

European Youth Networks¹: The case of Europeanization in Greece.

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Abstract. Hundreds of Non Governmental Organisations, members of various European Youth Networks, are active in the European Union. Many of them are directly or indirectly sponsored by the European Union. This research challenges to analyze their effort to promote the Europeanization of Youth in Greece. The importance of Youth Networks is even greater now in the aftermath of the EU enlargement; nowadays seventy-five million young people live in the European Union. This article challenges to analyze the effort to promote the Europeanization of Youth and the creation of young Europeans in Greece. The research attempts to open a broad debate of whether youth should be given greater priority in the European development. Is European Society building, a task of people that age around fifty, or youth could succeed it better? This is one of the debates that this project will aim to place and try to shed light in. The European Youth Networks as the main channels of influence and participation of youth across Europe, will be put into the microscope of this research project and make an effort to approach these issues.

Introduction

The European Union, more than ever before, is suffering of identity crisis. It is obvious, that questions like: *who are the Europeans, what do they have in common, where are they going and what links the EU States*, are crossing through citizen's minds. Trying to combine all these questions, I will paraphrase Massimo's D'Azeglio famous proverb that "having made Italy, we need to make the Italians", in having made Europe we need to make the Europeans (Bellamy, 2006, p.1).

All different all equal was the slogan of the Council of Europe's campaign against racism and xenophobia. Have you ever thought what the reaction of the Spanish crusaders was when they traveled to discover new territories and they came across natives from America? As Lauritzen wrote, the "situation is not much different when 25 young people around Europe get together for some days somewhere in Europe with its wars truck areas, anarchic regions, enormous differences in living standard and life prospects" (1999, p.223). This is one of the facilities that occur through NGO participation. It brings young EU citizens closer.

In all levels of the Greek historical evolution the youth has been the critical factor that has pushed innovation forward. For example, the 17th of November of 1973, while Greece was under dictatorship, it was the students that first started the revolution to reinstate democracy. Furthermore, as the European Union, still seeks to find its place in the world and in peoples' minds, it is necessary for "political socialisation to go beyond the requirements of a national curriculum" (Lauritzen, 1999, p.228). Youth can play an important role for this to be achieved.

This paper attempts to shed light on the role of transnational NGOs towards the Europeanization of youth in the European Union. I will focus my analysis in

¹ The term European Youth Networks for the needs of this paper has been linked to Non Governmental Organisations. So, we take for granted that NGOs refer to Transnational Youth Networks and not national.

Greece. It seems that the European Union supports the establishment of NGOs even with its economic help. One of the numerous examples that support this claim is EU willingness to support transnational youth cooperation through establishing the *Grants for international non-governmental youth organisations and networks* (Eufunding, 2006). This program has an annual budget of 3 million euros while it gives NGOs the opportunity to establish Transnational Networks; it also promotes the socialisation of youth, transnational cooperation and dissemination of information, organisation of events and exchange of know-how. Hundreds of similar programmes are established every year that prove EU's support in transnational youth cooperation (Eufunding, 2006). For example, the European Union economically supports NGOs actions with other means such as the Youth Program that has a budget of 915 million euros (Nyfoudis Nikos, 2007, p.19).

Alexis de Tocqueville characteristically wrote that, "feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and understanding developed" through active participation in organizations (cited by Marc Morje Howard & Leah Gilbert, 2008, p.12). In the same path, Lauritzen (1999, p.228) wrote that it is necessary "political socialisation to go [es] beyond the requirements of a national curriculum" and it can be assumed that youth are the necessary vehicle for this to be achieved.

Europeanization in the making

The intensive use of the expression "Europeanization" is a contemporary phenomenon and as Featherstone (2003, p.3) mentioned, a "fashionable" one. Many different scholars aimed to approach the term from totally different perspective. Radaelli (2003, p.30) characteristically wrote that Europeanization "refers to the process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies". The words of Puchala (1984), cited by Chrysochoou (2001, p.36), may appear interesting and farsighted. He wrote that, "Europeanization might comprise a long lasting but not really prominent part of history of Social Science of the 20th century." In contrast, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001, p.1) stated that "Europeanization matters." It matters because it develops "at the European level distinct structures of governance" (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001, p. 3) and promotes identity formation and institutional change among others (Mörth, 2003, p.31). Nevertheless, Europeanization is being decoded differently in each of the different EU Member States (Mörth, 2003, p.163).

Radaelli (2003) claimed that it is important not to confuse Europeanization with convergence, harmonization or political integration (Vink & Graziano, 2006, p. 13). Moreover, Europeanization is "more than" and "different from EU-ization" (Wallace 2000; Schmidt and Wiener 2005 cited by Vink & Graziano, 2006, p. 16). Despite the fact that it is the European Union that has increased the particular interest in Europeanization, other Institutions such as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also play an important role in the move towards this direction.

Cini (2005, p.333) identified five different definitions of Europeanization as: "(a) the territorial expansion, (b) the process of European-level institutionalization, (c) the export of European Institutions to the wider world, (d) "the strengthening of the European integration *project* or the *European Construction* as a political ambition"

and finally, (e) “the domestic impact of European-level institutions”. Europeanization in the context of this article will be linked with: i) *Cini’s fourth definition* the “strengthening of the European integration *project* or the *European Construction* as a political ambition” which is arguably a significant aspect of Europeanization; ii) Transnational European interaction (‘zimosis’) and the appearance of a new European public space, which is of major importance towards European integration project and iii) the process of transforming peoples feeling of belonging in a nation and their national citizenship, cultural and social identities.

Europeanization, according to Olsen “is not a unique process and a *suus generis* phenomenon” (2002, p.922). In this paper, Europeanization is related to the “process of structural change” and the “variously affected actors, institutions, ideas and interests (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p.3). Ioakeimidis pointed that Europeanization is seen as “the process that is transforming the political systems of the EU member states and beyond” (2002, p.1). Moreover, the process for deeper Europeanization is a process of deep evolution and innovation. It can be seen as “increasing transnationalism” (Featherstone, 2003, p.75). Gourevitch cited by Featherstone (2003, p.75) wrote that “this perspective can be seen as refracting the integration-building process underway at the EU level”. Although the common market, the common currency, the development of the Regions and the cohesion funds are important elements of the European Union, the Europeanization of people and the creation of a European demos is necessary for them to work (Theologou, p.2005, p.7).

Basic Frameworks

The European Union today, more than ever before, seems to need a new social legitimization that will give emphasis to the creation of an international public sphere consisted of the “constitutive norms of a European democracy of great range” (Chrysochoou, 2005, p.99). Moreover, the European Union needs to face a significant challenge in its effort to create a politically defined European demos, is to phrase an authentic interest in the essence of European unification and a European responsibility that will push forward further European unification (Theologou, 2005, p.63).

