

Agonism and Junta: Greece's Late Bourgeois Contribution to Public Sphere Discourse

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a model of the public sphere under conditions of dictatorship. I build on three pre-existing models: Jurgen Habermas' theory of the public sphere, Nancy Fraser's conception of multiple publics in response to the Habermas model, and finally Hannah Arendt's conception of the agonistic public sphere by way of the ancients.¹

In this introduction, I begin with a hypothetical portrait of democratic participation. I then move on to discuss the Habermasean perspective of the public sphere and Nancy Fraser's multiple publics critique. This will be followed by a discussion of Arendt's classical-based portrait of the public sphere, for descriptive purposes, with a focus on agonism. I will then present the historical case of Greece, as an empirical illustration of the hypothetical, as interpreted through the lenses of Habermas and Arendt and offer up a model of the public sphere, consequently, with distinct traits that will allow us to perceive of a departure from the presumptions imposed by normative accounts of public sphere in a non-authoritarian political environment. Finally I will suggest

¹ Habermas, Jurgen (Trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence): *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991; Fraser, Nancy: "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." In Calhoun, Craig (ed.): *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992, 109-142; Arendt, Hannah: *The Human Condition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958.

a model of the public sphere for authoritarian political environments that considers and challenges the multiple publics paradigm.

Let us begin with a protracted hypothetical scenario whose foundational imperative is the following: "A democratic society is not the only domain within which a public sphere can optimally function." I would continue the argument as follows:

The non-democratic state can also be the site where democratic participation occurs, or where the egalitarian realization of politicized communication and action with a view toward a democratic government may take shape. What I mean is, if democracy, with its implied universal enfranchisement and representative institutions, is the project of modernity, and modernity is the legacy of the Enlightenment, it may be a false distinction to separate the form and function of a democratic state from contained democratic participation on a smaller or lesser scale.

Multiple historical cases would remind us that it is the non-democratic state that gives rise to democratic mobilization, as in, to cite two landmark illustrations, France in the late eighteenth century, and Romania in the late twentieth. The *ancien regime* and authoritarian dictatorship both met their ends through a combination of elite driven and grass roots responses to failing non-democratic systems. The pre-World-War II era has delivered enough similar instances (Spain, Italy, Portugal, the Soviet Union, among others), and their cumulative effect

occasions the present discussion concerning the category of authoritarianism, which we can easily speak of in general terms. Authoritarian regimes share many distinct traits: a one-party state apparatus, reliance on the military, high statism, suppression of pluralism, lacking representation, repression of freedom of expression, to name but a few. What commonly follows under these circumstances, particularly if we allow ourselves to focus on the activities of resistance actors, is the search for and claiming of a venue for free expression, covertly, in fragments, wherever it finds ground enough to take root. In oppositional fashion, this movement may take on democratic characteristics, through an openness to participation and involving rational, strategic plans, with a view toward establishment of a fully democratic polity, in contradistinction to the failing accountability of the authoritarian regime. What may arise as a consequence is a growing legitimacy on the part of the resistance, whose responsiveness to the demands of popular will becomes tantamount to that of the regime in power.

A memorable case in point is that of General Charles De Gaulle, who served as interim president of France in 1944 and who founded the leading Gaullist party, both as direct results of the legitimacy established by the underground Free French movement, which de Gaulle organized and led. The logical conclusion to the normative scenario laid out herewith is that once the oppositional, or resistance, goals are attained and transition to

democratic institutionalization is accomplished, it is the democratic state, replete with accountability and responsiveness – both core constituents, that conceivably allows for its own improvement, in which case an engaged public sphere, or a more inclusive or perhaps autonomous civil society, can give rise to a deepening of those institutions with greater heterogeneous participation.

When institutional, structural, economic and ideological dimensions of democracy meet in a given polity, we can say that polity is "enlightened", it has been delivered, in broad terms, from the irrational to the rational, and it has most likely traveled a particular historical course – socially, economically and politically and with an embedded ideology – to arrive there. This is by and large true for advanced industrial or post-industrial democracies.

In broad terms, this is the project of modernity, and the earliest historical examples, which have been used as templates and grand bearers of the western standard, would include the original regions of the Enlightenment, namely, in Europe, France, Germany and Great Britain, and in the Americas, the United States. About peripheral, praetorian, or underdeveloped states outside of Europe, development models of liberal democracy and civil society appeal to similar reform, through either external pressure or internal pressure, or both. That has become the project of what is largely perceived to be late modern developments in the name of liberal democracies, now

the prevailing order in the developed world.

In another category, we have peripheral states on the Continent, which, with the ante upped, are members of the European Union but which have been until lately adamantly resistant to the legacy of the West, which possess pre-modern social traditions and non-conformist capitalist practices but advanced democratic-socialist constitutional institutions. Precarious as it was, this was the Greece of the late twentieth century, with one foot poised to imprint modernity, and the other hovering between antiquity and Byzantium, with pagan and Eastern definition. Such contradictory elements have defined Greece up to the recent decade, swift developments urged on by Maastricht standards notwithstanding. This is why Greece's public sphere has the privilege of legitimately falling within the theoretical domains of both the bourgeoisie formulation of Jurgen Habermas as introduced in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* and the agonistic configuration of Hannah Arendt as laid out in *The Human Condition*.

PART II: HABERMAS AND FRASER: SINGLE VS MULTIPLE PUBLICS

Jurgen Habermas' project with *Structural Transformation* was to hermeneutically document the rise and fall of the bourgeois public sphere in the Europe of the Enlightenment. This task derived from a restorative intent, illuminated by Habermas' admission that it was the style of liberal democracy under

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the Federal Republic of Germany that inspired the analysis – in Habermas' words, "to become clear myself about the dark sides and mistakes of our political system".² In tracing the structural effects of political and social change of an essential constituent of democratic societies over time, namely a freely accessible public sphere where consensus can be formed, Habermas, guided by philosophical debate, attempted to uncover the root causes of the problem. In arguing for a quasi-transcendental truth based on the structural process of rational, critical debate whose ends are the common good, Habermas traced the historical devolution of the ideal public sphere and argued that in late modernity individuals had been replaced by larger "private corporate bodies" which served as repositories of sorts of public opinion.³ These corporations, or mediated institutions, composing an "intermediate sphere,"⁴ in turn, stand to potentially represent the individual or a collectivity of individuals in the formation of consensus. As this would be the case in late capitalist societies, where institutions both are situated between and are of the public and private spheres, or state and society, Habermas nonetheless held out hope that such "power blocs" enabled by their corporate organization would serve as a viable substitute for the individual in negotiations bearing on democratic processes.

² Horster, Detlef: *Habermas: An Introduction*. (Trans.: Heidi Thompson) Philadelphia: Pennbridge Books, 1989, 83).

³ Habermas 1991, op. cit, 142.

⁴ Ibid., 176.

In much of the debate that has ensued since the English-language publication of *Structural Transformation*, the historical-structural component employed by Habermas has been elided, and with it a great deal of the peculiarity or integrity of the enterprise which largely occasioned the discussion in the first place. Yet nearly thirty years later, although some original substantive arguments have been revised, Habermas upheld the crucial saliency of historical and empirical analysis "not only of social movements but also of new crystallizations",⁵ justified by maintaining that the "structural transformation of the public sphere is embedded in the transformation of state and economy", the historical implications being clear.⁶

Habermas' philosophical contribution to a theorization of state and society has given rise to numerous accounts of various public spheres and their explicit characteristics given to specific time and place, which lead to reconfigurations and reconsiderations of the form and function of a public sphere.⁷ Along these lines, Habermas has lately conceded to the

⁵ Habermas, Jurgén: "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere". In Calhoun, op. cit., 472.

⁶ Ibid., 430.

⁷ See, for example, Craig Calhoun's edited volume, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, op. cit. Included are comparative essays which span various contexts: Michael Schudson on the American Case; Keith Michael Baker on France; David Zaret on England; as well as essays dealing with the public sphere and the media, the mass public and public discourse, among others.

multiplicity of public spheres, acting within or along side a public sphere of greater scope, taking into account the "dynamics of those *processes of communication* that are excluded from the dominant public sphere" (emphasis mine),⁸ substantively corroborating Fraser's post-bourgeois appreciation of multiple publics both in egalitarian and stratified societies.⁹ "It is wrong to speak of one single public," Habermas asserts, "even if we assume that a certain homogeneity of the bourgeois public enabled the conflicting parties to consider their class interest...as the basis for a consensus attainable at least in principle".¹⁰ Such an approach demands greater, detailed empirical focus on "internal differentiation" within the

⁸ Habermas 1994, op. cit., 425.

⁹ Fraser, op. cit.

¹⁰ Habermas 1994, op. cit., 424-425,

"homogenous" bourgeois public.¹¹

Nancy Fraser's urging on of Habermas's revision has been not insignificant, and yet the case made for multiple publics warrants assessment. What do we make of the disenfranchised, asks Fraser, who are barred participation in *the* public, despite official claims of democracy? Women, people of color, any group dispossessed in a post-bourgeois society with multicultural and pluralistic constituents, create their own publics, to negotiate, discuss, and debate issues of the public weal, suggests Fraser, and with that, we must take into account such publics as legitimate and as contestatory. The fragmentation of the public sphere would reflect, then, late capitalism's cultural and

¹¹ The philosophical foundations of this position are reliant upon recognition of difference. But while this recognition of plurality and variance may lead to the diminishment of the power and dynamics of dominating groups, when diversity rests, one might suggest that all fragments of a whole are similar in their ability to reveal a truth that at core holds the transcendent principle of sameness in that all can be reduced to zero, or, conversely, all can be adduced or elevated to transcendental truth. In this case, fragmentation in the service of multiple publics or one public yields similar logical conclusions. Arendt's reading of plurality, as "the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction.—" (Arendt, op. cit., 175) This reading of plurality negates the Habermasean conception of empirical plurality, and philosophically renders the empirical manifestation as meaningless, for it undermines the distinct character of multiple others in that "[i]f men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them." (*Ibid.*) For our purposes, however, let us sublimate the philosophical underpinnings to the empirical, which in the case of a historical hermeneutic must be the case since we wish to analyze what is observable.

economic fragmentation. As a result, Fraser calls into question the necessity or actuality of a singular, hegemonic public. An antidote to actually existing democracy that does not measure up, in Fraser's scenario, is a bargained-for equality along socialist lines of redistribution and recognition, the logic being that with economic parity comes an equally inclusive public sphere, for all to partake in regardless of station or status. Where cultural differences persist, though, subaltern publics, or a multiplicity of publics, would be desirable so as to facilitate various styles of discourse and different vernaculars of communication, without the threat of a masculineocentric bourgeois dominant public determining the style or content of deliberation. Finally, with a brief nod to cohesion, Fraser concedes that there will be "at least one public in which participants can deliberate as peers across lines of difference about policy that concerns them all."¹²

In my view, what subaltern, strong and weak, and multiple publics suggest is a variety of caucuses that break away from the public, to rally, plot, plan, strategize and perhaps concur on policy that at some point, if their voices are to be heard at all, must collectivize and re-enter *the* public to lobby and to influence decision-making at the legislative level. Without such re-entry fragmented publics remain ghettos, enclaves, which, despite their recognition of difference, would

¹² Fraser, *op. cit.*, 127.

just be pockets of identity.

What Fraser did not problematize, and what I see as an oversight in her theory, is the presence of cross-cutting cleavages in post-industrial, post-material, post-bourgeois, multicultural societies. In segmented societies, such as Belgium, for example, which has accommodated the overt cultural and linguistic interests of French-speaking Walloons, Flemish-speaking urbanites, cosmopolitan Brusselites and a small German-speaking population, by granting autonomy to the four regions, cross-cutting cleavages are somewhat diminished. But where societies are amalgams of pluralist and shifting identities, such as in Germany, for example, whose central government despite representation of the *laander*, or states (whose boundaries are not drawn based on cultural or linguistic or gender-based distinctions), in an upper house, nonetheless governs the sum of all parts with little or no autonomy granted to the *laander*, cross-cutting cleavages are indeed present. At the level of political parties, Germany has largely ameliorated the problem with the catch-all parties of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, sometimes in grand coalition, though the 1998 election brought to power through coalition the Green Party, which claimed to address the specific environmental problems of post-industrial German citizens eligible to vote. Unless a polity wishes to risk political segmentation to the extreme degree of secession based on Romantic ideas of nationalism, as we have witnessed with the break-up of Yugoslavia, the liberal democrat's ideal

type is a happily functioning pluralist society. And yet, multiple publics would indeed separate societies if left without an anchor, that anchor being a looming aspiration, a concerted understanding of belonging to the/a polity at large.

Let caucuses bloom, but let them bloom in the spirit of cooperation toward the commonweal, toward making inroads with government and policy formation. If subaltern publics hold to their "dual character," as Fraser suggests, to "function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment" as well as "bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics",¹³ the inference, though it is not spelled out in Fraser's scenario, is that one day they will become part of a wider public, with policy-making influences. My point is that if publics are to be fragmented, how does their fragmentation accommodate multiple interests of, let's say, one individual, without the absurd possibility of "public hopping"? I merely suggest that, in full wit of Fraser's philosophical justification of socialist equality and recognition of difference vis-a-vis her argumentation for multiple publics, no matter how a public is sliced or partitioned, we cannot overlook the fact that, in the final analysis, cooperation must be met in some gathering of the waters if the decisions made in separate publics are to become normalized or institutionalized, which is the point

¹³ Ibid., 124.

of deliberation, after all.

A consequent problematic arises: What is the public? Habermas never intended, I am sure, for a public sphere to engage all citizens at all times. Did Habermas intend the public to be *accessible* to all citizens at all times? Ideally, yes. Should there be a *desire ipso facto* on the part of a civically minded person to partake in deliberation in the public sphere? The normative response would be, yes, we should desire to participate in politics in whatever form, despite gargantuan hurdles posed by government opacity, co-optation, corruption, apathy, issue complexity, etc. But, what is to be done when these obstacles become insurmountable and the public sphere breaks down? What are the options available to regain or initiate civil society?

Let me for a moment highlight two of these hurdles: government opacity and apathy. Voter and participatory apathy, despite a lively press, among the electorate in the United States is well known – turnout for presidential elections are notoriously below 50%. While there is no shortage of lobbyists, political action committees, a free press of any stripe and a constitutionally guaranteed freedom to assemble, rather than participate, those of us who have lived for any extended period of time in the United States know that it is just as easy to throw up our hands over the lack of distinguishable choices on the ballots and not vote. And the US is an advanced industrial

democracy, with guaranteed freedom of expression. We could lament our system *ad infinitum* without reaching a consensus as to how these problems are to be solved.

At the other end of the "enfranchisement" spectrum, let us consider authoritarian situations, where apathy is imposed. That is to say, expression, assembly, participation is limited to the kind approved by government. When a population is begging for participation that is barred them, what are the options? What are the implications for public sphere theorizing? One option in a closed society is to remove itself from the territorial boundaries circumscribing a *de facto* polity and move it elsewhere: a public sphere that has got up and went. I speak of an authoritarian situation where the public sphere is so dominated by inequality that it shuts down completely, in which case what we have is a public without a sphere. What would a public without a sphere look like?

A public without a sphere would look like Greece from 1967-74, when it became a one-party state, reliant on the military, with imposed censorship and punishment of oppositional actors. We can begin to envision the character of the Greek public sphere by turning to Hannah Arendt. I turn to this intervention because it helps to describe Greek public sphere dynamics, in terms of space, style and egalitarianism of participation, and we can then proceed to the model suggested in the title of this paper – how Greece coped with a sphere that shut down.

AGONISM – DE-SCRIBING THE SPHERE

Where Habermas largely relies on the development of western politics and society from the point of the Enlightenment, Arendt turns to antiquity and the philosophical foundations of Plato and Aristotle. In this respect, Arendt undertakes to capture the spirit of communication and action, and rationality, of antiquity and relate it to the modern world, in full recognition that the subject within modernity's world view has changed. Arendt circumscribes her discussion of the public sphere by the larger philosophical framework of the *vita activa*, which she argues comprises the three fundamental human activities of labor, work and action, with action defined as "activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things", and which is linked directly to political thought,¹⁴ implicitly acknowledging the Aristotelian dictum distinguishing man as political animal. Arendt then introduces the concept of contemplation through Plato's placement of contemplation in a superior relationship to action, which for Plato justifies the philosopher's way of life in the polis. *Vita activa*, then, is infused with the concept of *vita contemplativa* – "its very restricted dignity is bestowed upon it because it serves the needs and wants of contemplation in a living body".¹⁵

¹⁴ Arendt, op. cit, 7.

¹⁵ Ibid., 16.

Consequently, Arendt argues, *vita activa* is "neither superior nor inferior to the central concerns of the *vita contemplativa*".¹⁶ On the other side of action lies speech, which Arendt plays not against action but alongside it. Speech, unlike contemplation, is not internal to action; it is rather an external complement without which action loses its meaning. Speech and action underwrite otherness among men and enable men to distinguish themselves publicly: "[w]ith word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world."¹⁷ Since "[t]he realm of human affairs...consists of the web of human relationships which exists wherever men live together,"¹⁸ human action must contain the speech act in the service of revelation if man is to announce "who" he is in relation to others. Action, therefore, is distinct from fabrication and is by nature operative in the community (society) and not in isolation.

¹⁶ Ibid., 17. Arendt discusses the relationship between thinking and contemplation wherein thinking leads to contemplation which is in the pursuit of truth. Thinking, nonetheless, involves an internal dialogue, where one side of the soul speaks to the other, thereby rendering speech an internal component of thinking. Thinking, also, is considered activity, although there is no outward manifestation to be recorded. Where the process of thinking is linked to *homo faber* in the making of the world, contemplation lies within a more pristine non-instrumental position. When, in her conclusion, Arendt suggests that when action is reduced to zero, we are left with thinking, there is ambiguity as to whether she is referring to thinking as fabricating, thinking as a means to contemplation, or whether she changes the meaning of thinking to that of contemplation. This is a problematic that lies outside the scope of this paper.

¹⁷ Ibid., 176.

¹⁸ Ibid., 183.

PART III: THE MODERN GREEK CASE – INTRODUCTION

A secondary purpose of this paper is to try to recapture the methodological elements in tracing changes in structure of the public sphere, not in the originating regions of the Enlightenment, but in modern Greece, which belatedly experienced the ideological and political-economic effects of modernity. Better defined, I am referring to the Greek political environment which was semi-peripheral and in certain respects pre-modern, given its late bourgeois development and marginal industrialization in some measure as a consequence of Ottoman dominance in the region. In this respect, the Greek public sphere bears traits that in some ways are ideal by Habermasian and Arendtian standards but in other ways depart into modifications of the ideal, particularly during the period of authoritarian rule between 1967 and 1974. The modern Greek public sphere, at least tentatively, can be considered largely unfragmented – or if this is too dramatic an argument, at least we can argue that Greece had a dominant public sphere. This thesis considers Greece's relative homogeneity of population with the frustrated development of minority consciousness or access and latent participation by women in the public sphere. ¹⁹

¹⁹ The women's movement after the dictatorship was tied intrinsically to political parties and largely consolidated under the government of socialist prime minister Andreas Papandreu, whose then-wife Margaret Papandreu led the movement. This phenomenon parallels the politicization and organization of women by Eva Peron, alongside the political enfranchisement of unions by Peron. I address this subject more fully in a later section of this paper.

HOMOGENEITY — REAL OR IMAGINED

What distinguishes Greece from its European neighbors west of the Danube, besides the obvious linguistic and ethnic manifestations of difference, is its historical past. Tempting as it is to glorify demographic homogeneity, as have recent governments who turn to the constitution which posits Greek the national language and Orthodoxy the dominant religion, Greece's heritage, contrary to the popular imaginary, is not homogenous. Alexandrian conquests of the East (bringing "barbarians" into the fold of Hellenism), North African correspondence (incorporating principles of Egyptian art into the classical program) and the more recent migration of Slavophones in the northern Greek region of Macedonia (approximately 50,000, about 5,000 of whom claim a non-Greek identity), or a Turkish and/or Muslim minority in the eastern region of Thrace largely deprived of upholding their own culture and language in public institutions, in the aggregate are evidence enough to dispute arguments in favor of homogeneity. Add to that growing enclaves in Athens of immigrants from the south and east and it is more than apparent that the denizens of Greece are anything but homogenous. And yet there is a complicated game played in Greek society which seems to magnify Greekness over otherness, Greekness being tied to a bloodline or sensibility that heralds some kind of legacy that is great and ancient, that twists glimmering strands of "non-Greek" tradition into a golden braid of pride in Greek language, religion, food, chaos, hedonism, order, rationality and the Acropolis.

To be Greek in modern Greece is to speak the language and abide by its religious prescripts. Furthermore, anyone of Greek parentage, living outside of Greece, can be granted citizenship. Even if we take this as a false leveller, the majority of the Greek population has been *conditioned* homogeneously. Paradoxically, however, its cultural traditions and economic structure have been shaped by non-indigenous experiences. From the sociologist's perspective, as Constantine Tsoucalas has argued, "the undoubted fact is that the origins of the modern social and economic structure are deeply rooted in the long period of Ottoman rule".²⁰

HISTORICAL RECESSES and SOCIOLOGICAL PROCESSES OF IDENTITY FORMATION

Anti-mercantilist Ottoman ideology enabled Greeks, Jews and Armenians to monopolize business life, particularly in Constantinople where bankers and merchants, known as Phanariots, gained control of economic transactions and participated in the political and administrative spheres both in the capital and in the provinces, where they also played key roles in government.²¹ After the middle of the eighteenth century, the growth of the bourgeoisie was brought about through the predominant role Greeks played in commercial, entrepreneurial and maritime activities,

²⁰ *The Greek Tragedy*, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969, 15.

²¹ This section is drawn largely from *ibid.*, chapters 1-2.

who in turn were instrumental in the independence movement in 1821. After independence, the semi-feudal system remained, and the land once held by Turkish feudal lords passed into the hands of local chiefs and notables but transformation of the socioeconomic structures was slow. It was only after 1860, when economic control was ended, that a new political consciousness emerged along with capitalist development, leading to the creation of a rising bourgeoisie. Greek-owned capital was invested in the country, attracting Greeks abroad, particularly from Constantinople and other large cities of the Ottoman Empire. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the political structure of Greece was altered by the rise the middle class, made up of industrial and financial bourgeoisie, who backed the liberal movement in politics, while the old ruling class and large landowners backed conservative trends. The taxation system remained organized on a feudal basis, which was indirect and not egalitarian with no property or income tax. With this poll tax, the liberal state fell, as did the liberal bourgeoisie's first attempt to take over and create a modern state.

Tax increases on essential goods around the time of the military revolt of 1909 put a heavy burden on workers and the middle classes who began to organize in commercial guilds and unions, demanding a system of progressive income taxation and the protection of production. Along with this came calls for agrarian reform of the estate system, inherited from the Turks, leading to violent peasant revolts. The elections of 1910

brought to power the Liberal Party of Eleftherios Venizelos, which with the input of bourgeois intellectuals, would try to construct a modern democracy on the Western European model, correcting the pre-existing social problems. With the first World War, Venizelos, who had pursued extra-parliamentary opposition out of office, came into direct conflict with the King, who sided with the Germans, until finally forces emerged so strongly against the King that he abdicated, bringing Venizelos to power again in 1917 and with it Greece's close relations to the Allies, especially Britain, lasting until the middle of the 20th century and characterizing Greece's semi-peripheral position in relation to powers on the continent.

This thumbnail sketch of the formation of the Greek bourgeoisie provides the necessary backdrop to more recent characteristics of Greek society which recall and institutionalize the Ottoman past, as well as the familial ties, that have persisted in interpersonal as well as business relations, frustrating until recently the normative tenets of free-market capitalism. While preserving the autonomy and individualism involved in the free-market enterprise that underwrites liberal capitalism, Greeks in modern society forfeited the responsibility that would accompany the capitalist *system* for more traditional, entrenched practices based on the gentleman's agreement and kinship associations predominantly **in** petty transactions, which have been the bread and butter of Greek

capitalism.²² "The 'people,'" Tsoucalas argued in the late 1960's, at the time of the junta, "consist of a mass of individuals indiscriminately seeking to promote their interests, to materialize their desires, to protect their havens, and to pursue their comparative advantages."²³

One might call this individualism virtuous, as it certainly lies within the program of modernity in the West. But in the Greek case, individualism, which Dorothy Lee wrongly correlated with the practice of *philotimo*, or "love of honor", nonetheless gave rise to "irresponsibility toward the collectivity, the law and others".²⁴ At cross purposes was the individualism bound up in "free-riding" capitalism, and the more correct tenet of *philotimo* which is rooted in group associations to which Greeks belong, be it either familial or related to the village or workplace, and within which system the Greek has a meager conception of the Western notion of privacy. Pollis has argued that the Greek need to prevent his or her *philotimo* from being molested within the group on the larger social scale provided the foundation for

²² About one-third of the active population is independently employed, and many are employed in firms with less than 50 workers.

²³ Tsoucalas, *op. cit.*, 199.

