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Paper: *'The role of the Brussels Office of PASEGES (Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Co-operatives) in the effective voicing of Greek agricultural interests in the EU (Eurolobbying). A role model for lobbying the EU?'*

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The present paper focuses on the role of the Brussels Office of PASEGES (Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Co-operatives) in the effective voicing of Greek agricultural interests in the EU (EU lobbying) and to what extent the Office's activity can be perceived as exemplary for interest intermediation at the supranational level.

The Greek Confederation currently comprises 112 Unions of agricultural cooperatives, which practically function as SMEs, and represents nearly 715.000 farmers.

The academic significance of the topic lies firstly in the fact that, compared to the international, especially western, bibliography on interest groups, as far as both national and comparative studies are concerned, in Greece, focus on interest group studies has been rather poor.¹ In addition there is a considerable gap in Greek bibliography on the issue of EU lobbying.² On Greek agricultural interests in particular, there has been limited focus on the interactions between PASEGES and the supranational level in matters of the Common Agricultural Policy, and no overall evaluation of the mission and activities of its Brussels representation. It should be born in mind that the CAP is a domain of exclusive EU competence, with the EU decision-making structures and mainly the European Commission relying heavily on stakeholders in order to initiate new legislation. Therefore the EU-lobbying activity of PASEGES should be examined more closely. Finally, given the fact that Greece has been viewed, until about 1995, as a member 'almost inherently incapable of internalizing the esoteric logic of European Integration and aligning its policy and behaviour to the EU's broad policy objectives and dynamics',³ it is interesting to examine the degree of Europeanization of at least one aspect of the country's EU involvement, i.e. Eurolobbying activities carried out by the Greek Farmers' Confederation.

Research is based on the review of extensive bibliography and, most importantly, as far as the empirical findings are concerned, on a series of interviews with high-ranking PASEGES officials, relevant administrators from the Greek Ministry of Agriculture and the European Institutions, MEPs, NPs and university professors. The paper is also based on the study of internal PASEGES working documents.

Concerning terminology and definitions, the activity of lobbying is exercised each time 'any kind of organized interest (company, union, etc.) tries to influence the decisions of public authorities'. This definition ideally focuses on the essence of the activity rather than on the various categories of involved actors or addressees/ targets.⁴ At the EU level, lobbying could be defined as 'the effort to influence Community decisions by any kind of organized interest'.

Lobbying may be used as a synonym to 'interest intermediation/ representation'. The latter presents the advantage of not being linked to the negative connotations of the

¹ D. Kioukias (1994), *Interest Organization in Greece*, Exantas, Athens, 20-21 and K. Lavdas (1997), *The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration*, Macmillan, London/ St. Martin's, New York, 55.

² E. Chatzianni (2007), *Pressuring for Decision*, Papisissis, Athens, 12.

³ P. Ioakimidis, 'The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems', in Ministry of Press and Mass Media (2002), *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*, Secretariat General of Information, Athens, 108-109.

⁴ R. Buholzer (1998), *Legislative Lobbying in the European Union*, Paul Haupt, Berne, 8.

term lobbying, as in many cultures lobbying has the image of ‘intervening in an unjustified manner in statutory decisions’.⁵

Regarding theoretical considerations, the present paper embraces the approach that many different systems of interest intermediation co-exist at the EU-level and are conditioned by the nature of the policy sector and the intensity of competition between organized interests. Pluralistic arrangements seem to dominate at the supranational level, especially since the 1980s, although in many cases neither pluralism nor (neo) corporatism seems to apply. More recent studies refer to concepts such as ‘power networks’ or the less cohesive, larger ‘issue networks’, both of which seem to be more compatible with the dynamic character of the EU and the growing professionalization of lobbying.^{6,7}

The most important reason for lobbying the EU decision-making process is the growing devolution of political power in crucial domains such as economic and social policy towards the supranational level. It is no longer possible to understand the policy process in any of the Member States without taking account of the power shift to Brussels since the early 1980s.⁸ In order to influence EU policy-making, affected interest groups have to ‘go European’, i.e. develop a European, apart from a national, lobbying route.

More specifically, what makes the EU very appealing to organized interests and provides a major stimulus for lobbying is the *highly dynamic nature* of the EU playing field, the *extreme complexity* of the EU machinery and that in the EU bargaining arena there is *much to be won or lost*, such as legislation, Community funds, etc.⁹

To conclude, the unpredictability of the EU policy agenda, forged by diverse elements, such as the openness of decision-making, its multinational character, the dispersion of policy-making power, the existence of different competitive national political agendas, of several policy initiators,¹⁰ as well as of many cross cut divisions and interdependencies (regional affiliation, etc.)¹¹ create an enormous ‘opportunity structure’ for various stakeholders, but on the other hand encourage the formation of an unstable, multi-dimensional, extremely competitive environment, where political fortunes are

⁵ K. Joos & F. Waldenberger (2004), *Successful Lobbying in the New Europe*, BWV, Berlin, 18 καὶ B. Vayssi re (2002), *Groupes de Pr ssion en Europe*, Privat, Toulouse, 15-18.

⁶ C. Lahusen & C. Jau , *Lobbying als Beruf*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 23-26 and S. Mazey & J. Richardson (1993), ‘Interest Groups in the European Community’, in J. Richardson (ed.) (1994), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, New York, 209.

⁷ Greenwood, Grote & Ronit noted in 1992: ‘From our studies it is impossible to draw the conclusion that interest intermediation at the European level is clearly either of a corporatist or pluralist nature’ and five years later: ‘There is, therefore, considerable unevenness by sector, and issue, and it is not possible to characterize European public policy processes as a whole, as for instance, as either pluralist or corporatist in nature’. (Greenwood 1997a, 24). Mazey & Richardson (1997) stress that ‘Our own findings suggest that there is, as yet, no dominant model or style of EC-group relation...In reality the intermediation process is one of muddling through with many different models of policy-making in use. R. Buholzer (1998), *Legislative Lobbying in der Europ ischen Union*, Paul Haupt, Berne, 24-25.

⁸ S. Mazey & J. Richardson (1993), ‘Interest Groups in the European Community’, in J. Richardson (ed.) (1994), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, New York, 191.

⁹ M. Van Schendelen (1993), *National Public and Private EC Lobbying*, Dartmouth, UK, 5-6.

¹⁰ S. Mazey & J. Richardson (1993), ‘Interest Groups in the European Community’, in J. Richardson (ed.) (1994), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, New York, 206-212.

¹¹ M. Van Schendelen (2005), *Machiavelli in Brussels: the Art of Lobbying the EU*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 89.

mercurial. In this context, keeping track of EU policy initiatives constitutes a major challenge for interest groups.¹²

The EU decision-making machinery provides an almost infinite number of access points through which to lobby the EU authorities. As M. Van Schendelen stresses, ‘The problem is not a shortage but an over-supply of potential routes’.¹³ PASEGES decided very early on to join the European Federation or Euro-group of COPA-COGECA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in the EU and General Council of Agricultural Co-operatives, respectively), one of the collective platforms at the supranational level, which traditionally enjoy privileged status within the EU policy process. On the other hand PASEGES set up its own Brussels Office. Especially since the mid-1980s, several national federations have either opened or expanded their EU Offices.¹⁴

The PASEGES Brussels Office was officially established in 1978, while accession negotiations between Greece and the then European Community were still under way (1975-1981). As soon as 1975, when it became clear that the Greek government would strive for full EU Membership, PASEGES decided to develop a European strategy, in order to reap the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP was a system, initially, of price support for farmers accounting for the bulk of the Community’s budget and being at that time the only policy decided at the supranational level.¹⁵

The Brussels Office of PASEGES assumed different responsibilities during its twenty-nine years of operation and had to deal with different challenges along the way. One can draw two basic conclusions from the research conducted:

- The Brussels Office evolved from a purely information office to a fully-fledged EU-lobbyist, even taking the lead in certain circumstances and assuming executive functions, normally exercised by the PASEGES Athens headquarters
- Concerning the style of EU-group relations in the agricultural sector there is a growing tendency away from corporatist and towards pluralist arrangements.

a) Even before Greece’s accession to the then European Community, the PASEGES Brussels Office became the **eyes and ears of Greek agriculture at the supranational level**.

Thanks to its highly qualified personnel, familiar with the EU negotiating and lobbying mentality, both PASEGES and the Greek public authorities (Ministry of Agriculture, Permanent Representation in Brussels, MEPs, NPs) gain a competitive advantage when negotiating at international or EU fora, as they receive valuable ‘inside’ information on the political priorities of the other Member States, on what coalitions are likely to be formed within the Council of Ministers, what the intentions of the European Commission and the other EU Institutions are, etc.

¹² S. Mazey & J. Richardson (1993), ‘Interest Groups in the European Community’, in J. Richardson (ed.) (1994), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, New York, 206-212.

¹³ M. Van Schendelen (1993), *National Public and Private EC Lobbying*, Dartmouth, UK, 11.

¹⁴ S. Mazey & J. Richardson (1993), ‘Interest Groups in the European Community’, in J. Richardson (ed.) (1994), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, New York, 193.

Furthermore, the maintenance of an EU Office by PASEGES secures continuity in representation, encouraging the establishment of a variety of professional and personal contacts that constitute a sine-qua-non for any effective interest intermediation at the EU level.

In addition, especially in the early 1980s, the Brussels Office offered valuable services to PASEGES, since the lack of refined IT technologies and the distance between Athens and Brussels slowed down the reflexes of the national federation (no internet, only telex, very expensive and not always available telephone connections, no direct flights to Brussels). Maintaining a constant presence in Brussels should therefore not be underestimated.

On another level, at the time of Greece's accession, the Greek state apparatus was rather unprepared to deal with the challenge of successful integration into the European Community structure. The average Ministry of Agriculture official was not familiar with the functioning of the European Community and did not speak any foreign languages. On the contrary, PASEGES had **already developed a coherent European strategy**, had proceeded to an evaluation of the pros and cons of EC Accession, and was aware of the technical issues that should be negotiated to the advantage of Greek agriculture. Its Brussels personnel was also multilingual. To that effect, during those early years, state negotiators were usually accompanied by a PASEGES official to sessions at Commission level.

Gradually the PASEGES Brussels Office, apart from monitoring EC legislative developments, producing newsletters and specialized studies, or simply accompanying the National Confederation's Athens officials to meetings of COPA-COGECA, assumed **more executive tasks**. It began approaching a series of mostly EU but also international lobbying targets, which in row of importance are: the European Commission,¹⁶ European Federations such as COPA-COGECA and UNITAB (International Union of Tobacco Producers), national public authorities (Ministry of Agriculture, Greek Permanent Representation to the EU), the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, as well as international fora (OECD, GATT or WTO negotiation rounds, bilateral discussions with agricultural stakeholders from the US), actively participating in their various committees or working groups. Judging from the bulk of EU lobbying studies and guides in circulation, the PASEGES Brussels Office did develop a comprehensive EU lobbying strategy. According at least to the EU Office's personnel, the PASEGES Brussels representation secures that Greek agricultural interests will not suffer from very negative legislation. Especially during periods of strained relations and introvertedness of the Athens headquarters (especially right after 1983), which at some point failed to make the most of opportunities presented at the EU level, it was the PASEGES EU Office that took the initiative and acted on its own, without any central guidance and with the best interest of Greek agriculture in mind.

Former directors of the Brussels Office finally stress that through their European experience they contributed to the **Europeanization** of the bargaining mentality of Greek negotiators, who especially in the earlier years would opt for emotionally charged

¹⁶ About the European Commission, see the very interesting article of S. Mazey & J. Richardson, 'Interest Groups and the Brussels Bureaucracy', in J. Hayward & A. Menon (eds) (2003), *Governing Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 208-227.

statements about national ‘rights and causes’ instead of adopting a more pragmatist and professional negotiating mentality, in line with the constant trade-offs in EU decision-making. It is also interesting that according to one former director of the Brussels Office, terms like ‘cohesion’ or ‘convergence’ entered the EU agenda quite indirectly, after PASEGES representatives repeatedly used them in EU discussion fora (at a much earlier time than their official incorporation into the Community agenda took place).

However, the influence of the PASEGES Brussels Office was always conditioned by the following factors: The office constitutes only **one (rather minor) voice** in the bargaining reality of a continuously expanding European Union. Its influence heavily depends on it building alliances with stronger organizations (such as the French or the Spanish), in the hope that their interests will coincide. Most importantly, it is the politicians who have the final say and their decisions are not always based on technical considerations.

On a second level, the influence en bloc of national federations in the framework of COPA-COGECA and the EU Institutions working groups is usually limited, since common positions are mostly **compromises at the most abstract level or a sum up of diverse views on concrete issues**.

Additionally, national farmers’ organizations are faced with a progressively diminishing agricultural population, a fact that **weakens their political leverage** towards EU decision-makers. Furthermore, the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with consecutive CAP reforms (among them MacSharry, agenda 2000), not to mention the most recent 2003 reform, that weakened the agricultural movement considerably. The CAP and the huge surpluses it created were gradually linked to environmental degradation and a sense of counter-productivity. To this end CAP arrangements became unpopular with the EU citizenry, leading to today’s decoupling of Community funds from the volume of agricultural production and an emphasis on rural development, food safety, animal welfare standards and sustainable agriculture. According to a senior Brussels Office official, previously the CAP was at the heart of the EC and the intensity of EC negotiations on annual agricultural prices legendary. ‘Currently things seem to have been decided until 2013’ and ‘...the Commission always manages to pass its proposals...despite our objections’.

