

Challenging NATO's Security Operations in Electronic Warfare: the Policy of Cyber-Defence: the Case of Greece.

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Abstract: NATO is evolving. It is changing. It is estimated that in the 2010 summit meeting in Portugal, Allied member-states will hold, as requested at the Kiehl-Strasbourg summit of 2009, a first evaluation on the need for renewed Strategic Concept. In terms of 21st century asymmetrical warfare, as part of the current security dogma, NATO requires to be technologically updated. This entails NATO to continue its effort to change. The results that shall occur in this subject shall be portrayed to the effort made on the renewed security concept. NATO is steadily unfolding its policy of Cyber-Defence. NATO needs to be operationally ready to counter all attacks of asymmetrical warfare, whether from the inside or the outside of its operational sphere of influence. The aim of this paper to provide the reader with the necessary information to firstly learn what has been done up to this date, in relations to NATO's operational preparations and in relations to its Cyber-Defence policy. In a second part, this paper examines and evaluates current policy decisions, as to understand whether a) NATO will actually take a major step into becoming involved into a new form of self-defensive or offensive asymmetrical warfare b) whether a political-military organisation of international members, such as NATO can actually afford working together. c) Whether the unfolding of Cyber-Defence policy will be implemented in NATO's operational environments, as to counter new phenomena of terrorism via the web. An explanation on network preparations and operations shall be made. At the same time an explanation shall be provided, why should the internet be so important to NATO's network centric operations and why does NATO need a Cyber-Defence policy. In practical terms, the case study of Greece is examined. What is Greece's policy objectives vis a vis NATO policy of Cyber-Defence? What has been done by Greece in creating the necessary steps to both take an initiative at NATO and at the same time initiate a national policy of implementation of the possible outcomes decided by NATO Heads of States? This paper is part of the author's wider topics of research made on NATO and its policies in the 21st century.

Keywords: NATO Cyber Defence Concept, NATO Cyber-Defence Centre of Excellence, North Atlantic Council, Transformation, Greece's policy on Cyber-defence.

1. Introduction

It is said, that future war-like operations will be held in a far more complicated than the current one, military operational environments, where battles will be dealt at multiple levels and multiple dimensions. Missions, according to NATO, in all fields “will continue to require agile and interoperable, well-trained and well-led military forces”ⁱ; assuming that these military forces shall be in greater need than today, if NATO decides to take part (as ordered by a viable and robust renewed Security Concept, -that is currently considered) at “offensive – first to be engaged- operations of all kinds, if need be, but also in defensive-clause operations”.

In the following paper we argue that NATO's new electronic security operational preparation that is unfolding should be challenged, as there is an increasing need to adopt new methods and actions, as to counter both, current and new, symmetrical and asymmetrical threats. Accordingly the result of possible new methods and actions to counter the ever emerging

challenges should be applied at a renewed Security Concept, to come. A proposal for a renewed and viable concept of security for NATO is expected to be proposed at the Portugal Summit of 2010. The outcome is a decision made by Heads of States at the Stratsbourg-Kiehl Summit in April 2009.

This paper shall examine the evolving challenges of the North-Atlantic Organisations' security operations and preparations at the fields of Electronic Warfare and in specific Cyber-Defence.

The aforementioned subject will be portrayed and examined. It is the purpose of the paper to draw the reader's attention, to portray and understand how the future of, what and how, when and in what other dimension, shall military operations be, according to NATO decisions, as accepted by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This paper argues that the argument that - most future, defensive or offensive battles shall also occur in an asymmetric level-, as was the case with the cyber-attacks in Estonia in 2007. Therefore a policy of Cyber-Defence but also a general preparation for electronic warfare, which includes network-centric operational interoperability of forces preparation, is in need at NATO to exist and to evolve for the sake of the Allied 'e-networked' states, against all traditional but also non-traditional forms of attacks.

The outcome of this paper's analysis shall be a variety of proposals, which will be put forward for consideration. At the same time these proposals shall be combined with any efforts made by the Greek Government to apply this new policy both at a national or supranational level. What are if any, the proposals that are in preparation by the Greek State to NATO's objectives on a renewed security concept and in specific NATO's policy of Cyber-Defence?

What should be noted is that the opinions mentioned in the current paper reflect solely the opinions of the author. They do not reflect any countries' or the North Atlantic Organisations' policies or actions. Current arguments are solely based on personal academic research, judgments and working experience from NATO.

A variety of issues in this case study needs to be addressed. The issues for consideration reflect the operational and tactical levels of what NATO needs to be. The Alliance is currently renewing and evaluating its transformation process that was initiated after the Prague Summit in November 2002ⁱⁱ.

2. Establishing NATO's new symmetrical and asymmetrical security environment.

Latest research has shown that NATO's policies and its security environment has been assessedⁱⁱⁱ. At the same research, it is mentioned that -in a post-2001 terrorist attacks in the USA- era, the Alliance has 1) invoked article 5^{iv}, claiming its right to defense against external aggression 2) Allied states agreed on an ever lasting transformation, politically, militarily, operationally and strategically in Prague 2002, 3) agreed to be involved in outer-areas of its traditional (26 member states) area i.e. Kosovo 1999^v, Afghanistan 2001^{vi} onwards via operation International Assistance Force (ISAF)^{vii}, 4) now challenged its current operational planning and decision procedure and agreed to examine and be engaged at new forms of

military preparation, for preventive or offensive purposes i.e. Decisions of the Allied Defence Ministers October 2007^{viii}.

Considering aforementioned political decisions, one important issue is that has been agreed by all member-states is that NATO is a necessity^{ix}. NATO is in fact, “required, requested, but now also retained”. By introducing the 3 (R)s in this paper, we establish what the Heads of States decided over and over again, from the Treaty of London during the beginning of the 1990s Summit, to its 1994 Summit in Brussels, to its 1999 over its 50th year anniversary Summit in Washington, to the immediate decisions taken in 2001 after the terrorist acts in the USA^x and finally to its 60th anniversary, which was held in Strasbourg and Kiehl (in specific Baden-Baden) accordingly in April 2009: NATO was created for a long-term and thus it is here to remain. NATO today is evolving. NATO’s administrative, operational and tactical current form is considered as “the purest form of a true military-political alliance that brings and binds together countries that hold the same supranational interests, in terms of security, in all fields related, such as military, political, financial, sociological and environmental security”^{xi}.

Politically, militarily, administratively, by consensus decision-making process of the Allied states, it was considered in 2002, due to the constantly challenging security environment that NATO is required to change. Its current 2001 Strategic Dogma is under evaluation and consideration as it is now widely challenged by member-states. Some say, it is no longer viable. Others consider NATO’s 2001 Security Concept would be the basis for collective member-states negotiations, as an opportunity for restructuring a renewed Strategic Concept; One that will portray all needs but also challenges; A Concept that will clarify policies, operational needs and doings, both at tactical and operational levels; a concept that will provide with the necessary financial but also legal clauses, which are now needed. The outcome for a renewed Concept of Security was portrayed at NATO Heads of State Summit in Strasbourg-Kiehl in April 3rd and 4th 2009^{xii}.

NATO is in need for a renewed Security Concept. The Alliance should be able to deliver better and robust outcomes in the 21st century security challenges. 10 years within the 21st century, it is the result of the authors recent research outcome^{xiii} that NATO should continue to transform in order to operate within the limits of its political decisions (that should be widened), according to its own ‘rules of engagement’ (NATO’s military doctrine). Therefore a renewed legal and political plan of operation and co-operation, for which NATO was in fact challenged and criticized, meaning over its ability to prepare and deliver actual military results, is in need. These aforementioned issues were also the reasons why the NATO Prague Summit of November 2002 came about. It resulted to the policy of transformation. Two major operational camps were created: 1) the Allied Command Transformation (ACT –USA-) and 2) the Allied Command Operations (ACO –Belgium-). In the following Summits, NATO’s Istanbul (2004), Riga (2006) and Bucharest Summits (2008), accordingly, delivered concrete and practical results after thorough evaluation of the current and ongoing changes within the Structure the administration, the military and political preparation. NATO’s leaders believe that the Alliance has today the ability to operate in a largely different security environment that is no longer limited only to symmetrical threats or geographical areas but also to an environment of asymmetrical threats as well as unstable areas of interest. The Alliance’s readiness for prevention against any or all asymmetrical attacks includes: Radiological, Biological, Chemical attacks, all forms of terrorists attacks. NATO has also the capability and capacity to counter-fight any opponents by military men-led operations supported by components of land and sea power in an out of controlled area operation via its NRF (NATO

Reaction Forces) force, i.e. Afghanistan. It is also capable of support led, peace-keeping, or peace-making operations i.e. Darfur or Somalia.

3. The trend for an e-security world.

Within the framework for a renewed security dogma, to be proposed^{xiv}, NATO leaders have to acknowledge the need to establish a policy that is linked to the general technological trends. This opinion, motive-wise, was certainly sustained post-2007 case of cyber-attacks in Estonia. The outcome was the creation of a cyber-defence centre according to the decision made by the Allied Command Transformation, in Norfolk Virginia USA.

It is believed that the 21st century shall be the century where all things will be dealt by constant creations and use of advanced technology. Of course technology has long-lasting history that dates back to the use by the Phoenicians, the Ancient Greeks and the Chinese. At the 21st century however, technology is referred to as the use of computers and their means such as the (World Wide Web). Unfortunately, our so-called wired-society that includes online services such as: banking, communications, shopping, media-services etc, take place in cyberspace and therefore are eligible to cyber-attacks. The fact that countries do steadily move forward in becoming dependent on computers and networked e-world, network security is becoming increasingly needed. E-world assurance of information is therefore needed, as to increase the security level of countries, meaning peapole, institutions and businesses.

Current security risk assessments consider that for the development of an e-secure world, organized crimes, made via the use of the web, should be countered. 'Cyber-crimes', are nowadays done by organized small groups. 'Hackers', are considered eligible to criminal justice judgements, by accessing to personal, classified or other unauthorized information by informal and unaccepted ways. The use of personal, unauthorized, or private information to get access to other resources such as funds is a crime, as is a crime the use of the web to terrorize citizens, states, institutions or organizations.

In terms of applying these issues in military policy, for which this paper is concerned with, the web and its service operations, are now widely used by national or multinational armies, by organizations such as NATO. Their technology invented is thus used as to become engaged at e-level networked centric operational preparation for assymetrical warfare and counter-warfare operations, where decided. As aforementioned above, cyber-space shall be used as a form of battleground and counter-battles in future conflicts. At the same time the thought only of hackers: 1) having access to sensitive information on military weaponry and possible use against any possible public, government or multinational organization, 2) using the web for cyber-attacks, makes the creation of a Cyber-Defence policy necessary.

Below, we will explain NATO's newest policy issue, a decision-made by the Heads of States and Governments as published at the Bucharest Summit of 2008 and the request of the ACT, which, since the Prague Summit in November 2002, deals with the ever ongoing NATO transformation, to seek solutions for the constant and emerging challenges against cyber-attacks.

4. NATO's Concept of Cyber-Defence:

NATO's Military Committee has recently decided on what has come to be called as a "Cyber-Defence Concept". The Committee's aim is to deliver practical results that will point out: 1) the necessity of NATO as a collective organization in a globalised and currently unsafe e-world 2) the Alliance' ability to deliver new policy results, taking into perspective new forms of asymmetrical threats such as cyber-attacks.

Historically, the 2002 Prague Summit first marked NATO's tasking authority committee with regards to all activities that should be held in relations to Cyber-Defence. As technical achievements were delivered, so did policy-makers, deliver policy results on Cyber-defence. That is why, Allied leaders during the Riga Summit of 2006 acknowledged the need to include as is stated on its decisions at the Press Communiqué: 1) protect NATO's operational information systems 2) protect its allied countries from any e-, or in other words cyber-attacks by new forms and means developed by NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

In turn, the October 2007 outcomes of NATO, at the level of Allied Defence Ministers^{xv}, gave way to the inauguration of NATO's centre of excellence (COE)^{xvi} by the Allied Command Transformation^{xvii} on Cyber-Defence, in Estonia –Tallinn^{xviii}-. It is based, on the aforementioned Concept on Cyber-Defence, as agreed by NATO's Military Committee.

The central and final decision-making role over the policy of Cyber-Defence however is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the highest deciding political authority, as we foretold. It considers NATO's policies and activities in regards to the subject politically and militarily. Below the NAC, is NATO's Consultation Control and Command Agency (NC3A)^{xix} and the NATO Military Authorities (NMA). This latest authority, takes part mostly on the implementation as its task^{xx}.

The implementation of NATO's Cyber-Defence policy is considered as the second most important decision of countering criminals and terrorists, as the decisions are taken by the NAC. The "Concept of Cyber-Defence" "adds practical action programmes to fit within the overarching policy"^{xxi}. The 'Cyber-Defence Management Authority' that is tasked upon its policy concept "brings together the key actors in NATO's Cyber-Defence activities". Its aim is to manage and support all NATO communication and information networked systems and individually allies upon request^{xxii}.

NATO's policy activity is encouraged by the Alliance, to the engagement of as many as possible, if not all governments, member-states of the Alliance, but also industries relating with these subject matters. In accordance to its best practice policy, NATO considers that its 'operational forum' can and should be considered as the best joint operational co-operation between states, as to also avoid duplication of efforts.

Practically or otherwise said in military policy implementation, operationally, as is mentioned by NATO, there are "three phases of practical activity" as how this policy came about: In its initial phase a "NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC)" was established as well as its "interim operating capability". Its second phase involved an ever more realistic-pragmatic perspective, that required the co-ordination of all initial 'offering' states (under the NATO agreement between states of a voluntary national contribution -VNC-), in bringing the NCIRC to a full operational capability^{xxiii}.

New policies came about after being proposed and then coming to effect (well-known procedure of internal NATO working process). A so-called 'Memorandum of Understanding' is drafted and proposed to NATO by the sponsoring state, in this case Estonia, prior to any of the above-mentioned phases of practical activity. From that point on it is the administrative decision of the Alliance, that once the aforementioned stages are put into effect, then a third phase comes into turn. Needless to say, this third phase may also be the most important. "It consists of incorporating -lessons learned- from the prior two phases as using new and latest Cyber-Defence measures (use of new technology and getting more knowledge on the security environment), in order to "enhance Cyber-Defence posture"^{xxiv}. Once the third phase has been evaluated, then the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) decides whether to declare the operational centre –in this case the Cooperative Cyber Defence (CCD) COE (Estonia)^{xxv}, what is called as a "Centre of Excellence"^{xxvi}. The outcome in May 2008, was that the centre of CCD was declared by NATO Allied Command Transformation as a 'Centre of Excellence' (CCDCOE).

