Shanin, "because peasants are still half of mankind, and if we add the peasants' sons, a large majority of the population of the globe." (473).

See Hobsbawm (1973) who authored the lead article in the charter issue of *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, where he includes in his definition of a traditional peasantry those peasants involved in some expression of both formal and informal collectivity (social, economic). This is an added feature to the peasant who is defined normatively in economic terms, as a smaller social unit of family organization. Hobsbawm extends the realm of "peasant analysis" to include the peasant who is at the juncture where family economy begins to give way to social and economic class differentiation, i.e., as it moves toward a market economy, passage to the metropole, or a variant of technological change or advancement (pp. 4-5ff). In this regard, Berger's study of rural organization in Brittany is one such example.

Marcus J. Kurtz, in "Understanding Peasant Revolution: From Concept to Theory and Case" (*Theory and Society* 29: 93-124, 2000) lays out four principal dimensions used to define the term "peasantry" and five definitional categories for "peasantry" as culled from the literature on peasant revolutions.

[xx] Hobsbawm 1973, 4.

[xxi] Scott 1976.

[xxii] Levi 2000.

[xxiii] Arnold 2001
.

[xxiv] Perlepes 254-255.

[xxv] Perlepes, 276, 272. The Agricultural Bank of Greece was founded in 1929 under law 1332/1929, as an autonomous banking organization to distribute credit and technical advice to farmers, though its board of

directors **is** appointed by the government. The Agricultural Bank of Greece was commercialized in 1986 and acquired by the Bank of Nova Scotia (Greece) in 2000 (Pagoulatos 227, 189).

[xxvi] PASEGES online, http://www.paseges.gr.

[xxvii] Close, 51, 173, 258; and Perlepes, 277 specifically. Perlepes' 1989 dissertation discusses the state's historical involvement, through financing, bureaucratic administration, national banks and outright steerage, in Greek agricultural organizations, preventing them from functioning effectively and autonomously in the political arena and in the market.

[xxviii] Perlepes, 277.

[xxix] Philippe C. Schmitter's distinctions between pluralism and corporatism are as follows (from Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics*, 36:1, January 1974, 96, 93-94, as cited in Keeler, 7): Pluralism is "a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly or representative activity within their respective categories."

Schmitter defines corporatism as a "system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demand and supports."

Molina and Rhodes, arguing that corporatism has changed in process and outcome but not in spirit, suggest that corporatist concertation has become "*less formal, less institutionalized*, and less predictable" and therefore … "structures and actors should be understood in terms of *networks*; their logics in terms of the processes that underpin them; their fate in terms of the evolution of integration and the changing 'currency' of exchange", 326 [emphasis added].

[xxx] Keeler 3-5. Thanks to Clifford Rosenberg for providing me with the bibliography on French farming consulted for this study.

[xxxi] Keeler, 12.

[xxxii] Keeler, 264.

[xxxiii] Berger, x, 30, and 32.

[xxxiv] Berger, 8.

[xxxv] Paraskevopoulos, 71.

[xxxvi] Paraskevopoulos, 73.

[xxxvii] Paraskevopoulos, 140.

[xxxviii] Puhle 312-313. I cannot corroborate the findings of Puhle regarding the dual influences over PASEGES. The literature on the state and farmers in Greece is so scant with only passing references in more general treatments of Greek politics that I am at a loss to explain how one party can control a union while another heavily influences it. This question alone warrants field research and conversations with those who know the official and unofficial stories. See also a report by Pavlos D. Pezaros, Greek Director for Agriculture Policy, Ministry for Rural Development and Food, entitled "The Greek Experience in Relationship with the EU and the Role of Greek Agricultural Civil Organization in Influencing EU Policy –

Successes and Failures," representing his personal views, not the Ministry's, which I downloaded from the internet.

[xxxix] *Agrotikos*, March 2004 issue, page 7.

[xl] Kalyvas, 90.

[xli] George Papandreou statements: Athens, January 25, 2005; Athens, January 28, 2005; Tegea, Arkadia, February 5, 2005; and Athens, February 9, 2005. Transcripts obtained from George A. Papandreou's personal website.

[xlii] The foregoing section on consolidation is culled from Braneau et al., and Legg et al.

[xliii] Paraskevopoulos, 99.

[xliv] Gunther and Montero in Diamandouros et al., 147.

[xlv] Turkey also applied for associate membership two months after Greece, on July 31, 1959, granted December 1, 1964, despite Greece's protestations. Turkey required a longer preparatory stage preceding the transitional stage, which became effective on January 1, 1973. Turkey's membership was frozen due to its own military takeover on September 12, 1980. Though once the dictatorship ended and relations normalized with the November 1983 elections, the priority of Turkey's membership took a back seat to the Union's enlargement in the Mediterranean in the 1980's. where it remains today (Tsalicoglou 14).

[xlvi] Tsalicoglou, 115. I also consulted Tsalicoglou for parts of the foregoing section on Greece's entry into the EU, particularly pages 9, 10, 12-18, 29, 103, and 115.

[xlvii] "The CAP is thus the product of the uneasy post-war alliance of the French imperative of agricultural expansion with the German desire for food security," writes Gardner, 16. On the other hand, Elmar Rieger has written that "the much repeated assertion that there was a political bargain between the industrial interests of Germany and the agricultural interests of France should be laid to rest. The record provides no evidence for this, nor would it have made much sense economically" (Rieger, pp. 183-184).

[xlviii] Ockenden, 2-3 and Gardner 13.

[xlix] European Commission: European Economy No. 5, 1997, p. 52, Table 3.

[l] Adapted from Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook Online. According to the 1991 Census, the Greek population was 10.26 million, similar to that of Austria or Denmark, whose work forces number about the same as Greece's (*Statesman's Yearbook 2003*, pg. 748). The data for Greece is corroborated by the *Yearbook of Labor Statistics 2002*, International Labor Office, Geneva, pg. 21. *Key Indicators of the Labor Market*, International Labor Organization, 2003 (3rd edition), shows a constant though incremental decline over time by both men and women's participation in the agricultural sector, as shown by the percentage of the total population in agriculture, as follows: 1990, 23.9%; '93, 21.3%; '94, 20.8%; '95, 20.4%; '96, 20.3%; and '97:19.8% (Table KILM4, pp 193-194). The 2001 Greek Census accounts for a total workforce over age 15 at 4,101,949; 311,259 are employed in fisheries and agriculture; 717 EU non-nationals were employed in agriculture, and 26,255 non-national, non-EU workers were in agriculture. 2001 Greek Census Online http://www.statistics.gr/eng_tables/S1100_SAP_5_euro15.htm.

[li] Coutsoumaris 32; Pezaros 2.

[lii] Pagoulatos, George*: Greece's New Political Economy: State, Finance, and Growth from Postwar to EMU*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 12.

[liii] Peterson and Bomberg, 139.

[liv] Eurobarometer 221, "European and Common Agriculture Policy" 2005 survey. Europa.eu.int/comm..agriculture/survey/2005/rep_en.pdf.

[lv] Paraskevoooulos, Christos: "Final Report/Executive Summary: EU Enlargement and Multi-level Governance in European Regional and Environment Policies: Patterns of Institutional Learning, Adaptation and Europeanization among Cohesion Countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and Lessons for new members (Hungary and Poland)". Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute of the London School of Economics, November 2003.

[lvi] Europarliament website, wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/.

[lvii] Tangerman and Swinnen, 186.

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF FLORENCE

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THE FOUNDING PROCLAMATION OF THE NATIONAL RADICAL UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

2nd LSE PhD SYMPOSIUM ON MODERN GREECE

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THE FOUNDING PROCLAMATION OF THE NATIONAL RADICAL UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

Introduction

The dominance of Christian Democracy in Western Europe is a central feature of the contemporary European history. Considering the electoral success of the Christian democratic parties and their strong influence in postwar European politics, it is striking that in the bibliography, there still exist visible gaps in terms of their ideology, political identity or policy-making. This is perhaps more so in the case of post-war Greek politics: research has focused on the aftershocks of the 1946-49 civil war, anti-communism and various theories regarding the advent of the post 1967- dictatorship, leaving aside other important issues, such as the development of Greek political culture and its relationship with European developments.

Like the Christian Democratic parties in the1950s and 1960s, the National Radical Union was a significant key player in the Greek political system between the years 1956 and 1967. The dynamics of both the Christian Democratic parties and the NRU in the postwar liberal democracies cannot be explained only in terms of changes in social structure and political economy. Instead we should also focus on their organizational patterns and their political identity to understand the principles governing their success and to explain their electoral success.

This paper aims to approach a poorly researched aspect of Greek political history, namely, the ideology of the NRU as this was reflected in its founding proclamation of 4 January 1956. The NRU's founding declaration was the first, and for some time the only, ideological proclamation of a party which dominated Greek political life for almost a decade. It remained the ideological cornerstone for Karamanlis's policies throughout 1956-63, including options of fundamental importance for the country, such as the strategies of economic growth, social priorities, Greece's international position, or even,

in later stages, the European option. The declaration reflected Karamanlis's perceptions for his party's position in the Greek political spectrum, and provided the main instrument for the political mobilization of the NRU's masses during the years of its electoral supremacy.

Moreover, it will be attempted to proceed to a comparison between the agendas of the NRU and the European Christian Democracy underlying the features that were common in their identity. Taking into account different historical traditions, constitutional conditions and national dilemmas, but also common challenges in European reconstruction and cold war priorities, the extent to which the Christian Democratic Parties influenced the NRU's priorities and political discourse is a question of crucial importance in evaluating post-civil war Greek politics.

Some questions I would like to pose are the following: What meaning does the notion of NRU policies have? What is the connecting link between the various Christian democratic parties in Europe and the NRU considering the different historical traditions, constitutional conditions and national dilemmas? In other words, are there any common features among the Christian Democratic parties and the NRU?

It must be noted that this paper is just a first attempt to interpret the political profile of the NRU in the scope of the wider European framework and the Christian Democratic culture. To prove the unity of ideas, we will co-examine the founding proclamation of the NRU on the one hand and the fundamental features of the Christian Democratic movement on the other. This comparison is based on the centre-right orientation that both the NRU and the Christian Democratic parties had. In addition, they were parties in government across national boundaries and they enjoyed a high cohesiveness which was much higher than that of the rival Social Democracy and the Greek centrist parties.

Christian Democracy in Europe

Christian Democratic parties descend from the family of political Catholicism. Although almost all of them were non-confessional parties in the postwar era, they were heavily dependent on their Christian roots. A lot of Christian Democratic features are identified

with the Christian social teaching such as the interventionist role of state and the principle of subsidiarity[1]. The term "Christian Democracy" corresponds to the progressive wing of the Catholic political and social movements and implies the reaction of Catholic democrats to liberalism, to the industrial revolution and to socialism. However, the formation of confessional parties in Western Europe and the prewar origins of the Christian Democratic parties are beyond the scope of this presentation. Fogarty and Irving are the major scholars that have made a comparative analysis on the formation and the development of Christian Democratic parties[2]. More recently, Kalyvas concentrated on how political identities and parties were formed studying the origins and shifting identity of confessional parties in the European continent during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries[3].

On the other hand, there were never confessional parties in Greece[4]. To cut a long story short, contrary to what happened in Catholic Europe where the involvement of the Catholic Church was a fundamental part of political ethics, the Orthodox Church has not established political parties in order to face anticlericalism, which was never high in Greece. Besides, both conservative and liberal political elites avoided to build their political parties on religious lines for mass mobilization purposes. Needless to say, orthodox identity was always dominant and above political parties on the one hand and on the other religion kept its social and cultural character as it did not constitute a political identity, a legacy coming from the ottoman past. It is indicative that religious faith was not transformed into a politicized cleavage neither during the age of National Schism or during the Civil War

After 1945, the Christian Democratic parties had a spectacular growth given that these parties were in power in five major European countries such as Germany, Italy,

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[1] Van Rompuy, Herman, "Formulating the Christian-Social Approach and Making it More Concrete", in European People's Party, *Efforts to Define a Christian Democratic "Doctrine"*, Occasional Papers, Brussels, 1989, pp. 13-15.

[2] Fogarty, M. P., *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957; Irving, R. E. M., *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1979.

[3] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1996.

[4] Definitions of confessional parties vary. Here we adopt Kalyvas' definition: "I define as confessional those parties that use (or have used when formed) religion (or issues related to religion or the church) as a primary issue for political mobilization and the construction of political identities", see Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1996, p. 19.

Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. These parties were formed simultaneously but rather independently in each country. This is evident if we take into account the exceptional case of Italy and that of Germany. Christian Democracy was founded in Italy in 1943, when the country was liberated by the Allies. Its origins were going back to the Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano) and soon became the main leading force in the postwar Italy under De Gasperi. Parallelly, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was established in West Germany in 1945 playing a pivotal role in the government after 1949. In general, from 1945 till the end of 1980s Christian Democracy emerged as a major political force either in government or in opposition. Besides, the European federation of Christian Democratic parties was a dominating power in the European parliament[5].

Christian Democratic Cooperation

We should take into account that Christian Democratic cooperation was ideologically weak and not very unified[6]. Contrary to proletarian internationalism, the Christian Democratic parties generally lacked an international calling. They had not formed a common strategy and they lacked any solid social policy even though they shared common values and the social teaching of the Christian tradition. Besides, the Christian Democratic parties never adopted a common manifest or a sort of common electoral platform. It must be noted that there was not a Christian Democratic transnational party in the 1950s and 1960s as political parties, by definition, become transnational only when they develop supranational organizations that cooperate across national boundaries. National parties of that period are neither members of a wider transnational party nor have individual party members in supranational executives. The Council of Europe, the United Nations, or the EEC could not be interpreted yet as supranational governments. In this sense, Christian Democratic parties paid more attention to national identity and not to transnational one.

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[5] Jansen, Thomas, *The European People's Party: Origins and Development*, Macmillan Press, London and New York, 1998, pp. 31-70.
[6] Papini, Robert, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York and London, 1997, pp. 267-268.

However, the incorporation of certain normative values such as liberal democracy against Marxist or market economy against the socialist form of development allowed the consciousness of a transnational Christian Democratic culture. Up to a certain degree, the common origin and values between the Christian Democratic parties cannot be denied. This was obvious for instance in the "Christmas Program" of the Belgium PSC-CVP in 1945: "The party is Christian since it wishes to take as its basis those human values that are the foundation of our Western culture and civilization. Historically speaking, these have been brought to us by Christianity; today, however, they provide a common heritage for believers and non-believers alike". What is more, the formulation of a European identity and the idea of European integration that was adopted and promoted by the Christian Democrats allowed to a certain degree the cooperation between the Christian Democratic parties[7]. Thus, a decentralized and soft cooperation gradually developed. Furthermore, transnational policies were undertaken on several aspects of policy-making giving the opportunity to the political parties to share information and to form a communication network[8].

The ongoing consolidation of transnational political initiatives in the early cold war era could not but affect Greece. The Greek statesmen turned towards institutions of multilateral cooperation which defined a common framework of security and economic policy. After 1945, Greece did not evolve independently of such international influence in promoting its reconstruction plan and economic development. On the contrary, it tried to integrate itself to the western institutions of economic cooperation and development – see for example the drachma's participation in the Bretton Woods system. Greece was also a founding member of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation that led to the establishment of OECD. It also joined the Council of Europe and was admitted into GATT.

Like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi, Constantine Karamanlis supported European integration and started negotiations in the late 1950s in order to associate Greece with the Community. European federation was

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[7] Irving, R. E. M., *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1979, pp. 235-252.

[8] Papini, Robert, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York and London, 1997, pp. 49-158

seen as a western cultural group or entity, of which Greece was almost axiomatically a member. In this sense, Karamanlis was fully aware that European integration based on the common values of democracy, economic cooperation and supranational institutions would safeguard the orientation of Greece to Western Europe. In essence, Karamanlis had the opportunity to collaborate with the European leaders during the negotiation process and to develop ideas more about European integration and less about general political and social issues. Needless to say, these contacts were mostly personal and did not lead to any permanent link or inter-party cooperation between the NRU and other Christian Democratic parties.

Founding Proclamation of the NRU

The announcement of the establishment of the new party took place in Karamanlis' house in the presence of Greek and foreign journalists. Apart from George Rallis, politician of the right-wing camp and minister of the Prime Minister's Office, no one else were there. Karamanlis explained that it was his choice to be alone at that moment and that there was no kind of communication or consultation between him and his political friends implying that he was the only one responsible for the decision to create a new party.

Moreover, Karamanlis' fundamental goal was to form a new party that would be a breaking point to the Greek political culture as well as the party formation. He justified the three words making up the title of his party with the following way: the word "National" indicated the contradiction to the Left while the term "Radical" referred to the progressive character of the new movement. The third word, "Union", meant to bring together the Center and the Right, the progressives and the conservatives[9]. The NRU was not a mere clone of its political predecessor, Papagos' Greek Rally. In what follows, I shall try to prove that NRU tried to upgrade the political discourse and image of the right-wing movement in Greece.

Karamanlis' starting point was to overcome the political incongruities of the past between republicans and royalists – venizelists and antivenizelists – who were

[9] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 337.

represented by the Liberal Party and the People's Party respectively. This was the dominant cleavage in the Greek politics of the interwar era. The origins of the conflict go back to the World War I when Venizelos, prime minister and leader of the Liberal Party, openly disagreed with King Constantine about country's orientation to the war. The polarization in the domestic politics led to the civil war of 1915-1917. The "National Schism", as it is well known, was reproduced by both the Liberal Party and the People's Party during the turbulent interwar era and left its own mark on the individual and collective memory.

The new party almost immediately not only superseded the People's Party and the minor right-wing parties but also dominated in the central political scene. It managed to win an electoral majority on three successive elections: 1956, 1958, and 1961. This was unique for the postwar Greece, since not even a political party had succeeded in this till then. In what follows, I shall underpin the main points of the ideology and the programmatic principles that NRU promoted. Given that all political parties work out the ethics and the politics of their age, the NRU cannot be an exception in the above rule.

Its founding proclamation was built entirely on the terms of "peaceful revolution" and "reform". Both of these terms sound socialistic in their sense, but the conception of "revolution" given by the NRU was apparently much different. It seems clear that Karamanlis has not hesitated to incorporate the term "revolution" that was so much connected with the socialist dialectic. Furthermore, "revolution" attached to class divisions and included armed activity. It may sound paradoxical that Karamanlis used this term as the cornerstone of his party ideology although the Greek bourgeois parties had met not only the utter disclamation of the postwar regime but also the violent operations of the Communist Party during the Civil War in the late 1940s.

Besides, Karamanlis himself was a strong opponent of communism and he never tried to cooperate with the left political camp. Nevertheless, he incorporated the above term making it part of the NRU's political vocabulary. He attributed to it a new concept that was far away from socialist thought. Karamanlis' "peaceful revolution" was attached to the rejection of nineteenth century lasses-faire liberalism and to the reforming character of conservatism implying the new role a modern party ought to play. He constantly underlined the necessity to go beyond the limited framework of the interwar

ideologies. Moreover, he was fully convinced that the state should guide the economic activity and that economic development along with welfare state should be the best guarantee for democracy.