Finally, the PASEGES Brussels Office is perceived as **understaffed and therefore not as efficient** by many Greek administrators or politicians, who will often communicate directly with the PASEGES headquarters. Furthermore, the Greek state apparatus has gained ground since the 1990s concerning its human capital, minimizing its over-reliance/ dependence on PASEGES. Finally, the maintenance of an EU Office is **financially demanding**. Budgetary considerations do not leave the PASEGES Brussels personnel a lot of room for manoeuvre in their lobbying activities.

b) On a theoretical level, it has been suggested that stable and predictable ‘policy communities’ have generally not developed at the EU level. However, agriculture constitutes a notable exception, not only because COPA-COGECA has from the very beginning been formally incorporated into the European Commission, playing a key role in the management of the CAP, but also because, at least until recently, EU policy-making has been dominated by a narrow range of interests (notably farmers and food manufacturers) who have successfully excluded other groups (e.g. consumers and

environmentalists) with possibly conflicting policy objectives.¹⁷ Currently though it seems that due to developments in the European agricultural landscape and CAP reforms referred to above, the agenda setting is becoming much more competitive, strengthening **pluralist tendencies**. On the contrary, according to a former PASEGES Brussels Office official, the weakening of agricultural voices at the EU level considerably strengthens the national federations at the Member State level, where, at least in the Greek case, the state has traditionally perceived PASEGES as its main interlocutor in agricultural matters.

In spite of the above, the Brussels Office of PASEGES enters upon its 30th year of successful operation. Being one voice in the EU interest group landscape, it has to offer the basic competitive advantage of timely information, much faster reflexes, professionalism and the consolidation of interpersonal relationships at the very heart of EU developments, which constitute an all time classic recipe for any successful interest intermediation.

¹⁷ S. Mazey and J. Richardson (1993), 'Interest Groups in the European Community', in J. Richardson (ed.) (1994), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, New York, 194, 209.

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Interviews with MEPs, European Commission officials, Greek Ministry of Agriculture officials, members of PASEGES and other Farmers' Unions (GESASE and SYDASE), members of Farmers' Cooperatives, University Professors, directors of the PASEGES Brussels Office.

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Presentation:

**Trade Union Strategies in the Era of European Integration:
Theoretical Concerns and Methodological Issues**

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Introduction

My study is divided in two main parts: a theoretical and an empirical one. Theory and Methods are the objects in which I would like to focus in this paper. Three sections compose the main theoretical body: In Chapter 1 I try to conceptualize a key-issue of trade unionism that is its “*crisis*”. After a historical analysis of the definitions “*Working Class*”, “*Working Movement*”, “*Trade Unionism*”, I assume that crisis is an inherent element of labour movement that is normally latent but in specific socio-economic conditions becomes active. The latter situation is manifested in trade unionism as declining membership, impotence in representing the demands of the working class, constraining of industrial action, challenging of the dominant logics and probably challenging of the leadership. Such a crisis manifestation can be discerned in the European (and in advance in Greek) trade unionism of the nineties.

Chapter 2 refers to the core theoretical issue that is the Strategies of trade unionism in the last fifteen years. Following the conceptualization of “*Revitalization Theory*” I apply some criteria such as europeanization, organizational logic, methods of reconstruction, coalitions, political action, contentiousness, internationalism. This classification leads me to the following dichotomy in contemporary trade union movement: Consensus versus Contentious strategic line. The origin of this dichotomy can be traced in the historical roots of labour movement and it is part of the inherent crisis that I mentioned previously. However, the focus remains on the contemporary environment within which European integration is the dominant external factor. The final concern of this chapter is to analyze the consequences of EU social and industrial relations policies.

The previous chapters focused on the effects that the social conditions cause on the strategies that trade unions apply. In Chapter 3 I examine the effects of trade union strategies over the social conditions. In order to evaluate this relation I classify two tiers of effects: the first tier refers to the working conditions (“bread and butter” issues and labour-capital relation issues as well). The second tier represents the effects of the two main strategies in trade union membership (union density, industrial action, representation).

The three chapters comprise three respective theoretical debates that Historical Sociology and Comparative Political Analysis have examined: *why* does trade union movement emerge historically? *How* is this emergence manifested? And *what* are the effects of these manifestations? The premises that derive from the conceptualization that is proposed compose the framework, which will be tested in the empirical part of my study. Remains to be seen if a macro-causal (time-series) explanative model can be applied effectively in order to examine relations between contemporary unions and federations in the national level.

Trade Union Crisis as a theoretical problem

The concept of “crisis” is so old, as the labour movement. Its roots can be traced back in the Webbs’ analysis over the history of the British trade unionism, one hundred years ago. Since then, many remarkable thinkers have contributed to a range of theories, which can be categorized in respect to the methods that they use to define the relation between capital and labour. The line between Marxian and Weberian theoretical tradition is the most prominent. Nevertheless, Tilly and Tilly (2001: 20-32) highlight three main approaches of Labour Theory: Marxist, neoclassical and institutional approach. Obviously, there are quiet many sub-categories that we could refer to. We will focus on these approaches that had a strong impact on the trade union movement classification and on the analysis of trade union crisis as well.

Sidney and Beatrice Webb gave a cornerstone on the unionism theory, following a rather functional approach. According to this type of analysis, the labour organization functions as an institution in which the interests of their membership are compiled and expressed directly from the labour leadership. Leadership has the competence to negotiate with the capitalists, without challenging its role as responsible co-actor. Trade union as an equivalent social partner, this is the dominant notion of this pluralist perception, according to which crisis is an external process, caused by socio-economic turbulences. E.g. economic crisis, high unemployment rates, external competitive pressures are considered to be the determinant factors that cause low union density, reduce the union recognition, undermine the collective agreements and their coverage. As we can assume, functional analysis tends to narrow the concept of trade union crisis in its manifestations. The by-product of this approach is a mechanistic connection between social conditions and labour movement.

Next to these schools lies the economic theory of collective action deriving from the neo-classical economic theories. Basic interest here is the estimation of assets and liabilities of the trade union actions. Olsonian logic is the most prominent example of this type of theories, no matter if the credit of analysis is the trade union or the membership. The labour organizations are considered as rational actors who act within a framework, which is common for all the social actors (namely the employers and the employees). The organizational formal analogies of the employer and labour unions, lead to a formal association, where the asymmetry of power is theoretically excluded. The contextual factors are also seen as major determinants of the internal trade union situation and once again crisis and its symptoms seem to be identical.

A historical materialist approach, based on Marxist methodological and theoretical premises, provides a framework within which the organizational products of the social consciousness (trade unions in our case) are correlated in a dialectical way with the conditions of the social Being. Concerning the trade union theory this correlation has two consequences: The first has to do with the contradictory character of the social consciousness, which reflects the contradictions that are present at the level of the social Being. The second consequence of a Marxist reading of trade unionism as a form of social consciousness is that the motions at the level of consciousness are not passive effects, but they have their counter-effect on the social conditions of capitalist reproduction. I will try to elaborate the theoretical derivatives of this analysis.

The unbearable inconsistency of trade union movement

Various macro-historical studies of labour movements' development have focused their scope on the causes due to which different social and economic conditions triggered various types of labour movement. Continental trade union development seems to differ from British or Southern European trade union development. What were the decisive factors that lead continental and anglo-saxon trade unionism to a "reformist rational type" (Seferiades: 1998), while Southern European trade union movements developed more revolutionary forms and methods?

Obviously, a historical materialist approach would give priority to changes and differences in the material base of social reproduction. If we take Britain, France and

Greece as representative features of three types of labour movement’s historical development, the materialist hypothesis seems solid. After a brief research over the “objective” and “subjective” factors of trade union emergence in these three countries I tried to compare the three cases by applying the method of maximum differentiation. Tables 1 and 2 show us the conclusion of this research.

The macro-causal factor that determines the different routes among British-French and Greek trade unionism seems to be correlated with the level and the regime of wealth accumulation in the three capitalist economies. Without entering in details over the components of the socio-economic environment that had a determinant impact on the character of a trade union movement, we can conclude that the processes that take place on the level of capitalist formation within the national and intra-national sphere cannot leave the various forms of social consciousness (trade unionism included) unaffected.

Table 1

	FACTORS	BRITAIN	FRANCE
OBJECTIVE	Capital Concentration	High	Relatively Low
	Working Class Concentration	High	Relatively Low
	Technological Modernization	High	Low
	Wealth Accumulation (Monopoly super-profit)	High	High
SUBJECTIVE	State and Bourgeoisie Strategy	Mild & Cooperative	Rival & Contentious
	Trade Union emergence	Beginning of 19 th Century	Middle of 19 th Century
	Ideological Fragmentation	Low	High
	Revolutionary Influence	Relatively Low	High
CRISIS OUTCOME		Reformist Domination	Reformist Domination

Table 2

	FACTORS	GREECE
OBJECTIVE	Capital Concentration	Low
	Working Class Concentration	Low
	Technological Modernization	Low
	Wealth Accumulation (Monopoly super-profit)	Relatively Low
SUBJECTIVE	State and Bourgeoisie Strategy	Extreme Rival & Contentious
	Trade Union emergence	Beginning of 20 th Century
	Ideological Fragmentation	Relatively High
	Revolutionary Influence	High
CRISIS OUTCOME		Revolutionist Domination

Whereas, according to a materialist notion, the capitalist transformations and their contradictions (fundamentally the contradiction between Labour and Capital), historically formed the socio-economic environment within which the working class became from a “class in itself”, a “class for itself”, developed class consciousness, create labour organizations, such as trade unions and finally political parties. Due to their origin and their position within the capitalist social formation (where the asymmetry of power is theoretically accepted), labour organizations embody in some way the contradictions that gave birth to them: they are not homogenized institutions, with inputs and outputs externally fixed, as pluralist theory assumes. The rank-and-file and leadership division is just a common feature of contradictions between socially and ideologically different sections of trade unionism. That means that crisis is not externally posed, but constitutes an inherent characteristic of trade union development. Monitoring the history of this innate inconsistency, at least in the case of Greek trade union movement, we could distinguish two successive “states of being”: the **latent crisis**, where the symptoms stay inert, the dominant strategy in trade union movement is strong enough to defend the fundamental rights of the membership, the indicators of union density are stable or even upward. Such a “state of being” was apparent at the first years of General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE). For almost a decade (1918-1926) GSEE leads effectively the struggles of its


members. The contentious strategy is almost dominant, the mobilization potential is high and the union membership is rising. The interference of exogenous factors (military coup d' état in 1926, state intervention in trade union processes etc) in tandem with inherent contradictions of Greek labour movement, lead to the activation of crisis, in the late 1920s: sharp division between rival tactics, extended gap between rank-and-file and leadership, organizational neutralization and finally organizational split (in 1929 “red” trade unionists established United General Confederation of Workers – EGSE – which was proscribed one year later).

Generally speaking, the **activation of crisis**, this successive “state of being” leads to a series of manifestations, which are the symptoms of crisis and not the crisis in itself. In tandem with external factors, as rising unemployment, economic crisis, international competition, technological innovations, political reciprocations, this activation results in some effects, which the contemporary international literature of “Revitalization Theory” – Behrens, Hamman and Hurd (2004), Turner (2005), Frege and Kelly (2003) – tend to analyze in four main dimensions:

- **Membership Dimension:** The main indicator here is Union Density decline, which is detected by many scholars as a tension of European trade unionism since the eighties (Table 3 and diagram 1). Problematic contact with “new” parts of working class (women, refugees, youth, “outsiders”) is the other side of this crisis dimension.

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Diagram 1 Union Density 1960-1998 (16 OECD countries, % of labour force)



Source: Kelly (2003: 3)


Table 3 Union Density Changes 1985-90

Χώρα	Union Density (1995)	Changing Rates (1985-1995)
Austria	41,2%	-19,2%
Czech Republic	-	-44,3%
Denmark	80,1%	+2,3%
Finland	79,3%	+16,15
France	9,1%	-37,2%
Germany	28,9%	-17,6%
Greece	24,3%	-33,8%
Hungary	60,0%	-25,3%
Ireland	83,3%	+6,3%
Israel	23,0%	-77,0%
Italy	44,1%	-7,4%
Malta	65,1%	-35,8%
Holland	25,6%	-11,0%
Norway	-	+3,6%
Poland	33,8%	-42,5%
Portugal	25,6%	-50,2%
Spain	18,6%	+62,1%
Sweden	91,1%	+8,7%
Switzerland	22,5%	-21,7%
United Kingdom	32,9%	-27,7%

Source: Katsoridas (2002)

- Economic Dimension:** The contemporary crisis of trade union movement is detected in two economic indicators: the coverage of Collective Agreements and mainly the effects of Collective Bargaining. Observing the latter in the case of E.U.-15 we can conclude that the last 15 years the tension is rather dim for labour (Diagram 2).

Diagram 2 Wage share in National Income 1979-1995, E.U.-15 .



Source: European Commission (2000: Chart 43).

Source: Kelly (2003)

- **Political Dimension:** Unions' political influence is directed at national and international political actors. This dimension is impossible to be observed out of the national framework, within which it is outlined. Likewise the typologies of different industrial relation systems are essential here. Regini (1987) distinguishes three types: Concertative industrial system, Political Isolation system, Pluralist Fragmentation System. A classical classification is given by Crouch (1993) whose basic criteria are the power of organized labour and the degree of neo-corporatism of the industrial relation system. However as many scholars of trade union strategy have remarked (Korver: 2004, Traxler: 1995) the last fifteen years there is a convergence tension among the various industrial relation systems, at least within the European Union. Trade unions modify their role into a Social Partner, not in a traditional corporatist way, but rather in a way that Hyman (2005) characterize as "elitist embrace", which in the case of ETUC is translated in "Brussels embrace" (Hyman: 2005, 25). Finally, concerning the bonds of trade unions with political parties, a relative relaxation tends to be a common observation, at least in the core European trade union movements (Germany, Britain, France). In Greece, during the last decade, there is a debate over the independence of trade unions from party mechanisms. In fact, in some degree, this political consensus for trade union consistency results in substitution of party bonds, with bonds with other poles of power (employer unions, other social partners, E.U. institutions).
- **Institutional Dimension:** Three sub-categories could indicate the institutional dimension of trade union crisis: the first has to do with the role of organization within the society. In Greece, the abnormal social and political life after the civil war, instilled many paternalistic elements in Greek trade unionism. The role of potential force of social renewal was decisively undermined. In the current phase of economic and monetary unification, starting in 1992 (Maastricht Treaty), GSEE acquires a new role;

that of a social partner whose first priority is to contribute to the “national aim” of participation at EMU. The second sub-category has to do with the relation between organization and membership. This relation is closer when the indicators of participation in unions’ inner organizational life are high: *participation in unions’ elections* and *participation in unions’ industrial action*, are two main elements of the relation between membership and organization. In the Greek case, as we can see in Table 4, the gap between the enlisted members and the members who participate in their union elections, seems to have been extended since 1992, indicating an extending representation gap.