5. Cyber-Defence put into the test: The Estonian Case.

The Centre of Excellence in Tallinn was primarily supported for two reasons: 1) It was already scheduled by the time of its inauguration as an idea. Estonia would have been the host country for such an operational centre. It had proposed as a newcomer to the Alliance to establish the first operational international military centre ever, in NATO's history as an Ally. 2) Estonia had already been witness of modern asymmetrical warfare attacks in 2007. This came as a result of Estonians removing the bronze statue of a Red Army soldier from the centre of Tallinn an honorary statue honouring the dead of the Second World War. This matter sparked social outrage between the 60-65% of its Russian Speaking, Russian native population and the Estonian Government^{xxvii}. It resulted to continuous cyber-attacks on Estonia's e-infrastructure public or private, military or civilian. One year later in 2008, 7 countries according to the memorandum of understanding, helped Estonia get full operational capability (Germany Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain), which lead to its current status. Current Status includes also the possibility of evolving as the US in interested in Joining; Turkey and Greece are in the middle of initiating an evaluation of their needs on whether or not to join this centre.

The cyber-attacks in Estonia, with a duration period of several weeks, in 2007, provided nonetheless NATO with a motive. NATO was in fact right on its judgment that: 1) Such an operational centre was in fact needed 2) Its operational centre, it was decided, that it should constantly be evaluating current and prospective evolutions in warfare and more specifically in Cyber-Defence.

Therefore, for this positive, for NATO, development on the matter of electronic warfare, the centre looks like that it will become the leading operational centre against any cyber-attacks.

Since the inauguration of its Co-operative Cyber-Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn Estonia in May 2008, the 30 men group operational centre, initiated a mission and a vision statement. Its *raison d' être* as stated is "to enhance the co-operative Cyber-Defence capability of NATO and NATO nations, thus improving the Alliance's interoperability in the field of cooperative Cyber-Defence". Its vision is to be "a primary source of subject matter expertise for NATO in cooperative cyber-defence related matters"^{xxviii}.

Core policy-creating by research and policy-presenting areas, are presented primarily at the Supreme Commander Allied Command Transformation (SACT), by a request of NATO HQ (Head Quarters) and by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) level. This includes:

- “Doctrine and concept development
- Awareness and training
- Research and development
- Analysis and lessons learned
- Consultation”^{xxxix}.

6. NATO approaches issues relevant to cyber-security

For the concept of Cyber-Defence to be successful, the Centre for Excellence in Tallinn, should continue to portray NATO's need for the creation of a permanent, of major importance core policy. On the 6th and 7th February 2009, NATO's Science for Peace and Security (SPS) sponsored a workshop entitled “Operational Network Intelligence: Today and Tomorrow”. Its overall purpose as stated was “to rethink present strategies and identify urgent measures to be taken in order to minimize the strategic and economic impacts of cyber attacks”^{xxx}.

NATO increasingly recognizes that organized cyber-attacks seek to take advantage as is stated “modern society's dependence on sophisticated technology in order to inflict serious damage on economies and national security”^{xxxii}.

NATO is also of firm belief that there is an increasing need for the co-ordination of the human factors related to the issues of electronic warfare, operational network, intelligence and Cyber-Defence. Said that, NATO implies that all people involved such as systems and security engineers, researchers, officers dealing with network operations and operational centers should be systematically involved at organized levels of discussion, under the form of academic research. In turn, at this point the paper proposes that this research could, if applicable, be put under the central command and authority of the Estonian Cyber-Defense Centre with simultaneous presentation of its outcomes to the political and military Committees of NATO and under the auspices of the Secretary General of NATO.

It is also important to stress that NATO's level of ambition on the policy of Cyber-Defence and at the general policy of electronic warfare should increase. Current Academic research should co-ordinate itself with practical work made at NATO's military operational levels. Said that, NATO should and could do more on this matter by:

- 1) Applying the outcomes both from the Centre of Excellence but also from the SPS at both tactical but also operational levels of NATO main forces.
- 2) Applying Tallinn's coordinated efforts outcomes on Cyber-Defence in its operational military centers that deal with the use of interoperable forces and network centric operations in warlike engagement operation.
- 3) The Allies involved at the Cyber-Defense centre should consider inviting more Allied member states to join, under the NATO co-operation form of ‘Voluntary National Contribution (VNC)’^{xxxiii}, looking to a positive outcome that will be offered by the Centre of Excellence on Cyber-Defence, in Tallinn Estonia.

4) By joint co-operation at the level of electronic-warfare prevention, detection and reaction onto attacks to member allied states, duplication of policy can be avoided.

The NATO Summit Meeting in April 2009, proposed two major issues: 1) The intention for a renewed Security Concept and 2) a policy-creation for negotiations amongst states, as well as evaluation and policy implementation agenda for the renewed Security Concept. While NATO creates, a political and military agenda for a successful renewed and viable dogma for security, a new policy-implementation and operational-strategic framework on the Cyber-Defence Concept, should also be drafted and then requested under the framework of the renewed Security Concept. Once accepted it should be included at the as aforementioned renewed NATO Security Concept. In turn, for this matter this paper proposes:

- 1) New policies relating to practical operational and tactical guidelines on how to achieve full operational security in electronic warfare to be drafted as included at the Security Concept.
- 2) At the same time as network-centric warfare has not established its legal status of engagement, the NAC or ACT should provide with the necessary decisions to allow the CCDCOE to evaluate and propose a legal guideline for the proper legal protection but also operation within the framework of the wider NATO legal operative environment.
- 3) Tallinn's CCDCOE, should be supported by the creation of a purely military NATO operational centre on electronic warfare (NATOCEW) that will deal only with the application of current CCDCOE research, towards the successful and interoperable engagement of NATO forces. It will be able to co-operate with other leading nations and possibly non-Allied members that do support wider policies such as the fight against terrorism.
- 4) Within the evolving strategy of NATO on Cyber-Defence, the CCDCOE should propose more Nations to get involved into the subject matter. Political support is there. The former Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (at that time still current) insisted on supporting its creation. Accordingly, at NATO's summit communiqué in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO reaffirmed its readiness to "provide a capability to assist allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack"^{xxxiii}. In 2008 the US forces command stated that it would not be involved at this level of operational research. However by February 2009, the CCDCOE was informed that the US would become an offering nation under the VNC (Voluntary National Contribution) clause, at the NATO effort made for a joint co-operation on Cyber-defence. At the same time, Turkey expressed its willingness to be involved at the operational research of the CCDCOE^{xxxiv}. As of the end of 2008, the CCDCOE holds also the recognition of an international organization, which offers the centre's ability to choose its partners but to also widen its perspectives depending on its current needs and allocation of funds^{xxxv}.

7. Greece's case on NATO policy of Cyber-Defence

Although Greece has not yet joined Tallin's Centre of Excellence against cyber-defence, Latest developments, following the NATO summit on 2009, resulted to a joint consultations and proposals workshop meeting of high level experts of NATO and General Armed Forces Staff of Greece in Athens between the 12th and 15th May 2009^{xxxvi}. This was the 11th NATO workshop on cyber-defence. It was hosted by Greece General Armed Forces and sponsored by NATO's NCIRC (NATO Computer Incident and Response Capability).

The aim was to present and provide an update on NATO's cyber-defence policy and management aspects, NATO's policy on cyber-defence operations, on its capability but also project deployment. The aim was to initiate a discussion at the military level with the creation of syndicate committees and to result to a positive outcome for both NATO and Greece on how to deal and to this effect, examine the possibility of Greece joining the Center of Excellence of NATO and international organisation, in Tallinn.

Greece's is still far from joining a cyber-defence centre and even more joining in Tallin's centre of Cyber-defence. This abovementioned cyber-defence workshop that took place in Athens in May 2009 was therefore considered essential in presenting the causes, the needs and the burdens that Greece would be asked to include in its military but also political agenda if agreed to join. The first results are therefore yet to be presented once they are made officially publicized. In the meantime, Greece's policy of cyber-defence as NATO military objectives are portrayed, do not formally apply to Greece's current and formal military objectives.

Greece is in the middle of re-allocating its military priorities in terms of symmetrical and assymetrical threats as is ordered by its national military dogma. What ever the decision will be, shall be a policy of full integration on the perspective under the policy of NATO interoperability of forces. As the Minister of Defence stated in his speech at the NATO council on 8th February 2008, and one year prior to the n April 2009 NATO summit, several issues were discussed as well as the policy of Greece vis a vis NATO's cyber-defence^{xxxvii}. The combination of a workshop in Athens one year later in May 2009 headed by the General Armed Forces of Greece and NATO, simultaneously leads us to the initial outcome that Greece is planning both at the national but also NATO levels to apply an interoperable policy of a joint effort on the matter of cyber-defence, avoiding any possibilities of duplication of efforts as is also the statement made by NATO Secretary-General.

At the operational level the decision of the Greek Prime-Minister to apply more national forces under the ISAF and NATO commands in Afghanistan and in specific in Herat, entails that in the effort of operational success network forces should be interoperable but also protected from any e-threats.

It is therefore the authors' assumption that Greece sooner or later shall be involved at a military level at the tactical preparation and authorization of NATO to conduct simultaneous and joint operations at a defensive level against possible and world cyber-attacks.

Concluding Remarks:

In conclusion to this paper, the main aim was to portray a recently new but important issue that has been decided by NATO Allies, to develop a policy in regards to electronic warfare and in specific Cyber-Defence. The creation of a Concept of Cyber-Defense and the inauguration of the Centre of Excellence for Cyber-Defence in Tallinn Estonia, according to the decision of the SACT at Norfolk Virginia, NATO is now challenging its current form of Strategic Dogma that has been there since 2001. It is of importance to stress that NATO Allies do widely accept now that a renewed Security Concept that portrays all challenges of the 21 century, is necessary. Within this renewed Concept, we estimate that the policy of Cyber-Defence and overall the policy of electronic warfare shall be mentioned. The question

is what and how the final decisions shall be made; whether the actual current players on this policy shall increase for an effective engagement in practical military operating environments; will other allies such as Greece decide to offer their co-operation under any form such as the VNC or otherwise instructed or decided, as was recently done by the USA and intended to be done by Turkey to the CCDCOE? Will the CCDCOE finally reach its full operational pick? Notwithstanding the fact that a legal procedure still needs to be drafted as to evaluate and establish the legal scale and the wideness of operations that it should reflect.

During the course of this paper we estimated that current developments shall lead the CCDCOE to a full operational capability. It will offer robust results, in support of current military man-handled operations. Nonetheless, what is needed to be clarified is NATO's intention for this current centre to offer its outcomes to the effort made by military operational centres such as the 'NATO Deployable Coprs' in Greece, in order to reach at an electronic level but also the levels of the military, interoperability of forces.

It is thus the outcome and proposal of this paper that this centre continues its efforts to become fully operational: Once all administrative decisions have been taken for its smooth operation and once all member allies such as Greece are in full co-operation amongst each other upon this matter, then the centre, should establish a strategic and tactical plan of operation and co-operation in the field of electronic warfare.

This plan shall be in support to current preparations of military man-made operations under NATO forces, such as the preparation of the NRF. Although the latest has become into full operational capability (Riga summit 2006), the NRF is still located at its preparatory and rotating (country-wise preparation) basis levels, where interoperability is yet to be accomplished.

By portraying such a subject we believe that there is a collective interest for NATO members. This subject relates directly not only to security matters to a third party such as states but rather to the well-operational environment of NATO forces, as are offered by the Allied States.

Greece is in the middle of a decision-making process that is not yet to become official as current risk assessments are been made. Greece has just recently embarked on examining the possibility of joining NATO's policy of cyber-defence, according also to the 'guide' of NATO's policy of interoperability of forces command and operation. The results are yet to be presented and then be evaluated. According to Greece's responsibilities to NATO, its military heads of Armed forces shall consider both possibilities positive or negative from this policy evolution on cyber-defence. If Agreed to join then Greece will do the outmost to take initiatives for the best co-operation at the level of NATO co-operation.

NATO is consider to represent the military moral values and the ethics of a collective supranational alliance that works for the collective interests, which are to defend democratic values, the rule of law and the respect of human rights. That is why NATO changes and that is also why NATO is required to change, to evolve, to develop and to expand current or new policies such as matters of Cyber-Defence.

NATO is needed. It is a provider of security in all fields. A preliminary assessment and a critique on NATO's policies were made. During the course of this paper we examined and analysed the policy of Cyber-Defence and the case of Greece. We proposed new practical,

administrative, political ways of expanding NATO's operational environment symmetrical or asymmetrically, in constantly changing security environment.

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ⁱⁱ Prague Summit Declaration: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>, November 2002.

ⁱⁱⁱ Efthymiopoulos Marios P. (2008), "NATO in the 21st century: The need for a renewed security concept and the ever increasing NATO-Russia relations, Athens, Thessaloniki, Published by Sakkoulas A.E. (in Greek).

^{iv} Invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm#Art05>

^v Operation Allied Force on Kosovo: http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo_air/index.html

^{vi} Afghanistan: The Taliban Resurgent and NATO, Brookings Institution March 31 2009:

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1128globalgovernance_riedel.aspx

^{vii} International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) website: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/index.html>

^{viii} For more information on the evolution of NATO's policy on cyber-defence see:

http://www.nato.int/issues/cyber_defence/index.html

^{ix} Ibid 2.

^x NATO updates for information on immediate NATO reaction see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0910/index-e.htm>

^{xi} Ibid 2. pp 8.

^{xii} NATO Declaration on the Decisions of Heads of States, NATO Summit Strasbourg-Kiehl April 2009 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease

^{xiii} Efthymiopoulos M.P. (2008), NATO's policies in the 21st century: the need for a renewed security concept and the ever enlarging NATO-Russia Relations, Athens-Thessaloniki, Published by Sakkoulas Publications (in Greek).

^{xiv} NATO secretary General meets with President Obama 25 March 2009: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2009/03-march/e0325b.html>

^{xv} Informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers October 2007:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2007/0710-noordwijk/0710-mod.htm>

^{xvi} What is a Centre of Excellence (COE)? 4 December 2003, the concept for Centres of Excellence was published. "This concept defines what a COE is, explains the applying principles, talks about accreditation, relationships and also includes guidelines on legal arrangements between the Strategic Commands and sponsoring nations...". For more NATO information on COE see <http://www.act.nato.int/news.asp?storyid=342>

^{xvii} The Allied Command Transformation vision statement and objectives <http://www.act.nato.int/content.asp?pageid=200>

^{xviii} NATO opens new Centre of Excellence on cyber-defence: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html>

^{xix} NC3A Agency official website: <http://www.nc3a.nato.int/Pages/Home.aspx>

^{xx} For basic information on the topic of NATO's cyber-defence policy see: "Defending against cyber-attacks http://www.nato.int/issues/cyber_defence/index.html

^{xxi} Ibid.