European construction

Schmitter (1996), among others, cited by Bellamy and Castiglione (2004, p.153), argued that Europe is characterized by the creation of a more complicated, multilevel and international form of governance. In this process of European construction, Europeanization is one of the most important tools. According to Chrysochoou (2005, p.67), the European Union needs to encourage its citizens to participate actively in the integration process as well as in the construction of a European public sphere (Chrysochoou, 2003, p.313). In addition, the European Construction used to be, and still is, an adventure with fellow travelers that aims at, strengthening democratic institutions, creating a common cultural identity and the evolution of the European Union in an important international scene. (Theologou, 2005, p.15). Europeanization, even if it is a fashionable concept, still is of great importance in the deepening of a European identity and the creation of a European

demos (Chrysochoou, 2001, p.321). The continuously increasing economic problems will decrease only if the EU moves closer to people's minds. Checkel mentioned in his work that the values and policy paradigms must be incorporated at the domestic level and reshape people's identities (Olsen, 2005, p.346).

Although the creation of a United States of Europe was never the "endpoint of the integration process", a "quasi-federal trajectory would indeed signify the beginning of the end of the nation-state as the dominant unit for political organization" (Vink, 2002, p.15). It is posited here that in order for this to happen, more efficient European Youth Policies need to be established, aiming at further Europeanization of youth, that will eventually lead to a more coherent European Union. Non Governmental Organisations, as one of the most important means of participation of youth has a major role in this effort.

European Demos

It is of major significance for a European civic sphere to be established. Internal borders and barriers will eventually be removed and at the same time external borders will be strengthened, as soon as the "collective feeling of belonging" develops. Lavdas and Chrysochoou (2004, p.20) set a new significant question: *who is governed* in the European Union? While, Jacques Santer wisely stated that:

"People still do not feel that Europe is active in their daily lives dealing with problems of unemployment. Therefore, the first operation we must undertake is to develop a whole strategy for combating the scourge of unemployment. That is of great priority if we are to reconcile the citizen, the man in the street, with our Europe" (cited by Dell' Olio, p.2005, p.79).

If the European Union does not succeed in answering these basic questions, then, a viable European democratic community cannot be achieved. "Many people, one demos" instead of "many demos, one people" is the epitome of what Lavdas and Chrysochoou supported concerning the importance of the creation of a defined European demos (Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2004, p.23). Hoskyns and Newman (2000, p.9) argued that "there is a potential demos in the EU but it needs to be given consciousness and the means to make its voice effective in existing and new institutions". Europeanization is one of the pathways that can lead to further strengthening of what is called "Europe". According to Fernandez, Europe is seen as a "highly divergent cultural space (Kultauraum) where young peoples' situation must be set in the wider, more fluid social and cultural context" (2005, p.59).

"Multiple and partially overlapping public spheres indicate that Europe's political order possesses the modalities for achieving a single deliberative polity with multiple 'demoi' (Lavdas, 2007, p.2). Young Europeans mainly active in a voluntary base, have achieved the first necessary prerequisite towards the achievement of a European demos: they have overlapped any cultural missing parts between their country of origin and EU and they are active not only in a local but in a pan 'European public sphere. As Habermas (1998) wrote, "The notion of a demos refers

to a form of civic membership in a political community organized around a specific set of common political ideals and principles” (cited by Fatovic, 2005, p.2). In addition, Bellamy and Castiglione described demos as “the creation of a political form that will provide people with power and will encourage the open dialogue between EU citizens” (2004, p.171).

Moreover, Radaelli (2003, p.33) argues, “Europeanization would not exist without European Integration”. He cites Börzel, Balmer and Burch’s (2001) argument that “Europeanization is a two-way process”. Therefore, the EU-Member States forward their “preferences” to Brussels, and accordingly accept implementing the EU policy directions. Börzel and Risse (2003, p.60) push forward this research era by claiming that the point is not if Europeanization matters or not, but how it matters. Furthermore, they state that “the lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions the higher the adaptational pressure” (Börzel & Risse, 2003, p.60).

Res publica

In an effort to create a politically defined European demos, the *potential* members are necessary to identify the common entity, as members of a “new, multilevel European *res publica*” (Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2004, p.22). This is not related to any institutional reform; on the contrary, it is related to the way that European citizens think of themselves in relation to their country, and more importantly, with a new political entity, a *res publica composita* (Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2004, p.23). Lavdas characteristically wrote that “the conception of a European ‘res-publica’ recognizes the value of diversity for the enrichment of the possibilities for self-government “ (Lavdas, 2007, p.16).

According to Chrysochoou (2005, p.97), even twenty-five centuries after the establishment of the Roman *respublica*, the same characteristics constitute *the raison d’ etre* of *res publica* that the European Union is seeking. Moreover, he pointed to the necessity for people’s actively participation in a new, multilevel and international *civitas* that will signify Europeanization’s effectiveness in promoting Europe’s common culture (Chrysochoou, 2004, p.144). Europeanization will help people understand the common rights and obligations that come as part of the European progress.

Since 1957, member states are gradually removing elements from their social, political, economical and cultural that is opposite or in contrast with that of the European Union. This is gradually moving the nation-state closer to what the European Union intends to represent. Many times this requires a lot of effort i.e. economic integration, while other times is easier i.e. use of EU funds.

European citizenship, cultural and social identities

The European Union is not an ordinary state where decisions can be enforced. It neither is a unified polity where you can find people with clear visions, dreams and hopes for their common future. European Union is a transnational sphere of belonging in a multi-cultural environment. People with strong cosmopolitan feelings are socially active in an effort to push forward integration process. NGOs

active in a broad European youth sphere make a significant effort to inspire further youth participation.

The Europeanization of people and the creation of a European citizenship or even further the creation of a European identity as a necessary prerequisite for the creation of the “imagined community” – the Europeans- is the most difficult of all aspects of Europeanization. The Treaties of Rome, Maastricht and Amsterdam raised the issue of a shared European identity but, of course, there is no obligatory agreement for the development of such an issue. As Risse wrote, “there are no formal or informal norms requiring European Union citizens to transfer their loyalties to the EU instead of or in conjunction with the nation-state” (2001, p.200). It is widely mentioned [Balibar (2002), Risse (2001), Checkel (2001), Lepsius (1990)] that the European Union is lacking of symbols, myths and common memories, which can initiate the creation of “common identity”.

There is a strong need for multiculturalism to promote a “shared sense of the public good” that will accelerate the creation of cultural and social identities (Bellamy cited by Lavdas, p.10). Lauritzen argued that, intercultural learning “puts participants through the painful exercise of learning about themselves by discovering the making of their own identity (de-construction, de-learning),” and eventually this promotes transnational bonding (1999, p.228). As Chrysochoou (2000, p.109) argued, the European demos is a “community of citizens linked to each other by strong democratic bonds and pressing to acquire a measure of effective control through formal or informal means over government”. It is the necessary prerequisite for the long-lasting but prominent effort of transforming national citizens into transnational ones.