It must be noted that the term “revolution” did not correlated, apparently, to the Bolshevik Revolution or to the French Revolution but to the American Revolution of 1776. In this context, the revolutionary movement of 1776 had a “positive” sense as the establishment of the American constitution defended the human rights. This “good” context of “revolution” was addressed by Luigi Sturzo, the internationally prominent theorist and Catholic priest, when he referred to the new role of the Christian Democratic parties in 1944: “Catholics in political life will no longer represent the old clericalism, the systematic opponent of modern parliamentary and democratic forces; they will not be afraid of the social conquests of the proletariat; they are responsible for a progressive and gradually “revolutionary” movement (in the good sense, as the American movement of 1776 was “revolutionary”)”[10]. The catholic meaning that lies beneath was that Christian Democracy was seen as the response to the alleviation of economic and social misery that industrialization and urbanization entailed. In addition, Christian Democracy was in favor of political action only in promotion of human and social rights rejecting the idea of military means.

Like most non-communist Greek parties of the postwar era, the NRU lacked a structured mechanism to promote its discourse. The political identity and the assessment of governmental priorities of the NRU were defined by its founder in general. The NRU’s political ideology was first stated in the party’s founding declaration of January 1956. Karamanlis announced the establishment of his party in the public presenting a whole set of ideological principles. However, we should take into consideration that Karamanlis, just like European Christian Democrats who did not often speak of their doctrine, was reluctant to make extensive references to theory or to wider philosophical issues. As a matter of fact, we cannot justify and explain the values and principles of these parties unless we turn to their political action.

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[10] Papini, Robert, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York and London, 1997, footnote 20, p.118.

Besides, Thomas Jansen, ex general secretary of the European Union of Christian Democrats People's Party (EPP) and of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD), points out that Christian Democracy might not be an intellectual and political movement but it offers an alternative to ideologies in actual politics[11]. Like Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, the NRU inspired by the conservative tradition and developed as a counter-position to communism and to superficial yet tense quarrels of the National Schism.

It must be noted that the NRU was a party in government between the years 1956-1963 and like the Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe put emphasis more on problems and policy-making than on ideology. Insofar as Karamanlis' party was strongly identified with the government, it is too difficult to make a distinction between the party and the government during these years. His goal was to create a "new" party that would operate in the centre of the politico-ideological spectrum offering a new perspective and a new dynamics to the electorate. The maneuvering between 19th century liberalism and socialism displays the most convergent feature between the NRU and Christian Democracy. Like the Christian Democratic leaders, Karamanlis was convinced that a middle ground could be found between laissez-faire capitalism and socialism. As it will be shown more analytically below, his idea was indicated in the second adjective composing the NRU's name, "Radical".

Karamanlis himself, although initially he seemed to intend to create a modern mass party, avoided to develop the party's own structures in the end. Instead, he worked heavily only on the accomplishment of his governmental duties laying aside the strengthening of the party organs. To a large extent, the party tended to rely on the state and the charisma of its leader for the reproduction of its power. By choosing to sacrifice the party development in favor of governmental tasks, the NRU was nothing more than a typical ruling party of its age. Besides Karamanlis' leading style was very much closed to the political behavior of the foremost Christian Democratic leaders as he addressed himself to be statesman more than party man.

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[11] Jansen, Thomas, "The European People's Party Reflects on Its Intellectual Basis in order to Strengthen Its Sense of Direction", in European People's Party, *Efforts to Define a Christian Democratic "Doctrine"*, Occasional Papers, Brussels, 1989, pp. 7-10, here p. 8.

In the early postwar years, the foremost European statesmen, including Karamanlis, revealed themselves to embed liberal democracy and especially economic development. Seeing ideology as politics in action, we could focus on the governmental policy-making in a further research. It must be noted that political ideology is a systemized set of opinions that has been hierarchically ordered to a certain degree[12]. The hierarchy of principles and objectives is defined considerably by the political and economic framework or dilemmas that a party in government has to cope with. As rational choice theory indicates political ideology is connected with objective factors and socio-economic structures. Political actors, therefore, have specified preferences and adopt such strategies that maximize their utility within given constraints[13]. The governmental priorities and the policies setting in motion reveal what problems are considered the most salient for the development of society. This might offer a clear vision of the party's political and ethical culture insofar as the governmental personnel is identified with the leading figures of the NRU.

In this sense, a closest consideration of the actors who formulate the decision-making might give enough evidence in the analysis of the above task. There has been no serious effort to look at the conservatives themselves in order to answer such questions as: who were they and what characteristics did they share. A future research should provide tentative answers to these questions.

"Union"

Insofar as the three words making up the NRU represent an ideological component we should analyze its founding proclamation under this scope. To begin with, the first part refers to the cleavage between royalists and republicans of the interwar era. To a certain degree, despite the turbulent decade of 1940s, the World War II, the country's occupation, and the Civil War, its influence was still powerful in the beginning of 1950s. This was apparent in the years 1950-1952, when all the party coalitions formed in the

[12] Dierickx, Guido, "Christian Democracy and Its Ideological Rivals: An Empirical Comparison in the Low Countries", in Hanley, David (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1994, pp. 15-30, here p. 15-16.
[13] Downs, Anthony, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper Collins, New York, 1957.

base of the afore-mentioned distinction. More specifically, the centrist governments of the years 1950-1952 were coalitions between the main leaders of the liberal camp, all coming from the Liberal Party of Eleutherios Venizelos: Nicolaos Plastiras, Sophocles Venizelos, and George Papandreou.

On the opposing side, there were the military and political winners of the Civil War. In order to face the communist threat and the guerilla bands the conservative and the liberal camp drew closer, at least in the short term. Both of these groups were labeled as "nationally-minded", because they "saved" the country defending the nation's traditions and, as a result, they set the rules for the postwar politics. The political lineage of the conservative camp went back to the royalists and the People's Party, whilst the liberal one stemmed from the republicans and the Liberal Party.

Although their ideological origins were completely diverse, these two wide coalitions shared a consensus with regard to the postwar political and economic objectives. Above all, their common distaste for communist ideology worked as cement between them helping them to diminish the vast differences of the past. This was comprehensible when both of them opted for King George's return to Greece in the plebiscite of September 1946 putting an end with this way to the long overdue question of the role of the monarchy in the domestic politics. The liberals tacitly accepted the monarchy in view of the new challenge coming from the Left Parliamentarianism. The democratic institutions and the value of liberal democracy were fundamental in their ideology too. Apart from this, they had common priority to retain the country in the West. Besides, they never doubted the free market economy and they agreed in the interventionist role of state and the model of the postwar reconstruction and development.

The argument here is that there were relatively minor disagreements between the conservatives and the liberals in the postwar era. The division between them was not clear-cut as they were not separated by definitive ideological differences and programmatic goals. In this context, we should interpret those attempts, sporadic and incomplete in most cases, aiming at superseding the National Schism. Kanellopoulos was the first to ask the breakdown of the division lines between royalists and republicans when he founded his first political party in December 1935 named "National United Party". During the years of occupation, there was also a frequent communication and

exchange of ideas between politicians and economists coming from opposing camps such as Kanellopoulos, Tsatsos, Papandreou, Zolotas, Aggelopoulos, Mavros, Svolos, and Karamanlis[14]. In the election of 1946, the first elections after the country's liberation, G. Papandreou, S. Venizelos and P. Kanellopoulos joined their efforts as co-leaders of a new party labeled "National Political Union". To a certain degree, these highlights depict a tacit convergence between the two camps, on which Karamanlis was able to build at the moment of the NRU's creation.

When Marshall Papagos founded the Greek Rally on 6th of August 1951, his aim, mainly, was to reestablish the right-wing camp that had started to be fragmentized. In November 1950, P. Kanellopoulos and S. Stefanopoulos founded the "Populist Uniting Party" and absorbed a lot of deputies from the People's Party, Karamanlis was among them. Spyros Markezinis' "New Party" was another party which detached deputies from the People's Party. After all these removals, the latter had lost the broadness of the past and it was represented only by its leader Constantine Tsaldares and his group. Both the Populist Uniting Party and the New Party were dissolved and their leaders, Kanellopoulos, Stefanopoulos, and Markezinis, joined Papagos' Greek Rally.

The first stage of such a unified initiative was the creation of Papagos's Greek Rally in 1951; by the next year, the Rally attracted most of the leading personalities of the Right, as well as some prominent centrists, for example former Governor of the Bank of Greece and former Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos who became one of the leading figures of the Greek Rally [15]. Besides, George Papandreou joined the Greek Rally as an independent politician.

Later on, when Karamanlis founded his party, the consolidation of the right-wing camp and the incorporation of liberal politicians were continued. According to the proclamation of the NRU, the elections of 1956 should be the landmark of a new political phase characterized by new political parties and the supremacy of new leaders and politicians. The division between liberals and conservatives, as they came out after the National Schism of 1915, was considered anachronistic and responsible for the

[14] For a further analysis, see Χατζηβασιλείου, Ευάνθης, *Ο Ελληνικός Φιλελευθερισμός στο Σταυροδρόμι: Η «Σοσιαλίζουσα» Φάση, 1934-1944*, Σιδέρης, Αθήνα, 2003.

[15] The 69 out of the 300 candidates of the Greek Rally in the elections of 1952 had cooperated with the centrist parties in the past. See *Νικολακόπουλος, Ηλίας, Η Καχεκτική Δημοκρατία: Κόμματα και Εκλογές, 1946-1967*, Πατάκης, Αθήνα, 2001, footnote 121, p. 161.

shortcomings of the Greek political life. The outcome of the interwar division was unstable democratic institutions, political tensions, social unrest and ineffective governments[16].

For all that, Karamanlis decided to create a new party in order to achieve coherence in ruling it on the one hand and on the other to safeguard his leadership and his party durability. Inevitably, almost all deputies of the Greek Rally adhered to the National Radical Union with the exception of the three leading figures who preferred to take some distance from Karamanlis' initiative. Thus, S. Stefanopoulos became a strong opponent of Karamanlis and he never cooperated with the NRU, whilst P. Kanellopoulos appeared on the NRU ticket as an independent candidate. Emmanuel Tsouderos, an old man by now, decided not to run for election again. Spyros Markezinis, the former leading figure of Papagos' party, had established a new party named "Progressives' Party" after his withdrawal from the Greek Rally in November 1954 and he was never invited to join the NRU.

After becoming Prime Minister in October 1955, Karamanlis constantly noted that he relied more on the new generation of politicians laying aside the leading figures of the Greek Rally who represented the political generation of the 1930s or the 1940s. In this context, the NRU continued the integration process of liberal politicians. Contrary to the Greek Rally before, that time the outcome of this policy was wider and attracted more eminent figures from the liberal camp, such as Constantinos Tsatsos, Evangelos Averoff, Grigorios Kasimatis, Dimitris Makris, Augoustos Theologitis, and S. Kotiades. A great difference, now, was that Karamanlis not only incorporated the liberal personnel but also he took advantage of their experience and ideas. It is evident that the leading group of the NRU composed, equally, of both conservatives and liberals, a fact that never happened under Papagos leadership. Furthermore, many of them, such as Tsatsos, Makris, Averoff, and Kassimatis, were very close to Karamanlis and played a major role in determining the policies and the ideology of the NRU.

Another observation that it could be made here is whether the term "Union" implies the idea of European integration or not. There was an increasing awareness

[16] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, pp. 337-338.

among the Christian Democratic parties that certain problems could no longer be handled solely within the framework of national sovereignty. This is why these parties sought for international actors capable of asserting international views.

Karamanlis, like all the foremost Christian Democratic leaders – De Gasperi, Adenauer, Schuman, Monnet, Bidault – was fully aware that a common commitment to defense and democracy by the western European countries could give a new impulse to the country's attempts to follow successfully the way of capitalist development in the Cold War climate. However, it would be an "a posteriori" interpretation to argue that the idea of European integration was included in the term "Union". For sure, Karamanlis had an Atlanticist orientation while he was in power but his belief in the Christian Democrats' idea of Europe was not visible yet in the beginning of 1956. Besides, the EEC was established one year after the establishment of the NRU and Karamanlis inaugurated negotiations with the Community in the late 1950s.

"Radical"

As was mentioned before, the aperture to the liberal camp cannot be isolated to the level of political personnel. It was also the issue of ideology and governmental principles that was lying beneath. Apparently, Karamanlis sought to engulf liberal values in the ideological construction of his party. This ideological shift from conservatism to liberalism or, even better, the combination of conservative and liberal values depicted to the term "radical". Decoding this term is a sine qua non in the effort to understand the articulation of NRU's ideology especially in the political, economic, and social fields.

Greece's modernization was the central aim of the NRU. Karamanlis constantly returned to this subject in the founding declaration. Thus he said that the main drawback of Greece was the sketchy state organization and operation[17]. Thus, the public administration should be reformed in order to promote the nation interest. Another important issue was the perception of state by the Greek people. Karamanlis stressed that the state had ceased to encourage the nation activities and initiatives because it had

[17] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.

become hostage of the political divisions of the past on the one hand and the client-type relationship between politicians and voters on the other. As a matter of fact, a kind of distrust had been formed by the citizens towards the role of state itself. Here, a fundamental liberal democratic belief about social progress may be identifiable. According to Karamanlis, the state, by definition, promotes the public interest which, as a consequence, guarantees social progress. All these are parts of the same chain and function as a premise for the other. If the state does not work properly, this has bad effects on public interest and progress of social entity.

For all that, Karamanlis went on, the main problem of Greece was the political one. Karamanlis insisted on the mutual relationship between the political problem and all the other problems. According to him, the starting point of his political party should be the settlement of the political problem, which was translated into political instability and ineffective governments. Then, all the efforts should be concentrating on the overriding of the survival problems that the country was still facing. The increase of the national income and the improvement of the standard of living of the lower classes were tasks of highest importance. This would be achieved through "social justice"[18]. What is significant here is that the term "social justice" stemming from the social democratic discourse has been espoused as pivotal element of the ideological axes of the NRU. As it will be shown below, the concept of "social justice" was a major concern in Christian Democratic culture and originated from the philosophy of personalism.

Karamanlis did not omit to express his strong belief about the nation's abilities that could be boundless under one condition: the creation of a modern state characterized by decisiveness, promptness, and justice[19]. This was the crux of the meaning of the term "radical", which mostly applied on the role of state in the economy. Radicalism referred to the need for state intervention in the economy as well as the need for social solidarity. By adopting the term "radical", Karamanlis attempted to locate the NRU between conservatism and 19th century liberalism. At the same time, the word "radical"

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[18] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.

[19] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.

emphasized the progressive and the social character of the NRU. Karamanlis' aspiration was to create "a new political movement, which will become the meeting point of all the progressive and sound elements of the period"[20].

Historically, radicalism relates to a variant of liberalism as expressed in France of 19th century. In Greece this term appeared in the political thought of Eleutherios Venizelos[21]. Its use by Karamanlis illustrates a non dogmatic and a practical attitude of this leader towards political and economic problems. To a certain degree, the state tries to overcome the weakness of the national market and in the long run assumes a role in economic development by encouraging investment and trade competition. The role played by the state in industrialization and economic development has been part of the political consensus emerging in Greece.

In Europe, the increased role of the state was not only the result of the two World Wars, but also of the political urge to greater social solidarity. Besides, the growing knowledge of the science of economics altered totally the attitude towards economic phenomena. Thus, politicians were encouraged to control economic activity and face drastically events such as boom or depression, which were previously accepted fatally as phenomena of nature. In the 1950s and 1960s, the economic policy of the most Christian Democratic governments was set by people whose ideas were inspired by economic liberalism as well as the need to create a "social market". Einaudi in Italy and Erhard in West Germany were exceptional figures of that economic thought. Panagiotis Papaligouras, a key-figure in economic policy in Karamanlis' governments, was also another utter supporter of economic liberalism in Greece.

"National"

It is now time to turn the spotlight on the term "national". The focal point in the NRU ideology was the quests for both "reform" and "peaceful revolution". The NRU hoped to be the centre of "all the progressive and sound elements of the period". "Progressive" and

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[20] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.

[21] Σβολόπουλος, Κωνσταντίνος, *Ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και η πολιτική κρίσις εις την αυτόνομον Κρήτην, 1901-1906*, Ίκαρος, Αθήνα, 1974, pp. 118-162.

“sound” was considered to be whoever was against the «corruptive impact of communism»[22]. Communism was regarded as the opponent ideological and political regime.

Besides, anticommunism was a recognizable feature of NRU’s ideological identity too because this attitude was connected with the “framework of real democracy”. Having this perception in mind, according to which the NRU identified with “real democracy”, it should be pointed out that an opposite way of thinking also existed. According to the latter, “communism” and “democracy” were uncompromising values. In this frame of thought, the memories and the experiences of the Civil War could be identified. That is why communism was considered as “corruptive”. As everywhere in the western world by that period, the basic line of political and social division established itself in the antithesis between Communism and Democracy.

From another perspective, Karamanlis’ reaction to the communist danger was not so much idealistic but rather pragmatic. His intention was not at all to face communism on a theoretical level in terms of a contest between the communist and the NRU doctrine. Instead, his focus was on the governmental level and his policy-making. The chronic inability of the previous governments should be replaced by a coherent and effective policy, able to visibly improve the country’s position and the standard of living of its people. The fight between “peaceful revolution” and communism was a fight against, political instability, the country’s poverty and, social injustice. According to Karamanlis’ syllogism, only when these problems would be solved, the communist threat would decrease.

Apart from the ideological battle between communism and liberal democracy, the interpretation of anti-communism also had another practical aspect, namely electoral success. Once Karamanlis decided to establish a new party and to enter into the electoral competition, he knew he should be effective in elections. No matter what the values and the goals are, a party must win votes. Seeking electoral support Karamanlis declared his revulsion to the socialist doctrine as the anti-communist syndrome was influential within the Greek society.

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[22] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.

Hitherto the term “national” was analyzed on the grounds of anti-communism. Nevertheless, the above term employs a fundamental belief of liberal ideology which has to do with the perception of the nation and the concept of the people. The founding proclamation expressly noted that the NRU will embed the scope of real democracy and in this framework the nation, disciplined and optimistic, will undertake the difficult course of conquering a new type of life, which is the long-term objective of the people[23]. It is evident that the term “people” is understood in the sense of the nation itself. In other words, the NRU identifies the nation with the people perceiving it as a holistic and indivisible entity that aims at the unification of the Greek people regardless of class boundaries. Thus, the national interest is strongly associated with the people as a whole and not only with a class. A necessary premise for the promotion of the national interest is the “disciplined” nation which is bound to act in the national framework and not outside of it. In the Greek case, the national framework was institutionalized by the constitution of 1952. On the other hand, the appeal to the “disciplined” nation reveals Karamanlis’ paternalistic way of governance and style of leadership. It is interesting that this kind of paternalistic or authoritarian behavior is also evident in most right-wing statesmen after the Second World War, such as Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle.