²⁴ Lee, Dorothy: *Freedom and Culture*, 141-153; Tsoucalas, "Free Riders in Wonderland; or, Of Greeks in Greece," In: Dimitri Conostas and Theofanis G. Stavrou (eds.): *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*. Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 191-219, 199.

an authoritarian political system in Greece.²⁵ Lee argued that loyalty in personal relations were paramount to any loyalty to the state, seen by the Greek as an abstraction and therefore impersonal, "external to the organic, structured whole".²⁶ But the way in which *philotimo* is protected is through *couvenda*, or conversation, as Pollis puts it, a softer version of armed tribal warfare, which is the mainstay of Greek culture and social relations. This remains very true today.

In examining the relationship between speech and action, reinvented in modern Greek society as the concepts of *couvenda* and *philotimo*, Arendt's classical perspective of the public sphere comes into play. Arendt's thesis is that "speech is what makes man a political being" and that through speech *and* action "men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct".²⁷ Speech and action for Arendt are mutually acquainted, interdependent, and not causal in relationship but rather rest on the same plane. Speech and action confluently contribute to the idea of the "agonal spirit", characterized as "the passionate

²⁵ Pollis, Adamantia: "Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self." In the *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, March, 29-47. This is part of Pollis' larger discussion of the Greek conception of self and its political implications, which wittingly or not proved a harbinger of the dictatorship two years later.

²⁶ Lee, op. cit., 149.

²⁷ Arendt, op. cit., 3, 176.

drive to show *one's self* in measuring up against others that underlies the concept of politics prevalent in the city states".²⁸ The paradigmatic entailment of publicity, space and power permeate the Arendtian conception of the public sphere, where the *polls occasions* and *facilitates* the distinguishing of self in public, remedies the futility of action and speech and serves as witness to deeds.²⁹

PARTICIPATION – REPLACING THE POLIS IMAGINARY WITH THE AGORA IMAGINARY

The modern-day analogue to the "polis imaginary" is what I would like to term the "agora imaginary", deriving from very *practical* roots.³⁰ The "agora imaginary", which allows a more casual participation in the agonistic ritual, is distinct from the polis imaginary of antiquity which is to a greater degree reliant upon contemplation and the life of the mind, and referring to Plato's conception of the polis, the domain of philosophers. Whether it take shape in a public park, a town square, a marketplace or corner coffee shops, testimony to the idea and the manifestation of agora can be found in present-day Greece. There are nonetheless similarities between the polis

²⁸ Ibid., 194.

²⁹ Ibid., 196.

³⁰ The crystallization of distinctions between the polis imaginary and the agora imaginary have been assisted by way of Gillian Robinson: "Why Rehabilitate the Greeks?: Ethics, Politics and Modernity," *Thesis Eleven*, Number 41, 1995, 54-75.

imaginary and agora imaginary, where in the context of cultural discourse, Greek styles of communication in and around the language itself have upheld a continuity dating to antiquity. In the area of interpersonal communication, the force of the better argument *and* the distinguishing of the self in public combine in a kind of *politicized communicative-agonistic ritual*. Histrionic and ardent in style, this form of expression is the germ of full-scale street demonstrations and strikes, an unusually regular phenomenon in the Greece of today, heightening the politicization in more demonstrable ways.³¹ Funerals of prominent personalities in Greek affairs have occasioned massive turnouts of mourners, crowding the streets and squares. During the regime of the colonels, the funeral march memorializing George Papandreou, the last prime minister before the dictatorship, became the venue for the celebration of democracy under the eye of the authoritarian

³¹ Neni Panourgia has argued contrarily, that the agonistic street demonstrations since approximately 1978 have been transferred to the soccer arena. She writes that "[m]ore young people and many more women started going to the soccer matches, and by the mid-1980s the soccer field, not the political rally and demonstration, was the only place where youth fervor could be found concentrated. Even the music from the old Theodorakis song 'It's Two of Us, It's Three of Us, It's a Thousand Thirteen of Us,' previously sung during demonstrations accompanied by police beatings and smoke bombs..., is now the greeting anthem of [sports spectators] and hooligans alike of all teams, again accompanied by police beatings and sometimes smoke bombs to quell civic disobedience.... Thus this vital part of political resistance has been reimagined along the lines of challenging the civic order." Panourgia, Neni: *Fragments of Death, Fables of Identity: An Athenian Anthropography*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, p. 50.

regime, as was the funeral of Alexandros Panagoulis, the attempted assassin of junta leader Colonel George Papadopoulos.

One regularly encounters in Athens, Thessaloniki, or any village, a convergence of discussants when the sun is fullest. At each respective town square, or *plateia*, these agora meetings mark a circadian exchange of information of the public domain and a *demonstration* of observably ardent *debate*. As with film-maker Theo Angelopoulos' travelling players, who materialize on various manifestations of the Greek landscape, recitations of highlights from the Greek drama inform polemics which generally aim to understand the present political predicament, whatever it might be. In the telling of these stories, through speech and action, man, in Arendtian fashion, contributes to his mortality and reifies the stories of those who came before him, enlivening social interaction and therefore politics. The crystallization of consensus to a greater degree is realized in the context of organizations. Such organizational political activities include those of government-consolidated unions, student political bodies through street demonstrations, as well as sectoral interest-groups. Concerning the informal, casual type, anecdotal evidence may serve to illuminate the customary phenomenon of agora discussion. By emphasizing their customary character, I wish to highlight their very habitual nature, which as well activates and enlivens the public sphere. Despite the traditional gender exclusivity of agora communication, a woman scholar when

approaching a Thessaloniki group at Aristotelous Square in August 1990, the day following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was welcomed to the discussion,³² and conversation, or *couvenda*, now included simply one more opinion. The displayed openness and regard for serious dialogue in an inter-gendered way in the traditionally male-centered *agora* reflected a positive change since the repression bred against all forms of free communication during the junta.

PART V: PRE-JUNTA PROTRACTED CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

If we can separate out, for a moment, the role of the public sphere, its routine activity and liveliness, and focus on the elite structure of the Greek state leading up to the dictatorship, we can appreciate the interactions of civil society

³²

I must mention the bourgeois and plebian categories of class represented in this discussion, a predominant characteristic of agora communication in Greece where class takes a secondary importance to village, workplace or neighborhood affiliations. My gender-specific "comrades in arms" present at this discussion were two other women, an old Methuselah, dressed in the traditional black swathing worn by widows, who sat on the ground, smoking her filterless cigarettes and punctuating the discussion with swings of her cane, sometimes striking the trousered leg of a discussant with whom she disagreed. The other woman present sat quietly on the park bench, nodding in agreement while more intense concentration was focused on her knit-one, purl-two enterprise, which rested on her ample lap.

and government, the interlocking dynamics of two realms of a polity. By 1952, Greek society had become polarized between rightists and Communists, through the experience of World War II and the subsequent civil war (1943-49), which yielded the monarchists as victors. The ensuing constitutional framework failed to ameliorate those polarizations and points to the problems of elite authoritarianism within the Greek state, which remained unresolved until 1974, after the dictatorship.

Greece under the constitution of 1952 was a crowned democracy. Theoretically, this meant that the king in the spirit of democracy should be held accountable to his parliament, although the person of the king enjoyed a status that was "unimpeachable". The king along with parliament possessed legislative power, although the king was mandated to "exercise this right through his ministers [cabinet]" (Articles 22-23).³³ The king was vested with executive power, exercised by his ministers, who in turn were appointed by the king (Articles 27, 31), although the king was mandated to be held not responsible for his actions as his ministers were vested with the proxy of

³³ All references to the 1952 constitution derive from *Constitution of Greece, January 1, 1952* [in English] in Peaslee, Amos J. (prepared by Dorothy Peaslee Xydis): *Constitutions of Nations*. Volume III – Europe (Third Edition). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, 403-427.

All references to the 1986 constitution derive from *The Constitution of Greece* [in English] in Blaustein, Albert P. and Gisbert H. Flanz: *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1988, 1-50.

responsibility (Article 29). The constitution did not mandate that the king shall appoint as prime minister the leader of the party holding absolute majority in parliament. Nor did it mandate the king to assign a party with relative majority to try to form a government. By the foregoing constitutional logic, the king enjoyed and was protected by a circular, exclusive and elite legitimacy. Since the letter of the law was not explicit in terms of the right of parliament to recommend ministers to the king for appointment, the king was not obliged to be held accountable to parliament in the choosing of his ministers. "Stacking the deck", as it were, was, by the letter of the law, feasible and a loose matter subject to interpretation, although such practice would conceivably violate the spirit of the constitution. Thus began a potential for protracted constitutional crisis – given the ambiguities in the text – and a lacking constitutionalism.

Vassiliki Leontari has mapped out the dilemmas of constitutionalism in Greece leading to the dictatorship by emphasizing the ambiguity of the dual executive – the king and the cabinet – as mandated in the 1952 constitution, created by and serving the interests of the right.³⁴ The executive was entitled to appropriate a large part of legislative power. In

³⁴ "The Legal Basis of the Coup d'Etat in Greece (April 1967)". MA thesis, the New School for Social Research, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, 1994.

authorizing the king to issue legislative decrees "for the settlement of exceptionally urgent matters" (Article 35), the power of the parliament as a legislative body was duly eliminated in favor of the king and a special parliamentary committee which functioned as an autonomous legislative body.³⁵ Leontari notes that the executive power belonged to the king but was "exercised by the appropriate ministers who were both appointed and dismissed by him."³⁶ Leontari argues that the role of king, as a symbolic executive who nonetheless appointed ministers, who in turn were obliged to mandate his legislative decrees, resulted in both a crisis of political institutions and a violation of the constitution. Whether or not this was indeed a violation of the constitution, or just the due result of a badly conceived constitution, given the vagueness of the mandate concerning parliamentary recommendations for cabinet positions, is debatable. However, the first assessment of Leontari is correct – a crisis of political institutions became more and more patent as the king repeatedly abused his powers, and, as I should like to argue, violated the spirit of the constitution.

Under the 1952 constitution, King Paul, as the king-as-symbol, *status coronae*, acted as king-as-leader, *status regni*, recalling the constitutional systematization formulated by

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

medieval English jurists.³⁷ Furthermore, the king held absolutist powers, as a *primus solus*, a worse crime for a modern nation-state to bear. By Sartori's measure of power sharing within a parliamentary system, the head of government, or the prime minister, rather than the king or president, would be the empowered body within the core authority structure, enjoying privilege to recommend to the president both the appointment and dismissal of ministers. Under the 1952 Greek constitution, the king effectively assumed the role of the prime minister as first above unequals, appointing both cabinet and prime ministers.³⁸

The most emblematic problematic created by the king's dual role as crown and leader was his appointment of Premier Alexandros Papagos' successor upon Papagos' death in 1955. The king, ignoring the mandate of the party holding majority in parliament, appointed Constantine Karamanlis as successor, who had been suggested and indeed was favored by the American government for his cooperation with US economic and military interests in the southern Mediterranean.³⁹ Ten years later, the

³⁷ Lane, Jan-Erik: *Constitutions and Political Theory*. Manchester University Press, 1996, 21.

³⁸ Sartori, Giovanni: *Comparative Constitutional Engineering* (second edition). New York University Press, 1997, 102-103.

³⁹ S. Linardatos: *Apo ton Emphylio sti Junta 1949-1967* [From the Civil War to the Junta, 1949-1967], Athens: Papazisis, 1986, 382. (As cited in Leontari, op. cit., 12.)

young King Constantine II⁴⁰ repeated his father's, King Paul, gesture, replacing the successor to Prime Minister George Papandreou, who himself resigned over the king's appointment of the minister of defense, whom Papandreou opposed. Papandreou had sought the post, which in addition to his premiership, would have enabled him to reform the military and its command structure. The army had considered itself the keeper of national values in the face of what was perceived as a communist threat – even more so since the Communist Party had been outlawed since 1947 and their underground activity could only be speculated upon. The prevailing attitude of the army toward its own political function relied upon the ideological legacy of the civil war, where communists were outrightly and popularly vilified over their guerrilla campaign to abolish the monarchy and form a republic, which they duly lost. This ongoing and polarizing right-left split in the popular imagination of Greeks, played out in the arena of elitist politics yet underscored by mobilization at the base,⁴¹ was only resolved, as Constantine Tsoucalas has persuasively argued, by the "democratic 'rupture' leading to an ideological polycentrism" that came with end of the colonels'

⁴⁰ Constantine was aged 24 upon his crowning in 1964.

⁴¹ On mass mobilization being an indicator of mass polarization, see Kalyvas, Stathis N.: "Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK's First Four Years, 1981-1985," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol 23.1 (1997), 83-104, particularly 89-91.

Tenure in 1974.⁴²

Center Unionist George Papandreou was not least among the antagonists of the political and constitutional order still dominated by the office of the king. Following the fall of his premiership, a series of short-term governments followed, introducing a period of protracted instability. The king during this period (1965-67) strategically attempted to weaken parliament by repeatedly appointing and dismissing prime ministers from the Center Union Party, which had become split by the "apostates", rather than calling for new elections.⁴³ Parliament avoided taking issue with this practice, and in the absence of a Constitutional Court, the king's actions went unchallenged until George Papandreou in 1967 advocated a new electoral law to bring an end to the ongoing political crisis. Elections were scheduled to take place in May of 1967, with the agreement and under the caretaker government of Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, who had taken over the leadership of the National Radical Union of Karamanlis upon Karamanlis' self-imposed exile in 1963.

⁴² Tsoucalas, Constantine, "The Ideological Impact of the Civil War." In Iatrides, John O. (ed.): *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*. Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1981, 319-341, 341.

⁴³ Clogg, *op. cit*, 161-162. Also, Katsoudas, Dimitrios K.: *The Constitutional Framework*: in Featherstone, Kevin and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (eds.) *Political Change in Greece*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987, 14-33, particularly 18.

Meanwhile, the younger Andreas Papandreu, a minister in his father's government, had been accused of spearheading a leftist conspiratorial plot within the army, known as *Aspida* (Shield), as against the right-wing movement within the army known as IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers), an organized brotherhood of sorts dating from World War II. It followed, then, that the young King Constantine refused George Papandreu's bid for the ministry of defense on the grounds that his own son was under investigation. Subsequently Papandreu resigned from his post as prime minister, leaving Kanellopoulos, appointed by the King, in his stead. As the May 1967 elections loomed, a debate over parliamentary immunity of Andreas Papandreu, so he might be tried for treason over the alleged *Aspida* plot, brought down the Kanellopoulos government, and Kanellopoulos in turn was appointed by the King to oversee the elections. It was here, on April 21, 1967, precluding elections, which were predicted to have been won by George Papandreu, that the colonels stepped in and occupied their own country by a NATO designed military putsch.

The following year, under the colonels, a new constitution was promulgated, approved by referendum, which was duly rigged, establishing a "crown parliamentary democracy", although parliament remained suspended, preserving the monarchy but stripping it of its powers. In 1973 the monarchy was abolished and constitutional amendments executed by the dictatorship regime were enacted making Greece a "presidential parliamentary

democracy" with Colonel Papadopoulos, one of the original three putschists, as president. A few months later, a second coup occurred, abrogating the earlier arrangement. This eleventh-hour constitutional change, months before the fall of the junta, represents a key link to the post-junta constitution of 1975.

PART VI: RECASTING THE PUBLIC SPHERE – DICTATORSHIP AND
MOVEMENT OF THE SPHERE

The military coup of April 21, 1967, brought to Greece seven years of rule by force, including strict censorship, poll rigging, the banning of political parties and trade unions, involuntary exile, house arrests, imprisonment and torture, as well as the suspension of constitutional rights. The unfree political environment eradicated any potential for democracy to exist and thereby rendered proponents of democracy to find outlets for such expression outside of the purview of the regime. This search for expression led to a *double dynamic* which *functionalized the private sphere as a more subversive realm and reterritorialized and radicalized the public realm*. Public activity antithetical to the regime underwent an *internalization into the private* and an *externalization outside the territorial confines of the nation*, into vast exile, into free spaces of the diaspora.

In living rooms and private offices, around kitchen tables, within the confines of prison camps, Greek met Greek with stealthy messages, wrote samizdat, colluded, or agreed to

patiently await the storm of the colonels whose days were numbered. Such covert activity implies secrecy, to cover, to protect, and within this province we may submit the privacy of secrecy not only to interior spaces but to the more public venue of literary enterprises, where tacit messages would be understood by only those who were ideologically keyed in to know. In this vein, the once pluralistic popular press ordered under the Press Law of the colonels to publish only official pronouncements and news not unfavorable to the regime, practiced subversions of its own. One newspaper regularly published the official stories of the day but in the same font and typeset usually reserved for obituaries. Literary texts metaphorically parodied the story of Greece under the colonels, and one prominent resistance anthology carried the simple title *Eighteen Texts*, reflecting the government mandate that titles directly describe the contents of a book. One of its entries, "The Cast" by Thanasis Valtinos, detailed the story of a protagonist who, after being hospitalized for a small injury, is eventually smothered by his own cast, satirizing the pronouncement of junta leader George Papadopoulos that Greece was a patient in a plaster cast, needing repair.'*^

The bibliography on the junta and resistance to it is burgeoning; for a starter, see Syrrakos, Barbara: *Aspects of 'Free Voice of Greece'*. Master's Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1993.

Outside of Greece, the resistance/opposition campaign was centered around political leaders, activists, intellectuals and journalists, through lobbying efforts, propaganda, public rallies in European and North American capitals, radio programs and the publication of books, anthologies, broadsides and periodicals. Deutsche Welle, and the BBC editorialized against the junta. WBAI and WEVD in New York ran a radio program, "Free Voice of Greece", for the duration of the dictatorship, featuring interviews with politicians such as Andreas Papandreu, poets, journalists, musicians, students, writers, and intellectuals, as well as editorials, advocating a return to democracy in Greece. In London, Helen Vlachou, a Greek newspaper publisher who fled Athens rather than bow to printing the official line, was an active publisher and advocate there, whose "Free Greek Voices" anthology (1971) memorializes the many individuals for whom Greece was not Greece without its democratic institutions. *In exile, the Greek public sphere flourished as a more participatory public sphere, incorporating Greeks by extension.* This is to say that women, foreign-born Greeks and "radicals", primarily communists – parties theretofore exempted from sharing in the political process formally or informally in Greece – gained entry into the debate about Greece which was predicated on an unwritten *consensus* to oppose dictatorial rule and replace it with a democratic system of governance.

The Greek public sphere in exile filled a void in domestic Greek affairs where organized opposition to the dictatorship was impossible due to censorship and the illegality of a multi-party system, punishable by torture, imprisonment or exile. The fragmented opposition in exile represented a "melting pot" of sorts for the playing out of opposition while maintaining its domestic Greek character, along partisan lines but with the common goal of unhorsing the enemy. In the end, we can say the exile activity *represented* the majority of Greek interests in Greece, which not without nostalgic overtones were interests bound to a democratic heritage. Whether the demise of the colonels rested upon popular disaffection with the regime after the Polytechnic uprising of 1973 where military tanks stormed the university gates, crushing unarmed students, or after the regime's attempted coup on Cyprus in 1974, sparking Turkish invasion of the island and partition, we cannot definitively say at this moment. But, more germane to this thesis is the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Greece after the dictatorship, legitimated by universal suffrage, a referendum ending the monarchy and amendment of the Greek constitution in 1975, whose patrimony is embedded in the present. We can say, therefore, that the political program represented by the resistance, both internal and external – a democratic program – transferred to Greece proper with the end of the dictatorship. The Greek public sphere that got up and went became the Greek public sphere of the legitimate democratic government in 1974.

There was no fragmentation, only movement. It is key to be reminded that the leaders of the exile resistance, Andreas Papandreou, Constantine Mitsotakis, and Constantine Karamanlis, to name a few elites, became the arbiters in post-junta Greece of democratic reform. How did democratic reform play out in post-junta Greece? Let us return to a survey of the institutions.

PART VII: PUBLIC SPHERE RETURNS HOME AFTER A TOUR ABROAD;
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND REFORM

On July 23, 1974, the dictatorial regime surrendered, and Karamanlis was flown in from Paris to Athens, where he was sworn in as prime minister by the president of the republic, General Phaedon Gizikis. On August 1, Karamanlis issued the first Constitutional Act of his new premiership, restoring the legality of the 1952 constitution, although the question of crowned democracy would be put to referendum. This was not a revisionary act. The Council of Ministers of the government were given constituent powers until convocation of the national assembly. Dimitrios Katsoudas keenly assesses the ensuing problems over the restoration of constitutional legality, jumping over the hump, as it were, of the constitution of the colonels, falsely legitimated through coaxed popular sovereignty, yet the regime was duly "legitimated" by its swearing in by King Constantine in April 1967. Katsoudas observes that Karamanlis took his own oath from

the president, thereby acknowledging the junta's presidential constitution and not the '52 crown constitution. If legality had returned, as Karamanlis claimed, only the king could have sworn him in. Furthermore, the '52 constitution mandated only a revisionary parliament through recourse to the people, not a constituent parliament, prohibiting revision of the entire constitution or the regime as that of a crowned democracy (Article 108). In the view of Katsoudas, democratic legality was restored, but the form, i.e., what kind of head of state (hereditary or elected), was not. This had to be put to referendum, since the '52 constitution, and those preceding it, was predicated on the source of all power residing in the people.⁴⁵

On November 17, 1974, the Fifth Revisionary Parliament was formed, replacing the Constitutional Act of August 1, to set about the business of revising the constitution. On December 8, 1974, the monarchy was abolished by popular referendum. In June 1975, the constitution came into force. Since no constituent assembly was convened, the government and revisionary parliament having exercised constituent power, the constitution was revised and not recreated, although in form and substance it was basically new. Technically, Donald S. Lutz would concur, in that the term "revision" is used to describe processes that use the

⁴⁵ Katsoudas, *op. cit.*, 19-22.

legislaire or judiciary.⁴⁶ The issue of revision will be revisited in the concluding section of this essay.

The pertinent provisions concerning the strong power of the president under the 1975 constitution are as follows:⁴⁷

If the major parties were unable to form a government, the president was able to appoint any person who may or may not be a member of parliament but who shall be able to obtain a vote of confidence in parliament. A prime minister thus appointed would be able to dissolve parliament for the purpose of holding elections (Article 37:4). Under this provision, again, legitimacy becomes circular, the prime minister falling in the service of the president.

The president could summon the cabinet with no counter signature by the prime minister, offering presidential autonomy.

The president could proclaim a referendum on crucial national issues or under exceptional circumstances address messages to the nation without sanction from the government. (Articles 44:2-3).

The president could declare a state of siege, countersigned by the cabinet or prime minister, with a

46 "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment" in Levinson, Stanford (ed.): *Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment*. Princeton University Press, 1995, 237-274, 240.

⁴⁷ I borrow from Katsoudas', op. cit., summary of the 1975 constitution, 24-25, since I was unable to obtain a copy thereof without the 1986 revisions.

convocation of parliament after 30 days, during which time anything could happen. Furthermore, the presidency did not enjoy popular legitimacy, placing the principles of parliamentary rule in jeopardy. Katsoudas rightly notes that if the framers of the constitution wished to legitimately grant exceptional powers to the president, his election should have come from the electorate. However, the provisions outlined above indeed speak to extraordinary circumstances, and the chances of their having been put into force were unlikely. Indeed there arose no opportunity under Karamanlis' presidency for their implementation.

In their comparison of new Mediterranean democracies – Portugal, Spain and Greece (and Italy) – the first three of which made the transition to democracy after periods of dictatorship, Arend Lijphart and his colleagues found that, given significant differences in their style of democracy, they do not form a distinct model of what could be called Mediterranean democracy.⁴⁸ Greece came out the most majoritarian of all, each of its cabinets during the period of 1974-86 being composed of members of only one party with majority support in parliament,

⁴⁸ Lijphart, Arendt, Thomas C. Bruneau, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther: "A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? The Southern European Democracies in Comparative Perspective" *West European Politics*, 11:1, January 1988, 7-25.

which was also the case before the dictatorship. Lijphart and his collaborators also found that Greece had very durable cabinets, an indication of a high degree of executive dominance over the legislature, owing not to a constitution which attempted to create a strong presidency with a cabinet dependent upon the confidence of the legislature, precisely because, they argue, unlike the French model, the Greek president is not popularly elected and therefore enjoys no popular legitimation, even though the president was given strong executive powers.

They correctly assess the conservative Constantine Karamanlis' success as a president in a socialist government in his bypassing popular electoral support based on the strength of his record as statesman, particularly in the light of his being warmly remembered by most Greeks as the first premier upon the junta's fall and therefore the deliverer, like a *deus ex machina*, in Clogg's words, of democracy.⁴⁹ The fact that Karamanlis' record, now more recognizably come to light, also demonstrates his authoritarian tendencies by virtue of his close historical ties to the pre-coup crown as well as the corrupt government of Richard Nixon was by-and-large overlooked by the Greek people warrants reserve in heralding him as the ideal democrat. Nonetheless, the more important observation to be made here concerning the stability of the post-dictatorship democratic

⁴⁹ Clogg, Richard: *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge University Press, 1992, 168.

regime, recognizing full well the accurate assessment of Lijphart et al. that Greece was "never genuinely presidential"⁵⁰ – nor was it a semi-presidential system by Sartori's criteria⁵¹ – and there was no power sharing taking place, was the phenomenon of cooperation and trust between the socialist premier and the conservative president during that crucial moment leading up the amendment of the authoritarian constitution, from 1981-85. Linz and Stepan consider the election of the socialists in 1981 the act that clinched democratic consolidation since "the institutions and values of Greek democracy had become the 'only game in town'," whereas the seven years of Karamanlis' governance saw the "major contestants" still grappling with adjustments.⁵²

The Greek case from 1981 onward exemplified the tacit understanding of a trust relationship among governors and between government and governed that Locke posited as the core of his

⁵⁰ Ibid., 20.