Table 4


GSEE Congresses	Members of trade unions belonging to GSEE		
	Voted	Enlisted	Gap
27 th Congress, 27-29/3/92	482.337	798.689	-316.352
28 th Congress, 16-19/3/95	430.581	775.115	-344.534
29 th Congress, 12-15/3/98	413.843	754.142	-340.299
30 th Congress, 15-18/3/01	420.610	768.484	-347.874
32 nd Congress, 15/3/04	448.754	839.383	-390.629

Source: GSEE (2006)

The industrial action, and especially, the strike waves have been systematically the focal point in many studies of trade union movement. Once again, I propose to take safe distances from the simplistic deduction of strike waves to economic circle solidly. There is no doubt that striking potential is negatively effected from an economic juncture where unemployment is high, capitalist production is stagnant, inflation is rising, technological innovations challenge the dominant employment model.

There are studies from various historical periods that indicate the relation between economic circle and industrial relation. Such a correlation is traced in Britain and Germany at the economic crisis on the beginning of the 20th Century (Cronin: 1987, 79-100, Boll: 1987, 47-78). Perlman (1922) in his classical study on the history of the American labour movement, notes a positive relation between rising financial indicators and rising industrial action and trade union action generally. Observing the official statistic database about strike activity in Europe since 1975, these correlations seem to be justified (Diagram 4).

Diagram 3 Strike activity on the whole industry and the services, EU-15, 1975-2002



Source: Waddington (2005: 523)

I would like to argue that on the eve of the external manifestation of crisis typical functions of trade unions are dislocated. In short, the crisis becomes apparent. For example, the Greek trade union movement recorded a dramatic decline in industrial action during the mid 90s. This was not a simple reflection of a bad economic or political juncture. The effects of economic crisis and capitalist restructuring thrived on a soil, which was already prepared

after the outcome of the inherent trade union strife in the early nineties. The total adoption of the notion of “Social Peace” in favor of the national competitiveness from GSEE leadership, initiated a period of declining strike activity and militant action in general.

Finally, the relationship between the confederation and the unions takes various forms depending on the form of trade union articulation in a national industrial relation system. In Greece, the vast majority of the shop floor unions and federations belongs to the Confederation. The number of independent unions is insignificant.

Trade Union Strategies

As I tried to show, the way that a trade union movement confronts the negative changes in socio-economic sphere, shapes the framework within which the outcome of the crisis activation will come up. In accordance, strategic choices or trade union politics in general, have their own counter-effect on the various motions that take place in the material base of social reproduction, namely in the terms that labour force is related with capital.

Obviously, we cannot evaluate the effectiveness of a strategy, without defining *what* this strategy is about. In order to understand the strategies that various trade unions adopt, I suggest applying some criteria that occur from “Revitalization Theory” debate. According to these criteria, we could distinguish trade union strategies in two main categories: **contentious** and **consensual**. One could also find alternative definitions for these concepts: partnership versus confrontational model (Mc Shane: 1999), moderate versus militant trade unionism (Kelly: 1996), adversarial versus co-operational tactics (Edwards, Belanger and Wright: 2006) and so on. I choose the terms consensual and contentious, as more inclusive. Militancy, or partnership, could be considered as indicators, or conditions, necessary but not efficient. Whereas, by using them as parameters, the two categories (consensual – contentious) gain explicitness and inclusiveness. In order to categorize trade union strategies, I propose the following parameters:

I. Europeanization: European Union policies and particularly economic and social preconditions of European integration, have their own impacts on the reproduction terms of the labour and capital relation. Observing the EU trajectory from Maastricht to Lisbon, I have concluded that trade unions cannot plan their politics anymore without calculating the consequences of these policies (namely, restrictive monetary policies and neo-liberal vision of marketization (Hyman: 2005, 15)). However the way that trade unions tackle Brussels' choices (exit or voice) affects the character of their strategy. Erne (2004: 2) distinguishes 4 strategies, which are determined from the type of stance over the EU policies and the degree of technocratization in policy making: Euro-technocratization strategy, technocratic re-nationalization strategy, Euro-democratization strategy, and Democratic re-nationalization strategy. Hyman offers a respective distinction between strategies that answers to "europeanization" in the following ways: "yes, if", "yes, and", "no, unless", and "no, because". Quoting his conclusion for the impact that europeanization has on trade union politics: "*Unions' engagement with the EU has largely abdicated contentious politics in favour of industrial legality*" (2005: 35). Therefore, I include in the category of consensus the strategies that in Hyman terms answer positively to European integration, or in Erne's terms, have a strong bias towards technocratization. Although in theory the policy-making criterion in Erne's analysis produces a division between euro-technocratic and national-technocratic strategies, in practice the technocratic-orientated unions rarely challenge the Europeanization prospect. The opposites apply to contentious politics.

II. Militancy: It is crucial to define the meaning of this concept, which very often is considered as identical with contentious strategies. In my analysis, militancy is a significant condition of contentious politics, but not efficient enough to define a union strategy. It is obvious that strike activity correlated with quality elements, as politicization of struggle, radical demands, strike propensity, and participation of the rank-and-file membership constitute a strong indicator of unions' militancy. High strike propensity is expected to characterize contentious strategy. On the opposite, axiomatic rejection of strike as ineffective methods of bargaining or claim, or repulsion, over other militant forms of pressure towards

employers (as factories occupation, demonstrations, road closures etc), indicates lower levels of militancy. The alternative methods of pressure that indicate moderation, namely Social Partnership, including social dialogues or other deliberative forms of bargaining, it is expected to characterize a more consensual strategy. Kelly (1996: 61) has grouped the characteristics of militancy and moderation in five categories: aims, membership sources, institutional sources, methods and ideology. Militant unions are considered to have large-scale demands with low concessions; their sources are based on the participation of their members; their institutional sources are based on collective bargaining exclusively; they use strike frequently; their ideological profile is adversarial. Whereas moderate unions develop moderate demands; they trust employers, and the law respectively; it is possible to experiment with non-collective bargaining institutions; they do not use strikes frequently; their ideological core is social partnership.

- III. Organizational Logic:** The methods that a union adopts in order to develop itself, and particularly the aims of these methods are crucial for the union strategy. If the enrolling of new members aims to grow mobilization potential, and participation of activists, then a movement's logic is reflected (participation logic versus influence logic). Heery and Adler (2004: 48-50) analyze the organizational logic in three basic components: Techniques (centralized, or decentralized processes), Aims (mobilization, or influence), and Motives (class-oriented unionism, or service unionism). However, techniques disperse in various strategies, thus my distinction is based on Logic (influence on the political system, or participation in trade unions), Aims of enrolling (influence or activist potential) and Motives (services or class-oriented struggles).
- IV. Coalitions:** Coalition politics constitute the “core” of a union strategy. Restructuring tactics and Organizational logics have a rather limited impact by themselves. Whereas, by choosing its social allies, trade union movement chooses its opponents too. According to Heery, Kelly and Waddington (2003), 1990s found trade unionism in Europe seeking for institutional resources through the various patterns of Social Partnership. The common characteristic of these patterns is the tendency to face the employer as a partner, in a positive sum game that can be profitable for all the actors. The dominant consensual strategy tends to take this option for granted. EU institutions, as European Parliament,

seem to be considered as credible ally too. On the opposite, unionism that seeks its allies among other social movements, women movements, peace movements, or even among petite bourgeois movements, or peasants' movements, is far more likely to adopt contentious strategies, against the state and the capital.

- V. Political Action:** The Coalition field it can be said that it is a sub-field of unions' political action. Inevitably, the taxonomical categories have some overlapping elements and an expected flexibility. However, the more explicit they are, the more analytical power they have. For example, Hamman and Kelly (2004) distinguish 5 types of political action: a) bonds with political parties, b) political strikes, c) social pacts with government, d) lobbying, e) strategic use of legislative action. These five categories are very useful in strategy analysis, because the systematic adoption of the first two types, limits the possibility of adopting the rest three types.
- VI. Restructuring:** Two main tactics occur in the case of union restructuring: a) Changes in the external structure (mergers, secessions), and b) changes in the internal structure (union government, resources allocation). Concerning the external structure, Behrens, Hurd and Waddington (2004: 19-21) make the following distinction: I) Aggressive restructuring (union's expansion against other unions), II) Defensive restructuring (exclusively orientated to the union's survive), III) Restructuring of renewal (adoption of new strategic priorities). Restructuring methods cannot determine the character of a union strategy by themselves. However, correlated with other tactics, they can result in a more contentious or a more consensual logic.
- VII. Internationalism:** Another source of conceptual "inflation". The scholar of contemporary unionism hardly meets an absolute absence of internationalist discourse, unless it is about a "yellow" trade union. Especially in the globalization era, references on the need of international action can be met on the whole political and ideological spectrum. Despite the superficial discourse over international solidarity, there are serious attempts in trade union literature to define more carefully this political choice. Lillie and Lucio (2004: 170) seem to correlate the radical internationalism with contentious strategic choices. My attempt is to distinguish between typical and essential internationalism in trade union movement. Concerning the typical internationalism of trade unions, it is manifested as contradiction between the logic of national competitiveness

(either national or international trade unions), and the international class solidarity. Greek trade union movement exemplifies this contradictory logic. Before we get engaged in the effectiveness debate (what could be the outcomes of these strategies and how can we evaluate them) I would like to depict the core strategies classification (Table 5).

Table 5

CRITERIA	STRATEGIES			
	CONSENSUAL		CONTENTIOUS	
Europeanization (Erne)	Technocratic re-nationalization	Euro-technocracy	Euro-democratism	Democratic re-nationalization
Europeanization (Hyman)	“yes, if”	“yes, and”	“no, unless”	“no, because”
Coalitions (Frege and Kelly)	“Progressive employers”		Social Movements	
Militancy (Kelly)	Low		High	
Political Action (Hamman and Kelly)	Lobbying, Social Pacts, Bonds with political parties, legal means of pressure		Bonds with political parties, politicization of discourse	
Organizational logic (Waddington)	Logic of influence, Various enrolling methods aiming at growing institutional influence, Service unionism		Logic of participation Enrolling methods aiming at activists’ participation, Class-oriented unionism	
Restructuring	Aggressive, or Defensive restructuring		Defensive, or restructuring of renewal	
Internationalism	Restricted by branch, national or regional competitiveness logic		Internationalist class-oriented solidarity	

Union Effectiveness

The last part of this theoretical and methodological work attempts to answer two interrelated questions: *what are the effects* of these strategies for trade unions, and *how could someone evaluate* these effects? The matter becomes more complex, as some of these effects have rather different importance for different actors within the trade union movement. In order to escape from a subjectivist understanding of current trade union strategies, I tried to group their effects in two categories: a) the terms of labour force reproduction generally, b) the terms of participation of workers in trade unions.


The first group of effects is reflected, more or less explicitly, on the Collective Agreements between trade unions and employers. Observing the Collective Agreements of the period that we are interested in (1991-2006), we can be informed about the wage fluctuations, the working hours regime, the safety and health conditions of workers etc. It is true that labour relations concern a wider range of issues than this of collective bargaining. Besides, the industrial relation systems display particular national features, despite the convergence that is noticed regionally, or even globally. French labour law has (at least until recently) much more crucial role than the collective agreements. On the opposite the de-centralized British industrial system provides a framework fertile for bargaining on a wide range of issues. Due to historical reasons, Greece lacks the collective bargaining traditions of continental Europe. However the democratization of Greek industrial relation system in the 1980s provided a collective bargaining framework of agreements at company, branch, and national level that is still dominant, although there is an explicit tension for individualization of collective bargaining.

Apart from “bread and butter issues” that are crucial for the labour reproduction and are described in the collective agreements, there are also some other issues, which we should include in our analysis. Taking in account useful insights of the various studies on this field (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin: 1991, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin: 1995, Edwards, Belanger and Wright: 2006) I distinguish the following indicators, which describe well the terms that labour force enters in the labour-capital relation: managerial prerogatives, limitations on the right of strike, bargaining duration, the contract’s validity (one year, two years, many years), the democratic rights of the workers in the working place (union liberties, respect of the worker’s personality,

deterrence of managerial illegal behaviours). Some of these issues are also described from the Collective Agreements, while others have to be detected by examining the workers' views.

The estimation of second group of effects has also two aspects: the first one is qualitative. All the trade union organizations that I observe provide data for their membership fluctuations, at least for the last fifteen years. A rather difficult task is to estimate the trade union density, a crucial indicator of union effectiveness at the representation level. A first incomplete attempt to estimate this indicator for the twelve unions that I am interested in is given at Diagram 5.

Diagram 5 Union Density in 12 branches (1995-2003)



Sources: GSEE (28th – 32nd Congresses)
 ESYE (National Statistical Service of Greece)

However, it would be far more interesting if we could combine these findings with an individual-level analysis, which could inform us about workers' opinions on how effective trade unions are in representing their interests. There are quite many researches on European Trade Unionism that provide us with methodological instruments and fine techniques. Among the most relevant, this of Bacon and Blyton (2002), who use various scales that measure demands, concessions, strike action, managerial understanding, values, in order to evaluate what are the effects of various union strategies on union representativeness, on the worker-union relation, on the

terms of labour reproduction. Researches based on individual-level cross-sectional analyses can be complementary to a macro-causal one. As Riley (1997: 270) notes about the two methods: ‘Rather than comparing the effect of environmental factors on a group of people over relatively long periods of time, individual-level analysis tends to be based on a snapshot taken at one point in time [...] Whilst both approaches are valuable, individual-level studies may enjoy a higher ability to detect the morphology of the causal links whose effects have been identified in macro-level’.