The creation of a common European identity can be defined as the creation of common European characteristics and the creation of feelings of belonging in a bigger community, Europe. Paraphrasing Massimo’s D’Azeglio famous proverb “having made Italy, we need to make the Italians” (Bellamy, 2006, p.1), nowadays having made Europe we need to make the Europeans. Necessary for this to happen is to create a Common European Identity. Ignatief (2000) cited by Lavdas and Chrysochoou (2004, p.143) mentioned that, “we should conceptualize the complex nature of Europe as a community with common perception of the meaning, size and scope of freedom”. Moreover, basic common values must come into surface; the creation of such common values is necessary if further integration is desired. As Checkel (Olsen, 2005, p.346) mentions in his work, European values and policy paradigms must be incorporated at the domestic level to help reshape people’s identities.

Europeanization and NGOs

The last decade there have been significant developments “in promoting more coherent youth policies at the European level” (Sellberg & Orr, 2004, p.4). Both the European Union and the Council of Europe have been very keen in the Youth issues. *The New Impetus for European Youth (2001)*, was the result of Viviane’s Readings (Commissioner-Designate for Education and Culture) effort to plan a White Paper on Youth and Youth Policy in Europe. Because of the White Paper (2001), the

open method of coordination was launched for the first time in the Youth field and it identified four areas of action: participation, information, voluntary service among young people and a greater understanding of youth (Sellberg & Orr, 2004, p.6).

The White Paper on Youth gave further support to the cornerstone of Youth action, the *Youth Programme*. The Youth Programme is one of the most useful tools in promoting actions of NGOs and its budget for the period 2007-2013 has risen to 915 million euros. The Youth Program and its implementation through NGOs struggle to promote the Europeanization of Youth. They move forward Kant's principle of cosmopolitan law (Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2005, p.285) that states: "the fact that people of the world coexist and cope regularly is relative with the main principle of the creation of the state through the nature" (Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2005, p.285).

The European Construction used to be, and still is, an adventure with fellow travelers that aims among others: in the strengthening of democratic institutions, in the creation of a common cultural identity and the evolution of European Union in an important international scene. (Theologou, 2005, p.15). NGOs seem play an important role in motivating young people's awareness and participation, at the same time as they can be the necessary vehicle that will push European integration forward.

There is a significant importance in the analysis of the Youth sector in the European Union. For example, the European Institutions "have taken an interest in the democratic and European dimensions of education, hoping to make young people more conscious of European ideas and of being Europeans [Beukel, (2001) cited by Olsen, 2002, p.931). During this process of Europeanization (Anderson, 1991, cited by Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001, p.201) "groups of individuals perceive that they have something in common, on the basis of which they form an imagined community"; NGOs seems to contribute to the creation of this imagined community, the Europeans. This paper aims to spread light in the outcomes of this interactive process.

Article 128, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) states that, "the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Members States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (du Bois-Reymond & Hubner-Funk, 1999,p.6). Laurite posits that if "we cannot leave identity behind us on our road towards tolerance of ambiguity, we could use this term as expressing the sum of person's life experience" that is "a mixture of genetic, environmental and educational factors" (1999, p.223).

Despite that the creation of a *United States of Europe* was never the "endpoint of the integration process", yet "a quasi-federal trajectory would indeed signify the beginning of the end of the nation-state as the dominant unit for political organization" (Vink, 2002, p. 15). For this to happen, NGOs and transnational networks must play an important role "in agenda setting at all levels of domestic, transgovernmental and European politics and policy-making" (Kaiser & Starie, 2005, p.11). Moreover, concepts like Europeanization of people must be in their primary agenda. Furthermore, Europe undoubtedly, has covered great step of political and

social evolution, since the Treaty of Rome (1957) was signed. Though, Europe is still in “period of transition” and the “continent is moving towards a new form of political organization” (Olsen, 2002, p. 944). The European Union as a breathing organisation is in constant change; this article will try to show the importance of youth towards its development.

Europeanization and the Greek Youth.

Having in mind Chrysochoou’s words that co-governance is the action of common governance through common commitments I will try to underline the importance of youth participation in NGOS towards the Europeanization of youth (2007, p.1). In this research project, 70 young people from the Greece were interviewed. The young correspondents had at least one common thing: their membership at a Transnational Non Governmental Organisation. Some of the correspondents participated in a NGO in a full time basis while others in a part time basis. Some of them are still members of NGOs while others are not. The age range varies between 16 to 52 years old. This is one of the most important quantitative tools of the research, because it connects after-participation feelings with the analysis. In other words, our “conceptualization” aims in investigating how participants changed their feelings and ideas because of their involvement to an NGO.

Lavdas (2007, p.11) very successfully wonders “how we will succeed to disentangle the issue of participation in the EU from the cultural and emotional dimensions of participation based on pre-existing affinity and confirmations of belonging”. Eriksen, cited by Lavdas, calls to separate citizenship from nationhood (2007, p.11). Voluntary participation of youth in NGOs and associations’ active in the national and EU field shows this commitment of the youth to move over national borders and discover what lies outside their country of origin. Many times, young people all over the European Union, leave behind friends and families, while they decide to voluntary work abroad or travel through exchanges and summer schools; many times they work on projects and NGOs totally disconnected to their country of origin. One of the characteristic examples, is their participation to the Youth in Action Program, in Summer Camps or even in activist actions concerning globalisation, environment, human rights and other (Nyfoudis, 2006, p.12). It is Pentland who wrote that “European integration will require a transformation of the way the average European thinks and acts” (1973, p242). In the following pages, I will analyse that this is achieved by NGOs active in the European Union. It is very interesting to read that several correspondents stated: “through our interaction we exchange ideas, hopes believes while many times we create common stories, memories, fairy tales and who know some times heroes”.

The Table 1 shows that 69 correspondents answered that their participation to the NGO helped them discover many common things among all EU citizens. Which are these? Human Rights have the first place in Greece (64%). The second common characteristic is Education with 45% acceptance in total, while highly important seems to be Democracy with 42% in total. As Chrysochoou stated, it is necessary for the European Union to be based on “a double democratic legitimacy”;

that of a European demos – a body of citizens - and of the “constituent governments, as instruments for the articulation of territorial interests” (2005, p.67). Here lies the connection between young people’s participation to Non-Governmental Organisations: young people being envisaged with characteristics that create a common bond among them and other European citizens.

Question 7	
Yes	69
No	1

Table 1

It is of highly importance here to mention that Religion keeps the last place (14%) in the common element that young correspondents discover through their participation to NGOs. As discussed above, these are strong reasons to believe that young people are eager to find things that unite instead of dividing EU citizens.

The next question (Table 2), following a set of introductory questions, asked correspondents “if they believe that their participation to the NGO contributed to their transnational bonding with young people from other EU countries”. The answers leave few misunderstandings: 90% of the Greeks answered positively. It seems that Lavdas has been prophetic when stated that “a multitude of commitments may develop emotional engagement and enhance opportunities for meaningful choices” (Lavdas, 2007, p.11).