^{xxii} Defending against cyber attacks: http://www.nato.int/issues/cyber_defence/practice.html

^{xxiii} Ibid.

^{xxiv} Ibid 15.

^{xxv} Cooperative Cyber Defence (CCD) COE (Estonia): <http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/CentresofE/CCD>

^{xxvi} Centres of Excellence (COEs), are funded nationally or multi-nationally and are consistent with NATO efforts. For more see the ACT website on Centres of Excellence at: <http://www.act.nato.int/content.asp?pageid=335>.

^{xxvii} See News Scientist: <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13904-nato-to-give-estonia-cyber-defences.html> or Ibid 2.

^{xxviii} CCDCOE website at: <http://www.ccdcoe.org/11.html>

^{xxix} Core areas of the CCDCOE <http://www.ccdcoe.org/37.html>

^{xxx} SPS workshop rethinks approaches to cyber security: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2009/02-february/e0206a.html>

^{xxxi} Ibid.

^{xxxii} VNC is a form of National Contribution under the rules of national policy for a specific period of Time under the auspices of a Government of Foreign or Defense Ministries.

^{xxxiii} NATO creates cyber-defense centre in Estonia, May 15 2008:

[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33636](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33636)

^{xxxiv} History and way ahead of the CCDCOE: <http://www.ccdcoe.org/12.html>

^{xxxv} Ibid.

^{xxxvi} 11th NATO CYBER DEFENCE WORKSHOP 12-15 May 2009, Athens, Greece hosted by NATO and HNDGS www.geetha.mil.gr/media/11cyber/4.Agenda.doc

^{xxxvii} Greek Defence Minister to the NATO Council:

<http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=19&article=22812>

Paper Prepared for the 4th PhD Symposium of the Hellenic Observatory, LSE

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Greek Foreign Energy Policy: Is It Conflicting with European Union Energy Security Objectives?

Introduction

According to the United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, four crises are currently under way. There is a food crisis, a climate crisis, a financial crisis and an energy crisis.¹ The focus of this paper is on the latter. But to be accurate the world is not facing as yet an energy crisis. What exists today are characteristics of an imminent crisis; One that directly affects the climate, the global food production and distribution and as a consequence the financial system. There is still time for humanity to move towards the right direction, but in a world of competitive nation states how possible that is?

In this paper I am examining whether Greece's energy diplomacy and policy choices are conflicting with European Union energy related security aims. The transit pipelines projects in which Greece participates have raised questions on whether they jeopardise European Union security of supply. In order to address that issue the necessary conceptual framework needs to be set and the relevant structure has to be presented. Therefore, at first I am going to briefly discuss the recent developments and changes that are taking place within the international system. Then, I attempt to define the European Union. Since the main question is more about Greece than the EU as an organisation I use concepts and assumptions from the neorealist theoretical toolbox. Thirdly, I explore Greece as a nation state and its foreign policy under the condition of anarchy. Finally, the projects that Greece participates are presented and discussed before providing the conclusions of the paper.

Setting the Framework

As life is, the international system is in constant change. It is evolving continuously and the new aspects and trends within it always challenge the nation states, which comprise the system's fundamental units. The end of the East – West geopolitical² and ideological rivalry, namely the Cold War, brought about the rise of a new global environment with different characteristics. The 1990s have been a decade where the rapid developments in technology, communications and of international financial

¹ Introductory remarks at the 2009 Davos based, World Economic Forum.

² The term 'geopolitical' refers to a branch of the science of Geography. Geopolitics deals with the political, economic and strategic issues that influence and shape the study of Geography. There are too many analyses recently that use the term and do not provide the necessary definitions. Others are mistakenly identifying geopolitics to realism. However, all forms of realist thinking use the term to describe phenomena referring to spatial politics. For a general analysis see, Daniel Deudney (1997), *Geopolitics and Change*, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, Oxford: Westview Press, pp.91-123; and, Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (1999) eds., *Geopolitics – Geography and Strategy*, London: Frank Cass.

In this paper I use the term to describe systemic change or foreign and security policies and strategies in which geography plays a determinative role that deeply influences decisions or limits choices.

interactions gave boost to the forces of globalisation.³ Scholars like Francis Fukuyama declared that the end of history had arrived while few years later, others like Samuel Huntington argued about the oncoming class of civilizations.⁴ A series of challenges jeopardised national security forcing nation states to adapt to the new conditions. In the post-Cold War era states not only faced old types of threats but a series of new ones like the massive movements of refugees, which often leads to illegal immigration, environmental pollution, international terrorism that identify itself beyond state structures, the trade of narcotics and electronic warfare to mention a few. In September the 11th of 2001 the world witnessed the terrorist attack of Al Qaeda in New York. From that point onwards it was obvious that the international system had entered into a new phase signalling simultaneously the dawn of the 21st century.

Since the end of the Cold War it became widely accepted that the increased levels of energy consumption and the negative environmental externalities that these create were putting nation states and humanity in general at the crossroads of history once again. At the same time, rising global energy demand was followed by the need for extensive investments, the deployment of more sophisticated technologies, the inevitability for energy's efficient use and by the need to access oil and gas fields, which are located into remote and/or highly unstable politically regions. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), on average world primary energy demand grows by 1.6% per year for the period 2006 to 2030, which translates to an increase of 45% (from 11,730 to approximately 17,010 Mtoe).⁵ Additionally, the projections for the investment needed to meet the rising demand reach the \$26 trillion.⁶ These trends are alarming and co-operation among governments and co-ordination of their actions seems to become a necessity. But in a world and an international system, where the nation state prevails as a fundamental unit, how possible that is? International institutions as other units of the same system have increased their number and scope of action. But again, have they reached these levels of expansion, development and strength that nation state's power is seriously eroded?

In this paper Greece as a nation state is discussed and its foreign policy choices are examined by giving attention to its energy related diplomacy and actions, and to the

³ By globalisation I refer to the process where interactions among peoples and societies increase in number and complexity due to the elimination or rapid minimisation of distances, borders and of physical and non-physical barriers. World is not a single place but is rapidly perceived as one due to the tremendous development of communication technology and of the global movements of finance. There is an ongoing debate about the nature, characteristics and the definition of globalisation. However, since neo-realism will assist us in explaining Greek foreign energy policy choices, it has to be noted that for realists in general globalisation as a trend within the international system does not eliminate the security considerations of states. On the contrary it increases them as new security challenges arise.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Penguin; and, Samuel P. Huntington, (1997), *The Class of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, London: Simon & Schuster. When Francis Fukuyama declared his *end of history*, his thesis had been that liberal democracy and free trade had triumphed over other (more autocratic) forms of politico-economic organisation. He argued that as a result humanity was moving towards a specific end, namely, a world with democratic nation-states, with open societies and liberalised economic structures. On the contrary, Huntington despite being influenced by the realist school of thought, he used constructivist analytical tools, such as culture, ideas and identities and argued that in the 21st century we will witness conflicts among the planet's major civilizations.

⁵ International Energy Agency (2008), *World Energy Outlook 2008*, Paris: OECD/IEA.

⁶ Ibid.

impact these actions and policies have on European Union's energy security policy framework. Energy security as a term may have a variety of definitions. It depends on whether someone examines it from a supply side or from a demand side. An exporter of hydrocarbons focuses on security of demand, while an importer is interested in guaranteeing its energy supply security. The International Energy Agency defines the term security of energy supply, "as the availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable price."⁷ However, this definition does not cover all aspects and dimensions of energy security – or even of supply as in this case – and this reveals the level of complexity any analysis on the issue may face. If we are to examine energy security issues it is needed to identify first the areas where the research is focused on.

Apart from supply and demand we need to make a distinction between the types of energy sources such oil and gas or primary energy or between types of energy such as nuclear energy, renewable or electricity and their end use associated issues. Furthermore, special attention is needed to be paid on the physical, the economic, the political, the social, the environmental and the temporal, namely short-term, long term, dimensions of energy security issues and to whether the analysis focuses on the local, national, regional or international/global level.⁸ Here, the focus is on Greece's foreign energy policy choices and on the impact these policies have on European Union. Therefore, in the case of Greece, as a state, and the European Union (EU) as union of states, which have given part of their sovereignty to five main institutions,⁹ the focus is on energy supply security. In the case of Russia, which is also discussed, the focus is on the demand side of its energy security.

Another crucial factor is that from an International Relations perspective the overwhelming majority of the discussions within the various international forums and institutions over the past two decades, starting from the first Gulf War,¹⁰ are about energy supply security issues. As a consequence, as Dieter Helm points out, the energy policy of the nation states has become to large extent a foreign policy since the vast majority of hydrocarbon reserves are located in volatile areas.¹¹ Moreover, various state-owned national companies, such as Gazprom or Saudi Aramco, continue to hold the bulk or all the reserves of their respective countries.¹² In today's world energy policy and foreign policy are interrelated. This does not imply that all aspects of energy policy are linked to foreign policy nor vice versa. It does imply though that

⁷ International Energy Agency (2001), *Toward A Sustainable Energy Future*, Paris: OECD/IEA.

⁸ Anil, Markandya, Valeria, Costantini, et al. (June 2005), *Security of Energy Supply: Comparing Scenarios From a European Perspective*, IEM – International Energy Markets, NOTA DI LAVORO 89.2005.

⁹ The European Union is primarily composed of five institutions, which are the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Auditors.

¹⁰ Namely the Gulf War of August the 2nd 1990, which was triggered by the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait and led a coalition of states under the leadership of the United States and with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council to liberate the emirate from Iraq. The invasion and the annexation of Kuwait were changing significantly the balance of power in the already unstable region of the Middle East and were threatening the flow of the state's oil supplies to the international markets. This conflict also signalled the beginning of the post-Cold War international order, or better to say the post-Cold World international system.

¹¹ Dieter Helm (2007), Introduction: The Return of Energy Policy, in Dieter Helm, ed., *The New Energy Paradigm*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, p.1.

¹² Ibid. Also see, Valerie Marcel, (2006), *Oil Titans – National Oil Companies in the Middle East*, Brookings Institution Press: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

major aspects of a state's energy policy are incorporated within its foreign policy designs. At the same time, dealing with energy issues and their economic and environmental aspects have become today one of the priorities in the foreign policy making of nation states.

In order to examine Greek foreign energy policy objectives and discuss their impact on European Union three main states have to be taken under consideration; these are Russia, Turkey and of course the United States. The European Union seems to be dependent on Russian energy sources, views Turkey as one of the key transit countries in its periphery and since the end of the Second World War was depending more or less on the United States for its security which led to the development of a trans-Atlantic community. But what is the European Union and which are its energy security objectives?

The European Union, Theory and the interplay of Energy and Security

The European Union is an international organization composed of 27 member states. The characteristics which make the EU a unique case study in international affairs are the liberal democratic governance, the free-market orientated economy, the protection of social values and of human rights and the existence of the concept of an integrated security community. The term 'security community' implies that a group of states within a certain geographical area have achieved high level of co-operation and non-institutionalised collaboration. As a consequence the settlements of disputes and conflicts among them are reached through compromise, not through the use of force. According to Karl Deutsch high degree of transnational links and networks among societies can make resorting to war, as a conflict resolution mechanism, a highly unlikely option.¹³ Till the end of the Second World War the European continent had been one of the most – if not the most – conflict ridden regions of the planet. After the second largest world-wide war European leaders despite their differences in the way they viewed national sovereignty argued about a kind of unity for Europe. Winston Churchill argued at Zurich University in September 1946 in favour of a "United States of Europe" led by France and Germany. Although Churchill did not directly include the United Kingdom into his project, his efforts led to the Hague Congress of May 1948 and to the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949.¹⁴ In 1950 France's Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. It was a major effort to integrate the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, namely the two industries vital for the making of war. Monnet was influenced by the functionalist theorising of David Mitrany.¹⁵ Mitrany argued that enhanced co-operation and greater interdependence among countries can lead to peaceful relations but the necessary prerequisite was that the links and the collaboration should come mainly from their technical experts, not from their politicians. Close to the 1960s Ernst Haas developed the neo-functionalist theory which although is based on functionalism he rejects that politics can be separated

¹³ Karl, W. Deutsch et al. (1957), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁴ Brent F. Nielsen and Alexander C-G. Stub eds. (1994), *The European Union – Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, London: Boulder, p.5.

¹⁵ David Mitrany (1966), *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle Press; David Mitrany (1975), *The Functional Theory of Politics*, New York: St Martin's Press; Jean Monnet (1978), *Memoirs*, London: Collins.

from Mitrany's technical co-operation. He proposed integration should be based on the co-operation, mutual assistance and collaboration of self-interested political elites. For Hass, the integration process occurs when "political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties...toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."¹⁶ Neo-functionalism suggests that this process of integration depends on the notion of 'spill over' meaning that increased co-operation in one area enhances co-operation in many other different areas as well.¹⁷

However, even though the 1950s and the early 1960s Western European states started co-operating, the limitations of France's national sovereignty made Charles de Gaulle to oppose increasing interdependence. These developments forced neo-functionalist theorists to realise that "...theory of regional integration should be subordinate to a general theory of interdependence."¹⁸ Interdependence is a condition where the actions of one state have direct or indirect impact on other states. As a process it is linked to the phenomenon of globalisation. Especially, after the end of the Cold War the integration of national economies into the international financial system, the expansion of a worldwide market and the technological revolution in all forms of communication have to an extent reduced states' ability to completely govern their affairs. For the liberal theorising¹⁹ since the late 1970s the world was rapidly entering into a new historical stage as the changing international conditions were challenging national sovereignty and state security. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed the concept of "complex interdependence," which refers to conditions within the international system that make international relations becoming more like domestic politics. The main characteristics of "complex interdependence" are the rise of transnational actors that constantly enhance their role within the state system, the use of military force becomes less relevant as institutional instruments can be more effective, and, states are more focused on low politics, namely welfare issues than high politics, such as national security.²⁰ The post-Cold War euphoria that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of democracy in former communist states gave boost to the neo-liberal institutionalist theorising of international relations.

Neo-liberal institutionalists consider the state a major actor within the global system but they support that it has significantly minimised its influence due to the existence, rapid expansion and evolution of international institutions and non-state actors. The anarchical nature of the international system is recognised but the presence of international institutions and regimes can decrease its effects on state behaviour. In other words, co-operation among states is not unachievable. Unlike the realists they do not perceive international politics as a zero sum game and argue that by enhancing the notion of interdependence and the economic relations amongst states, societies are

¹⁶ Ernst Hass (1958), *The Uniting of Europe – Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p.16.