Another concept of the human beings is related with the personalist vision which is also recognizable to all the Christian Democratic parties. Personalism taught by the Catholic intellectual Emmanuel Mounier emerged in the early 1930s and it was bound to be the basis for unity of thought among these parties[24]. In Christian Democratic culture liberal individualism is incorporated under the scope of personalism[25]. According to this philosophy, human beings are conceived as persons and society as a community of persons. Human beings and society are the two poles of the same system as they are tied up together and cannot be separated. Consequently, the self ought to behave with

[23] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.
[24] Papini, Robert, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York and London, 1997, pp. 3-7.
[25] Mounier, Emmanuel, *Personalism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1952; Kelly, Michael, *The Cultural and Intellectual Rebuilding of France after the Second World War*, Palgrave, New York, 2004, pp. 127-154.

responsibility and dignity towards the community it belongs as it utterly depends on it for its prosperity. On the other hand, the development of freedom, creativity, and personal initiative are encouraged. This concept derives directly from the Christian social thought, which introduced the idea of the strong and dependent relationship between human beings and society.

The philosophy of personalism was bound to be a response to the expansion of totalitarianism in the 1930s and a defense against any new forms of totalitarianism after the end of the War. In the political field, personalism offers a whole set of principles which serve as a frame of reference for political action such as the principle of subsidiarity, the priority of the common good, the necessity of private property, and the primacy of social objectives over economic success[26]. Solidarism appears not only in the Christian Democratic discourse but also in the founding proclamation of the NRU. This concept may emerge from social democratic collectivism but in the Christian Democratic context it perceives a new meaning. According to Christian Democracy, the human beings can fulfill their personality and realize themselves solely in the community[27]. Although there is no evidence that Karamanlis had studied such ideas in the 1930s, it is possible to detect the influence of other leading intellectuals with whom he was associated since the 1940s, such as Constantine Tsatsos or Panayiotis Kanellopoulos.

The last point that should be clarified is the role of the party towards the national interest and, generally, the nation. Karamanlis made clear in the proclamation that his party served the country taking the initiative to form a new political power and, thus, he invites all those that share the idea of a political enlightenment and believe in the principles of social progress and social justice[28]. The conception that lies beneath is the political parties, by definition, pursue the national interest and work against the class conflict. Karamanlis not being dogmatic was a moderate politician who was akin to borrow ideological references of his political opponents. He attributed a liberal sense in

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[26] Dabin, Paul, "The Search for the Intellectual Basis of Christian Democracy", in European People's Party, *Efforts to Define a Christian Democratic "Doctrine"*, Occasional Papers, Brussels, 1989, pp. 18-26.

[27] Van Kersbergen, Kees, "The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy", in Hanley, David (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1994, pp. 31-47, here pp. 32-34.

[28] Founding Proclamation of the NRU, 4 January 1956, in Svolopoulos, Constantinos (general editing), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts and Texts*, vols. 1-12, Athens, 1992-1997, (in Greek), vol. 1, p. 338.

the term “social progress” emphasizing the equality of opportunity that should be guaranteed by the state. The social progress is identified with the national interest and the NRU intends to be a political party that promotes these quests uniting the society. Karamanlis, therefore, never sought to be supported by one class exclusively. He aimed at mediating the interests of the various classes of society and the moderation of the antagonism between labor and capital. From a political point of view, this is a hint against the role of the Left during the Civil War, when the Communist Party of Greece did not respect the values of liberal democracy and attempted to divide the Greek society.

The originality of the afore-mentioned perception of community and public good lies in the Christian Democratic doctrine[29]. There is a distinction between the concept of “one” and the notion of “we”: the former represents the impersonal world of totalitarianism while the latter sketches the world of dialogue and solidarity which identified with the main value of democracy. According to the dialectic of Christian Democracy, the human being is being placed in the center of political action and society, and has the task of promoting the good of all. In this basis, political parties as rulers of state community are identified with the promotion of common good that stabilizes democracy. Good for all or, in other words, national interest is reflected by policies such as the maintaining of defense and security, the establishment of economic and social rights, the promotion of social justice and solidarity. To sum up, the interlinking of national interest with the democratic institutions is among the principal concern of Christian Democratic parties. Apparently, Karamanlis and Christian Democratic leaders being strong supporters of democracy could never accept the argument that democratic institutions should be sacrificed for the attainment of economic and social objectives.

Conclusions

By the end of the World War II, an entire new set of issues came up in the European continent. The major challenges in Europe were the safe passage from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes to democratic institutions, the reconstruction, the promotion of

[29] Papini, Robert, “The Tradition and Present-Day Relevance of Christian Democratic Thought”, in European People’s Party, *Efforts to Define a Christian Democratic “Doctrine”*, Occasional Papers, Brussels, 1989, pp. 36-46.

modernization and the welfare state, and the European integration. It might be difficult to delineate Christian Democratic theory as it seems to be a mixture of conservative, liberal, and socialist thought. Christian Democratic dialectic lacks the clarity of other political ideologies, since it focused on practical politics. Christian Democratic parties have not invested on production of intellectual theories making the relation between theory and political practice to be based on rather weak bonds.

The NRU shows great resemblance to the Christian Democratic parties on the grounds that its political and economic program was not directed by an articulated political and social philosophy but by a set of practical concepts and loose ideological principles which bear a striking resemblance to the Christian Democratic agendas. Hardly has Karamanlis emphasized on social and economic theories apart from his profound attachment to the liberal democracy, to the right of private property, to the interventionist role of state, and to anti-communism. Conversely, his political program was free of theoretical limitations and ideological orders. Karamanlis' governmental tasks must be interpreted much more in political and managerial terms and less in ideological terms. He loathed dogma and this was reflected in the founding declaration of his party.

Once Karamanlis announced the establishment of the NRU, he presented a set of generalized ideological principles for the party. His major intention was to form a political party that would serve as a breaking point to domestic politics. Thus, NRU declared its commitment to parliamentary democracy and stood firmly against communism. What was different, it was the integration of eminent Liberal politicians on the one hand and liberal discourse on the other. Karamanlis' party shares features of the conservative and liberal tradition. According to the founding declaration, the NRU was a manifestation of a "reforming" political power that sought to possess the middle ground between communism and 19th century liberalism. From this point of view, the ideological affiliation with Christian Democracy is rather apparent as the "middle ground" was the principal task. The Christian Democratic parties sought to comprise liberalism and collectivism rejecting simultaneously the extreme doctrines of capitalism and Marxism[30].

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[30] Irving, R. E. M., *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1979, p. xviii.

It needs to be emphasized that this was the first time in postwar Greece that a ruling conservative party was able to elaborate a coherent set of ideological principles that would serve as a pivotal guide for its governmental actions. Besides, another exceptional and unique feature of the conservative camp was the governmental stability and continuity for eleven successive years embedded by both the Greek Rally and the NRU. From this point of view, it is superficial to interpret the NRU merely as a variant of conservatism although the ideological background and the majority of its political personnel come from the People's Party and the Greek Rally. As mentioned before, the NRU's distinctiveness lies in the synthesis of both conservative and liberal values and in the reorientation of the Greek conservatism.

It can be said that the founding proclamation of the NRU delineated a matrix of ideas and values that constituted the ideological frame of the NRU's political action. In the context of the Greek mid 1950s, the NRU's distinctive name indicated a new set of ideological references emphasizing its "reforming" orientation. Although the NRU was not a Christian Democratic party itself, there are similarities with the European Christian Democracy in terms of ideology and political culture. The NRU shared not a few fundamental principles and values with the Christian Democratic parties. On the other hand, it adopted the political discourse of the broader Christian Democratic tradition adjusting it to the Greek postwar reality.

Contending explanations about interest in politics in two new democracies: Greece and Spain

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1- Introduction

The starting point of this research dates back to my first visit to Athens in September 1993. The climate of political effervescence that preceded the Greek general elections in those days was quite shocking for somebody used to the way these events are usually lived in Spain. This atmosphere was clearly reflected in the public opinion polls when Greeks were asked about their level of interest in politics. What I did not know then was that I had the privilege of living what was to be the last electoral period of that kind for years to come. After 1993 interest in politics started to decline gradually and one could say that politics in Greece started to become rather different to what it had been during the eighties and early nineties. Why were the Greeks so interested in politics until 1993 while the citizens of Spain - another South European new democracy – declare themselves to be so indifferent towards politics since the seventies? Why did Greeks stop being interested in politics after that date? In other words, my objectives have been to find out why the levels of interest in politics in Spain and Greece were so different during the eighties and early nineties and why the evolution of this attitude has been so different in the two countries[A1][1].

Although these two countries have barely ever been subject of a two case comparison, several contending explanations have been suggested by the literature about political culture of each of the countries or about the political culture of new democracies[2]. The two that have found the biggest echo are the one that focuses on the historical legacies of a country, and the one that traces the origins of the peculiar political culture of a country to the period of transition to democracy. In the following pages I will analyze to what extent each of these explanations is well suited to understand both the Greek and the Spanish political culture in what refers to the levels and evolution of interest in politics as declared by citizens. Furthermore, I will try to argue that more attention should be paid to a third kind of explanation; namely, the one that focuses on day to day politics since the period of transition until nowadays.

2- Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Greece and Spain

[1] In my PhD. research I also addressed a third point that will not be dealt with here. It referred to the meaning of “being interested in politics” in the two countries.

[2] The only comparative study between Greece and Spain that I know of is Kaminis’ study of the two constitutional processes (1993). For a study of political disaffection in new democracies see Torcal (2003).

With regard to the aggregate levels of interest in politics the question is: Why did *more than half* of the Greek population over 18 declare, during the eighties and beginning of the nineties, that they were very or quite interested in politics, while *just one fourth* of the Spanish population shared the same attitude? (graph 1)[3].

Graph 1: Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Spain and Greece, 1983-2002

The high levels of political interest amongst the Greeks and the low levels of the Spaniards were not only evident when we compare these two countries but were confirmed also when compared to other countries. Within the European Union, Greece has been one of the EU countries with *above* average level of interest in politics while Spain has been amongst those *below* the average (graph 2).

Graph 2: Interest in politics in Spain and Greece within the EU
, 1983-1998

In terms of the evolution of trends the question I intend to answer is: Why did interest in politics *decrease* amongst the Greeks after 1993, while it remained quite stable among the Spaniards? In Greece the percentage of citizens interested in politics has fallen by 20 points between 1993 and 2002 while in Spain it has remained at similar levels (graphs 1 and 2). In September 1993 still 52% of the Greeks declared to be interested in politics but in June 1994 this proportion had fallen to 40% and in March 2002 to 34%. On the contrary, in Spain the percentage of citizens interested in politics has remained quite stable since the beginning of the eighties until nowadays. In May 1983 24% of the Spanish population above 18 declared to be interested in politics while in March 2002 this percentage was still quite similar, 22%, without having suffered big oscillations in between. The European Social Survey carried out in 2002-2003 (not included in the graphs) reveals the following aggregate percentages for Greece and Spain respectively: 31% and 21%.

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[3] See annex for the list of surveys used in these analyses.

3- What is important about "interest in politics"?

When we refer to the political culture of a society this includes several attitudes towards politics that refer to different aspects. Some of them refer to whether citizens *support the democratic regime* or not, others have to do with whether citizens are *satisfied with the way the democratic regime works*, others refer to the *evaluation of specific political outcomes*, another group of attitudes has to do with whether *politicians are perceived as trustworthy and responsive* to citizens' demands. In the case of interest in politics, we are in front of an attitude that, first of all, deals with *politics in general* instead of with an aspect of politics in particular, and secondly, it does not necessarily imply a positive attitude towards politics but just "interest". The implications of the attitude of being interested in politics have been stressed by both the literature on democratic theory, the literature on political participation, as well as by the literature on political psychology.

Interest in politics is important for the substance of democracy itself. In this sense, one may be left wondering what is the meaning of popular sovereignty and citizenship if citizens are not interested in politics (Neumann, 1986:9; Hahn, 1993:317; Held, 1993:58; Melville, 1993:58). Interest in politics is also relevant as an indicator of how much information citizens have about politics and how they manage this information. More specifically, interest in politics is said to help citizens process complex information. In other words, interest in politics is an indicator of citizens' capacity to make sense of politics (Lodge and Taber, 2000; McGraw, 2000; Kuklinski et al, 2001:413). This is why this attitude has a positive influence on the formation, stability and coherence of political opinions and on the making of political decisions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Niedermayer, 1990), as well as on the expression of political demands through political participation (van Deth, 1990:276; McDonough, Barnes and López Pina, 1998:936-7). Thirdly, interest in politics can have consequences for the relationship between citizens and their political representatives. When people, as a consequence of being interested, have attitudes towards politics, take decisions related to political matters, and express these attitudes and judgements, they are better able to resist manipulation and to exert control over their political representatives (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993:965; Mutz, Sniderman and Brody, 1996). In other words, it is more likely that a citizenship that is

interested in politics has a positive effect on the accountability of politicians than a citizenship that is indifferent towards politics.

I do not ignore the fact that, depending on the sources of interest in politics and, therefore, depending on the nature and meanings of interest in politics, its implications for the aspects just mentioned will vary. In the following lines I will not pay attention to the meanings and consequences of interest in politics but just to its sources. However, one should be aware of the fact that interest in politics may not be related in exactly the same way to other attitudes and behaviours in every single place and at every single time and, therefore, may not always have the same implications.

4- Why Greece and Spain?

The similarities between the histories and many characteristics of Greece and Spain make the case of the different levels of political interest all the more puzzling. As Professor Malefakis has pointed out, the commonalities among the countries of Southern Europe – and, therefore, between Greece and Spain - go beyond the parallel processes toward economic, social and cultural modernization since the early fifties (1995). These commonalities pre-existed and were strongly reinforced during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They can be summarized as follows: "the struggle against absolutism and in favour of liberalism and democratization was mounted very early in the South European countries but had a much rougher road than in the west" of Europe (1995:42).

Under a special heading called "Why Greece fits in with the South" Malefakis highlighted the undeniable fact that "much of its history links it more to the Balkans than to the Italian and Iberian peninsulas". In this sense, the history of the Ottoman Empire provoked a decline in the governmental experience among the elites and the lack of autonomy of Greek society. However, he reminds us that, thanks in part to the Orthodox Church and its privileged position under the Ottoman Empire, Greeks filled the large ecclesiastical bureaucracy which enjoyed unprecedented administrative authority. The presence of Venetian outposts until the late eighteenth century and the interest in Ancient Greece that developed in the Western world since the Renaissance allowed continuous commercial and cultural contact between Greeks and the West. This contact was enhanced by the kind of professions that were left open to the non-Muslims, and especially the Greeks, under the Ottoman Empire. These were precisely the kind of

activities that implied contact with the West, such as finance, commerce, maritime activity, and diplomacy. To all of these facts we can add that one of the main prophets of Greek Independence, Rigas Fereos wrote his famous revolutionary hymn in Vienna as well as his adaptation of the American and French revolutionary declarations that would inspire the war for Greek independence that broke out in 1821. Therefore, some important sectors of Greek society were indeed in touch with the ideals of the Enlightenment.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were, again according to Malefakis, other aspects that were also common to the South European countries: precocious but weak social movements, the protagonism of certain actors and phenomena (army, church, anticlericalism, opportunistic court circles, little organized but frequent labour protests, revolutionary peasants, feelings of national inferiority, strong regional consciousness), a semi urban-semi rural society in which capitalism was early accepted but often questioned. But there is one commonality of the South European region that is of especial relevance for the object of this study: the presence of particularistic politics that have corrupted liberalism, both during the nineteenth and, in rather different forms, also during the twentieth century. While in Spain reference has been made to these practices in order to explain the distance between Spanish citizens and politics (Monzón, 1988:110 and 1992:447), in Greece the argument has been exactly the opposite. One of the most common arguments found in the Greek literature is that interest in politics has been so high amongst the Greeks due to the fact that politics is perceived in a particularistic way[4]. I will come back to this paradox later on.

There is still an additional feature of the recent history of Spain and Greece that only these two countries share and that is of especial relevance for the attitudes of today's citizens towards politics: the civil wars that divided both countries during the second half of the 1930s in Spain and during the second half of the 1940s in Greece. In Spain this traumatic event has often been referred to as the cause of either the automatic rejection of political divisions by Spanish citizens, or as the object of political discourses, both during the Franco regime and during the transition to democracy, that have tried to influence Spanish collective historic memory while, at the same time,

[4] The list of authors that appeal to particularistic politics as an explanation – whether partial or total - for the high levels of interest in politics amongst the Greeks is very extensive. Some of the most relevant are the following: Mouzelis, 1978:145, 1986 and 1995:31-32; Diamandouros, 1983:44-45, 58; Spourdalakis, 1988:18; Charalambis and Demertzis, 1993; Demertzis, 1997.

trying to keep citizens estranged from politics[5]. In Greece, however, the literature on political interest scarcely refers to the reconstruction of the memory about the civil war, nor can we conclude that civil strife automatically results in a gap between citizens and politics[6]. For all these reasons, I think that the comparison between the cases of Spain and Greece offers a particularly interesting occasion for the study of political interest from a perspective that goes beyond both the influence of particularistic politics and the experience of the civil war.

The more recent history of the processes of transition to democracy during the 1970s also allows comparison between these two countries. Finally, the political parties or actors that have played an important political role are also quite similar. The main protagonists of the transitions to democracy were in both cases conservative forces. In spite of their historical relevance communist parties in both cases have remained minoritarian ones. At the beginning of the eighties, what had been until then minoritarian socialist parties won power in both countries. From then on the government has been disputed in both cases between these socialist parties and one conservative party. But in both cases we have been able to speak of predominant parties when referring to the socialist ones. All these similarities support the comparability between these two cases in spite of the inevitable existence of differences between them.

5- Contending explanations

Let's then, analyze the plausibility of each of the three explanations mentioned above: the one based on historical legacies; the one based on processes of political change understood as critical junctures; and, third, the one based on day-to-day politics.

[5] Also in this case, the list of authors that have considered that the civil war has played an important role – either directly or indirectly – in the relationship between Spaniards and politics is very broad. Some of these are Carr and Fusi, 1979; López Pintor, 1982: 78; Montero and Torcal, 1990 and 2002; Aguilar, 1996.

[6] Some exceptions are Pollis (1977:13-14) and Pantelidou-Malouta (1987:241).

5.1- The legacies of the past

The aim of this section is to analyze the plausibility of the explanations based on the history of each country and, more specifically on the history of democracy. We can label this a "cultural explanation" and it is found in the literature that deals with the political culture of both the Spanish and Greek cases. Cultural explanations assume that "the members of different societies are characterized by enduring differences with respect to basic political attitudes, values and skills; that is, by different cultures" (Inglehart, 1991:35[A2]). Here, I come back to the paradox I mentioned before. In the two cases, the unstable and incomplete history of democracy has been put forward to explain opposite outcomes. In Greece, part of the literature finds the cause for the *high* levels of interest in politics in the manipulation of democratic processes, in the huge presence of the state, in the weakness of civil society, and in the consequent particularistic perception of politics. However, in some of the Spanish literature these same factors are seen as the causes for the *low* levels of interest in politics in Spain.