Question 12	
Yes	69
No	1

Table 2

European Identity

Risse wrote that “the impact of Europeanization on collective identities and shifting loyalties is not only controversial but poorly understood” (2001, p.198). In the next two questions I explore how participation influenced the creation of a common European Identity. It is explored that a very high percentage of correspondents assumes that participating in the actions of a NGO contributed to the construction of a European Identity. In details, according to Table 2: 98% of the Greeks believe that their participation contributed to the construction of a common European Identity. Even though they believe that this construction is occurred through NGOs, the first questions that comes into the mind is the following: which are the qualitative characteristics that are constructed through NGO participation? According to Table 3, Common European Awareness and Mutual Respect are the two most important constructed elements among the answers of the youth participants. In other words, it is the youth participation through NGOs that creates the necessary prerequisites for a European culture that will generate a new form of the “think of Europe”. European

Awareness as well as mutual respect, that both are necessary elements of a multinational community, seem to secure this; Moreover, according to the survey, 33% believe that common culture is also among the primary characteristics being promoted by NGO participation.

Question 13	
<i>Common European Awareness</i>	46
<i>Mutual Respect</i>	40
<i>Common Culture</i>	21
<i>European Demos</i>	24

Table 3

Risse characteristically wrote that “social identities contain first ideas, describing and categorizing an individual’s membership in a social group including emotional affective and evaluative components” (2001, p.201). The confidence and support in those characteristics is a necessary element on the road of the creation of the imagined community called “the Europeans”. As Lavdas wrote, “a multitude of commitments may develop emotional engagement as well as enhance opportunities for meaningful choices” (2006, p.14). In our case the emotional part includes the creation of all the above while the meaningful part includes the creation of a common European Identity.

The Greek correspondents, with 100%, declared that their participation to the NGOs actions enhanced their knowledge in issues such as Human Rights, Freedom, Democracy, Participation, European Integration and Mutual Respect. Consequently, it is very important for the youth to understand and be able to accept all these changes that occur in every day life. Especially in issues concerning the European Union several changes occurs in short periods. It seems though, that NGOs participation assists this integration/understanding process.

Very important and particularly interesting seems to be the following results. The correspondents in these questions need to identify themselves in terms of citizenship before and after their exposure to an NGO. As it can be seen by the 4th Table, the majority of the young correspondents before their participation to the NGO distinguish themselves as citizens of their country of origin. In contrast, according to Table 5, after their participation to the NGO, young participants recognize European citizenship just next to their national one. As Lavdas and Chrysochoou (2004, p.285) wrote, “the fact that the people of the world coexist and cope regularly is relative with the main principle of the creation of the state through the nature”. Constant exposure to new ideas, experiences, images, in formations and actions that occur through NGO participation seems to be highly important in the construction of a common European way of thinking. This is the necessary prerequisite for the “new, hybrid form of transnational and cultural identity” that Demossier wrote about (2007, p.53).

Question 25	
<i>Citizen of your country (only)</i>	45
<i>Citizen of EU (only)</i>	3
<i>Both citizen of your country and EU</i>	18
<i>Other</i>	3

Table 4

Question 25	
<i>Citizen of your country (only)</i>	4
<i>Citizen of EU (only)</i>	7
<i>Both citizen of your country and EU</i>	53
<i>Other</i>	5

Table 5

The above seems to be highly interesting and will be further enriched in the next chapter that connects them to the construction of a common European Demos, the “imagined community”. According to a young correspondent “my participation to the NGO, gave me the opportunity to discover many common things and minor differences that connect me with citizens of other EU countries. By having friends all over the European Union through our common projects, I everyday worry and care about the developments in their country”. Demosier wrote that “to be British or to be French is to be conscious of different historical, cultural, economic and political processes in which the concept ‘European’ has become increasingly relevant and also problematic, as national and political contexts shape the nature of debate” (2007, p.53).

Imagined Community

One of the questions was asking the correspondents if their participation to the NGO/association help them to become more interested in what is going on in EU politics. The Greek correspondents with 94% declared that their participation to the actions of NGOs, pushed them to become even more interested for the European Union; necessary element for the creation of a European Demos. According the Table 6, it is obvious that youth participation to the NGO enriched the knowledge towards the EU in a very intense scale (Table 7). Even more, the 8th Table shows that 78% of Greeks are certain that after their participation, they are even more in favour of accelerating the EU’s deepening process.

Question 39	
<i>No</i>	1
<i>More or Less</i>	22
<i>Yes</i>	45
<i>Don't Know</i>	1

Table 6

Question 40	
Yes	65
No	1

Table 7

Question 44	
Yes	55
Unsure	13
No	1

Table 8

The most important, among the questions, is the one that correspondents needed to judge/compare their level of exposure to Europeanizing influences before and after their participation to the NGO/association. It seems that 84% of the young participants stated that they are more Europeanized than before their participation. As it can be observed in the above question, the issue of Europeanization as shifting people's minds is well realized and has affected young people in a great level. This is not related to the member state's status quo, because as it can be noticed, the results are similar despite of the country's background. All these comes to confirm what Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse wrote that "institutions, policy making and policy implementation have great political effect in the Europeanization of people" (2001, p.15). Now, NGOs should be added as well.

Following the above, I could conclude that through the participation in the actions of NGOs in Greece, the European ideal, the European Integration, and Kant's Cosmopolitan law is promoted. The constant interaction that occurs through these actions seems to be very important for the Europeanization and European orientation of young people. The Europeanization of minds take place with success when young people from Greece participate in NGOs actions.

If you were asked to mark the level of your own exposure to Europeanizing influences before your participation to the NGO -YA, which level would you choose? (1=less, 10=higher)

Question 17	
1	6
2	19
3	4
4	16
5	4
6	8
7	6
8	5
9	1
10	1

Do you believe that exposure to the actions and cultures of the NGo-YA has affected the process of Europeanization in your own case? If yes and if you were asked to mark the level of your own exposure to Europeanizing influences after your participation to the NGO -YA, which level would you choose? (1=less, 10=higher)

Question 18	
1	0
2	0
3	3
4	4
5	4
6	14
7	4
8	26
9	7
10	8

Conclusions

The collection and analysis of the interviews, aimed at achieving an intent and analytical research. *Do the participants in the NGOs feel more European than before? Or, is it truth that the NGOs contributes in the creation of this Imaginary Community, called the Europeans? And if this happens, which are the common values that are established? Which are the elements that constitute the bond between so many different cultures?* These are only some of the questions addressed in this paper.