¹⁷ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen (2007), *Introduction to International Relations – Theories and Approaches*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.104.

¹⁸ Ibid, at p.105; Also see, Ernst Hass (1976), *Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration*, Vol.30, No.2, *International Organization*, p.179.

¹⁹ Liberal thinking includes a variety of theories such as, Liberal Internationalism, Idealism, Neo-liberal Institutionalism. Integration theories such as Functionalism and Neo-functionalism belong to this school of theorising.

²⁰ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977), *Power and Interdependence – World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little Brown.

driven to more liberal democratic and free market principles of organization. The end result would be a world of liberal democratic states, less likely willing to resort to force, to solve their differences.

In addition, neo-liberal institutionalism claims that states are more interested in absolute rather than relative gains, as neorealism supports. In terms of security, collective action should prevail to unilateralism. For neoliberal institutionalists the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August the 2nd 1990 was a characteristic example of collective security in the post-Cold War era.²¹

For neoliberal institutionalist theorists, with the end of the Cold War humanity had reached a point where political and economic interdependence is a reality and that the nation state was becoming less and less significant. The forces of globalisation constantly change the international system and expose the nation state into new challenges, opportunities and threats. By globalisation are meant “the processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distance-less and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place.”²² The expansion of global markets, of global communications, and of global threats and the fact that an event happening in one part of the world can affect the processes in another, reveal the main aspects of 21st century life. In the era of globalisation the nation state has lost some elements of sovereignty that was characterising the Westphalian state system. Globalisation is a process, which nobody denies that occurs within the system and influences all the politico-economic and social interactions. However, the level of these influences as well as the origins of this process is greatly debated in the literature. For example theorists like Martin Khor argue that, “...globalisation is what we in the Third World have for several centuries called colonization.”²³

With regard to security, as I mentioned before neo-liberal institutionalists argue that economic well being is of more importance now than military might. Extending this it could be argued that national security is better guaranteed when a state is economically developed and its society is financially, politically and culturally evolved. They emphasise on the phenomenon of interdependence and claim that states need to develop strategies and forums for co-operation over a whole set of new issues and areas that unilateral approaches would be unsuccessful.²⁴ An example here can be

²¹ The policy of economic sanctions against Iraq, the constant political pressure the Iraqi regime faced through the United Nations organisation and ‘Operation Desert Storm’ that ousted Iraqi forces out of Kuwait comprise primal example of collective security mechanisms.

²² Jan Aart Schotle (1997), *The Globalisation of World Politics*, in Baylis, J. and Smith. S., eds., *The Globalisation of World Politics – An Introduction to World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.14.

²³ *Ibid*, at p. 15. For more on the phenomenon or process of globalisation see, Paul Hirst and, Graham Thompson (1996), *Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Cambridge: Polity Press; Ian Clark (1997), *Globalization and Fragmentation – International relations in the 20th Century*, New York: Oxford University Press; Jagdish Bhagwati, (2004), *In Defence of Globalisation*, Oxford University Press, New York.

²⁴ For more see, Robert Keohane (1984), *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Robert Keohane (1989) ed., *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations*, Colorado: Boulder; Robert Keohane (Spring 1998) *International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?*, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 82-96; Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, (1993) eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Harvard: Cambridge University Press; Robert Keohane (2002), *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World*, New York: Routledge. For Nye see, Joseph Nye (2002) *The Paradox of American Power – Why the World’s Only Superpower*

the global environmental problems. Co-operation under anarchical conditions can exist if the process is facilitated by the establishment of regimes. Regimes have been identified as "...sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."²⁵ Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalists disagree when they assess international regimes. The assumption that they share is that regimes are able to promote international order.²⁶ One of their differences is that for neorealism regimes enable states to co-ordinate whereas for neoliberal institutionalism regimes enable states to collaborate and promote the common good.²⁷

Although for neo-liberal institutionalists the main features of the international system change, for neo-realists the change occurring does not fundamentally alter the way states act within the anarchical environment nor significantly enhances the prospects for co-operation amongst them.²⁸

The European Union, as it is in its current form, was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and it is composed of 27 member states. As a case study it is unique because of the level of political and economic integration amongst its members. The creation of a single market in the economic sector and multidimensional co-operation in many other areas make the European Union a unique case study in international relations. Neo-liberal institutionalists claimed that institutions within the EU helped it to absorb the shocks of the sudden end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany.²⁹ On the contrary, neorealists argued that the end of the United States-Soviet Union rivalry will bring more instability within the European continent. Neorealist thinking is that post-Second World War peace in Europe was established because of the balance of power conditions that existed within the international system. The system's bipolarity, the distribution of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the nuclear arsenals that both possessed, had been the reasons behind this relative stability.

For neorealism the focus and research interest is on the structure of the system itself, where the nation states are born, interact and die. The system's most important units are the rational nation states but their actions are limited and constraint within an anarchical international environment.³⁰ Recent neorealist thinking can be categorised

Can't Go It Alone, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Joseph Nye (2004), *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs.

²⁵ Stephen D. Krasner, (1983) ed., *International Regimes*, New York: Cornell University Press, p.2.

²⁶ Richard Little (1997), International Regimes, in John Baylis and Steve Smith eds., *The Globalisation of World Politics – An Introduction to World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.233.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ For a general understanding of the debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism with regard to the issue of co-operation and for an overview of the main theorists see, Robert Jervis (Summer 1999), Realism, Neo-Liberalism, and Co-operation – Understanding the Debate, Vol.24, No.1, *International Security*, pp.42-63. Jervis supports the realist school but this article offers a good understanding of the issues and the scholars involved in the debate. Also see, David A. Baldwin (1993) ed., *Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism – The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press.

²⁹ Robert Keohane (1993), Introduction – The End of the Cold War in Europe, in Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffman eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Harvard: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-23.

³⁰ See, Kenneth N. Waltz (2001ed.), *Man, the State and War – A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press; and, Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill.

into two sub-schools, namely that of defensive realism and that of offensive realism. Defensive realists argue that states behave aggressively because the structure of the international system forces them to compete for power. This does not imply that states are necessarily mean and immoral. Defensive realism assumes that in order to survive in anarchical conditions, the best way is to become powerful. Furthermore, defensive realists claim that states may seek power but only to an extent, because if they seek too much it can be destructive.

John Mearsheimer, who is the main theoretician of offensive realism, agrees with defensive realism that the structure has strong effect on the behaviour of states and that anarchy makes them highly insecure. Offensive realism accepts that states' insecurity causes security dilemmas which give rise to systemic instability and conflict. Security dilemma as a term implies that the actions of state A to enhance its security by acquiring weapons alarms a neighbouring state B, which perceives state's A policies as threatening to its own security. The result is that state B will follow the same process which will create zero sum game conditions and inevitable instability. The difference though the two sub-schools have is offensive realism's assumption that states seek hegemony. Realist scholars pay attention to the use of force and to the military power that a state and especially a great power, possesses. Offensive realists argue that military power is a means for a state to dominate the system. A state would seek hegemony mainly on a regional level because if it did so the others would be incapable to wage war on it. Waltz would disagree with this assumption because when a state becomes so powerful the other states will attempt to balance it. In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer asks, a) what causes states to compete for power?, and, b) how much power do states want?. In the first question classical realism assumes that human nature forces states to compete, whereas both defensive and offensive realism theorise that the answer is found in the structure of the system. In the second question defensive realism argues that states do not seek so much more power than they already have in contrast with both classical and offensive realism, which claim that states aim to maximise relative power having as their ultimate goal hegemony.³¹

Moreover, for neorealism international institutions are units within the international system but their role is not as crucial as neoliberals describe and argue. States do operate through institutions as well but the causes of war and peace have to be traced in the balance of power or better say in the way power is distributed in the system. As Mearsheimer remarks, the great powers in the system create and shape international institutions, "...so they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it..." adding that, "...the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war and institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process."³²

In addition, Joseph Grieco, points out that neo-liberal institutionalism gives too much attention on absolute gains and neglects both the phenomenon of cheating as well as the importance of relative gains.³³ Generally, although for neo-liberal

³¹John Mearsheimer (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.p.22.

³² John Mearsheimer (Winter 1994-1995), *The False Promise of International Institutions*, Vol.19, No.3, *International Security*, p.13.

³³ Joseph M. Grieco (1993), *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation – A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism*, in David A. Baldwin ed., *Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism – The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press, p.118. For a realist view on the European Union as a case study see, Joseph M. Grieco (1995), *The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme*, Vol.21, No.1, *Review of International Studies*; and, Joseph M. Grieco (1996), *State Interests and International Rule Trajectories – A*

institutionalism the existence and expansion of international institutions deeply affects the prospects for co-operation amongst states, neorealism stresses that their influence is just marginal.

Within the energy sector European Union states have been co-operating since the process of liberalization of electricity and gas markets is under way, research and investments in the renewable energy sector is flourishing and various nuclear projects are under consideration. Additionally, efforts to minimise the energy's consumption negative environmental externalities are being made and steps for its efficient use are constantly taken. In the European Union's summit in spring 2007, it was decided that by 2020 the main energy policy targets would be 20% increase in energy efficiency, 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and 20% of energy should be produced from renewable sources. These measures along with other ones, which included nuclear energy, the establishment of trans-European networks and investments in research projects were described by the Energy European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs as "...a new industrial revolution."³⁴ Furthermore, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso pointed out that, "...energy policy was a core area at the start of the European project. We must now return it to centre stage."³⁵

Despite the intentions and the setting of targets energy security has become one of the most crucial issues in the foreign policy agenda of all nation states. Although the energy mix is changing, oil and natural gas will keep on dominating the fuel (energy) market over the period 2000-2030. At the same time, natural gas it is estimated to have a 30 percent share of the total energy market.³⁶ The European Union member states just like other major or minor powers around the globe are facing the pressure of an oncoming energy crisis. The main reasons are the rapid growth in the consumption of energy and the declining amount of hydrocarbons that reaches the international markets either due to lack in refinery capacity or for geological and geopolitical reasons. Moreover, the recent oil price record highs accelerated the phenomenon of energy insecurity of supply. Currently the price of oil has dropped due to the autumn 2008 international financial crisis. From almost \$150 per barrel of oil in July 2008 it reached lows below \$35 per barrel in December the same year. However, the lack of investment and the constant need for energy consumption for the production of goods and services and for the well-being of societies have started to increase the price again. According to Nobuo Tanaka, the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency fossil fuels will comprise 67% of energy consumption till 2030.³⁷ Furthermore, Deutsch Bank estimates that the price of oil will reach \$65 in 2010 from \$50 in June 2009.

These factors show that not only energy security constantly increases the concerns of nation states but also show that in a world where international anarchy co-exists with forms of organised interdependence, the forces of co-operation will conflict with

Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and the European Economic and Monetary Union, Vol.5, No.2, *Security Studies*.

³⁴ European Commission (2007), *Commission Proposes an Integrated Energy and Climate Change Package to Cut Emissions for the 21st Century*, IP/07/29, European Commission Press Release, 10 January, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/29>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Adam E. Sieminski (2005), *World Energy Futures*, in Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn eds., *Energy and Security – Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy*, Washington DC: Wilson Centre Press, pp24-25.

³⁷ This was claimed by Nobuo Tanaka, the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, in the 5th of June 2009. Source: Reuters.

unilateral approaches. Two points have to be made here. First, there is not any physical shortage of oil and gas. There are vast resources ready to be exploited in the Middle East, in Russia and Central Asia, heavy oil in Canada and Venezuela and recent findings, like the offshore giant field in Brazil, to mention a few. The problem is that supply will not be able to meet demand in the future due to capacity constraints. In other words the main problem lies on how to make these resources available to the market. The second crucial point is that energy independence is unachievable. Energy specialists and international oil companies' executives agree that a nation state must take measures to enhance its energy security but a policy of achieving energy independence is not feasible. Finally, a last factor that needs to be mentioned is that the bulk of oil and gas reserves belong to national oil companies. Price of oil increases can have macro-economic impact on a states' economy leading their governments to pursue policies of greater intervention in their energy sectors.³⁸

It is estimated that by 2030 70% of European Union energy consumption will be covered by imports.³⁹ However, as with the formulation of a common foreign and security policy, a viable agreement among member states that would create a common energy policy has not been achieved yet. Member states seem to pursue the main aspects of their energy policies independently. Moreover, two non-European Union states are playing significant role in its supply security considerations. These are Russia and Turkey. Russia is seen as a major supplier of gas and secondary of oil but since Putin's first administration till the present day is gradually regaining its great power status partly because of the exploitation of its energy sources, which in turn leads Russia to adopt a more realpolitik approach in its foreign policies. Turkey due to its geographical location is seen as a vital transit state for the supply of oil and gas. One way to access the oil and gas supplies of Russia, the Caspian Sea and of the Middle East is through the use of transit pipelines. Currently the EU has one policy with two dimensions in order to safeguard its supply; while it attempts to develop political and economic links with Russia is simultaneously investing in pipeline routes that by-pass it.⁴⁰ According to Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu of the European Council of Foreign Relations, European Union member states can be categorised into five groups with regard to their relations with Russia. These are the "Strategic Partners" such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain. These countries are developing special relations with Russia that occasionally undermine common EU policies. There are the "Friendly Pragmatists" like Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia, who have close relations with Russia and tend to give priority to business interests than political ends. The third group is the "Frosty Pragmatists," like Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These states although they do promote their economic interests with Russia and tend to speak out when the latter seems to have an aggressive behaviour as during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. Fourth, is the group of "New Cold Warriors" composed of Lithuania and Poland that have hostile relations with Russia and are able of using

³⁸ Paul Stevens (2008), *The Coming Oil Supply Crunch*, A Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, p.8.

³⁹ Green Paper (2006), *A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, COM(2006) 105, 8.3.2006, final, Brussels.

⁴⁰ For more on energy security and its dimensions see, Daniel Yergin (2005), *Energy Security and Markets*, in Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn eds., *Energy and Security – Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy*, Washington DC: Wilson Centre Press, pp.51-64.

their veto power to prevent a series of negotiations between the EU and the Russian Federation. Fifth, there is the “Trojan Horses” group formed by Greece and Cyprus. Greece and Cyprus the report argues that frequently defend Russian interests within the EU and are willing to veto common EU positions and policies.⁴¹

The main argument of this paper is that classifying Greece and Cyprus as a “Trojan Horse” within the European Union is unfair and misleading as it does not include national security realities and balance of power factors found in the geographical location where Greece and Cyprus are placed.