⁵¹ Op. cit., 131-132. I.e., the head of state (president) was not elected by popular vote and the authority structure was not dual in that the president was not independent of parliament. Linz and Stepan concur, stating that Greece is a purely parliamentary system. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan: *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, 142.

⁵² Linz and Stepan, op. cit., 133.

seventeenth-century conception of constitutionalism.⁵³ If we follow this Lockean logic a bit further, by placing supremacy on the natural law of equality and popular sovereignty within a commonwealth, Karamanlis, precisely because he was not popularly elected, was obliged to exercise constraint, and thereby demonstrate his responsibility in the office of president to the electorate which had been left out of the game. The ante was upped since the constitution which gave reserve powers to the president was the first post-civil-war version to mandate a parliamentary republic, over a crowned democracy, the constitution of which Karamanlis himself was a participating architect, and given his party's significant majority (73.3% of the seats), was able to overwhelmingly confirm in parliament, though, tellingly, only his own deputies supported it. The opposition parties, including the Communists, though relegitimized under Karamanlis (the party had been outlawed during the civil war in 1947), boycotted the vote on the grounds that the constitution was authoritarian, preserving as it did some of the provisions, and surpassing others, of the crown in the 1952 constitution.

⁵³ Even though Locke favored a constitutional monarchy, although that can be clearly understood by the historical context in which he was writing – although all the more reason trust was elemental, obviously.

The political balance between right and left at the time was even more delicate owing to the fact that Karamanlis' party, New Democracy, of which he was the founder and under whose banner he served as prime minister from 1974-1980, was in 1981 voted out of office in favor of the socialists, led by Andreas Papandreu. Karamanlis' elitism as contrasted with Papandreu's charisma and populism – although Papandreu was as harsh a politico as any – finds best illustration in their respective styles of resistance activity during the junta years. While Papandreu was in exile touring the capitals of the western world, speaking at rallies, appearing on radio programs and the like, sharing company with Pete Seeger and other artistic doyennes of the international left, Karamanlis largely remained in Paris where he found refuge in 1963 until his return to the premiership in 1974, maintaining a strong stately presence and operating behind the scenes, on the phone with both Washington and Athens. Karamanlis traveled in elite power circles, while Papandreu courted that cohort of the radical left which was gaining momentum as the social movement of the hour at the height of '60s activism. The contending politicians of the post-junta era, of differing generations and outlook, were old cronies with lasting animosities that spanned decades, yet, were committed to the project of creating anew a stable democracy, a common ground upon which Papandreu and Karamanlis found respect and affinity for one another.

It was not surprising then that Papandreou had publicly commended Karamanlis in his handling of the presidency⁵⁴ yet it was unexpected that Papandreou would shift his support for the presidency from Karamanlis to Christos Sartzetakis, a Supreme Court judge with an impeccable record in opposing the junta and widely known for his prosecution of the assassins of the popular United Democratic Left deputy, Gregorios Lambrakis, in 1963. Such decidedly leftist cultural and political associations were now bona fide benchmarks of a widespread ideological openness awaiting due status in political institutions in Greece which had become liberated since the careful and expert diplomacy – non-threatening to the extreme right yet incorporating the left – carried out by Karamanlis during the *metapolitefsi*, transition, in 1974, and throughout his tenure as prime minister.

Papandreou had argued that it would be difficult to pass amendments to a constitution created by his current president, Karamanlis.⁵⁵ Karamanlis quickly resigned his post and was replaced by the president of parliament and a socialist deputy, Yannis Alevras. New Democracy opposed the Sartzetakis

⁵⁴ Clogg, op. cit, 105.

⁵⁵ In a conversation (February 11, 1998, CUNY Graduate School, New York) I had with former US ambassador to Greece Monteagle Stearns, Mr. Stearns suggested that Papandreou's policy of isolationism had determined his break with Karamanlis, given that Karamanlis had had too close ties with the United States.

candidature, but the Communists supported it as well as the amendments. The election of Sartzetakis was to be problematic. It was foreseen that the vote could hinge on Alevras, who, opposition argued, was barred from voting given his status as acting head of state and deputy. Papandreou argued that there was no constitutional provision for acting head of state to be denied voting rights. Alevras did not vote in the first round. A special parliamentary session was held to decide whether Alevras could vote the second round, and the socialists provided the necessary majority. Alevras did not participate in the second vote. In the third round, the balance of the vote was to be decided by Alevras' ballot, which gave Sartzetakis the necessary winning margin. The constitutionality of the right of Alevras to vote, meanly yet correctly challenged by the opposition, threw the constitutional balance into disruption. Nonetheless, Papandreou was able to proceed with his amendments, which were approved, by 182 votes on two occasions, one month apart. Early elections were to be called for a second parliament to ratify the revisions and the socialists again won. Clogg suggests that Papandreou's support of Sartzetakis and his amendments attracted a significant number of votes from the far left, at the expense of the Communists.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Clogg, *op. cit.*, 111.

The amendments curtailed the power of the president. Referendum could now be called only upon the advice of the cabinet (Article 44:2). A state of siege might be called only by parliamentary vote upon a proposal by the government, not by the president (Article 48:1). The president reserved the right to dissolve parliament only when it was incapable of forming a government and not when the president deemed, as previously, that parliament no longer reflected the will of the people (Article 38).

PART VIII: ILLUSTRATING ITS SUCCESSES BY SURVEYING, AS AN
EXAMPLE OF WIDER INCLUSION, THE POST-JUNTA EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Since the junta, the inclusion of women in Greek society has been dramatically expanded within the constitutional framework and through a loosening up of social and civic constraints brought on by economic development and the establishment of socialist governance in 1981,⁵⁷ as well as by cultural influences from the West, primarily through American or American-style mass media. In the post-war period, the structure of the labor force was positively influenced by migration from rural areas to the

57 This section draws largely on Kyriazis, Nota: "Feminism and the Status of Women in Greece." In Conostas and Stavrou, op. cit., 267-301.

metropole and through an increase of women in higher education. Educational attainment enabled more women to freely compete with men for jobs, although Greece still lags behind the rest of the European Union in this area, explained by the still traditional demands placed on women in the private sphere. Homemaking retains its status as a virtuous enterprise for women, deriving from the role the family unit played in agricultural production, dating from the Ottoman period. In this system, female was equated with mother, the organizer of the household and "guardian of the family's cohesiveness", whereas the male assumed the role of the "family's outside representative, enjoying social prestige and esteem".⁵⁸ This state of affairs still generally defines the separation between public and private spheres which Arendt embraces and which greatly characterizes both the influential and subversive role of women in relation to men in Greece. As Ernestine Friedl has shown through her anthropological fieldwork in the Greek village of Vasilika, women employed their power by advantaging the gender-specific roles expected in the public and private domains.⁵⁹ Friedl argued that "[i]nsofar as men's honor [*philotimo*] depends on the behavior of their womenfolk, these women exercise a real measure of control over them. It is the

⁵⁸ Ibid., 274.

⁵⁹ Friedl, Ernestine: "The Position of Women: Appearance and Reality," *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 40, no.3, July 1967, pp. 97-108, reprinted in Jill Dubisch (ed): *Gender and Power in Rural Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 42-52.

women's willingness to behave chastely, modestly, and becomingly that is a prime necessity for the maintenance of men's self-esteem."⁶⁰ By reminding men of their obligation toward the women in the household because of their "toil and trouble" in the performance of household tasks, the effect was to keep men aware of their dependence on women and "how they must in their turn...uphold the honor of the family by reciprocating all the women do for them."⁶¹ If women once had any control of public affairs in Greece it was traditionally through the men in their lives, in an indirect way, by way of "kitchen table" discussion and an influence which drew from their authority in the private sphere, in the domain of the family and household, leaving it to the men to represent women in the public sphere.

In the political realm, however, there emerged after the dictatorship women's organizations associated with parties of the Left, the largest membership belonging to the socialist party of PASOK under Andreas Papandreou. The organizations were hierarchically ordered with elected officers, statutes and committees, and their outgrowth from the general attitude toward *collectivity* which defined the post-junta years placed them within the general program of sociopolitical change rather than as an independent extra-political movement.⁶² Greece's full

⁶⁰ Ibid., 51.

⁶¹ Ibid., 52.

⁶² Kyriazis, op. cit., 276.

entry into the European Community in 1981 brought equal opportunities for men and women into the fold of constitutional mandates, begun with the post-junta constitution of 1975 and extended with the revised Family Law of 1983. The Family Law eliminated discriminatory clauses against women and the concept of "head of household" and replaced it with a concept in which the spouses are jointly responsible for decisions concerning family life. Other laws gave women the right to participate in agricultural cooperatives, established rape as a statutory offense, provided for equality in employment relations, and protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood. There is a cleavage, however, between the *de jure* equality of women and *de facto* equality. Women still are crowded into the secondary labor market – service, clerical and certain types of manufacturing – which benefit from their "feminine" traits.⁶³ Overall, however, the constitutional amendments giving legitimacy and responding to women's demands for equality *could not have happened without the "revolutionary" rupture in Greek society and politics delivered by the dictatorship, which cleared the slate for modernization in Greece*, altering participation in the public sphere indubitably. Women today in Greece are on par with men in the public sphere and hold high political office at the local, national and European Union level.

⁶³ For an excellent discussion of the legislative versus *de facto* changes in women's status in Greece, see Kyriazis, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

PART IX: CONCLUSION

The foregoing is not so much a critique of Habermas, Fraser, or Arendt as it is a way applying what each had to say about the public sphere and extending their arguments to a historical narrative which surpasses the specific moments within which each was writing, with the intent of helping us to conceive of a public whose sphere transferred from one place to another, using the Greek dictatorship as an empirical case. Where Habermas is instructive, is in the dominating concepts of 1) historical hermeneuticism, 2) communication and consensus, 3) evolution and devolution of social structures, and 4) individual participation and consensus formation replaced by institutions which hold out the possibility for representing the individual in consensus formation. All of these components may in the aggregate lead to the interpretation of the role of civil society as an, if not absolutely autonomous site for political action, a quasi-autonomous site which nonetheless can impact on state activities and rule-making. In the case of dysfunctional politicization which cannot accommodate, or deliberately suppresses accommodation of, democratic intents, the role of the state, oppressive or not, is the stalwart variable in the degree to which civil society through the public sphere may or may not optimally function "democratically". In the more specific case of Greece in the twentieth century, institutional power over the public sphere – these institutions created by and comprised of individuals with the intention of subverting a dictatorial regime

– played itself out as *the Greek public sphere*, with an emphasis on debate and deliberation, cohesive in its vision of restoration of a nonauthoritarian state where civil society could reassert itself more freely and democratically. In this case, the public sphere was not fragmented because the dominant public sphere shut down completely. The dominant public sphere became the public sphere in exile and finally the public sphere which ushered in a post-dictatorship democratic regime and thereupon flourished. In this vein, I engage Fraser's conception of multiple publics by instancing a case where fragmentation was conceivable but was met instead with a breakdown and complete regeneration of the public sphere, outside of the polity proper. This allows us to operationalize the spatial component of the public sphere and consider its salience alongside the salience of a participatory public. We can then factor in Arendt's contribution.

The characteristics of the public sphere I draw from Arendt, then, are, first, materialism of the public sphere defined by that location which is at once reminiscent of the principles of the polis (socially exclusive formal contemplation as well as demonstration) and of the agora (informal participatory gathering of discussants). This is the site of the actual. Second, the metaphysics of the public sphere which engage the dual role of speech and action in another sense where speech and action are symbolic of the acting out of the story of the individual and its memorialization (polis as witness), as well as its power rather than strength in the service of rationality. This is the site of the potential.

In capturing for Modern Greece the demonstrative attributes of politicized activity in the public sphere characteristic of antiquity, one can establish a continuity across time which

enables us to situate Greece in two places at once, and for this comparison we must bring Habermas back in. The Greece of the twentieth century, then, was the inheritor and reinventor of habits and traditions born and conceptualized in antiquity, as well as it was the bearer of structural social changes which institutionalized the individual within politicized corporations.

To suggest that the affairs of any polity are the unique domain of that polity would impugn the influence of international relations and balances of power, in Polanyian terms or otherwise, in regional or global contexts. The case of Greece is not extraordinary in this respect, and one can only contemplate the extent to which an internal political culture is any match for the larger field of negotiations where polity politics are mere variables in a broader and more complex formulation.

I have argued for a revision of the public sphere in a late bourgeois authoritarian region of Europe, by tracing its historical development and highlighting an acute example of a representative public sphere, which, while removed, was nonetheless singular in objective. In this, both the Habermasian and Arendtian notions of public sphere elucidate, within the 1) context of democratic *institutions*, and 2) the sociopolitical

temperament which elevates *communicative action* to an essential position within the unifying notion of freedom to associate and its *demonstrative* outcomes. Guided by the Habermasian/Arendtian theoretical model, I have tried to indicate the paradoxes of Greek identity, shaped by both the external-material political world and the internal, ideological predisposition for continuity of tradition, as converging at the intersection of communication and power, allowing for the expression of freedom and association.

As these interpretive conclusions emerged in the process of exploring the Greek public sphere and its theoretical implications, philosophical questions emerged that could not be tackled in this brief paper. Ambiguities in Arendt's unveiling of the relationship between speech and contemplation and thinking emerged, as did, in the final analysis, similarities between Arendt's reliance on communication in the realm of political action and its ethical overtones, and that of Habermas, while their theories were developed within different historical periods, although perhaps with similar intents. One could say that beneath the surface both Arendt and Habermas were haunted by the cataclysms of authoritarianism and fascism and questionable liberal democracies, and so in one sense their individual paths originate at a similar place and pursue similar ends. Views of pluralism and diversity – an equalizer in Arendt's hands, roads to subversive power in Habermas' hands,

contestatory and enabling in Fraser's model – bring about reconfigurations of publics *and* spheres. When one component lacks its complementary other, the model becomes skewed, which forces further evaluations, including the consideration of a model of the public sphere under authoritarian regimes.

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Title: *The significance of the French example and experience in the building of the Greek nation's civic and ethnic dimensions from mid-eighteenth century onwards.*

Abstract: This paper looks at the fundamental French elements that facilitated the building of what is called today the civic and ethnic dimensions of the Greek nation. In particular, the paper focuses on the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution that were amongst the main sources used in Greek nation-building (mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth century). It discusses firstly the adaptation of French Enlightenment ideas by Greek Enlightenment thinkers. Further, it examines the French impact on the assimilation of ancient Greek values and principles in the building of the ethnic and civic dimensions of the Greek nation. It then considers the effect of the French Revolution's experience, principles and ideas on Greek social and political thought. Further, it explores the impact of the French Revolution's declarations and constitutions in providing a framework for building the civic dimension of the Greek nation. Finally, the paper considers the survival of the French influence on the civic and ethnic dimensions of the Greek nation to date.

Introduction

In attempting to determine the factors that contributed to nation-building in Greece, it would not be erroneous to argue that the French example had a prominent position especially at the inaugural stages of the formation of the Greek nation. It could also be claimed that there are still traces of French influence on what forms today's Greek nation. Indeed, if one considers that a nation has civic and ethnic dimensions consisting of civic¹ and ethnic² features respectively; but, also takes into consideration that in its course to nationhood a nation defines itself in relation to others, then it can be theorized that the French example had and still has an influential role in the building of the Greek nation's civic and ethnic dimensions.

¹ Civic features often include: common political will, citizenship, common political values and loyalties, popular sovereignty, and political participation.

² Ethnic features often include: language, common historical heritage, and cultural tradition.

1. The influence of the French Enlightenment

The French Enlightenment³ was amongst the propelling complementary forces in the formation of the Greek nation. Especially during the second half of the eighteenth century, the ‘French Enlightenment’ ideas would have great bearing on the perceptions of Greek Enlightenment scholars who sought to reform Greek society. This French movement introduced a new system of values, a break from traditional social structures. By advocating principles such as freedom of thought, freedom of religion, progress, reason and natural law, it inspired the Greeks to challenge superstition, prejudice, ignorance, intolerance, and despotism all of which were present in Ottoman dominated Greece. The promotion of natural law, associated with the doctrines of freedom and equality (characterised as the natural rights of man), would lead to the quest for the formation of a sovereign collective entity with free and equal members.

The ideas of French Enlightenment thinkers deeply influenced Greek intellectual thought. The philosophes were particularly influential. Their ideas were studied carefully, were adapted and incorporated in the writings of Greek intellectuals. The philosophes’ questioning of the existing regime and social order, their promotion of equality before the law and reform of society, encouraged these Greeks to demand emancipation from the social and political restraints of the time and the formation of a new collective social organization. The Greek intellectuals influenced by philosophes such as Diderot, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, adapted the same philosophical positions to Greek reality. The ideas of the philosophes were mostly drawn from the *Encyclopédie*⁴, one of the major works of the French Enlightenment consisting of

³ Apart from other influential factors such as the English, Italian, German Enlightenment, the French Enlightenment holds a prevalent place in terms of the influences received on the formation of the Greek nation mainly due to the fact that ideas came chiefly through the French medium (eg. a number of books of the English Enlightenment were translated through French translations). According to Dimaras, France during the eighteenth century had primacy in terms of education, and this was a position it held in the consciousness of the Greek Enlightenment and its opponents. It is during this time that France and French literature were the mouthpieces of European spiritual life. Seen in: Δημαράς Κ.Θ., (1991: 36-37).

⁴ The *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société des gens des lettres*. Mis en ordre et publié par M. Diderot et M. D’Alembert, Paris, 1751-1780, had a strong influence in the Greek area as is shown in Greek works; See: Δημαράς Κ.Θ., (1991: 35).; According to Vallianatos, Voltaire and the rest of the philosophes were well-known to the Ionian

articles from well known philosophes of the time⁵. The ‘Encyclopédie’ thoughts had a great impact on the Greek intellectual scene. Rhigas collected and translated passages from the *Encyclopédie* and inserted them into his own texts.⁶ Katartzis also inspired by this work was encouraged to express many of his philosophical, pedagogical and linguistic theories.⁷ Korais praised the philosophes for producing this work, and remarked on their enlightening impact especially through this work in Greece.⁸

The Ideologues were another group of French intellectuals, whose works were studied by Greek intellectuals enabling them to see solutions to the political, cultural and social problems faced by their compatriots. Carriers of the ideas of the Ideologues were intellectuals such as Korais, who familiarized himself with their philosophy,⁹ conversed with their circle¹⁰ and participated in their movement¹¹, but also revolutionary Greeks who published political indoctrinations which derived from the ‘Ideologue’ circle¹².

It becomes readily apparent that the primary recipients of the ideas of the philosophes, Encyclopaedists and the Ideologues comprised of the educated classes. These educated parts of the population helped in communicating these French ideas to the Greek public, through the return to the fatherland of Greeks who had studied abroad and wished to share the French Enlightenment spirit with their compatriots, but also through translations, circulation of periodicals often read in groups, word of mouth, or copies of works imbued with these ideas sent often with added explanations to Greece. Instrumental in this process of diffusion of ‘enlightened’ French ideas were the Greek ‘Diaspora’ communities, which helped in the establishment of schools, printing presses, and publishing of books for the general public as well as text-books for Greek schools. Also providing fertile ground for the French ideas to take root were

cultural elite whose libraries treasured various editions of the works of the Encyclopaedists.; Seen in Vallianatos E.G. (1987: 48).

⁵ Those who contributed to the *Encyclopédie* included all the well known names of the eighteenth century: Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, D’Alembert, D’ Holbach, Helvetius, Condillac, Diderot. They wrote articles on science, mathematics, philosophy etc.; Seen in Whitmore, P.J.S., (1969: 103).

⁶ Βελεστινλής P. (2002: 26).

⁷ Βαρίκας Β., (1987: 151).

⁸ Κοραΐς Α., (1964d: 156).

⁹ Αργυροπούλου Ρ., (2003: 29).

¹⁰ Cf. Ηλιού Φ., (1978: 36-38).

¹¹ Κουμαριανού Α., (1984: 138).

¹² Αργυροπούλου Ρ., (2003: 211).

autonomous communities that started developing within Greek territory by the end of the eighteenth century.

This diffusion of ‘French Enlightenment’ ideas was to be challenged not only by Ottoman authorities but also by sections of the Greek population including the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church, those who were influenced by the conservative clergy or were conservatives themselves.

2. Reconnection with classical Greece

Another reason for using the French example was that it was considered as the modern version of the ancient Greek model and because it advocated and revived Classical Greek thought.¹³ As the politico-philosophical teachings of Greek antiquity were embraced and used by French Enlightenment thinkers and constitutional drafters, the Greeks were even more inspired to use such teachings and apply them in the formation of their new political and cultural community. Intellectuals such as Korais found it a disgrace that foreigners use their ancestral sources, while the Greeks who were the inheritors of such knowledge were unaware of them.¹⁴ He comments: “It is very unfortunate that today we, the descendants of those admired Hellenes, have no other choice but to seek that paternal inheritance through the Europeans.”¹⁵

Undeniably, eighteenth century French neo-classicism contributed to making the Greeks aware of their ancient heritage, its significance and the need for its revival. The revival of ancient Greek thought, models and philosophy in the works of the most

¹³ Rhigas for instance looked up to the French constitution as it reflected many of the laws set by Solon; See: Λεγράνδ Α., (2000: 91).

¹⁴ «μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν διεγείρω τοῖς νέους τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ γένους εἰς ζῆλον τῶν προγονικῶν ἀπὸ τῆν δοξης, βλέποντας, ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστήμων, ὅσαι φωτίζουν σήμερον τὴν Ἑβρώπην, τὸ πρῶτα σπέρματα καὶ στοιχειῶ γεννηθησαν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τῶν, καὶ σφίζονται εἰς τὴ βιβλία τῶν ἑλληνικῶν συγγραφέων. Ἐναι καταισχύνη ἡμέτερα, ὅν ὅσ οἱ ξένοι τὴ φυτεύουν, τὴ καλλιεργοῦν, τὴ ἀξάνουν εἰς μεγάλα ἢ δένδρα, καὶ τρυγῶσι τοῖς καρποῖς τῶν, ἡμεῖς μῆτε νὴ ἐξευρωμεν, ὅτι ἀπὸ εἶναι προγονικῶ ἡμῶν κληρονομία. Μῆτε τὴ παραδείγματα ταῦτα, μῆτε ἢ σθενῆς μου φωνή, ἠθελαν εἶσθαι ἡκανὸν νὴ διεγειρωσιν εἰς μίμησιν τῶν κάλων τῶ γένος, ὅν ἢ ξὺ ἡτυχίας οἱ Γραικοί, ὅσαν ἢ κόμη εἰς ἢ κείνους τοῖς ἢ ξιοθρήνητους καιρούς, ἢ πόταν ... ἢ ἢ τῶς χρεία νὴ μνημονεύω τὴ παρελθόντα κακαί;»; Seen in Κοραῖς Α., (1802: ζ-η).

¹⁵ Κοραῖς Α., (1964c.: 405-412).

eminent representatives of the French Enlightenment influenced decisively the Greek intellectuals to use the ancient Greek model not only as a measure of comparison and criticism of present Greek society but also as a means of offering solutions for the Greeks' future. This by extension would contribute to the formation of the civic and ethnic dimensions of the Greek nation.

Classical Greek ideas such as democracy, popular sovereignty¹⁶, and separation of powers¹⁷ revered in the works of French Enlightenment thinkers and constitutional drafters were also embedded in the works of Greek Enlightenment thinkers. These ideas were used as a manual for the building of the civic dimension of the Greek nation. The democratic model of Greek antiquity would enable the Greeks to envisage and pursue the creation of a collective entity whose members are equal, free and sovereign. The ideas of popular sovereignty and separation of powers were to reinforce the need for the members of this entity to become the holders of sovereignty.

The French mediation in reviving the Greek interest to reconnect with Greek antiquity, would also spur in the long run the incorporation of a common historical heritage as an 'ethnic' feature of the national Greek community. The ancient Greek heritage was channelled through French help mainly through the translation of French works (history, political philosophy books) referring to classical Greece. The translations of works such as Charles Rollin's *Histoire Ancienne*¹⁸, Abbé Millot's *Éléments d' Histoire Générale*¹⁹ and Jean-Jacques Barthélemy's *Voyage du jeune*

¹⁶ The idea of popular sovereignty advocated mainly by Rousseau originates from classical Greek political thought, which declared the origin of the rule from the people.

¹⁷ The principle of the separation of powers adapted by Montesquieu, has its starting point in ancient Greek political reality, it is based on the Aristotelian distinction. It was theoretically developed in the *Politics* of Aristotle. See: Μαυριάς Κ., (2002: 162).