The aim of this paper was to test whether NGO participation in Greece promotes the Europeanization of youth, transnational bonding and the formation of a European identity and a European demos. This can be defined as learning to live, co-exist, co-operate and work with people from different countries. This is because cultural learning, socialization and transnational youth networks move forward what Kant (cited by Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2005, p.285) wrote about “cosmopolitan law” (Weltburgerrecht). Non Governmental Organizations succeed such learning through the constant interaction of their members with young people all over Europe; exchanges, seminars, voluntary work and meetings are only few of the occasions that bring the participants of youth organizations in interaction. Kant (1991) cited by Lavdas and Chrysochoou (2004, p.285) phrased that cosmopolitan law is the natural expansion of political philosophy of the national state. Furthermore, cosmopolitan law is based on “the fact that people of the world coexist and cope regularly and is relative with the main principle of the creation of the state through the nature” (Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2005, p.285). NGO participation supports this principle: it brings people together and creates bonds. As long as young people are in constant contact to each other, they are obliged to establish a legitimate order: Europe.

Moreover, NGO participation promotes the formation of a European identity and a European Demos. This can be defined as the creation of common European characteristics and the creation of feelings of belonging in a bigger community,

Europe. Non Governmental Organisations promote this notions since the constant interaction of young Europeans promotes the creation of common feelings of belonging that contribute to the construction of a European demos and the formation of a European identity with common basic values. This cannot occur automatically but, instead, requires time and effort. O'Neill (2000, p.122) mentioned that the process of integration became a subject of criticism and the result is uncertain. Tsinisizelis (2001) wrote that the republican theory replaces and recomposes the vital issues of freedom, rights, dominance, justice and even more the constant search for the ideal – international – polity (cited by Lavdas & Chrysochoou, 2004, p.108). It seems that NGO participation in Greece strengthens young people's need to live in a better society. This is the reason that most of the actions are related with this kind of issues: human rights, democracy, justice, freedom, racism etc. Ignatief (2000) cited by Lavdas and Chrysochoou (2004, p.143) mentioned that "we should conceptualize the complex nature of Europe as a community with common perception of the meaning, size and scope of freedom". Chrysochoou (2004, p.144) pointed out that the European "res publica" will be the cornerstone of the protection of "democracy of reflection" in the context of a new, multilevel and international "civitas", that signifies the progress of the common culture of Europe. Furthermore, he added that in the creation of a European demos, people should be aware of their common rights and obligations that come as a result of the European Citizenship. NGO participation initiates constant interaction between different people from different countries all around the European Union. Through this, young participants create relations and become more aware of the common and different characteristics of their countries. It is Featherstone who characteristically wrote that Europeanization can be seen as "increasing transnationalism: that is the diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities, and patterns of behaviour on a cross-national basis within Europe (2003, p.7).

The analysis came up with certain outcomes that support the claim NGO participation in Greece drive the young participants, in a great majority, in discovering common elements of culture, politics, actions, and creation. This, results, in feeling, progressively safer next to people that, before NGO participation, were strangers. Elements like common European awareness, mutual respect, human rights and common culture are constructed through NGO participation in Greece and contribute to the creation of young people's way of thinking. These promote transnational bonding, the formation of a European identity with specific origins, and the formation of a European demos. A European Union of people.

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Europeanization of shipping policy in Greece: *Evaluating the impact on the policy network.*

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Abstract

The paper studies the liberalization of coastal shipping in Greece that was reluctantly initiated in 2002 and the modifications that took place in terms of the established policy network in the passenger shipping market. The Greek coastal shipping, which was a tightly closed market in the 1990's, is now coming across forces of competition. The "political power" seeking policy change in the field of coastal shipping is for the most part supranational. Europeanization has affected the national coastal markets, due to the obligation of national states to open the local markets to competition. What's more Europeanization of public policy areas has led to changes in terms of public agenda setting and the formation of public networks.

The main hypothesis is that the shipping policy network is no longer as stable as it used to be due to the ship-owners' denial to implement national shipping policies. The business interests that were privileged participants in the formulation and implementation process of policy outcomes are seeking new alliance in the European Union seeing that they are failing to influence the national policy network via traditional resources. The stability of the network was initially challenged by the state's obligation to abolish cabotage and enforce free competition in the shipping sector, as the European Union commanded. The Greek governments were slow in introducing regulations that would liberalize the market and tried to legitimize the postponement of reform on grounds that coastal shipping is a public service. The ship-owners are requesting full liberalization of the market, leading to conflict between the two main participants of the national shipping network, thus causing the destabilization of the network.

1. Introduction

Modes of transportation have changed rapidly over the last decades. The aim of the ongoing regulatory evolution, in Europe, is to establish a milieu in which European means of transport may develop and boom without compromising safety and while respecting social and labour principles. In this context, it was obvious that maritime transportation and passenger shipping would have to take on a great deal of reform. With the intention of ensuring a sustainable social and economic environment for coastal shipping, the European Union took imperative steps towards integrating the maritime governance at EU level while pursuing necessary actions for the establishment of the internal market and ensuring the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. The European Commission's objective was to eliminate restrictions on the freedom to provide maritime transport services within Member States. The central inspiration was that liberalized European maritime transport would accelerate economic growth and improve quality of coastal shipping service through liberalizing provision.

The role of the public sector has evolved in response to the above mentioned economic environment. During the last decades new ways of public intervention have emerged. The political forces seeking policy change in the field of coastal shipping

are for the most part supranational. Europeanization has affected the national coastal markets, due to the obligation of national states to open the local markets to competition. What's more Europeanization of public policy areas has led to changes in terms of public agenda setting and the formation of public networks.

In this context, the paper attempts to assess the changes that occurred in terms of the policy network¹ in the Greek passenger shipping market due to the liberalization of the sector. The European maritime policy introduced a new era for the Greek coastal shipping industry. The process of Europeanization in shipping policy played a fundamental role in determining the public/private relations seeing that curtailing government authority (through liberalization) affected the state's gigantic apparatus and strengthened the business interests. The main hypothesis is that the shipping policy network is no longer as stable as it used to be due to the ship-owners' denial to implement national shipping policies. The business interests that were privileged participants in the formulation and implementation process of policy outcomes are seeking new alliance in the European Union seeing that they are failing to influence the national policy network via traditional resources. The stability of the network was initially challenged by the state's obligation to abolish cabotage and enforce free competition in the shipping sector, as the European Union commanded. The Greek governments were slow in introducing regulations that would liberalize the market due to the fact that coastal shipping is regarded as a public service. The ship-owners are requesting full liberalization of the market therefore leading to conflict between the two main participants of the national shipping network.