Greece’s National Security and Energy Policy Choices

Greece has been a member of the EU since 1981. Since then its foreign policy has been determined mainly by three different factors, namely the relations with the EU as an international institution in which Greece participates, its relations with Turkey⁴² and the country’s relations with the Balkan region especially after the demise of the communist regimes from 1990 onwards.

Greece’s participation in the EU has benefited the country in many ways. The most important aspects have been the strengthening of Greece’s democratic institutions⁴³ and the new security framework offered by the EU under which the costs of a major Turkish expansionist action would be perceived as an attack to a European Union soil. However, Greece is located within a region in which Mitrany’s and Hass’s integration concepts border with Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s balance of power principles and conflicting states’ interests. Turkey is Greece’s main external threat. Three are the main reasons why Greece perceives Turkey in that way; first, there are the Turkish claims with regard to the status of the Aegean Sea and large parts of it that are under Greece’s sovereignty, secondly, the Turkish invasion and occupation of 37% of Cyprus’ territory and third, the Turkey’s hegemonic attitude in the region of South Eastern Mediterranean and South Eastern Europe. Although Greece enjoys a certain level of security through its participation into the European Union within an anarchic international system, states can only rely on themselves for the preservation of their interests, their territorial integrity and for the safeguarding of their national sovereignty. The crises of 1987, of Imia in 1996, and the constant violations of Greece’s airspace are reminders that great powers and other minor in power states that enjoy EU-membership status, do not have as yet a common policy developed able to guarantee Greece’s or any other member state’s national security. We also have to remember that only recently Greece obtained common land borders with another EU country. Since the end of Cold War both the international and the regional environment where Greece is located are constantly changing offering simultaneously opportunities and threats to the country. One of the central features of the politico-economic interactions that were taking place within the geographical area that extends from Europe to Central Asia is the transport of oil and gas resources through the use of pipelines.

⁴¹ Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu (November 2007), *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*, Policy Paper, ECFR/2, European Council on Foreign Relations, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_0fm6bphgw.pdf.

⁴² The Turkish-Greek relations involve the interactions between these two states on the one hand and the security dynamics within the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus triangle on the other.

⁴³ From 1967 to 1974 Greece suffered from a military dictatorship which destabilised the socio-political system and finally collapsed with the invasion of Turkey in Cyprus.

Greece is currently involved in three major pipeline projects.⁴⁴ These are the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, the South Stream gas pipeline and the Turkey-Greece-Italy gas inter-connector. All projects are aiming in enhancing the energy supply both of Greece and of the European Union.

Transit Pipelines – The Case Studies

A common mistake in many analyses on energy security that discuss the use of pipelines is that the main definitions and clarifications are not being offered. Transit pipelines are lines which cross a state's sovereign territory to get the hydrocarbon resource to the market. Sovereign territory refers to national or regional administrations that have the power to cancel an agreement. The geography of Central Asia dictates the use of pipelines for the transport of oil and gas. Pipelines are highly efficient and their efficiency depends on the size of pipeline and the length of the hole. The capacity of a pipeline is approximately proportional to the 2.5 power of the diameter of its hole, while the capital cost is quite directly proportional to the diameter.⁴⁵ As a consequence the pipelines with larger diameter tend to have lower average total costs for the same utilization factor.⁴⁶ Therefore, pipelines are characterised by very large technical economies of scale and as economists remark, in pipeline economics "big is beautiful." Furthermore, from an economic point of view one big pipeline carrying a certain volume between two points is far more efficient than two pipelines carrying the same volume.⁴⁷ The huge economies of scale that characterise pipelines imply very large capital investments, which in turn lead to fixed costs and lower variable costs. In pipeline economics "full is beautiful" as well. When a pipeline is constructed then capacity utilisation is necessary for its profitability, which means that if capacity throughput of a pipeline falls, then the average cost of throughput rises. When this situation occurs, the operation of the pipeline system becomes significantly less profitable. Thus, as Paul Stevens argues, security of supply with respect to throughput is vital if it is to have a profitable operation of the pipeline system.⁴⁸ Therefore, when a pipeline is being designed the operator always seeks to ensure long term agreements and contracts with the producers due to his security of supply concerns. However, these contracts are not always respected mainly due to greater politico-economic reasons. The large number of disagreements and breaches of contracts in the past has led pipeline operators to control at least one end of the pipeline. In that way they secure supply and keep the operation profitable. Paul Stevens supports that "...ownership of the pipeline usually reflects the ownership of the oil and gas that is being produced."⁴⁹ On the other hand, pipelines tend to be natural monopolies just like the transmission and distribution wires. This means that between two points only one pipeline is desirable because otherwise – for example, in

⁴⁴ The energy related projects in which Greece participates are more than these three pipelines. However, the focus of this paper is only on the geopolitical considerations, the economic parameters and the security implications that these three transit pipelines have on Greece and the European Union. For a brief but comprehensive analysis see, Kostas Ifantis, Greece's Energy Security Policy – Between Needs and Geopolitical Imperatives, in Antonio Marquina (2008), *Energy Security – Visions from Asia and Europe*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.69-83.

⁴⁵ B. McLellan (Summer 1992), *Transporting Oil and Gas – The Background to the Economics*, Vol.7, No.2, *Oil and Gas Finance and Accounting Journal*.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Paul Stevens (1999), *A History of Transit Pipelines – Lessons for the Future*, Seminar Paper, University of Dundee: Centre for Energy Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, p.5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, at p.6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

case you have two pipelines for security of supply reasons – the whole system becomes much less profitable. The construction of a second pipeline makes both pipeline projects inefficient compare with one with huge economies of scale. The use of one pipeline with large diameter makes absolute economic sense. In reality though, the nation states do not always solve their state-to-state issues in a peaceful way and as a result the construction of multiple pipelines takes place.

As I mentioned earlier, when a pipeline is crossing another territory either national or interstate is called transit pipeline. Since it is economically better for the operator to continue operating the pipeline system even in the case that the whole operation is less profitable or just making losses,⁵⁰ the bargaining power rests with the transit country. The latter can pressure either politically or economically in order to increase profits, namely the transit fees. This may happen because the transit state knows that the operator would prefer to continue operating than closing the pipeline system.

Another issue that needs to be mentioned is that transport of oil and gas differ. Transporting gas by using pipelines implies that bigger diameters and greater compression energy are required.⁵¹ The compression of gas has higher costs in comparison with the pumping of oil for various technical reasons. Furthermore, gas pipelines need high pressures to be economic because gas is a “high volume” “low value” hydrocarbon. This means that high pressure provides economic transportation costs.⁵² Finally gas cannot be stored or shipped in contrast with oil, and the product to be transported per day is usually determined by the seller in case of oil and the buyer in case of gas.⁵³ Gas can be transported by tankers in the form of LNG – liquefied natural gas – but that is not an option in this case, in which pipelines instead of tankers are able to transport gas from the landlocked resource rich states of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Exceptions to this rule are terminals of gas pipelines. From there gas can be transported in a liquefied form with the use of tankers.

Last, Paul Stevens in a recent report about transit pipelines extends his earlier findings and categorises the characteristics of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ transit countries.⁵⁴ It is true the political, the geopolitical and the strategic considerations of nation states almost always affect the construction and operation of transit pipelines and shadow many fundamental economic parameters and principles. As he points out his list is not absolute as characteristics change over time, and “...judgement is required to weigh their relative importance.”⁵⁵ In general, ‘good’ is a state that is tending to produce a situation where conditions are predictable and accepted by all, with minimal disruptions that guarantee economic transportation.⁵⁶ A ‘bad’ state is the one that creates insecurity and disrupts the design, the construction and the operation of the line. Therefore, a ‘good’ transit country, a) wants foreign investment, b) transit fees is unimportant for foreign exchange, c) transit fees is unimportant for revenue, d) there

⁵⁰ The same fixed costs have to be met both when an operator decides to close the pipeline system or in case the system does operate but it is not as profitable as expected.

⁵¹ B. McLellan (Summer 1992), op. cit., p.85.

⁵² Ibid, p.89.

⁵³ B. Zakirov (1999), *The Economics of Transit Pipelines – Can Transit Pipelines Provide Viable Export Routes for Kazakh Petroleum?*, Thesis, University of Dundee: Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, p.17.

⁵⁴ Paul Stevens (2009), *Transit Troubles – Pipelines as a Source of Conflict*, A Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.11.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

is limited rent to be grabbed, e) it is amenable to military pressure, f) is dependent upon line off-take, g) it is one of a number of alternatives, h) there is no collusion likely with alternatives, i) the state is not a competent exporter. A 'bad' transit country, a) rejects foreign investment, b) transit fees are important for foreign exchange, c) transit fees are important for revenue, d) there is significant rent to be grabbed, e) it is not amenable to military pressure, f) it is not dependent upon line off-take, g) it is the only possible export route, h) collusion is likely to occur with alternatives, and, i) the state is a competent exporter.⁵⁷

The Burgas -Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline (BA)

In March 15 2007, the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline agreement took place. This is a proposed pipeline which will begin from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek port of the city of Alexandroupolis in the Aegean Sea. This pipeline is designed to transfer oil from the Russia as well as from sources of the Caspian Sea region. With the visit of the Russian President Putin in Athens an agreement was signed amongst the interested parties, namely, Greece, Russia and Bulgaria, aiming to start its construction in 2008. However, the discussions about this pipeline take place for 14 years.⁵⁸ The significance of this pipeline is that it will be the first Russian owned pipeline within EU soil since 51% of the shares will belong to Lukoil and other Russian companies. This raises questions of energy security for the European Union. This transit pipeline by passes the straits of Bosphorus (Turkey) and offers an alternative for the supply of Western Europe and other international markets. This geo-economic project will enhance Greece's role in South Eastern Europe and within the EU in general, and simultaneously will secure the state's oil supplies. When this project was under consideration there were two other projects proposed as well. The first had been the AMBO pipeline running from Burgas and through the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Vlore in the Adriatic coast of Albania. In the early 1990s the changing regional environment in the Balkan region offered both opportunities and security threats to Greece. Relations between Greece and Albania were not at a good stage due the large number of immigrants arriving from it after the collapse of the communist regime and due to disputes over the human rights of the Albanian population of Greek origin found mainly in the south of the country. With FYROM the name dispute as well as the nationalistic attitude of the regime of Skopje towards Greece forced the latter to consider participation into the designs of pipeline projects in the area as a means not only to gain economic benefits but also to attempt to balance regional power politics policies. Last but not least, compare to the BA, AMBO is longer and more expensive to construct.

While the discussions for the construction of the BA were under way another project of great geopolitical significance was taking place, that of the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi (BTC) oil pipeline. It is a United States backed pipeline that transfers oil from Azerbaijani and other Central Asian oil fields, through Tbilisi in Georgia to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey. This line's share is divided among many

⁵⁷ Ibid at pp.11-13 and Paul Stevens (1998), A History of Transit Pipelines in the Middle East – Lessons for the Future, in Blake, G. H., Pratt, M.A. and Schofield, C.H. eds., *Boundaries and Energy – Problems and Prospects*, London: Kluwer Law International, pp.215-232.

⁵⁸ For an in depth analysis see, Theodore Tsakiris (2007), *The Bosphorus Conundrum – Alternative Pipeline Bypasses for the Turkish Straits to 2015*, London: GMB Publishing Ltd; and; P. Ghikas (2003), *Which are the Geopolitical Considerations and the Economic Parameters Behind the Design and Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Transit Pipelines?*, Unpublished MSc Dissertation, University of Dundee: Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy.

participating companies but the largest percentage belongs to BP of the United Kingdom. Although, the BA pipeline has not been constructed as yet the BTC is constructed and operational. It was a very expensive project but its economic significance is not as important as its geo-strategic value, since from United States point of view it is by-passing Russia and offers an alternative way of oil supply to world markets.

Through the BTC project Turkey enhances its regional role and benefits both in terms of economics and politics. From a neorealist perspective Greece had to participate into the BA designs because the regional system constraints led it to find another pipeline project to balance the increase in power that Turkey gained via the BTC. The benefits for Greece from the BA are, a) it secures supplies of oil, b) develops the region of Thrace, which has been highly neglected over the past years, c) as a result investments have a stabilising effect on the area since Turkey systematically attempts exploit the presence of a Muslim minority that inhabits there, d) through BA Greece has been enhancing its links with Bulgaria, e) it by-passes the Turkish Straits, f) enhances European Union energy security as both Greece and Bulgaria are member states of the EU.

A trilateral committee of Russia, Bulgaria and Greece met in Sofia in 18th of January 2008 and decided the establishment of a company based in the Netherlands aiming to start BA's construction in 2010.

The South Stream Pipeline

In June 2007 the Russian state company Gazprom and Italy's largest energy major ENI signed an agreement to create the South Stream pipeline. This pipeline would link Russia's Black sea ports to the city of Varna in Bulgaria. From Bulgaria the pipeline will be divided into two parts. The first will continue to Greece and via the Ionian Sea to south Italy. The other, to the north would go through to Romania, Hungary, Slovenia and north Italy while a second route has been recently agreed to go through Serbia. The significance of this pipeline is that directly challenges the Nabucco pipeline project, which is considered crucial for European Union energy security designs. The United States is also affected since it will by pass countries such as Ukraine that are pro-Western. It does create geopolitical rivalries that directly affect Greece's status and its foreign policy designs. The Nabucco pipeline is planned to transport natural gas from Turkey to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Again, the main aim is by-passing Russia and getting natural gas sources of Central Asia to Europe. Both the Russian administration and the European Commission claim that these two projects are not necessarily antagonistic. The European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs warned at a news conference in 9th of June 2009 in Bucharest that issues over Europe's supply with Russian natural gas might re-emerge this winter. At the same time though, he expressed the opinion that the South Stream gas transportation project does not endanger the Nabucco gas pipeline project and that it will be another supply route for European Union's energy markets.⁵⁹ The South Stream is the southern equivalent of Nord Stream, which is being supported strongly by Germany and Russia. The former German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, acts as chairman of Nord Stream's shareholders' committee. The European Commission has described it as a "project of European interest."⁶⁰ As it has been remarked the Commission seems more worried about South Stream than it does for Nord Stream.⁶¹

⁵⁹ EU leader views Romanian-Russian gas storage collaboration, 09/06/2009 BBC Energy Reports.

⁶⁰ Energy fuels new 'Great Game' in Europe, 09/06/2009, BBC.

⁶¹ Ibid.