¹⁸ Alexandros Kangelarios translated this work in 1750 in order to acquaint the Greeks with their glorious past; The publication of Rollin's *Histoire Ancienne* was to become a widely used history textbook in the Greek schools in the fifty years following its publication. Copies of *Histoire Ancienne* remained available for decades and the work was widely spread in the libraries of the Greek space.; cf.: Κιτρομηλίδης Π., (1996: 98-99).

¹⁹ Abbé Millot's *Éléments d' Histoire Général* was to replace Rollin's work and to offer a new perception of history offering room for critique.; cf. Κιτρομηλίδης Π., (1996: 102-103); The translation of Millot's work was undertaken by Grigorios Konstantas and Zisis Kavras, partly because of their will to promote historical knowledge but also due to the need for the education of the Greeks in terms of history; Millot, (1806: θ´).

*Anacharsis en Grèce*²⁰, contributed to further acquainting the Greeks with their historical background. This ‘heritage’ awareness would gradually be instilled in the public and would by extension become part of their national consciousness. The awareness of a glorious past, the acknowledgement of the great achievements of the ancient Greeks would reinforce the Greeks’ self-confidence, would make them embrace their links with their classical past and would in turn become one of the unifying bonds of the members of the Greek nation. Partly through French intervention, the revival of this historical knowledge and the promotion of the study of history would go towards building the ethnic dimension of the Greek nation.

The French example was to influence indirectly the building of the ethnic dimension of the Greek nation not only through inspiring the Greeks (primarily intellectuals) to inject their ancient heritage into the national context but also to standardize their language and reform it.²¹

3. The influence of the French Revolution

The French Revolution would reinforce the need to change the traditional order and would contribute to the building of the civic dimension of the Greek nation. By the end of the eighteenth century, a fertile ground had been created for the reception and adaptation of French revolutionary influences by Greek society. According to Kitromilides²² the propagation of these influences in the Greek world can be seen to unfold in three stages in the period from 1789 to 1815.

²⁰ Barthélemy’s work was a glorification of ancient Greece and as such Rhigas chose to translate this work to show the Greeks their glorious past. The Austrian police, confiscated a number of copies of this work that Rhigas was trying to ship to Greece. In their report the Austrian police stated: “This book Anacharsis was meant to show to the Greek nation how great was its fatherland before”; Seen in Άμάντος Κ., (1997: 29). In spite of the efforts of the Austrian police, *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis* circulated among the Greeks and proved such a favourite that it was translated once again in a complete version by Chrysovergis. Cf. Χρυσσοβέργης Κ., (1819, 17’).

²¹ Many intellectuals at the time were influenced by French thought on the language question; Katartzis basing himself on the French experience, when Parisian French became the standard for the French language, he thought that it was the privilege of every nation’s capital to set the standard for its language. Cf. Καταρτζής Δ., (1970). The essay of d’Alembert “Sur l’ harmonie des langues” seems to have been read by a number of Greeks. It made Katartzis, for example, strive for harmony and melody in his writings in the detriment of clarity; See: Δημαράς Κ., (1940: 227).; Cf. Rousseau’s influence on Korais, in regards to the reform of language; Κοραής Α., (1964b).

²² Kitromilides P., (1980: 277).

Greek intellectuals of the time experienced the French Revolution²³ either in person or through contact with representatives and supporters of revolutionary France. In the main, this was to shape their social and political thoughts as far as the future of Greek society was concerned. Seeing the effects of the French Revolution, intellectuals such as Korais attributed great importance to the role of this movement in helping morally transform the Greeks but also in consolidating in their minds the need for freedom:

Ὡν, ἡνάμεσα στῆς ἀπῆτιες τῆς ἠθικῆς ἡναμόρφωσης ποῦ συντελεῖται ἀπὸ τὸ στιγμῆ ἡνάμεσα στοῦς ἠλληνες, ἠδῶσα τὸ δεῦτερη θέση στὸ Γαλλικὸ ἠπανάσταση, ἀπὸ τὸ ἠκανα, γιατί πραγματικῶ ἠρχεται δεῦτερη κατὰ τὸ χρονικῶ σειρᾶ, ἠγκαλα καὶ εἠναι ἀπὸ τὸ κυρίως ἠ πρώτη ἀπῆτία, ποῦ ἠφάνταστα βοήθησε τοῦς ἠλληνες νῶ στερεῶσουν μέσα στὸ μυαλῶ τους τὸ σωτήρια ἠδέα, ποῦ τῶν εἠχαν ἠδη συλλάβει, γιῶ τῶν ἠνάγκη τοῦ φωτισμοῦ τους.²⁴

If, amongst the causes of the moral reformation that is taking place at this moment amongst the Greeks, I gave the second place to the French Revolution, this I did, because truly it comes second in chronological order, in conjunction and it is this main reason, that helped the Greeks to instil in their minds the redeeming idea, which they had already conceived, for the need of their enlightenment.

The French Revolution in its battle against despotism and in support of principles such as freedom, equality of rights, fraternity, and popular sovereignty appealed to Greek modernizers²⁵, and led them to make political claims to territory, autonomy or independence, to aspire for a free democratic society, self-government, the attainment

²³ The tumultuous social period before the French revolution as well as its eruption in 1789 deeply influenced Rhigas.; Seen in Μαυδᾶς Γ., (1997: 802).

²⁴ Κοραῖς Α., (1964d: 156).

²⁵ During the 1790's decade, the principles of the French Revolution were received with enthusiasm by the neo-Hellenic bourgeois class; Seen in Αργυροπούλου Ρ., (2003: 222); The French Revolutionary ideas were particularly appealing to the intellectuals of the Diaspora and their ideological allies at the centres of the Enlightenment within Greek society; See: Κιτρομηλίδης Π., (1996: 282).

of political autonomy. Rhigas²⁶, for instance, came to see equality as the first and most important natural right and insisted that no distinction based on religion, language, race or descent was acceptable in his envisaged Greek Democracy. The French Revolution also inspired the Greek modernisers to engage in radical restructuring of Greek society: its social, economic, political, administrative and moral reform. This French movement encouraged radical challenge against foreign despotism but also internal oppression (privileges enjoyed by clergy and aristocracy). In making proposals for the future of the Greek people, Greek intellectuals such as Rhigas and Korais found themselves taking different political routes in terms of following Jacobinism and liberalism springing from the French Revolution. Influenced by Jacobinism, Rhigas took a more radical stance and advocated the active participation of the Greeks in their collective goals such as freedom, sovereignty and independence²⁷. He proposed a unified, non-monarchical, polity with an intensely participatory character in decision-making and in all the levels and sectors of administration.²⁸ On the other hand, criticizing the radicalism exhibited by Jacobinism,²⁹ Korais influenced by the Girondins took a more liberal stance and placed more importance on spreading education prior to proceeding with revolutionary means to achieve the Greeks' sovereignty.

The French Revolution inspired the struggle of the Greeks through the War of Independence (1821-1827) to transform themselves from subjects under despotic rule to nationals of a sovereign nation. It prompted intellectuals such as Rhigas³⁰ to engage in revolutionary actions and prepare writings and publications that would bring radical changes. These intellectuals helped inspire the uprising of Greek revolutionaries³¹, but also managed to spread the message of freedom to the majority of the populace, encouraging them to strive for new political destinations³².

²⁶ Seen in Θεοτόκης Σ., (1931: 39).

²⁷ Βλάχος Γ.Κ., (1994: 535).

²⁸ Κιτρομηλίδης Π., (2003b: 225).

²⁹ Κιτρομηλίδης Π., (1996: 385).

³⁰ Affiliated with Rhigas' revolutionary plans are his map and constitution. Rhigas' *Thourios* became the military march of the enslaved Greeks preparing them for an uprising; See Αδάμου Γ., (1990: 381).

³¹ Kamarianos finds it very probable that Rhigas developed a patriotic activity around a group of progressive Greeks and Rumanians who met from time to time and discussed contemporary political facts, as well as the possibilities of a revolution in Greece against the Ottoman conquerors. Καμαριανός Ν., (1999: 67).

³² Κιτρομηλίδης Π., (2003a: 36).

4. French declarations and constitutions

The French declarations and constitutions, written during the French revolutionary period, assisted in injecting into the Greek nation what we would call civic characteristics. These documents provided a set of civic ties potentially open to newcomers, a set of rules, laws and regulations, unified codes of law and legal institutions, equal and common rights and duties of citizenship. The adaptation of these important documents, mainly by Greek Enlightenment thinkers and the Greek Revolution's Constitutional drafters aided in creating a constitutional and institutional framework for the Greek people, in bringing about political changes and social restructuring as well as the rapid development of a national consciousness.

The *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* of 1789, one of the most enduring accomplishments of the French Revolution, proved to be, with its list of natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man, very popular especially amongst the Greeks of the Diaspora. Having a universal appeal, this declaration was used as a guide for the civic behaviour (the rights and duties) of the Greeks. Its promotion of principles of constitutional and universal value such as equality before the law, freedom of religion and freedom of the press found fertile ground in the constitutional plans of the Greek reformers. Such was the effect of this fundamental document that the Greeks of the Diaspora engaged almost immediately in spreading its ideas. Evidence of this is the fact that this document along with the constitution of 1791 was translated and published in *Εφημερίς/Ephemeris*, the first Greek journal in Vienna in September 1791, by Greek scholars three weeks only after their publication in *Moniteur*³³. The 1793 French declaration was also used as a model by intellectuals such as Rhigas who adapted it in his drafting of *The Human Rights* to suit Greek actuality.

In addition to the declarations, the French constitutions had a complementary role in defining the terms by which the members of the Greek nation would be bound. Those who were responsible for drafting the Greek constitutions prior to and during the

³³ Βρανούσης Λ., (1984: 223- 258). Argyropoulou notes that the first to translate this declaration in their *Εφημερίς* were Μαρκίδες- Πούλιου, cf. Αργυροπούλου Π., (2003: 85); Argyropoulou also notes that in the final decade of the eighteenth century, the French Declaration greatly spread amongst the Greeks of Vlachia, who translated it and knew it off by heart; See: Αργυροπούλου Π., (2003: 89).

Greek Revolution used the French constitutions³⁴, adapting their content to Greek reality. Many of the provisions of the democratic *Temporary Constitution of Greece of 1822*³⁵ were taken from the 1793 and 1795 French constitutions³⁶. The proclamation of the principle of the separation of powers in these French texts would influence all successive Greek constitutional texts.

Through these French texts citizenship criteria were delineated, determining the membership criteria for the nation. By asserting the conception of a nation that is mainly characterized by an open citizenship, the 1791 and 1793 constitutions influenced Greek Enlightenment thinkers and constitutional drafters during the Greek Revolution to allow, as would be expressed in their constitutional drafts, the incorporation of foreigners and/or of those of a different religion in the nation via the process of naturalization. Nevertheless, numerous intellectuals including Korais stressed that for the incorporation of those of a different religion stricter laws should be applied.³⁷ Indeed, in determining the criteria of membership to the Greek nation, the constitutional drafts succeeding Rhigas' Constitution, differ from the 'open' citizenship invoked by the French constitutions, in that they pose additional restrictions and prerequisites.

The Greek Enlightenment thinkers involved in the production of political texts, which were partly inspired by the French declarations and constitutions, were to subsequently influence constitutional drafters and revolutionaries³⁸. For instance, many ideas of the French declarations and constitutions found their way, through

³⁴ Κοραΐς Α., (1933: ιθ').

³⁵ It was entitled *Temporary Constitution of Greece* because the authors were afraid of the reaction of the Holy Alliance. It included a few clauses guaranteeing the protection of human rights, while as far as the organization of the government was concerned, it allowed for the representative principle as well as for the principle of separation of powers. The preamble of this temporary constitution addresses the Greek nation and declares its political existence and independence in the name of the holy and indivisible trinity; Seen in Κοραΐς Α., (1933: 1).

³⁶ Ibid. p. η'.

³⁷ Κοραΐς Α., (1964a, ΚΚ').

³⁸ Korais' influence on the Revolutionary constitutions was felt and became part of the liberal and constitutionalist tradition of modern Greece.; Seen in Chaconas S., (1942: 181).

Rhigas' legal texts, into successive constitutional documents³⁹ and projects of revolutionaries⁴⁰.

The adaptation of these important French documents would in the long run appeal to a wider Greek social strata⁴¹ leading to the expansion of their political participation in the revolutionary struggle, their 'democratic indoctrination', their moral and spiritual awakening, the cultivation of their national consciousness.

5. French influence in the building of the Greek nation after the Greek Enlightenment and up to the twenty-first century

The decades following the Greek Enlightenment, would still see the influence of the French example on nation-building in Greece. The connection with ancient historical roots, partly inspired by the French example, and the advocating of the 'historical' feature as an important Greek national constituent became apparent during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After the Greek War of independence, an emphasis was placed by intellectuals and the newly founded State on the promotion of ancient Greek language and culture, on the connection with Greek antiquity. For the purposes of the Great Idea, which played a major role in Greek politics (after 1830), insistence was placed on historical (classical and Byzantine) roots in order to justify territorial expansion and to gain control of the unredeemed Greek populations.

With the passage of time and up to the present day, aspects of the Greek nation's identity have been subjected to challenges. In particular, factors such as the inclusion of more groups in the nation, and more recently that of multiculturalism, globalization, Europeanization, the influx of immigrants have made the Greek nationals rethink how they place themselves in relation to others. Consequently, constituent features of the Greek nation have been reassessed.

³⁹ Rhigas' political thoughts find their continuation in the successive constitutions of Ionian islands and later on in the constitutional texts of the Greek War of Independence; Seen in Λεοντσίνης Γ. (1986: 521).

⁴⁰ Rhigas' constitutional and state proposals became mostly available and known through the secret circulation of manuscripts from his *New Political Administration*, which influenced not only the Society of Vienna (including people that were in Rhigas' circle such as Peraivos), but also certain Phanariots, and foremost the Philikous who channelled a part of his vision in their political program.; Seen in Αξελός Λ., (2003: 387-388).

⁴¹ Λεοντσίνης Γ., (1990: 521).

Despite such challenges one can still see the persistence of features, partly inspired from the French example, within the Greek nation. These elements have helped preserve both the ethnic and civic dimensions of this nation, the unity of its members and its distinctiveness from other nations.

As far as the civic dimension of the Greek nation is concerned, one can still distinguish the presence of features in it, partly inspired by the French example, such as common political will, citizenship, popular sovereignty and egalitarianism. As for citizenship, this constituting feature has aided in managing challenges posed by a changing world. Its flexibility contributes to the adaptability of the Greek nation's civic dimension to the needs of the members of the Greek nation, by dealing with recent phenomena such as multiculturalism and waves of immigration. Citizenship is open in principle to those who wish to belong to the national community by allowing their legal assimilation into the nation, but at the same time for determining who is included or excluded from this community. In the face of cultural particularities, citizenship is a feature that contributes to the attempt to secure homogeneity and unity within the nation since it provides for the equality of common rights and duties for those who have acquired membership in the Greek nation and accordingly creates a sense of solidarity and fraternity through active equal social and political participation and a common field of understanding.

In recent times, one can also see the resonance of the French example in the attempts made to reinforce the civic dimension of the Greek nation and to make it more open to newcomers, through the implementation for instance of the French principle of *laïcité* (secularization), something that displays the intention to reduce gradually the role of (Greek-Orthodox) religion as a prominent feature of the Greek nation. While Greek Orthodoxy might still be considered a constituent national feature, an integral part of the identity of the majority of the Greek nationals; nevertheless, in recent years we have seen a tendency towards secularization, following partly in the footsteps of the secular measures taken in France while on its path to nationhood. This would involve the removal of the Church as a national institution, proclaiming its separation from the State. An example of this tendency to secularisation has been recently demonstrated

by members from political parties in Greece.⁴² A further suitable example is that of the identity card fracas.⁴³

Conclusion

During the Greek Enlightenment and Greek Revolution, the French example provided a source of inspiration, a reference point and a measure of comparison for the Greeks, who through their exposure to the French Enlightenment, neoclassicism and the French Revolution became more aware of the backwardness of their compatriots, and accordingly sought to remedy the Greeks' misfortune. French influence contributed in precipitating the process of nation-formation in Greece and did not cease to exist in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even to this day it can be said that it has a durable impact on the dimensions that form the Greek nation.

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⁴² Recently, politicians of various political parties have advocated the separation of the Church from the State. Of course a major opponent to such measures is the Church which opposes any ideas or measures that come into conflict with the Greek Orthodox 'tradition'.

⁴³ Conflict between the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church and the PASOK government of Kostas Simitis over the removal of religious affiliation from the identity card.

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*Discourse Analysis and Nation-building. Greek policies applied in W. Thrace (1945-1967)*¹

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Key words: Discourse Analysis, Nationalism, Nation Building, Minorities, “Muslim Minority”.

What I will try to do in this paper is to apply the vocabulary of discourse analysis, (as it was developed by E. Laclau and Ch. Mouffe) to nationalist ideologies and nation-building projects, in the cases where antagonistic national constructions challenge the domination of a nation-state. Thus, in cases where a minority nationalism contest for ‘space’ while the nation-state tries to ‘eliminate’ that space and to expand its hegemony in all the aspects of the social and political life.

The situation in Greek Thrace during the period from 1945 to 1967 is a good example which demonstrates how the minority nationalism promoted an ‘identity crises’ to the Greek administration, as well the state’s efforts to correspond and overcome this crisis expanding its hegemony and eliminating the space that the minority rights had create.

I want to argue that what defines the policies in Thrace regarding the minority is a kind of antagonistic relation; antagonistic relation not only between the two states as political entities, but also between ‘Greece’ and ‘Turkey’ as concepts, as abstract categories. This is why in this relation the biggest problem for the Greek administration was the Turkish identity of the minority and its expression.

This as the main factor together with the minority rights and the Turkish nationalism, promoted an ‘identity crises’ to the Greek discourse and as a result was blamed for its failure to hegemonize both the conceptual and political ‘space’. This is why almost all the range of the Greek hegemonic efforts was focused in these aspects².

In the methodological level, I study the minority policies in a *genealogical* (in the Foucauldian sense) way. This means that I study the origins of the today policies, the emergence of things. Genealogy is a tool in order to give some order to history, focusing in the way that things emerge and arise as a result of interaction and struggle of different forces against each other (Foucault 1984: 148-149). History in that sense tries to avoid the categories of continuity, teleology, and destiny. Instead, “becomes effective to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being” (quote. Mahon: p. 113).

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² I am focusing more the way that the Greek side perceived this antagonistic relation, both because there are available data to do so, but also that it seems that the Greek side was the one which in a minor position, and so it experienced the antagonism in a more intense and traumatic way.

Genealogy will help us to give emphasis on the relations and conflicts of power³, studying the power relations in our case in a way that will not make judgments about right or wrong but it will search for the origins and the functions of certain political actions. Genealogical approach will help us too, to describe those functions and the *statements* as an ongoing process, highlighting the possibilities that were excluded.

Antagonism is that which prevents the constitution of objectivity itself. It prevents a part to become the absolute dominant. It prevents a nation-state to achieve full homogenization of its territory and become an 'objective' power into that territory. This view of antagonism includes the concept of "constitutive outside". This is an 'outside' which blocks the identity of the 'inside'; it is an alternative national construction which blocs the dominant one from being an 'absolute' dominant without any resistance. As Laclau puts it, with antagonism denial does not originate from 'inside' of identity itself, but in its most radical sense, *from outside* (Laclau 1990: 17).

The antagonizing force fulfils two crucial and contradictory roles at the same time. On the one hand it 'blocks' the full constitution of the identity to which it is opposed, so there is something that a nation-state will always blame for its weakness to be totally sovereign. For example in Thrace the Turkish nationalism blocks the full constitution of a 'Muslim minority' or the identity of a Pomak as the Greek state tried to construct, in the same way the minority rights bloc the full expansion of the state institutions into the minority affairs

But on the other hand given that this latter identity like all identities is merely rational and would therefore not be what it is outside the relationship with the force antagonizing it, the latter (the force antagonizing it), this 'outside' (the Turkish nationalism etc.) is also part of the conditions of existence of that identity, formulates that identity (Laclau 1990: 21).

So, if we consider '**Nation-building**' as the nationalist project of states which aim to hold on to their hegemony (both political and conceptual) over the nodal point 'nation', sub state challenges to the constitutional status quo use the same ideological principles, but adapt them to an alternative national construct. The outcome is an *identity crisis* which is a sign of antagonistic discourses battling to rearticulate the contested concept of 'nation' and what competing ideologies would have as the 'common sense' understanding (Sutherland 2005: 195). The prize is conceptual and political hegemony.

In the above approach antagonism is *a relation* (HSC, 125), since it is founded on the 'relational moment' between social identities. This antagonistic *relation* occurs from the impossibility of constitution of full totalities or full identities⁴. This impossibility results the construction of an enemy who is considered and blamed for this failure.

³ Power is not what someone 'have' and exercise it to others, but a dispersed force, a force that it can be found everywhere, and that is why in order to study about 'power' (in singular) someone need to see it as 'a relation' and not as a single force (Shiner: 389).

⁴ Since every identity has an impossibility of closure, since it is a continuous movement of differences which make the identity unstable, Antagonism is the 'experience' of the limit of all objectivity (HSC, 122), but also they constitute the 'limits of society', thus the latter's impossibility of fully constituting itself. (HSC, 125).

This relational character of the antagonisms drives to my final theoretical point.

Between states that are host of an ethnic identity (home states), the minorities and the 'external homelands', there is a triangular relation developed. As Brubaker has argued (Brubaker 1996) in such cases there is a *relational nexus* between those three parts and their national ideologies are connected and interact with each other⁵.

This is as I argue a typical manifestation and application with the notion of antagonism as Laclau (and Mouffe) have developed.

As in any antagonistic relation, the three parts (home state, minority and kin-state) are not considered as close categories with some essence but planes in continuous progress. So, the triangular relation *between* those fields is at the same time a relation *inside* each field, leading to a relational approach to the national question, with the perceptions, the representations, the preoccupations and the misconceptions about each other to become the primary field for study (Brubaker: 67-68).

States as well as any other collective formation do not have a social identity before interaction, and whether or not states have egoistic or cooperative identities depends on the nature of interaction with others. States in that framework do not have fixed preferences or interests. Depending on interaction with others they define and redefine their identities and base their interests in the new definitions of their identities. (Bozdaglioglou: 159, 166).

Furthermore, the outcome of such antagonistic relations is not something pre-given but *contingent* and a result of social constructions. This means that in the example of the Greek-Turkish antagonism in the case of Thrace there is not something which has some special 'nature' because of the history, the Balkan environment, the character of the populations and so it could not be avoided or could only result like it is today. On the contrary, it was a product of certain decisions, mistakes, major events, interplay etc.

The above theoretical framework applied in the policies regarding the minority in Thrace can provide us some useful remarks.

It is since Lausanne peace treaty which 'fixed' the different communities in the region as one (Muslim) minority and resulted their (partial) unification, what resulted the "lack" of the minority for an ethnic identification during a period that the national ideology was expanded in the Balkan area and the ethnic identification was prevailed against the religious one. This lack, which was supplemented by the Greek policy and especially by its denial to recognize the ethnic character of the minority, was filled with the ideas of Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism in that case functioned as the 'nodal point', the crucial factor around which the minority was unified and constructed a logic of division ('equivalential logic') against the Greek majority in the same way that the Greek nationalism had constructed the same logic.

⁵ In that case the nationalism of a home-state is formulated around a dominant ethnic 'core' which perceives itself as the legitimized "owner" of the state, at the time when the nationalism of the kin-state challenges directly the home-state nationalism since it asserts a right to control, support and promote his co-nationals abroad against in possible assimilation policies of the home state. Finally the minority and their nationalism is between the two antagonistic nationalisms. Of course, those three parts are not considered as closed and fixed categories but as relational entities which are transformed continuously.

But what interests us here more is that the ‘minority rights’ as they derived from the treaty, constructed a ‘space’ where the Greek state couldn’t enter expanding its hegemony. It was this space that became the contested element between the two states after the increased influence of the Turkish nationalism in the region.

The raising of the Turkish nationalism among the minority members troubles increasingly the local administration since its re-establishment in the region in 1945 (mainly in Komotini at that time). This Turkish influence and ‘propaganda’ (as it is called) is regarded as the most important issue and as a negative proportion in the relation between the Greek state and the minority; the strongest the relation of the minority with the Kemalist reforms, the weakest its relation with the Greek state. This perception had as result the approach of the minority as an issue of ‘National security’ during the 60’s.

This is the starting point from which the request for more strict policy derives. Turkey through its consultant was presented as the one who had the power in the region and this is what provoked and legitimized all the decisions for the strengthening of the repressive and restriction measures⁶. This is also the starting point for the efforts to restrict the minority autonomy (especially in education and in administration) which was blamed for the expansion of the Turkish influence.

