

Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974:

'Responsibility without Power'¹

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1. Introduction

This paper is part of an ongoing Ph.D. thesis which looks at the roles played by Britain and the United States during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. My thesis examines whether Britain and the United States were responsible by acts of omission or commission for the Greek coup and subsequent Turkish invasion, which led to the current division of the island. This paper will look at British policy from 15th – 19th July and assess how effectively Whitehall was able to make and execute its policy decisions.

2. 1878-1960

On 4th June 1878, Cyprus was leased to Britain by the Ottomans, as a consequence of the Congress of Berlin, so that Britain could use Cyprus as a *de facto* base in order to protect the ailing Ottoman Empire from Russian encroachment. Forty-five years later, in Articles twenty and twenty-one of the Treaty of Lausanne, the newly-founded Republic of Turkey renounced any claim to sovereignty over Cyprus in favour of Britain. In 1925, Cyprus became a British Crown colony. After the Second World War, the Greek Cypriot population of Cyprus began actively arguing for *Enosis* (union with Greece), whereas the Foreign Office's assessment of giving up Cyprus was

Assuming a worst but no means impossible case, with the Russians possessing a foothold in Palestine as a result of their efforts in the UN, and with Cyprus ceded to Greece which had subsequently gone Communist, we should ... not only [have]

created a vacuum in the Middle East, we should have gone halfway towards letting the Russians fill it.”²

On the 1st April 1955, an armed campaign began, ‘the EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*) struggle’, in order to achieve *Enosis*. Britain remained resolute with Prime Minister Eden stating during a visit to Norwich in 1956

No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.³

After four years of fighting, during which Britain quite deliberately awakened Turkey’s interest in the island, an international agreement was drawn up in Zürich and then later in London by Britain, Greece and Turkey.⁴ The agreement that was reached was largely down to a background role played by the United States, and would prove to be the first of many occasions during which Britain, quite happily, would have to give way over Cyprus to her more powerful ally across the Atlantic.⁵ Consequently, Cyprus became “the first country in the world to be denied majority rule by its own constitution”⁶ and has been

² FO 371/67084, ‘Cyprus: Question of Cession to Greece’, Minute by C.H. Johnson, 24/10/47.

³ *The Times*, June 2nd 1956.

⁴ Eden, Sir A., *Full Circle*, London, Cassell, 1960, p.414 and p.396. Prime Minister Anthony Eden in 1955: “I considered it capital that we should carry the Turks with us in any new move...” after all “In early 1955 their passions were not yet inflamed, for the Turks is slow to anger, but once roused, he is implacable.”

⁵ PRO: CO 926/977: The US expressed their concern to Whitehall in June 1957, over fears that Britain may pull out of Cyprus altogether. Their concern was to a certain extent due to US communication facilities situated in Mia Milea and Yerolakkos, as confirmed by CIA File, ‘The Outlook for Cyprus’, published 28/12/61, which states that the US reached a pre-independence agreement with Britain for these facilities.

PRO: CO 926/627: Following some subtle American pressure, Britain had accepted that she no longer needed the whole island as a base, but only required bases on the island. On September 12th 1957, FO and US officials covertly met at the US Embassy in London, where the Americans emphasized their preference for a form of independence, guaranteed by NATO powers, for the island.

PRO: FO 371/144640: The clandestine role played by the US cannot be underestimated and is once more underlined by the fact that a Gentlemen’s Agreement had been reached by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey during the independence talks stating that that they would ensure that the two Cypriot communities had to outlaw communism and that this agreement would remain permanently secret. The records of this conversation highlight the fact that Britain was completely ignorant of the discussions between Greece and Turkey, where as the US was surprisingly well-informed.

⁶ Foley, *Legacy of Strife, Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War*, Baltimore: Penguin p.164.

described as having the “most rigid, detailed and complicated constitution in the world”.⁷ A protocol was added announcing the agreement on a further three documents, including the Treaty of Establishment which ensured that Britain retained sovereignty over ninety-nine square miles of territory - two large Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). In addition to the two SBAs (Akrotiri and Dhekelia), Britain also retained various communication and surveillance sites across the island and essentially reserved the right to use the whole of the island as a military base.⁸ The safety and retention of these facilities would come to dominate British policy on Cyprus for the next fourteen years.

3. 1960-1974

When inter-communal fighting erupted in December 1963, Britain was approached to deploy a Joint Truce Force to prevent further violence. This did not last long, and on 25th January 1964, the British Government approached the United States in forming an international peace-keeping force, which would eventually lead to the formation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).⁹ From this point on, both the Wilson and Heath administrations would adopt a policy of ‘impartiality and non-involvement’, allowing the United States to be at the forefront of events in Cyprus.¹⁰ Britain’s main concern throughout was the retention of her military facilities on the island.

During the 1960 negotiations, the Cyprus Government dropped earlier claims for payment for sites and facilities and accepted Britain’s proposal to determine at five-year

⁷ Polyviou, P.G., *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980*, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980, p.21.

⁸ See Klearchos Kyriakides, ‘*The SBAs and British Defence Policy Since 1960*’, in ‘*Britain in Cyprus*’, Faustmann & Peristianis, Peleus, Band 19, 2006.

⁹ Ball, G., *The Past Has Another Pattern*, Norton and Company, London, 1982, p.340.

¹⁰ PRO: DO 204/19, ‘Intercommunal Talks, Part C’, ‘Cyprus: The Enlarged Intercommunal Talks’, from Oliver to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 24/10/73 and PRO: PREM 15/31: Under ‘Kyprianou calls in on the Secretary of State’, 17/7/70.

intervals, after full consultation with the Cyprus Government and taking all factors into account, the amount of financial aid to Cyprus to be provided in the succeeding five years. This was set out in an Exchange of Notes which provided for £12 million of aid up to 1965, paid in instalments tapering to £1.5 million in the final year.¹¹ In fact, the Cyprus Government was told in March 1965 that further payment was dependent upon progress toward an intercommunal settlement, as this was the only way Britain could guarantee equal distribution amongst the two communities, thereby demonstrating and ensuring British impartiality.¹²

As the SBAs are sovereign territory, no rent was to be paid under the signed agreements, but in 1972, the Makarios government made a request for payment due for the use of Britain's other facilities.¹³ The following year, a second request for payment was made. The Cypriot Government asked for £76.5 million from Britain for the use of facilities and services on Cyprus for the period of April 1st 1965 to March 31st 1972.¹⁴ An additional request was made for a subsequent annual payment of £11.48 million as of April 1st 1972.¹⁵ Consequently, Whitehall asked the Chiefs of Staff to re-evaluate the strategic importance of Cyprus, and found that the Chief of Staff Committee agreed with the results of the 1971 evaluation, in that Cyprus was of significant geopolitical importance to both Britain and the Western world.¹⁶

Nonetheless, Whitehall was unwilling to concede to Makarios' request for payment and in December 1973, told the Cyprus Government, that the presented claims were not

¹¹ PRO: AIR 20/12691: 'Cyprus – Financial Claims for Facilities, November 1974'.

¹² PRO: PREM 15/31: 'Kyprianou calls on Secretary of State, 17th July 1970', Appendix R.

¹³ *Hansard*, vol.327, p.805: At least, there was no "direct payment". See Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Defence in the House of Lords, 2/2/72.

¹⁴ This was not for the SBAs.

¹⁵ PRO: FCO 46/1017: B.Stanbridge, Air Commander, Secretary, Chief of Staff Committee, 13/9/73.

¹⁶ PRO: FCO 46/1017: 'The strategic importance of Cyprus', 26/9/73.

legally well-founded, as all payments under the Treaty of Establishment were being honoured¹⁷ and that any resumption of payment should be made in accordance with the 1960 Exchange of Notes.¹⁸ The Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, concluded at a Defence & Overseas Policy Committee meeting before Christmas 1973, that Britain would need to resume financial assistance to ensure continued use of the SBAs and that the British High Commissioner, Sir Stephen Oliver, should inform the Cyprus Government that although the claim was questionable, Britain did not rule out discussion of the matter.¹⁹ On 9th May, with Edward Heath having been replaced by Harold Wilson, who had set British policy on course for a defence review, Oliver delivered a message from the Prime Minister to President Makarios, informing him that due to Britain's serious economic situation, it could not, for the time being, discuss the Archbishop's financial request. As always, Makarios was sympathetic, but explained that he too, was under pressure from his Minister of Finance, Mr. Patsalides, and asked Oliver whether Britain could pay the Cypriot Government the sum of £10 million.²⁰ In his message to Whitehall, Oliver explained that the future of the SBAs and the retained sites depended "ultimately on the goodwill of the Cyprus Government."²¹ We now know that a paper was prepared proposing annual payments of up to £2.5 million from April 1974 to March 1980 as well as a retrospective sum of £10 million to be paid to the Cyprus Government. After the general election in February, this all changed, and once Wilson committed

¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/131: HMG pays £1 million p/a for certain services and facilities.

¹⁸ PRO: AIR 20/12691, 'Cyprus – Financial Claims for Facilities, November 1974'.

¹⁹ PRO: CAB 148/131: D & OPC, 14/12/73.

²⁰ PRO: DEFE 11/729: Oliver to Wiggin at the FCO, 13/5/74. The letter had been written by Wilson on 20/4/74. Also: Wilson, H., *Final Term, The Labour Government, 1974-1976*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979, p. 22-49.

²¹ PRO: DEFE 11/729: Oliver to Wiggin.

himself to a defence review, it would have been unwise for Britain to commit itself to facilities which it might not want to hold onto for much longer.²²

Britain had previously considered withdrawing from at least one of the SBAs,²³ but a combination of gentle prodding from Washington²⁴ and a belief that if Britain withdrew from one of the Areas it would become more difficult to hold onto the retained sites, meant that this was never realised.²⁵ However, in May 1974, a top secret paper suggested that the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) should make a proposal based on the assumption that Britain totally abandon the SBAs, and try to establish what the minimum expenditure could be whilst maintaining “effective collections service.”²⁶ Further, there is an increasing amount of evidence available which suggests that Washington opposed any suggestion of Britain leaving Cyprus. A Ministry of Defence paper, dated 7th July, shows that the Commander of the British Forces Near East (CBFNE), Sir John Aiken, was concerned at the level of the American presence at Akrotiri. Aiken felt so strongly about this, that he asked the Ministry of Defence to help him prevent further increases in the deployment of U2 spy planes or US personnel in Cyprus.²⁷ In a memorandum prepared in December 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was informed that the British were getting nervous about US use of Akrotiri in light of the continued left-wing press reports in Cyprus and that the US would be better to withdraw now, so that (a) Britain would not need to ask them to leave, and (b)

²² PRO: AIR 20/12691, ‘Cyprus – Financial Claims for Facilities, November 1974’.

²³ PRO: FCO 9/65, PRO: CAB 148/18: 24/11/65, PRO: CAB 148/29: D & OPC, 16/11/66, ‘Rundown of Forces’.

²⁴ NARA: RG 59, GR of the DoS, CFPF, 1964-66, Political & Defense, Cyprus: telegram from US Embassy London to State Department, 28/11/66.

²⁵ PRO: CAB 148/81: D& OPC, 2/6/67: Report by the Defence Review Working Party.

²⁶ PRO: DEFE 11/729: ‘Value of intelligence collecting facilities in Cyprus’, 5/6/74.

²⁷ Supported by: PRO: DEFE 68/90: Note of a meeting between CBFNE and VCDS, 7/7/74.

Washington would have a better chance of using Akrotiri again at a later date.²⁸ This once again highlighted how British policy on Cyprus was being influenced by the Americans.