The paper is organized as follows: The first part focuses on the actors participating in the policy process and the nature of their established relationships. We will analyze the role of public agencies (YEN²) within the network and present the private interests in the sector, placing emphasis on the business unions (EEA³). We will illustrate that ship-owners play a crucial role in the policy process. The means and actions they utilize, in order to influence the final political outputs, will be fully examined. Then we will go on to examine other participants in the policy process. The union of workers (PNO⁴) will have to be studied in order to understand their point of view on liberalization of the market. After demonstrating the analysis on the three main participants in the policy process, we will observe how power and influence are distributed within the policy network in order to understand what kind of relationships occur between the three participants and the means of mediation of interests in the sector. The second part of the paper will analyze the coastal shipping market in terms of liberalization and the changes that this process brought to the policy network. We will identify the initial factors that led to the opening of the shipping market,

¹ Smith M.J., *Policy networks*, in M. Hill, *The Policy Process: A reader*, London: Prentice Hall^{2nd} ed.(76-86) 1997. Campbell J. C., Baskin M. A., Baumgartner F. R., and Halpern N. P., *Afterword on Policy Communities: A Framework for Comparative Research*, Governance, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1989. Heclo H., *Issue networks and the executive establishment* in King A. (ed) *The New American political system*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC 1978. Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W., *Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology*, in D. Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.) *Rhodes Policy Networks in British Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Richardson, J. J. and Jordan G., *Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post-Parliamentary Democracy*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979.

² National Merchant Marine Ministry

³ Greek Coastal Shipping Association

⁴ Pan-Hellenic Maritime Federation

introducing therefore the European level regime. It is of great interest to accumulate information on the initial perspectives of the key players during the negotiation procedure. The primary reactions of the shipping actors will be observed and so will their change of attitude, when realizing that the opening of the market suited their interests. We will show that the shipping industry used all kinds of means in order to influence policy outcomes. In part three we will extensively explore the relationships in the network, which seems to be entering a new phase, where everything is not so harmonious and agreeable. The interests of the state and ship-owners, for the first time, seem to be completely incompatible concerning the extent of market liberalization. The concepts of multi-level governance and Europeanization are examined, while at the same time we try to explain how the national political system and the policy process are affected by the globalization of the markets. The ship-owners, as we will observe, adjusted quickly to the new -not so friendly -environment and introduced new ways in order to accomplish their objectives. In trying to persuade the state to fully open the market they approach the European Commission and utilize resources in order to place pressure on an alternative political arena that of the EU. It seems that the national policy network is being destabilized since a main participant is seeking to form a new network at a European level.

1. The participants of the shipping policy network

Apart from the highly centralised administrative apparatus that constitutes a central actor in the formation of policies, the social and economic pressure groups display an equally important role⁵. Every social and economic group that is affected by a potential policy and is willing to express an argumentative opinion may be entitled to participate in the in the policy making process. Unions of economic interests, enterprises, trade-union organisations, professional associations, social organisations and teams aim to influence the political system in various ways and means in order to draw favourable regulations for their members. The state seems willing to allocate part of its regulatory power to these organisations, thus demanding in return economic, cognitive and legitimizing resources both at the formation level and in the implementation stage of a policy⁶. Quarterly

In the coastal shipping industry, the social and economic institutions, that are influenced by public action and with which the Merchant Marine Ministry is obliged to collaborate with, in order to accomplish smooth application of policies are: the Union of Coastal Shipping Enterprises, the Pan-Hellenic Maritime Federation, the Greek Marine Chamber (NEE), the working trade unions of seamen, the tourist unions, the local self-governments of islands e.t.c. The extent and the way these actors participate in the formation and execution of policy outcomes depends on a variety of factors, such as the structure of the political system, the power of each social and economic actor, the particular issue of policy, the degree to which a political decision may have an effect on the interests of the team, the economic and social resources utilized etc⁷.

⁵ Cobb, R. W. and C. D. Elder., *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building*, 2nd ed Boston: Allyn & Bacon 1983. Cobb R. & J.K. Ross & M.H. Ross, *Agenda building as a comparative political process*, American Political science Review 70(1) 1976

⁶ Koutalakis C., *State, civil society and interests: Conflict, Negotiation and participation in new forms of environmental governance*, International and European Policy, Quarterly Evaluation of International European Policy and Economy, issue 3, p. 210-235, 2006. [In Greek].

⁷ Muller P. & Y. Surel, *L'analyse des politiques publiques*, Paris: Montchrestien, 2nd ed 2000. Cobb R. & J.K. Ross & M.H. Ross, *Agenda building as a comparative political process*, American Political

1.1 The role of the Merchant Marine Ministry in the shipping network

The main regulating actor in the shipping policy sector is the Merchant Marine Ministry (YEN) occasionally in collaboration with other qualified Ministries, as the Ministry of National Economy, the Former Ministry for Aegean and Island Policy, the Ministry of Transport and Communication. The Merchant Marine Ministry constitutes the main administrative agency, accountable for the rational and effective formation and implementation of shipping policies at a national level. YEN is responsible for the foundation of the institutional frame in which the shipping industry operates and develops, consists in the main representative of the shipping sector at European and international level, and generally undertakes all kind of action that could contribute to the growth of Greek shipping. The liabilities of YEN are the ocean (freight) shipping, the coastal shipping and the cruise. Among the three, what always constituted a sector of exclusive national policy was coastal shipping since it appeared to be the only sector where the private interests were directly interwoven with the government and illustrated ensuing benefits from their intervention. In this context, the operation of the coastal market and the provision of marine transport, the coastal infrastructure and the harbours, the guarantee of economic growth of the sector, the regularity and security of transport for passengers and cargo, the adequate transport provision to islanders and tourists, the endorsement of high-quality working conditions for seamen and generally every aspect of the internal marine transport system is delegated to the Merchant Marine Ministry. The object of YEN concerning coastal shipping is composed of three constitutive parts: ship-owners, seamen and passengers/islanders. The interests and demands of these three economic units may sometimes be conflicting, compelling the Ministry to undertake the role of a third party and to seek accommodating solutions. It is the responsibility of the state to endorse stability and diminish the conflicts that arise, by putting into effect the authority to exercise control over non-state actors.

1.2 The business interests.

Turning to the business interests, the first point to be acknowledged is that EEA constitutes the representative institutional body of ship-owners operating in the Greek coastal industry. Today EEA represents the unique interlocutor of the state on issues concerning the shipping industry and has become one of the most powerful pressure groups in the country. The aims of the Greek Shipping Association are: representation of its member's at a political level and interaction with the political administrative system, the purpose of the latter being to acquire economic benefits for its associates. EEA prepares proposals and schemes presenting economic solutions, carries out surveys and research projects pertaining to coastal shipping issues, all of which intend to provide insight resources, facilitate the resolution of transport problems and improve operational coastal shipping conditions. According to their official declarations shipping policy must be a cornerstone of the process of the transition to a market-oriented economy. This transition calls for a new definition of the role of institutions and groups engaged in shipping policy and in their function in cooperating Governments.