The European Union is worried that Russia is winning the competition of pipeline projects and due to its energy thirst is becoming very dependent on Russian gas or on gas that is being transported via Russia controlled pipelines. The Russian-Ukrainian energy disputes of 2006 and of January 2009 as well as the Russia-Georgian crises of August 2008 reminded many policy makers in the European Union that the international system still has spheres of influence and nation states act according to their national interests needs and under the constraints that the anarchical system imposes on them.⁶² At the same time though, it is useful to remember that Russia had been a stable supplier of oil into Western European markets during the Cold War. Moreover, although for neo-liberal institutionalism European Union eastern enlargement and NATO eastward expansion are natural processes for neorealists this is translated as an advancement of Western interests and mainly United States ones in areas where the Soviet Union existed. After the end of the Cold War the collapse of the Soviet Union created a vacuum of power in the region stretching from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus. It is logical to assume then that Russia perceives certain actions as threatening for its own security just like the US anti-missile system, NATO's invitations to Ukraine and Georgia and Kosovo's independence to mention a few. Energy matters interlink with geopolitical considerations of nation states. The South Stream pipeline benefits Greece as a) it increases the country's geopolitical role, b) enhances its security of gas supply, c) again upgrades the regions of Thrace and Epirus, d) balances Turkey's role, which is upgraded by Nabucco pipeline, e) Greece becomes a major transit state actor in South Eastern Europe. For European Union the benefits are obvious, it will have an alternative route with secured gas supplies that by-passes Ukraine and politico-economically develops many of its member states that are participating into the project.

The Turkish-Greek-Italy Gas Interconnector (TGI)

A Turkish-Greek gas pipeline has been constructed and its inauguration took place in November 2007. This pipeline links the natural gas resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus with Turkey and Greece. The third part of the pipeline will link Italy and its construction is under way.

The significance of this pipeline is that it is a major project between the two rival countries, it will link the European Union via Italy to the energy sources of Central Asia and it will enhance the EU energy security since the latter is aiming to diversify its supply routes. However, in January 2008 the Islamic Republic of Iran cut off the supply of gas to this pipeline and as a result Turkey cut off its supply to Greece to cover the Turkish domestic needs. This incident shows that despite the diversification of the supply routes, the security of energy supply is more complex and demands multiple scenarios and alternative solutions. Greece was not directly affected as the supply of natural gas to cover its domestic consumption is too small from this particular pipeline. In the future though, it could have direct implications to customers further down the line, namely other EU countries. The construction of this project shows that Greece attempts to develop a balanced relation between the United States and Russia. From a neorealist standpoint all states in a system, "...are affected much more by the acts and the intentions of the major ones than of the minor ones."⁶³ In this

⁶² For more on the Russian-Ukrainian crises see, Jonathan Stern (2006), *The Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006*, Oxford: Oxford Institute of Energy Studies; and, Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, (2009), *The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009 – A Comprehensive Assessment*, Oxford: Oxford Institute of Energy Studies.

⁶³ Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), op. cit. p.72.

case the United States and Russia relations are characterised by both co-operation and competition. They are co-operating in counter-terrorism, the United States may need Russia if it is to balance a rising China, they are interesting in minimising nuclear weapons proliferation and the U.S. has to include Russia in Afghanistan's stabilising arrangements. They do compete though as it is 'natural' for great powers over their spheres of influence. This competition has two dimensions, namely the enlargement of NATO and energy supply security.

The United States had been favourable to the creation of the Turkish-Greek-Italy Gas Interconnector. There are even prospects of joining this project to Nabucco. For a neoliberal point of view this project is a result of absolute gains mentality. For neorealism relative gains prevail. During the recent crisis with Iran, Turkey cut off the pipeline's supply to cover its own needs. Simultaneously, Turkey aims to become a transit country without having the characteristics of it. For example, only recently it dropped its uncompromising negotiating position and accepted the EU's terms. Turkey was insisting to purchase 15 percent of the gas transit at discounted prices.⁶⁴ Moreover, Turkey is a candidate for European Union membership. It strongly supports its application without at the same time recognising Cyprus as a member state and refusing to open its ports and airports to Cypriot companies. The most recent event regarding Cyprus is Turkey's refusal to recognise the states' exclusive economic zones. In 2006 major oil discoveries were made offshore Cyprus. These discoveries forced Cyprus and Egypt to redefine their maritime boundaries. These actions triggered the reaction of Turkey, which argued that it does not recognise any agreement of this kind. The same issue erupted with discoveries found between Cyprus and Israel.

On the other hand, high oil price makes the development of oil deposits in the Aegean Sea and South Eastern Mediterranean economic to exploit. However, the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea legal status complicates the issue.

The TGI benefits Greece because, a) it strengthens the country's geopolitical weight, b) enhances the security of gas supply both in Greece and the European Union, c) satisfies the requirements of the policy of multiple pipelines that the EU has set and the United States supports, d) shows that Greece is ready to protect its national interests without excluding energy partnerships with Turkey, e) upgrades the regional economy in north Greece.

Conclusions

This paper has shown that in order to comprehend Greece's energy diplomacy and examine whether the country's foreign energy policy choices conflict with EU energy security objectives the following aspects have to be taken under consideration;

a) The way that states act and interact within an anarchical international environment and a global system in which the nation state is the most significant actor. I argue that for energy security analyses within the European Union neoliberal-institutionalism's assumptions may be more useful to explain phenomena. However, outside the European Union framework and its unique characteristics, neo-realist approaches to international relations theorising may be the proper way to understand and analyse politico-economic events.

b) Energy projects have long lead and operating times. Therefore, the outcome of the projects currently taking place will be revealed over the longer term. Geopolitics

⁶⁴ Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco, 12/05/09, Eurasia Net Weekly Update.

constantly changes. The same applies to national interests and national security objectives. This is evident in the area that stretches from European Union's Eastern borders and the Balkans to the Caucasus region, Central Asia and the Middle East. Greece is located in an area where, balance of power politics co-exist with organised interdependence. It is therefore, unfair to categorise Greece as a Trojan Horse only because it reacted to balance of power changes in its immediate neighbourhood or because it attempted to enhance its geopolitical weight and its supply security by joining or by promoting projects that were not of the liking of certain viewpoints. The state does not do anything else other than promoting its national and energy security interests in the same way others not to say all EU-member states do.

c) Greece is heavily involved within the European Union, identifies itself with European principles and enhances its national security through its membership. The same applies to Cyprus. The Burgas-Alexandropolis oil pipeline and the South Stream gas pipeline aim among other factors in safeguarding supply security not only of Greece but of many other member states as well.

d) It has to be remembered that while the EU is concerned about its security of supply, Russia is also concerned about its security of demand.

e) Energy security policies for the European Union are not just the creation of various pipeline projects. There are a series of other measures that the EU has to consider such as the development of mechanisms like the Energy Charter Treaty, the creation of physical interconnection of the electricity grid, the establishment of gas security and storage regime and reformation of the energy markets to mention a few.⁶⁵

f) Additionally, the EU has been developing a Euro-Mediterranean energy market. This is another way to secure hydrocarbon supplies from various North African and Middle Eastern sources. Recent developments include the French proposals for energy links with North African countries, French and British investments in Libya, Greece's proposal for a pipeline linking the island of Crete with Libya.

g) The Energy Charter Treaty needs to be re-negotiated due to Russia's objections.

h) Geopolitics and geographical realities will continue to play a major role within the international energy system. For example, the status of the Caspian Sea is still unresolved.⁶⁶

i) The different viewpoints that European Union member states have with regard to Turkish accession to the EU. The United Kingdom for example is in favour of full Turkey's membership while others like France prefer only a strategic partnership. Moreover, in order to show the level of differences of opinion, the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt in support of Turkish candidature claimed in *Le Figaro* that how can the EU have as a member a state, which is close to Syria, referring to Cyprus, and not Turkey, without any mentioning of the Cypriot divided territory by the Turkish occupation armed forces.⁶⁷

j) Finally, theoreticians from both schools of thinking in Greece, namely those, who are influenced by neoliberal-institutionalism and those that follow realism's premises

⁶⁵ For an in-depth analysis see, Dieter Helm (2007), *European Energy Policy – Securing Supplies*, in Dieter Helm ed, *The New Energy Paradigm*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.440-453.

⁶⁶ See, Sergey Vinogradov and Patricia Wouters (1996), *The Caspian Sea – Quest for a New Legal Regime*, *Lieden Journal of International Law*; and, Sergey Vinogradov (1998), *The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Hydrocarbon Resources*, in in Blake, G. H., Pratt, M.A. and Schofield, C.H. eds., *Boundaries and Energy – Problems and Prospects*, London: Kluwer Law International.

⁶⁷ Turkish newspapers talk about the 'hot incident' in the Mediterranean due to the oil exploration search that a large American oil company will carry out. 31/05/2009, *To Vima*.

are in favour of the strengthening of Greece's relations with Russia without undermining its EU links and Greece's status as a European Union country.⁶⁸

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⁶⁸ P. Ioakimides, What Kind of Relations with Russia?, 02/05/08, TA NEA.

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**The Role of Media in the Imia/Kardak Crisis: The Importance of
Media Influence and Its Limitations?**

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ABSTRACT:

On the 31st of January 1996, Greece and Turkey came very close to launch a war due to their disagreement on the status of two uninhabited rocks in the Aegean Sea. Although there were significant differences between the two countries in many issues, including the Aegean, an escalation of the dispute over the Imia/Kardak rocks cannot be solely explained as a result of these. New actors, such as media, played a crucial role in the creation of a suffocating domestic political environment in both countries, in which the weak governments of that period had to prove to their respective audience that they were true guardians of national interests and pride. However, as this paper argues, Media did not fabricate the crisis from a zero point, even if they had an active role into bringing the two countries on the brink of war.

As the title suggests, the main question of concern in this paper is the importance of the media influence on the Imia/Kardak crisis and its limitations. The answer to this question is difficult, since states have a crucial role in the creation of the pre-existed political and historical context. In addition, the interests of both agents, states and media, simultaneously run parallel to each other and intermingle. Yet, this paper maintains that the governments would not participate in a military escalation of the dispute at that time without the involvement of the media. Conversely, the media would not exacerbate the dispute if they were not to operate within the general political atmosphere of Greek-Turkish relations; all the more because the media often went beyond its role in reporting the news by directly intervening in the developments of the disagreement.

1. Introduction

It is widely acknowledged nowadays that media play an important role in the formation of state policies along the traditional elements of state power, such as the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The technological advancement in media sector during the last decades as well as the third wave of democratisation has rendered media an appealing power of influence on public opinions, and, by extension, on the traditional elements of state power. However, the influence is not only top-down, but also bottom-up, especially if one considers that a number of private media exists along a small number of state media. Private media following the rule of market have to be tuned to the expectations of their client-public opinion. In this case, media act as a conduit of public opinions' ideas, sentiments and expectations.

In order to test media's influence on the domain of politics, foreign policy has been selected as the domain where media influence has the least likely effects. Considering the fact that state officials perceive the implementation of foreign policy as prerogative of traditional elements of state power, such as the executive and the legislature, a case study in which media play a crucial role in comparison with past events will shed light on the extent that media influence decisions of foreign policy, as well as on the circumstances under which influence takes place. A good case study to that end is the Imia/Kardak crisis between Greece and Turkey.

The Imia/Kardak crisis erupted in 1996 and was one among many that characterise Greek-Turkish relations during the last fifty years, such as in Cyprus in 1963 and 1974, and in the Aegean Sea in 1976 and 1987.¹ If one opens a Greek or Turkish book of history or a book on Greek-Turkish relations², it is easy to understand the degree to which hostility and competition existed -at least until 1999³- at a state level, not to mention at a societal one⁴, between the two neighbouring countries. Therefore, one could ask what an analysis of the Imia/Kardak⁵ crisis might add to the understanding of the Greek-Turkish relations, given

¹ More background regarding these two crises in the Aegean in: Athanasopoulos Haralambos, *Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea, A Case Study in International Law*, McFarland and Company, Inc. Publishers, U.S., 2001, pp. 46-49.

² More background for history books of both countries in: Hercules Millas, *Ikones Ellinon kai Tourkon, Sholika Vivilia, Istoriografia, Logotehnia kai Ethnika Stereotipa*, Alexandria publications, Athens, 2001, pp. 85-129, 301-327. A survey of the University of Thessaloniki referring to how the Greek students see the Turks: Panagiota Bitsika, "Pos vlepoun oi mathites tous Tourkous" reportage published in BHMA newspaper, 09.12.2007, p. A54 on http://tovima.dolnet.gr/print_article.php?e=B&f=13438&m=A54&aa=1, accessed 21.07.2007. Books referring to the disputes: Athanasopoulos Haralambos, op. cit., pp. 5-13 and Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, DER publications, Istanbul, 2001, pp. 253- 320.

³ In 1999 at the European Helsinki Summit, Turkey was designated as a candidate member of the European Union with the consent of all European members including Greece and so a first step was made for the improvement of their relations at a political level.

⁴ Clogg argues: "...even if a rapprochement between two governments is achieved, it would be a much more difficult and arduous process to overcome the mistrust between two peoples, mutual stereotypes and fears that are fundamental for existing confrontation." As quoted in Mustafa Aydın, *Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities*, in Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), *Turkish-Greek Relations, The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 23-24.

⁵ Imia and Kardak is the name that is used in Greek and in Turkish respectively for a set of two small uninhabited islets situated 6 miles off the coasts of the Greek island Kalymnos and 3.5 miles off the Turkish coasts. Regarding the names see Krateros Ioannou -Anastasia Strati, *Dikaio tis Thalassas*, second edition, Sakkoulas publications, Athens-Komotini, 2000, p. 486.

mutual misperceptions and conflicting interests, which have created great antagonism between the two countries, and brought them to the verge of war several times.

One possible reason for further analysis of the Imia/Kardak dispute, apart from the fact that the crisis added an “unknown” until then dispute to the Aegean problem or problems⁶ as far as the *status quo* of islets and rocks is concerned, is the role that media played as a distinctive actor in both countries, by competing in or contributing to the states’ attempts to implement their respective foreign policies. Thus, an examination of this case will give us the opportunity to assess the role that media played in the conduct of Greek and Turkish foreign policy during this particular event, and subsequently to draw some conclusions concerning the interrelation of foreign policy and media.