Up until 14th July 1974, Britain's only considerations *vis-à-vis* Cyprus were the SBAs, her retained sites and whether or not, after the Defence Review, Britain could continue to justify such a large-scale military presence on the island. This was all about to change, and once more, British policy would be highly susceptible to decisions taken in Washington.

4. 1974: 15th – 19th July

On the morning of 15th July 1974, the Greek junta, through its officers commanding the Greek Cypriot National Guard, launched a *coup d'état* against the Makarios government, destroying the Presidential Palace in an attempt to kill Cyprus' President. In his memoirs, the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, asserted that he did not have an "inkling" of what was about to happen.²⁹ However, once news of the coup reached London, Callaghan revealed 'other problems were pushed off his desk' and the Foreign Office became preoccupied with events in Cyprus. Both Greece and Turkey were reminded of

²⁸ NARA: RG 59, CFPPF, 1970-73, Defense, Cyprus. On the other hand, US documents reveal that Makarios was fully aware of American use of the SBAs for U2 flights and that "he has been very good about it." See: NARA: RG 59, GR of the DoS, CFPPF, 1970-73, Political & Defense, Cyprus, memo for President Nixon, 22/10/70.

²⁹ Callaghan, J., *Time and Chance*, Collins, London, 1987, p. 335.

their responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee³⁰ and Britain asked both to show restraint and urged Ankara to avoid “any kind of precipitate action or intervention at this stage.”³¹ During a meeting with Foreign and Commonwealth officials, Callaghan accepted responsibility in that Britain would have to take the initiative with Athens and Ankara and that Britain’s primary concern was the safety of British dependants and holiday-makers. Additionally, the safety of the SBAs was of vital importance to Britain. Callaghan and his advisers agreed that an armed response by Turkey needed to be avoided, that the junta was probably culpable and that despite this, Britain should consult with both Athens and Ankara as stated in the Treaty of Guarantee. Even if Makarios was dead, the decision not to recognise any other government in Nicosia had also been agreed upon.³² By now news that Nicos Sampson, an EOKA fighter who was sentenced to death by the British but later amnestied, had been named as the new ‘President’ of Cyprus, had reached Whitehall. In Nicosia Oliver, concluded that Makarios had to take responsibility for provoking Athens, a sentiment which caused some disagreement within the department:

Surely even Makarios could not have calculated on such crass stupidity on the part of the Colonels to embark on a course of action which would almost certainly justify if not stimulate a subsequent Turkish intervention.³³

At 12.30 GMT on the 16th July, Makarios asked Oliver, via General Prem Chand, Commander of UNFICYP, to airlift him to Akrotiri. This decision led to the

³⁰ Under Article IV, each Guarantor reserves the right to restore constitutional order on the island. Before doing so, the three countries should consult together in an attempt to ensure the provisions of the constitution are observed.

³¹ PRO: FCO 9/1890 ‘Notes for Supplementaries’, and Callaghan’s telegram to Ankara, Callaghan, p. 336.

³² Callaghan, p. 337.

³³ PRO: FCO 9/1914: Comment by Lynton Jones on Oliver’s dispatch “The Coup against Makarios”.

implementation of Operation *Skylark*, a contingency plan which had existed for some time. Naturally, Whitehall was keen to keep the operation as covert as possible, so as not to provoke a reaction from the National Guard.³⁴ Once authorisation had been received at 16.00 GMT, camouflaged whirlwind helicopters of 84 Squadron, kept in Nicosia as part of the United Nations detachment, were alerted by CBFNE. One of these helicopter left Paphos at 16.25 GMT,

...and made a deliberate detour so that it looked as though it came from Nicosia, which is a well-established and non-suspicious route. The lift out was unopposed, but still a 'close run thing', as shortly after a brief battle for Paphos began.³⁵

There was considerable concern as not only was Whitehall pressing for a delay in order to discuss the Archbishop's destination, but CBFNE feared the possible reaction of the National Guard against the SBAs, as, at that moment, the families in the dormitory towns were all under the control of the National Guard. A conversation between Kissinger and Callaghan at 15.15 GMT revealed the former's displeasure at hearing that Britain had agreed to evacuate Makarios. Kissinger feared Makarios would lead an "outside movement and ask for Soviet help." The US Secretary of State conceded that if Makarios was to leave the island he would have to re-assess the situation and that his primary concern was "to keep outside powers out of this."³⁶ Eventually, CBFNE applied sufficient pressure and Makarios' flight, the *RAF Argosy*, was airborne by 17.02 GMT. It appears that it was CBFNE who, due to the *Argosy's* limited range, chose Malta as

³⁴ Callaghan, p.337.

³⁵ PRO: WO 386/21, 'Report on the Cyprus Emergency', 15/5/1975. PRO: FCO 9/1914: Sampson's account of the coup which appeared in *Machi*: As Makarios was boarding the helicopter, Sampson claims that he received a call from one of his officers, stating that the Archbishop was in shooting range. Sampson claims that he ordered that Makarios should be let go. In the circumstances this seems highly unlikely.

³⁶ NARA: NPMS, HAK, TCT, Callaghan and Kissinger, 15.15 GMT, 16/7/74.

Makarios' destination. A message was received by Callaghan, and the escorting officer, Wg Cdr Hodgkinson was asked to determine where Makarios wanted to go.

Makarios replied that he "had no concrete plans", but that his "final destination was London". At this time, Makarios was unaware that he was heading for Malta.³⁷

The *Argosy* landed at Luqa at 21.12 GMT and was met by the British High Commissioner Haydon, the Governor General, Deputy Prime Minister and a little later by Prime Minister Dom Mintoff. They were all greeted warmly by Makarios "who had about him an Olympian calm and was really rather magnificent considering what he had gone through."³⁸ Makarios had wanted to head straight for London and needed a lot of persuading to stay in Malta overnight. He had spotted an *RAF Comet* and suggested that only if it took longer than forty-five to sixty minutes to get ready would he stay.

Hodgkinson took advice from the British High Commissioner and after visiting the *Comet* returned to report an unserviceability had been found (in fact a minor fault) and that it would take "more than an hour" to repair.

Makarios agreed to stay with the Governor General but added that he would have to leave the following morning by 9am.³⁹

Very early on during the crisis, a divergence in British and US policy became apparent. This different outlook is reflected in a message sent by Callaghan to Kissinger, in which the former suggested a joint refusal to accept Nicos Sampson as head of state, the

³⁷ PRO: WO 386/21, 'Report on the Cyprus Emergency', 15/5/1975.

³⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1891: tel. 207, Haydon, Valletta to FCO, 16/7/74.

³⁹ PRO: WO 386/21, 'Report on the Cyprus Emergency', 15/5/1975.

removal of the Greek officers from the National Guard, and the return of President Makarios. Also, Callaghan quickly enlisted the support of the nine member states of the European Community and urged the US to apply pressure on Athens, in order to remove the Greek officers from the island, secure the return of Makarios and thereby prevent a Turkish invasion.⁴⁰ During the first five days of the crisis there were two main issues on which Whitehall and Washington initially failed to agree. The first was the issue of recognition, the second was restoring Makarios as President of Cyprus.

Almost immediately, Callaghan informed the British Embassy in Athens that Makarios was the legitimate President and that Athens should unambiguously state what its intentions were whilst removing the Greek officers in the National Guard responsible for the coup.⁴¹ Sir Robin Hooper, the British Ambassador, met with the acting Foreign Minister, Constantine Kypraios, and explained Britain's position. Kypraios "balked slightly" and asked why Britain still did not recognise the Portuguese dictator Dr Caetano or Colonel Papadopoulos, the leader of the initial junta, at which point Hooper explained there was a difference

...between a freely and constitutionally elected President and one imposed without genuine popular consultation.⁴²

The reaction across the Atlantic was very different.

Throughout the crisis, Ambassador Robert Anderson, the State Department's press spokesman, would inform the media of Washington's stance during his daily noon briefings. Anderson had received instructions from Kissinger to avoid any binding

⁴⁰ Kissinger, H., *Years of renewal*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999, pp.210-211.

⁴¹ PRO: FCO 9/1891: Instructions from Callaghan to the British Embassy Athens, 16/7/74.

⁴² PRO: FCO 9/1891: tel. 204, Hooper to FCO, 16/7/74.

statements regarding the recognition of Makarios.⁴³ On the day of the coup, Anderson commented that the situation in Cyprus was “unclear”, that there was no confirmation of whether Makarios was dead or alive and that

The question of recognition...does not arise because the situation on the island is changing. It is necessary first to know who controls the territory of Cyprus...Our policy remains that of supporting the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its constitutional arrangements.

By not condemning the coup, the US was tacitly recognising Sampson. A CIA report dated 19th July revealed that Kissinger had argued that it was better to deal with Sampson, than risk offending the junta, as otherwise they could “toss the Sixth Fleet out of Greek ports.” US policy concentrated on preventing the declaration of *Enosis*, as Turkey would not allow this and it would almost certainly result in a war between two NATO allies, thereby weakening the Alliance’s south-eastern flank, with only one possible beneficiary – Moscow. Washington, already concerned over its relations with Ankara due to the dope trade,⁴⁴ showed further concern upon discovering that Russia, “always eager to foment trouble, has lined up with Turkey.”⁴⁵

On 16th July, Anderson was asked whether the Makarios government was the government of Cyprus, to which Anderson replied “I would rather just not comment on it at all.”⁴⁶ This was almost twenty-four hours after it had been revealed that Makarios was still alive and almost two hours after Callaghan had spoken to Kissinger about evacuating Makarios from Cyprus. Callaghan explained why he felt Britain should continue to recognise

⁴³ NARA: SD, tel.154133, 17/7/74, ‘Department press briefing – Cyprus’.

⁴⁴ Under Ecevit, Turkey had re-commenced poppy cultivation. For several years, US pressure and financial aid had persuaded Ankara to ban such cultivation. Ecevit wanted Turkey to move away from its dependence upon other countries, most notably the US.

⁴⁵ NARA: CREST, CIA report, Research Institute Staff, Friday 19th July.

⁴⁶ Stern, *Wrong Horse*, Time Books, New York, 1977, p.112.

Makarios as he believed the Archbishop was genuine in his desire for Cypriot independence and by supporting him, one could “avoid him turning to Moscow. This I did.”⁴⁷ Having arrived in London on 17th July, Makarios was informed personally by Callaghan that Britain continued to recognise him as President and that Britain wanted him to return to Cyprus in that capacity.⁴⁸ Ultimately, Washington’s policy on Makarios would have a significant effect on the development of Britain’s intention of restoring him as the legitimate head of state.

The question of restoring Makarios as President of Cyprus also revealed differences between London and Washington. At a Cabinet meeting on the morning of 16th July, Harold Wilson informed his Cabinet that Britain was ready to implement contingency plans if needed, suggesting that Britain was seriously considering restoring Makarios to Cyprus.⁴⁹ On the following morning, Anthony Acland Callaghan’s Private Secretary, together with Callaghan, reviewed answers given to Callaghan by the Ministry of Defence on this question. The Ministry of Defence felt that the British forces in the SBAs could cope with the National Guard, but if they were to be used offensively, they would need reinforcing. The aircraft carrier, *HMS Hermes* was twenty-four hours from Cyprus and other forces were currently seven days notice away and could only be made available at the expense of Britain’s Northern Ireland contribution.⁵⁰ Provisionally, the Ministry of Defence felt Makarios could be restored militarily, provided the only opposition was that

⁴⁷ Callaghan, p.338.

⁴⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1892: Makarios meeting Callaghan at FCO, 17.45, 17/7/74.

⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 128/55: Cabinet meeting, 10, Downing Street, 16/7/74, 11am.