As long as Turkey could apply reprisal measures in Istanbul against the Greek-Orthodox minority, the Greek state could not be directly been involved in the region restricting the activity of the modernists. This is why behind the scenes supported the conservatives⁷. With the support of the conservatives and the perception of the minority issue as one pf ‘national security’ the Greek state tried to impose a border inside minority (a ‘logic of equivalence’ in our terminology), and to include on that all those who co-operated with the Greek administration, or they simply didn’t follow the Kemalist reforms. Thus, a border based in the negation of an identity, supporting something more like a ‘negative’ identity than a ‘positive’ one⁸.

This is why Turkish nationalism in the region functioned as a ‘constitutive outside’ for the Greek nationalism and this is why as I argued in the beginning we have this antagonistic relation between the two nationalisms. This negation of the identity (which took place from both sides) is exactly what gives rise to antagonisms, since the hegemonic force (Greece) which is responsible for the negation of an individual or collective identity will tend to con-

⁶ The failure of the Greek policy to avoid the spreading of the Kemalist reforms leads the local administration to blame the Turkish consultant. ; in such extend that the responsible for the Greek policy in the region states: «In Thrace, Ankara is the one who has the power and governs».

⁷ Iliadis C. «The national identity of the Muslim minority and the educational policy. A Study of Archival sources 1945-1967» (in Greek), unpublished MA Thesis, 2004.

⁸ Identity has an impossibility of closure (a fundamental lack) and the reason for that is something which always prevents it, an ‘outsider’ which blocks the full identity of the object. Laclau and Mouffe argue that this ‘outside’ or ‘negativity’ which prevents an identity of fully constitute itself, it is thus ‘constitutive’ of the identity. Blocking the identity constitutes it. So, the negativity is part of any identity and identities are relational fields which are formulated with a continuous interplay between ‘themselves’ and the ‘outside’. (Laclau-Mouffe 1985: 107, 111 and Laclau 1990: 4). This *constitutive outside* is inherent to *any* antagonistic relationship (Laclau 1990: 9).

struct the excluded identity (Turkish) as one of a series of threatening obstacles (Torning, 120).

This antagonistic relation in Thrace was based on and produced an antagonistic fixity between the political frontiers, implying the 'total' exclusion of the other in a way that no articulation, no communication between the two parts was possible. The relation between the two groups (those who were defined with the Greek state and those who were defined with the Turkish) could only be one of a potential war. In such a situation only the disappearance of the other could have provided the possibility of a stable resolution of the socio-political division, something which partially has happened with the disappearance of the conservative group.

The above together with the national ideology and the specific historical formation of the nation-states in the Balkan area led to the application of policies of exclusion, assimilation or expulsion regarding the historical ethnic minorities.

**Concepts, rhetoric and electoral reform:
Introducing compulsory voting in Greece, 1911-1926**

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ABSTRACT

Ever since the institution of representative government, debates over the principles and practice of voting are recurring, especially due to the post-Soviet wave of democratisation. Issues linked to the electoral system might appear too technical and unimportant, yet they depend on specific political choices of the past and on conceptual positions that define the relation between states and citizens. One such controversial issue is compulsory as opposed to voluntary voting. In this paper I touch upon the relevant Greek discussion in the turbulent years preceding WWII and try to follow their references to similar European examples. In particular, I focus on three different moments prior to the introduction of this measure in constitutional and electoral legislation. By following up on parliamentary, journalistic and academic texts, I wish to shed some light on the historical development of a neglected voting principle, which informs the political constellations and the understanding of key concepts like representation and freedom.

I. Introduction

Compulsory voting laws exist in several countries today, from Belgium, Luxembourg and Cyprus to Australia, Singapore and Argentina. Some European states abolished them in the last decades including Italy and the Netherlands. It has recently re-entered the French and British parliamentary agenda, as a possible counter-measure to low election turnouts. In Greece, it first appeared in the 1911 Constitution as an interpretive act allowing for its introduction in the legislation. Indeed, in 1926 it became part of the new election law, which also introduced the

proportional system. Since then, little if any evidence exists about its actual enforcement.

Nevertheless, in the framework of the 2001 constitutional revision, the Greek legislator found it worthwhile to withdraw a provision for imposing penalties to non voters. Stripped of its potential, compulsory voting became a pure *lex imperfecta*, ‘light that does not lighten, fire that does not burn’ to quote the poetical effusion of a Greek MP¹. What is the ideological background of such a nominal law that symbolises the core of democratic representation for some and epitomises a violation of electoral freedom for others?

Few years later, an appeal concerning the 2004 national election results challenged the validity of blank votes in the calculation of electoral thresholds. In this case, the Special Supreme Court issued a controversial decision to count blank votes as valid thereby raising the thresholds. In this context, the compulsory nature of voting served to justify the decision by pointing to the significance of blank votes as a valid political choice in terms of conscientious objection. In November 2005, the government overturned this decision and the specified New Democracy MP for Serres Achilles Karamanlis resigned, while the case is also pending with the Council of Europe. The new election law defined blank votes as invalid. All these ambiguous changes underlined the fact that compulsory participation in elections remained a politicised and thus questionable issue.

II. Methodology: history, language and political thought

In order to effectively question the present we need to escape from its own limited analytical scope. Instead, we had better to look away from the current partisan problematic, back to the past to understand what generated it and then venture a guess about how it could look in the future. Indeed, an ongoing riddle unravels itself if we approach it in an ‘original’ way, precisely by discovering its historical ‘origins’. To take note of the different issues linked to the topic throughout history allows to discover its life cycle and to reconstruct its ‘genealogy’². Once the time-element is brought into play, our horizon becomes wider and the dynamics of the political game more transparent.

My main focus targets the political language of the parties to the debate. As a result, I follow up the recurrence of guiding terms such as ‘liberty’, ‘democracy’ and ‘representation’, their synonyms and derivatives. These terms do not only give shape to the argument, they take shape themselves too. As Koselleck argued, historical changes of phenomena are linguistically articulated in concepts³. For example, using the concept of liberty to substantiate a claim for or against obligatory vote enables a reform and re-description of its meaning within that particular historical context.

However, these conceptualisations are not regarded as theorems, but as a type of rhetorical artefacts. In other words, the arguments contained in them will not be taken at face value, but in view of their function within linguistic acts of persuasion. Or, as Quentin Skinner suggested, political discourse consists of speech-acts, expressions that are reasoned within a particular discursive context and articulated in accordance to the purpose they serve⁴. This approach allows uncovering the elements of politicisation and moralisation in parliamentary deliberations.

The competitive character of the debate and the constitutional nature of the question trigger reflection and innovation concerning key political and legal principles. Indeed, the arguments put forward by the political agents bear a significant conceptual quality recognisable as articulation of genuine political thinking⁵. Therefore, I prefer to count as evidence of political thought the contingent reference to selected concepts within political speeches rather than their systematic description contained in the *grandes œuvres* of political philosophy.

III. 1. The 1911 debate: external paradigms

The first relevant official discussion took place in Greece in the context of the constitutional reform on the 2nd April 1911. Upon MP Athanasakis’ proposal, the 30-member committee, chaired by St.Dragoumis, had introduced a relevant paragraph on compulsory voting in its draft, presented to the plenum on 25th February 1911. A sentence under Art.66, which handled the principles of elections, read: ‘*the exercise of the specified right is compulsory as further regulated by the law*’⁶.

a. The ancient Greek legacy: Solon, Plato and Aristophanes

Both the constitutional committee's written comment and MP Athanasakis's opening remarks made explicit reference to ancient Greek political thought and practice. The report stated that the incorporated new measure was '*a principle, whose origin is purely Greek*'⁷. Or, according to MP Athanasakis, it was '*a duty recognised ever since antiquity*'⁸. Regardless of the theoretical value contained in the ancient texts, the link with that tradition strengthened the argument by emphasising two points. Firstly, the element of Greek-ness responded to accusations that many regulations were copied and uncritically 'transplanted' from other countries. Secondly, the classic legacy brought in the authority and legitimating depository of tradition.

In particular, an idea similar to compulsory voting coexisted in the Laws of Solon (6th century BC). The archaic legislation was meant to put an end to the economic stalemate, social inequality and political fragmentation in Athens. Solon tried to moderate the ongoing civil strife (*stasis*) between the nobles and the common people by promoting political solidarity. Plutarch explains: '*Amongst his other laws, one is very peculiar and surprising, which disfranchises all who stand neuter in a sedition; for it seems he would not have any one remain insensible and, regardless of the public good and securing his private affairs, glory that he has no feeling of the distempers of his country; but at once join with the good party and those that have the right upon their side, assist and venture with them, rather than keep out of harm's way and watch who would get the better* (emphasis added)'⁹. In other words, Solon's vision had Athenians placing private interests below public good, to guarantee political and civil unanimity, even within a basically oligarch system.

Other arguments drew from ancient Greek political philosophy to substantiate the idea of political duty. In his Republic (360 BC), Plato explicitly attacks those who abstain from politics: '*the chief disadvantage for he who does not want to rule is to be ruled by someone who is worse than himself*'¹⁰. For, in an ideal society, what drives men into politics is not money or honour, but fear of bad governance, in other words interest of self-preservation. Hence, abstention does not make sense in the Platonic society. On the other hand, the Aristotelian concept of political community through

equality provided for an alteration of command and obedience. '*An inalienable condition of liberty is ruling and being ruled in turn*'¹¹ reads a famous passage from Politics (350 BC). People who could be governors as much as governed would be free persons too¹². If voting is an act ruling, then liberty is partly enshrined within.

Despite the charm of the Aristotelian ideal of participation, the political reality of ancient Athens pointed at the practical difficulties. Ironically, the phenomenon of citizens who shirked their duties towards the state existed then too. Aristophanes, the famous comic script writer, called them 'escaping citizens'¹³. His satiric hero Dikaiopolis observes: '*some chit-chatted in the market, skedaddled here and there, to avoid the red rope*'¹⁴. In fact, we learn from this quote that the authorities in Athens urged all citizens to directly take part in the works of the governing assembly, the ecclesia, by laying a rope with fresh red paint around it; those who tended to linger behind were marked with the rope's red colour and charged with a fine. Aristophanes mocks the authorities for this practice by making his comic hero shout: '*O city, city! I am always first to come to the assembly and sit there*'¹⁵.

b. The 19th century precedents

More recent efforts to introduce the obligation to vote were recorded in an old law on the organisation of Municipalities and Communes which dated from 27 December 1833. Art.14 indicated that '*every member of the community who has the right to vote must attend the municipal elections and vote in them*'¹⁶. Unless 2/3 of the electorate took part in local elections, the result was considered invalid; with the exemption of the sick and the absent, non participants were then invited to pay the expenses for a by-election. According to Kyriakopoulos, the law had no practical value at all, for its enforcement had many practical difficulties¹⁷. It affirms however, an 'early' tendency to enforce democratic participation. Sotirellis attributes the 'democratic nature' of the Greeks throughout the nineteenth century, on one hand to a weak societal polarisation and the decentralised system of communes in the Ottoman era, and on the other to the egalitarian and anti-dynastic impetus of the Greek War of Independence after 1821¹⁸.

In 1899, the Assembly of Crete also happened to briefly discuss compulsory voting¹⁹. Eleftherios Venizelos at that time served as Minister of Justice to the High Representative of Crete. He himself proposed compulsory vote and the 16-member committee pre-approved it with a sharp majority. But Prince George disagreed with him as he found it practically unenforceable; the courts, he said, could not leave aside all their works after every election in order to judge people who had not participated in them. The courts should rather focus on the resolution of general election disputes in the post-election period. This opinion fought down Venizelos' proposal and compulsory voting did not pass into the Cretan constitution. Instead, the Cretan treaty incorporated the unified vote and minority representation as means of empowering voters and hence attracting them to the polls. Twelve years later, Venizelos would claim that those reforms lead to a high electoral turnout in the 1901 elections in the island compared to the usually lower quotas in the mainland (85-90% against 65%).

c. The examples of Belgium and Germany

Another argument for compulsory voting was the successful examples from other countries. Its introduction in the Belgian Constitution in 1893 succeeded at surprisingly reducing some relatively high abstention rates. Barthélemy showed that the initiative came from the side of the Catholics and Liberals, who were trying to offset the rise of the Socialist party²⁰. In other words, the voting zeal of the Socialists, who collected the voices of the militant and rising working class, had encumbered the election of bourgeois parties, whose followers were the ones mostly targeted by the new measure.

In Germany too, the fear of the Socialist party legitimized a strategy of compelling citizens to vote in the elections of 1907. Rather than enacting a concrete bill, the government administration exercised pressure on civil servants through unofficial 'instruction' meetings in the workplace or repetitive statements concerning the 'patriotic duty to vote', pronounced by the interior ministers in each of the federal states²¹. As a deterrent, they used admonitions about dismissal and displacement, which proved an effective strategy. For MP Koutoupis, this example showed the coercive nature of the measure, which led to the election of the 'detested' German party of the conservatives.

III. 2. The 1911 debate: internal rationale

a. Universalising suffrage: a guarantee for social inclusion

In a similar vein to the Belgian and German cases, one reason to introduce punishment against abstention was to counter voters from the working classes, usually adhering to socialist ideas. Hence, the main rationale was to urge to the polls the usually more moderate voters of the upper class. In the committee's own words, the new measure would contribute *'to countering the wide inexcusable neglect, especially observed among the developed classes unfortunately, through which they wrong the polity and themselves'*²². Hence, inclusiveness and balanced political representation of all social strata gave a strong argument for proposing compulsory voting.

In fact, the measure would benefit the poorer classes too, as it would stop them from being the prey of the rich and influential; their legal obligation to vote would pose an end to their de facto disenfranchisement through bribery. In MP Roufos' mind, it would prevent the exploitation of the peasants and secure their unimpeded and spontaneous turnout at the polls. For it would leave the prospective corrupters without any method of controlling the numbers of voters and thus set the necessary seal for free voting²³. This was a particularly strong motivation, in the context of the 1909 Goudi movement, when new political forces proclaimed the defeat of the wealthy old establishment.

Of course, nothing could fully prevent money offers to the poorer voters, who had still the possibility to agree on casting a blank ballot. MP Koutoupis' pessimistic view ruled out any possibility for escape from the advantages of the rich and the dependence of the poor. The proposed system, he said, would end up imposing fines to the latter while recognising many abstention excuses to the former, to whom punishment by fine did not constitute a great threat anyway.

b. The outdated RIGHT v. DUTY debate

The dead-end of the first theoretical argument brought to questioning the nature of the vote as such. Since the debates of the French Revolution, the division was crystallized between those who regarded it as a duty (fonction) and those who considered it a right (droit). The first line, developed during the Constituante (1789-91), was compatible with the idea of ‘national sovereignty’ (as opposed to royal). Its main theorist, the Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, explicitly distinguished between active and passive citizens: “*Tous les habitants d’un pays doivent y jouir des droits de citoyen passif [...] mais tous n’ont pas droit a prendre une part active dans la formation des pouvoirs publics : tous ne font pas citoyens actifs*”²⁴. The unique and indivisible entity of the nation can express its will only through selected members, who are state agents thus responsible to exercise their duties.

On the contrary, the Convention in France (1792-95) understood and instituted voting as an individual right. This was compatible to the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’, according to which the people, that is all citizens, “*have the inalienable and sacred right to contribute to the formation of the law*”²⁵. Electing was a true act of sovereignty, a political right that belonged to everyone by virtue of nature and reason. Rousseau went further and recognized such an extent of authority to individual voters that they could even decide to sell their vote²⁶. It is noteworthy that French scholars tended to identify the Anglophone tradition with this Rousseauvian liberalism, arguing that extreme individualism²⁷ and a general disgust against constraints²⁸ allows these electors to freely determine their political will, including the decision to participate in elections altogether.

A third opinion expressed the middle way. According to Raymond Carré de Malberg, voting is both an individual right and a collective function, “*un droit, en tant qu’il s’agit pour l’électeur de se faire admettre au vote et d’y prendre part; une fonction, en tant qu’il s’agit des effets que doit produire l’acte électoral une fois accompli*”²⁹. In fact, at the time of the institution of universal suffrage in 1864, the Greek National Assembly adopted this view, after long debates between the national liberals and the republicans³⁰.

These three options have traditionally dominated discussions on the nature of the vote. However, they do not have much relevance to the debate on compulsory vote. Whether we agree to one or the other, we have room for a valid justification of compulsory vote. Although this is easy to understand with regard to the duty-concept, the rationale is not as clear with that of individual right. Yet the concept of right has become the buttress of universal suffrage. In this sense, as long as the reality of abstention undermines the element of universality, it follows that compulsory voting appears a necessary complement that would ‘validate and offset’ universal suffrage³¹. It would serve as ‘a reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the people’, self-discipline with regard to the exercise of their political rights³². The state would thereby go further, from respecting and protecting, towards fulfilling in a positive way the unifying³³ promise of universal suffrage.

c. Representation: idea and practice

In addition, the different concepts of voting have a strong link to different understandings of representation. Fears were voiced that ‘true’, ‘real’ or ‘full’ representation was at risk, if participation in elections would remain optional. If voting was only a right *strictu sensu*, everyone could decide not to vote, and then ‘we would not have representation’³⁴. For the existence of representative governments relied on a tacit agreement between the citizen-voters and the state as a representative institution, which the former had to validate by participating in the elections. As a result, the state possessed a right to defend itself against citizens who broke the ‘representation contract’ and force them to vote by threat of punishment. Otherwise, representative democracy would not have any serious possibility to work out. This argument relied on a three-partite conception of representation, whereby an abstract collectivity –the state- exists between represented and representatives and defines the rights and obligation of both.

The same idea of mimetic representation³⁵ was used in order to defend the ‘right of abstention’. The opponent MPs Koutoupis and Patsourakos pointed at widespread abstention of representatives themselves from the parliamentary sessions³⁶. As long as that situation remained, it would have been hypocritical to deny the same right to citizens. Here the representatives were portrayed as a model for the

represented, especially with regard to their political responsibility and public function. In this light, a system that forbade abstention would produce more voters, but less 'represented'³⁷.

The ideal of full representation encountered many practical difficulties when it came to the enforcement of compulsory voting³⁸. The indecision referred to finding efficient and costless transport, to the type of penalties -fines or removal from election lists- and the capacity of the judicial mechanism to deal with prosecution and appeals. Thus, Venizelos suggested other measures, such as abolishing the voting by spherules and introducing plural voting or catering for the representation of minorities. A new and fairer election system appeared a better solution and the assembly decided to authorize a special committee to take over the issue. The idea of a proportional election system began to germinate³⁹. For the moment, the assembly decided to add, under Art.66, a declaration stating that '*the law could establish the obligatory exercise of the right to vote*'⁴⁰. As Venizelos rightly foresaw, no follow-up came, despite the passing of a new election law (1075) in 1917.

IV. The 1923 debate

a. A response to election boycotting

The unsuccessful constitutional draft of 1920 included the same declaration as the 1911 Constitution. In the meantime, the political parties abstention from elections had become a frequent phenomenon⁴¹.

(a) The 28 November 1910 elections had been boycotted by the 'old oligarch' parties. Their decision was due to the predominance of the liberal-republican venizelist forces after the military coup of 1909. The latter had also secured support by the crown, hence their electoral victory was guaranteed.

(b) The election result of 31 May 1915 did not meet with the king's approval. An earlier disagreement with the winning Venizelos about which part to join in the First World War led king Constantine I to dissolve the parliament. The new elections of the same year were boycotted by the venizelists. However, after foreign

intervention in 1917, the first government was called back and the king surrendered his place to his son.

(c) In a controversial election in 1920, the venizelists lost, despite their successful foreign policy and the collection of more votes that were not translated in seats by the existing majority system. Subsequently, they boycotted the referendum of the same year, devised to authorise the return of Constantine I.

The next elections, scheduled for the 16th December 1923, would have been an answer to Constantine's poor leadership in the battles over Anatolia and the humiliating defeat of the Greek troops in August 1922. Foreseeing their defeat, the monarchists pronounced again their intention to abstain. Their decision was backed by the redesign of electoral districts and the enfranchisement of over a million Asia Minor refugees with traditionally leftist political views. In response to these plans, shortly before election-day, the anti-monarchists came up with the idea of introducing compulsory voting to safeguard the legitimacy of the upcoming election. The head of The Revolution, General Plastiras, announced the decree on the 1st of December⁴². A series of indirect measures, including temporary dismissal and suspension of life-long terms of civil servants, promotion of military personnel and judicial officers⁴³, allegations that the refugees would lose their aids and benefits, showed the intention of the incumbent government to create an atmosphere of intimidation.

The antivenizelists reacted instantaneously. They proclaimed their fundamental electoral liberties, denounced in advance those among the opposition who would participate in the elections and declared *a priori* invalid the upcoming election result (Picture 1). In addition, they appealed to the international community to stand guard (Picture 2). The press abounded in ironic comments, with the venizelists ridiculing abstainers and the opposition mocking the authorities for tampering with election lists⁴⁴. The government's position remained ambiguous. On the eve of the elections, Plastiras stated that '*abstention for political reasons was a crime against the fatherland*', it undermined government stability and the parliamentary regime as a whole. However, the day after he denounced rumours about punishment of civil servants, on the basis of their un-stamped personal election booklets⁴⁵.

b. Political risk or moral gain?

Upon invitation from the antivenizelists, constitutional law scholar Alexandros Svolos expressed his view of compulsory voting as an aggressive act that would probably unleash more violence. Only the 'free will' of the electorate could guarantee equilibrium between the opposed forces; elections did not need legitimating as long as they conformed to legal standards opposing undue interference on voters. He added that it neither preceded in imperativeness to fortify the regime against domestic and foreign actors. The absence of a serious opposition in parliament would be the natural punishment for the abstaining opposition. However, the 1915 case proved Svolos wrong. Not only did the venizelist abstainers form a parallel government in Thessaloniki, they were also backed by the Entente, who dissolved the monarchist parliament, in their capacity as patrons of the Greek constitution, forced Constantine to leave the country and his successor to call back the parliament in its initial composition (*'Vouli ton Lazaron'*).

Obviously, the issue was too politicised to pass at that specific moment. Nevertheless, it was acceptable in principle even by the opposition. In its absolute form, the idea of binding people to choose their representatives had a clear pedagogical value⁴⁶. It would enhance the political literacy of citizenry and make them fully conscious of the importance of voting, if anything, as a safeguard of their own interests. This explains also the persistence of the principle in time, despite its inapplicability. For, the winners of each election had logically no interest in prosecuting those who did not show up at the polls.

c. Germany and France

In order to convince the opposition, new examples of similar practices in other countries were illustrated. In 1923, an attempt to introduce such a provision in the German Constitution under Art.125 had no success. Admittedly, the initiative was a repercussion of the 1922 elections for the House of Saxony, when workers' councils characterised the electors who abstained as 'indolent' and 'enemies of the working class'⁴⁷. As a result, the bourgeois parties suffered a large electoral loss. However,

compulsory voting did not pass at the end, partly because it contradicted the other constitutional principle of 'free elections'.

In France the relevant discussion was triggered by the fear of an apathetic citizenry, 'the greatest danger of Democracy'⁴⁸. Abstention for reasons of neglect and indolence did not consort with the republican ideal of political participation. However, the situation in Greece differed. Due to the politicisation of the issue and the wave of reactions, the day after announcing the plan Plastiras consulted legal advisor Konstantinidis and constitutional law Professor Nicolaos Saripolos. The latter argued that in most countries compulsory voting supplemented the proportional system, which provided more guarantees for the representation of minority opinions⁴⁹. So the decree fell into discredit and was withdrawn, just as expeditiously as it was registered.

V. The 1926 debate: attracting the 'best' votes

Nevertheless, according to the applied Constitution of 1911, the matter still depended on the legislator. Indeed, compulsory voting was to enter the Greek legislation for the first time as a clause in the election law of 1926⁵⁰, which introduced the proportional system. At this point, General Pangalos seized control, dissolved the Fourth National Assembly, headed by Michalakopoulos, and authorised a 30-member committee headed by Alexandros Papanastasiou to draft a new Constitution (1925/1926). The outcome of these deliberations that lasted from 7th July to 9th September was published in September 1925, but with too many arbitrary alterations. Hence, Pangalos proclaimed his dictatorship in January 1926 and he attempted, without success, to organise elections and apply compulsory voting. He was finally overturned in August 1926 by General Kondylis, who announced elections for November, on the basis of the election law that was ratified by the Papanastasiou committee⁵¹.

In the summer 1925 deliberations, introducing compulsory voting appeared purposeful for three different reasons⁵². First, according to MP Voudouris, it would counterbalance electoral abstention, which was high '*not only in numbers but also in quality*'. It would '*assure the participation in voting of the best in town, who do not*

condescend to vote and leave elections in the lap of the disorderly elements', Papanastasiou added. Second, compulsory voting would obstruct those who encourage others not to vote for certain candidates. Finally, it would intimidate that class of electors that MP Alevizatos criticized about not voting unless they got paid for it. In fact, it was observed that only those who had a '*personal interest*' attended the polls.

These arguments, along with generous provision for exemption of the sick, the old and those who lived far, convinced the opponents. The new measure would not harm the quality of democracy; it would rather improve it by protecting citizens from corruption. Hereby, democracy was portrayed as an abstract value that requires devotion from the represented as much as from the representatives. As Papanastasiou declared, '*those abstaining from elections lose their right to protest against the decisions that are made in their absence; otherwise political life in a land cannot exist*'⁵³. This statement equated abstention with '*political suicide*'⁵⁴, but it also implied that political existence became conditional upon complying with and participating in the existing structures, thereby establishing an '*equal and universal dependence of all*'⁵⁵.