Final Methodological Remarks

Recapitulating the methodological trajectory which ends up in a combination of macro-causal and cross-sectional analyses, it is useful to remind the three consequent questions that I have posed: *how* trade unions emerged historically, *what* strategies do they adopt today, *what are* the impacts of this adoption? In order to answer the first question, I tried to represent the inconsistent emergence of trade unionism and its inherent crisis, with reference to three trade union movements: British, French and Greek. This macro-historical analysis helped in defining the meaning of trade unionism as a form of social consciousness that is related dialectically with the “environmental factors” of the social Being (effects and counter-effects).

In order to answer the second question, I focused on the Revitalization literature by grouping some key-insights about the contemporary European trade union movement. By elaborating seven categories of indicators, I tried to make clear the meaning of the two basic strategies (consensual-contentious) that trade unions adopt or reject in the era of European integration.

Finally, I attempted to group and structure some indicators of trade union effectiveness, in order to make possible the evaluation of the two strategies in the Greek example. Two groups of effects seem to be possible to be examined: A) the terms of labour reproduction, or speaking broadly the terms in which labour get engaged with capital, B) the terms of workers’ participation in unions (relation between unions and working class generally). My sample consists of the twelve most important secondary trade union organizations that correspond to twelve branches, crucial in economic terms (share of value production, employment share, investment share). The importance of these twelve unions derives from their power within GSEE,

their historical importance and their dynamics. The analysis of the effects of the strategies that the twelve unions adopt is two-folded: a time-series research on the data that are collected from trade union archives (membership fluctuations, resources, strike activity, mergers etc), from union constitutions, or other official union documents, from Collective Agreements, from secondary sources; a cross-sectional individual-level analysis based on questionnaires that will be collected from a subsample of the twelve branches. A Simple Regression Analysis (F-Test) could show us how two quantitative variables (contentiousness-effectiveness) are correlated (positively or negatively) according to employees' opinions. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) could test how contentiousness (quantitative variable) is correlated with the character of a union (category variable). Taking in account the results of these tests and in accordance with the time-series analysis that has been preceded, we can reach to our final conclusions about union strategies and their impacts in the context of European integration. These conclusions might bring us closer to the answer of the question that was the basic motive of my research: *what prospects for trade unions today?*

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The Political Behavior of the Unemployed: Theoretical Considerations and Methodological Dilemmas

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
Key words: unemployment, economic voting, political behavior, elections, political participation

Abstract: Unemployment forms one of the most important economic indicator around which the parties and the governments battle. On the other hand, voters take into account unemployment, inflation and other economic rates in order to judge the governing party, whether sociotropic or egocentric (pocketbook). In this paper I discuss the basic bibliographic review on the economic voting theory, the main theoretical assumptions that will engage my research and the methodological dilemmas that result from the elaboration of aggregate data of the past two national elections in Greece.

Introduction

During the last decades, unemployment consists one of the most important problems not only in Greece but also in the European Union. Especially in Greece unemployment was increased dramatically in the 1990s, reaching its peak in 1999 and since then it is decreasing, without, however, approaching the unemployment levels of the 1980s (see Figure 1). According to data from European Committee, unemployment in the EU in 1995 exceeded 10% of workforce (INE/GSEE 1996), while 20 millions, in the EU-12 fell victims to it and it is estimated that this number will be increasing at half a million the next years (Pelagidis 1998). Accordingly, unemployment has evolved to one of the most important problems of Europe and has become, henceforth, the central problem of last decades.

Figure 1



Source: Eurostat

According to the last measurements made by the Observatory of Employment of Organization for the Occupation of the Workforce¹, the total number of registered unemployed in February 2007 in Greece amounts to 452.888 individuals, while the majority of unemployed consists of women by 63,04%, against 36,96% of men (see Table 1). At the same time, the corresponding rates of unemployment in the EU-25, according to EUROSTAT data² (see Figure 2), soar to 7,9% of the total of population, with Greece exceeding by 1% the mean of EU-25 and EU-27 and by 1,5% the mean of EU-15 countries, with the percentage of women is double comparing to those of men; 15,5% against 6,2%.


Table 1

Sex	Frequency	Percentages
Male	167.373	36,96%
Female	285.515	63,04%
Total	452.888	100,00%

Figure 2

¹ For further details see <http://www.paep.org.gr>

² For further details see <http://www.epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int>



Source: Eurostat

The difficulty of the calculation of unemployment and its comparative analysis in the various countries stems from the fact that there is not a single definition that would be used by all the organizations that measure it. In Greece there is differentiation in the definition of unemployment by the two organizations that publish data on unemployment and materialize the employment policies. The National Statistical Service holds the quarterly "Research on Workforce" which is sampling research and is realized using common methodology in the EU member states. In this research are used definitions, which have been agreed on internationally. Thus, for the Statistical Service "unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a. without work during the reference week, b. currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week; c. actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start later, i.e. within a period of at most three months"³. The determination of the number of unemployed according to the official

³ For further details see <http://www.epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int> and <http://www.statistics.gr>

definition results from the answers asked in a line of questions and not from the characterization that everyone makes for himself.

The Greek Manpower Employment Organization - *inter alia* – registers those who arrive in its offices and ask to receive an unemployment card. Registrations are completed with statement of those interested and without extensive investigation of the individual's place in the job market. The Greek Manpower Employment Organization determines the unemployed as "persons of age of 15 years and more, capable of working, registered in the offices of the Greek Manpower Employment Organization, subsidized and not and available to direct undertaking of work". The above comments are pointed out to illustrate that the comparison between the unemployment as defined by the National Statistical Service and the Greek Manpower Employment Organization should be avoided because they measure unemployment by using different methods.

What has concerned the present research, however, is not the different definitions of unemployment, but the problem of unemployment itself and how it affects the "political" life of persons. Does unemployment constitute a factor of influence of vote and political action, more generally, in Greece? According to data, unemployment is a particularly important criterion for the evaluation of economy by the citizens, more important than inflation⁴. It remains to see if this is also a fact in Greece.

Economic voting and unemployment

Unemployment forms, at the same time, the most important economic indicator around which the parties and the governments battle. Even though citizens are not in position to realize the details and the causality of economic policy, they attribute responsibilities to the parties and the politicians based on their wider perception for the economic situation⁵. Unemployment comprises a very important

⁴ As Robertson (1984) notices, unemployment, among other economic indicators, proves to be the most important factor of forecasting the endurance of parties' cabinet administration in 8 European countries that were investigated from 1958 to 1982.

⁵ There is an argument whether vote is retrospective or it is based on the expectations for the future economic performance of parties and whether our personal or the national economic situation is the factor that affects voters in their vote decision. These arguments are going to be presented later on this paper with further details.

indicator of economic situation - personal and national. According to Anderson (1995) unemployment and inflation are the most important indicators of economic performance. The researches of public opinion show continuously that inflation and unemployment are the subjects that concern more the citizens. Since the citizens are not able to collect information on the economy and the policies that are followed, unemployment and inflation are the variables that can be comprehended more easily and they are widely also used by the media. The role of the media is very important, especially when media can shape voter's perception not only for the economy but for their own personal economic situation too (Sanders & Gavin 2004).

Another issue dealing with the economic vote more generally is that of aggregate and individual data and the differentiation that they present in voting forecast. According to a lot of researchers, the electoral chance of a party depends on the economic situation of the country. Thus, they treat party vote as a dependent variable and various economic indicators (inflation, unemployment, income, etc.) as independent variables (Fiorina 1978). The weaknesses of these researches lie on the fact that they fail to pass in the individual level; many times voters judge the parties influenced by their personal economic situation. Characteristic is the phrase of V. O. Key (1961, 473-4), "does the politicians dance take place before a blind audience", wanting to show the weakness or the unwillingness of voters to assess national policies.

Dealing with data caused another problem, what Paldam called "the instability dilemma" (Paldam & Nannestad 1994); running a cross-national study of economic voting he warned that the evidence for economic effects on government popularity or vote choice is seldom conclusive or straightforward:

First X presents an impressive study of the Vote or Popularity function for country Z, with a nice theory and—most important—very fine econometric fits: a high R^2 , very significant t -ratios, and, in addition, some new econometric trick like the ζ ζ -test from the latest issues of *Esoterica*. Everybody is impressed, until a few years later Y demonstrates that, by one little change, X's result collapses. (Paldam 1991, p. 10).

Paldam wanted to indicate the fact that the individual is an *individual* that has many constrains, influences or emotions affecting his behaviour in general. On the other hand individuals are not judging the parties *de novo*, that is to say every party has a

history of policies and programmes that has implemented in the past and every voter can judge by that and by its personal attachment towards a particular party.

Thus another disagreement that exists between researchers of electoral behavior is whether voters evaluate the parties based on the country's economic situation or their on personal economic condition. According to the theory of "sociotropic prediction" (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981) voters take into account the national economic situation before they vote. Writing on sociotropic politics in the USA, Kinder and Kiewiet (1981), argued that the voter that is instigated by "sociotropic" information supports candidates that have profited the national economy with their policies and, hence, the incumbent party enters in the foresight of electors if according to their calculations it has threatened the national economy - irrelevantly if their own "wallet" is full. On the other hand, is the theory of pocketbook politics (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 130-3) focused on the personal economic situation of citizens and in the way with which they conceive themselves? Citizens voting for a party valuing it from the situation of their "wallet", do not require particular knowledge or information on finances.

As it appears from the above, what differentiates the two theories is not the motive but the information. It is easier to judge the economic policy of the parties based on our personal prosperity, for which it is not required particular knowledge but only the personal experience; this keeps pace with the theory of Downs on rational voters (Downs 1957), which are ready to vote against the government as soon as their economic situation is worsened. The same argument is described by the punishment hypothesis: "the citizen votes for the government if the economy is doing all right; otherwise, the vote is against." (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000, p. 211). Nevertheless, according to the supporters of sociotropic politics, the vote that is consistent with the situation of pocketbook does not have relation only with the parties and the candidates that fight for the victory in the elections, but also with the economic policies that are to follow.

Whether it is the national economic policy or the personal economic situation enough theorists argue, following the example of V. O. Key and Cummings (1966) and Fiorina (1978), that the vote is retrospective. The retrospective model supposes that voters have abated competence to decode the complexity of economic environment. Electors observe certain available information on results that are supposed to reflect the economic records of the party in office. If this party brings the

desirable results in the economy, according to the subjective crisis of voters, it will be rewarded in the elections. The retrospective vote means that the government is checked retrospectively. The future expectations of voters result from the deductive observations of previous years. This, of course, does not mean that voters do not have future expectations; to the contrary, the records of government in the past are those that create proportional expectations for the future (Lewis-Beck 1988b).

Usually, those who argue that vote depends on economic performance, they keep in mind only the individual preferences, that is to say, they make analysis on the individual level, as it was reported previously. What happens in these cases is what Campbell et. al. (1960) named “perceptive screen”, voters conceive negatively or positively the economic policies depending on whether the incumbent party is the party that they support or not. That is to say, there are also political factors that structure the economic perception. This theory was processed by Lewis-Beck (1986; 1988a) in his research for the economy and the elections in Great. Britain, France, Germany and Italy; the vote represents a retrospective function and expected evaluations of the government’s economic performance, with the effect of other factors, such as ideology and social class.

These complex or intermediary economic evaluations, represent an operation of other retrospective economic evaluations of – included also national economic situation - four aspects of governmental effect in the economy (economics of household’s, job perspective, unemployment and inflation) and anger for the governmental economic policy generally, which is found to immediately influence the vote. Receiving, therefore, indirectly, into account Campbell’s perceptive screen, he attends to include in his model the ideology and the social class.

Therefore, provided that there is reference in ideology and economic policy, we should then examine the role of parties in this form. Many scholars argue that parties have different preferences as for the macroeconomic results of their economic policy. Left-wing parties are considered to aim at the reduction of unemployment instead of fighting inflation because their final objective is their support from the working class while right-wing parties focus on the reduction of inflation because they seek the favor of the business world (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1987). This phenomenon was named by Hibbs and Alesina “ideological” or “party” cycle and they separate it from the opportunistic economic cycle (business cycle) (Nordhaus 1975). The original model of Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) suggested that voters select

a party taking into consideration retrospective, as was described previously, evaluation of the parties' economic performance . Their judgment is, thus, based on their most recent experiences so that their manipulation by politicians is easy. The strategy of the parties was the achievement of low unemployment rates and high growth before the elections and never the cost of the, inevitably, high inflation after the elections, which was forgotten up to the end of office. However, the model of rational choice led theorists to reject these short-sighted voters and to replace them with rational electors who make their choice according to rationally calculated expectations of the future economic performance of parties. At the same time, parties also act rationally, applying the economic cycle and giving benefits always a little before the elections.

Summarizing, we can see that there are two research questions that should be taken into account: the retrospectivity or not of the vote and the determination of the way (sociotropic or pocketbook politics) with which voters conceive the policies of parties. These assumptions will form the basis of research on the political behavior of unemployed in Greece. Unemployment is taken as criterion of political behavior because it consists one of the most important indicators of economic condition in a country.

Theoretical considerations

The other half of the title, political behavior, has also been investigated extensively, nevertheless the originality of present research lies in the combination of these two variables (unemployment and political behavior) in Greece. On political behavior exists a large body of research, ranging from Lazarsfeld et. al. (1944) and Campbell et. al. (1971) to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Downs (1957). Jahoda et. al. (1971) can be seen as a useful example for this research because they had done something similar 76 years ago in a small city of Austria, Marienthal. There they realized that short-term unemployment altered political behavior - attendance in parties and organisms, interest for the policy, reading of newspapers - even if not related to elections.