⁵⁰ PRO: DEFE 11/729: Paper related to ‘preliminary draft’, 17/7/74.

of the National Guard.⁵¹ It was considered that National Guard standards of training were poor, their equipment heavy and weapons old and that their morale before the coup was not high. The Ministry of Defence believed the operation could be successful, but that the problem might come afterwards, with Britain being left with a situation similar to that in Northern Ireland. The question that needed to be answered was whether a situation could be created where British troops could simply return to the SBAs and leave Makarios and his Government in a secure state - extremely low was the conclusion. One of the difficulties would be the 23 000 civilians (service dependants, British citizens and friendly nationals) living in Cyprus, as they could be used as hostages. They would have to be evacuated first, which might initiate action by the National Guard which Britain would want to forestall.⁵² A minimum force would “require three brigades plus a HQ element and a detachment [sic] close air support airfield”, which would take two weeks to mount.⁵³ It was concluded that Britain would enjoy international support for this venture as long as it was based on the Treaty of Guarantee.⁵⁴ If Britain failed to act, Turkey “might go it alone”. Possible disadvantages cited were that even with Makarios restored, the situation would still be unstable, he would have to make improved constitutional arrangements and might ask for “some kind of continuing military guarantee” which could affect the Defence Review.⁵⁵ Crucially, it was also agreed that the US Government would have to be warned in advance and that they should seek assurances from Moscow not to intervene. It was clear that Washington would never

⁵¹ The NG comprised 10 000 men, light tanks, artillery and heavy equipment and could mobilise a further 30 000.

⁵² PRO: DEFE 11/729: Paper related to ‘preliminary draft’, 17/7/74. Of those 23 000, 17 500 live outside the SBAs of which 13 000 are service dependants or UK personnel employed in the SBAs.

⁵³ PRO: DEFE 11/729: paper (not draft), 17/7/74.

⁵⁴ PRO: PREM 16/19: ‘Implications of Reinstating Makarios with UK military support’.

⁵⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1915, Top Secret, Killick to Goodison, 17/7/74, Acland and Callaghan.

agree to such a venture, having failed to denounce the coup or recognise Makarios.⁵⁶ Additionally assurances would be needed from Ankara that the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish forces on the island would not resist Britain and might even give unsolicited assistance.⁵⁷ On the 18th July, Wilson told his Cabinet that urgent studies were being made of the implications of military intervention. While he thought that intervention was undesirable, if diplomatic pressure on Athens failed, military action would have to be contemplated. “HMG had made some precautionary naval dispositions and [sic] looking at [sic] usefulness of [sic] international blockade...”⁵⁸

The consideration of using a military naval blockade gathered momentum once the Turkish delegation had come to London for consultations on the 17th July. Once more, at least superficially, it appeared as though it was the British who were negotiating with Turkey. The reality, however, was that throughout their meeting, Callaghan, using the pretext “I am going to the loo,”⁵⁹ would leave the room in order to consult with Kissinger in order to obtain his approval on all crucial matters being discussed.⁶⁰ Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit asked the British Government whether Turkey could land her forces in the SBAs and whether Britain would consider joint military action against the Greek forces. These proposals were rejected by the British. Callaghan declared that he wanted Makarios to return, emphasizing that he did not equate this to restoring the *status quo ante*, and that, as dictated by the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece should be invited to

⁵⁶ NARA: NPMS, NSC, Greece/Cyprus, ‘The Cyprus situation – today’s WSAG Meeting’, 16/7/74, memo for Nixon from Scowcroft.

⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1915, Top Secret: ‘Possible military intervention in Cyprus’.

⁵⁸ PRO: CAB 128/55: Cabinet meeting, 10, Downing Street, 18/7/74, 11.30am.

⁵⁹ Birand, M., *Thirty Hot Days in Cyprus*, K.Rustem & Bros, Nicosia, 1985, p.7.

⁶⁰ Baroutdjou, Edjimele, ‘*The Cyprus Peace Operation and its Aftermath*’, a series of articles published in *Cumhurriyet* from 17 July 1989, p.17. Translated into English by the Public Information Office, Nicosia.

consultations, which would help delay the issue of a United Nations Security Council resolution having to be discussed, thereby pleasing Dr. Kissinger.⁶¹ No agreement was reached and the obvious conclusion was that without serious pressure being put on Greece to restore constitutional order in Cyprus, Turkey would take unilateral action.⁶² British policy continued to be at the mercy of Washington, and more specifically Henry Kissinger. The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, spoke to Kissinger and found him to be critical of Whitehall's approach to the coup. Kissinger felt it was wrong to commit to Makarios, as if he were to return, the already influential communist party in Cyprus could gain further in strength.⁶³ Pressure was being applied on Britain to cease its support for Makarios and Washington also urged a joint Anglo-American approach at the United Nations. On the other hand, Callaghan's main concern was that the US should put pressure on Athens and obtain a withdrawal which would prevent the "Turkish hawks" from sinking their teeth into Cyprus. Callaghan further raised the possibility of a naval blockade to prevent Greek and even theoretically Turkish troop reinforcements.⁶⁴

The American attitude has been rather disappointing...the Americans want us to go slow in the UN. They are showing some reluctance to speak firmly to the Greek Government, no doubt because of their different view of their interests, particularly as regards the strategic importance of Greek bases to them.⁶⁵

⁶¹ PRO: FCO 9/1894: instructions from Callaghan to Richard, 19/9/74: Callaghan instructed UK representative, Ivor Richard that although Britain believed Makarios was the legitimate President of Cyprus, if the US were to make an issue out of it "don't commit to continued recognition of Makarios indefinitely regardless of the circumstances." Kissinger was fearful that Makarios would enlist the help of Moscow at the UN or secure his recognition as the head of state in a resolution.

⁶² PRO: 'Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and the Defence Secretary, and the Prime Minister, the Acting Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior, after dinner at 10 Downing Street, Wednesday 17 July 1974.'

⁶³ PRO: FCO 9/1892: tel. 2414, Ramsbotham to FCO, 17/7/74.

⁶⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1892: John Killick to Goodison, 'Note for the Record', 17/7/74.

⁶⁵ PRO: PREM 16/19: Letter by Lord Bridges, 18/7/74, after request made to Robert Armstrong for an account of the position of Her Majesty's Government on Cyprus after Wilson had met with Makarios.

Callaghan expressed similar disappointment and confusion during a Cabinet meeting at 11.30 GMT on the 18th July. “US policy is not entirely clear”. Britain still believed that if the Greek officers could be made to withdraw, however unlikely that was, Sampson would probably fall and Makarios would be free to return.⁶⁶

Although Whitehall may have been able to argue that it was surprised by the coup, there was ample evidence available to British intelligence about developments in Ankara⁶⁷

...as early as Monday, 15th, the Turkish General Staff ordered preparatory measures for armed intervention in Cyprus.⁶⁸

On the afternoon of 19th July, a Nimrod surveillance aircraft on patrol north of Cyprus obtained a radar indication that

...considerable force of vessels was moving south from the Mersin area...The force split into two groups of 37 units and 6 units and, on instructions from Near East Operations Centre the original Nimrod and another which succeeded it on task shadowed the larger element of 37 vessels using radar and reported that they had been joined after dark by a further three vessels from the west.

This larger group of about forty vessels continued to move towards the northern coast of Cyprus and by midnight it was assessed that “a landing in the Kyrenia area was likely for the following morning, 20 July.”⁶⁹ Further, it had been clearly established that on both

⁶⁶ PRO: CAB 128/55: Cabinet meeting, 10, Downing Street, 18/7/74, 11.30 am.

⁶⁷ PRO: AIR 23/8715: ‘Cyprus Emergency, Akrotiri’, *HQ Near East Force, 25//174, Cyprus Crisis, July/August 1974, Operational Aspects and Lessons Learned, signed RD Roe, Air Vice-Marshal for Air Officer Commanding in Chief*. The Ministry of Defence instructed sorties to take place even when the Near East Air Force felt the gains did not justify the risk and on at least one occasion a flight was refused permission when the Near East Air Force felt it was operationally justified.

⁶⁸ PRO: AIR 23/8715: ‘Cyprus Emergency, Akrotiri’, Annex A.

⁶⁹ PRO: AIR 23/8715: ‘Cyprus Emergency, Akrotiri’. This revised existing intelligence predictions that a landing was likely on the 21st.

18th and 19th July, Turkish aircraft had been identified carrying out reconnaissance flights over northern Cyprus.⁷⁰

On 18th July, the Chief of Defence Staff wrote to Callaghan informing him that the indications were that Turkey might take unilateral action and that the forces currently earmarked to protect the SBAs and British citizens were inadequate. He recommended the following be brought under seventy-two hours notice:

- (a) forces originally envisaged for the reinforcement operation (Operation *ABLAUT*),
and
- (b) in addition, one infantry battalion and armoured recce regiment (less one squadron).⁷¹

The Ministry of Defence prepared papers listing the Royal Navy ships available for operations off Cyprus and on 19th July, Chief of Defence Staff Sir Michael Carver, informed Callaghan that Ministers had agreed the previous night to reinforce the SBAs in order to facilitate the evacuation of dependants and other British civilians due to a likely Turkish invasion, which at the time was predicted to take place within the next seventy-two hours. It had been decided not to act prior to the invasion, as this might have given the impression of collusion and could endanger civilians.⁷² Callaghan recalled that both he and Alec Douglas-Home, Shadow Foreign Secretary, agreed that Britain should not hesitate to defend the SBAs,⁷³ and that contingency plans were being discussed

⁷⁰ PRO: AIR 23/8715: 'Cyprus Emergency, Akrotiri'.

⁷¹ PRO: DEFE 11/729: 'Defence Review: Cyprus', Chief of Defence Staff to Callaghan, 18/7/74, 'Cyprus Contingency Planning.'

⁷² PRO: DEFE 11/729: 'Defence Review: Cyprus', Chief of Defence Staff to Callaghan, 19/7/74.

⁷³ Callaghan, p.337.

In the event of Turkish or Greek forces intervening in Cyprus you are to avoid hostilities unless specifically instructed to the contrary. You are, however, to take such action as you consider essential for the protection of British lives, the SBAs, and those Retained Sites which in your view warrant protection. In those circumstances you are to maintain the closest possible liaison with the UN Force Commander.⁷⁴

British policy *vis-à-vis* British citizens in Cyprus and British facilities were executed without difficulty. British military considerations *vis-à-vis* the political consequences of a Turkish invasion would suffer a different fate.