In general terms we can identify two kinds of cultural explanations, according to the degree of change in political attitudes they consider possible. On the one hand, we find explanations that can be considered "primordialist" in the sense that they assume that these differences are inherent to the different cultures and, therefore, permanent[7]. On the other hand, there are cultural explanations that admit the possibility that attitudes change, although very slowly, as a result of the socialization during early adulthood of different age cohorts into the predominant political values of the time under different political circumstances. According to this kind of cultural approach, political attitudes acquired during that period of life tend to remain stable, and changes at the aggregate level will only be observed as the oldest cohorts are replaced by the youngest ones (Inglehart, 1991:5). Let's remember that one of the phenomena we want to understand is, precisely, the change in political interest that took place in Greece after 1993. We also want to know if it was some previous change in attitudes that can account for the different levels of interest in politics observed in Spain and Greece during the eighties. Therefore, it is only in the second kind of cultural explanations that can offer a possible answer to our questions.

[7] Laitin has referred to these as the "the first face of culture" (1986).

The idea then is to test the plausibility of the cultural argument based on the history of democracy to explain the different levels and evolution of interest in politics in Greece and Spain. This argument usually assumes that the citizens socialized as young adults under democratic regimes would show higher levels of interest in politics than those socialized under non-democratic regimes. In order to test this idea I have identified several periods in the more or less recent history of these countries according to the degree of democratic openness and, also to other characteristics of the political context such as the degree of mobilization, the degree of repression, or the stability of the political regime. Cohorts have been defined as the groups of individuals that were between 17 and 22 years old during the different periods. The delimitation of this age period attends basically to two criteria, one substantial, and one practical. The substantial reason is that between 17 and 22 is the age when individuals in most democracies first assume political responsibilities, mainly voting (Beck y Jennings, 1991; Johnston, 1992:96; Percheron, 1993:175). The practical reason is that, if we restrict the socialization period to a few years (six in this case), we minimize the possibility that the youngest and the oldest individuals within one same cohort have different perceptions of the political events[8]. The resulting cohorts are five in Spain and six in Greece. In Greece, the cohorts are formed by those who were between 17 and 22 years old during 1) the "national schism" and the Metaxás dictatorship (before 1940), 2) occupation and civil war (1941-49), 3) "watched democracy" (1950-66), 4) Junta (1967-1973), 5) transition and consolidation of democracy (1974-80) and 6) consolidated democracy (1982 and after). In Spain, the cohorts are formed by those individuals that were between 17 and 22 years old during 1) the civil war and the period that preceded it (before 1939), 2) the first period of the Franco regime, characterized by repression and economic autarchy (1940-54), 3) the second period of the Franco regime characterized by a certain openness (1955-76), 4) the period of transition and consolidation of democracy (1977-81), and 5) consolidated democracy (1982 and after)[9].

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[8] For a discussion about the problems related with the definition of cohorts, cohort socialization and cohort analysis, see Martín (2004:174-185).

[9] For a more detailed explanation of the individuals that were included in each of the cohorts in our analyses see tables A5 and A6 in the annex. Some clearly distinct periods have been considered as just one for practical rather than substantial reasons. This is clearly the case of the oldest cohorts in the two countries. If we had distinguished two different cohorts – making more sense of history – we would have been left with very few individuals in those cohorts and the statistical analyses would have been invalidated.

I will try to analyze whether the levels of interest in politics in each of these cohorts are different. For this purpose I have designed a multivariate model that will allow us to know to what extent belonging to a specific cohort increases the probability of being interested in politics or not. In this model I have controlled the impact of cohorts for the effect of two of the most influent factors when we refer to political interest: gender and level of education. By introducing these controls we are able to say that, if belonging to a certain cohort increases – or not – the probability of being interested in politics, this occurs no matter whether we are speaking of men or of women, and no matter whether we are referring to individuals that have achieved a high level of education or to individuals that have not had any. I have also controlled the effect of the cohorts for the effect of the "life-cycle"[10].

Graph 3: Interest in politics in the different cohorts

After analyzing the effect that belonging to a certain cohort has on being interested in politics the cohorts socialized under democratic regimes[11] are found to be *less* interested in politics than some of the cohorts socialized under the civil war[12] or even under a non-democratic regime[13]. The results of my analysis suggest that what influences citizens' level of interest in politics is not the history of democracy, but

[10] When analyzing the effect that belonging to a certain cohort may have on the level of interest in politics we face a serious methodological "identification problem" (Fienberg y Mason, 1985). Briefly explained, this consists in the fact that behind the cohorts lie two other, but coincident, variables: "life cycle" and "period". The three variables – "cohort", "life cycle" and "period" – are related in the following way: age=period-cohort, and this creates a statistical problem of multicolinearity that keeps us from being able to identify which of the three is responsible for the effect on political interest.

Although there is no solution to this puzzle there are two mechanisms that can minimize it somehow and that have been applied to this analysis. One is to aggregate several samples of individuals that were interviewed at different points in time and treat them as just one sample. This way we break the multicolinearity between "cohorts" and "life cycle groups". For example, in the new sample we will have two individuals that are considered as being 30 years old, however, one was born in 1983 and the other in 2000. These to individuals will not be placed under the same group in the two variables: they will belong to the same age group - that is in the life-cycle period of the "thirties" - but they will belong to different "cohorts". In this case 13 Spanish surveys and 9 Greek surveys have been used to create an aggregates file. See Table A4 in the annex.

However, the problem of multicolinearity does not disappear completely if we keep introducing the three variables in the model. This is why I have applied a second mechanism to solve this problem: two alternative models. The cohort effect is tested in both but in one of the models it is controlled for the "life-cycle effect" and in the other it is controlled for the "period effect". The results shown in the graphs refer to the first of these models.

[11] In a coloured version of the graphs these are the orange lines.

[12] The black lines.

[13] The green lines.

rather the history of *political mobilization*. In Spain the cohorts that show the highest levels of interest in politics are the cohort socialized during the second phase of the Franco regime (1955-1976), characterized by the gradual revival of civil society, as well as the cohort socialized during the transition and consolidation period (1977-1982), also characterized by higher levels of mobilization than the rest of the historical periods here analyzed[14]. In Greece, the cohorts that declare to have the highest interest in politics are those who were socialized during the previous period to the occupation and during the occupation and the civil war. They are followed by the cohorts that were socialized during the "semi-democratic" period (1950-1966), and during the Junta (1967-1973). Social mobilizations were intense both during the sixties and in 1973[15]. However, neither is an explanation based on the history of political mobilization sufficiently persuasive.

The fact that the youngest cohorts are less interested in politics than the oldest ones, can help us understand the gradual decreasing levels of interest in politics in Greece as young indifferent cohorts are replacing old interested ones. It can also explain the different aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain and Greece as more living Greeks have been socialized under periods in which political mobilization was intense[16]. But, it would lead us to expect to find decreasing aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain as well, and this is something we do not observe in the graphs that describe the evolution of aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain[A3]. Nor can it help us understand why *all* the Greek cohorts have a higher level of interest in politics than the Spanish ones.

[14] For a history of social movements in Spain during the twentieth century see Álvarez Junco (1994). About the mobilizations carried out by the workers and the students during the fifties, sixties and seventies see Maravall (1978).

[15] For a complete revision of the characteristics of social mobilization in Greece between 1949 and 1967 see Bernardakis and Mavris (1991). About mobilizations during the Greek transition to democracy see Bernardakis (1995).

[16] Notice that until they reach 30 the likelihood of being interested in politics of all the cohorts except the youngest one is higher than that of any of the Spanish cohorts. This kind of explanation assumes that political attitudes within each cohort are the same in all of the years analyzed. This is why it cannot account for the likely decrease of interest in politics in all of the Greek cohorts from 1993 onwards. The model could be improved by introducing interaction terms that would tell us whether the relationship of interest in politics and age is the same in all cohorts or not.

[17] This kind of explanation assumes that political attitudes within each cohort are stable. This is why it cannot account for the decrease of interest in politics in all of the Greek cohorts from 1993 onwards. We cannot be sure that the relationship of interest in politics and age is the same in all cohorts if we do not introduce interaction terms in the model.

This is why it becomes necessary to analyze the plausibility of the other two types of explanation based on critical junctures and on day to day politics. It could be that the gradual decrease of interest in politics we find in Greece is not due to generational replacement (remember we do not find this in Spain, although we should according to the lower levels of interest in politics amongst the youngest cohorts) but to a phenomenon that affects all cohorts since the beginning of the nineties. This is a hypothesis that needs to be explained under the "day to day politics" approach since it could be a rather rapid change in attitudes as a reaction of the performance of political actors and institutions. Secondly, it could be that the levels of interest in politics are higher in all of the Greek cohorts (at least until 1993), as a result of a change in attitudes that took place during the critical juncture of the process of transition and consolidation of democracy in this country. Did this process have a more intense mobilizing effect of society at large in Greece than in Spain? Let us first examine this explanation based on the intense and lasting effect that critical junctures can have on political attitudes.

5.2- The impact of critical junctures: transitions to democracy

Were the characteristics of the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy in each of these two countries responsible for the different levels of interest in politics observed during the eighties and the nineties? At first sight it seems a reasonable explanation that the decisions taken by the political elites during this period about how much to mobilize society could have implied a redefinition of the relationship between citizens and politics that marked a rupture with the past and the beginning of a diverging trajectory in the political culture of these two countries. According to Collier and Collier critical junctures are "periods during which an important change takes place, that usually adopts distinctive characteristics in each country (or unity of analysis), and of which different legacies are derived" (1991:29)[A4]. Given the relevance of the changes that took place during the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy, and their foundational character with respect to the new democratic regime, we could think that the kind of relationship between citizens and politics that was built during this period could have had a lasting effect on interest in politics. This redefinition of the relationship between citizens and politics could have implied a relatively rapid change in the political attitudes of all the cohorts, independently of their age.

Reference to this argument has been quite frequent in the Spanish case[18]. The *consensual natur*e of the transition to democracy, *ideological moderation* and the *lack of political mobilization* by the political elites in Spain during this process have been said to have had long lasting effects on citizens' indifference towards politics. On the contrary, in Greece, these processes were characterized by the unilateral decisions taken by the Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlís, by the radical discourse of the opposition forces – especially by PASOK – and by the much more intense political mobilization by the parties of the left[19]. But, in order to be able to say that these differences were the result of decisions deliberately taken by the political elites, we should be able to show that the confining conditions that limited their capacity for manoeuvring[A5] were similar, and not too strong, in both countries. Otherwise, we would not be able to speak of a critical juncture since the constrictions of the past would leave too little room as to allow for different possible trajectories. Most of the literature has emphasized the greater constrictions in the case of the transition to democracy in Spain than in Greece. The transactions between the elites of the outgoing regime and the new democratic elites implied a much greater risk on involution in the Spanish case than in the case of Greece where the authoritarian regime had collapsed. The attempted coup d'état that took place in Spain on the 23 of February 1981 has often been used as the demonstration that important threats – especially those coming from the Armed Forces – were menacing the democratization process from the very beginning.

However, we have several reasons to doubt about the relationship between a negotiated transition and low levels of interest in politics. An analysis of the evolution of political interest in Spain during the late 1970s does not allow us to conclude that the politics of *pacts and consensus* had a negative impact on interest in politics in Spain (graph 4). On the contrary, interest in politics rose during the years 1977 and 1978 when the main negotiations between the political elites were taking place.

Graph 4: Interest in politics during the Spanish transition to democracy

[18] The most representative works that have put the emphasis on this kind of explanations are Paramio and Reverte (1980), Maravall (1982), Del Águila and Montoro (1984), Edles (1990), Morán (1997), Benedicto (1997) and Powell (2000:237).

[19] About the types of transition processes that took place in these two countries see, among others, O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1989) and Linz and Stepan (1996).

We have a second reason to argue that pacts between the elites were not at the roots of political indifference in Spain and this is the fact that there were also pacts in Greece. It is true that the constitutional processes was not based on consensus but on the unilateral decisions taken by the Primer Minister Karamanlís and that this had as a result the negative vote of PASOK when the Constitution was voted in Parliament in June 1975. However, there were pacts between government and opposition in other matters such as in order to impose the supremacy of civil authorities over military ones[20], to have a critical stance towards NATO for its passivity during the Cyprus crisis, and to narrow the relationship between Greece and the Balkan countries (Agüero, 1995:391-92[A6]). None of these pacts seemed to have the effect of decreasing interest in politics amongst the Greeks in later years.

Although the relationship between a negotiated transition and lower levels of interest in politics are not at all evident, there are stronger grounds for arguing that both *ideological moderation and political demobilization* during the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy may have contributed to the different levels of political interest observed during the following years in both Spain and Greece. Although pacts with political forces from a different ideological sign are usually accompanied by ideological moderation, this is not always the case. It was so in the case of the Spanish socialist party (PSOE) that soon abandoned its rupturist strategy (after the referendum about the Law of Political Reform in December 1976). Its definite ideological moderation came in September 1979, after the first two general elections, when it abandoned its self-definition as a Marxist party. In the case of the Greek socialist party one could say that their discourse was more radical in relative terms. However, this radicalism cannot be understood unless it is placed in the context of the unilateral decisions taken by the Prime Minister Karamanlís. PASOK did not have time to moderate its discourse before the first general elections of November 1974, like PSOE did. The fact that these elections were celebrated so early was also one of the reasons for the radicalization of the opposition parties of the left – mainly the recently created PASOK – for it did not leave them time to organize their electoral campaign.

[20] Psomiades has said that, in spite of its radical discourse, PASOK never questioned the democratic regime and abstained from any actions that could have been interpreted as a provocation or a pretext for a military intervention (Psomiades, 1982:259). The collaboration between the elites was also evident when Karamanlís had to calm down the Armed Forces after PASOK's victory in the 1981 elections (Psomiades, 1982:266). Papandreu's laudatory comments in 1987 about the successful management of the military issue by Karamanlís during the transition to democracy point in the same direction (Agüero, 1995:392, n.40).

Radicalization was also fostered by the exclusive character of the constitutional process in which only representatives or the right and centre forces participated. It cannot be ignored either, that from 1975 on, PASOK started a process of ideological moderation during which it came to abandon the term socialist as part of its self definition in 1977 Spourdalakis (1988:190)[21].

But it is true that during the first years PASOK's discourse was radical in the sense that it called for a class struggle in opposition to the government's appeal to national unity; it defended an independent and "thirdworldist" strategy as opposed to what it considered a government too dependent on the United States' imperialism; and it called for socialist self-management as opposed to what it saw as the reconstruction of a parliamentarian oligarchy (Kaftantzoglou, 1979:50, 54-55). During the first years PASOK's discourse was more radical than the Communists' (Kaftantzoglou, 1979; Spoudalakis, 1988:78; Karakatsanis, 2001:10)[22] and in relation to Greece's integration in the European Community it kept a critical stance until 1985 (Verney, 1993:139). This is why we could expect a higher interest in politics amongst the Greeks as a result of the mobilizing capacity of the radical discourse of PASOK during this crucial period of political change.

The differences between the aspects of the transition and consolidation processes in Greece and Spain become even clearer when we focus on party mobilization. The organizational mobilization carried out by PASOK – and the rest of the parties as a reaction to its strategy – was considerably higher than that carried out by PSOE (and the rest of the Spanish parties). In Spain the intense mobilizations that had characterized the political scene during the second half of 1976 and the first half of 1977 entered a decline after the legalization of the Communist Party in April 1977 and, especially after the first general elections that took place in June that year. In Greece the trend followed by social mobilization was the opposite. It was characterized by a spontaneous and not structured character until 1977 but, starting the summer of 1977 social mobilization became part of the successful electoral strategy of PASOK. This included both the development of a party organization all over the country and the

[21] About the gradual moderation of PASOK's discourse see Lyrintzis (1984:111); Elephantis (1981:116, 129), Spourdalakis (1988) and Karakatsanis (2001:127 ff.)

[22] Although one could also find a parallelism in this respect between PASOK and PSOE. For example, PSOE accepted the monarchy only after PCE did.

collaboration or cooptation of the social movements[23]. This process culminated in the electoral campaign of 1981. Spourdalakis has said that the mobilizational strategy of PASOK implied, not only a redefinition of the electoral rules but of Greek politics in general (1988:209). The comparison between the number of party members between 1974 and 1982 speaks for itself and reinforces the idea that the intense party mobilization that took place in Greece during these years could be at the basis of the different levels of interest in politics during the eighties and beginning of the nineties (table 1).

Table 1: Evolution of the number of party members during the transition and consolidation of democracy in Spain and Greece[24]

PSOE[25]	AP/ CD[26]	PCE[27]		PASOK[28]	ND[29]	KKE	KKE-es
3.000		15.000	**1974**				
			1975	8.000			
6.000			**1976**		20.000		
51.552		191.607	**1977**	27.000	20.000		
		156.184	**1978**		100.000		
101.082	5.000		**1979**	65.000	150.000		
			1980	75.000			
99.408	20.000	132.069	**1981**	110.000			
112.591	85.412		**1982**				

Number of party members. There are no data for KKE and KKE-es for this period.
Several sources.

These differences could be attributed to the lower risk of involution in the Greek than in the Spanish process of transition and consolidation of democracy. If this were so we would not be able to say that they were part of the choices made by the political elites during a critical juncture that were responsible for the different trajectories followed in each of the countries thereafter. However, there are several arguments that support the idea that the confining conditions were similar in both countries and,

[23] About the development of both these processes see Elephantis (1981); Fakiolas (1987); Spourdalakis (1988) and Bernardakis (1995).

[24] Due to the nature of these data, it is necessary not to interpret them literally. In order to be able to compare the numbers between the two countries it will be useful to take into account that the population size in Spain and Greece, respectively, was 35.3 and 9 millions in 1974 and 37.9 and 9.8 millions in 1982 (European Economy, 2001:114).

[25] The data for PSOE come from Gangas (1995:144) and Colomé (1998:272). Other sources provide slightly different numbers such as, for example, 2.548 in 1974 (Míguez, 1990:240 cit. Powell, 2002:67), 9.000 in 1976 (Satrústegui, 1992:39) or 150.000 in 1979 (Colomé, 1998:272).

[26] Most of the data for PP come from López Nieto (1998:257) who refers to them as oficial party data.

[27] Ramiro (2003:80). The data for PCE in 1974 come from Míguez (1990:240 cit. Powell, 2002:67).

[28] Spourdalakis (1998:400). According to Lyrintzis in 1980 the number was 60.000 (1984:111).