The results of research on unemployed voters of Marienthal can be separated into three categories: 1) apathy, 2) mobilization or radicalization and 3) clientelistic relation with the party or party competence the unemployed attributed to the parties.

Based on the conclusions of Jahoda et. al. (1971) we can be led to a theoretical model that constitutes a mixture of rational choice and party identification, in the model of Hirschman (1970). Hirschman (1970), by examining the behavior of consumers, members of organizations and parties was led to three types of behavior: exit, voice and loyalty. Exit gains ground in the economic behavior of consumers and executives of enterprises. When the consumers are not anymore pleased with the products of an enterprise they were used to prefer, they decide to withdraw and to prefer another product of a different enterprise, potentially with better quality and, consequently, with higher price.

Respectively, another alternative reaction is disagreement (voice) or the articulation of interests for the members of a party or organization, when they see their organization plummeting. Devotion plays important role in the theory of Hirschman; it can constitute a function of disagreement. Disagreement could be increasing as devotion increases too, because the member that wants the good of his organization believes that in this way he is doing the right thing. Of course, there is also a different reading in the way with which devotion affects the behavior of unemployed and it has to do with the expectation that a "constant voter" (Lazarsfeld, et al. 1944) has from his party. That is, he anticipates the growth of clientelistic relation with his party, which will help him find a job in return for the help he provided in the elections.

Devotion, certainly, as it was reported previously, constitutes the third way of reaction, or rather not reaction of members of organization. This third piece of theory of Hirschman, which he names "Unconscious **Loyal Behavior**" (ULB) (Hirschman 1970), can be explained better through the social-psychological model of party identification proposed by Campbell et. al. (1960) that attempts to demonstrate the existence of long-lasting psychological relation between voters and party, in the sense that between them has developed a sentimental bond. Moreover, voters of a party believe in the "party competence", in the competence of their party to solve their problems and it is for this reason that they select to support it. The devotion however cannot be considered irrational. To the contrary, as Hirschman stresses, for the case where it involves disagreement, "it exists the rational expectation that the improvement or the reform can be carried out from the inside". They can, that is to say, make a "suboptimal choice" (Tsebelis 1990), voting the party that traditionally supported, expecting profits in the future and denying to abandon it.

In the place of consumers or organization members we can place the unemployed. Thus, whenever it has to do with their vote in the elections or their attitude toward a party or trade union, eliciting from the theory that was described above, they can withdraw, disagree or do nothing of the two. When it comes to elections, some voters might withdraw, that is abstaining. They will choose not to vote not from apathy, but out of their will to show their opposition in the way with which leaders manage their problems. Exit can be also construed as vote of protest to another party, close to the party of their preference. Of course, the protest vote appears to be the powerful card in the hands of not privileged teams and for that reason we see in the pre-election statements of parties being particular focusing on groups, such as farmers, blue-collar workers or the unemployed. Exit, as analyzed by Hirschman, to profit of another "product" occurs mainly in the relations of enterprises with the consumers, in the economic field, while in the political field when we talk about exit we mean exit from a party or organization for the members of the party.

For the above reason the vote of protest can represent also a form of "disagreement". Especially in the cases of incomplete two-party systems, if we could thus characterize Greece after its two largest parties garnered above the 80% of votes in the last elections, the vote of protest includes two versions: voters of one of the largest parties can vote the rival party, expressing, hence, their opposition to the policies or the programmatic statements of the party which traditionally they used to voted for or on the other hand, it is likely the electors to turn to the extremes of the party system, punishing the two largest parties that had the power but did not manage to find solutions in their problem of unemployment. This potentially means that they will contribute in order that their party loses the elections but thus might revise his way of action and shape policies that will resolve their problem. Disagreement can exist also outside the elections, in the form of strike or demonstration for the defense of interests of particular social groups even when the party that they support is in power. We have seen in Greece the phenomenon of unionist of the ruling party organizing demonstrations and strikes when they believe that a bill affects their interests.

Finally, the "Unconscious Loyal Behavior" has to do mainly with party identification and the choice for the voters not to react in choices of their party believing that in the long run they will gain. There are two factors explaining the devotion of voters: firstly, they continue voting the party that voted until then and

second, they vote the party in which as unemployed they owe to show devotion. It is important to stress that when talking about rational voters and about results of economic policy, like unemployment, it should become comprehensible that the discussion on the subject includes the subjective opinion of voters for the economic policy of parties, that is probably erroneous because many times weakness to comprehend phenomena for which people do not know many.

At this point it is important to indicate the role of the mass media in the shaping of the economic perception. Sanders and Gavin (2004, p. 19) argue that “expectations derive partly from voters’ direct experiences of the “objective” economy and partly from the kind of economic coverage that is provided by television news”; in their study for the first period of New Labour government 1997–2001, they conclude to the fact that economic perceptions are influenced by the news coverage, although it is noticed that they are not taking into account the fact that prior political preference influences perceptions of economic management competence or even that perceptions of competence affect economic evaluations, they just excluding this case by running a “weak exogeneity” test. Thus, economic perception is depended on the individual’s judgment, which can be influenced, in some level, by the media (Paldam & Nannestad 1994).

The breadth of voters’ rationality lies on possessed contestation in the political economic thought. The contestation is focused on rationality and on voters’ limited competence to collect information. On the other hand, this lack of information is that makes them turn their self to parties - mediators of knowledge - so that they do not spend time searching for information. There lies the very element of their rationality.

Unemployment and vote in Greece

Unfortunately there are not many data available in Greece for the political behaviour of the unemployed. For that reason it will be presented data from the last national elections and from the European Social Survey. As it is shown in the first two tables there is quite a differentiation between the last two national elections in Greece regarding the unemployed individuals’ behaviour. In Table 2 you can see that there is big difference in voting behaviour between the two categories of the unemployed; those who define themselves as unemployed for the first time they seem to support the then opposition party, New Democracy (ND), by 44,2%, percentage which was much higher than the one that ND won at the 2000 national elections. At the same time

those who defined themselves as unemployed but used to work show confidence in the then government, as we can see in Table 2, with 42,5% of them supporting the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the ruling party at the time while the percentage that PASOK gained from the unemployed (for the first time) reached 31,4%. It is obvious that people who got fired and lost their job showed more confidence to the governing party, thinking that it was more competent to deal with their problem. On the other hand, unemployed for the first time were willing to test another party's competence to solve their problems or, in other words, they were willing to risk by voting a party that had not been put through his paces. It should also be pointed out that the voting behaviour of the unemployed that used to work was very similar with that of the workers (wage earners) of the public and private sector. Thus we could assume that they were keep having the attitude of the employed.

Table 2

2000 National Elections		
Vocation	PASOK	ND
Employers	34,70%	52,60%
Farmers	38,70%	47,80%
Wage earners (public sector)	49,40%	37,00%
Wage earners (private sector)	47,00%	35,80%
Unemployed (for the first time)	31,40%	44,20%
Unemployed (used to work)	42,50%	39,10%
Housewives	43,60%	46,40%
Retired (public sector)	39,80%	53,80%
Retired (private sector)	40,30%	47,80%
Students	44,60%	42,70%

*Source V-PRC Institute

Table 3

2004 National Elections							
Vocation	PASOK	ND	KKE	SYN	DIKKI	LAOS	Other
Employers	35	49	5	3	3	4	1
Farmers	35	51	7	2	3	2	0
Wage earners (public sector)	43	39	6	7	2	2	1
Wage earners (private sector)	44	39	7	4	2	3	1
Unemployed (for the first time)	44	46	4	4	0	2	0
Unemployed (used to work)	39	43	7	2	2	2	4
Housewives	44	49	4	1	1	1	0
Retired (public sector)	33	56	6	2	1	1	0
Retired (private sector)	42	46	7	2	1	1	1

Students	46	36	5	7	3	1	2
Active-no active							
Active	40	43	6	4	2	3	1
Unemployed	41	43	7	2	2	2	3
No active	42	48	5	2	1	1	1
Personal economic situation							
Improved	74	17	4	2	2	1	0
Stable	44	41	6	4	1	2	1
Worsened	17	67	7	3	2	3	1
Feelings about their income							
Live good	61	29	4	3	0	2	0
They manage easily	53	34	4	5	1	2	2
There is difficulty	35	51	6	2	2	2	1
There is great difficulty	14	67	9	3	3	3	0

*Source V-PRC Institute

At the 2004 national elections things seemed to change. As Table 3 shows, unemployed for the first time displayed no big differences in their voting behaviour; ND fared slightly better than PASOK (46% vs. 44%). But it is quite interesting the alteration of the behaviour of the unemployed that used to work; while in 2000 they were strongly supporting the governing party, in the last elections they seemed to support the opposition party. It seems that they were prolonging their support for the government at the time (2000 elections) to solve their problem and in 2004 they were willing to try another party for the solutions they were seeking.

Another point that should be highlighted here is the distinction that it is made in Table 3 between active and not active population. As we can see there are no big differences between the active and no active (unemployed and no active) population, which leads us to the conclusion that the key element in the political behaviour of the unemployed is not the distinction between employed and unemployed, working and no working population but the length of the unemployment. In other words, for this analysis it is not important whether someone is unemployed or not but whether he used to work or not and for how long he has been unemployed (long-term and short-term unemployment) as we will see.

The tables that follow are from the cumulative data of the two rounds of the European Social Survey in Greece; the first round was conducted in 2002 and the second round a few months after the 2004 national elections; only for the crosstabulation of vocation and vote it was used data from the second round of ESS, since the two round have significant difference in the time that they were conducted.

In ESS there is not the distinction between the unemployed that used to work and those who are unemployed for the first time, but between unemployed that are looking for a job or not. As we can see in Table 4, the difference between the two categories of the unemployed is quite intense since those who are actively looking for a job seem to have a normal distribution between the two biggest parties but for those who are not looking for a job the distribution leans in favour of the party that has just won the elections, ND, after a long period of governance by PASOK. It is also quite interesting the percentage that Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) – the far right-wing party – gains from the unemployed that actively looking for job (5,1%). This is the largest percentage that LAOS gains from all the other vocation categories, as it is for Left Wing Coalition (SYN) and the unemployed that are not looking for a job and they seem to support SYN with 12,5%. This could lead us to one of the assumptions of this study that unemployment could push voters to smaller or more radical parties (far left or far right wing parties).

Table 4

	Party voted for in last national election, Greece						
	PASOK	ND	KKE	SYN	DIKKI	LAOS	Other
Paid work	35,6%	44,9%	6,6%	6,2%	,6%	2,0%	4,2%
Education	32,1%	41,5%	11,3%	5,7%	1,9%	1,9%	5,7%
Unemployed, looking for job	40,7%	42,4%	3,4%	3,4%		5,1%	5,1%
Unemployed, not looking for job	25,0%	58,3%	4,2%	12,5%			
Permanently sick or disabled		66,7%	33,3%				
Retired	33,5%	59,0%	4,2%	1,7%		,9%	,7%
Community or military service		100,0%					

Housework, looking after children, others	28,5%	64,3%	2,5%	2,2%	,4%	,7%	1,4%
Other	25,0%	50,0%		25,0%			

Source: ESS-round 2

Applying the Chi-Square⁶ test between vocation and vote we see that we can relate the alternative hypothesis that the subcategories of vocation do differ in their voting behaviour and by index $\Phi=0,267$ we can see that the relation between the two variables is quite strong too. But if we run the same crosstabs and tests using a filter variable that will disembroil in our sample only unemployed and workers the results are quite different. According to the Chi-Square test we can affiliate the null hypothesis that employed and unemployed have no difference in their voting behaviour. Consequently, we should take into account more variables that could affect voting behaviour alongside with vocation.

It should, also, be pointed out that in similar researches in other countries there was not noticed a strong relationship between unemployment and vote. Jahoda et al. (1971) observe in their study of unemployment in Austria during the 1930s that protracted joblessness produces so acute an apathy that remaining opportunities, including political avenues of response, are left unexplored. Zawadski and Lazarsfeld (1935) point out that though there is a tendency to criticize the government and wish for a change, the unemployed are not revolutionaries. The experiences of unemployment “only fertilize the ground for revolution, but do not generate it.”

As Scott and Acock (1979, p. 364) argue “the link between unemployment experience and its political correlates lies in the prime role one’s occupation typically plays in determining who one is and where one fits into the social scheme of things.”. So it is very important to examine whether unemployed come from a higher socioeconomic class or have higher education skills. In a research that was held in Greece for the Labour Institute of the Greek General Confederation of Labour (INE/GSEE) in 2003 Panagiotopoulos (2005) argued that for the discrimination of active and no active unemployed it is very important the educational level of the unemployed’s parents, as an indicator of the general socioeconomic status of the unemployed and the pressure that his feeling from his social environment to find a

⁶ For the variables vocation and vote the $\chi^2= 95,835$ in $df= 48$ ($p<0,05$).

job; “many sociological researches in Greece are omitting to investigate the variable of the socioeconomic situation of the parents which although it is just an approximate indicator of social background or social class in which the questioned man belongs to, it is definitely a useful indicator in the system of explanatory variables of an individual or collective practice.” (Panagiotopoulos 2005, p. 95-96).

In Table 5 we can see there is no difference between unemployed and employees in their interest in politics or between the two categories of unemployed. They all have high percentages of low interest in politics and the employees show slightly high percentages in interest in politics than the unemployed. The same trend is noticed, also, in other aspects of political behaviour, like participation in the elections and in trade unions (Table 6 & 7); there are not big differences neither in participation in elections nor in trade unions. In participation in elections it is observed high score for all the three groups of vocation, with unemployed having a slightly highest rate in abstention. As far as it concerns trade unions, employees are preceding in participation although this divergence could be justified by the fact that for the unemployed it is difficult to be organized under a union since they are not a concrete group. Despite the slight difference that is noticed in the above variables, all the relevant tests show high significance level between them⁷. And at this point we come back again to the “instability dilemma” (Paldam & Nannestad 1994) and the fundamental question of economic voting research quickly changed from “How can we best identify a relationship we know exists?” to “How can we best make sense of a relationship we know to be unstable?” (Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000, p.119.).