The important negotiating power of ship-owners as a pressure group should be sought in a line of factors. Firstly, the fact that they lead one of the most robust coastal markets in Europe, in combination with their opportunity to switch to various “flags of convenience”, is of paramount significance⁸. Additionally, the threat of relocating their ships to other European markets has turned out to be a powerful negotiating element, since coastal shipping is regarded as an indispensable means of transport in the Greek region. Another strategic parameter influencing the degree of power is the fact that they are a small group, allowing fine coordination and facilitating collective action. Interest groups that enclose a rather small number of members are found in a advantageous position, as the organisational function is rendered easier, the communication between members is viable and assured, the unearthing and collection of essential economic resources does not contend with delays and doesn’t encounter free riding problems⁹.

Furthermore, the efficiency of any pressure group to mediate demands on the political agenda hinges on its exerted influence compared to the influence developed by other pressure groups in the sector¹⁰. That is to say, the power of ship-owners is partly determined by the strength of other active pressure groups in the shipping field. Provided that the other social forces in the network are characterized by large numbers of potential members, the comparative supremacy of ship-owners in terms of organisation and collective action should be considered unambiguous.

Other important parameters contributing to their influential position in the shipping policy procedures are: a prevailing organisational structure, immense economic resources, and extensive information on market issues in tandem with enhanced experience. In addition, the opportunity of imposing indirect economic and social sanctions is a decisive factor of influence, when forces of cooperation and consensus in the network fail to succeed. The switch of flags, the disorder of itineraries, the refusal to provide service in certain coastal lines and even the threat of a strike, all of which lead to the disturbance of social cohesion, are means that can be utilized.

All in all, the shipping group possesses extensive knowledge and experience needed by the government in order to regulate the coastal shipping sector, therefore placing EEA in a rewarding position in terms of interaction with the state.

1.3 Other non-state actors in the network.

Up to now, we have presented the two main participating actors in the shipping policy network. However, other significant economic and social groups are involved in the formation and implementation of Greek shipping policy, the requests and the demands of whom emerge on the political agenda. In this section of the paper we attempt a short description of these groups as an, in detail, analysis does not correspond to the objectives of this paper.

One of the most important participants in the formation of policies is the labour sector with the various maritime associations and unions. The privilege of

⁸ Lavdas, K. A., *The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration*. London: Macmillan, 1997

⁹ Olson, M., *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965. Stigler, George J., *Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist*, Basic Books 1988

¹⁰ Becker Garry S., *A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3, 1983

representation of shipping interests at a political level is undertaken by the Pan-Hellenic Seamen Federation (PNO). PNO was founded in 1920 and currently comprises 14 trade Unions. The fundamental aim of PNO is to upgrade working conditions for the Greek coastal shipping crew, to assist in the organizational enhancement of the MARINE PENSION FUND, and all in all represent and protect its member's economic and social interests in an effective way. The federation as the central organisation of maritime trade-unions constitutes a praiseworthy interlocutor of the state in its quest for legitimacy and of the ship-owners in an attempt to shape sustainable channels of communication. PNO as a pressure group seizes important resources in mediating demands on the political agenda, such as high membership, internal legitimization, an important position in society as a transport provider, financial power, expertise, the capacity to stimulate social sympathy, the ability to provoke social disorder with the main threat usually being the decision to go on strike. PNO has succeeded in becoming a stable actor in the shipping policy network through utilising all the above mentioned vital resources.

Due to the evolving process of economic transformation that the shipping industry is facing at present, the participation in the network is relatively open to interest groups that are actively involved in the sector of shipping policy. Another important social institution in the sector of marine transport is the Greek Naval Chamber (NEE). NEE was established in 1936 and constitutes a legal entity incorporated under Public Law privileged with independency; however it operates under YEN's authoritarian supervision with regard to the legality of its actions. The chamber's purpose is to protect and contribute to the development of coastal shipping and offer opinion on draft legislation proposed by YEN or other government agencies. The Chamber is the official Advisor to the government on all shipping matters and participates in the configuration of coastal policies. It can be perceived as a possible supporter to the coastal interests, seeing that seldom does it raise argument on EEA's (and PNO's in some occasions) opinion while at times the support the shipping interests receives is of palpable significance.

Other participants in the network that should be mentioned are the Hellenic Coast Guard, the economic chambers of islands, local unions, Non-governmental organizations, shipping and holiday bookers, tourist unions etc. The power of the aforementioned participants is perceptibly weaker than that of ship-owners and seamen; nonetheless in an adequate amount of cases their input is necessary in order to accomplish efficient policy outcomes.

1.4 The existence of a policy network in the shipping industry

The sector of coastal shipping is an eminent example of sectoral logic, with the relations between the Ministry and the economic interests being powerful. The policy network is developed by a number of participants that interact, exchanging information and expertise in the sector in order to formulate public policy while simultaneously trying to enhance their position in the industry. In the shipping policy network the state is represented by YEN, the business interests by EEA, the seamen's interests by PNO. YEN is a sectoral ministry, the latter defined as a vertical distribution of competences that implies that a sector with comparative independence or self-sufficiency and consequently with limited dependence from other vertical or sectoral ministries. The organised interests of the shipping industry shape vertical, but also horizontal, bonds with YEN and benefit from preferential presence in the processes of planning and implementing government policy. The ministry regulates

the “process of exchange”¹¹ and remains the dominant actor in the network. The ship-owners and seamen participate via their institutional bodies in committees, councils, working teams etc. EEA and PNO are currently partaking in the Council of Coastal Transport, the National Council of Shipping Policy, in working teams concerning regulation policies. The need of reciprocal information and the development and implementation of effective policies constitute the basic explanatory parameters of the intensive relations that are developed between the government and shipping interests, with the latter providing cognitive, economic and technical resources that are essential to the State. Furthermore, YEN can anticipate that potential oppositions and objections to potential regulation will not be expressed since the policy network is based on cooperation and consensus. On the other hand non-state actors via the direct access to their Ministry and the policy making process are privileged compared to pressure groups that are excluded. They are in position to express preferences and influence policy outcomes via means of negotiation. The two main representatives of capital and labour in the industry are powerful pressure groups that are able to utilize means and ways of exerting negative pressure on the political system and therefore the Ministry prefers to produce a network which introduces principles of negotiation, cooperation, consensus, and legitimacy to the relationships.

At this point it is important to point out that the policy network might, during a hasty analysis, seem a relative open network with a great deal of participating groups as described above. The Ministry is willing to consult with many pressure groups and receive informative resources, but when it comes to decision making it is likely that they will be excluded from the process since they don't have adequate power to dominate in the network. In this context, the ministry has inaugurated an extensive form of social dialogue in a line of subjects, which includes a proposal-invitation to all organisations that wish to attend and consult. At the same time, a lot of social and economic institutions participate in committees and councils of Ministry. The council of Coastal Transport is composed of a wide range of social and business groups, like the local and prefectural self-government, the tourist and the ship brokers. However, even in these cases it is impractical to assert that these social and economic entities can allocate the same power and resources of influence in the network. Many argue that the public dialogue simply represents a way to legitimize decisions that have already been made by the three main participants. What is implied is that the public consultation or the national councils are essential in the period of formation of policies in order to obscure the real origin of decision¹².