Callaghan had already raised the possibility of a naval blockade and there is considerable evidence to support the assertion that Whitehall did propose such a venture along the northern coast of Cyprus in order to prevent a Turkish invasion. Lord McNally, then Tom McNally, Callaghan's political advisor, has revealed that although Makarios was not Britain's favourite Commonwealth leader, the Wilson government did support him and wanted him re-instated. McNally went on to say that the new Labour government had come into power, without a parliamentary majority, at a time of economic crisis, which meant that although military options were considered, they were unrealistic. The only available option was to act in concert with the United States, which was the only power capable of preventing an invasion. According to McNally, Callaghan genuinely wanted to prevent a Turkish invasion and suggested a joint military operation. Smiling, McNally revealed that the realities of 1974 meant that a joint military operation meant sending the US Sixth Fleet along with one British ship (probably *HMS Hermes*) to the northern coast

⁷⁴ PRO: DEFE 11/729: Vice Chief of Defence, signed by J.R. Rigby, Colonel, 16/7/74.

of Cyprus. McNally called this “responsibility without power”. Kissinger, who was obsessive about the importance of the south-eastern flank of NATO and the importance of Turkey to American interests, rejected the proposal.⁷⁵ Neither Callaghan nor Kissinger mention this in their memoirs and there is no documentary evidence of this approach in the US National Archives. In the British National Archives, there is a ‘Note for the Record’ prepared by Sir John Killick, the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which he revealed that during a conversation between Callaghan and Joseph Sisco, the American Assistant Secretary of State, on 18th July, Callaghan mentioned the possibility of a naval blockade. Sisco’s response is not noted.⁷⁶ Further, there is an official record of a proposed ‘Royal Navy Blockade of Northern Cyprus’, which was considered after the 23rd July ceasefire. With the ceasefire being continuously violated, the idea of a blockade was suggested in order to prevent further Turkish reinforcements reaching Cyprus. At one point, a Task Group made up of four Royal Navy ships made it as far as Cape Andreas, in anticipation of the blockade being authorized, only for the Vice Chief of Defence Staff to send a last minute message stating that the action was too grave and its potential consequences too serious. “The idea was not shelved and continued to be contemplated at ministerial level.” Callaghan requested an assessment of Turkish strengths and whether the US Sixth Fleet could be used in conjunction with the Royal Navy. The following morning he received information that

...the current Royal Navy forces in the theatre were adequate for a blockade, but if Turkey were to use all forces at her disposal, the blockade might not be 100% effective.

⁷⁵ Interview with Lord McNally, House of Lords, London, 16th March 2007.

⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1892: John Killick to Goodison, ‘Note for the Record’, 17/7/74.

Using the US Sixth Fleet would have solved the problem. It is unclear from the documents whether the Americans once again refused to take part in this proposal or whether Britain simply decided that the risks outweighed the benefits.⁷⁷ Whatever Britain decided, one can assume that Washington wanted no part in any kind of blockade against Turkey and that this official record of a proposal for a naval blockade was based on the initial proposal made by Callaghan to the Americans before the initial phase of Turkey's military operations.

It is, of course, possible that Callaghan made the original suggestion in a telephone conversation with Kissinger, who was well known for being selective about the conversations he recorded. In his memoirs, Callaghan does recount that the US had far more influence with both countries than Britain, and felt that Britain's experiences during WWII had made him a strong advocate of Anglo-American cooperation when crises developed. Not only were his wartime experiences crucial, but the effect of Suez on British foreign policy thinking cannot be underestimated. Callaghan revealed that he did not want to expose Britain to those kinds of differences again, when the American fleet used its radar to deliberately 'sabotage' both British and French ships.

I was determined that if military force had to be used in Cyprus, there must be a clear understanding with the United States, with their support fully guaranteed.⁷⁸

It is also clear that Callaghan was an admirer of Kissinger and that some British officials were virtually in awe of him.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ PRO: WO 386/21 'Report on the Cyprus Emergency'.

⁷⁸ Callaghan, p.341.

⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 49/548: 'British interests and objectives in Cyprus', Lord Lennox, North America Department, FCO, 14/11/74.

If McNally is to be believed, and there is sufficient documentary evidence to suggest he should, it is hardly surprising that Callaghan makes no direct reference in his memoirs to this suggestion. In his chapter on Cyprus Callaghan does mention that

I therefore sent him [Kissinger] a detailed personal message on 19 July urging the need to coordinate British and American views on the best way to bring the situation under control. I made certain proposals on lines of policy.⁸⁰

McNally even asserted that in his desperation Callaghan was willing to fly to Ankara on 19th July to try to dissuade Ecevit from authorising an invasion.⁸¹ Callaghan believed that only pressure on Greece could prevent a Turkish invasion and to this end he “asked that America should redouble its efforts.” Callaghan recognised the importance of the US and that it would be essential for Britain to carry the Americans with them in whatever Britain decided to do. US support would be necessary for any representations made in Ankara or Athens and as this was not forthcoming, Washington’s position ultimately failed to provide Callaghan with the tools needed to prevent a Turkish invasion.⁸²

Immediately after the coup, Britain, assuming responsibility, set out to prevent Turkish military action, to continue to recognise President Makarios, possibly even to restore him by force and to secure and safeguard British citizens and military/intelligence facilities on the island. It is not a coincidence that the only one of these policies which was not in conflict with US policy, namely securing and safeguarding British citizens and

⁸⁰ Callaghan, pp.341-342.

⁸¹ Interview, House of Lords, London, 16th March 2007.

⁸² PRO: FCO 9/1894: ‘HMG’s draft response to the possible Turkish invasion of Cyprus’, 19/7/74, and Callaghan, p.342.

military/intelligence facilities, was the only policy which Britain had the power to successfully and effectively implement.

Late on 19th July, the United Nations Security Council unanimously carried a resolution, deploring the outbreak of conflict in Cyprus, highlighting the necessity of restoring constitutional order, requested the withdrawal of those officers requested to leave by Makarios in his letter of 2nd July 1974 and called for an immediate end to foreign military intervention.⁸³ Whilst this resolution was being voted on, the Turkish military, using the pretext given to them by the Greek junta's coup, had already begun the first phase of its invasion of Cyprus.

⁸³ UNSC Resolution, No.353 (1974).

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DEFE 13	Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files.
DO	Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations and FCO.
FCO 9	Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
FCO 46	Defence Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
FO 371	Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence
PREM 15	Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers.
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Experiencing the paradox: Greece's past, current and future of co-operation, at NATO

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Introduction

Considering the constant challenges in the field of security in the 21st century, NATO has rightfully embarked into a phase of transformation that is still ongoing. It is implicit for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to transform. This key point was agreed at the time of the Prague Summit in November 2002¹, which initiated officially the policy of transformation. At the same time, Greece as member-state of NATO since 1952², is involved at several levels of NATO policy and action.

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine and analyse Greece's policy to NATO considering its relative past, current and future co-operation within the Alliance. As an active member in the decision-making process both at a political but also military levels, Greece's example is believed that will contribute further to the development of NATO relations with other countries in the area of Southeastern Europe.

Several questions need to be answered in relations to Greece's evolution and further involvement at NATO: Is Greece's foreign and security policy interoperable with other NATO nations? Does the current security policy satisfy the needs and the interests of the country and the state as well as supporting NATO nations or not? What are the variables with which Greece establishes a foreign and security policy? Do they always coincide with the interests and needs of NATO? What are the positive and negative aspects of being a member of NATO? Is the Foreign policy of Greece structured in such a manner to conduct multiple transformations when foreign and security challenges arise? Is there a stable and operationally viable 'Dogma'?

The opinions that will be mentioned in the paper do not reflect any official policies or opinions of the Greek government nor any respective Ministries relevant to NATO's organization, but are solely based on personal experience and judgments of the author.

¹ NATO Prague Summit Meeting 21-22 November 2002: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/index.htm>

² "Protocol to the Accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO": <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a1.htm>

NATO policies: A Brief Overview

What we all know is that NATO has changed. What we do not know is why it has changed. As professor Couloumbis points out, “NATO countries have substituted the concept threat, which steamed from imminent Soviet threat, with the concept risks, with all the attendant implications for western defense and security doctrines”³.

NATO has evolved. It got over the historical events that took place from 1989 to 1991. NATO’s evolution is a result of multiple consultations and summit meetings of the Heads of States, members of NATO. The outcome would be the sustainability of the Alliance. NATO’s past summits “reveals how closely the Alliance’s evolution has been intertwined with Europe’s maturation into an undivided and democratic security zone”⁴.

Since 9/11, NATO’s purpose has been reaffirmed. NATO is to get further involved in the field of security, to portray the norms and values of the military alliance according to article 51 of the UN Charter that it was created for and at the same time protect all members-states from any imminent attacks, according to article 5 of the treaty, by symmetrical and asymmetrical ways.

NATO is still expanding. It is becoming the single most important security Alliance in modern history of alliances. The organization today includes 26 member-states and many other co-operative states in co-operative programs: PfP-Partnership for Peace, MAP-Membership Action Plan, EAPC, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. At the same time, it has established relations in a unique way with Ukraine and Russia, via the NATO-Ukraine Council and the NATO-Russia Council. The Alliance has recently established also contacts with Contact Countries such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan, to hold meetings and negotiations for a variety of issues of joint interests in the field of security.

During the Prague Summit meeting held in November 2002, 19 member-states, at that time, agreed to pursue with the plan of a necessary transformation that would provide NATO with tactical ability to pursue operations beyond the traditional sphere of influence. Its abilities had to increase in specific areas: NATO had to improve their administrative, operative, network and fighting capabilities, enhance co-operation and enable different military forces to conduct joint operations (to become interoperable). All those issues were mentioned and supplemented both at the Istanbul summit in 2004⁵ and later on, during the Riga summit in 2006.

One of the positive aspects in relevance to NATO’s ongoing operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan is that the Alliance has improved its readiness to conduct multi-task and multi-national operations. At the same time NATO’s Response Force (NRF), which is officially in a ready state of alert, since October 2006, is believed to prove most valuable to operations beyond the traditional points of control. The NRF which can hold 25.000 to 30.000 troops, is equipped with the state of the art weaponry, is interoperable and can -stand alone- (with no contact, away from bases), up to a month.

³ Couloumbis Th. (2000), *Regional Challenges of the 21st century*, in NATO and Southeastern Europe, security issues for the early 21st century, (ed) by D. Keridis and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Virginia, Published by Brassey’s.

⁴Jaap De Hoop Scheffer (2006), *Reflections on the Riga Summit*, in NATO Review: Riga Summit Special, Brussels, Published by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division

⁵ Istanbul Summit Meeting 28-29 June 2004: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/home.htm>

What is yet to come in the near future is a new strategic plan. As the existing one (strategic plan of 1999) is believed to not fulfilling all the needs and requirements of the 'new' form and goals of the Alliance. NATO Heads of States need to negotiate a new plan that fulfills the needs and interests of all. A new strategic plan will include a new context and strategy of political and military operations. It will supersede, but at the same time, supplement the current one. It will legally provide the Alliance with a new role, globalize the importance of NATO and will supplement efforts made in all fields of security by NATO, until that very moment. That is why at the Riga Summit a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) was drafted. The moment has come as the Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer mentioned, to maybe negotiate a new plan⁶. As a senior officer of the Public Diplomacy division stated, the CPG is "a draft guidance that initiates a negotiation on issues relevant to NATO's needs", that possibly will be reflected to a renewed strategic plan, is to be drafted in the very near future.

Greece and NATO

Greece considers it self, as stated by the Ministry of foreign Affairs –a consistent supporter- of NATO⁷. Greece's foreign and security policy is devoted to international political multilateralism, preservation of peace and security and to the respect of International laws and treaties.

Greece's multi-dimensional integration into the mechanisms and institutions of both NATO and EU has helped Greece to evolve politically, financially and militarily. Today, the country is in terms with NATO's treaty and agreements and fulfills all its obligations. It identifies itself with all decisions agreed at all summit meetings.

Paradoxically, and for which we will analyze below, Greece has not seen so much progress in its relations with NATO, as in the latest years. This progress has come about due to the changing security environment post-9/11. Greece is active and constantly involved at NATO procedures as its national and foreign interests coincide to those of NATO policies and actions.