[29] The data for ND come from Kalyvas (1998:93), Pappas (1999:177) and Morlino (1998:179,204).

therefore, that the different mobilizational strategies were the product of elite choice[30]. The two most revealing ones are the fact that the rupture with the non-democratic regime was not as clear in Greece as has often been assumed and the fact that the Armed Forces posed a threat during the Greek process of political change to a similar extent as they did in Spain[31]. The authoritarian regime in Greece collapsed but this did not necessarily imply a rupture since there was no actor that could develop it. The one who finally did, Konstantinos Karamanlís, was called to lead the process by the President of the outgoing regime, General Gizikis, and the links with the outgoing regime were noticeable since, for example, three of the ministers – Vitsio, Gikas and Averof – had been related to the Junta (Kaftantzoglou, 1979:59-61). Therefore, collapse does not necessarily mean rupture. Secondly, the fact that the threat of a coup d'état only materialized itself in the case of Spain does not mean that this threat was not as present in Greece. In fact, several conspiracies were discovered and one could say that the risk of a military coup did not disappear until 1983 (Karakatsanis, 2001:154-156).

But, once more, an explanation based on the different mobilizational strategies during the critical process of political change is not completely satisfactory when it comes to trying to understand the levels and evolution of political interest in Spain and Greece during the eighties and the nineties. Critical junctures are supposed to have a lasting effect that will be resistant to change until a new critical juncture arises. No political process during the democratic period can be compared to the transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one or to the period of consolidation of the new democratic regime. Why, then, has interest in politics decreased amongst the Greeks after 1993? This is why I think it necessary to explore a more dynamic explanation based on day-to-day politics.

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[30] Not only was the risk of involution as important in Greece as it was in Spain, but the Spanish elites not always perceived the risk in their country as being as important as most of the literature has emphasized later one. After the first general elections of June 1977 the big, most risky, decisions had been taken and the overall perception was that the worst was already gone. This perception was even clearer when the politics of consensus was broken during the 1979 electoral campaign (Malefakis, 1982:226; Agüero, 1995:391-392).

[31] For other arguments that support the idea that the risk of involution was similar in the two countries see Martín (2004:289-302).

5.3- Day to day politics

The main argument regarding day to day politics is that the discourse of political parties is a changing one, and that it has a “running” effect on citizens’ interest in politics. Both *ideology* and *perception of differences between the discourses of the main parties* can provoke changes in citizens’ interest in politics. The analysis I have carried out reveals that a leftist ideology can foster interest in politics and that a centre ideology may have the opposite effect. A right-wing ideology would be somewhere in between. Also, the more differences citizens perceive between parties – whether ideological or otherwise– the more interested they will be in politics. One third factor that I show to have an effect on the level of interest in politics is *party mobilization* during periods of rutinary politics. This is shown by the fact that the voters of some parties are more interested in politics than others and that their different levels of interest have nothing to do with the parties’ or the citizens’ ideology, nor with the cohort they belong to, their age, their gender or their level of education (table 2)[32].

[32] The analysis is a binomial logistic regression in which the variables “ideology”, “party preference / vote intention” and “polarization / perception of differences between the political parties” have been added to those variables already included in the model that was designed to test the effect that belonging to a certain cohort had on being more or less interested in politics.

Tabla 2.1. Political explanations of interest in politics in Spain and Greece controlling for the LIFE-CYCLE EFFECT – Logistic regression models

		SPAIN				GREECE		
		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**		**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Sociodemographic variables	**Gender**	0,61*	0,60*	0,56*		0,58*	0,57*	--
	Level of education	0,83*	0,81*	0,75*		0,43*	0,48*	--
	Age	0,00	0,00	0,00		-0,02*	-0,03*	--
Cohorts	**Cohort 1: Before end of civil war**	0,07	0,15	0,39	**Cohort 1: Before occupation**	1,49*	2,19*	--
	Cohort 2: First Franco period	0,32*	0,33*	0,34*	**Cohort 2: Occupation and civil war**	1,47*	1,94*	--
	Cohort 3: Opening of Franco regime	0,64*	0,57*	0,57*	**Cohort 3: Semi-democracy**	1,31*	1,61*	--
	Cohort 4: Transition and consolid.	0,35*	0,26*	0,23*	**Cohort 4: Junta**	0,95*	1,07*	--
					Cohort 5: Transition and consolid.	0,66*	0,68*	--
Ideology	**Extreme left**	1,40*	1,22*	1,06*		1,13*	1,07*	--
	Left	0,81*	0,74*	0,55*		0,78*	0,70*	--
	Right	0,59*	0,38*	0,29*		0,25*	0,26*	--
	Extreme right	0,72*	0,51*	0,61*		0,35*	0,38*	--
Party preferences (vote intention)	**PSOE**	--	0,50*	0,45*	**PASOK**	--	0,78*	--
	PP	--	0,74*	0,64*	**ND**	--	0,51*	--
	IU	--	0,92*	0,87*	**KKE**	--	0,79*	--
					KKE-es	--	0,28	--
	Another party	--	0,95*	0,71*	**Another party**	--	0,05	--
Polarization	**All parties are the same**	--	--	-0,96*		--	--	--
	Constant	-2,76*	-2,98*	-2,29*		-0,95*	-1,00*	--
	Nagelkerke R^2	0,18	0,20	0,24		0,12	0,15	--
	N	62.745	62.745	18.568	N	15.653	15.653	--

Reference category of cohorts "Cohort socialized during the consolidated democracy (80s and 90s)".
Reference category of ideology "Centre".
Reference category of party preference "Did not vote / blank / not valid".
* Significant p<0,05.
Note: In Greece the model that intends to measure the impact of polarization controlling for age presents multicollineality problems as measured by the tolerance statistic and by the Variante Inflation Factor (VIF).

Table 2.2. Political explanations of interest in politics in Spain and Greece controlling for the PERIOD EFFECT – Logistic regression models

		SPAIN			GREECE			
		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**		**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Socio-demographic variables	**Gender**	0,61*	0,60*	0,55*		0,59*	0,59*	0,45*
	Level of education	0,83*	0,81*	0,75*		0,47*	0,51*	0,46*
Cohorts		--	--	--	**Cohort 1: Before occupation**	0,45*	0,34*	0,55*
	Cohort 1: Before end of civil war	0,10	-0,01	0,31*	**Cohort 2: Occupation and civil war**	0,65*	0,51*	0,65*
	Cohort 2: First Franco period	0,34*	0,21*	0,28*	**Cohort 3: Semi-democracy**	0,74*	0,61*	0,70*
	Cohort 3: Opening of Franco regime	0,66*	0,52*	0,54*	**Cohort 4: Junta**	0,64*	0,51*	0,55*
	Cohort 4: Transition and consolid.	0,36*	0,24*	0,22*	**Cohort 5: Transition and consolid.**	0,43*	0,33*	0,18
Ideology	**Extreme left**	1,41*	1,23*	1,06*		1,14*	1,10*	0,98*
	Left	0,82*	0,75*	0,55*		0,81*	0,72*	0,59*
	Right	0,59*	0,39*	0,30*		0,22*	0,26*	0,06
	Extreme right	0,72*	0,51*	0,61*		0,32*	0,38*	0,01
Party preferences (vote intention)	**PSOE**	--	0,49*	0,45*	**PASOK**	--	0,76*	0,48*
	PP	--	0,73*	0,62*	**ND**	--	0,46*	0,36*
	IU	--	0,92*	0,87*	**KKE**	--	0,67*	0,39
		--	--	--	**KKE-es**	--	0,42*	0,62
	Another party	--	0,95*	0,72*	**Another party**	--	0,09	-0,19
Polarization	**All parties are the same**	--	--	-0,98*		--	--	-0,96*

(Continued)

(Continuation of Table2.2)

		SPAIN			GREECE		
		Model 1	**Model 1**	**Model 1**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Period effect	**Year 1983**	-0,11	-0,06	--	0,11	0,64*	--
	Year 1984	-0,05	0,00	--	--	--	--
	Year 1985	-0,03	0,04	-0,07	0,68*	0,76*	-0,16
	Year 1986	0,15*	0,22*	--	--	--	--
	Year 1988	-0,04	0,00	-0,01	0,61*	0,71*	--
	Year 1989	-0,02	0,03	-0,11	0,87*	0,93*	--
	Year 1990	-0,08	-0,10	-0,24*	0,70*	0,74*	--
	Year 1991	-0,10	-0,07	-0,16	--	--	--
	Year 1992	-0,11	-0,05	--	--	--	--
	Year 1993	0,01	0,06	--	0,55*	0,56*	--
	Year 1994	0,16*	0,15*	--	--	--	--
	Year 1995	--	--	--	-0,05	0,00	--
	Year 1996	0,06	0,02	-0,05	0,07	0,09	--
	Constant	-2,77	-3,08	-2,22	--	--	--
	Nagelkerke R^2	0,18	0,20	0,24	0,15	0,16	0,18
	N	62.832	62.832	18.588	15.801	15.801	3.050

Reference category of cohorts “Cohort socialized during the consolidated democracy (80s and 90s)”.
Reference category of ideology “Centre”.
Reference category of period effect “Year 2000” (“Year 1990” in the model for Greece in which the polarization variable is introduced).
Reference category of party preference “Did not vote / blank / not valid”.
* Significant $p<0,05$.

It is the specific mobilizing strategies used by each of the parties that seem to play the crucial role. Overall, during the period 1983-2000 the most successful party strategies in promoting interest in politics amongst their voters have proven to be the following. In the case of Greece, both the Communist (*KKE*) and the Socialist Party (*PASOK*) have mobilized the political interest of their voters to a similar extent and they have been more successful in doing so than the Greek Popular Party (*Nea Dimocratía*). In Spain the nationalist parties and *Izquierda Unida* (United Left) have mobilized the political interest of their voters to a greater extent than the main two parties. However, the *Partido Popular* (Popular Party) has been more successful in this sense than the Socialist Party.

The analysis of the evolution of the relationship between these three political variables – ideology, polarization and party mobilization – through bivariate analysis together with the narrative of events prove illuminating[33]. First of all, they reveal that the evolution of interest in politics in Spain has been much more dynamic than what the analysis of the aggregate data allows us see. The relationship between political interest, on the one hand, and ideology or party preferences, on the other, has proven to be a changing one in the two countries. As the political discourse of the main parties has become more moderate and moved closer to the centre, the proportion of citizens that place themselves near the centre of the ideological spectrum has also increased. As we saw in the multivariate analysis, centrist ideology is the one that appears least likely to foster interest in politics. In other cases the discourse of political parties has become similar with respect to non-ideological issues, or less confrontational, or less credible. This has given rise to a different kind of depolarization and to an increase in the proportion of citizens sharing the impression that "all parties are alike". This perception also leads to a decrease in interest in politics.

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[33] Neither the bivariate analyses, nor the narrative of events are included here. For more details see Martín (2004:340-401). In any case, this is not the ideal method for this purpose, but there were important data constraints on following a multivariate strategy which would have been the ideal way to carry out this analysis. In order to be able to control the effect of the cohorts for the effect of age without facing multicolinearity problems I had to carry out a pooled logistic regression. This method does not allow us to obtain a dynamic view of the relationships analyzed. If I had carried out one logistic regression for each of the years I would have confronted two problems. First of all, the different sampling methods used by the different institutes would not have allowed me to compare the non-standardized coefficients of each variable across surveys. A second problem would have been that of multicolinearity when trying to control for both the effect of cohorts and the effect of age. A more detailed analysis of the dynamics of party mobilization and interest in politics would require a more complex analysis and, probably, the introduction of interaction terms in the statistical model I have used. This is one of the possible lines of research for the future.

Each of these processes of moderation and depolarization has followed a rhythm of its own in each of the two countries. This is what explains the different evolution of political interest in Spain and Greece.

Graph 5: Interest in politics and party mobilization

As we can see in graph 5, in the case of Greece radical discourse, polarization and mobilization were intense during the eighties, especially on the part of the Communist and the Socialist parties. The process of moderation, depolarization, and demobilization followed by the two main parties increased from 1993 onwards and it found a reflection in the decreasing interest in politics of their voters. Only the Communist Party, after 1991, has been able to maintain the levels of political interest amongst its voters through the radicalization of its discourse and its appeal to mobilization. Therefore, a leftist polarizing discourse and party mobilization fostered interest in politics in Greece during the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties[34].

In Spain the Socialist party adopted a more moderate ideological discourse and the relationship between the two main parties was not, in general, a polarized one, at least until 1993. However, interest in politics has proven to be sensitive to changes in the mobilizing strategies followed by parties. As you can see in the second graph, this was the case during the mid-1980s when the left mobilized its voters against the Spanish membership of NATO. But this has also been the case of the organizational changes produced in the Popular Party after its re-foundation during the early nineties. The emphasis of the Spanish Popular Party on organizational mobilization has been able to counter the demobilizing effects of its process of moderation and towards a centre-like discourse. At the aggregate level it has also been able to counter the diminishing interest in politics amongst the voters of *Izquierda Unida*[35].

[34] However, because these factors were combined with populist elements - that is, with the excessive simplification of reality and of political antagonisms – they led to a formalistic kind of political interest (see Martín, 2004).

[35] In this case it has not been due to moderation but to the distance between voter's ideological preferences and the party's. In the case of IU the party has followed a more radical discourse than that of its voters.

6- Concluding remarks

I have tried to argue that, contrary to what much of the literature has insistently argued, citizens' interest in politics is not so resistant to change. The levels and changes observed in citizens' interest in politics depend on the discursive, ideological and mobilizing strategies that political parties decide to implement as part of the normal development of political life. In other words, day-to-day party politics has an influence on the level of interest that citizens have in politics and its aggregate levels are not only dependent on history or culture.

The main conclusion can therefore be summed up as follows: only the changes observed in the degree of polarization, ideology and mobilization of political parties during day-to-day politics
can help us understand the evolution and meaning of interest in politics in Spain and Greece during the democratic period. The history of each country and theories based on socialization during young adulthood can explain why more Greeks are interested in politics. More Greek than Spanish cohorts have been socialized under periods of intense political mobilization. But they do not explain the evolution of interest in politics. Why does interest not decline in Spain in spite of the fact that younger cohorts are less interested in politics? The visions and decisions of the political elites during the critical juncture of transition and consolidation of democracy offer and explanation for the higher levels of interest found in all the Greek cohorts when compared to the Spanish ones. The degree of party mobilization during the consolidation of democracy was more intense than its equivalent in Spain. But, again, it does not offer an explanation for its decline in Greece after 1993. Like I say, only the evolution of the three political variables mentioned during the eighties and nineties can give us a clue about the changes in political interest occurred both in Greece and in Spain.

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[36] This may explain why all cohorts are more interested in Greece than in Spain.

[37] In this case it has not been due to moderation but to the distance between voter's ideological preferences and the party's. In the case of IU the party has followed a more radical discourse than that of its voters.

Graph 1: Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Spain and Greece, 1983-2002



Graph 2: Interest in politics in Spain and Greece within the EU 1983-1998





Graph 3: Interest in politics in the different cohorts
(probabilities controlled for age, gender and level of education)



N.s.: Not significant



Graph 4: Interest in politics during the final phase of the Franco regime and the Spanish transition to democracy[38]



Source: ICSA/Gallup series (Monzón, 1988).



Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Series 18900

[38] Two different graphs are shown because the wording of the questions differed in the surveys included in each of them. In the first graph percentages are for those citizens who said they were "very" and "quite" interested in politics while in the second they are for citizens who said they were "very" and "so-so" (*regular*) interested in politics.

Graph 5: Interest in politics and party mobilization





ANNEX

Table A.1. Time series of "interest in politics" – Greece (1985-2002)

GREECE			
Institute	**Year**	**Month**	**Sample size**
EKKE (*Four Nation Study*)*	1985	May	1.998
EKKE	1988	May-June	3.000
EKKE*	1989 A	June	1.996
EKKE*	1989 B	October	1.200
EKKE*	1990	April	1.200
Opinion*	1993	September	2.009
V-PRC (*PASOK*)	1995	June	3.000
MRB (*Mega*)	1995	--	1.500
EKKE (*CNEP*)**[39]	1996	September-October	1.196
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)	1999	October	1.614
MRB (*Mega*)*	2000	February	2.000
MRB (*Mega*)*	2000	March	2.000
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)*	2000	October	1.607
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)	2001	November	1.600
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)	2002	--	1.000

* Pre-electoral survey
** Pre and post-electoral survey
In parenthesis is the name of the project (1985 y 1996) or of the institution that ordered the study.
-- Unknown.

[39] The pre-electoral survey was carried out between 7-13 September and ended befote the televised debate between Simitis and Evert, according to the CNEP rules. The post-electoral survey took place between 1-10 October, the sample size was 996.

Table A.2. Time series of "interest in politics" CIS – Wording "quite interested" (1983-2002)

SPAIN Series nb. 200 "Quite"				
Institute	**Study number**	**Year**	**Month**	**Sample size**
CIS	1355	1983	May	3.368
CIS	1380	1983	November	11.077
CIS	1390	1984	January	2.948
CIS	1430	1984	October	2.505
CIS	1453	1985	March	2.493
CIS	1461	1985	May	2.498
CIS	1471	1985	July	2.479
CIS	1517	1986	February	2.454
CIS	1526	1986	April	25.667
CIS	1529	1986	May	4.429
CIS	1559	1986	November	2.493
CIS	1567	1986	December	2.488
CIS	1740	1988	April	2.496
CIS	1788	1989	January	3.356
CIS	1789	1989	February	27.287
CIS	1803	1989	April	2.499
CIS	1808	1989	May	3.072
CIS	1838	1989	September	2.471
CIS	1870	1990	April	2.895
CIS	1871	1990	May	2.876
CIS	1970	1991	June	2.471
CIS	2013	1992	June	2.495
CIS	2055	1993	April	2.500
CIS	2062	1993	June	2.500
CIS	2083	1994	February	2.499
CIS	2212	1996	April	2.499
CIS	2382 / 2384	2000	May	24.040
CIS	2450	2002	November	4.252

Table A.3. Eurobarometers containing the question about "interest in politics" (1983-1998)

Study number	**Year**	**Month**	**Sample size**	
			Greece	**Spain**
EB 19 *	1983	Mar-Apr	1.000	--
EB 30	1988	Oct-Nov	1.000	1.013
EB 31	1989	Mar-Apr	1.000	1.001
EB 31A	1989	Jun-Jul	1.000	1.003
EB 32	1989	Oct-Nov	1.007	992
EB 33	1990	Mar-Apr	1.003	1.004
EB 34	1990	Oct-Nov	1.008	1.001
EB 41.1	1994	Jun-Jul	1.002	1.000
EB 42	1994	Dec	1.002	1.006
EB 49	1998	Apr-May	1.013	1.000

* Spain was not yet an EC member.

Table A.4. Surveys and variables included in the "aggregated file".