It is quite apparent that the same situation will not produce the same consequences, simply because we are dealing with individuals, who come from backgrounds, different experiences and varying abilities, and necessarily react to the situation in the light of their previous behavior. The attitudes developed in the case of unemployment are partly a result of past histories and developments of the individual. Concluding, as this research is proceeding, it should be developed a model of political behavior of the unemployed since there are many variables, alongside with unemployment that constitute economic voting and political behavior in general.

⁷ For the variables: vocation and interest in politics the $\chi^2=13,058$ in $df=6$ ($p<0,05$), for the variables: vocation and whether they voted or not the $\chi^2= 18,286$ in $df=4$ ($p<0,05$) and for the variables: vocation and membership in trade unions the $\chi^2= 45,424$ in $df=4$ ($p<0,05$).

Table 5

	How interested in politics			
	Very interested	Quite interested	Hardly interested	Not at all interested
Paid work	10,4%	25,6%	35,1%	28,9%
Unemployed, looking for job	6,0%	19,1%	38,6%	36,3%
Unemployed, not looking for job	9,6%	21,7%	32,5%	36,1%

Source ESS cumulative

Table 6

	Voted last national election		
	Yes	No	Not eligible to vote
Paid work	87,1%	7,2%	5,7%
Unemployed, looking for job	77,8%	13,0%	9,3%
Unemployed, not looking for job	83,1%	13,3%	3,6%

Source ESS cumulative

Table 7

	Member of trade union or similar organisation		
	Yes, currently	Yes, previously	No
Paid work	19,4%	5,0%	75,6%
Unemployed, looking for job	2,8%	3,7%	93,5%
Unemployed, not looking for job	8,4%	7,2%	84,3%

Source ESS cumulative

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**Applying the second-order elections model
on the European Election of 13th June 2004
in Greece**

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1. Introduction: main objectives of the paper*

As we get closer to the next European Election in 2009, the European Parliament and the election of its members, as institutions, have developed in a rather important way. Since the first European Election in 1979, when only 9 countries participated, to those of 2004, when there were 25 member states of the European Union (EU), there has been a lot of development concerning the future of European integration, as well as the role and functions of this supranational institution. In this context, the study of electoral behaviour in the European Parliament (EP) elections is getting more important.

The theoretical framework of the paper is mainly the perspective, which has been introduced by Reif and Schmitt (1980) following the first EP elections in 1979, the so-called second-order elections (SOE) model.

The main objective of the paper is the application of the second-order elections model on the 2004 EP election in Greece. The paper is divided in four parts. In the first part, there is an attempt to present the theoretical framework of the concept of the second-order national elections. The roots of the theories of lower stimulus elections are briefly presented, and the second-order elections model is introduced more elaborately. The second part of the paper deals with the application of the SOE model on the last EP elections in Greece. In this part, we try to extract the main characteristics of the second-order features of the EP election as well as the main trends of voting behaviour. After reviewing the theoretical propositions and testing the SOE model on the last EP election in Greece, the hypothesis which is addressed at the third part of the paper is to answer whether this election comes under the SOE model for all the greek electorate. The fourth and final part of the paper is comprised of the main conclusions of the study.

* This paper is within the context of the research programme PENED (ΠΕΝΕΔ) 2003, in which Eftichia Teperoglou is Junior Researcher. The programme title is "*Political Action and Behaviour in the new European framework; elections, political parties and interest groups in modern Greece*". Its main implementation institution is the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE); scientific coordinator is Professor Christos Lyrintzis and it is co-funded by the European Union (European Social Fund- 75% of the Public Expenditure) and the Ministry of Development, General Secretariat of Research and Technology (GSRT) within the framework 8.3, 3rd Community Support Framework, 25% of the Public Expenditure.

2. Theoretical framework: the roots of the theories of lower stimulus elections

i) US mid-term elections: the 'surge and decline' theory and its revised version

The attempt to study systematically and comparatively different types of elections has started from the USA and the theoretical approach for US mid-term election results. In 1960, Angus Campbell formulated the '*surge and decline*' theory. The theory seeks to explain differences in turnout and support for the president's party between mid-term and preceding presidential elections. He identifies the presidential election as an example of a high stimulus contest, while the mid-term elections are characterized as low stimulus. The higher stimulus of a presidential election and the surge of political information "facilitates" the mobilization of those voters who do not usually vote, those who A. Campbell calls "*peripheral*" voters: as their party attachment is low, they are under the influence of the circumstances and they vote for the winning party. The "peripheral" voters at the next mid-term election stay at home. On the contrary, the surge of political information is neutral to those with a high party identification. So, the other "category" of voters in a high stimulus election is the so-called "*regular-core*" voters. They depart from their normal partisan behavior and they return to their regular and habitual behavior in the low-stimulus mid-term election.

In the beginning, the original theory of A. Campbell was widely accepted. Later, a quite different explanation for mid-term losses was developed. It was about the *referendum theory*, which was mainly formulated by E. Tufte (1975). According to this theory, the roots of mid-term losses are in relation with the record of the administration. Mid-term elections are characterized as "referendum on the government's performance, in which voters express their approval or disapproval through voting for or against the presidential party" (Marsh 2007:77). Tufte's referendum theory does not directly link turnout and midterm loss. Others have attempted to do so within referendum theory. According to S. Kernell (1977) who asserts the "negativity" hypothesis, judgments on the president performance are always characterized by a kind of "punitive" response and the negative impressions and voting is always more salient (Marsh 2007:78).

After the referendum theory advanced by Tufte, subsequent accounts (Stimson 1976, Erikson 1988) played down the emphasis on economic performance variables. Therefore, within the referendum theory it was also developed a “*presidential penalty*” (Erikson 1988: 1013-14) explanation for midterm loss: “midterm electorates punish the presidential party for being the party in power(...) regardless of the quality of its performance or its standing in the electorate” (Jeffery & Hough 2001:77).

In the broader framework of the referendum theory, the German Länder elections and the British by-elections have been classified, by Anderson & Ward (1996) as “*barometer elections*”. This term was developed for studying the performance of the government. Barometer elections are defined “as elections that reflect changes in citizens’ attitudes toward the government in response to changing political and economical conditions, absent the direct opportunity to install a new executive or remove the party in power”(Anderson & Ward 1996: 448).

Some decades later, James Campbell (1987) provided a *revised version* of the original surge and decline theory. The new key factor is that of cross-pressure. He maintains the characteristics of the high and low stimulus elections, but he revises the impact of that on the types of voting behaviour. More specifically, he argued that the difference in the result between the presidential and mid-term elections is not caused by the turnout effect, but on the contrary, derives from the voters, those that James Campbell calls “*disadvantaged partisans*”. Those voters return to the mid-term electorate of partisans of the losing party in the previous election. Therefore, unlike the original theory, the revised one hypothesizes that the surge in information in a high stimulus election will affect the turnout of “peripheral partisans” and the vote choice of independents and weaker partisans.

ii) ‘*Minor elections*’ theory

In Europe, the first study on the electoral cycle and the popularity of the government was done by Reiner Dinkel (1977, 1978) and was formulated in the ‘**minor elections**’ theory. Reflecting the US electoral cycle literature (Goodhart & Bhansali 1970, Stimson 1976) Dinkel observed that the performance of the federal government parties in the German Länder elections depended on the

timing of the election within the federal cycle. Testing a cyclical model of vote-loss at state elections, Dinkel concluded that the more remote from the federal election, the greater the government parties' loss, while the probability of winning a federal election is greatest at the beginning or at the end of the federal cycle. He illustrated the notion of "expected vote share" and "relative vote share". The first one is the simple average of party vote shares in that Länder election at two successive federal elections, while the relative vote is the shortfall of the federal government parties in achieving their "expected vote share" (Jeffery & Hough 2001: 80-81). The main assumptions and conclusions of Dinkel could be summarized as follows: "minor elections –above all Länder elections- are systematically influenced by the superior constellation in the federal parliament (...), the losses of the governing parties are a function of time within the electoral cycle of the federal election" (Dinkel 1978:63).

The characteristics of the mid-term and Länder elections, which were described above, led to the formulation of the theoretical model of 'national second-order elections'.

Theoretical model of 'national second-order elections'

Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt's model is a turning point in the study of elections that had been overshadowed by national ones. In their 1980 article, they have distinguished two interrelated orders, or types of elections. They draw the distinction between "First - order national elections" and "Second - order national elections".

- According to the type of institutional arrangement of the respective political system the category of *First - order national elections-FOE* includes the national parliamentary elections or the national presidential elections. These are the most important elections, which offer the voter the critical choice of who should govern the country.
- But in all the political systems, there is a variety of elections, which determine the outcome for lesser offices: municipal elections, regional, local, provincial, cantonal, Länder elections, by-elections (parliamentary or local), elections for legislative representatives in presidential systems. All those elections are *Second-order national elections –SOEs*

All the above second-order national elections are examples of sub-national or territorial elections. Writing in the aftermath of the first European Elections that took place in June 1979, Reif & Schmitt represented the first supranational election of the members of the European Parliament as a typical example of a second-order election. They had regarded them not primarily as European but as a pale reflection of national elections (Marsh & Franklin 1996: 11)

The main hypothesis and novelty of Reif & Schmitt's theoretical model is not the distinction of the elections as such but their reference to the different arenas of politics. More specifically, they stress that "*if we want to understand the results of European elections, we have to bear in mind, (.....) the political situation of the first-order political arena at the moment when second-order elections are being held*" (Reif & Schmitt 1980: 8). Each member-state of the EU has a ***national first-order political arena -FOPA*** and therefore, the European Election result (***second-order political arena-SOPA***) is clearly affected by the current national policies and the national first-order political arena. The outcomes of the SOPA cannot be separated from the FOPA. Thus, at the time of the European Election, the FOPA plays an important role in the SOPA (Reif & Schmitt 1980, Reif 1985).

Reif & Schmitt place the European Election within each national electoral cycle and claim some hypotheses, which can be tested in the context of the European Elections:

- Participation will be lower
- Larger parties will do worse and smaller and new parties will fare betterⁱ
- Governmental parties will loose
- Higher percentage of invalidated ballotsⁱⁱ

All these trends derive from the fact that in European Elections there is **less at stake**, since no government will be formed after the day of the electionⁱⁱⁱ. The "less at stake" dimension is the first axis of the model and most European Elections studies consider it the key point for understanding and analysing second-order elections. Primarily, Reif & Schmitt's (1980) study has also been grounded in other axes: the specific-arena dimension, the institutional-procedural dimension, the campaign, the main-arena political change dimension and the social and cultural change dimension. Most of the studies that followed focused

on the less at stake dimension and its effects. The SOE model has been invaluable in shedding light on these matters.

After the publication and definition of the model, Reif & Schmitt's hypotheses were tested with aggregate data on the 1984 EP elections (Reif 1985). Most of the studies have been focused on the turnout hypothesis, using data from more than one election (Curtice 1989, Niedermayer 1990, Schmitt & Mannheimer 1991, Franklin et al 1996). Later, there has been an attempt from some scholars to re-examine the propositions of the model and to provide an extensive reassessment of the theory, using also individual data^{iv} (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996, Van der Eijk et al 1996, Freire 2004, Van der Brug & Van der Eijk 2005). At the same time special focus has been given on comparisons of turnout (Blondel et al. 1996, 1997; Franklin 1996, 2001a, 2001b; 2005b; Mattila 2003), specific arena (Küchler 1991; Wüst 2006) and campaign dimensions (Banducci & Semetco 2003; De Vreese et al 2006) between national and European contests, as well as some efforts of revising the SOE model (Reif 1997, Norris 1997), testing the model using data from many sets of EP elections (Marsh 1998), confirming or not the nature of the model after EU enlargement (Schmitt 2005).

One step further to the model of second-order elections: a complete approach of understanding voting behaviour in European Elections

The model of second-order elections does not develop a proper theory of voting behavior. Reif & Schmitt's main aim has been an attempt to provide some elements, which can be used as an explanation of aggregate patterns in terms of individual electoral choice. Nevertheless, they give prominence in some elements, which are important in relation to the individual motivations of voting. The first change of the voting behavior is that from voting and non-voting, while the second one refers to party choice. Moreover, Reif & Schmitt give emphasis on the way in which national politics constrains European elections and how electoral behavior in European Elections is shaped, depending on the timing of the contest within the first-order electoral cycle. They suggested that governments would perform worse when second-order elections occurred at the mid-term period of the electoral cycle (see in details below). This strategic aspect was further developed following Tufte's propositions. As Michael Marsh underlines "there is a

referendum element in the SOE model, which is contextually located, not by levels of government dissatisfaction, but by the timing of the SOE in the first order electoral cycle” (Marsh 2007: 74).

According to Cees van der Eijk, Mark Franklin and Michael Marsh, Reif & Schmitt’s hypothesis that voters might withhold their support from governing parties or from whatever party they might have voted if a first order election had been held and national power had been at stake, raises some crucial points that the authors of the model do not address. These questions are in relation with the decision of voters to choose to comment on national politics in a European Election and to express their disapproval towards the governing parties. The scholars, who developed the additional approaches to the SOE model have addressed numerous questions which are mostly interlinked with the “role” of the electoral cycle and how is voting behaviour affected (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996, Van der Eijk et al. 1996). They give prominence to the study of party choice, which is affected by a variety of factors. They explore it under the headings of partisanship, issue voting and ideology, and campaigns activity. They stress many theoretical and empirical questions such as “What can EP elections tell us about voters?”, “Is there only one European electorate or many?”, “Which are the inputs and outputs of EP elections?” (Marsh & Franklin 1996: 11-32, Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996: 33-54). Regarding both turnout and its effects as well as party choice, they take into account a variety of systemic and contextual factors (i.e. the presence of compulsory voting, the number of parties in the political system, the nature of the electoral system), individual level effects (i.e. Left-Right distance, EU approval, issue voting).

Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) find out some “modes” of voting in EP elections: “*voting with the head*”, “*voting with the heart*” and “*voting with the boot*”. These terms are predominant in the study of electoral behavior in European contests. Nevertheless, all three of these modes of voting are oriented towards national politics and the respective FOPA (Franklin 2005a: 4-5).

More specifically:

➤ “*Voting with the head*” (which contains at least an element of strategic voting) mainly occurs in national elections, when voters take account of strategic considerations. Two are the main factors that the voters take into consideration: they decide not to waste votes on parties that is unlikely to be a viable contender

for government office, or to vote for a party that might have a destabilizing effect in the Parliament (Franklin 2005a: 5-6)^v

➤ On the contrary, "*voting with the heart*" (or "*sincere voting*") corresponds to voting without taking into account any strategic considerations. Since in EP elections there is not something at stake, in many cases voters cast their ballot for the party they prefer most^{vi} (Oppenhuis et al. 1996: 301-304, Marsh & Franklin 1996: 16-21, Franklin 2005a: 4-5).

➤ The term "*Voting with the boot*" is taken from the lexicon of British football hooliganism and expresses *protest voting* against the incumbent government, the political class, the programs and/or the candidates of the parties that voters would normally vote for, or to indicate support for a particular policy (Oppenhuis et al. 1996: 301-304, Franklin 2005a: 4-5).

Another development of Reif & Schmitt's model is the suggestion that the differential importance of elections is better represented by a continuum than by a categorisation. More specifically, as Cees Van der Eijk, Mark Franklin and Michael Marsh underlined "some second-order elections are evidently more second-order in character than others, which leads to the idea that some first-order elections may also be more second-order in character than others" (Van der Eijk et al. 1996:162). Therefore, not all second-order elections are equally unimportant but not all first-order are equally important either. In countries where national elections have few implications for the choice of government, then they may differ little from the SOE model (Marsh 2007: 75).

National electoral cycle and its consequences in voting behavior in European Elections

Studying the electoral cycle within the SOE model relates with the observation of various levels of popularity that have different political consequences in respect with the time that passes from a FOE to the SOE in question. In the most common four-year cycles, there is a honeymoon period (covering the first 12 months), the mid-term period (13-16 months) and the later-term period (37-48 months) of the electoral cycle.

According to many scholars, “timing” is considered as a key factor in the EP elections. Locating them at the electoral cycle of the first order election, we can identify “three categories” of EP elections.

- EP elections which are held on the same day with national elections
- EP elections which are held shortly after the national election (within a year)
- EP elections which is conducted at a considerably temporal distance from the previous first order election, possibly with the next national election already in sight

The number of those who vote with the heart or boot varies from country to country, depending on many things including the timing of the election within the national election cycle for each country, as explained in Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and Franklin (1996). An interesting question which can be addressed is related with the political consequences for national governments in EP elections that take place during different phases of the national electoral cycle (Freire & Teperoglou 2007). Putting all the viewpoints together, one will find convergence and divergence points between different analysts.

- In terms of the honeymoon period some scholars defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in second-order elections as compared to first-order ones (Tufté 1975; Reif & Schmitt 1980; Reif 1985, Marsh 1998). Another group of scholars defends that more voters will tend to “vote with the heart”, since this kind of “category of EP elections” has to face up the so-called *electoral fatigue*, as they are held concurrently or shortly after the national elections and there are no consequences for the government. (Eijk & Franklin 1996). Therefore, larger parties in government and the opposition will tend to lose vote share to smaller parties in multiparty systems.
- For the mid-term period there is a solid consensus in the literature: governmental parties will tend to lose votes in second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif & Schmitt 1980; Eijk & Franklin 1996). It is the case of those voters who, in the last general election, voted for the winning party, and after a spell of time they were disappointed by the policies implemented. These voters will prefer

to abstain or to cast a null vote, or even to vote for an opposition party. This is precisely the case of “voting with the boot”.

- For the later-term period some authors defend that, since second-order elections tend to better fulfill their function as markers of public opinion regarding support for government the closer they fall to the next first-order election, voters will tend to vote with the boot (Eijk & Franklin 1996). In contrast, Reif & Schmitt (1980) underline that the later-term period is characterized by a certain recovery in national government popularity, and so parties controlling national cabinets will tend to lose less votes than in midterm elections.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned additional approaches to the SOE model, we come up with a holistic approach, which can be used in any aspect or dimension of an EP election study. Until now, the SOE model is considered in this field of research as the scientific approach *par excellence*.


After reviewing the theoretical framework of the paper, in the next two parts the 2004 EP election in Greece will be in the focus of analysis. The last greek EP election is examined with the help of the SOE model. The main question is whether the 2004 EP election in Greece verifies the hypotheses of Reif & Schmitt, which have been elaborately mentioned above. Secondly, another question is if all the greek electorate treated the election as a SOE or according to some social demographic variables, certain groups of voters maintained their “first - order” voting choices, also in a “second - order” contest.

3. Testing the second-order election model at the 2004 European Election in Greece

1st hypothesis: participation in EP election is lower vis-à-vis the national election

The first hypothesis to be tested is that electoral mobilisation is lower in the greek EP election of 2004 than it would be in a previous first order election and therefore participation rates are predicted to be lower as well. This hypothesis is verified in the case of the last EP election in Greece: participation decreased and reached 63.22%, which is the lowest turnout of any election^{vii}. This fact is especially relevant since in Greece voting at the European Parliament Elections is quasi compulsory^{viii}. In the 1999 election participation was 70.21% and the difference with the respective figure in the 2000 General election has been 4.72%. Comparing participation in the two elections in 2004, the difference is three times as big: it reaches 13.3%. Comparing the evolution of participation in all the European Elections in Greece and the respective rate in the previous national election (Chart 1), there is a clear manifestation of increasing abstention in SOEs.

Chart 1
Evolution of participation in European (E) and National (N) Elections in Greece, 1981-2004




Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

At the European level, the last EP election has seen the lowest participation ever throughout the EU; it reached 45.7%, following the steady decrease from 63% in 1979 to 61% in 1984, 58.5% in 1989, 56.8% in 1994 and 49.9% in 1999.

Chart 2 shows that participation in European Elections in Greece, if compared with the European average, is higher than in the other member states.


Another comparison is also worth mentioning. That of participation figures between European Elections and the elections for the Prefectures, as another type of SOEs (Mavris 2003). According to Reif and Schmitt, participation in European Elections is even lower than in other SOEs (Reif 1985: 16). This feature is also verified in Greece (Chart 3).

Chart 2
Evolution of participation in European Elections in Greece, compared with the European average



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior and European Parliament

Chart 3
Evolution of participation in European (E) and Prefecture (P) elections in Greece, 1994-2004



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

According to the statistics, more than 1.3 million voters decided to abstain, compared to the March General Election. Amongst them, 57% came from those who voted for PASOK in March, 33% came from ND voters and 10% from those who had voted for the rest of the parties (TA NEA (THE NEWS newspaper), 15 June 2004). Irrespectively of party preference and affiliation, abstention by a considerable share of voters indicates the citizens' alienation from the national political elites, and from the process of European integration (Pantazopoulos 2005: 141-63).

Furthermore, another issue that rises is the timing of the decision to abstain in European Elections. As Flash Eurobarometer (EB) 162 data show, a large part consists of regular abstentionists (24%). An equally large part (23%) decided to abstain a few months before the election, while 38% answered that the decision not to vote was taken on election day or a few days before it. The reasons that the abstentionists mentioned are related to the 'less at stake' dimension of Reif and Schmitt's model: the largest share (31%) claimed that they were 'on vacation, not at home', and 17% claimed 'illness'. On the contrary, the share of answers like

'lack of interest for European issues' and 'lack of information about the European Parliament', is quite low, 6% and 3% respectively. It is worth mentioning that no one of those who abstained claimed to be opposed to the EU.

The reasons of abstention are partly related to the core of the electoral campaign and the citizens' lack of information on EU issues. According to a study conducted in Greece, 'enlargement, integration, the European Constitution and EU membership were seldom brought up for discussion by the mass media. [...] (T)he Greek media, as is also the case of other member states, pay less attention to Europe and European politics'^{ix} (Demertzis and Tsiligiannis 2004: 162). Furthermore, in the electoral debate that was conducted on the eve of the election, journalists and party leaders alike focused on domestic issues, avoiding to bring up subjects such as the EU in general, and the European Constitution and EU common policies in particular (Kavakas 2005: 134).

Participation and the electoral cycle of the national elections

One of the most important defining factors of participation in European Elections is the time of such an election within the electoral cycle of the national elections. According to Marsh and Franklin (1996: 17-9), European Elections that took place near the start of the electoral cycle have low participation (the difference exceeds 10% in comparison with national elections). On the contrary, European Elections that take place just before national ones, in the end of the cycle, are characterised for higher participation. Attempting to apply Marsh and Franklin's conclusions in the case of the Greek European Elections, we find that in the 1984 and 1994 ones they are verified. In the first case, the election took place a few months before the national election and participation was high. In the second, the election was soon after the national contest and participation was low. On the contrary, the 1999 European Election contradicts the conclusions, as participation was low even though the election took place a year before the national election.

In the last EP election, low participation on the one hand, is related with the fact that the election took place in the start of the electoral cycle and on the other, it shows that the complimentary and secondary character may also be attributed to

the electoral fatigue due to the recent national election (Teperoglou and Skrinis 2006: 137).


2nd hypothesis: the government party will suffer losses in EP election

The dropoff (Van der Eijk et al. 1996: 156) of the ND party in the last EP election, that is the difference of the vote share between the national election and the European Election, reached 2.35%. However, this loss of votes for the governing party is the lowest that has ever been recorded in all European Elections in Greece (Teperoglou and Skrinis 2006: 140). This observation is consistent with the hypothesis that government parties fare well in European Elections that take place near the start of the legislature, because they may still take advantage of the honeymoon period. This is the first time in Greek European Elections that this hypothesis has been verified.^x

Does the greek electorate uses the EP elections (1981-2004) as a way to express content or discontent with national government?

Trying to answer this question, aggregate electoral results across national and EP elections are used and compared during different periods of the national electoral cycle. Most of the greek EP elections are placed in the honey-moon period (1981, 1989, 1994, 2004) in which two of them were held at the same day with national elections, and the EP elections of 1984 and 1999 consist examples of a mid-term period. The governmental parties' vote share in the previous (or concurrent) first-order election is used as baseline (Figure 1).

Figure 1: EP Elections and the National Electoral Cycle, 1981-2004




Looking at Figure 1, it might be observed that regardless of the timing of the EP elections, all the European contests in Greece do show anti-government swings. However, the magnitude of the losses is usually rather limited. The losses of the Greek government parties in EP elections held concurrently or very shortly after first order elections seem to contradict the hypothesis of the authors (Tufte 1975; Reif &Schmitt 1980; Reif 1985a, 1985b. Marsh 1998) that defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in EP elections compared to prior or concurrent first-order ones. On the other hand, there is a significant variation in the extent of losses: from -2,35% (EP 2004) to -9,23% (EP 1994). From this contradiction it can be suggested that the results in EP elections that take place during the honeymoon period are better explained by focusing on each EP election and its social, economic and political context.

3rd hypothesis: losses in the vote share of large parties as a whole

In the June 2004 election, the share of the two larger parties has been clearly lower: it decreased by 8.9% compared with the national election in March (77% and 85.9% respectively). Chart 4 shows that the cumulative share of ND and PASOK is 8% higher than the respective figure in 1999. It is the second highest since the 1984 election, which was characterised by total confrontation and polarisation. Thus, we find ourselves in front of a certain particularity: the 2004 EP election took place only three months after ND won the government and, therefore, it was politically impossible that an actual issue come up, especially concerning governing. In similar cases, the absence of such an issue is also manifested in the results of European Elections: comparing with the European Election of 12 June 1994 that also occurred during the honeymoon period, one may observe the similar decrease of both major parties PASOK and ND, which were kept to about 80% and 83% of their share in the 1993 national election (an aggregate fall of 15.8%).

Chart 4

Evolution of the aggregate vote for ND & PASOK in European Elections, 1981-2004



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

The losses of the larger parties are attributed according to the model to the fact that voters in European Elections feel less obliged to stick to their party attachment. This entails vote switching between national and EP elections. Franklin (2005), analysing the European Election Study 2004 (EES 2004) results, has calculated the net vote switching in the last European Election at about 8.6%.^{xi} Moreover, exit polls set off interesting connotations in relation to vote switching. Table 1 shows that of those who voted in March either for ND or PASOK, 13% switched in June: 3% turned to the opposite big party, while the rest 10% turned to smaller ones.

Table 1
Vote-switching: National– European Elections 2004

National Election 2004	European Election 2004					
	ND	PASOK	KKE	SYN	LAOS	Other
ND	87.2	3.1	1.7	1.4	3.6	3.0
PASOK	3.0	86.2	4.0	2.5	1.0	3.3

Source: Exit poll OPINION S.A, 13 June 2004

Consequently, one may wonder whether these ‘leaks’ have been consolidated. The results on the question, in the exit poll by OPINION S.A., on the timing of the final decision about the party people voted for in the EP election raises some interesting aspects. Most of those who had chosen which party to vote for early, systematically vote the same way, while very few were those who had taken the decision only a few months before the election. From those who answered ‘a few weeks ago’, ‘a few days ago’ and ‘on election day’, the main trend consists of those who made their choice on the last moment (day of the election). The ‘last moment’ voters have favoured the smaller parties’: the 41% preferred the very small lists, the 26% the nationalist Popular Orthodox Rally-LAOS, the 20% of those, voted for the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN). Only 6.8% of the PASOK voters and 4.5% of the ND ones decided in front of the polling booth.