At first glance, the crisis could be divided into two parts, although both parts are interrelated. In the first part, the vessel accident happens, the secret exchange of verbal notes follows, in which the Greek-Turkish disagreement over the status of Imia/Kardak rocks is expressed, and finally the freeze of the dispute for “unknown” time evolves, while in the second part, media bring the whole problem to the forefront, they actively promote tension, aggravation of the difference follows, the two countries are on the brink of war, and finally American diplomatic intervention comes up and disengagement of both countries from the crisis occurs.⁷

2. The Imia/Kardak Crisis as a Media Made Crisis

2.1 In What Ways Do Media Influence the State Foreign Policy?

During the last century, many analyses based on empirical observation and scientific investigation have been written about the influence of media on peoples’ thinking, especially after the wide use of television in western countries. Generally speaking, there were periods of time when the media effects were exaggerated, i.e. after the end of the First World War and afterwards till the end of the Second World War, when the political propaganda had triumphed, and periods during which researchers described media as having very limited powers of persuasion, i.e. in the 1950s and the 1960s.⁸ Finally, there is another period starting

⁶ The Greek side regards the demarcation of the Continental shelf as the only controversy that both countries have to negotiate for, while Turkey proclaims that this is not the only one claiming that the extension of territorial waters, the airspace limits of 10 nautical miles, the FIR (Flight Information Region) and the demilitarisation of the eastern Aegean Islands are also part of the Aegean dispute. See Şule Kut , *Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu* in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed.), op. cit., p. 253. Also, Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türk-Yunan Sorunları Çözülmez...* in Semih Vaner (ed.), *Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı*, Metis publications, Istanbul, 1990, p. 11. As well as in: Stelios Perrakis, *Oi Ellinoturkikes dienexeis sto Aigaio, to plaisio dieuthetisis tous kai i prooptiki tou Diethnous Dikastririou* in Stelios Perrakis (ed.), *Aigaio, Exelixis kai prooptikes epilisis ton ellinoturkikon dienexeon*, N. Sakkoulas publications, Athens-Komotini, 2003, pp. 128-129.

⁷ For the description of the events the following sources are used: Kourkoulas Alkis, *Imia, Kritiki Prosegisi tou Tourkikou Paragonta*, Sideris I. publications, Athens, 1998, pp. 27-56. Krateros Ioannou-Anastasia Strati, op. cit., pp. 490-492. Katharina Hadjidimos, *The Role of the Media in Greek-Turkish Relations- Co-production of a TV programme window by Greek and Turkish Journalists*, Robert Bosch Stiftungskolleg für Internationale Aufgaben Programmjahr 1998-1999, pp. 8-9, on <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/Greek-Turkish-Media.PDF> , accessed 12.07.2007. Şule Kut, *Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu* in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed.), op. cit., p. 259.

⁸ The “magic bullet theory” refers to the first period and the “limited effects theory” to the latter. See more in Jian-Hua Jonathan Zhu and Deborah Blood, *Media Agenda-Setting Theory: Review of a 25-Year Research Tradition*, City University of Hong Kong, Vol. 8, spring 1996, pp. 105-107. On Hong Kong Journals Online,

from early 1960s during which scholars took a very cautious approach to the results of the two aforementioned ones supporting the happy medium by accepting small effects, while at the same time methods had to be more precise and additional factors regarding the real ability of media to influence were taken into account.⁹ This discourse to define the role of media within societies is crucial and continues to be debated in the light of new empirical observations and scientific research.

Before any analysis about the influence of media on foreign policy is made, it would be useful to clarify what is meant by the word “influence” in the following paragraphs. Influence is the ability of the medium to corroborate or change the degree of interest or the perception of individuals over a specific issue according to the intended purpose of it (medium).

As far as foreign policy is concerned, there are no specific theories which focus exclusively on the influence of media on it. Yet foreign policy can be considered as part of politics with its own specificities and therefore important theories, such as the “agenda-setting” and the “agenda of attributes” can help in assessing the role of the Greek-Turkish media in the crisis. In this section, a theoretical framework is constructed in order to assess the role of media as a key factor in the development of the crisis retrospectively.

As it is well known, the conventional role of media in democracy is to inform the citizens about a variety of issues and it is the same conventional role that gives the medium the “power” to influence the political life of a country through their complex relation with citizens, who are theoretically true holders of the political power. In addition, media often play an important role in providing information such that they themselves become a symbolic forum of discussion. Accordingly, the media define the basic characteristics of public issues, but what circumstances are created for this dynamic to occur?

More specifically, in 1972 the Chapel Hill study carried out by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw inaugurated a new era in the field of studying media influence. These two researchers introduced the idea of “agenda-setting” through a survey of the U.S. presidential election in 1968 which revealed that there is a connection at a first stage between the political issues emphasized in the news media and what the voters thought to be the central issues in that election.¹⁰ In other words, it was proven that consistent publicity of an issue can draw significant social attention to it.¹¹ Therefore, editors and broadcasters have the ability under specific circumstances to create a “pseudo environment”, as Lipmann, a journalist and scholar of the 1920s had called it, where social reality is whatever the media consider crucial and to be discussed by society. As Bernard Cohen put it in 1963, “the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”¹²

<http://sunz1.lib.hku.hk/hk/hkjo/accept.jsp> , accessed on 12.06.2007. Also, for more background regarding these two periods see Denis McQuail, *The Influence and Effects of Mass Media*, in James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, Janet Woollacott, John Marriott, Carrie Roberts (eds.), *Mass Communication and Society*, Edward Arnold in association with the Open University Press, London, 1989, pp. 72-74.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 73-74.

¹⁰ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, *The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press*, in Doris A. Graber (ed.), *Media Power in Politics*, CQ Press, second edition, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 76.

¹¹ More about the empirical evidence of the agenda-setting see Ibid., pp. 76-78.

¹² University of Twente, *Agenda Setting Theory*, Netherlands, on http://www.tcw.utwente.nl/theorieenoverzicht/Theory%20clusters/Mass%20Media/Agenda-Setting_Theory.doc/ , accessed 04.09.2007.

In addition, Lipmann himself had pointed (1922) in one of his articles about the press that “only at these points where social conditions take recognizable and measurable shape do the body of truth and the body of news coincide.”¹³ He believed that the press emphasizes parts of real life that are interesting for various reasons, such as the finite ability of it to conduct investigations and to present them to the public as well as the press’s need to make profit, and the same happens with political issues and international news.¹⁴

In 2002, McCombs argued that media not only define the agenda of issues that will be debated more or less in the grass-roots, but also our understanding and perspective of the topics in the news.¹⁵ The main idea is that in subjects that are presented by media, some attributes are highlighted more while others remain in obscurity. Hence, the idea of the “agenda setting” was supplemented with the idea of the “agenda of attributes”.¹⁶

Of course, there are factors which determine the degree of applicability of these two ideas. The theory which explains fluctuations in the degree of media influence is the “contingent theory”.¹⁷ According to this theory, there are three sets of contingent conditions, i.e. audiences, issues and media characteristics.¹⁸

Starting with the audience characteristics, the need for orientation is the factor which makes the audience to seek more information from the media. The theory maintains that the stronger the need for orientation, the more powerful the effects of the “agenda-setting” and, at a later stage, the effects emerging from “the agenda of attributes”. However, the need for orientation varies from individual to individual and it is defined by two components, relevance and uncertainty.¹⁹ Relevance has to do with the degree of interest of individuals in a matter at hand. If the individuals are highly interested in and their uncertainty, which concerns the degree of their knowledge on a specific issue, is also high, then the need for orientation is high as well and therefore their susceptibility to news media is greater. More specifically, relevance concerns the effects of the “agenda-setting”, as the more interested a person becomes in issues that media present, the easier for media to shape his/her day-to-day agenda, while the more uncertain the person is, the more likely his/her perception to be moulded by the “agenda of attributes”. Relevance is the initial defining condition that regulates the level of need for orientation, whereas uncertainty plays the first role in the “agenda of attributes”, since its degree is connected with peoples’ need to obtain information. Naturally, to what extent the citizens place reliance on media as their primary source of information, meaning whether media have prestige among public opinion enters at this juncture. For example, media which are run by a dictatorship have much less prestige than media which exist at a comparatively more democratic and open society.

The issue characteristics in turn refer to the notions of “obtrusiveness” and “unobtrusiveness” as they were defined by Zucker.²⁰ As specified, an issue is obtrusive when the public or the individuals have direct contact and personal experience with it, whereas unobtrusive issues

¹³ Walter Lippmann, *Newspapers*, in Doris A. Graber, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 39-41.

¹⁵ Maxwell McCombs, *The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion*, Conference at London School of Economics, *Mass Media Economics 2002*, 29.07.2002, p. 5 on <http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/events/mme2002.asp>, accessed on 12.06.2007.

¹⁶ More background regarding the empirical evidence Ibid., pp. 5-8.

¹⁷ Jian-Hua Jonathan Zhu and Deborah Blood, op. cit., p. 115.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁹ Maxwell McCombs, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁰ Jian-Hua Jonathan Zhu and Deborah Blood, op. cit., p. 117.

concern “remote” from daily life issues.²¹ Accordingly, media cannot do much in changing the perception of individuals on issues with which they have a day-to-day relationship, such as unemployment or inflation.²² For instance, even if the media propagate with zeal that the economy is sound in a country where the majority of the people cannot make a living, the influence will be very limited. Correspondingly, media will have much more influence on issues, such as foreign policy, where, because of the complexity and the Olympian side of the subject, people accept more easily information from the self-declared “experts”, the media.

Lastly, the characteristics relate to the different types of media and their respective influence on the public. McCombs and Shaw reported on (1972) the influence of local newspapers, national newspapers, newsmagazines and television networks, arguing that national newspapers show the strongest “agenda-setting” effects, followed by television.²³ Several other studies conducted in the 1970s and one in 1989, have confirmed what is mentioned above regarding the primacy of national newspapers in “agenda-setting”.²⁴ However, more recent studies deny the previous results and contend that, since the public spends more time watching television than reading newspapers and people have greater confidence in the former, television has much more influence than previously thought.²⁵

Ultimately, whichever study represents the reality more accurately, the “agenda setting” and “agenda of attributes” have limited effects in societies where many different types of media exist (plurality), given that they have conflicting interests. In practice, we can imagine that it is not possible to mould a uniform “agenda-setting” and an “agenda of attributes”, when various media propagate their own “agenda-setting” and “agenda of attributes”. The only exception to that would be in societies where various media existed, however, strong stereotypes and perceptions of an issue pervaded all levels of society, and therefore a tendency to create a uniform “agenda-setting” and “agenda of attributes” would emerge. This seems to be the case, especially with “sensitive” issues referring to the foreign policy, as with Greece and Turkey. The lack of knowledge about the “Others” and about the complexity of the decision making of foreign policy, even if there are different perceptions of how foreign policy must be conducted, gives way to strong stereotypes which pre-exist or emerge in order to fill the aforementioned lack, and which in the end do not allow any productive dialogue within society and political circles for the most appropriate decision at a specific period of time.

2.2 The Role of the Media as a Key Factor in the Escalation of the Crisis and its Limitations

It remains to be examined what the role of the Greek-Turkish media in this crisis was, as the basis of the crisis was the existing climate in Greek-Turkish relations and more specifically the totally different approaches to the Aegean problem, as well as that the governments, at a first stage, did not want to make a great fuss of it at that specific time. Was media’s role only conventional and “decorative” as source of information, in the sense that they brought the

²¹ Ibid., p. 117.

²² Ibid., p. 118.

²³ Ibid., p. 119.

²⁴ More background about those studies in Ibid., pp. 119-120.

²⁵ More background about recent studies in Ibid., p. 120.

issue to the forefront, an issue, as Mr. Millas pointed out²⁶, that the governments did not want to cope with and media simply dredged it up? Or should one think that media did not play the role of a detached information provider, which covered the dispute, and furthermore that they tried in the way they presented the whole event and more importantly by intervening in it directly to create great tension, public interest and in the end better economic results for their companies? In other words, did media contribute decisively in the creation of a suffocating diplomatic context, where the two rivals could not even freeze their difference and they needed the intervention of a superpower to do so?

At this juncture, it should be mentioned that by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the monopoly of state television had broken and private channels started broadcasting in both countries.²⁷ This was a significant development, since an important part of mass media entered the free market and therefore news would be subject to the “law of high ratings”. In other words, the “blessing” of the audience for the news presented would be the main target, an audience which had a well-established negative perception in the field of Greek-Turkish relations.²⁸

In any case, the Greek-Turkish media played a key role, as it is shown by the events, in two specific ways during the second phase of the crisis. First, the great majority of media agencies monopolised the public discussion with stereotypes without any serious attempt to analyse in depth the diplomatic, political and legal context in which the difference occurred. In other words, the dispute was simplified by both sides into two antagonistic forces, Greeks and Turks, moral and immoral, good and evil. Secondly, not only they influenced the way people conceived this specific disagreement through a biased presentation, but also intervened directly in the dispute creating news and not simply describing it.

More specifically, according to the media monitoring report²⁹, a majority of Greek newspapers³⁰ raised tension with sensationalist headlines and analyses. Indicatively, the right wing newspapers Eleutheros Typos, Apogeumatini and Adesmeutos Typos wrote “(...) scenarios (...) of terrorism and Turkish provocation in Thrace”, “the Turks want an island of ours” (25/1) and “they grow insolent. The Turks ask for more islands” (26/1) respectively.³¹ The same newspapers developed more acrimonious speeches, after Turkish journalists removed the Greek flag³² from one of the two Imia/Kardak rocks, such as: “Brutal provocation. The Turks humiliated us” (EL.T., 29/1), “Invasion of Turks” (AP., 29/1) and

²⁶ Recorded interview via telephone with Mr. Hercules Millas, Professor at the University of Athens in the department of Turkish Studies, Evia, 17.08.2007, min. 3:55-4:05.

²⁷ The first Greek private channel was founded in 1989 and the first Turkish one started broadcasting via satellite from abroad in 1990. In 1993, after the amendment of Article 133 of the Turkish constitution, which was banning the private broadcasting, Turkish private channels started operating within Turkey. For Greek television see Katharina Hadjidimos, op. cit., p. 18. For Turkish television see Human Rights Watch, *Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey*, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1999, pp. 28-29.

²⁸ See footnote 4.

²⁹ For the Greek media see Vasiliki Neofotistos, *The Greek Media on the Imia/Kardak Conflict*, in Mariana Lenkova (ed.), *“hate speech” in the Balkans*, The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), 1998, pp. 71-77. On <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/hatespeech.pdf>, accessed 25.06.2007 and for the Turkish media see Ferhat Kentel, *The Turkish Media on the Imia/Kardak Conflict*, in Mariana Lenkova, op. cit., pp. 77-81.

³⁰ A great exception was the small in circulation leftist newspaper Avgi. See Panayote Elias Dimitras, *The Apotheosis of Hate Speech: the near-success of (Greek and Turkish) media in launching war*, in Mariana Lenkova, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

³¹ Vasiliki Neofotistos, *The Greek Media on the Imia/Kardak Conflict*, in Mariana Lenkova, op. cit., pp. 71.