	Gender	Level of education	Age / Cohorts	Ideology	Vote intention	All parties are alike
Spanish surveys						
CIS 1380 – November 1983	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 1390 – January 1984	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 1461 - May 1985	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1517 – February 1986	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 1740 – April 1988	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1788 – January 1989	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1870 – April 1990	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1970 – June 1991	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 2013 – June 1992	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 2055 – April 1993	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 2083 – February 1994	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 2212 - April 1996	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 2382 / 84 – May 2000	X	X	X	X	X	X
Greek surveys						
Eurobarometer 19 - 1983	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – May 1985	X	X	X	X	X	X
EKKE – May/June 1988	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – October 1989	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – April 1990	X	X	X	X	X	X
Opinion – September 1993	X	X	X	X	X	
VPRC – June 1995	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – September 1996	X	X	X	X	X	
Opinion - 2000	X	X	X	X	X	

Note: The syntax file with which I have standardized the variables of the different surveys that form this file can be made available by the author.

Table A.5. Spanish surveys: Cohorts from youngest to oldest as used in the statistical analysis

	DEMOCRACY		DICTATORSHIP		
	80s and 90s	Trans. and cons.	Openning of Franco regime	Repression and autarchy	Civil war and before
1979		18-19	20-41	42-56	57-98
1980		18-20	21-42	43-57	58-98
1982		18-22	23-44	45-59	60-98
1983	18	19-23	24-45	46-60	61-98
1984	18-19	20-24	25-46	47-61	62-98
1985	18-20	21-25	26-47	48-62	63-98
1986	18-21	22-26	27-48	49-63	64-98
1989	18-24	25-29	30-51	52-66	67-98
1990	18-25	26-30	31-52	53-67	68-98
1991	18-26	27-31	32-53	54-68	69-98
1993	18-28	29-33	34-55	56-70	71-98
1994	18-29	30-34	35-56	57-71	72-98
1996	18-31	32-36	37-58	59-73	74-98
1998	18-33	34-38	39-60	61-75	76-98
2000	18-35	36-40	41-62	63-77	78-98
2002	18-37	38-42	43-64	65-79	80-98

Table A.6. Greek surveys: Cohorts from youngest to oldest as used in the statistical analysis

	DEMOCRACY		DICTATORSHIP	SEMI-DEM.		
	80s and 90s	Trans. and cons.	Junta	Semi-dem	Occup. and civil war	“Schism” and Metaxas
1983	18-19	20-25	26-34	35-50	51-59	60-98
1985	18-21	22-27	28-36	37-52	53-61	62-98
1988	18-24	25-30	31-39	40-55	56-64	65-98
1989	18-25	26-31	32-40	41-56	57-65	66-98
1990	18-26	27-32	33-41	42-57	58-66	67-98
1993	18-29	30-35	36-44	45-60	61-69	70-98
1995	18-31	32-37	38-46	47-62	63-71	72-98
1996	18-32	33-38	39-47	48-63	64-72	73-98
2000	18-36	37-42	43-51	52-67	68-76	77-98
2001	18-37	38-43	44-52	53-68	69-77	78-98
2002	18-38	39-44	45-53	54-69	70-78	79-98

[A1]The main conclusion about the meaning of "politics" is that it refers mainly to party politics and to institutional politics. This means that those citizens who are not interested in politics may be interested in other political issues not related to parties or to institutional politics. For example, in most countries citizens that are not interested in politics are just as interested in the main social problems, or in environmental problems as those people who declare an interest in politics. In fact, in Spain, in spite of the low levels of interest in politics, interest in the main social problems or in the Third World are higher than the average of the European Union. In Greece, we find the opposite. The high levels of interest in politics are not paralleled by a similar level of interest in more specific issues. This is an indication that, as much of the literature has emphasized, this attitude amongst the Greeks has an important formalistic component. From the findings of this chapter we cannot conclude that interest in politics has a clear instrumental meaning in any of the countries.

I have explored the meaning of "being interested". The findings of this chapter show that being interested mainly refers to feeling informed about political issues and talking about them. This, together with the fact that interest is not clearly linked to positive feelings towards politics, leads me to consider it a strongly cognitive attitude. The strong partisan dimension becomes evident once more when we examine the forms of participation it is related to. This is why if we consider the levels of participation of the Spanish society in activities that are not clearly related to political parties, Spanish citizens appear to be more participative than the low levels of interest in politics would lead us to think.

[A2]Ésta es la cita de la versión en castellano.

[A3]Esto hace pensar en que estamos midiendo un efecto del ciclo vital (los jóvenes siempre se han interesado menos y por eso no se observa una disminución a nivel agregado) pero... se supone que este efecto ya lo estábamos aislando al controlar por la edad!

Además, puede querer decir que la disminución en Grecia no se debe a esto sino a una reacción de todas las cohortes frente a la actuación de las instituciones a partir de 1993.

[A4]Buscar cita original

[A5]Esto nos permitiría entender por qué todas las cohortes españolas tienen niveles de interés por la política más bajos que las griegas pero... ¿qué nos permite entender que no haya ido disminuyendo gradualmente? Que sea el ciclo vital lo que estemos reflejando... ¿

[A6]Comprobar cita.

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Party Strategies and the Risk of Democratic Breakdown: evidence from Spain and Greece

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Introduction

Comparative studies of democratisation often stress the key role of political parties in the process (Pasquino, 1990), (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995), (Morlino, 1995). Needless to say, parties have a variety of vital roles in a new democracy, ranging from legitimising the new regime (or failing to do so), to mobilising citizens and articulating interests. This role is more pronounced during the later stages of democratisation and in particular during the process of democratic consolidation.[1] Yet, their most important function involves the entrenchment of the democratic process through party behaviour. I argue that the concept of party strategy best captures this critical function.[2] Subsequently, I identify two general strategies for political parties during the process of democratic consolidation: conflictual and consensual.[3]

What determines the choice of party strategy? There are two shortcomings in the existing literature: first, its static nature. Democratization studies, analytic or not, assume that actors have fixed, predetermined preferences regarding potential

[1] I follow the established practice by accepting the sub-division of democratisation into three conceptually distinct processes: liberalisation, transition and consolidation (Rustow, 1970). That is, liberalisation comes first, followed by transition and then democratic consolidation. The pivotal sub-processes, are the institutional transition and consolidation of democracy. Transition comes first though in reality "[the two processes] may temporarily overlap or even coincide" (Gunther Puhle and Diamandouros 1995:3). Nonetheless, the process of consolidation can only end if the institutional transition has been completed. It is not necessary, however, for transition to be complete in order for consolidation to commence.

[2] "Party strategy" is defined here as policy output, of a certain party, which is formulated after reasonably comprehensive planning with the purpose of attaining a specific goal in competition with other parties (Sjoblom, 1968:30). Parties can of course have institutionalised presence in other (e.g. government or municipal) domains. These are not under examination here. To borrow the terminology of Katz and Mair (1994) my primary concern here is not with the "party in public office" but rather with "the party on the ground" and the "party in central office".

[3] By "consensual" and "conflictual" strategies, I understand two mutually exclusive and antithetical policy options that parties have at their disposal in order to define their stance towards their systemic opponents.

strategies and remain committed to these preferences throughout the democratization process. Yet, democratization is a dynamic process affecting the likelihood of potential outcomes which in turn determine the distribution of benefits to actors. Therefore, if benefits depend on outcomes and if outcomes are being affected by the process, strategies can not remain stable but rather must be updated in order to reflect the evolving reality. The approach presented here has the advantage of capturing this dynamic nature of preference formation by discriminating between two chronological stages; where actors have the option of choice between alternative strategies.[4]

Second, democratization theory has traditionally implied that actor choices reflect an evaluation of the survival prospects of democracy (Przeworski, 1996:30), (Burton, Gunther and Higley, 1992), (Alexander, 2002) without; however, specifying how this decision making mechanism operates. The conventional wisdom is that since parties are rational actors they will adjust their strategies in the face of imminent danger. I argue that this is not necessarily the case. Under certain conditions, the optimal party position is to retain a conflictual strategy even as the risk of democratic breakdown increases. Hence, for the actors involved I incorporate in the analysis both the degree of political risk as well as their expected payoffs.

In order to test the argument, I draw evidence from two relevant cases. One where democracy was eventually consolidated and one where it failed to do so: namely, Spain in the late 1970s and Greece in the 1960s. Alexander (2002:13) has highlighted the tendency of democratisation studies to focus only on cases where democracy was successfully consolidated. The main methodological assumption here is that important insights can be gained from comparisons between breakdowns and consolidations. Conveniently, the two cases also vary on the dependent variable. Although both started with a conflictual strategy, Spain eventually switched to a consensual one.

The paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, party strategies are explained in reference to the calculations that actors make and not to idealised notions of political culture, capricious leaders, international demonstration effects and other zeitgeists. Second, the distinction between the two decision nodes is vital, not only because it corresponds more accurately to the existing ontological

[4] Coinciding (depending on the particularities of the case) with the beginning of the transition and the

divisions of the democratisation theory (that is, to transitional and consolidation processes); but also because it is flexible enough in order to accommodate strategy changes, a serious failure of the relevant literature. Third, the concept of political risk is explicitly incorporated in the analysis as a variable affecting the calculations of party strategists.

I proceed in the following way. I start by developing an analytical, non-formal, model for the choice of party strategy during democratic consolidation. The model accounts both for cases of consensual and conflictual party strategies and incorporates the actors' assessment regarding the survivability of democracy for each strategy as well as the payoffs associated with the two options. The model is then applied to the two case studies.

Party Choice under Uncertainty

Party Choice

In this section I develop a model which accounts for the choice of party strategy during the process of democratic consolidation. Parties want to maximize power, which is generally defined as the ability to influence policy decisions. In order to do so, parties seek electoral victory. Conflictual strategies yield higher electoral payoffs because supporters can be mobilised more easily through a polemical discourse. Still, under certain conditions it can lead to democratic breakdown and therefore to no payoffs at all. On the other hand a consensual strategy can help party actors survive in an unstable party system. The choice of strategy therefore can only be the product of a calculus which considers not only the benefits of the available strategies but also the probability of their realisation.

I argue that this probability is the product of two subjective assessments: of the current level of political risk and of past historical experiences in establishing trust between actors.

The first feature involves a subjective assessment of political risk and in particular of potential threats to survival of the new democratic regime. The main theoretical assumption here is that party behaviour cannot be independent from the probability of democratic stabilisation. That is, if we accept the argument that there is a certain degree of conflict which can be absorbed by any given democratic regime before collapsing and if parties are indeed self interested maximizing actors; their

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consolidation phase respectively.

priorities should include, in most cases, a conscious effort to avoid the collapse of democracy.[5] However, since the risk of collapse dependents on the particularities of each case, tolerance thresholds will vary from case to case and even within the same case at different chronological periods. Therefore, party behaviour depends on fluctuations of political risk and then party strategy should be a function of that probability assessment. As a result we should expect to see party actors having a greater choice of possible strategies in the absence of a credible threat to democracy and adjusting their strategy accordingly in the face of imminent danger.

It should be noted again that this is only a subjective assessment. This is the case because the concept of probability is not necessarily interpreted in axiomatic terms by party actors. That is, the fact that a given party actor is negatively assessing the credibility of other actors and is pessimistic about the possibility of democratic consolidation does not necessarily reflect reality. It only reflects the assessment of the actor in question at a given time.[6]

The importance of trust is frequently identified as one of the fundamental building blocks in theories of social exchange. Studies of trust take it as a precondition for cooperartion between individuals, that is sets up expectations about others behaviours and that it relies in shared norms even if such discussions differ over what are the boundaries and sources of trust (Misztal 1996). According to Arrow (1974:23), trust is an economic externality it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought very easily. If you buy it then you already have doubts about what you have bought. The problem of trust is therefore not independent of reputation building. Party actors like any other actor involved in a market exchange, need to interact with other actors through time but in order to do so, a level of trust needs to be established. Given the fact that democratic consolidation is a process which goes beyond a momentary exchange, a trustworthy reputation is a desirable asset.[7]

However, reputation building is a costly endeavour.[8] Therefore for an argument involving the existence of reputational trust to be complete, it must

[5] There are some exceptions which I discuss later in relation to the payoffs of party actors.
[6] Hence, actor behaviour is rational only in the sense that it is internally (and not externally) consistent.
[7] In a momentary exchange trust might emerge for exogenous reasons.
[8] Reputation building is costly for political parties for two main reasons: first, since it requires from actors to commit themselves (either implicitly or explicitly) to cross party bargains their policy options are constrained.

stipulate how this was achieved in the first place. In the context of the present study it begs the question as to how it is possible for trust to emerge between new actors in a nascent party system. Although reputation building is costly, it does not have to be a process extending indefinitely into the future. In fact some studies have indicated that actors tend to be more trustworthy in the first rounds if any given game precisely because they need to establish a reputation.[9] Secondly, although party actors might be newly emerging, their leadership is frequently not. Indeed in all cases examined in this study the new party elites were known and in some cases have been active in public life previously. Therefore their reputation is likely to be already established.

Previous experiences, often involving not only the same party actors but even the same party elites, offer insights on how actors will behave in the future. Thus, historical experiences can act as information shortcuts when assessing the credibility of other actors. In the process, they form the basis for the establishment of trust between party actors or a reason for failing to do so. Historical experience is further relevant to the assessment of regime prospects given the fact that parties enter the democratic consolidation process with an already established strategy. Strategy change is not a costless endeavour because of reputation costs. Therefore the existing strategy must be taken into account when considering changes.

Expected payoffs can therefore be calculated through $E(\Pi)=p*\Pi$. Where $E(\Pi)$ are the expected payoffs, p is the probability of democratic consolidation and Π is the payoff of a given strategy. We assume that there are two available strategies one consensual the other conflictual (S1, S2). The payoffs associated with respective strategies are $\Pi1$ and $\Pi2$ where $\Pi2>\Pi1$. Conflictual strategies however can also lead to democratic breakdown therefore leading to no pay offs for the actors involved.[10] Hence, ideally parties want to adopt the most conflictual strategy available without crossing the imaginary tolerance threshold where democracy will eventually collapse.

Second, bargains are not always acceptable from the party base and therefore can prove problematic for less cohesive parties.

[9] An interesting example involves the formalisation of the 1960s saying "never trust someone over thirty" (Hargreaves Heap, 1992: 153).

[10] With the exception of anti-system parties which could, under certain circumstances, have higher payoffs under a non-democratic alternative.



Fig. 1

I will consider three pertinent examples. In the first example (Fig1), there are two available strategies S1 and S2 which give us the same $E(\Pi)$ at T1. That is, $E(\Pi1)=p1\Pi1$ and $E(\Pi2)=p2\Pi2$. We assume that $p1\Pi1=p2\Pi2$. Given the fact that the payoff is identical, parties are indifferent between the two strategies. At T2, a change in the probability of democratic stabilisation as long as it is applied uniformly for both strategies will also result in the same outcome. If the probability increases by λ% for both strategies, we have new payoffs: $E(\Pi1)=(1+\lambda)\ p1\Pi1$ and $E(\Pi2)=(1+\lambda)p2\Pi2$. Therefore, again we have $E(\Pi1)= E(\Pi2)$ and parties should be indifferent between the two positions.

What happens, however, if the probability disproportionately affects one of the two strategies (Fig.2)? That is both probabilities increase but the conflictual strategy is affected more. If we assume that $\lambda1<\lambda2$ then $E(\Pi1)<E(\Pi2)$ since $(1+\lambda)\ p1\Pi1<(1+\lambda)p2\Pi2$. Therefore, the optimal strategy is S2. This example involves a disproportionate increase in the probability of S2 which, in turn, makes it more desirable than S1. However, the opposite situation would also be true if $\lambda1>\lambda2$. Then, the payoffs would be $(1+\lambda1)\ p1\Pi1>(1+\lambda2)p2\Pi2$.

All the examples so far involve positive changes in p. That is the probability of democracy surviving increases and party actors need to incorporate that to their

calculations. What happens, however, if there is a negative change? That is, what happens if the probability of democracy surviving takes an unexpected turn for the worse? In this case the probability that democracy decreases by λ. In this case if we assume that the original payoffs were p1Π1<p2Π2 the new payoffs will be (1-λ) p1Π1<(1-λ)p2Π2. Therefore the optimal strategy would still be S2.



Fig. 2

The counter intuitive insight is that changes in the level of political risk do not correspond exactly to shifts in strategy. That is, for a rational party actor the optimal position does not depend to changes in the level of political risk per se. Therefore, an increase in the probability of democratic breakdown does not necessarily mean that a party with a conflictual strategy will switch to a consensual strategy. Rather, it is the direction of the change in the probabilities which affects, either negatively or positively one of the two available strategies and causes a shift in the optimal party position. Hence, parties will respond to probability changes affecting disproportionately one of the two strategies.

Given the fact that there are two decision nodes in each case (T1 and T2) and we want to explain the change of strategy from one node to the other (or the failure to change the strategy); there are four relevant questions which must be addressed in juxtaposition with each of the two case studies: what was the strategy at T1, which strategy was affected more by the probability, what were the payoffs for the actors and what was the strategy at T2.

Greece 1958-1967

The immediate post-civil war party system was highly fragmented and fluid. By the late 1950's, however, this fluidity showed signs of stabilisation. The party system was characterised by two overlapping cleavages: Left VS Right and the republicans VS monarchist. The Right was dominated by a single conservative party (ERE), the centre-left by a coalition of parties (the Centre-Union) and the communist left by the illegal communist party (KKE) under the disguise of a leftist coalition (EDA).

In 1955, Constantine Karamanlis emerged as the new leader of the conservative *Ellinikos Synagermos* (Greek Rally), but decided to dissolve the parliament and proceed with new elections. In the spring of 1956, Karamanlis also dissolved *Synagermos* and then essentially re-established it as ERE.[11] ERE won a narrow victory in 1956 against a loose coalition of left wing parties and again in 1958 when EDA emerged as the second largest party due to the increased fragmentation of the centre. However, as the Left was becoming better organised the institutional weaknesses of ERE were becoming more obvious and the party deputies were becoming increasingly critical of Karamanlis.

Table 2: Electoral Outcomes of National Elections 1958-1967

	1958	**1961**	**1963**	**1964**
ERE	41.2% (57%)	50.8% (58.7%)	39.4% (44.%)	35.2% (35.7%)
Centre-Union	---	33.7% (33.3%)	42.1% (46.0%)	52.7% (57.0%)
EDA(**1**)	24.4% (6.3%)	14.6% (8%)	14.3% (9.3%)	11.8% (7.3%)
Liberal Party	20.7%(12%)	---	---	---
Electoral Alliance of Centrist Parties	10.6%(3.3%)	---	---	---

NB: Percentage share of parliamentary seats in parenthesis
(1) As part of the Agrarian Democratic Front Coalition in 1961
Source: Clogg (1987).

The fragmented centre consolidated in 1961 to form *Enosis Kentrou* (Centre-Union) headed by the veteran politician George Papandreou. In terms, of its ideological orientation the Centre-Union was purposefully vague as most Greek parties of the period. Nonetheless, the party manifesto included several important items of faith that differentiated it from both the traditional Left and Right. For example, the party was anti-communist despite the fact that it campaigned for the abolition of the repressive civil war legislation. Similarly, the Centre-Union was in favour of participation in the NATO structures but strongly championed for the control

of the armed forces by elected officials. The main ideological theme of the Centre-Union, however, its pro-republican sentiment, was largely absent in 1961.