In Greece's recent historical past, its entrance into the Alliance in 1952 signified for most national leaders a feeling of security and certainty, in relations to the integrity and sovereignty of the state. Yet, not all were of the same opinion. As the ministry of Defense mentions "Greece is at an important geopolitical and geostrategic location"⁸. This meant possible imminent threats. With the country's withdrawal from NATO in 1966 (Greece reintegrated at NATO in late 70s early 80s) and in conjunction to the events of the 1970s, Greece's national security and defense was challenged. NATO's reaction was not the one which was

⁶ 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy <http://www.securityconference.de/>, see also NATO Secretary General Addresses Munich Security Conference <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/02-february/e0209a.html>, for the full text see the Speech of the Secretary General of NATO at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070209d.html>

⁷ See Ministry of foreign Affairs of Greece security and defence policy: <http://www.yplex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Multilateral+Diplomacy/Security+-+Defence/NATO/>

⁸ For more information see the geopolitical analysis of the Ministry of Defense: <http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3&MainLinkID=12&SubLinkID=13>

anticipated. The outcome was the atrocities and consequently the unlawful division that followed in Cyprus.

Since then, the Cyprus issue has become an important part of Greece's foreign and security policy. Greece's position on the action of Turkey against Cyprus has much reflected its past multilateral policy at a NATO level and its bilateral relations with Turkey. Greece rightfully so, does not support any actions made against the integrity and sovereignty of another country. That was and in some instances still is reflected in Greece's foreign policy.

In Concern to the area of Southeastern Europe, Greece's foreign and security policy has been quite noticeable in relevance to the challenging and instable environment of the 1990s. Greece supports and proposes constantly plans for a step by step consolidation of democracy and its terms, in the area of Southeastern Europe for all Southeastern European countries. They have invited, proposed and support the countries of the area to join both the EU and NATO, as long as the international laws and agreements to peace, security, stability and dialogue are agreed and honored.

Greece strongly supports multilateral levels of negotiations and actions as tools of peaceful resolution. The country has politically and militarily signaled to the world that it does no longer feel insecure as it once was. It is a strong supporter of all actions made in relevance to the support of peace, stability and prosperity of all countries or people, always in respect to the Charter of the United Nations.

Consequently, Greece is involved both at the political and operational levels of NATO. It supports NATO's actions. Perhaps not in a way or with the force that one may have expected, yet it does fulfill its obligations. At the same time, at an EU level, it increases both its economic and political stability and power, as to show that Greece is rightfully its member.

Political and operational obligations of Greece vis a vis NATO

Politically, the country belongs to the 26 member-states of NATO. This entails both obligations as aforementioned but also rights. Greece, as all members, is obliged to offer what it has negotiated with NATO, to the support of all its operations and actions.

Militarily, Greece, as all member-states, is offered an opportunity for military co-operation and exchange of information with all member and partner countries to NATO.

Operationally, Greece does not have any obligations to be involved with, initially. It is however actively engaged in all negotiations concerning the operational build of NATO forces and structures. Depending on the importance and needs as well as the political cost and interests, the country agrees to an offer, or does not.

The 9/11 terrorist acts however changed all this theoretical scenery. In response to the challenges posed for an increased co-operation against asymmetrical threats, NATO has required today a more qualitative and risk managerial decision-making process in a political

level. At a military level, NATO required and continuously requests for more finances and better offers for optimum operational capability.

In turn, for the country's foreign and security policy this meant a need to change. Greece decided to re-identify itself with the needs and challenges of NATO. It needed to identify itself with the efforts to proceed to all necessary reforms to address the non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian crises and natural disasters. These after all are the new national but also trans-national security challenges.

Accordingly, has Greece's foreign and Security changed over these last years? Is it now interoperable with the other 25 member-states of NATO? Does its security policy coincide with the needs and the interests and support to NATO?

Greece's Foreign and Security policy post 09/11.

Greece's foreign policy is believed to be two folded: it includes a strategic and an operational plan. Strategically, Greece's foreign office has established key points of national interests: 1) promotion of peace, security and dialogue 2) establishment of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 3) Promotion of national interests at multilateral levels of actions such as the EU, NATO, UN 4) Negotiations upon subjects that are of key national priority such as a) FYROM's bilateral relations with Greece and b) Turkey's joint process for a steady integration of Turkey into the EU, with the perspective that Turkey will obey to all the rules and regulations set forth by the EU and in respect of other countries integrity and sovereignty rules.

Operationally, Greece exercises what is called 'a low-policy'. Through constant dialogue, multilateral and bilateral talks, Greece is handling its national and foreign affairs. It agrees to negotiate for issues that are truthfully in need of resolution, such as the ones mentioned above.

The country's government agrees and obeys to the international laws of mediation and peaceful co-existence as long as its national, foreign and security interests are not at stake. For all issues that cannot, for the time being, be resolved, Greece can apply all its rights at a supranational level either at the UN, or the EU, OSCE, or NATO, depending on the importance, subject and circumstance.

Security-wise, Greece has increased both its levels of operational readiness and strategic ability to handle all national security issues. At a NATO level, Greece supports all decisions that are agreed by Consensus for security and defense purposes of the Allied countries.

The country's security policy is adequate to counter all new threats and challenges posed in the beginning of the 21st century. Through constant exchange of information, joint operations and exercises, Greece portrays a strong feeling of co-operation. Once agreed, it obeys in security related fields, always to the treaties and rules of peaceful co-existence and satisfies most of NATO's needs, as agreed, in multi-level negotiations.

An example case of Greece's co-operation with NATO is the not so long ago exercise held in Greece with the operational code name "Trial Spartan Hammer 06". The goal was to test "intelligence interoperability" and national preparedness. The goal was "to determine how intelligence and electronic warfare can aid in locating and characterizing terrorist threats"⁹. The exercise was conducted in co-operation with the Greek exercise on national electronic warfare "Trojan Horse"¹⁰.

The outcome of the exercise, confirms that both foreign and security policies of the Greek Government have transformed and supplement the needs and goals also of NATO. Greece's foreign and security policy is interoperable both at a strategic but also tactical levels. NATO policies and actions are considered to be in demand. This means that a multilevel session of a decision-making body of 26 member states is in demand. Greece portrays the demands and needs of the Greek people. It does however also supplements other states and supports equally proposals, as long as they are in relevance and in the interests to the current strategic and security needs.

Greece was and still is committed to continue to be engaged both in Kosovo and Afghanistan but at also in certain instances Iraq. In the recent past, it supported in defense with tactical engagements the "passing through the Mediterranean sea of US war ships or coalition ships during the beginning of the War in Iraq". Via its active engagement in operations under 'Active Endeavour' Greek Forces are involved into real-time joint exercises at the Aegean, Mediterranean and the Black Seas but also classified or unclassified operations. At the same time via its force both in Afghanistan under ISAF (International Assistance Force) or KFOR (Kosovo Force) Greece fulfills its obligations for standard support of NATO operations, with humanitarian, peacekeeping or peacemaking operations.

Greece is also actively engaged at rescue missions operations and relief work. As such, with the co-operation of the Rescue Mission and Co-ordination Centre of NATO, Greece is actively engaged via its national centre to any humanitarian relief and rescue operation, when required.

Greece's foreign and security policy is interoperable with NATO's needs. Its national interests do coincide with the ones of the Alliance at multiple-levels of co-operation, both political and military. Maybe Greece could be more actively engaged yet, before projecting such a case, one must understand that the country's obligations are been fulfilled.

Greece and NATO: negative perspectives of co-operation

Being part of NATO does entail political, military and financial costs. Keeping also in mind that NATO's perspective of engagement in international relations has changed over the last 17 years, a large proportion of Greece's public opinion is not keen in accepting NATO any longer. For two reasons: 1) NATO's policy is considered synonymous with the foreign policy of the USA therefore unilateral 2) NATO is considered an offensive military alliance that

⁹ Exercise Trial Spartan Hammer 06. "Exercise to test Intelligence Interoperability":

<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/02-february/e0208a.htm>

¹⁰ Ibid.

does not portray currently the security challenges raised but rather gets operationally involved by interest of the few but 'dynamic states'.

21st century security challenges amended security concepts and assessments. NATO does no longer represent a defensive alliance. Although its legal clauses in the preamble confirm that NATO is a security defence Alliance, it has adopted a new approach based on the fight against terrorism. NATO is considered the next best thing to a true Alliance that is sustained based on the need for exploration, enlargement and new co-operations, both at military but also political levels.

Yet, it comes with an expense. Financially, the costs for exploration, enlargement, new operations and evolution via its military and political transformation, is high. Although militarily, NATO has been in a constant transformation and alignment to the needs of a transformed security environment, politically the steps for a renewed security preamble are not concrete. There is a need for a robust security preamble that politically and legally justifies actions of NATO outside the traditional sphere of influence and that provides with new commands and operations as well as operatives to conduct multi-level, multi-task, joint operations, in an interoperable environment.

Allies need to draft a renewed and long-term security preamble that truly portrays the interests of all member-states, equally, where the interest groups are set, where the levels of negotiations and engagements are set. Until that very time the cost will continue to be high as public opinion tends to disagree with actions made in a politically correct way for some but not for others. NATO has to portray the consensus of all countries involved.

As long as NATO policy will be synonymous with US or any other unilateral foreign and security policy, NATO will not be accepted. A General of the ACT (Allied Command Transformation) in Norfolk Virginia supported the argument that NATO policy is actually "synonymous"¹¹. In relations to Greek public opinion, as professor Couloumbis explains, "...throughout the Cold War, NATO tended to be equated in Greece with the political and strategic will of the United States..."¹².

For Greece's public opinion, this policy is considered wrongful. It is understood that NATO's policy coincides with US foreign policy and judging from the involvement of US military forces in several geographical areas, Greek public opinion tends to disagree.

What public opinion agrees for is that there is a need for a stronger co-operation in the field of security. What it disagrees for is that NATO's strategy seems offensive but is neither politically nor legally justified.

As long as NATO's operations, which are not portrayed in the preamble or in actions by consensus, increase, 'dynamic states'¹³ will control an alliance that was created for the defence

¹¹ Academic Research in 12 countries members of NATO including the USA. ACT was visited in the end of December 2004.

¹² Couloumbis Th. (1997), "*Greece and NATO enlargement*", NATO paper presented in a conference held at NATO in Brussels with title: "the National Debates over ratification".

¹³ In our PhD research we have established that dynamic states at NATO are a reality. They are a group of countries with high political and military as well as financial power that are portraying their national

of all countries involved. The estimate is that as long as dynamic states do not respect the rules and treaties of NATO as an alliance, NATO will never take its true form. At the same time all member-states need to realise that some national interests may be or should be jeopardised in the interests of an ideal but possibly true form of Alliance.

Greece and NATO's summit meeting in Riga

NATO's latest summit in Riga¹⁴ is summarized in three key points: "Prevailing in Afghanistan, improving NATO's capabilities and enhancing co-operation"¹⁵. In the effort to conclude towards a successful result during the Summit meeting, Greece within the framework of its obligations re-affirmed its contributions to the Alliance. In relations to the operations in Afghanistan Greece contributes according to the Greek foreign office a "174-member special battalion with infrastructure work as its basic mission, 56 vehicles, one C-130 aircraft, 2 officials to the ISAF staff, 3 officials to Kabul airport, a 50-member medical unit (Role 2) and 14 persons to Composite HQ. The forces in question are operating in Afghanistan's capital and in a 30- to 65-km radius outside Kabul.

Afghanistan's control over Kabul's Airport, is operating in a rotating period of national control from the countries involved in ISAF. Chronically, between 1 December 2005 to 31 March 2006, Greece "headed the administration of Kabul airport with 39 personnel. Moreover, at the informal summit meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers held in Brussels on 26 January 2007, Greece announced its intention to provide 500,000 Euros to co-fund four programmes (agriculture, education, water management and healthcare) to the Hungarian Provincial Reconstruction Team in northeast Afghanistan's Baghlan Province"¹⁶.