³² It should be reminded that the Greek flag had been planted there by the Mayor of Kalymnos and other officials on the 25th January 1996.

“The Tourkalades [prejorative for Turks] scallywags (...) the scoundrels” (AT., 30/1). In addition, the centre-leftist newspapers, such as Eleutherotypia, Nea and Ethnos, followed the same pattern although not using such speeches with the exception of Ethnos newspaper: “They ask for new borders in the Aegean! The Turks start a slanging match” (EL., 30/1), “Bayrak[Turkish word for flag]-provocation” (N., 29.1) and “Agents’ assault on rocky islet! Turkish provocation aiming at the islands of the Aegean.” (ETH., 29/1).³³ The Greek channels, especially the private ones, kept the same pace with the newspapers by using a dramatic tone in every news broadcast and made things worse by airing the footage of the replacement of the Greek flag with a Turkish one several times.³⁴

On the Turkish side, it is apparent that the Turkish media did not use as much “hate speech” as the Greek media. However, they cultivated a “going-to-war” attitude³⁵, presenting Greece, as a “spoilt child” that should learn its lesson.³⁶ Hürriyet newspaper, one of the most well-known newspapers in Turkey, on the 28th January had as its front title “War Flag” (Bayrak Savaşı)³⁷ and on the 30th “This flag will go down” meaning the Greek flag³⁸. The very same newspaper on the 31st January had on its front cover a comparison of the military forces of the two countries and on the top of it the title “We are superior” (Biz Üstünüz).³⁹ Also, Sabah newspaper had an article with the headline “Turkey Can Overwhelm Greece in 72 Hours”.⁴⁰

Nonetheless, the most significant development regarding the coverage of the crisis by the Turkish media was the fact that Hürriyet daily newspaper sent a group of journalists in order to replace the Greek flag with a Turkish one, to take pictures and to film the whole event. The incident was reproduced by the Greek media many times, as it had happened with the act of the Greek mayor few days before. In a very ironic way, the Greek and the Turkish media had built a “holy alliance across the Aegean”, as the Association of European Journalists (AEJ) observed, during the crisis and they were leading the two politically weak governments to a war.

In order to understand better how this could happen, the media theory mentioned above will be employed for the better understanding of this case. First, media in both countries succeeded at a first stage to define the “agenda-setting” and at a second the “agenda of attributes” in a period of internal political crisis in both countries. Relevance and uncertainty was very high and subsequently the need for orientation was also high. This happened, because the dispute concerned the Greek-Turkish relations, a high profile issue in both countries. Furthermore, the public did not know anything about what the Imia/Kardak rocks, what had happened on them and what the exchange of verbal notes was about, and as consequence the uncertainty was also high. Moreover, the presentation of the exchange of verbal notes by the absolute majority of media in a dramatic way did not let any possibility for several agendas. In other words, all the media had suddenly focused on the events of the Imia/Kardak rocks and as a result, the public did the same.

³³ Vasiliki Neofotistos, *The Greek Media on the Imia/Kardak Conflict*, in Mariana Lenkova, op. cit., pp. 72.

³⁴ For more background Ibid., pp. 71-77.

³⁵ A prominent exception was the Yeni Yüzyıl newspaper and some journalists in other newspapers in Ferhat Kentel, *The Turkish Media on the Imia/Kardak Conflict*, in Mariana Lenkova, op. cit., pp. 79-81.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 77-78.

³⁷ Front cover of Hürriyet newspaper, 28.01.1996, on

<http://arsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivweb/sayfagoster.asp?id=1743&sayfa=01> , accessed 18.07.2007.

³⁸ Front cover of Hürriyet newspaper, 30.01.1996, on

<http://arsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivweb/sayfagoster.asp?id=1745&sayfa=01> , accessed 18.07.2007.

³⁹ Front cover of Hürriyet newspaper, 31.01.1996, on

<http://arsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivweb/sayfagoster.asp?id=1746&sayfa=01> , accessed 18.07.2007.

⁴⁰ Ferhat Kentel, *The Turkish Media on the Imia/Kardak Conflict*, in Mariana Lenkova, op. cit., pp. 78.

In addition, the uniform stance of the Greek and Turkish media towards the “Others” characterized by aggressiveness and an attempt to present the “opponent” as irrational and impudent made it very easy for them to create a general “agenda of attributes”, namely to create a general perception for the ongoing dispute. The broadcast of provocative actions in which media were the protagonists or the film-makers, and at the same time the “unobtrusiveness” of the issue helped also towards this direction. The result was that in each country a suffocating political environment was created. On the one hand, the two public opinions were seeing the opposite state as the aggressor, and on the other hand, two weak governments were trying to prove to their respective audiences that their rights on the rocks are not negotiable. In any case, the governments could not easily freeze the dispute and negotiate in the long run, as was the case during the first phase of the disagreement. Yet, does the fact that Greek and Turkish media took the lead in the second phase of the dispute means that it was the media influence that account for the crisis solely?

The answer is definitely negative, since relevance, a constitutive element of an effective “agenda-setting”, is firmly connected with what pre-existed in the peoples’ minds, and in this case, the great hostility that existed between the two countries during the second half of the 20th century, drew additional attention to the dispute. Furthermore, how the events evolved confirms the idea that media acted within a certain context and that they did not fabricate it from zero point. Specifically, the decision of Hürriyet newspaper to intervene directly consists of an international “novelty” in the field of media role in foreign policy in the sense that a group of journalists preceded any reaction of the Turkish state in a disputed area. This action becomes more important for the understanding of the “freedom” that Turkish media felt that they had, as Mr. Sami Kohen said⁴¹, at that specific juncture if we also consider that it embarrassed the Turkish state in a period of time during which the free expression was under significant restrictions; several journalists were imprisoned and newspapers, radio and television stations had been closed down.⁴² The fact that the newspaper decided to act like that as well as the fact that the Turkish state did not take any measures against the journalists and the newspaper itself, prove categorically that Turkish media were acting within the context of the Turkish establishment and, as Mr. Nuri Çolakoğlu explained, the move was popular and welcome.⁴³

Even if there were thoughts that this action was not right in terms of deciding to replace the state in a sensitive issue and in terms of basic journalistic ethics, it would be difficult for the Turkish government or some political circles to denounce it in a climate of pervasive nationalism and stereotypes promoted by the media themselves. It is worth notify that the contradictory report of the High Council on Radio and Television (RTÜK), in which the Council refers to the act of the journalists as “...a “mistake” [quotation marks in the text] which crossed the line of the journalistic duty”. However, in the same report the Council says that “it is not realistic for a journalist to be expected -even if it is desired- to take the role of a neutral “third person” [quotation marks in the text] in an issue, such as the integrity of his own country, which carries the meaning of life [very important]”, and that “the mistake of the action does not carry characteristics that cast their shadow on the respect of their

⁴¹ “The media influence (...) in terms of embarrassing the government” in Mr. Sami Kohen, Columnist of Milliyet newspaper on issues of international relations, Istanbul, 18.07.2007, min. 9:52-10:04.

⁴² More background about the controversial role of the High Council on Radio and Television (RTÜK) see Katharina Hadjidimos, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17. Also for more background regarding imprisoned journalists on free expression charges and the closure of radio and television stations see Human Rights Watch, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31 and pp. 49-50.

⁴³ Recorded interview with Mr. Nuri Çolakoğlu, Vice President of the Doğan Group and Columnist of the Turkish Daily News, Istanbul, 15.07.2007, min. 5:08-5:15.

[journalists'] profession".⁴⁴ Thus, it is more than apparent that the Turkish media acted in conformity with the basic ideas of the establishment and that state institutions in charge of the behaviour of the media were not disposed to condemn such an act. One might ask, as Mr. Nuri Çolakoğlu did, what happened in the case of the mayor of Kalymnos, who took the decision to plant a Greek flag⁴⁵, or even more what happened in the case of the Skai television station, which filmed Greek warships' departure from their anchorage in Salamina during the Imia/Kardak crisis and broadcast it? The answer is that the Greek state also turned a blind eye.

To sum up, Greek and Turkish media played a key role during the second phase of the dispute in that they played the role of a "magnifying glass" in the Greek-Turkish disagreement about the rocks. They did not create the disagreement, as it was there from the first phase of the dispute, yet media demonised every act of the "Others" without making any attempt to analyse the different incentives of each factor, states, media and individuals. On the contrary, they moulded the perception of their audiences on the basis that their country had absolute right, when simultaneously different legal interpretations existed.

Lastly, one might point out the degree to which media pushed the two states varies, since in Turkey non political bodies such as the army play a fundamental role in the decision-making of foreign policy issues through the National Security Council.⁴⁶ Thus, media could not influence the foreign policy of Turkey through the Turkish public opinion. Perhaps this is true, but we have to consider also Mr. Tüzecan's negative answer to my question on whether the government or the National Security Council could pursue unpopular policies without the support of media.⁴⁷ It should be added that popularity is significant for the Turkish army, especially in moments when it believes that it has to act against internal "threats", as it was the case after the elections of 24th December 1995, when the Islamist Welfare Party became the biggest party with 21.4 per cent of the vote.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Cem Işıklar, *Ege'de Casus Belli*, Ankara, 2005, pp. 137-138. Report of the High Council on Radio and Television (RTÜK).

⁴⁵ Recorded interview with Mr. Nuri Çolakoğlu, op. cit., min. 5:12-5:20.

⁴⁶ The Article 118 of the Constitution provides that the National Security Council "determines measures that are deemed necessary for the preservation of the existence, independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the state and maintenance of stability and security of the society". For more background regarding the structure of the National Security Council (MGK) and its responsibilities on foreign policy issues see Secretariat General of the National Security Council, *The NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC (1983-2003)*, on http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/Tarihce/tarihce004_en.htm , accessed 10.09.2007. Also, see Human Rights Watch, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

⁴⁷ Recorded Interview with Mr. Temüçin Tüzecan, Communication Director of Hürriyet Daily Newspaper, Istanbul, 18.07.2007, min. 8:35-8:50.

⁴⁸ For more background regarding the rise of the Islamists during that period see Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, new revised edition, I.B. Tauris publications, London, 2003, pp. 310-315.

3. Some Conclusions regarding the Interaction between Foreign Policy and Media in the Case of Imia/Kardak Crisis

The Imia/Kardak crisis was a singular case in the history of the Greek-Turkish crises in the sense that different phases of it cannot solely be explained by the disagreements and interests of the two rivals, and more specifically the go-to-war attitude of the two states for two uninhabited rocks during important internal political fluidity. Therefore, we need to focus on the eagerness of media to compete each other in the field of nationalism.

Around the world, maritime disputes exist and some of them with very significant issues at stake, such as oil⁴⁹, but the majority of them do not result in a military crisis or war. Either they are “frozen” or there are negotiations between experts, or they are submitted to the International Court of Justice. Some examples include the dispute of five littoral countries over the oil and gas-rich Caspian Sea⁵⁰ and the dispute between Norway and Russia about their maritime limits in the Barents Sea and Russia's fishing rights beyond Svalbard's territorial limits within the Svalbard Treaty zone⁵¹. In addition, as Mr. Kourkoulas pointed out, “if this event (Imia/Kardak dispute) happened between Finland and Sweden, (...) the press would not be bothered....there would be an interest (by media) about how the arbitration would end.”⁵² In the same way, his colleague, Mr Kohen stated that “probably without such a fuss, with some kind of secret diplomacy or silent diplomacy the question could have been resolved.”⁵³ Thus, it is apparent that the media intervened directly with specific acts or indirectly through the “agenda-setting” and the “agenda of attributes” between the states in the first occasion (direct intervention) and between the states and their respective public opinions in the latter one (agenda setting and agenda of attributes).

On the other hand, the substratum of foreign policy is not created by media at the same time that crisis occurs; but rather it is a pre-existing nexus of political “elements”, such as national interests that states promote, political currents and ideologies which pervade societies, perceptions that are already constructed in these societies and objectives in general that are projected by several institutions and in the end all together build this substratum. Thus, the examples, which Mr. Çolakoğlu gave regarding the limits that media have into defining basic concepts in societies, strike the right note. He says that “one should not exaggerate the influence of media, because when you look at the Soviet Union for 75 years using every media available, they passed on certain ideas, certain way of thinking to the people or they thought they did, but the moment the climate changed the people of Russia turned around in twenty two seconds”⁵⁴ and he continues with a rhetorical question about how many Greeks or Turks would convert into Catholicism if a Catholic radio would start broadcasting.⁵⁵ In the end, he concludes that “If there is no base among people for anything that you are trying to sell the media are totally ineffective. But if there is something which is looming in their heads

⁴⁹ For more background see Global Security Organisation, *International Disputes*, on <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/disputes.htm>, accessed 07.09.2007.

⁵⁰ For more background see Energy Information Administration, *Caspian Sea*, January 2007, pp. 9-10, on <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/pdf.pdf>, accessed 07.09.2007.

⁵¹ The World Factbook (CIA), *Norway*, on <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html>, accessed 07.09.2007.

⁵² Recorded interview with Mr. Alkis Kourkoulas, Head of the Athens News Agency in Turkey and columnist of the BHMA newspaper, 20.07.2007, Istanbul, min. 5:37-5:59.

⁵³ Recorded interview with Mr. Sami Kohen, op. cit., min. 13:18-13:28.

⁵⁴ Recorded interview with Mr. Nuri Çolakoğlu, op. cit., min. 10:32-10:57.

⁵⁵ Ibid., min. 10:58-11:20.

and if you grab that then you can really mobilise the masses through the media.”⁵⁶ As he previously pointed out, this is where media interact with the substratum of foreign policy. Either because media are private and want to make profit or because they are state media and have to highlight the problem in accordance with official policy, they reflect and amplify the pre-existing substratum of foreign policy.

Finally, my conclusions about the interaction between foreign policy and media by no means intended to indicate the need for restrictions on media’s access to foreign policy issues, or that foreign policy must be conducted for the people without them by a small group of experts. On the contrary, as the Imia/Kardak crisis proved, media do play a significant role under specific circumstances, and as such, editors, journalists and columnists must take their profession seriously. At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, in his renowned *Fourteen Points Speech* declared that “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view”.⁵⁷ This is exactly where media can contribute in by shedding light on all the aspects of a conflict or a dispute or a diplomatic process, because in the end, it is the democratic right of every citizen who lives in a pluralistic democracy to have an as much as of a complete picture of what is happening around him/her.

⁵⁶ Ibid., min. 11:21-11: 40.

⁵⁷ Woodrow Wilson, *Fourteen Points Speech (1918)*, on <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm> (US Department of State), accessed 11.09.2007.

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