Once more, the opposition complained; obliging citizens to express their preference in '*an unknown language*' -the new electoral system of proportionality and ballots instead of majority and spherules- made an insult to the common understanding of electoral liberty⁵⁶. Any intervention by the state undermined the integrity and full consciousness of the voters (Picture 3). This individualist definition of liberty stood in contrast to the overly republican character of the new election law⁵⁷. In addition to compulsory voting, it also provided for a later incorporation of a clause that disenfranchised the illiterate. In any case, given the high number of abstentions and the inoperability of enforcing participation, all hopes for resolving the political stalemate rested with proportionality that led to an upheaval of existing party structures and a reconfiguration of their electoral strength⁵⁸.

Hence, compulsory voting was not enforced in the elections. More than one third of the electorate abstained, but certainly not as many as the opposition claimed. The issue generally retrograded and was not considered important enough to pass into

the new Constitution of 1927. For the August 1928 poll, Venizelos restored the majority system and issued a legislative decree⁵⁹ affirming the validity of other parts of the 1926 election law including compulsory voting. But for a second time, no judicial enforcement followed because of the high number of the offenders. The failure to enforce it immediately after its first introduction anticipated what would be the life of a dormant institution throughout the twentieth century.

VI. The aftermath⁶⁰

Despite the imperfectness of the law, it continued to attract the attention of the legislator. As a result, in 1929 it was complemented by another clause, providing even heavier punishment to ‘*anyone who would prevent the elector from voting in whatever way, especially if the latter has some sort of dependence from her*’⁶¹. By that point, the notion of voting freedom started to take new shape, to include not only direct coercion but also indirect pressure based on relationships of dependence.

Since then, the clause reappeared alternatively in election laws, coercion acts or legislative, royal and presidential decrees to our day⁶². It was incorporated again as a declaration in the Constitution of 1952 (Art.66). In the following period of ‘the right-wing state’, two legislative decrees introduced stricter punishment, including imprisonment, dismissal of civil servants and ineligibility to acquire occupational clearances, driving licenses, passports or IDs⁶³. It finally became a constitutional clause in the 1968 and 1973 Constitutions, during the dictatorship of the colonels. Few, if any, convictions were ever recorded, mostly targeting the communists that abstained in the 1946 elections. However, its existence in the law succeeded in intimidating voters and slowly but steadily raising the rates of electoral participation.

Finally, despite its obvious slide to a totalitarian type of application, compulsory voting was also included in the democratic Constitutions of 1975/1986/2001 (Art.51, par.5). The 1975 debate, where Dimitris Tsatsos and Apostolos Kaklamanis systematically opposed it as un-democratic and arbitrary institution that undermined the political meaning of abstention. Its retention however could be also interpreted in the light of the paternalistic conservatism of Karmanlis’ cabinet that took over from the colonels⁶⁴. Here again, the language of the debate

shows that it was strongly interlinked to perceptions of liberty, representation and democracy.

VII. Conclusion

To sum up, the Greek discussion about compulsory voting seems not to have unfinished. The general question of whether it is expedient to oblige citizens to vote is scattered in smaller instances of debate, defined by specific political constellations in each historical context. The ancient Greek legacy, the post-1909 tendency to eliminate the political influence of the old establishment and fight electoral corruption and to bring to the polls the moderate bourgeois informed the first decision to introduce it in the Constitution of 1911.

Ten years later, it was conceived as a measure against organised and politically motivated electoral abstention that subverted the foundations and stability of the regime. The opposition denounced it as an act of petty tyranny and the government accused boycotters as potential terrorists. Compulsory voting was enacted in the electoral law of 1926, as a complement to a proportional system in the light of the post-1922 wider republican reform. The absence of real enforcement despite its constitutionalisation in 1968 did not prevent it from functioning as a medium of intimidation that could be reinvigorated selectively.

Whether a republican ideal or a totalitarian means of oppression, the question appears irresolvable throughout time. The concepts of right and duty, but mainly those of liberty and democracy were often used to justify the positions of both proponents and opponents of compulsory electoral participation. Eleftherios Venizelos, the subsequent founder of the Liberal Party, had himself suggested its introduction in the 1899 Constitution of Crete. On the other hand, the monarchists, who were the main objectors, protested against what they saw as a violation of basic political liberties.


On the basis of my analysis of the actual deliberations, I argue with Quentin Skinner⁶⁵ that the distinction between the two opposite conceptualisations of freedom lies on their emphasis either on the state or on the individual. The alliance of liberals-republicans endorsed an understanding of freedom as a common good that flourished

only within a state. The state existed only if the contract between represented and representatives held strong. In return it safeguarded the equality of all citizens and protected them against external and internal enemies. Hence, *freedom OF vote* was conceptualised as state-guaranteed absence of inter-dependence. In contrast, the monarchists defended freedom in terms of an individual's blessing that extended over and above elections and the state. Theirs was a *freedom TO vote* or *NOT TO vote* defined negatively as absence of state interference on the personal will of the individual.

The two opposed views of free voting adopt also a different perception of democracy. The first understands it as a political system with members that are equal and independent from each other. The second sees it as one that encompasses individuals without interfering on them. This ideological difference precluded any agreement on the terms of the debate and offered the basis for a perpetual conflict. Only by historicising the theoretical argument does it become clear that it is a highly politicised matter that spans over the whole of the twentieth century.



Picture 1.
Abstention or Participation?
The burning issue of the day
Ethniki Ora, 2.12.1923



Picture 2.
Urgent appeal of the opposition for the abstention.
Declares people's electoral liberties prosecuted.
Protest to the International Assembly and the League of Nations
Ethniki Ora, 4.12.1923



Picture 3.
The Pre-election Kitchen (proportionality, elections).
'With the things you pour into the pot you will spoil the food, cook!'
Proia, 4.9.1926

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- ¹ MP Anastasios Nerantzis, Parliamentary Proceedings – 7th Revision Assembly, 22.2.2001
- ² Rosanvallon P. 2002. Pour une histoire conceptuelle du politique, Paris : Seuil
- ³ Koselleck R. 1972. 'Einleitung' in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, v.I, p. XIX
- ⁴ Skinner Q. 2002. *Visions of Politics I: Regarding Method*, Cambridge: CUP, p.103-127, 145-175
- ⁵ Palonen K. 2005. 'Political Theorizing as a Dimension of Political Life' in *European Journal of Political Theory* 4(4) 351–366
- ⁶ «Η άσκησης τοῦ δικαιώματος τούτου εἶνε ὑποχρεωτική, κατὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου εἰδικώτερον ὀρισθησόμενα», Second Report of the Constitutional Revision Committee, 25.2.1911 in Davais M. – Papaioannou G. 1911. *To Istorikon tis Anatheoriseos tou syntagmatos kai ta episima keimena: to neon syntagma*, Athens: Kallitehnikhi Epitehorisi, p.133
- ⁷ «ἀρχή, τῆς ὁποίας ἄλλως τε ἡ καταγωγή εἶνε ἀκραιφνῶς Ἑλληνική», *ibid.*
- ⁸ «καθήκον ἀναγνωρισμένο ἀπὸ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα ἀκόμη», *Journal of Parliamentary Discussions*, 2.4.1911, p. 1548-1553
- ⁹ «τῶν δ' ἄλλων αὐτοῦ νόμων ἴδιος μὲν μάλιστα καὶ παράδοξος ὁ κελεύων ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει μηδετέρας μερίδος γενόμενον. Βούλεται δ', ὡς ἔοικε, μὴ ἀπαθῶς μηδ' ἀναισθητῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ θέμενον τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τῷ μὴ συναλαγεῖν μηδὲ συννοεῖν τῇ πατρίδι καλλωπιζόμενον, ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν τοῖς τὰ βελτίω καὶ δικαιοτέρα πράττουσι προσθέμενον, συγκινδυνεύειν καὶ βοηθεῖν, μᾶλλον ἢ περιμένειν ἀκινδύνως τὰ τῶν κρατούντων». Plutarch. 75 AD. *The Lives, Solon*, XX, transl. J.Dryden in *The MIT Internet Classics Archive*
- ¹⁰ «Τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλη ἄρχειν», cited in Saripolos 1899. See also Plato. 360BC. *Republic*, I, 347, 25, transl. B.Jowett in *The MIT Internet Classics Archive*
- ¹¹ «Ἐλευθερίας ἐν τῷ μέρει ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι», cited in Saripolos 1899. See also Aristotle. 350BC. *Politics*, VII, Part XIV, transl. B.Jowett in *The MIT Internet Classics Archive*. In 1899, Professor Saripolos used this Aristotelian idea to advocate the restoration of common rule in the act of electing. Saripolos N.N. 1899. *La Démocratie et l'Élection Proportionnelle*, Paris: Arthur Rousseau, p.340-342, n.4
- ¹² Several centuries later, Rousseau criticizes this idea of freedom through representation: 'Le peuple Anglais pense être libre, il se trompe fort ; il ne l'est que durant l'élection des membres du parlement : sitôt qu'ils sont élus, il est esclave, il n'est rien.' [1762]. *Du Contrat Social*. Book III, Ch.XV
- ¹³ «διαδρασιπολιται», Aristophanes. 405BC. *Frogs*, 1014, cited in Charitakis G. 1925. *Peri analogikis eklogis*, b1, Athens: Estia, p. 169-171
- ¹⁴ «Δικαιοπόλις: οἱ δ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ λαλοῦσι κᾶνω καὶ κάτω τὸ σχοινίον φεύγουσι τὸ μεμιλωμένον», Aristophanes. 425BC. *Akharnians*, 21-22, cited in Saripolos N.N. 1915. *Ellinikon Syntagmatikon Dikaion*, Athens: A.Raftanis, p.342, n.2
- ¹⁵ «Ὡ πόλις, πόλις, ἐγὼ δ' αἶε πρωτίστος εἰς ἐκκλησίαν νοστῶν κάθημαι», Aristophanes 425BC, 27-29
- ¹⁶ «πᾶς δημότης, ἔχων τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ψηφοφορεῖν ὀφείλει νὰ παραυρίσκειται εἰς τὰς δημοτικὰς ἐκλογὰς καὶ νὰ ψηφοφορῇ κατ'αὐτάς», *Journal of The Government of The Kingdom of Greece* n.3, 10.1.1834
- ¹⁷ Kyriakopoulos E. 1932. *Ellinikon Syntagmatikon Dikaion* v1, b1, Thessaloniki: M.Triantafyllou, p.293, n.1
- ¹⁸ Sotirellis G. 1991. *Syntagma kai Ekloges stin Ellada 1864-1909. Ideologia kai Praksi tis Katholikis Psifoforias*, Athens: Themelio, p.86-91, 433-434
- ¹⁹ Saripolos N.N. 1902. *To Kritikon Syntagmatikon Dikaion*, Athens: Raftani-Papageorgiou, p.34-37
- ²⁰ Barthélemy J. 1912. *L'Organisation du Suffrage et l'Expérience Belge*, Paris: Giard & Brière, p.7768
- ²¹ Arsenschek R. 2003. *Der Kampf um die Wahlfreiheit im Kaiserreich*, Düsseldorf: Droste, p.209-15
- ²² «πρὸς καταπολέμησιν τῆς παρὰ πολλοῖς, ἐκ τῶν ἀνεπτυγμένων ἰδιᾶ, δυστυχῶς τάξεων παρατηρουμένης ἀσυγγνώστου ὀλιγωρίας, δι'ἧς οὗτοι ἀδικοῦσι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ ἑαυτούς», Second Report 1911
- ²³ Barthélemy J. 1923. 'Pour le vote obligatoire' in *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*, p.121
- ²⁴ Sieyès E.-J. 1789. *Préliminaire de la Constitution française : reconnaissance et exposition raisonnée des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, Paris : Bibliothèque Royale, p.36-37
- ²⁵ Pétion J. de Villeneuve, cited in Sgouritsas C. 1959. *Syntagmatikon Dikaion*, v.1, Athens : Zacharopoulou, p.229. MP Andreou uses the same expression in the Greek context, see *Journal* 1911

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- ²⁶ Rousseau, Book IV, Ch.I.
- ²⁷ Hauriou M. 1923. *Précis de Droit Constitutionnel*, Paris: Sirey, p.631
- ²⁸ Barthélemy 1922, p.131
- ²⁹ Carré de Malberg R. 1920. *Contribution à la Théorie générale de l'État*, t.I, Paris: Sirey, p.441, 463
- ³⁰ Sotirellis 1992, p. 60-68
- ³¹ «εἶνε ἡ κύρωση τῆς καθολικῆς ψηφοφορίας καὶ τὸ ἀντιστάθμισμά τῆς», *Second Report* 1911
- ³² Charitakis 1925, p. 170; Manesis A. 1965. *Ai Eggyiseis Tiriseos tou Syntagmatos*, II, Thessaloniki : Sakkoula, p.245-248
- ³³ Rosanvallon P. 1992. *Le Sacre du Citoyen*, Paris : Folio
- ³⁴ «ἂν εἶναι μόνον δικαίωμα, μποροῦν ὅλοι νὰ ἀποφασίσουν νὰ μὴν ψηφίσουν, καὶ τότε δὲ θὰ ἔχομεν ἀντιπροσωπεῖαν», *Journal* 1911
- ³⁵ Ankersmit F. 1996. *Aesthetic Politics. Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value*, Stanford: SUP, p.21-63
- ³⁶ MP Patsourakos, *Journal* 1911
- ³⁷ Saripolos 1899, p.339
- ³⁸ Robson A. W. 1923. 'Compulsory Voting' in *Political Science Quarterly* 38 (4)
- ³⁹ Meyer G. 1901. *Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht*, Berlin: O.Haering, p.657; Saripolos 1899, p.343
- ⁴⁰ «ὁ νόμος δύναται νὰ καταστήσῃ ὑποχρεωτικὴν τὴν ἐνάσκησιν τοῦ ἐκλογικοῦ δικαιώματος», *Journal* 1911
- ⁴¹ *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous* v.15, 1978, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, p.271-304; Contiades I. 1969. 'Griechenland' in Sternberger D. and Vogel B. (eds.), *Die Wahl der Parlamente und anderer Staatsorgane. Ein Handbuch*, b1, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, p.555-603
- ⁴² 'Patris', 1.12.1923
- ⁴³ 'Eleftheron Vima', 8-15.12.1923, 'Patris', 7.12.1923
- ⁴⁴ 'Ethniki Ora', 4-17.12.1923, 'Eleftheron Vema', 7-17.12.1923
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ Svolos A., 'Ethniki Ora', 5.12.1923. See also Svolos A. 1928. *To neon syntagma kai ai vaseis tou politevmatos*, Athens: Pysrou, p.275; Svolos A. 1935. *Syntagmatikon Dikaion*, B, 1, Athens: Pysrou, p.64
- ⁴⁷ Kyriakopoulos 1932, p.291 n.2
- ⁴⁸ 'Ethniki Ora', 5.12.1923
- ⁴⁹ Ibid. 'Estia', 3.12.1923.
- ⁵⁰ *Journal of the Government*, n.291, 2.9.1926, Law 3363, Art.3, par.6
- ⁵¹ 'Eleftheron Vima', 4.9.1926, 'Proia', 4.9.1926
- ⁵² *Official Proceedings of the Parliamentary Committee for the Constitution etc.* 1925. Athens: National Print, p.119-121
- ⁵³ 'Eleftheron Vima', 6.9.1926
- ⁵⁴ Sotirellis G. 1988. *To Dikaioma tis Lefkis Psifou kata to Syntagma kai tin Eklogiki Nomothesia*, Athens: Sakkoula, p. 24-26. Sotirellis distinguished between blank and invalid votes and attributes the term 'political suicide' rather to the latter, p.42.
- ⁵⁵ Palonen K. 2007. 'Voting and Liberty' in *Contributions* 3 (1) (forthcoming)
- ⁵⁶ 'Estia', 4.9.1926
- ⁵⁷ *Istoria* 1978, p.304
- ⁵⁸ Indeed, the 1920 Parliament included only two parties and the 1923 only the Liberals. In contrast, in 1926 at least eight parties entered and by 1928 ten, excluding the large number of independent candidates.
- ⁵⁹ *Journal of the Government*, n.122, 11.7.1928, LD, Art.3, par.6
- ⁶⁰ For more information on the second half of the century see my, 'Between republican reform and totalitarian application: compulsory vote in Greece 1946-67', in preparation for the 10th Annual Conference of the *History of Political And Social Concepts Group*, 30th August - 2nd September 2007, Istanbul Technical University, Turkey
- ⁶¹ 3824/1929 (Art.135, par.12)
- ⁶² El.L.3824/1929 (Art.6), El.L.5493/1932 (Art.8), C.A.1020/1946 (Art.10), C.A.1090/1946 (Art.5), El.L.1878/1951 (Art.30), L.D.3615/1956 (Art.5), L.D.4274/1962 (Art.65), R.D.592/1963 (Art.5), P.D.650/1974 (Art.7), El.L.1065/1980 (Art.33)
- ⁶³ 3615/1956 and 4274/1962, see Rallis K. 1969. *Votes, Elections and modern Electoral Systems (in Greek)*, Athens: (unknown publisher), p.73-76
- ⁶⁴ I am thankful to Professor Nicos Alivizatos for this comment.
- ⁶⁵ Skinner Q. 1998. *Liberty before Liberalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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A Theory of Nation-Building

Assimilation and Its Alternatives in Southeastern Europe

Abstract

Under what conditions does a state target a non-core group with group-specific assimilationist measures instead of accommodating it? When does it choose to physically remove the non-core group, by exchange, deportation, or killing? In this paper, I develop a theory that accounts for the variation in nation-building policies. I also test it against alternative explanations such as cultural distance arguments, modernization theory, and the homeland factor. I propose that the content of non-core groups' rival claims together with the host states' foreign policy goals are the most important explanatory variables in understanding nation-building policies. My test has been conducted on a dataset compiled on all politically relevant non-core groups in post-WWI Southeastern Europe. My results show that non-core groups living in states that pursue expansionist foreign policy goals are more likely to be excluded than targeted with assimilation. Furthermore, seeking no territorial changes and living in urban centers increase the likelihood of accommodation for a non-core group. When a non-core group is larger than one percent of the total population, however, it is more likely to be targeted with exclusionist or assimilationist policies rather than be accommodated. Prominent alternative explanations cannot account for the observed variation in nation-building policies. For example, non-core groups that are perceived as revisionist by ruling political elites will be targeted with exclusionist policies when they are living in revisionist states and are not primarily urban *irrespective* of their cultural distance from the core group or the existence of an external national homeland. Non-core groups whose cultural distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity are more likely to be targeted with assimilationist policies even when they have both a different language *and* religion from the core group.

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Introduction

Ruling political elites of modern nation-states have followed a wide range of policies to achieve national integration. Non-core groups have been targeted violently, deported, exchanged, and granted autonomy, while still other groups have experienced strong assimilation pressures. What accounts for the variation in nation-building strategies towards different non-core groups by the same government? What accounts for the variation in nation-building policies towards similar groups in different countries? Under what conditions does a state target a non-core group with group-specific assimilation measures instead of following nation-wide acculturation policies, granting it minority rights, or physically removing it by exchange, deportation or killing?

Many arguments have been proposed to explain aspects of this variation ranging from ethnic hatreds, racism, and ethnic dominance, to purely instrumental rationality or strictly military security ones. Most of these theories, however, focus on explaining only the most violent state strategies: extermination, deportation, and secession.¹ They neglect the less violent ones. As Stevan Pavlowitch notes, “There is a fascination with victims: the massacre of populations is more interesting than their daily lives.” (2000: 147). My argument accounts for both violent and non-violent strategies towards non-core groups.

An additional problem in the literature is the assumption that nation-building policies affect all non-core groups more or less equally; thus having little to say about the variation in state-planned nation-building policies. In reality national integration can be achieved in many ways ranging from supra-nationalist federalism to ethnic cleansing.

¹ Political violence has been studied under the label of genocide (Straus 2006, Valentino 2004, Rubinstein 2004, Harff 2003, Gurr 1993 and 2000), ethnic cleansing (Bulutgil 2006), and civilian victimization (Kalyvas 2006, Downes 2006), mass violence (Valentino et al. 2004), and violent ethnic conflict (Toft 2002/3 and 2003). For self-determination movements, see Horowitz 1985 and Sambanis & Zinn 2005.

Exploring the variation in nation-building policies across space and over-time allows me to relax this assumption and push our understanding of these processes forward.

Despite the voluminous literature on more or less successful national integration histories,² there is no theory that accounts for this variation in state policies towards non-core groups.³ To be sure, different paths to national-integration have been proposed. The modernization theorists have emphasized the importance of economic transformations such as industrialization and urbanization for identity change and suggested that national integration is more or less a by-product of these processes (Deutsch 1965, Gellner 1983). But these theories never specify who pursues these policies. As Anthony Smith put it, in this set of theories “the role of the state is simply to act as a handmaid of history, whose goal is a world of large-scale nation-states or regions.” (1986: 232).

Later generations of social scientists provided microfoundations to the various modernization theories (Hechter 1975, Laitin 1995 and 1998). However, these studies also embraced the unplanned character of nationalist assimilation strategies posited by the modernization theorists. Their work, inspired by methodological individualism, provided microfoundations focusing on the calculations individuals make with respect to identity choices (Laitin 1998).⁴ However, state policies range from assimilationist to

² Deutsch and Foltz (1966), Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973), Weber (1976).

³ Moreover, in the cases where assimilation strategies were pursued the content of the various policies followed and the extent of their implementation varied. Assimilation campaigns include one or a combination of the following policies: linguistic and educational reforms, affirmative action policies (facilitating social mobility), marriage laws, name-changing campaigns (both of people and of places), religious conversion, population displacement (segregation, dispersion, mingling), census manipulation, propaganda, violent persecution of elites that resist assimilation, and so forth. The variation in the strategies of assimilation will be influenced by the **type** of difference as well as issues such as spatial distribution, group size, and organizational structure. I pursue this research question elsewhere.

⁴ Populations adapt to the hegemonic constitutive story in order to secure upward social mobility. According to this theory we should not observe any group specific assimilation strategies since people will gradually integrate (just the basic incentive structure is enough). This theory ignores

exclusionist ones and individual level decisions are always structured by these contexts. Thus, without a theory that accounts for variation in state-planned policies towards non-core groups we cannot have a complete theory of nation-building. Overall, the “supply side” of nation-building is under-theorized.

I propose a theory that accounts for the nation-building choices of ruling political elites towards non-core groups. I identify the nature of non-core groups’ rival claims together with the host states’ foreign policy goals as key explanatory variables in understanding nation-building policies. Core group elites will pursue group-specific nation-building policies only if a non-core group is mobilized by a revisionist claim from a neighboring country or a local national movement. The policies will be assimilationist when the group is residing in a country that does not seek to change the status quo and exclusionist when it the host state has revisionist foreign policy goals. Within this subset of cases, cleansing becomes more likely in war-time when the stakes are high, the time horizon short, and the international attention low. If the non-core group has no competing claim at all, then the core group will follow nation-wide assimilation policies. The only situation where the ruling political elites will accommodate a non-core group is when it is mobilized by a status quo claim.

My argument is applicable to cases that satisfy the following scope conditions: 1. Regions where there is geopolitical competition for territorial control among both Great Powers and regional states, 2. there is a ruling core group in the country and part of the population has not been assimilated yet (i.e. there are non-core groups). 3. The boundaries of the state are fixed in the period for which I predict state strategies

the politics involved in the process. For example, sometimes individuals are not even given the option to assimilate while others they are given incentives to do so.

(boundary changes overtime are part of my explanation both through strategic considerations and by affecting important variables). 4. Finally, I assume that nation-builders represent a specific “national type” and want to *directly* rule the population. I should also emphasize here that the *choice* of a state policy (e.g. group-specific assimilation) is analytically distinct from its *success or failure* (i.e. if the policy actually succeeded in assimilating the targeted group or not).

I test my theory of nation-building against alternative explanations on a dataset I have compiled on all non-core groups in post-WWI Southeastern Europe.⁵ From this first empirical analysis I find that non-core groups that are perceived as revisionist by ruling political elites will be targeted with exclusionist policies with a mean probability of .76 when they are living in revisionist states, they are not primarily urban and they are culturally distant from the core group. Varying the degree of cultural distance does not change the mean probability of exclusion, although it broadens the confidence interval. Moreover, having a homeland does not really have an effect on the mean probability of exclusion. Non-core groups living in states that pursue revisionist foreign policy goals are more likely to be excluded than assimilated. Consistent with my theory, a non-core group whose cultural distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity has a .52 mean probability of being targeted with assimilationist policies even when it has a different language and religion from the core group, something that contradicts “cultural distance” arguments. To be sure, having a different religion than the core group increases the likelihood of being targeted with exclusionist rather than with assimilationist policies.