The left-wing coalition EDA[12] emerged in 1951, as the first Greek mass party bringing together not only communists but also socialists and other smaller Left wing groups. The communist party (KKE)[13] was, of course, illegal with Law 549/1947 though the party was indirectly represented through EDA. As it was the case with PCE in Spain, KKE retained a highly disciplined underground network which operated throughout the country. Nonetheless KKE was never tolerated by the authorities and arrest warrants for treason were still in effect for most party leaders.

Party Strategies at T1

At the start of the democratization process Greek parties had adopted conflictual strategies. This was certainly the case with the two mainstream parties ERE and Centre Union and, to a lesser extent, with the left wing EDA. ERE had demonstrated that it was prepared to exploit its privileged access to the state apparatus in order to manipulate the electoral outcome and often reverted to scaremongering tactics against its opponents. On the other hand, Centre Union was committed to challenging fundamental aspects of the post civil war regime which was bound to bring it into collusion with authoritarian elements in the armed forces. Although in the past EDA had refrained from adopting a conflictual strategy by the early 1960, it was increasingly pressing for the abolition of Civil war legislation which discriminated against the Left in general and the communist Left in particular.

Direction of Probability

I argue that the probability of democratic consolidation was decreasing in the case of Greece in the mid 1960s. This was the case not only because the risk of democratic breakdown had sharply increased compared with the recent past but also because party elites repeatedly failed to establish a minimum level of trust among them. Although trust by itself could not have saved democracy it would have a positive impact upon the choice of strategy.

Political risk was amplified given the increased tendency of authoritarian elements within the armed forces to plot against the government of the day. My aim

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[11] *Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*, (ERE).

[12] Eniea Democratiki Aristera (EDA).

here is twofold, firstly to demonstrate that the threat was credible and secondly that party elites were fully aware of the danger and therefore must have included it in their calculations.

Given the declared aim of Centre Union, to challenge fundamental aspects of the post civil-war arrangement, military elites became increasingly alarmed.[14] In particular, military elites were concerned not of a communist takeover per se but rather of a potential electoral cooperation between the centre-left and the traditional (communist) left. It was assumed that a grand coalition of the Left would lead to the emergence of a government ultimately under communist control. Such a, "Trojan horse", scenario was highly unlikely given not only the particular context of the cold war but also the declared anti-communism of Centre Union leaders. Yet, the perception remained.

The army certainly had a tradition of intervention in Greek politics, both explicitly through "*pronunciamentos*" but also implicitly by making their preferences known to the relevant actors. Yet, the establishment of long-term authoritarian regimes was rare.[15] In the context of the mid 1960's, military interventionism took the form of organised plots with the aim of establishing a military dictatorship. A declassified intelligence report from the US embassy (drafted in 1966) points out to the existence of a group of conspirators from as early as 1963: "[…]. In late 1963 and early 1964 a group of rightist Greek Army colonels (reported at that time as the military conspiratorial group) organized to stage a military coup if Georgios Papandreou accepted support from the United Democratic Left (EDA)." (Foreign Relations of the US, Document 225). Even though, such early attempts were characterised by a lack of consistency and indecisiveness they do point out to the pattern of hostility towards democracy, as well as to the willingness of military elites to operate outside of formal institutions.

By 1964, senior officers were concerned to the extent that they attempted to establish links with US representatives; presumably in order to asses the willingness of the latter to back a potential coup. On October the 8th, the US embassy *charge d'affairs* Norb Anschuetz met with the retired air force general Petros Mitsakos and the retired army brigadier Anthony Skarmaliorakis who expressed their alarm over

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[13] *Kommounistiko Komma Ellados* (KKE).

[14] By the term "military elites" and "armed forces" I refer primarily to army officers. As it was also the case in Spain, navy and air force officers tended to be more moderate.

left wing mobilisation. Mitsakos claimed that he represented a group of officers which "closely monitors the events" and stressed that there is a "possibility of military intervention". Furthermore Mitsakos, somehow self-contradictory, argued that "if the US also concludes that the point of no return has been reached, then it should participate in an operation to save democracy in Greece." Anschuetz argued that there is no politician or political force in Greece which could lead the country to communism through the establishment of a broad popular front. Mitsakos responded that "you [i.e. the US] do not understand the extent of the problem." (Quoted in Papachelas, 142-144:2000).

Party elites were aware that conspiracies were being formed. This was evident both in their public statements and actions. For example, George Papandreou declared in parliament "all those who believe that they belong to another organisation [i.e. IDEA] besides the army and the nation have no place in it" (quoted in Danopoulos, 1984:49). One of the first tasks of the new Centre Union government was to restructure the army by making sure that suspected officers were not to be found in key positions. In turn this provoked an angry reaction from military elites. Senior officers started to openly voice their concerns over the Centre Union government: Retired General Sakellariou, "who was ousted last year as Army Chief of Staff, told Emb[assy] officers openly last week that it is essential Papandreou be "overthrown" before he drags country down to destruction" (Foreign Relations of the US, Document 194). This proved unnecessary as the Centre Union government collapsed by itself. The crisis, incidentally, was caused by the decision of Papandreou to dismiss his defence minister whom he suspected of being in collusion with army officers.

The collapse of the Centre Union government in 1965 did not significantly reduce the risk of democratic breakdown.[16] In fact popular protests, largely orchestrated by Centre Union and EDA, added fuel to the fire by confirming the suspicions of military elites towards democracy. From the point of view of the army, politicians had brought the country to the brink of anarchy.

Even more problematic was the fact that by 1966 conspiracies started to re-emerge in the armed forces. Moreover, officers who had been transferred to northern Greece had now "completed their tours in these areas and are gradually returning to

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[15] In fact, there is only one successful example: the Metaxas dictatorship in the 1930s.

key command positions in Athens" (Foreign Relations of the US, Document 225). Furthermore the same report asserted that the "rightist conspirational group" had already planned an averted coup: "Just before the Centre-Union 16 February 1966 rally in Athens, Lt. Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos came to Athens to contact military colonels in the event a coup was deemed necessary to thwart mob violence instigated by EDA or by Georgios Papandreou at the rally." (Ibid).[17]

A further escalation came in December of 1966 when, following a series of secret meetings, ERE and Centre Union reached an agreement that would eventually lead to elections in May of 1967. Although this was interpreted at the time as having a depolarising effect, in reality it prompted military elites to overcome their indecisiveness. While ERE and the Centre Union were reaching an agreement, a US intelligence report points out to the re-activation of the colonels group (Foreign Relations of the US, Document 245). The army could not fail eventually to see what was the most likely outcome of the elections. Although ERE leaders appeared to be confident of their victory, the general assessment was that Centre Union would have no difficulty in obtaining a strong mandate. After all the party had received almost 50% of the vote three years earlier and polarisation had swelled its ranks. Hence, it made perfect sense for the military to intervene before the actual date of the elections in order to prevent a second Centre Union victory.

There was very little trust among party elites at the time. Party competition took place along the two established cleavages of Greek politics: monarchists VS republican and communists VS anti-communists. Although cleavages were normally not intransitive for individual party members and supporters, they made it particularly difficult for parties themselves to publicly justify inter-party collaboration. The difficulty arose not from the mere existence of ideological cleavages but rather from of their interpretation as forming mutually exclusive political identities. The calculus was that if that was indeed the case, any collaboration would ultimately undermine party claims regarding the validity of the party discourse. Hence the established political culture encouraged confrontation and did little to promote inter-party collaboration.

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[16] Following the defection of a significant number of deputies to ERE.

[17] The report continues by listing ten Lt. Colonels as members of the group, including all the main conspirators of the 1967 coup.

This tendency to view party identities as mutually exclusive was not shared by individual members and certainly not by voters. Party discipline was weak, and deputies were often disloyal to the party which helped them get elected in the first place. As a result defections were hardly unheard of. In fact parties frequently encouraged such defections in order to build up their parliamentary strength. From a point of view of trust establishment, the practice strongly undercut any effort to establish inter-party relations.

Crucially, there was no tradition of official inter-party collaboration to build upon. Governments were almost always supported by a single party and the establishment of both electoral and governmental coalitions was interpreted as a sign of weakness. There was no institutional incentive for the establishment of coalitions as the electoral system in use during the 1960's was clearly designed to produce single party majoritarian governments.[18] Formal coalitions apart, the aversion towards inter-party collaboration also extended to informal pacts. There was only one such case and it involved the agreement between Centre Union and ERE to hold, prematurely, national elections in 1967.

Nonetheless, this sole example actually illustrates rather than undermines the general argument. The negotiations were conducted in secrecy out of fear that they would disturb rank and file members and were purposefully downplayed by both parties. Although the alleged aim was to solve the political standoff, the declared five month electoral campaign was hardly the most efficient way of achieving this. Therefore, far from being an exercise in compromise, the agreement guaranteed a renewed confrontation between the two main parties. Moreover, since the agreement was essentially a case of momentary exchange, compliance could be guaranteed for exogenous reasons. Thus, it did not promote inter party trust.

Yet, it is important to stress that the lack of trust was not a pivotal factor by itself. A party system facing a lower threat of democratic breakdown could have absorbed the lack of trust without collapsing. Conversely, the existence of significant potential payoffs could have tempted party actors to cast aside some of their differences in order to conquer a higher prize.

Hence, the overall probability of democratic consolidation was decreasing in Greece during the early 1960's. This was the case not only because there was a

[18] In part due to negative experiences with previous (more proportional) electoral systems.

significant escalation of the threat emanating from authoritarian elements in the armed forces but also due to the complete lack of unity among party elites. Although party decision makers were aware of the threat their response was not a strategy shift towards a less conflictual strategy as the democratisation theory assumes but rather a continuation of the previous strategy. I argue that this was the case given the payoffs associated with each strategy.

Payoffs under Alternative Strategies

What were the payoffs for each strategy? A conflictual strategy would certainly put the survival of democracy into serious doubt. Although democracy had enjoyed two decades of uninterrupted existence, it was far from being consolidated. Given the right conditions, the armed forces had palpably demonstrated their willingness to stage a coup. In terms of benefits, a conflictual strategy would help increase the electoral returns for both EDA and Centre Union by keeping their supporters in a situation of constant mobilisation. In particular for the Centre Union, the long run survival of the party was unlikely given the loss of a significant number of deputies together with their clientelistic networks. However, a renewed strong electoral mandate would offer it a second opportunity to cleanse the state and the army from authoritarian elements and consolidate its power base. In turn, this required a sustained conflictual campaign focusing not only on ERE but also against the armed forces and the King who were, conveniently, bundled all together in the same category.

A consensual strategy could potentially reduce the possibility of democratic breakdown but had little additional benefits. For Centre Union such a strategy could very well end up being counter productive if it failed to secure the survival of the party. Although the party had won a legitimate electoral victory in 1964; it was prevented from fully exercising its electoral program and was essentially forced out of office with the defection of the Mitsotakis faction in 1965. From the perspective of the Centre Union there was little difference between a real coup and, what party leaders referred to as, the “royal coup” they had just experienced. Hence, the party saw little benefit in contributing to the stability of a regime which excluded it from power by adopting a consensual stance. Rather, it sought to maximize its electoral potential with a risky strategy which guaranteed a strong electoral result if democracy survived.

For two main reasons EDA had reached independently a similar conclusion. First, after 1965, it became clear to party strategists that their main aim, KKE legalisation, was difficult to achieve even under a potential Centre Union government. This was the case not only because Centre Union elites were lukewarm to the idea but also because a Centre Union government would be vulnerable to accusations of communist complicity. Moreover, if the demand for the legalisation of KKE was to be taken seriously, it was always absolutely vital that the party demonstrated that it represented a significant number of voters. Yet, by 1967 EDA felt increasingly outflanked by Centre Union. The, almost uninterrupted, daily protest organised by the latter attracted large numbers of EDA supporters. Therefore, as long as the possibility of legalisation was not a realistic option, the party had no reason to adopt a depolarising strategy.

Finally for the conservative ERE, a conflictual strategy was a less attractive option. ERE could not compete with the mobilising capabilities of EDA and its leadership lacked the rhetorical skills that Centre Union leaders used in order to inflame supporters. Moreover, the party, as opposed to Centre Union and EDA, had a realistic chance of satisfying its preferences within the confines of the existing democratic regime. Therefore it made sense to be risk adverse and promote the stability of the current regime. However, strategies are not adopted in a political vacuum, and in the case of ERE, this meant competition in a highly polarised environment. A consensual strategy would have put the party in a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis other parties, especially given the increasing mobilisation of the Left. Therefore, for ERE too, a conflictual strategy was the optimal choice.

Party Strategies at T2

In the case of Greece in the 1960's there was no strategy change. That is party strategies remained conflictual. This was the case despite the fact that all three major parties had had little sympathy for an authoritarian alternative. Still, for EDA and Centre Union, their future prospects under the existing democratic regime were only marginally better. Therefore, even by taking into account the increased probability of democratic breakdown, the optimal strategy for all party actors remained the conflictual one.

Spain

The death of Franco in November of 1975 did not force the automatic collapse of the regime as many had predicted. However, it did remove the most serious obstacle to democratic reforms. The decision of the King to appoint Adolfo Suarez as prime-minister, after a brief interlude with the *continuista* Carlos Arias Navarro, opened the way for the institutional transition to democracy.

The founding elections of 1977 produced a party system formed along the lines of two traditional cleavages of Spanish politics: left/right and centre/periphery, pitting a major party of the centre/right against two left wing parties and nation-wide parties against regional ones. [19]

The Right was split between *Allianza Popular* (AP), representing mostly reformed Francoists, and the centre-right *Union de Centro Democratico* (UCD). On one hand, AP emerged as a coalition of small conservative parties organised around high-ranking bureaucrats in 1977.[20] UCD, on the other hand was primarily the personal electoral vehicle of the last Franco prime-minister Adolfo Suarez.[21] Originally founded as a coalition of small centrist parties, UCD relied on Suarez's charisma and status for electoral success. The 1977 elections gave a relatively comfortable victory to UCD with 34.4% of the popular vote and again with 35% in 1979.

Table 1 Electoral Results of Spanish National Elections: 1977-1986

	1977	**1979**	**1982**	**1986**
PSOE	29.3	30.5	48.4	44.1
AP (CD,CP)	8.3	6.0	26.5	26.0
UCD	34.4	35.0	6.7	---
PCE (PSUC)(IU)	9.4	10.8	4.1	4.6
CDS	---	---	2.8	9.2
CiU	2.8	2.7	3.7	5.0
PNV	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.5
HB/EE	0.9(EE)	1.4	1.4	1.7
Other	13.3	12.1	4.3	7.9
Abstention	21.4	32.0	20.0	29.0

NB: Figures in Percentages
Source: Gillespie 1990:126

[19] The two regional parties were the Basque PNV and the Catalan CDC.
[20] Principal among them, the party leader Manuel Fraga Iribarne, a former Franco minister.
[21] Suarez was actually appointed prime-minister under the provisions of Francoist legislation.

The left was dominated by the socialist *Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol* (PSOE) and the euro-communist *Partido Communista Espanol* (PCE). Despite the fact that PSOE could trace its history back to 1870's, by the early 1970's it could offer very little in terms of historical continuity, having largely ceased to function within Spain during the Franco years.[22] However, with the transition to democracy the party rapidly grew, overshadowing the communists and in the 1977 elections emerged as the primary opposition party. In 1979 it was again narrowly defeated but it in 1982 won in a landslide. PCE was originally being founded in 1921 as a socialist splinter group. Unlike PSOE, the party did retain a significant clandestine presence within Spain during the Franco years. As a result by the middle 1970's the party had a wide network of supporters (not always party members) and largely controlled most illegal labour syndicates.

Party Strategies at T1

What were the declared party strategies at the beginning of the democratisation process? Most party actors entered the democratisation process with an established conflictual strategy. PSOE in the twenty-seventh party congress in December 1976, had reaffirmed its commitment both to democratisation through *ruptura* and the "conquest of political and economic power and the socialisation of the means of production" (Maravall, 1982:145). Similarly, PCE was still committed to a confrontational stance through the *Huelga Nacional Pacifica* (HNP) strategy announced at the VIII party congress in 1972. The strategy had some moderating elements (e.g. cooperation with bourgeois forces) but was still largely conflictual. The collapse of the Francoist regime was to be brought through a massive strike and other forms of mobilisation orchestrated by PCE (PCE-Comité Central, 1972:44). This view was not altered after the death of Franco with Carrillo dismissing the King as nothing more than the representative of the dictator (*Le Monde*, 23/10/75). Although some of the party system actors had not emerged formally there was little to indicate the tendency for compromise, which would eventually come to define the Spanish case.

[22] In 1974 PSOE could claim only 4000 members, about half of whom were actually in exile (Gilmour, 1984:103).

Direction of Probability

The probability of democratic stabilisation in the case of Spain decreased during the process of democratic consolidation. A regime breakdown and a reversal to the previous non-democratic order was hardly an unimaginable outcome for the newborn democracy. Yet although the risk was probably higher than any other case examined in this research; a degree of trust was established between party elites as I demonstrate bellow.

The risk of democratic breakdown was substantial in the case of Spain. Where was the threat coming from? Social and political tensions had created a permissive environment, which was exploited by authoritarian nostalgists in an effort to justify their repeated attempts to subvert democracy. Social unrest and demands for regional nationalism increased the suspicion of military elites towards democracy.

Social unrest was made up by two distinctive elements: right-wing violence and labour mobilisation. Aimed both against democratic activists and regime moderates, right-wing violence culminated in arson and bomb attacks against progressive bookshops, newspapers and even *Opus De*i affiliate institutions. Prominent in inciting violence was the extremist press with the dailies *El Alcazar*, *Fuerza Nueva* and *El Imparcial* routinely publishing polemic articles, brandishing reformist politicians as "traitors" and "cowards" (Gilmour, 1984:237-233).[23] Right-wing agitation coincided with a wave of public manifestations and industrial action organised mostly by labour unions. A total of 931 cases of industrial action were recorded in 1973, still under the Francoist regime. The number increased to 2.290 in 1974 and 3.156 by 1975. The transition failed to defuse civil unrest. In 1976, 17,731 strikes took place (Maravall**?**). Between the 6th of January 1976 and the 15th of June 1977, the day of the first elections, a total of 51 large manifestations took place in Madrid (Rodriguez, 1989:99).

Regional nationalism is traditionally associated both with the Basque country and *Catalunya*.**[24]** However, from the perspective of military elites, Basque nationalism was the most problematic of the two; insofar as its more radical nature distinguished it from the Catalan variety both in qualitative and quantitative terms.

[23] For an interesting account on the activities of the extreme right wing press see Rodriguez (1994:231-241).