In regards to KFOR (Kosovo Force) and its ongoing operations, Allies "confirmed NATO's preparedness to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo"¹⁷. In this regard, Greece supplements the efforts made and request further NATO presence. At the same time the country continues its efforts by participating in KFOR with "Mechanised Infantry Battalions (576-strong and 173 vehicles)" and continues to provide its air-cargo assistance with an C-130 that is based in the Elefsina air force Base¹⁸.

Greece supported also two more important issues concerning NATO's enlargement process and NATO's enhancing co-operation. At Riga, NATO invited three more countries to join the PfP (Partnership for Peace) but also the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council): Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. At the same time some three countries were evaluated on their MAP (Membership Action Plan¹⁹) progress: Croatia, FYROM and Albania.

interests in a supranational level. They believe that those interests in many instances should be adopted by all, as true Allied interests. (this is opinion is of the author and is subject to alterations according to the final finding of the research paper). The attempt is to merely describe a pragmatic approach of how NATO works today.

¹⁴ NATO Riga summit meeting <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2006/0611-riga/index.htm>

¹⁵ NATO (2006), "NATO after Riga", Brussels, Published by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece NATO section: <http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Multilateral+Diplomacy/Security+-+Defence/NATO/>

¹⁷ Ibid 12.

¹⁸ Ibid 13.

¹⁹ The membership action plan requires countries to fulfil certain objectives in order to further develop their political and military capabilities as to get closer to the Alliance structures and ideals. Further to MAP accession is most of the time PfP. Once all countries fulfil the obligations of the PfP then they are invited to join in full

As the Secretary General mentioned: Riga reaffirmed NATO's commitment to the 'Open Door policy' and to further enlargement of the Alliance. In respect to the MAP countries the Secretary General stressed that they need to continue their efforts to "qualify for membership"²⁰. In terms with the PfP and MAP countries, Greece strongly supports the need to maintain and enhance these programs.

In relations to a new partnership framework, with the Contact Countries, such as New Zealand, Japan and Australia, NATO proposes a dialogue process such as the one included at the level of NATO's "Mediterranean Dialogue"²¹ and the "Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI)"²². Greece stressed and proposed a new format of partnership one that will enhance co-operation so long as it is decided by the North-Atlantic Council. As such in this case we propose meetings in the level of a NATO-Contact Countries Council (NCC). Discussions should include sharing of information, tactical and strategic partnership in exercises and in Rescue Mission Operations.

Allies stressed their solidarity into the efforts made to fulfil the strategic vision of NATO's strategic concept. For this reason a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) was drafted. The CPG we consider that is or should be a negotiating tool. It stresses the key points and issues that need to be re-examined in a new form of a strategic plan. NATO is in the process of fulfilling the objectives of a successful transformation and enlargement process and in enhancing political and military capabilities. As soon as all the objectives set out at the transformation plan initiated in the Prague Summit of 2002 are concluded, NATO should set out new rules and criteria in the format of a new strategic concept.

This Concept in turn, should clarify the rules and regulations of NATO's political and military objectives. It should clarify NATO's new strategic vision based on the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges and should establish the risks and threats of the 21st century.

As Greece enhances, implements and improves its capabilities in relations to NATO obligations, its foreign and security structures are also in constant and ongoing transformation. In order to meet the interoperability objective, Greece's forces continue to transform. Its security dogma no longer represents the traditional objectives of defence and mediation, but rather counters, as aforementioned, challenges raised by asymmetrical threats. As Greece's objectives coincide of those to NATO member and partner countries, Greece is no longer in a position of national insecurity, as aforesaid. Greece is constantly developing in all sectors including in its security and foreign perspectives and objectives.

Through the national program of "reform for the 21st century", Greece's security dogma is currently transforming. Currently, major efforts are made to concentrate on issues of "Health and Safety" policy development²³.

membership NATO structures politically and militarily. In essence MAP & PfP are considered within the Alliance, the levels of required fulfilment of objectives in order to join NATO.

²⁰ Ibid 2.

²¹ For more information see NATO's policy and the Mediterranean Dialogue: <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm>

²² For more information see NATO's policy and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): <http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html>

²³ For more information see the website of the Greek Ministry of Defence:

<http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3&MainLinkID=188&SubLinkID=0>

However, its armed forces are also changing. In order to effectively counter the challenges raised post 09/11 the Greek armed forces are adapting in order to remain “flexible and effective”²⁴. The armed forces are transforming in the fields of defence and its structures, in its weaponry systems and finally in its human resources.

Consequently, for a viable and interoperable to NATO security dogma, we suggest a supplement to the new national military strategic plan. It should include new doctrines for air, sea and land components, which will promote further interoperability that will create an even smaller but high readiness rapid but multi-task reaction force. At the same time it should look upon new forms of technological insights and applications at a network-centric operational environment.

We should note that Greece’s national armed forces are in a ready state of alert to counter all asymmetrical threats as was shown during the Olympic Games in 2004. Yet, this does not mean that national security forces should not keep on transforming.

Finally, an ever more important sector of reform is the one on information gathering, sharing and action. Greece needs to portray more actions in a tactical order, to counter a multiplicity of regional and peripheral problems within NATO’s framework of action.

Suggestions for a even closer co-operation at NATO

During the Olympic Games of 2004, Greece was in close co-operation with NATO. Greece requested NATO’s presence to portray a better sense of security. The decision to involve NATO via its operation “Distinguished Games”²⁵, in the field of Olympic security, raised some few but important issues.

The country’s political initiative was well accepted by all member states. It initiated a new dialogue between the member-country and NATO on the future of their co-operation. New challenges that still arise from the constantly changing security environment request both Greece and NATO to transform. They both need to be in a ready state of alert to get engaged at anytime, to counter any or all asymmetrical threats.

Greece has to be more engaged into the decision-making process of NATO: 1) due to its geopolitical importance, and 2) due to its experience of coordinating a supranational non-traditional operation in a non-traditional security environment.

With its ongoing national transformation of its security dogma and armed forces, Greece already portrays a ready state of alert to counter all asymmetrical threats. At the same time Greece is already showing the first signs of further engagement in NATO political and

²⁴ For ore information see a policy analysis on the transformation of the armed forces:
<http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage2.asp?HyperLinkID=2&MainLinkID=26>

²⁵ For more information see NATO assistance to Greece:
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/DistGames.htm

military affairs with its actions in relations to the future of Kosovo and negotiations for its further contribution in relations to the operation in Afghanistan.

Greece's policy towards the operational environment of NATO is more active. The country is offering as stated above everything that it has or is negotiating operationally (e.g. Afghanistan). It is willing to offer more according to its obligations in relations to rescue and humanitarian missions and operations, according to the supplements of the Riga Summit agreements.

In the recent NATO summit meeting in the levels of Foreign Ministers in Oslo in April 2007²⁶, in which the issues of missile defense was discussed, Greece, via its foreign Minister Dora Bakoyianni, initially agreed to one but important issue: If a US missile umbrella should expand to the east, it should protect the whole of Europe²⁷.

The Minister's action was very much criticized by the Greek Media. Yet, irrelevant to the outcome of this issue, the foreign ministers' position portrays the increasing willingness of Greece to be much more engaged in NATO negotiations. Greece should continue its efforts to portray an ever increasing co-operation with NATO, as long as it also projects national Greek interests within the framework of the Alliance.

Greece has to establish in a separate to its foreign and security dogma, a policy of national interests that need to be promoted at a NATO level. They need to be coherent and supplementary to the overall Foreign and Security Dogma. The interests should be portraying the national military and political interests within the Alliance in tactical, strategic, operational and conceptual levels.

Greece should get further involved in the field of intelligence. Via NATO's Deployable Corps in Thessaloniki²⁸, Greece should be keen in being further involved both at an intelligence gathering and sharing. At the same time, Greece should be more involved at the Joint Intelligence Centre in Moleworth²⁹.

Greece should re-examine its 'insecurity related fields'. It should assess future co-operation with neighboring countries in the context of NATO co-operation as those countries do happen to be willing to join the Alliance. In its bilateral talks with its northern non-NATO countries, Greece should take more concrete steps to resolve all issues prior to the next summit meeting of 2008³⁰. It is important for Greece to portray to the member states that within the context of NATO, Greece offers viable solutions to all problems relating with possible enlargement of NATO in the area of South-Eastern Europe.

²⁶ Informal Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers Oslo Norway 26-27 April 2007:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2007/0704-oslo/0704-oslo.htm>

²⁷ Comments and article By Russian News & information Agency:

<http://en.rian.ru/world/20070427/64568868.html>

²⁸ NATO Deployable Corps Thessaloniki Greece: <http://www.ndc.gr/>

²⁹ NATO builds Intelligence Apparatus in Moleworth:

http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/91/365/16760_NATO.html see also : Intelligence fusion centre initial operational capability (IOC) ceremony: <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2006/10/061011a.htm>

³⁰ Next Summit meeting was decided to be held in Bucharest Romania:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/04-april/e0427a.html>

For Greece's closest northern neighbor soon to be invited to NATO FYROM, it needs to understand that a viable solution is equal to joint concessions. If concessions on both sides are not portrayed then a viable solution is not an option and therefore neither is membership to the Alliance. In case a viable solution fails a possible 'memorandum of understanding for a viable solution' within the context of NATO negotiations, should be proposed as to initiate negotiations in order to protect all vital interests of Greece as a member of NATO that reflects the country's integrity, sovereignty and historical and cultural safety.

Greece on its own side needs to take concrete steps towards a resolution of issues that need an end. It is estimated that Greece is willing to take brave and difficult decisions for issues that concern its periphery. However, Greece should be given in return, much more to a respect, an ability to act without constraints in the wider area of Southeastern Europe politically and financially. It should lead the integration of possible new member-states from Southeastern Europe to NATO and should be helped by other experienced NATO members to construct a NATO Balkan (or South-Eastern) Educational Centre for all military and civilian employs to NATO or NATO structures or those civilians related to NATO issues, policies and actions.

Conclusions:

This short assessment aimed at portraying the ongoing changes in the foreign and security policy on both NATO as an Alliance and Greece as its member-state, as a result of the constantly changing security environment.

Several questions that were raised initially concerning the past current and future policies of Greece vis a vis NATO and their co-operation were answered in the most discrete way, and in respect to the policies of the Greek government.

It is the conclusion of this paper that the future of co-operation of Greece to NATO should be its ability to lead at its periphery within the framework of the Alliance. Its national interests vis a vis NATO policies should continue to be set. The ongoing renewed foreign and security dogma when finalized should be long-term, should include all possible threats and risks and should be able to self-transform in case of possible alteration in the wider security environment.

At the same time, Greece should continue its active engagement within the framework of the Alliance. At the same time it should enhance its ability by proposing new and interesting issues for consideration both at NATO's military but also political committees.

As Greece slowly portrays its obligations in relevance with NATO duties and obligations, it should make the utmost to promote concretely its national interests in relevance with the Alliance.

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Paper Title: “Cyprus” EU Membership as a Catalyst for the Solution of the Political Problem: Myth or Reality?”

I. Introduction

On 1st of May 2004², on the fifth challenging and rather difficult enlargement of the European Union, the Republic of Cyprus became a member state of the EU even though the “Cyprus problem”, as is common refers remains unresolved. Among the challenges of the EU enlargement the issue of accession was one of the most important foreign policy issues for Cyprus, because it aspires to secure a better future for its people within the framework of the European Union. The main political purpose for Cyprus was the settlement of the political issue.