⁵ Southeastern Europe is the neutral term which I decided to use as an alternative to politically/culturally loaded and anachronistic terms such as “the Balkans” and “Turkey-in-Europe,” respectively. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Todorova 1997, Glenny 2001: xxi-xxvi, Mazower 2001.

However, this is not surprising finding in the Balkans. Furthermore, seeking no territorial changes and living in urban centers increase the likelihood of accommodation for a non-core group. Finally, groups that are larger than one percent (1%) of the total population are more likely to be targeted with exclusionist or assimilationist policies rather than be accommodated. This analysis is obviously a snapshot and will be complemented with more cross-sections as well as in-depth case studies. These results are derived from the situation in Southeastern Europe immediately after WWI. It remains to be seen how generalizable these findings are overtime and across space.

The primary reason to study and understand the logic of nation-building strategies towards non-core groups is the empirical observation that minorities have been –and still are- used as a pretext for nations to fight expansionary wars or to destabilize neighboring countries (Woodwell 2004). Both interstate and intrastate wars have been instigated by minority politics. For example, Russia used the pretence of protecting the rights of the Orthodox Christian millet to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, while the politics surrounding the Serb minority in Austria-Hungary spurred WWI.⁶ Similarly, the political unification of the German *Volk* residing outside of Germany's borders has been cited as the main principle that Hitler advanced to justify the initiation of what would end up being WWII. More recently, the military intervention of Turkey in Cyprus has been justified on the basis of the protection of co-ethnics outside of Turkish territory; and the protracted bloody conflict in Ireland has been justified on the basis of a conflict between the Catholic minority in the North and the Protestant minority in the Republic of Ireland.

⁶ Another theory is that the Franz Ferdinand's assassins wanted to prevent the reorganization of the Habsburg Empire on a tripartite basis (a plan to include the Slavs in the Dual Monarchy in order to check the Hungarians), which would severely undermine Serbian aspirations in Bosnia and Croatia (Sowards 1996).

--Map 1 here--

The above cases and many more, serve as examples of the explosive consequences of minority politics for the economic and political stability of societies around the world. Today, more than twenty million Russian-speakers live in the newly formed post-Soviet republics, around a million Turks live in Bulgaria, at least two million ethnic Albanians live outside of Albania proper in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, more than one million and a half Hungarians live in Romania, a little less than a million ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, and there are still significant numbers of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. Moreover, millions of Roma are dispersed around the European continent. The fate of these, and many other peoples with similar status, as well as their host states depends very much on the nation-building policies that the latter will follow.

From a policy perspective, understanding the logic of state-planned nation-building might help the decision makers of the international community devise incentives to prevent ethnic cleansing, encourage viable conditions for accommodation, or even foster national integration. One might argue that the era of nation-building and assimilation has reached its limits (Young 1993) and that the time where citizenship is not connected to ethnicity is –or should be- near (Kymlicka 1995). It could be the case that there is a threshold of economic development and military power after which a state becomes immune to nationalist ideology. However, the euphoria of the early 1990s with regards to the prospects of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism was seriously challenged by political realities around the world. And while it is true that most of the civil wars and mass killings did not take place in the West, I hold that continuous

immigration movements, increasing protectionist tendencies in the global markets, and inefficient international institutions can reverse the situation even in the West. Nevertheless, I do believe that the processes I am analyzing are more relevant for what is known as the ‘developing world’; especially for the states and peoples where borders were drawn without almost any consideration of ethnocultural boundaries.

Besides the methodological justifications for studying Southeastern Europe after WWI, I hold that the international balance of power today approximates the situation of the interwar years. Moreover, many of today’s so called developing countries are experiencing analogous challenges with those faced by the Balkan states a few decades ago: incomplete nation- and state-building; weak political institutions unable to deal with the increasing political participation; unconsolidated democracy; religiously, linguistically, and culturally heterogeneous populations; people accustomed to a world of corporate privileges; and, economic ‘backwardness’.

I organize this paper in seven sections. In the first, I describe the relevant actors and present the range of possible strategies that a nationalizing state might pursue. Next I present my theory of nation-building. In the third section, I discuss the existing literature on the topic and derive testable hypotheses for the variation in the treatment of non-core groups by nationalizing states. Next, I present my research design strategy and justify my case selection. In the fifth section, I describe the data and the operationalization of all the relevant variables. In the next section, I present the results from my statistical analysis. I conclude with a discussion of the data problems that I faced and my strategies for solving them in subsequent chapters.

I. Actors and Nation-building Policies

a. *The core group and its elites*

Naturally, in order to speak of *non-core groups* we first have to define the “core group” (Hollingshead 1952: 685). For example, in the case of the USA in the 1960s, Milton Gordon identified the *core culture* as “the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins” (1964: 72).⁷ Thus, my project focuses on cases where there is a clear “national type” that is being more or less actively propagated within their territorial borders (Deutsch 1965). Indicators of “core culture” crystallization include standardization of language,⁸ a national historiography that reaches a high degree of consensus among the core group members, an official (or state-favored) religion,⁹ some form of phenotypic stereotype (a combination of physical attributes).¹⁰

I distinguish between the “core group” as a *demographic majority* that shares a common national type (e.g. common language, religion, certain phenotypical characteristics, a shared culture), from the “core group” as the *ruling political elite* that

⁷ Several questions arise: Can one get assimilated in a national community that lacks a “national type”? How does this type emerge and change? Does it matter if it includes physical characteristics or not? How does a set of norms, meanings, and cultural models become the leading one? Does the nature of the period of the incubation (conquest, civil war) have an effect on state-building or national integration? More empirically speaking what accounts for *where* and *when* powerful pre-national communities sustain the salience of their identity and pay loyalty to local leaders rather than the state? I address some of these questions in the theory section.

⁸ As Banac put it: “In principle, though a single language may be shared by two or more nations, a single nation cannot be multilingual. [...] The exceptions to this principle are most often a result of centuries of assimilation (as in the Irish case), of unique historical circumstances (the Swiss example), or of colonial experience.” (1984: 22-23).

⁹ Clearly there are cases where a nation is split between two (or more) religions but they are the exception in Balkan history. Albania and Yugoslavia are the only cases and for a short period of time since both became Communist following WWII; thus weakening the intensity of the religious cleavage.

¹⁰ There is no restriction about which markers are the most important ones (e.g. race, religion, language, etc.). An interesting research question is if some kinds of markers are more powerful in achieving national integration than others and why? In my cases there is no important variation along these lines.

claims to represent this demographic majority. The ruling elites of the core group determine the constitutive story of the nation in such a way so that it has (or can easily construct) a significant demographic core group base and at the same time ensures the legitimacy of their hegemony over any competitors. It is in this sense that the economic consequences enter the picture. Being a member of the nation allows one to be a part of a specific status group which is less threatened by the instabilities of economic change. The exclusion of outsiders (those not fitting the criteria of the national type) is essential for the existence of the status group and sometimes even for its economic well-being.

When I refer to the “core group” as an agent in my theory I mean the ruling political organization that has the military and administrative capacity to enforce its decisions within the internationally recognized borders of the state. This ruling organization is not necessarily coinciding with the economically dominant class or the intellectuals of the state.¹¹

I use the term “core group” rather than “nationalizing state” (Brubaker 1996: 63-66) for a variety of reasons. First, in order to avoid contradictions; for example, a nationalizing state *accommodating* a national minority is a contradiction. This is not a problem when using the term “core group” since it can act as a nationalizing state towards one non-core group but not another. Second, since I am interested in understanding group-specific nation-building policies I cannot use a term that implies a specific set of policies and has a state-level focus.

b. The non-core group and its elites

¹¹ For a distinction between ruling and political classes, see Aron (1966: 204) and Weber (1968: I, 56).

Any aggregation of individuals that is different in a politically salient way (linguistic, religious, physical, ideological) from the national type of the core group of a society at T_0 , I call it a “non-core group”. The non-core group members might or might not be citizens of the state but are certainly not considered *members of the nation* before they are targeted with assimilation policies.¹²

There is wide variation in the types of non-core groups across space and time. This variation is a function of the content of the national constitutive myth (Smith 2001) of each country and the relevant attributes of the groups that reside within it. Thus a non-core group could be an ethnic or tribal group, a religious or linguistic minority, a racial minority, or even a cultural or ideological group.

In the literature the term “minority” is commonly used to refer to “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members –being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”.¹³

I refrain from using the term minority for a variety of reasons. First, the “non-core group” category is broader than that of a “minority” since it includes aggregations of people that are conscious of their difference from the dominant national type without necessarily being mobilized around this difference. Second, the term “minority” is usually used to refer to “numerically inferior” groups while the term “non-core group”

¹² There are cases where a non-core group is targeted with group-specific assimilationist policies the core group members deny to recognize them as ethnoculturally similar. However, in my dissertation I am not focusing on the outcomes of state policies.

¹³ Capotorti’s definition of a minority quoted in Clogg 2002: xii.

does not imply anything about size. Third, the term “non-core group” allows us to view even stereotypical members of the demographic core group as targets of assimilation by the core group elites. In other words, a “minority” is a special type of a “non-core group” and a “national minority” is “a non-core group mobilized by a revisionist claim”.

c. The dependent variable: *Nation-Building Strategies*

For each country under study, I identify all the politically relevant non-core groups at T_0 . At the higher level of analysis I am using the policies pursued towards non-core groups as an indicator capturing the intentions of the nationalizing state.

“*Assimilationist policies*”, refer to educational, cultural, occupational, marital, demographic, and political state policies aiming at the adoption of core-group culture and way of life by the non-assimilated group.¹⁴ These policies usually target directly a specific group (or part of a specific group) but might be presented under the guise of an impartial law. For the purposes of this paper, I include under this category “nation-wide assimilation” policies that aim at the acquisition of certain traits such as language, dress, behavioral patterns by the whole population. The ultimate goal of such policies is national integration. These are policies differ from group-specific ones because they do not target any group in particular but might end up disproportionately affecting a specific group (or part of a specific group). The goal of assimilationist policies is to secure the loyalty of an individual or a community by “conquering” her belief system and guaranteeing her obedience to your rule.

¹⁴ In the future, I intend to explain the variation in type and intensity of group-specific assimilation policies across groups and overtime.

“Exclusionist policies”, refer to policies that aim at the national homogeneity of particular areas within the country. Policies under this category include population exchange, deportation, internal displacement, or even mass killing.

“Accommodation”, refers to situations where the differences of a non-core group are more or less perpetuated by the institutional structure. The non-core group is allowed to have certain separate institutions such as schools, churches, cultural associations and so forth. The state here requires just a minimum of political loyalty to the central state institutions and obedience to general laws. However, the fact that difference is accepted and perpetuated does not mean that the non-core group does not face discrimination both by state institutions and by individual core group members.

II. A Theory of Nation-Building

In this section I develop a theory of state-planned nation-building strategies. Nation-building entails a parallel process where the ruling political elites maintain and reinforce differences with ‘nations’ in surrounding states and eliminate differences within their own boundaries. Although people have been conscious of *national* or *ethnic* differences for many centuries, with the advent of modernity this consciousness became intertwined with the political program of self determination.¹⁵ By the mid 19th century, the cultivation of nationalistic sentiments became an important part of statesmen’s repertoire to establish legitimate order and secure the loyalty of the population within the borders of states in Western Europe. National leaders and their associates tried various policies to manage and/or manipulate the identities of the population within their territorial borders.

¹⁵ Banac’s definition captures this well: “nationalism should only indicate an ideology, a comprehensive, modern world view, distinguished by its all-inclusive penetration of national consciousness into every going pursuit. [...] The old national consciousness was not necessarily concerned with specific cultural or political goals.” (1984: 27).

First, I describe a set of building block concepts; second, I provide causal mechanisms that link host state and non-core group characteristics to nation-building strategies. Then, I derive several test implications from my theory.

Modern States and loyalty: The origins of rival claims to non-core group loyalty

Following Weber, I define the “state” as the organization that has the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force and extraction within a clearly bounded territory (1946: 83). I begin from the premise that the ultimate political goal of the ruling political elite of every modern state is to master the loyalty of its population and remain sovereign. A government is considered legitimate when it enjoys the consent of the citizens. Legitimate rule enhances the taxing abilities of a state, facilitates conscription to the army, fosters compliance to the laws, and prevents separatist movements. Troubles ensue when a section of the population does not consider the government legitimate.

This challenge to state legitimacy can take many forms. The actual form it takes in different epochs depends on the *nature* of the state organization. In the modern era most states have converged on the ‘national state’ model and popular rule (Tilly 1992: 2-3). At the turn of the 18th century, a gradual transformation of *territorial* sovereignty¹⁶ into *popular* sovereignty¹⁷ began.¹⁸ Empires could -and did- rule over masses of aliens for centuries but in the modern nation-state system alien rule became unacceptable. Popular sovereignty implied that the members of the “nation” should rule the state. Thus

¹⁶ Established by the Peace of Westphalia (i.e. the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück which ended both the Thirty Years and the Eighty Years Wars in 1648).

¹⁷ The 1789 French revolution is the landmark for this shift.

¹⁸ Other scholars have labelled this transition differently; for example, Banac talks about a distinction between “historical rights on a territory” and “national right of self-determination” (1984).

it followed that one could become a *separatist* in such a state by either refusing to be part of the nation or by claiming to be part of another one!

Before entering a discussion about the origins of revisionist claims made by non-core group representatives, we need to stress that the existence of a culturally distinct group does not necessarily involve a competing claim to the political loyalty of this population. Cultural distinctiveness is politically irrelevant unless there is a *group-formation process* to turn it into a social identity. As Hechter puts it “one can only identify with a given group when such a group actually exists.” (2000: 97). This begs the question, When is a non-core group less likely to have a politically salient social identity? Nomadic groups, groups that are territorially dispersed, or small isolated communities are not likely to have any *political* identity linked to their cultural, linguistic, religious, or other distinctiveness. Moreover, research findings in social psychology indicate that individuals from such non-core groups are likely to quickly assimilate into a “higher status” group in order to maximize their self-esteem (Hechter 2000: 99). As a result, over time many of these groups have been adsorbed by neighboring larger groups. On the contrary, groups that are large, sedentary and territorially concentrated are more likely to build local institutions and link their cultural, linguistic, religious or other distinctiveness to a political identity.

In general, we can distinguish between those non-core groups that are mobilized by a rival claim and those that are not. In my framework, non-core groups that are not mobilized by any rival claim should be targeted with assimilationist policies such as mass schooling, political rights, welfare benefits, and military conscription (*Hypothesis 1*).¹⁹

¹⁹ To be sure, the ruling political elites might maintain the difference of a non-core group without a rival claim when the cost of assimilating it is very high. Such cases include groups with an

Non-core group loyalty and revisionist claims

I have already argued that large, sedentary non-core groups that are territorially concentrated are likely to link their distinctiveness to a political identity. However, this political identity of the non-core group could be more or less threatening for the host state. For the purposes of this paper, I single out challenges to a state's sovereignty as the most important ones. I refer to a non-core group as revisionist when it aims at boundary changes and as status quo otherwise.

But under what conditions does a non-core group turn to be revisionist? Revisionist claims are usually the result of external intervention by a Great Power or a neighboring country that wants to weaken the host state (top-bottom) and less often of an independent local national movement (bottom-up). In the case of Great Powers, different justifications can be proposed for intervention ranging from a common marker (e.g. the Russian empire claimed that it was assisting its co-religionist in the Balkans) to an international norm, such as 'human rights'. Neighboring countries might attempt to find populations that either share a marker with their own core group or in some cases they might organize propaganda teams across the border with the aim of forging a common national consciousness. In other words, a state has to act in order to "become" an external national homeland. Finally, a revisionist claim can emerge from a non-core group that has developed a local national movement in reaction to centralization of authority or some other political or economic grievance. Expectedly 'revisionist alliances' are likely to form between Great Powers, neighboring states, and aggrieved nationally conscious non-core groups against the host state.

entropy resistant marker (Gellner 1983) or groups whose economic skills are linked to their identity (Laitin 1995).

Undoubtedly, Great Powers and states around the world do not select randomly which non-core groups to target. Non-core groups in geopolitically important areas have a higher probability of being targeted with agitational campaigns. Moreover, non-core groups residing in weak host states that cannot effectively fend off such interference and crash revisionist networks are also good candidates. On the whole, Great Powers and neighboring states are more likely to target non-core groups that are in the periphery of the host state since they are usually harder to control and less integrated, thus rendering them easier targets.

Conversely, a non-core group is less likely to be mobilized by a revisionist claim if it is residing in a geopolitically unimportant area or far from the borders. The category of status quo non-core groups includes also communities of strategic regional allies. The cultural distinctiveness of such non-core groups is likely to be accommodated by the host state (*Hypothesis 2*).²⁰

Revisionist claims, Revisionist States, and nation-building policies

Non-core groups mobilized by revisionist claims are perceived as security threats by the ruling political elites of states and receive immediate attention. Nation-building is not considered complete until there are no such groups in a nation-state. In such cases, the ruling political elites have to make decisions with respect to these threatening groups. In this decision making process, the core group members that are not part of the ruling political elites are only indirectly influencing decisions, even in democratic settings. This

²⁰ Following the above logic, we should not observe a strategy of instigating revisionist propaganda by either Great Powers or neighbouring states towards nationally integrated states, comprised solely by literate nationally conscious citizens. In such cases they are more likely to pursue either ideological penetration (e.g. communism, fascism, etc.) or direct interstate war.

is because such decisions are usually made behind closed doors on behalf of the ‘nation’ but without its direct approval.²¹

The ruling political elites will pursue group-specific nation-building policies anticipating a future fifth column situation. The policies towards non-core groups mobilized by revisionist claims will vary mainly according to the foreign policy goals of the host state. These goals in turn are determined by the geopolitical situation and the ethno-demographic landscape surrounding the host state.

The ruling political elites of a state are likely to be motivated by revisionist goals if it has a significant number of co-ethnics in the near abroad. Irredentism is a prominent sub-category of revisionism, and becomes a foreign policy goal when the state has recently lost territory and/or has ‘unredeemed co-ethnics’. Then again, revisionism can be the result of a pure expansionist desire, which might be instigated either by population growth or military strength and technological innovations. The motivations behind expansionism could be strategic ones such as access to sea, expropriation of resources, more defensible borders. It follows that the host state is likely to be revisionist when its ‘co-ethnics’ reside in a geopolitically important territory and are part of a non-allied state. Finally, a host state can become more assertive in its revisionist claims when it gets the approval and backing of one or more of the Great Powers.

When the host state has revisionist foreign policy goals then its ruling political elites are likely to pursue exclusionist policies towards revisionist non-core groups (*Hypothesis 3*).²²

²¹ Nevertheless, there is an important way that core group members matter in the process. They account for much of the confusion on the ground. Their prejudice, discrimination, and desire for revenge might derail the policy pursued by the ruling political elite. Such ‘noise’ is hard to anticipate by the nation-builders.

Conversely, I refer to a host state as status quo when it does not seek border changes. A state tends to pursue such a foreign policy once it has accomplished a territorial expansion or a massive population exchange. The logic here is that both of these events would have significantly decrease the number of ‘unredeemed co-ethnics’. At the same time a territorial expansion usually comes with more non-core groups that are or could potentially become revisionist. When the host state wants to preserve the status quo in the international system then it is more likely to pursue intense assimilation policies towards revisionist non-core groups within its borders (Hypothesis 4).²³

Summary of Hypotheses

H1: A non-core group whose distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity should be targeted with assimilation policies such as mass schooling, political rights, welfare benefits, and military conscription.

H2: A non-core group mobilized by a status quo claim should be accommodated by having, for example, their own schools and churches and maintaining their differences from the core group.

H3: A non-core group mobilized by a revisionist rival claim residing in a state pursuing a revisionist foreign policy should be targeted with exclusionist policies, such as population exchange, deportation, or killing.

H4: A non-core group mobilized by a revisionist rival claim residing in a state that is interested in preserving the status quo should be targeted with assimilation policies, policies that aim at the eradication of differences with the core group.

--Figure 1--

Overall, a few more general implications stand out. Thinking about this process in a more dynamic way two things merit our attention: first, a large revisionist group once cleansed will ‘become’ small and maybe stop being revisionist. Such a change would

²² Within this subset of cases, cleansing becomes more likely in war-time when the stakes are high, the time horizon short, and the international attention low.

²³ Within this category of intense assimilation there is important variation in policies. I intend to explore this variation in the future.

lead to a policy change from exclusion to accommodation. second, a revisionist host state once engaged in exclusionary policies might end up receiving many of its ‘unredeemed co-ethnics’ through population exchanges or refugee waves and thus cease being revisionist. Both of these processes might move state policies from *exclusion* to *assimilation* (*Testable implication 1*).

Demographic dynamics over time are also crucial in the choice of nation-building strategies. A rapid population growth of a non-core group combined with low fertility of the core group might trigger a shift from accommodation to intense group-specific assimilation policies (*Testable implication 2*). The logic being that a larger group is more likely to be targeted with revisionist claims by Great Powers or ‘external homelands’.

Neighborhood effects seem to be really important in nation-building policies. A state surrounded by status quo states should be less likely to pursue assimilationist or exclusionist policies and more likely to adopt accommodation (*Testable implication 3*). The logic here is that such a state is less likely to have revisionist non-core groups within its territory.

Assimilationist campaigns towards revisionist non-core groups should be fairly rare since the latter, anticipating exclusionist policies by the host state, are likely to flee – especially during wartime. If a part of such a group remains, it will most likely be accommodated since its members will be perceived as status quo supporters (*Testable implication 4*).

III. Existing Explanations

Taking the theories of nationalism, state-building, political development, and ethnic politics together, I derive several hypotheses for why a state would choose to assimilate

some non-core groups and accommodate or exclude others. I group them into two broad categories: A. Theories that treat national identities as exogenous to politics and economics; B. Theories that treat identities as endogenous to politics and economics.

First, there are explanations that take group boundaries as *exogenous*. There are at least four variations of these. Both members of the non-core group and the core group may not want to contaminate their respective races with foreign blood or outside cultural influences; thus assimilation is out of the question (*Primordialism/Racism*). In case the dominant group used to be dominated by the non-core group then the relations will be conflict ridden and we should observe no assimilation attempts (*Status Reversal/Ethnic antipathy*, see Horowitz 1985). Research in social psychology provides a mechanism for this hypothesis, namely that individuals seek to maximize their self-esteem and a positive social identity (usually at the expense of an ‘other’) is one way of reaching the desired goal (Hechter 2000: 99). Ernest Gellner (1983) links ethnicity with social class in his theory. According to Gellner’s theory, when a certain non-core group is significantly different from the core group (on a salient cleavage dimension) and at the same time over-represented either at the top or the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy then assimilation is unlikely (*Entropy resistant markers*). Pushing the logic further we should not expect assimilation attempts towards non-core groups with ethnic markers that are so resistant to assimilation. Finally, Myron Weiner highlighted the importance irredentist claims for political development (1971). According to Weiner, when the host state is faced with serious irredentist demands then it grows suspicious of the loyalty of the ‘unredeemed’ ethnic minority and is more likely to “accelerate programs to ‘nationalize’ schoolchildren, to press the minority to learn the majority language and in various ways

to demand expressions of identification and loyalty by the minority toward the national government” (1971: 674).

Second, there are theories that emphasize the important impact of economic development, industrialization and urbanization on nation-building. These theories treat national identities as *endogenous* to political and economic dynamics. The most prominent theory in the USA is the *Melting Pot* theory according to which both members of the non-core group and the core group choose assimilation for material reasons, thus assimilation is a by product of economic development that does not require much state intervention. There are however at least four theories that fall under this category. Since assimilation is a by product of the processes related with modernization the state is not likely to pursue any group-specific policies unless a group is not affected by this modernization process. Pushing this logic further we should observe assimilation policies targeting non-core groups that are isolated and untouched by modernization. (*Modernization Theory*)

Michael Hechter opposes the view that modernization and centralization will necessarily lead to national assimilation of the periphery. In his *Internal Colonialism* (1975) Hechter argues that when the cultural division of labor that exists is beneficial to the core group then there is less of an incentive to assimilate the non-core groups. We should only observe selective cooptation. Hechter also points out that when a group is subject to a “*hierarchical cultural division of labour*” and it is territorially concentrated then that group is more likely to develop a local nationalist movement (2000: 106). Thus we should not observe assimilation attempts towards such groups especially when they are territorially concentrated since their assimilation would be too costly.

Structural conditions may generate incentives for the core group to assimilate a non-core group. If a non-core group does not have an external national homeland then it is more likely to be targeted for assimilation (*Homeland factor*, see Brubaker 1996: 66-67). Besides the “Homeland factor,” the number of non-core groups in a country as well as their percentage with respect to the total population might be another structural factor that matters for nation-building. There may be a threshold of ethnic diversity (e.g. *40% being members of a non-core group*) in the country after which the dominant group stops considering assimilation policies and turns to various policies of accommodation or consociationalism.

Existing Hypotheses and Testable implications

A. National Identities as Exogenous to Politics & Economics

H1. Primordialism/Racism (Group level hypothesis)

Only non-core groups that fit the criteria of nationhood should be targeted with assimilation policies.

H2. Ethnic antipathy/Status reversal (Group level hypothesis)

The core group should not target the previously advantaged group(s) with assimilationist measures. Assimilation policies should be pursued only towards other disadvantaged groups.