[24] Even in the 1970 regional sentiment was not limited to the Basque country and Catalunya. However, it was only in these two areas that nationalist demands was strongly organised. For example, in Galicia the *accumulated* returns for the two nationalist parties (PSG/EG and BNPG) were only 11.3 % in 1979 compared to 27.6% for PNV in the Basque country.

ETA exemplified a radical tendency almost from its conception. It represented an alienated and dissatisfied section of the Basque youth which refused to settle for, what was interpreted to be, the conformism of PNV. ETA considered itself fighting an anti-colonial war and therefore violence was seen not only as legitimate but also as the only realistic tool towards independence[25]. Although initially ETA's attacks were neither massive nor indiscriminate by mid-1970's terrorism was becoming a serious destabilising force.[26] In 1973 the organisation carried its most famous attack: the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, second in the regime hierarchy only to Franco himself.

Therefore social and political unrest was combined with growing nationalist mobilisation in order to create a permissive environment. The existence of a window of opportunity however, is not enough by itself for a threat to be credible. Actors willing and able to take advantage of the special conditions in order to bring down democracy are necessary. In the case of Spain, that role was assumed by the military, to which I turn my attention now.

The Spanish military in the late 1970's was in many respects (both attitudinally and operationally) similar to the one that defeated the republican forces in the civil war.[27] It remained a force whose primary focus was counter insurgency operations. For example, the military was often directly involved in counter-guerrilla (in the 1950's against PCE guerrillas) and anti-terrorism operations (against ETA). Moreover, former officers staffed the upper echelons in most security agencies and made up a sizeable proportion of executives in the public sector (Martinez, 1988:318), (Olmeda-Gomez, 1988:249). Although military elites could be safely judged as harbouring suspicions towards democracy,[28] this was not sufficient to justify direct action. This is demonstrated by the fact that the army did not block the transition despite the fact that it was clearly capable of doing so. However, the

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[25] Different ideological factions did exist within ETA. The so called "culturalists" who advocated mobilisation only among *Euskera* speakers, "trotskyites" who proposed cooperation with the Spanish workers and "third wordlists" (*tercermundistas*) who believed that the Basque provinces were in effect Spanish colonies. By 1970, the third wordlists had emerged victorious in the internal debate (Clark, 1984:32-34).

[26] For example only two organised assassinations were committed prior to 1972. All other deaths were unintended.

[27] By "military" I refer primarily to army officers (Ynfante, 1976:324). Officers in the navy and the air force tended to be more progressive (Preston, 1995:181). Furthermore, the army had the lion's share in terms of budget allocation and other resources as well as privileged access to the regime (Martinez, 1988:343).

[28] Best captured in the statement of General Milans del Bosch that "The balance [of democracy] does not seem to be positive: terrorism, insecurity, inflation, economic crisis, pornography and, above all, a crisis of authority" (cited in Gilmour, 1985:290).

growing mobilisation of regional nationalism was seen as a direct challenge to the territorial integrity of the country and therefore it was an area of primary interest for armed forces.

In this regard the interplay of the strategies of two actors, ETA and military elites, proved crucial. As Preston (1995:192) has pointed out the continued terrorist attacks in the Basque country kept the nerves of the army on edge. ETA violence did not stop with the transition to democracy. In fact, attacks intensified both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Not only did the number of attacks increased but also the number of deaths as a result of these attacks rose sharply. For example in 1977 there were only 13 victims of ETA initiated violence. In 1978 the number of deaths as a result of ETA actions had increased to 69 and then again to 85 in 1979.[29]

The ultimate result of such attacks was to push military elites from a stance of open hostility towards democracy to direct confrontation.[30] A correlation between nationalist violence and attempted coups can be established. In 1978, the year of the first coup attempt, there was a serious escalation of violence. In 1980, a few months before the February 1981 coup attempt, ETA conducted its most violent campaign with over one hundred victims. Moreover, as Gilmour (1985:225) has pointed out when the 1981 coup failed, ETA focused its attacks on army officers, "presumably so as to encourage them to try again." The irony was not missed by the mainstream press. As the weekly Cambio 16 put it: "either the regime breaks ETA or ETA annihilates Spanish democracy" (Cited in Carr and Fusi, 1979:252). This is not to argue that the aim of ETA was specifically to provoke a coup.[31] But rather that a successful coup could very well be the unintended result of terrorism.

Consequently, not only the threat to democracy was substantial but a capable and motivated actor willing to bring down democracy existed. This was obvious to most political observers at the time.[32] Party elites were also aware of the precarious

[29] Comparative figures of ETA related violence from: www.avt.org/eta/

[30] At least two major coup attempts took place, the first one was organised for November 1978. The second one; in 1981 involved a dramatic takeover of the parliament with the government and the MPs taken as hostages.

[31] From ETA's point of view the regime question was irrelevant since both democracy and authoritarianism were seen as illegitimate. The relation between repression and nationalist mobilisation was central to ETA's organisation-building efforts as formulated in the spiral theory of action-repression-action by the leading theoretician of the group Frederico Krutwig. Indicative of this line of thought is an early ETA document: "Repression and torture [...] become the best recipe for the youth's rebellion" (*Documentos Y*: vol. 1p.371).

[32] Indeed, diplomatic observers writing at the time did not rule out the possibility that democracy would eventually collapse. See for instance, Eaton (1981:143-144).

nature of the situation. As Gonzalez himself put it later, “in 1977 we did not know what would [come] at the end of the campaign, [...]” (Felipe Gonzalez, interview to Sol Alameda, 1996:545). But the threat of democratic breakdown created the necessary conditions for a strategy that would minimise such risks. Carrillo argued that “to have endured fascism for over thirty years in order to take power from it and then be defeated again two or three years later is something that would scarcely be worth while” (Carrillo, 1976:197). Thus party elites understood the similarities with the situation in the 1930’s and above all wished to avoid the repetition of such a scenario.

Yet, the threat of democratic breakdown was not sufficient by itself, in order to create an incentive for cooperation. That is, the optimal party position might still have been to adopt a conflictual stance given the absence of a realistic alternative. For the alternative to be realistic, an element of trust among party system actors is necessary. Therefore, risk can became a constructive factor but only in conjunction with the existence of a trustworthy relationship between actors. In this regard, the degree of trust established between party elites during the process of democratic consolidation was crucial. Party elites enjoyed if not a trustworthy relationship at least some form of a *modus vivendi.* How was this outcome reached?

Trust did not emerge spontaneously but rather through a series of implicit and explicit agreements between parties. The motivation was not ideological affinity but rather tactically motivated considerations. Inter-party agreements started before the actual transition to democracy and their cumulative effect was that parties entered the democratic consolidation period with an already established reputation for trustworthiness. I argue that this process of reputation building evolved in three separate cases of social exchange: the legalisation of PCE, discussions between Suarez and Gonzalez and the Moncloa pacts.

Suarez had a strong incentive to accept a legal PCE for two main reasons: firstly, as the primary opposition group it would legitimize the new democratic party system by its sheer presence and size and secondly, if it remained underground it would almost certainly become a serious destabilising factor. Yet, this was bound to be unacceptable to military elites. In fact, Suarez had explicitly promised, as late as the fall of 1976, that his reform plans did not include the legalisation of PCE. Therefore, to do so involved a serious gamble and is difficult to justify in the absence of practical benefits. Suarez opted to proceed only after a series of secret meetings

between Carrillo in early 1977. In the course of the meetings Carrillo agreed to accept the legitimacy of the monarchy as well as the Spanish national flag and made some other, less important, concessions in exchange for PCE legalisation (Gilmour, 1989:177). The meetings took place at the insistence of the communists with Carrillo becoming increasingly anxious to establish contact with the new prime minister (Claudin, 1983:238). The negative experience of the Arias government; when PCE anticipated a relaxation of the authoritarian regime, which failed to materialise, had increased the stakes for the party and its leadership. It was conceivable that a pluralistic party system would emerge with PCE still in clandestinely.

Naturally, electoral participation is a requirement for electoral success. However, the keenness with which PCE renounced core programmatic positions is still perplexing. This is even more perplexing given the possibility of eventual legalisation *after* the first democratic elections.[33] The logic was that tensions would be defused during the transition without, ultimately, denying full democratic legitimacy from the new regime. Yet, the behaviour of PCE can be explained by looking at the benefits that the party expected to derive in a competitive party system. The party was confident that it would perform well in the electoral arena. For example, the party newspaper Mundo Obrero (24/1/77) argued that "we are going to win the elections so that the people can recuperate sovereign control over their own destiny, and open the way to socialism and freedom." Given the fact that PCE was the largest opposition group this was hardly an unrealistic forecast. Although most political observers at the time did not predict an outright electoral victory for PCE; the general assessment was that the party would emerge as a major party system actor. However, if the party was to be legalised after the elections, then it would have to enter an already established party system, a far more formidable task.

Likewise, PSOE had also started with a conflictual approach requesting a complete rupture with the authoritarian past but eventually found it more suitable to adopt a consensual approach. According to the personal account of a senior socialist strategist; a communication channel was established fairly soon through Andres Casinello an army officer (Guerra, 2004:171). Face-to-face meetings followed between Suarez and Gonzalez; with PSOE leaders becoming increasingly confident that Suarez would proceed with his promises for reform. As a result, PSOE elites

[33] A proposal supported by the vice president of Suarez, Osorio, at the time but flatly rejected by PCE.

started to hint a more moderate approach would eventually be adopted. In the first legal UGT congress Gonzalez warned that "liberty must be recovered first, socialism will come later […] to pretend otherwise is pure demagogy" (quoted in Gillespie, 1989:315-316). Later, in 1977, Gonzalez was to dismiss the *ruptura* strategy as not being realistic anymore (Julia, 1997:454). Hence PSOE was also willing to reject the conflictual strategy. The calculus was based on the fact that, for the socialists, the conflictual option had functioned as a hedge. Given the absence of the mass organisation that PCE enjoyed, the threat of *ruptura* was the only credible weapon that the party had at its disposal. Once PSOE became convinced on the credibility of Suarez, there was no reason to hedge against a threat that was not relevant anymore.

The economic crisis plaguing the economy was addressed in a series of meetings between party elites in October 1977 at the prime minister's residence, in Moncloa. The main aim of the pacts was to deflate the economy, and it was based on the proposals of Enrique Fuentes, the finance minister. In particular, the pacts stipulated the adoption of higher social security benefits for unemployment and some improvements in housing and education. In return, PSOE and PCE agreed to use their influence with the trade unions in order for the later to accept the limited increases in wages (well bellow the inflation rate) as well as the tight monetary policy and reduce the number of union approved strikes.

For UCD it was important to reach an agreement with the opposition since PSOE and PCE, through their affiliate unions (UGT and CCOO respectively), controlled the labour unions and, consequently, were in a position to bargain with the government.[34] According to Fuentes, Suarez initially considered a parliament vote (where he held the majority) instead of negotiations with the major opposition leaders. (Enrique Fuentes interview with Andreu Misse, 1996:260). Yet, Suarez had apparently already discussed the possibility, in somewhat vague terms, of a pact between various social forces on economic and political issues with Carrillo, from as early as February 1976 (Adolfo Suarez, interview with Sol Alameda, 1996:457).

However, for PSOE and PCE the pacts involved painful concessions on what was their natural and core constituency. In the absence of a reference to the precarious nature of democracy such concessions were unjustifiable for vote

maximizing actors. As Carrillo put it, in a speech delivered at the national stadium of Seville, the party had to deviate from what was effectively the declared party policy “because we have no illusions, [that] we are in a state of emergency and we are (in this state) because we are going to pass from a regime of dictatorship to democracy” (Carrillo, 24/9/1978). Hence the main priority for both PSOE and PCE was to consolidate democracy in order to have the opportunity to contest a more significant payoff in the future.

Some parties remained in the periphery of this *modus vivendi*. AP occasionally did slide to conflictual positions. Regional parties also found it difficult to balance between the need for a national consensus on one hand and the demands of their voters on the other. Yet, although the influence of such actors in specialised electoral groups was substantial; the three main party actors cooperated. This is not to argue that party actors were not attempting to maximize their electoral gains or that unbridgeable ideological differences did not exist. As Carrillo put it in parliament: “we did not do it (sign the Moncloa pacts) in order to save the government, it is well known that we ourselves believe that this is not the best government” (Carrillo, 1978:64). Rather, inter-party cooperation must be seen as an attempt to temporarily suspend mutually detrimental activities in order to have the opportunity to compete for a more significant payoff in the future.[35]

Payoffs under Alternative Strategies

What were the potential payoffs associated with the available strategies? There were two possible strategies: One conflictual the other consensual. A conflictual strategy would almost certainly lead to democratic breakdown. As Carrillo put it to adopt a position “to the left of PSOE [would force PCE to] the clandestinity” (1979:24). Although such a strategy might have helped some parties, especially within the Left, to maximize electoral returns in the short run by satisfying some of the demands of their core constituency; in the long run it was bound to be counter productive given the likelihood of democratic breakdown. In this case payoffs would be null for parties.

Party leaders were conscious of the repercussions of their actions. That is, they were aware that their choices could lead either to democratic consolidation or

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[34] According to Schmitter (1995:300) the combined strength of UGT and CCOO in 1977 was about 3,400,000 members. The number dwarfed the independent USO (644,476 members.

breakdown[36]. Even in the late 1970's, most senior party members had either experienced personally the civil war or were influenced by individuals who had. For example, Carrillo was already a leading member of the of the socialist youth organisation (JSU) in 1936 (Threlfall, 2000:53). In fact the overwhelming majority of senior PCE members in the late 1970's were also politically active during the civil war (Gunther et al., 1988:146). Generally, this was not the case with the party elites of the other main national parties. Both Suarez (born in 1932) and Gonzalez (born in 1942) were too young to actually remember the civil war. Still, they had experienced its consequences. For example, Suarez has argued that, (after reaching the decision to legalise the communist party) "my number one objective during the first months of the transition was to make sure that this legalisation would not turn out to be a reason for political reaction […] the civil war was against communism […] and this was inscribed to everyone's consciences for 40 years" (Adolfo Suarez, interview with Sol Alameda, 1996:457-458). Thus, collective memories from the civil war acted as a constant reminder of what a conflictual strategy could potentially involve.

A consensual strategy, on the other hand, was much more appealing. A stable democratic regime was not anymore a vague possibility but rather an attainable goal if the existing volatile situation was defused. According to Carrillo "the struggle of the classes can not be reduced to frontal attacks of one class against the other [...] rather it can be a policy of limited compromises in order to obtain intermediate objectives that approximate the ultimate objective (Carrillo, 1979:40). Hence, it made sense to suffer minimal defeats in order to have the opportunity to contest a much higher prize later on.

However, payoffs were not uniform across the political spectrum.[37] The three largest national parties were the primary beneficiaries of a consensual strategy because it was they who had a governmental or coalition potential. Nonetheless there were important differences between them. In the aftermath of the first democratic elections UCD was in government and therefore had clearly the most to

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[35] In Carrillos' words "For the Communists, the essential question is not Monarchy or Republic; it is democracy or dictatorship, and we are predisposed to subordinate our preferences in favour of consensus" (Carrillo, 1979:51).

[36] A member of the PCE executive committee captured the spirit very well. "After more than a century of civil wars and a vicious cycle of massacres among Spaniards […] this is the moment when it is possible to end this cycle and open a period of civilised life, politically speaking" (quoted in Gunther et al., 1988:147).

[37] That is only for a consensual strategy. For a conflictual strategy payoffs were non-existent and therefore uniformly applied.

lose from a return to the previous order. PSOE had demonstrated with its strong electoral results that it had a realistic chance to win the next elections. Finally PCE had done poorly but party elites at the time had, to some extent justifiably, interpreted this to the inexperience of the electorate and claimed that the electoral fortunes of the party would soon improve.[38] In 1977, when PCE was legalised there was an added reason to assume that a euro-communist party could emerge as a leading electoral force in a western European party system. In 1976, when PCE strategists were contemplating the electoral chances of their party, the Italian PCI received 34.4% of the popular vote; fairly close to the 38.7% of the dominant Christian democrats. The possibility of a clear PCI victory was still rather remote in the context of cold war politics but nevertheless the implemented moderate strategy had tangibly succeeded to attract increasing numbers of voters. The events in Italy were closely followed by Spanish communists.

Party Strategies at T2

Hence, parties switched to a consensual strategy due to objective reasons. The probability of democratic consolidation was decreasing. This was the case because there was a clear and visible threat to Spanish democracy stemming from anti-democratic military elites. Yet, a degree of trust had been established between the leaders of the main national parties. The development of this special relationship in conjunction with the payoffs that parties were expecting to collect from a consensual strategy can account for the choice of strategy.

Conclusion

Both nascent democracies were threatened by pro-authoritarian domestic actors. The reaction of Spanish party leaders was to moderate their discourse while in Greece there was no corresponding change. Why? Two crucial elements differentiated the cases. The first one involved the difference in expected payoffs: in the case of Greece, for most party actors, potential payoffs from a consensual strategy were not significantly greater compared with what they were already collecting. In contrast, in the case of Spain, payoffs were substantial enough in order to tempt parties.

[38] Needless to say parties normally do not downplay their electoral prospects, at least in public. Nonetheless in the case of PCE the initial disappointing results did point out to a strong potential for electoral growth.

The second element differentiating the two cases involved the probability of actually achieving these payoffs. Strictly speaking, military intervention was equally likely in the two cases given the intransigence of military elites.[39] However, in Spain a *modus vivendi* had emerged among party elites which made possible the adoption of consensual strategies. Party elites were able to compromise knowing that they would have a fair chance to satisfy their preferences later on.[40] In turn, this reduced conflicts and, by extension, opportunities for military intervention. Hence, it made democracy an attainable outcome.

In terms of theory, this paper has demonstrated that contrary to the assumptions of the relevant literature, under certain conditions, parties will not moderate their strategies in the face of an imminent threat to democracy. Furthermore, I have argued that since party strategies are not adopted in isolation but rather depend on objective factors; they can change in the course of the democratic consolidation process, reflecting changes in the environment. Finally, it was shown that the concept of political risk is a relevant factor in the calculations of party elites.

The approach presented here raises some further theoretical questions relevant to the process of democratic breakdown. Intuitively, some of the variables examined here can not be independent of such a process. For example, conflictual strategies probably do contribute to democratic breakdown. But do they constitute sufficient or merely necessary conditions for the collapse of democracy? The formal causes of democratic breakdown are beyond the scope of this paper and were not addressed here. Nonetheless they comprise a logical area for the expansion of the present research.

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Therefore, the optimism of party elites was not illogical. Indeed in 1979, the party made some modest gains and collected 10.8% of the popular vote.

[39] Hence, the existence of actors with anti-democratic attitudes is not important by itself. What is important is to minimize the opportunity that such actors have to challenge democracy.

[40] As a leading Catalan politician, who is hardly known for his moderation of demand, put it when describing his decision not to press for a greater degree of autonomy early on: “We were not defeated in Madrid though, rather in Barcelona [we decided] not to be veto players” (Jordi Pujol in conversation with the author, London:8/2/05).

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