At the heart of the political problem is the division of the island into Greek and Turkish zones, with Greece supported the Greek zone in its ambitious to see a united island joining the EU and Turkey supported the Turkish zone in its wish for independence and its opposition to Cyprus becoming an EU member as long as the division of the island existed.³ The Cyprus problem is not just another international problem, it is primarily a European problem and presents a paradigm test for modern international relations, as well as a pointer to the future.⁴

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² European Union, www.europa.eu.int/enlargement/doc

³ Nugent N, “ EU Enlargement and The Cyprus Problem”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, March 2000, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp 131-150

⁴ Kasoulides I, “ Cyprus and its accession to the European Union”, *Center for European Integration Studies*, ZEI, C 47, March 1999

The European Union incorporated the problem, which was a priority in the European political agenda. Evidently, the Cyprus issue is a case with important political and security implication⁵ for regional and international stability.

I would argue that developments on Cyprus and the final character of any solution will determine the political situation in the Mediterranean and contribute to the stability on Greek -Turkish relations. Thus, the case of Cyprus demonstrates that the de facto partition of the island is a constant threat to the stability of the Mediterranean and its perpetuation has not mitigated human suffering both for Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The current paper aims at providing an overview of the perspectives of the solution of the Cyprus issue and the impacts on the European Union's political capacity. Moreover, a summary of the most important events that took place over the past years in the EU-Turkey-Cyprus relations will be shortly presented

Because it would be imprudent to search for final answers, this paper can simply hope to improve scholarly awareness and understanding of the issues involved.

II. The importance of the Cyprus Problem

The main question is “How can such a small island be so important to EU politics?”. To answer this question we have to start by outlining what has become known as the ‘Cyprus Problem’.⁶

Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960. Three years later, inter-communal violence broke out between the Mediterranean island's Greek and Turkish communities, which eventually led to a Greek-sponsored attempt in 1974 to seize the government and a military intervention by Turkey. By the end of 1975 Turkish-Cypriots (comprising 18 per cent of the population) held some 37 per cent of the island north of a divide line and were backed by a garrison of 30,000 Turkish troops and a steady stream of mainland Turkish settlers. Despite the catastrophic

⁵Diez Th, “The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict”, Modern Conflict, Post Modern Union. Manchester University Press 2002

⁶ George S. Yiangou, “The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order”, University of Cambridge, UK, Issue 2/2002, <http://www.ecmi.de>

consequences for their community, the government of the Republic of Cyprus (now exclusively in Greek-Cypriot hands) continued to be recognized as the legitimate government of the island and, therefore, retained the advantages of international legitimacy and access.

In 1983, the Turkish-held northern part of the island declared itself the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC). However, the TRNC is recognised by Ankara only. Since 1974, the island has been divided, despite repeated efforts under into two zones and it has been overseen and patrolled by the United Nations Forces⁷

The actors involved in the Cyprus conflict are: the United Nations, the European Union, the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot Community, Greece, United Kingdom and USA.

Principally, the prospect of the Turkish accession in the European Union and the opening of negotiations for entry make it indisputably necessary to find a workable solution for both sides of the island.⁸

The accession of Cyprus in the EU could therefore, provide the perfect opportunity for both the Cyprus and Turkey to take a step back and forward and rethink their positions *vis-a-vis* each another for the settlement of the problem. The question is: "How far and in which direction these relations will develop in the future?". It depends on how Cyprus and Turkey will act and also how the EU will respond to Turkey. The *de facto* partition of the island is a constant threat to the stability of the region.⁹

III. The United Nations' role in the process

The United Nations role in the process is very significant. UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on 27 March 1964. The creation of the Force was mandated by the Security Council of the United Nations in its resolution adopted on 4 March 1964 [186, (1964)] following the outbreak of the inter-communal conflict on the

⁷ United Nations, www.un.org

⁸ Semin Suvarierol, "The Cyprus Obstacle in Turkey's Road to the European Union" in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds), *Turkey and the European Union* (London, Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 62-66

⁹ Ph Savvides, "Cyprus: The Dynamics of Partition"

island and the threat of an imminent invasion by Turkey. By an exchange of letters dated 31 March 1964 between the Secretary General and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, an agreement was concluded concerning the status of the Force (Host Country Agreement).

The United Nations have in several resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council demanded respect for the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus, the return of refugees to their homes and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island.¹⁰ Though since 1977 several rounds of talks under UN auspices have taken place, they have produced no result.

Unfortunately, until now, all efforts by the United Nations to achieve a solution of the Cyprus problem had failed.¹¹

The international community was not prepared to accept defeat and a new effort started to try and achieve a solution before the 1st of May 2004. These efforts led to the preparation of the “Annan Plan” and the referendum. On 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriots rejected by a three-to-one margin the plan proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the reunification of Cyprus. The plan, which was approved by a two-to-one margin by the Turkish Cypriots in a separate but simultaneous referendum, would have created a United Cyprus Republic and ensured that the entire island would entry into the European Union on 1 May.

It serves no purpose to try and analyze what went wrong with the negotiations. What is important is that at the referendum while the Turkish Cypriots were able to accept with a 2/3 majority the Annan Plan, 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots rejected it. The Annan Plan wasn't impeccable¹². On the contrary many of its provisions could not be considered satisfactory. Most important, there, was one underlying factor shared by practically all: the fear and lack of trust for Turkey and its motives because of the 1974 experience. Greek- Cypriots could not believe that after thirty years of occupation Turkey had suddenly abandoned its policy. They were thus convinced that not much would change, since the Plan enabled Turkey to maintain its hold on the future Turkish - Cypriot Federated State and maintain occupation troops on the island even after its accession to the EU. Of course the Turkish Cypriot side can argue that

¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus:
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus01_en/cyprus01_en?OpenDocument

¹¹ For further information, follow this link: <http://www.unficyp.org/>

¹² George Vasiliou, President of the Republic of Cyprus (1998-1993), The solution of the Cyprus Problem : The key to Turkish Relation with the EU”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=winter_2005_Vasiliou

these fears were exaggerated but the fact remains that all the above were valid worries which may led to the rejection of the Plan finally.

IV. CYPRUS – EUROPEAN UNION

A summary of the most important events that took place over the past years in the EU- Cyprus relations follows¹³:

On 19th of December 1972 the European Union and Cyprus sign an Association Agreement establishing trade relations. On 19 October 1978, EU and Cyprus sign Protocol Agreement defining “conditions and procedures necessary” for the implementation of a customs Union. On 26 June 1990 (Dublin) the European Council states concern Cyprus’ division and notes the effect of Cyprus problem on “EC-Turkey relations, bearing in mind the importance of these relations, it stresses the need for the prompt elimination of the obstacles that are preventing the pursuit of effective inter-communal talks aimed at finding a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus on the basis of the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary General, as it was reaffirmed by Resolution 649 of the Security Council”. On 4 of July 1990 the Government of Cyprus submits application form from the whole island for full membership to the European Community and in 1993 the European Commission recognizes the “European identity and character” of Cyprus and its “vocation to belong to the Community” asserts the positive role of EU accession in solidifying a settlement and recommends prior resolution of island division (avis).

On 10 April 1993 in Luxemburg the European Council invites European Commission to open substantive discussions with the Government of Cyprus to help the preparation for accession negotiations. The Council also confirmed the Community's support for the efforts made by the United Nations Secretary General to produce a political settlement of the Cyprus question. Also the Council agreed to reassess the situation in the light of the positions expressed by each side in the inter-

¹³ The information’s for the timeline are from Europeans Union officially documents and also from the following links: <http://www.pio.gov.cy/>, <http://www.cyprus-eu.org.cy/>, <http://www.parliament.cy/>, <http://www.delcyp.cec.eu.int/>, <http://europa.eu.int/>,

community discussions and to examine in January 1995 the question of the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.

On 21-22 June 1993 at the European Council of Copenhagen the solution is prerequisite for membership. On 24 June 1994 (Corfu) the European Council affirms that next phase of EU enlargement will involve Cyprus and “reaffirms that any solution of the Cyprus problem must respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and high-level agreements”. On 19 December 1994 (Essen) the European Council confirms that the next phase of enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus. On February 1995 the European Council decides that negotiations can begin 6 months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (after Greece threatens to veto EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe if Cyprus not taken on).

On March 1995 EU states accession negotiations to open with Cyprus six months after the 1996 IGC (linked to Greece’s refusal to implement Customs Union with Turkey unless open negotiations with Cyprus. On June 1995 the EU Madrid summit declared that negotiations with Malta and Cyprus would "start six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. On 16 December 1995 (Madrid) “the European Council reiterates the importance which it attaches to making substantial efforts to achieve a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus in line with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, on the basis of a bi-zonal and bi-community federation”.

On 16 December 1996 (Dublin) “the European Council urges Turkey to use its influence to contribute to a solution in Cyprus in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions”. On 12-13 December 1997 the European Council of Luxemburg “Cyprus recognised as a candidate for the EU accession (Turkey not recognised) and concludes that the accession negotiations of Cyprus “should benefit all communities and...contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem”. On 31 March 1998: EU officially opens accession negotiations with Cyprus. On 9 November 1998 (Brussels) at the Meeting of the European Union General Affairs Council: Germany, France, and the Netherlands issued a joint communiqué stating that unless a solution to the Cyprus problem is found, severe problems will arise with the island's EU accession process.

On 11 December 1998 (Vienna) “The European Council confirms its support for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General towards a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus”.

On 10-11 December 1999 (European Council of Helsinki) it officially declares that the political settlement is not a precondition for Cypriot membership and Turkey recognised as a candidate for EU membership. On 15 April 1999: the European Parliament’s resolution on Cyprus’ progress towards accession. On 7-9 December 2000 (Nice) the European Council states support for UN efforts in Cyprus and appeals to all parties involved to contribute in efforts. On 15 May 2001 (Brussels): Conclusion of EU-Cyprus Association Council. On 15 December 2001 in (Laeken) the European Council supports recent meetings between leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

On 26 November 2002 (Brussels) European Council: “The Union reiterates its preference for a reunited Cyprus to join the European Union...In the absence of a settlement, the decisions to be taken in December by the Copenhagen European Council will be based on the conclusions set out by the Helsinki European Council in 1999. On 16 December (Copenhagen) in the European Council all negotiations chapters are concluded (Cyprus to enter EU on 1 May 2004), still prefers united island, “in absence of a settlement, the application on the acquis to the northern part of the island will be suspended until council makes a decision”. On January 2003 Cyprus Pre-accession Report by Delegation of the European Commission to Cyprus.

On 21 March 2003 (Brussels) European Council: “The European Council regrets that the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem have failed. It urges all parties concerned to spare no effort towards a just, viable and functional settlement and, in particular, the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reconsider its position. The European Council reaffirms its decisions taken at Copenhagen with regard to Cyprus' accession to the EU.”

On 16 April 2003 (Athens) Cyprus signs EU Accession Treaty.¹⁴ On 23 April 2003 Turkish and Greek Cypriots cross the island's dividing "green line" for the first time in 30 years. On 9 August 2003- Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in northern Cyprus announce the signature of a trade agreement to remove trade

¹⁴ Cyprus-EU Relations: <http://www.pio.gov.cy/> , <http://www.cyprus-eu.org.cy/>

obstacles and allow goods from northern Cyprus to reach foreign markets via Turkey. On 24 April 2004, The Greek Cypriots rejected while the Turkish Cypriots approved in a referendum a UN-sponsored unity plan, known as “the Annan Plan.”.

On 1st of May 2004 the Republic of Cyprus became a full member of the EU. On December 2004 at the European Council summit EU leaders agreed to open accession talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005. One of the conditions specified was for Ankara to extend a 1963 association agreement with the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community, to the Union’s ten new member states. This group includes the Greek Cypriot state, which is not recognised by Turkey.