4th hypothesis: small parties are expected to do better in an EP election

Looking at Chart 5, the strength of all the small parties increased in the European Election. Nevertheless, this increase is not particularly high. It is in

accordance with the axioms in the literature about the electoral cycle and the honeymoon period, when protest voting is quite low. Besides, we should underline that the share of the smaller parties might have been higher, if participation had not been so low. In our case study, abstention has been another form of protesting (Teperoglou and Skrinis 2006: 143). The choice not to vote, instead of the so-called ‘voting with the boot’, does not add much to small or new parties, contrary to the case of the 1994 and 1999 European Elections.^{xii}

Chart 5

Smaller parties’ vote share in the General and European Elections 2004



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

- In the last European contest the Communist Party of Greece (Komounistiko Komma Elladas, KKE) presented itself as the main expression of euroscepticism in Greece. Its vote share increased, gaining 3.58% (143,823 votes) more than in the General one.
- The respective increase of SYN has been clearly limited: on the whole 12,908 more voters turned to it in the European Election. This may actually be considered on the one hand as a standstill in its electoral appeal compared with the General election (0.9% rise), and on the other as the start of a fall in comparison with the 1999 European Election, when it had elected 2 MEPs, with 5.16% of the votes.

All the same, it was expected that SYN would be favoured, gaining sympathy votes, especially in an election where less is at stake, and attract voters, who would otherwise vote tactically. The share of the ‘Women for another Europe’^{xiii} list (0.76%) partly explains SYN’s standstill and constitutes an explicit example of ‘loose vote’ that emerges in European Elections.

- LAOS had been significantly favoured in this European Election. It got 90.326 more votes than in the March General Election, almost doubling its vote share. Taking into consideration the findings of surveys on the LAOS’s electorate (Koukourakis 2005), one may argue that the rise in the party’s share in the last European Election came from various ‘groups’ of voters. To begin with, this share came from ND voters who either were disappointed by their party (although not much time had passed since ND came to government), or chose to express themselves through a ‘loose’ choice, as is the case in European Elections. At the same time, a part of LAOS voters, according to the same surveys, describe themselves as ‘a-political’ and ‘anti-political’ (non-partisan vote). Besides, LAOS had called for the support of rightwing euroscepticists (Koukourakis 2005: 139). Thereby, the LAOS choice implies, at least as far as the conscientious voters are concerned, voting with the boot towards the established parties.
- Finally, the total share of the rest of the lists also has risen (2.5%) compared with the national election three months earlier.

4. Did the greek electorate as a whole treated the European Election 2004 as a typical SOE?

The main conclusion from the previous part of the paper is that in the case of the 2004 European Election in Greece, the main hypotheses of the 'less at stake' dimension are verified. The main aim, which runs through this part of the paper, is to find whether the secondary character of the election applies to the whole of the electorate or if there are different trends among different socio-demographic groups. On the one hand, participation will be examined and on the other the performance of large and smaller parties according to socio-demographic variables^{xiv}.

Summarizing the results of the crosstabulations, the main conclusions are the following

Main trends from the crosstabulation of sociodemographic characteristics and abstention EES 2004- Flash EB 162

- Age is the most important variable. According to the results, there is a very clear trend of increased abstention among younger voters (aged 18 to 24). In Europe, according to EES 2004 and Flash EB 162 abstention is also high among the second age group (25-39). In Greece, though, abstention decreases almost 20% in comparison to the youngest age group and the European average. The decreasing trend continues both in Greece and in Europe, in the 40-54 and 55+ age groups. Consequently, the main trend running through both surveys is that both in Greece and in Europe as a whole, it is highly possible that the younger one is, the more one will abstain
- The locality variable is equally interesting. From both surveys, there is a clear split between the answers that have been given in greek metropolitan and urban areas (high rates of abstention) on the one hand, and rural areas (lower rates of abstention) on the other. Contrary to the case of Greece, the EU average shows uniformity among geographic areas
- From the education variable one may not derive any specific conclusions

- The gender variable does not give statistically significant results

Table 2
European Election Study 2004: Demographics and abstention crosstabulation

		EES 2004	
		EU24^a	GREECE
Sex	Male	54.4	37.7*
	Female	57.3	34.4*
Age	18-24	70.5	67.2
	25-39	63.7	43.9
	40-54	54.3	27.8
	55+	46.2	19.1
Years of education	-15	54.7	16.4
	16-20	59.4	40.5
	21+	52.6	39
	0	69.1	-
Area	Large town	55.2	41.6
	Middle or small size town	56.4	32.4
	Rural or village	52.3	24.7

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004 data

The sample has been weighted for participation. The results are statistically significant at least at 95%, except the figures with an asterisk (*).

^a Malta did not participate in the EES 2004

*Main trends from the crosstabulation of sociodemographic characteristics and voting
for large or smaller parties*

EES 2004- Flash EB 162

- From the EES 2004 data it is clear that elder voters tend to vote more for large parties. Comparing voting choices between March and June, it is obvious that young voters change more. Supporting smaller parties is mainly an issue among those in the first age group. Elder voters respond differently. Their EP election votes do not loosen too much, and tend to remain constant and consistent to the General Election (see Table 3)
- Turning to the locality variable, the difference lies between voters in metropolitan areas on the one hand, and urban and rural on the other. In more populated areas there is more dispersion of votes among parties, while in less populated areas the share of votes is about the same (see Table 4)
- Moving next to the educational variable, the EES 2004 data are quite homogeneous. Voting choice seems to be consistent among the three different

groups, while the change from the General Election is almost the same. On the contrary, Flash EB162 data show that the more years of full-time education one has, the more prone one is to turn away from bipartism and support smaller parties

- EES 2004 data do not provide statistically significant results for the gender variable. Using Flash EB 162 data, it seems that female voters favour more one of the two big parties, while male voters turn slightly more towards smaller and more extreme lists

Table 3
Crosstabulation: Age by size of party
EES 2004

	18-24	25-39	40-54	55+
Large (ND & PASOK)	65.2 [89.4]	76.8 [83.8]	67.1 [75]	84.9 [90.7]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	34.8 [10.6]	23.8 [16.2]	32.9 [25]	15.1 [9.3]

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004 data

Table 4
Crosstabulation: Locality by size of party
EES 2004

	Large town	Middle or small size town	Rural or village
Large (ND & PASOK)	74,1 [81,6]	79 [90]	82 [87,8]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	25,9 [18,4]	21 [10]	18 [12,2]

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004 data

5. Conclusions

The paper has examined the second-order election model in the greek case of the EP elections of 2004. The first main objective of the paper was to provide a short overview of the literature based on the conceptual framework of low stimulus elections. Locating its roots in the midterm elections in the US, the main characteristics of the original ‘surge and decline’ theory and its revised version have been shortly presented. In order to provide an integrated approach of the US-based theories, the main aspects also of the referendum theory have also been presented. The ideas on electoral cycles returned to Western Europe in the late 1970s but in a new form of terminology. The Dinkel model, which had been applied in the German context, was the predecessor of the SOE model in Europe. The second-order election model by Reif & Schmitt is based on “orders” of elections. The paper has presented the fundamental characteristics of the model as well as its limitations. The more recent approaches have been examined in order to come up with a holistic approach, which can be used in any aspect or dimension of an EP election study.

Applying this theoretical model in the EP elections of 2004 in Greece, some major “lessons” might be interesting to summarize. These “lessons” derive from the main conclusion of the study, that the last EP election in Greece was a SOE. The main hypotheses of Reif & Schmitt’s model have been verified. Participation was the lowest ever; the losses of ND are in consistency with the timing of the election -post-electoral euphoria- in the electoral cycle of the national election; smaller parties fared better and examples of voting with the boot have been evident.

Starting from the observation of the verification of the hypotheses, the first major lesson from the study is that the result was defined by the current political context and the first-order political arena. The greek electorate used the EP election as a ‘medium’ for either to express true party preferences or to protest against the party usually voted for in national elections. Nevertheless, the large share of the two big parties recorded in this EP election resulted in limiting the increase of the vote share for the smaller parties. In most cases, the greek

electorate is strongly influenced by the FOPA and its EP election vote is a kind of “reproduction” of the national vote.

Another lesson from the application of the SOE model in the greek case of the EP elections of 2004 is the fact that adding to the analysis also the notion of the electoral cycle, there is partly evidence of its main effects. Sometimes the greek electorate is more prone to change vote and express, through the EP contest, content or disapproval with national government and on other occasions the reverse is true. Therefore, the major lesson which might be extracted is that it is necessary to focus each time on the EP election and its social, economic and political context.

Trying to answer the question if every Greek treated the European contest as a second-order election, the most salient lesson is that there is differentiation of electoral behaviour from one demographic group to the other. All groups of voters are influenced by the fact that less is at stake in European Elections, but do not respond the same way. If it is interesting to outline a kind of “profile” of the voter, who accords more to the hypotheses of the ‘less at stake’ dimension, then the younger, male, more educated citizens living in more populated areas tend to adopt this “second order electoral behaviour”.

In any case, all these conclusions are nothing more than trends and indications, which derive only from one case study, valid at any rate in the election in question. Given that European Elections take place every five years in all member states, they may prove as “venues” and valuable “laboratories” to study electoral behaviour in national as well as European elections.

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ⁱ In his 1997 article, Reif mentions that apart from smaller parties, radical, populist ones and protest parties also tend to fare better in second-order elections (Reif 1997: 118).

ⁱⁱ In the following studies, this hypothesis has not been elaborated further.

ⁱⁱⁱ Definitely, many European Elections studies, almost invariably conclude that the European electorate votes on the basis of national interests, the parties fail to campaign in truly “European issues”. Nevertheless, as also Hermann Schmitt (2005) has stressed “the growing policy authority of the EU level of European governance, (...) the series of successive EU treaties expanded the power of the European Parliament, what is now at stake in EU level is not so limited and (therefore) all this might have taken away some of the second order nature of the election”.

^{iv} Since the European Elections of 1979 a project called “*European Election Studies*” (EES) has been established. Primarily, these studies have been focused on electoral participation and voting behaviour in European Parliament elections. Later, they are also concerned with the evolution of an EU political community and a European public sphere, with citizens' perceptions of and preferences about the EU political regime, and with their evaluations of EU political performance. The project was started in 1979 by a trans-national group of electoral researchers and Europeanists some of which are still on board. Between 1979 and 2004, 6 election studies have been prepared and 5 of them realised. A new era began in 2004 when national study directors - rather than the international research group - funded and conducted the 2004 study in 24 of the 25 EU member-countries. For more information on the EES, <http://www.europeanelectionstudy.net>.

^v There is a relationship between the number of parties and the express of tactical voting: the more the parties, the less the expression of tactical voting. As M. Marsh underlines, in many European countries with multi-party systems, the relationship between elections and government formation is extremely opaque, while in Britain or Germany government alternation is more probable. (Marsh 1998: 597).

^{vi} Cees Van der Eijk and Mark Franklin invented also a new term, referring to those voters who indicate that they would have voted differently in a concurrent national election: “quasi-switchers”. This term is different from the concept of “split-ticket” voters in the US elections because is not intended to imply change over time, but the contrast between voting preferences at the European and national level (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996: 47).

^{vii} According to various researchers, the share of actual participation is almost 13% higher (Franklin 2001a: 207). This difference has been attributed to the electoral register that is not updated regularly, but also to the fact that the register for national and European elections had been based on the municipal rolls. These included people who had migrated, their children, etc. (Drettakis 2004: 15-7). For abstention figures in the last European Election see Andreadis (2004) and Drettakis (2004: 18-38). It should be underlined that these percentages are based on official sources and are underestimated. According to calculations in Greece, there is almost universal turnout.

^{viii} According to the 2001 amendment of the Greek Constitution (article 51/5), there no longer are any penal sanctions for abstaining.

^{ix} The purpose of the study was a discourse analysis of the European Election campaign by the media. It covered the last fortnight (01/06/2004-13/06/2004) before the election. The data had been compiled from six nation-wide and two regional newspapers, and three private and one public TV network. Prof. Demertzis from the University of Athens was the study supervisor.

^x The 1994 European Election took place eight months after the 1993 General Election, during the honeymoon period, the decrease of the government party reached 9.23%. The respective figures in the 1981 and 1989 European Elections, which coincided with the General Elections, were 4.53% and 3.17%. The case of the last European Election in Spain may be compared to the Greek one. The Spanish General Election took place one week after the Greek General Election. PSOE's share increased. We assume that this deviates from the SOE model, as it is due to post electoral euphoria, and it fits Angus Campbell's notion of ‘surge’.

^{xi} According to Franklin's calculations, the 1989-2004 average was 8.9. This is the lowest among the 15 member states (Franklin 2005a).

^{xii} The nationalist Political Spring (Politiki Anixe, POLAN) won 8.65% in the 1994 European Election and the populist Democratic Social Movement (Demokratiko Kinoniko Kinema, DIKKI) 6.85% five years later.

^{xiii} The ‘Women for another Europe’ was an *ad hoc* list comprised of left-wing women, who formerly belonged to or supported SYN.

^{xiv} For a more elaborate approach, see Teperoglou & Skrinis (2007). We have chosen to use the following demographic variables: sex, age, years of education, size of the town. These variables are crosstabulated with abstention and party preference. We try to find if there is any association between the demographic variables and abstention or the size of the party voted for (where large parties are ND

and PASOK, and smaller parties, which KKE, SYN, LAOS and 'other' parties). We have recoded the vote variable so that ND and PASOK choices are coded as 'large' parties, and KKE, SYN, LAOS and the rest of the lists are coded as 'smaller' ones.