H3. ‘Entropy resistant’ markers (Group level hypothesis)

- i: Non-core groups that do not differ from the core group in a *hereditarily* transmittable manner will be targeted with assimilationist policies.
- ii: Non-core groups with a distinct hereditary trait but a random social distribution should be targeted for assimilation.

H4. Irredentism (Group level hypothesis)

- i. When a state faces an irredentist demand by a neighboring state then it will accelerate assimilation policies towards the ‘unredeemed’ non-core group.

B. National Identities as Endogenous to Politics & Economics

H5. Modernization/Urbanization (Group level hypothesis)

Non-core groups in rural and isolated areas should be targeted with assimilation strategies.

H6. “Internal Colonialism” (Group level hypothesis)

When the cultural division of labor in society is beneficial for the core group there should be no assimilation attempts. Instead we should observe selective cooptation of individuals.

H7. The Homeland factor (Group level hypothesis)

Non-core groups with an external homeland should not be targeted for assimilation.

H8. Ethnic diversity (State level hypothesis)

Countries where non-core groups make up more than 40% of the total population should not pursue assimilationist policies. (The more fragmented the “non-core group category” is the more likely assimilationist policies become).

IV. Research Design

My universe of cases includes all non-assimilated groups that reside within the recognized boundaries of national states. The assumption here is that the nation-state is

ruled by a hegemonic group that aims at securing the political loyalty of the population of the country among other things.²⁴

Selecting a region

In order to control for many of the macro-historical and geopolitical factors that affect the politics of nationalization I focus on one region, Southeastern Europe. In particular, I am focusing on the parts of Southeastern Europe that were part of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ Studying one region allows me to make some credible assumptions about actors' preferences, increases my analytical leverage, and protects me from selection bias that mars most research on nation-building. What makes this region a laboratory for the study of nation-building is that the wide set of common *initial conditions* coexists with a linguistically, religiously and culturally *heterogeneous* population.²⁶

Moreover, this set of cases is a crucial test for some of the most prominent explanations in the literature. The Balkan states have been narrated as stereotypical cases of ethnic hatreds and intergroup enmity. The term “Balkanization” is still being used by journalists and academics to indicate chaotic situations. All in all, the Balkan Peninsula is typically considered as the most turbulent and blindly nationalistic part of Europe (Pavlowitch 2000); thus it should be harder to discern a *logic* in nation-building strategies

²⁴ To be sure, there are many cases where the core group is not the majority of the population. In such circumstances, the dominant group might be obliged to form ‘winning coalitions’ with other groups or follow some kind of a consociational constitution (see Lijphart 1968 and 1977).

²⁵ Specifically, I include in the analysis any part of Southeastern Europe that was a part of the Ottoman Empire for more than two centuries.

²⁶ I elaborate on this point later in this paper. Briefly, the point is that unlike many other empires or large states, the Ottoman Empires does not engage in assimilation or religious conversion campaigns in a systematic or massive scale. Thus when the “age of nationalism” comes at its door there are myriads of differences that have survived Ottoman rule and can potentially be politicized.

here than anywhere else. Finding a pattern would both rehabilitate the region's reputation and add to our knowledge.

Prior to the early 1800s the region was under the Ottoman Empire for almost three centuries. All of these territories had a more or less shared legacy of the pre-national era. The local ruling classes of the Balkan peoples were crushed or incorporated to the Ottoman system, thus the local population was "left leaderless, anonymous, and silent" (Stavrianos 1958: 96). They were all predominantly agricultural societies that lived in a world of corporate privileges for religious groups rather than individual rights. Stavrianos summarizes this background well:

The typical Ottoman subject thought of himself primarily as a member of a guild if he lived in a city or as a member of a village community if he lived in the countryside. If he had any feeling of a broader allegiance, it was likely to be of a religious rather than of a political character. It was likely to be directed to his millet rather than to his empire. (1957: 338).

More importantly, all of the Balkan states achieved independence in the years between 1830 and 1923, in other words *during* the "age of nationalism". This particular timing is crucial for the purposes of testing my argument since a main assumption is that the ruling political elites representing the demographic core group aim at national integration.

These nation-states achieved national self-rule through secession from the Ottoman Empire and, at least initially, all had unredeemed co-ethnics outside of their borders (see Map 2). Mazower captures this reality well:

All states could point to ‘unredeemed’ brethren or historic lands which lay outside the boundaries apportioned them by the Powers: Romanians in Hungarian Transylvania, Serbs in Habsburg Croatia and Ottoman lands; Bulgarians in the lands of the San Stefano state they had been cheated of; Greeks –in thrall to the ‘Great Idea’ of a new Byzantine Empire– redeeming Hellenism across the Ottoman Empire from Crete to the Black Sea. Popular irredentism mobilized public opinion, financed cross-border incursions by bands of irregulars, and often forced unwilling Balkan monarchs into rash adventures against the advice or wishes of the Powers (2000: 101-102).

--Map 2 here--

Selecting a period

The six independent nation states I focus on (Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Turkey)²⁷ were all engaged in the “Eastern Question,” namely the Great Powers’²⁸ competition for spheres of influence, instigated by the gradual disintegration of

²⁷ For historical surveys of the region see Janković 1988, Jelavich & Jelavich 1965 and 1977, Mazower 2001, Pavlowitch 1999, Roudometof 1996 and 2001, Sugar 1977, Stavrianos 1958 and 2000.

²⁸ The Powers involved include: Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Imperial Germany, and Russia.

the Ottoman Empire. Pavlowitch describes well the international context within which the Balkan states emerged:

Their foreign policies usually went no further than looking for, or resisting, a Power patron. They were encouraged and manipulated. Their size, shape, stage of growth, even their existence in final analysis was regulated by the Powers in the hope of gaining influence. Yet they also exploited the mutual jealousies of the Powers, and thus enjoyed some freedom of action. Imperialism contained so many internal contradictions, and was weakened by such rivalries, that it did not result before the First World War in renewed subjugation of the Balkans. (2000: 144)

The joint production of both the Balkan states and many of their main policy initiatives is an undisputed fact in Balkan historiography. However, some scholars tend to exaggerate the external involvement and underestimate the agency of the various national governments completely. Jankoviä is a case in point:

The Eastern Question was as eternal as the conflict between the Great Powers over their interests in these areas, as eternal as the expansionist aspirations and international relations and conflicts based on them. These aspirations caused problems everywhere or kept them simmering to serve as pretexts for intervention or bargaining for compromises and divisions of spheres of interest (1988: 7).

Finally, it is important to note that the system which resulted from WWI was obliging *only* the small nations and the defeated Great Powers to respect ethnic, religious and racial minority rights. Nevertheless, the League of Nations changed the incentive structure for both minorities and nation-states. For example, revisionist states were trying to use the League of Nations in order to avoid the assimilation of their co-ethnics abroad and destabilize neighboring countries (Divani 1995: 36). States that were satisfied with the status-quo were trying to preserve it and assimilate all of the minorities within their territory before the revisionist powers could undermine this process or attempt to alter the borders.

V. Data and Operationalization

Nation-building strategies

My dependent variable, nation-building strategies, can take three different values. When the ruling political elite accommodates the non-core group I assign the value “0”, when it pursues assimilationist policies I assign the value “1”, and finally when it adopts exclusionist measures I assign the value “2”. To be sure, there are cases where a part of a group is targeted with assimilation policies while the majority is excluded and vice versa.

To address this problem I introduce a threshold of 80%. I hold that this is high enough of a threshold to err on the safe side. Thus, if a country targets with assimilation policies 81% of a non-core group and with exclusionary policies 19% I infer that the main goal of the government was assimilation. Reversely, if 19% was targeted for assimilation and 81% was excluded then I infer that the goal was not to assimilate this

non-core group.²⁹ At the lower level of analysis, I code my dependent variable through the relevant legislation and confidential reports of governmental officials.

Variable Name	Coding ³⁰
Nation-building Strategies	Coded as “0” if the non-core group is <i>accommodated</i> , “1” if it is targeted with <i>assimilationist</i> policies, and “3” if it pursues <i>exclusionist</i> ones.
Language	Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different language, “0” otherwise.
Religion	Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different religious organization, “0” otherwise.
World Religion	Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different world religion than the core group, “0” otherwise.
Distance index	Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different language <u>and</u> world religion, “0” otherwise.
Urban	Coded as “1” if the non-core group was primarily urban, “0” otherwise.
Rival Claim	Coded as “1” if the non-core group’s cultural distinctiveness was linked to a political identity, “0” otherwise.
Revisionist Group	Coded as “1” if the non-core group was mobilized by a revisionist claim, “0” otherwise.
Revisionist State	Coded as “1” if the host state had revisionist foreign policy goals, “0” otherwise.
Homeland	Coded as “1” if the non-core group had an external homeland, “0” otherwise.
Group size	Coded as “1” if the non-core group was larger than one percent (1%) of the total population, “0” otherwise.

²⁹ For a discussion of census data, see *Appendix: “Numbers game” and selection effects*.

³⁰ The coding of these variables is based on archival research and secondary sources listed in the special sections of my bibliography.

VI. Analysis

The pattern of nation-building policies over time

Studying nation-building policies in the 19th century one observes that many rural populations are completely ignored irrespectively of their ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural background. Assimilationist policies are almost entirely linked to state centralization and modernization. Wherever and whenever these processes occur in the Balkans national integration takes place. Group-specific nation-building strategies, however, are largely absent in most of the 19th century Balkan history. Assimilation was mainly an unintended consequence of migration to the urban centers and schooling. In this manner people of “low cultures” assimilated into “high cultures” and enjoyed upward social mobility (Gellner 1983).

In the case of Ottoman Europe, the choice between different high cultures was more or less overdetermined by religious affiliation. Thus for a Vlach from Pindos mountains or a Slavophone from the plains of Macedonia, both members of the *Rum millet* by virtue of their Christian Orthodox faith, the “high culture” was Greek. Accommodation was based solely on religious not national basis. Towards the end of the 19th century -and especially after 1878 Russo-Turkish war- competing national programs emerge and the stage is set for the enactment of a series of nation-building strategies in the whole peninsula.

Especially during the late 19th century, amidst an intense Great Power competition, assimilationist policies were primarily focused on contested borderland areas. The most common strategy was the establishment of schools (Vouri 1992), the control of churches, and the organization of armed bands which would ultimately imprint the ‘correct’

national consciousness in the hearts and minds of the local population (Dakin 1966, Perry 1988, Gounaris 1996, Livanios 1999, Aarbakke 2003). Urban centers and groups of the dominant Muslim faith were largely left out of this competition. Moreover, exclusionist policies could only be used selectively on individuals since the control of the territories was still under the Ottomans.

Only in the early 20th century and especially after WWI, when a new balance of power emerged in Europe together with new borders in its Southeastern corner, do we observe a drastic intensification of nation-building policies within states (Gounaris 1994, Karakasidou 1997, Michailidis 1998 and 2003, Carabott 1997). After the Balkan Wars and WWI, the various national programs had already crystallized and internal nation-building intensified. Overall, forty six percent (46%) of the non-core groups in my analysis were accommodated; while around forty percent (40%) were targeted with assimilationist policies. Only fourteen percent (14%) was targeted with exclusionist policies. This set of statistics is impressive given the lack of such state policies before the turn of the 19th century.

--Graph 1 & Table 1--

Descriptive Statistics

Turning to my independent variables, it is worth noting that eighty one percent (81%) of the groups in my analysis spoke a different language and half (54%) had a different religion from the core group. Sixty percent (60%) of the non-core groups that I study were larger than one percent of the country's total population. A little less than half of them were primarily urban (44%) and had an external homeland (39%). Finally, one third

of the non-core groups were motivated by revisionist claims (31%) while four out of the six states in my study were pursuing a revisionist foreign policy in 1918.

From the cross-tabulations below we observe some striking facts that merit further research. I will discuss each table individually and then turn to the analysis of the multinomial regression results.

Language

Strategy	Same	Different	Total
Accommodation	2	38	40
Assimilation	13	21	34
Exclusion	1	11	12
Total	16	70	86

Almost thirty percent of the non-core groups that had a different language from the core group of their host state were targeted with assimilationist policies. To be sure groups with a different language were more often excluded or accommodated, but the fact that thirty percent of them were targeted with assimilation policies undermines cultural distance arguments. Not surprisingly, non-core groups that shared a common language with the core group were more often targeted with assimilationist policies than accommodation or exclusion.

Religion

Strategy	Same	Different	Total
Accommodation	13	27	40
Assimilation	22	12	34
Exclusion	4	8	12
Total	39	47	86

Groups that had the same religion with the core group were more often targeted with assimilationist policies than with accommodation or exclusion. More than 50% of the groups that had the same religion with the core group of their host state were targeted with assimilationist policies. Importantly, twenty five percent of the non-core groups with a different religion were also targeted with assimilationist policies. This is really surprising for the Balkans where religion is a very salient marker.

World Religion

Strategy	Same	Different	Total
Accommodation	25	15	40
Assimilation	30	4	34
Exclusion	7	5	12
Total	62	24	86

Conducting a cross-tabulation with “world religion,” rather than religious denomination, as the breakdown category we see that only four non-core groups from a different world religion were targeted with assimilationist policies; accommodation of such groups is much more often the chosen policy.

Importantly, among the non-core groups that share the same world religion with the core group, there were more non-core groups targeted with exclusionist policies than the ones that did not. This empirical record directly contradicts cultural distance arguments.

Homeland

Strategy	No	Yes	Total
Accommodation	21	19	40
Assimilation	25	9	34
Exclusion	6	6	12
Total	52	34	86

Most non-core groups in my analysis did not have an external national homeland. The ones that did were usually accommodated. But also a significant number of the ones that did not have a homeland were also accommodated. Thus, we cannot say that there is a clear homeland on the choice of accommodation. Moreover, there were nine (9) non-core groups that had a homeland but were nevertheless targeted with assimilationist policies. The homeland argument circulating in the literature would be hard pressed to explain these patterns.

Primarily Urban

Strategy	No	Yes	Total
Accommodation	16	21	37
Assimilation	22	12	34
Exclusion	8	4	12
Total	48	37	83

Groups that were not primarily urban were more often targeted with assimilation and exclusion. This empirical pattern is consistent with the logic of my argument with respect to non-core groups that live in peripheries of a host state. The latter are more likely to be or become revisionist, thus the ruling political elites target them with

assimilationist policies, when the state has status quo foreign policy goals, and with exclusionist policies, when these goals are revisionist. Accommodation was preferred for groups that were primarily urban. This could be due to the fact that such groups are easier to control and at the same time more visible to the diplomats of the international community. In such a context, not respecting the international treaties for minority protection is challenging.

Non-core group revisionist

Strategy	No	Yes	Total
Accommodation	30	10	40
Assimilation	26	8	34
Exclusion	3	9	12
Total	59	27	86

Non-core groups that were seeking border changes were more often targeted with exclusionist policies than groups which did not. Status quo non-core groups were targeted equally with assimilationist policies or accommodation, but very rarely with exclusion. Moreover, we should keep in mind that all groups that have ‘no rival claim’ are included in the category of ‘status quo’ groups. This probably explains the numerous cases of assimilation.

Group larger than 1%

Strategy	No	Yes	Total
Accommodation	23	17	40
Assimilation	12	22	34
Exclusion	3	9	12
Total	38	48	86

Finally, non-core groups larger than one percent of a country's population were more often targeted with assimilation than the smaller ones were. Small groups were more often accommodated. Also, exclusion was a preferred policy towards non-core groups larger than 1% than for smaller groups. This pattern is consistent with the security logic that underlies my argument. Smaller groups are not a threat thus they can be accommodated. Larger groups have to be either excluded or assimilated.

Explaining Variation in Nation-building policies

Given the case selection and the regional character of the data a few of the alternative hypotheses are controlled for or are easily falsified. Thus, for example, there is very little variation in the understandings of nationhood and the modernization levels across the states included in my analysis. More contested is the degree to which we can assume that most of these Balkan states were all ruled by a majority core-group. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could be seen as an ethnically diverse country since the Serbs in 1918 were not more than thirty eight percent (38%) of the total population. Nevertheless, if one takes the regimes discourse for granted then Serbo-Croats constituted an absolute majority with sixty three percent (63%) of the total population (Banac 1984:58). Albania also could be considered as an "ethnically" diverse state since its core group was comprised of Albanian speaker of Muslim, Christian Orthodox and Catholic faiths. Nevertheless, most scholars use language as the most important marker and suggest that the core group was seventy eight (78%) percent of the total population. With these minor caveats, we can assert that all of the countries in the analysis had a core group that was more than 60% of the total population.

Beyond the common historical legacies and geopolitical context there was a great deal of heterogeneity within the Balkans that I am trying to capture in the dataset I have compiled. Using this dataset we are in a position to test a few group-level hypotheses such as: the impact of cultural distance (measuring differences in language and religion), the effect of having an external homeland or not, the importance of being an urban group as opposed to a rural or a nomadic one, and the impact of group size.³¹ Furthermore, I have coded every non-core group's level of mobilization, political goals, and degree of loyalty to the government. These codings are not necessarily capturing the realities on the ground; rather they are more attuned to the perceptions of the ruling political elites of each state.

The results from the multinomial logit regression are confirmatory of my intuitions.³² Groups that are perceived as revisionist by ruling political elites are more likely to be excluded than targeted with accommodation. Moreover, non-core groups living in states that pursue revisionist policies are more likely to be excluded than assimilated. Whether a non-core group has an external homeland or not does not have any statistically significant impact on nation-building choices. A non-core group that resides primarily in urban centers is more likely to be accommodated than targeted with exclusionist policies.

--Table 3--

³¹ For a correlation table of the explanatory variables, see Table 2.

³² A fundamental assumption underlying the multinomial logit is the *Independence of irrelevant alternatives* (Hausman & McFadden 1984; Ray 1973). In my case this means that I assume the following: If assimilationist policies are preferred to accommodation with respect to a non-core group, then introducing the alternative strategy of exclusion will not make accommodation *preferred* to assimilationist policies.

Turning to demographic and cultural characteristics, we observe that having a different language gives us no indication about nation-building policies. This contradicts the primordialist argument that culturally distant groups are more likely to be excluded or accommodated. To be sure, having a different religion than the core group increases the likelihood of being targeted with exclusionist rather than with assimilationist policies. However, this is not surprising finding in the Balkans. The way to adjudicate the question of cultural distance is to find out whether groups are accommodated for reasons that are consistent with my argument or based on cultural distance. I pursue this line of research in following chapters. Finally, groups that are larger than one percent (1%) of the total population are more likely to be targeted with exclusionist or assimilationist policies rather than be accommodated.

Simulations

Interpreting results just by looking at regression coefficients and standard errors is often tedious and not very enlightening (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). To present my findings in a more straightforward way I employ *Clarify*, a program developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2003) that uses stochastic simulation techniques to help researchers interpret statistical results. It works in three steps: first, estimating the model; then setting the desired values of the independent variables; and third, computing the probabilities of each outcome.

A relatively large revisionist non-core group living in a state pursuing a revisionist foreign policy faces a mean probability of .76 of being targeted with exclusionist policies, given that it is not primarily urban, it has a homeland, and is

culturally distant from the core group (Simulation A). In case the non-core group has no homeland, then the probability of being excluded decreases by only .03 (Simulation B); this negligible change indicates a low explanatory power that the homeland variable has independently.

--Table 4--

With all the variables at their minimum value we get a mean probability of .9 that assimilation will be the preferred strategy (Simulation C). This is consistent with the logic of the argument. It describes a non-core group that is smaller than one percent of the total population, its cultural distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity, it is either rural or nomadic, and it shares language and religion with the core group. Such a group is not a likely target of a Great power or a neighboring state that wants to undermine the host state and is equally unlikely to develop a local national movement. It will be targeted with assimilationist policies.

Setting 'group size' at its maximum we get a slight increase of the mean probability of assimilationist policies to .93 from .91 (Simulation D). 'Group size' is not as important when the distinctiveness of the non-core group is not linked to a political identity, although it does increase the incentive of the host state to pursue assimilation. Complicating the situation by setting 'language' to its maximum we find that assimilationist policies are still preferred but the mean probability falls to .75 (Simulation E). Although this is a significant change, this finding provides evidence against the cultural distance arguments. Setting both 'religion' as well as 'language' as different from the core group does not overthrow the effect of the other variables; assimilationist policies are still preferred with a mean probability of .52 (Simulation F).

Accommodation is the preferred strategy for non-core groups that are mobilized by a status quo rival claim, reside primarily in urban centers and are smaller than one percent of the total population with a mean probability of .91 (Simulation I). If the non-core group is larger than one percent of the total population then accommodation becomes less likely, but still has a mean probability of .77 (Simulation H). Importantly for my theory, whether a non-core group with the above characteristics resides in a revisionist or status quo state does *not* affect the probability of accommodation. This finding supports further my theoretical expectation that whether a state is revisionist or not should matter only with respect to revisionist non-core groups.

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Map 1. Minorities in the Balkans in the late 20th century




Dérens (2003), Available at: <http://mondediplo.com/2003/08/04Derens>

Map 2. Revisionist Claims in the Balkans in the early 20th century




Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1993), Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/balkan_aspirations_1914.jpg

Figure 1. Group Claims, Foreign Policy Goals & Nation-Building



Graph 1. Nation-Building Policies in Southeastern Europe after WWI



"0" Accommodation, "1" Assimilation, "2" Exclusion

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Nation-Building Strategy	Frequency	Percent
Accommodation	40	46.5
Assimilation	34	39.5
Exclusion	12	13.9
Total	86	100.00

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
rivalclaim	Rival claim	86	.73	.44	0	1
Revisionist	State - Revisionist	86	.59	.49	0	1
revisionist	Group -revisionist	86	.31	.46	0	1
homeland	Group has a Homeland	86	.39	.49	0	1
urban	Group Primarily Urban	86	.44	.49	0	1
language	Different Language	86	.81	.39	0	1
religion	Different Religion	86	.54	.50	0	1
groupsize	Group larger than 1%	86	.58	.49	0	1

Table 2. Correlations

	Rival claim	Revisionist/State	revisionist/Group	homeland	urban	language	religion	group size
rivalclaim	1.0000							
Revisionist	-0.1262	1.0000						
revisionist	0.4087	-0.0006	1.0000					
homeland	0.4348	-0.2499	0.2729	1.0000				
urban	0.3260	-0.1685	-0.1478	0.1426	1.0000			
language	0.4537	-0.0311	0.3234	0.3255	-0.1161	1.0000		
religion	0.2939	-0.1841	0.1129	0.1155	0.1520	0.1647	1.0000	
groupsize	0.0731	-0.1272	0.0661	-0.0852	0.2804	-0.1634	0.0319	1.0000

Table 3. Multinomial Logit Estimates
for Nation-building Strategies in Post WWI Balkans

	Accommodation	Assimilation
<i>Comparison Group</i>	Exclusion	
Variable		
Rival Claim	-.15	-.92
Revisionist Group	-2.5	-1.77
Revisionist State	-1.35	-1.6
External Homeland	-.24	-.18
Primarily Urban	1.61	.36
Language	2.17	-.34
Religion	-.4	-1.58
Group Larger than 1%	-2.8	-1.69
_constant	3.13	6

Results are coefficients,³³ Bold and Italics signify statistical significance.

Number of Obs. 86
LR Chi-Squared (22) 49.45
Prob>Chi-Sq. 0.000
Pseudo R-Sq. 0.29

³³ They actually signify the log ratio between the **Probability of Accommodation/Probability of Exclusion** in the first column and the log ratio between the **Probability of Assimilation/Probability of Exclusion** in the second column. For example looking at whether a non-core group is revisionist or status quo we find that a one unit change decreases the log ratio of the Pr(accommodation)/Pr(exclusion) by 2.5.

Table 4. Simulations

Variable	Simulation A	Simulation B	Simulation C	Simulation D	Simulation E	Simulation F	Simulation G	Simulation H	Simulation I
Rival Claim	max	max	min	min	min	min	min	max	max
Revisionist Group	max	max	min	min	min	min	min	min	min
Revisionist State	max	max	min	min	min	min	min	min	max
External Homeland	max	min	min	min	min	min	min	min	max
Primarily Urban	min	min	min	min	min	min	max	max	max
Language	max	max	min	min	max	max	max	max	max
Religion	max	max	min	min	min	max	max	max	max
Group Larger than 1%	max	max	min	max	max	max	max	max	min
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Pr(Accommodation)	.1	.1	.07	.02	.19	.37	.63	.77	.91
95% Conf. Interval	0-.3	0-.38	0-.3	0-.1	.03-.5	.09-.76	.2-.9	.47-.94	.7-.9
Pr(Assimilation)	.13	.1	.91	.93	.75	.52	.31	.17	.06
95% Conf. Interval	0-.4	0-.4	.67-.99	.75-.99	.4-.95	.16-.85	.05-.75	0-.4	0-.2
Pr(Exclusion)	.76	.73	0	.03	.04	.1	.05	.04	.02
95% Conf. Interval	.38-.96	.34-.95	0-.06	0-.1	0-.2	0-.5	0-.3	0-.22	0-.1