On 17 April 2005, pro-EU and pro-unification candidate Mehmet Ali Talat was elected president of the self-declared TRNC. He replaced 81-year-old Rauf Denktaş in the post. Following a series of debates among the EU-25 states, the Council on 3 October 2005 decided to open accession talks with Turkey. On 29 November 2006 the Commission recommended the partial suspension of talks, because Turkey had refused to implement the Ankara Protocol and open its trade to vessels from Cyprus. On 11 December 2006 EU foreign ministers agreed to follow a Commission recommendation to sanction Turkey and suspend talks on eight of 35 areas. On 1st of January 2008 Cyprus will join the Euro

V. The Helsinki Summit 1999

On December 1999 at the EU Summit in Helsinki,¹⁵ a decision of historic significance for Cyprus and Turkey was taken. Actually the Helsinki Summit underlined the necessity for a solution before accession of Cyprus and supported the UN initiatives

9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

¹⁵ The Cyprus Question, A brief Introduction”, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus., Also: The Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusion <http://presidency.finland.fi/doc/summit/index.html>

(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.

It was clearly stated that the member states would like to see the reunification of the island before accession but if, despite their desire, this did not prove possible then the whole island would join, but the *acquis communautaire* would be implemented only in the areas controlled by the Cyprus Republic¹⁶. The Decision clearly pointed that at long last the road to EU membership for Turkey was opening. Turkey would be able to start accession negotiations if it was to convince the member countries that it had adopted the Copenhagen criteria.

In paragraph 12 of the Resolution it was clearly stated that:

12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).

The significance of the Decision was that it ensured that even if a solution would not be reached Cyprus could accede, something that was not at all certain until that date. Furthermore, however, Commission officials pointed out that the EU is not willing to accept the creation of two independent states. They clearly stated: “*One Cyprus and not two will be able to join the Union.*” The two communities of the island would have to agree on the elements of a solution under the auspices of the United Nations. In Copenhagen, Cyprus successfully completed the accession negotiations and was invited to join the Union.

¹⁶ George Vasiliou, President of the Republic of Cyprus (1998-1993), *The solution of the Cyprus Problem: The key to Turkish Relation with the EU*, Turkish Policy Quarterly, http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=winter_2005_Vasiliou

VI. The European Union's instruments for conflict response:

The European Union has an important role in the field of Conflict Prevention and conflict resolutions, through coordinated and systematic use of EU instruments and by promoting international cooperation and improving its capacity to react to conflicts. The EU has the potential to be a crucial player in conflict prevention, with the largest aid budget, the world's biggest market, historical and cultural ties with most of the sensitive regions and political presence in most economic fora¹⁷

The EU sui generis instruments for conflict response are political, economic, civil and military. In the 1st and 2nd pillar we categorize the following instruments:

- Agreements¹⁸,
- Cooperation Programs,
- Humanitarian aid,
- Rapid Reaction Mechanism,
- Political dialogue,
- Diplomacy,
- Political Statements,
- Observation,
- Fact-finding missions,
- The Policy Planning,
- Early Warning Unit,
- Cooperation among Member States in the field of armament,
- Rapid Reaction Force and Civil Crisis Management.

¹⁷ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy "Conflict Prevention—looking to the future", Conflict Prevention Partnership dialogue on "Five years after Göteborg: the European Union and its conflict prevention potential", Brussels, 12 September 2006, Reference: SPEECH/06/51312/09/2006

¹⁸ Commission Communication of 11 April 2001 on Conflict Prevention [COM(2001)211 final - Not published in the Official Journal]

More over the European Union exerts influence through four procedures:

1. Enlargement
2. European integration
3. European Neighbourhood Strategy : “Wider Europe”
4. Common Foreign and Security Policy. CFSC (political dialogue and diplomacy, declaration, special representatives, missions, measures)

Enlargement has shown its enduring value as one of the EU’s most effective policies¹⁹, successfully contributing to peace, stability and democratic development throughout the continent. The ten Member States which joined in 2004 have continued their smooth integration into EU institutions and policies. The new Member States' democratic political systems have, on the whole, continued to function well. They have an excellent level of compliance with EU law and have made a significant contribution to the work of the EU’s institutions. The EU's institutions have continued to function effectively. Thus, enlargement has increased the EU’s weight in international political and economic life and added to the EU’s negotiating strength in different fora.

As well as having increased security and stability in Europe, enlargement has also brought economic benefits. The new Member States are rapidly catching up with the old Member States. Enlargement has been beneficial overall for the EU economy and helped it face better the challenges of globalisation. The progressive adoption of the euro by the new Member States, starting with Slovenia on 1 January 2007, and in Cyprus in 2008 will further contribute to this positive trend.

Overall, the enlargement has acted as a catalyst for economic growth and modernisation in the EU. With the latest enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania and Turkey as a candidate it seems that enlargement remains on the EU agenda for several more years²⁰.

¹⁹ “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007” Including annexed special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members”, Brussels, 8.11.2006, COM(2006) 649

²⁰ Smith J, “ Enlargement in the EU”, JCMC, 2003, Vol, 44, Annual Review pp 115-117.

On the other hand, the European Union's action in conflict management is criticized for being more reactive than preventing. Also that is not always capable of making an effective use of its instruments and finally that the EU could be more effective through a more focused Foreign Policy Strategy (lack of coherence, multi-representation of the EU, sovereignty)

European integration is the process of political, economic (and in some cases social and cultural) integration of European states, including some states that are partly in Europe²¹. For centuries, there have been proposals for some form of integration. With his "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union"(1930), Aristide Briand came with the first twentieth-century proposal by a European government (french) for European Unity. By creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), France and Germany initiated the first decisive step towards further economic and political integration in Europe. Jean Monnet, regarded as the "founding father" of the European Union. Through different stages and set-backs, the ECSC has evolved into the European Union, which is regarded as the dominant force in European integration. The institutions of the European Union, its commissioners and bureaucrats as well as the nation-states, its leaders and people, all play a role in European Integration.

Nevertheless, the main question of who plays the key role is disputed as there are different theories on European Integration focusing on different actors and agency. The question of how to avoid wars between the nation-states was essential for the first theories. Federalism and functionalism proposed the containment of the nation-state, while transactionalism sought to theorize the conditions for the stabilization of the nation-state system. One of the most influential theories of European integration is neo-functionalism, developed by Ernst Haas (1958) and further investigated by Leon Lindberg (1963). Today there is a relatively new focus on the complex policy making in the EU and multi-level governance theory (MLG) trying to grasp the workings and development of the EU.

²¹ From Wikipedia, the encyclopedia : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_integration

There is no fixed end result of the process of integration. Integration and enlargement of the European Union are major issues in the politics of Europe, both at European, national and local level. Integration may conflict with national sovereignty and cultural identity, and is opposed by eurosceptics.

European Neighbourhood Strategy : “Wider Europe”²²

The initiated Wider Europe - Neighbourhood Strategy certainly reflects the EU’s most important task of contributing to peace, security, democracy and economic stability wherever this is at all possible whereas the strategy should therefore avoid allowing a new dividing line to emerge with eastern neighbours in Europe. The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighbourhood..

The progress achieved under the ENP has confirmed the great potential of this long-term policy. In the Black Sea region, where Moldova, Ukraine and the countries of the Southern Caucasus come together with the EU and with Russia and Turkey, the ENP also offers great potential for dialogue and cooperation at regional level. From January 2007, when the Black Sea will form one of the borders of the Union, a strengthened regional approach becomes an essential part of our neighbourhood policy.

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Within the context of the CFSP, the Union is developing a common security policy, covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. This policy could lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide, subject to a decision adopted by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements²³.

²² Report on 'Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours' (COM(2003) 104 - 2003/2018(INI),) Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, RR\329290EN.doc

²³ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESPD_main_en.pdf

In addition to appointing Javier Solana as the first "High Representative for the CFSP", the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks (known as the "Petersberg tasks") at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. These crisis management tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat-force in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are since then devoted specifically to the CFSP. The new Treaty of Nice entered into force on 1 February 2003 and contains new CFSP provisions. It notably increases the areas which fall under qualified majority voting and enhances the role of the Political and Security Committee in crisis management operations. Political dialogue and diplomacy, Joint actions, common positions and common strategies are not analysed in this paper.

VII. Cyprus' EU Membership as a Catalyst for a Solution?

The EU offers the perfect opportunity for Turkey, Greece, Cyprus to take a step back (and forward) and rethink their positions *vis-a-vis* each other. Also it has an important role in creating an atmosphere to all parties involved using its measures and approach for possible progress in Cyprus problem.

As we already mentioned the main objectives of European unification is to ensure peace and political stability throughout the continent.

Since the Anan Plan, three years have gone by, there has been no move towards a solution. No sign of negotiations. The status quo remains and the dangers of the de facto partition becoming a permanent division are becoming greater day by day.

The European Union supports the Turkish Cypriot Community²⁴ in various ways: a) to end its isolation, b) to approach the European economic standards through financial support and facilitate the economic development c) to implement the *acquis communautaire*

²⁴ Turkish Cypriot Community Measures. <http://www.delcyp.cec.eu.int/>, <http://europa.eu.int/>,

Above all, the structure of the European Union, the institutions, and the Member States can work as pressure mechanisms for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus problem.

VIII. Possible positive outcomes of an EU solution

The reunification of the island would benefit greatly all Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in several factors. Economic activities, Tourism, Services, Industry, Agriculture, the living standard. At the same time not only the economy but also the identity, the culture and the cohesion of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community will be upgraded remarkably.

Cyprus will finally become a bridge between East and West, between Islam and the EU

The benefits for Turkey would be also Turkey's objective to join the EU, partly goes through Cyprus.²⁵ Even if Turkey implements the *acquis communautaire* successfully governments, this is still not enough. It must overcome the anxieties and objections of many of the EU inhabitants and convince them that they have nothing to fear from Turkey joining.

The solution of the Cyprus problem with the help and support of Turkey will be a decisive factor in convincing people that Turkey can be trusted; that with Turkey as a member, the Union will be disproportionately stronger.

²⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theories of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979)

EPILOGUE

If we want find a workable solution obviously we need to start negotiations²⁶. For the time being this looks difficult. Such an initiative would involve a number of steps which could lead to a reversal of the present negative climate.

If negotiations will start again under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union and with good will, it could lead to a mutually agreed solution. As a result, the image of Turkey in the EU will substantially improve. It will convey the message that Turkey do not wish to use their military and economic power to impose their will. On the contrary, they are interested in creating conditions of peaceful coexistence with all neighboring states and people. Turkey will not only win the battle of impressions but, more important, will secure its future accession to the Union.

The division of Cyprus into a Greek and a Turkish community has been one of the most difficult issues to solve in the EU. A possible solution of the Cyprus issue will offer more changes for accession and provide the space to carry on with the necessary reforms

Special Adviser on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto told the Security Council: *“The people had at last decided for themselves. Their decision, on each side, must be respected. While the ultimate outcome of the effort of the past four and a half years had not been a success, a great deal had nevertheless been achieved. Those achievements should be built on, and a number of elements put in place, to keep alive the prospects of reconciliation and reunification in the future.”*

As to a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Secretary-General said *“it also needs bold and determined political leadership on both sides in the island, as well as in Greece and Turkey, all in place at the same time, ready to negotiate with determination and to convince their people of the need to compromise”*.

²⁶ William J. Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict,” *American Political Science Review*, 88:1 (March 1994), pp. 14–32; Michael Mousseau, “Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts, 1816–1992,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42:2 (April 1998), pp. 210–230.

The European Union can help Cyprus to solve the problem, but finally any solution must be accepted by both sides the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots, because it is all about their past, their presents and their future.

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