All in all, the shipping policy network is developed by a very limited number of participants, is characterised by stability, cooperation, consensus and mutual exchange of resources in order to fulfil their preferences and goals.

2. The process leading to the liberalization of the market

The policy that had been formed in the Greek shipping sector and that had been maintained for decades lead to the protectionism of the internal market. The ship-owners were protected through the right of cabotage, the trade (seamen) unions by means of complimentary labour regulations, the passengers and the islanders via

¹¹ Smith M.J., *Policy networks*, in M. Hill, *The Policy Process: A reader*, London: Prentice Hall^{2nd} ed. (76-86) 1997

¹² Richardson J., & G. Gustafsson, & G. Jordan, *The concept of policy style*, in Richardson J. (ed.), *Policy Styles in Western Europe*, George Allen & Unwin, London 1982

the maintenance of prices. The institutional frame of marine transport that was in effect verifies the utter state sovereignty in the sector¹³, with the authorizations of expediency constituting the basic instrument of development and implementation of government policy¹⁴. The minister of shipping in fact determined and regulated everything concerning the coastal network: market entrance, the number of regular lines, passenger fees, obligation of public service contracts, crew/staff composition, the amount of boats operating in each line, the number and sequence of port calls on each line, the required density of itineraries, the dates and the schedule of the itineraries¹⁵. The domineering interventionist policy of the Ministry was rationalised on the ground that it sought to achieve a range of objectives with the most imperative being the promotion of “social policy”¹⁶. The social requirement of fulfilling the transport needs of islands all year round led YEN to adopt policies and practices for the protection of public service lines, where the enterprising interest was not sufficient. The Minister would provide a profitable line to a shipping company demanding in return the provision of public service on other itineraries¹⁷. These governmental practices had produced a market that functioned under oligopolistic conditions, while at times even presented tendencies of monopolistic exploitation. Each company had created its own monopoly in concrete lines: ANEK and MINOAN LINES in Crete, DANE in Dodecanese, NEL in Mitiliny, and STRINTZIS Lines in Cephalonia. Each company “satisfied” in its given line did not have any reason to demonstrate elements of competition, consequently creating a prolonged status quo. On the other hand the protection of the interests of the Greek coastal workforce was achieved via the prohibition of utilising Community personnel or through determining the composition the crew providing accommodation services on board. This governmental domineering system, which was developed in many economic sectors and dates back to the end of the civil war, gained legitimisation from the forces of the market. The private interests had ensured favourable regulations from the state, creating a desirable status quo that allowed the State to continue regulating and intervening in the market¹⁸.

The shipping industry presumably wouldn't have undergone any reform and the state would have remained the dominant actor, if supranational political forces hadn't expressed the need of change in the sector. The need to set up an integrated European transport system, thus including coastal shipping, was initially expressed by the European Commission in the late '80. The immense importance of coastal shipping for the EU, lies in the fact that the Union aspired to become a leading international maritime force, strengthening consequently the Union's negotiating power in International Maritime Organizations. The Commission decided to make maritime policy one of its strategic objectives, in line with an International trend towards more integrated policy-making on maritime affairs. The first Community measure adopted in the coastal shipping sector sought to abolish discrimination in shipping conditions and to integrate national coastal transport markets in concert with the establishment of the single market for goods and services.

¹³ OECD, *Regulatory Issues in International Maritime Transport*, Paris 2000.

¹⁴ Presidential Decree 684/1976

¹⁵ Psaraftis, H. N. *Coastal shipping and cabotage: Essays and analysis on the problems of the sector and their resolution*, Evgenidou Publications Athens 2006 [In Greek].

¹⁶ Economic bulletin Alpha Bank

¹⁷ Psaraftis, H. N. *Coastal shipping and cabotage: Essays and analysis on the problems of the sector and their resolution*, Evgenidou Publications Athens 2006 [In Greek].

¹⁸ Kazakos P., *Between State and Market, The Economy and economic policy in post-war Greece 1944-2000*, Pataki editions, Athens 2001 [In Greek].

It was necessary to create a genuine internal market in which coastal shipping operators from all the Member States would have access to, under the same conditions as those prevalent on their national markets. This implied freedom of establishment, the removal of barriers to freedom of movement and the harmonisation of competition conditions¹⁹.

Greece's position, in the first round of negotiations concerning the removal of coastal traffic, was characterized extremely adverse seeing that the government rejected almost all the introductory drafts of Regulation²⁰. The main argument presented by the Greek government was the uniqueness of the Greek marine region, with numerous islands and hence several coastal lines. This supremacy of the Greek coastal market attributable to an exceptional geographic reality could engender favourable conditions of development, creating a comparative advantage for the European ship-owners whereas Greek shipping interests would not encounter similar enterprising openings in Europe²¹. Greece's initial refusal was further rationalised on grounds that to acknowledge coastal shipping liberalization would threaten the social cohesion and imperil the national strategic and economic interests in Aegean. In actuality, however, it was the pressure groups' interests the government sought to protect given that the shipping industry was opposed to the market's opening.

Finally, in 1992 after extensive negotiations, and reinsurances towards the Greek State that its requests would be fulfilled, the European Commission adopted Council Regulation No 3577/92/EEC that would eliminate cabotage rights and apply the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States. Greek coastal shipping was temporarily excluded from the scope of this Regulation. This exemption was prolonged until 2004 for scheduled passenger and lighter services and services involving vessels of less than 650 gross tonnage in the case of Greece.

However, the shipping industry failed to seize the opportunity created by the temporary exemption of the implementation of this Regulation. Business and labour interests continued to be in opposition to any patterns leading to transitions from a regulated to a de-regulated market. Furthermore, YEN did not undertake action and avoided bringing in schemes or proposals that could be perceived as liberalizing. Instead of introducing competition and deregulating the sector, the government tolerated and even encouraged ship-owners to exercise their oligopolistic power in the sector²².

However in the late '90s, the issue of the obligatory forthcoming liberalization was introduced on the political agenda and immediately activated intense controversy. Certain shipping firms started supporting the deregulation and their leaders sought to articulate newly important values²³. The aim was to prevent the central government to play the key role in all economic shipping activities. These firms were ready to be exposed to competition and expressed the belief that liberalization would enhance the

¹⁹ CEU, *The development of Short Sea Shipping in Europe: prospects and challenges*, Com (95) 317 final, Brussels: European Commission, 1995. CEU, *The Common Transport Policy*, Com (95) 302 final, Brussels: European Commission, 1995. [In Greek].

²⁰ Goulielmos A.M. , *the economic process of channelling the Greek coastal shipping to market status quo(1997-2004)*, in *Coastal Shipping and Air transportation: Competition and supplementation, 2nd Symposium of transport economics*, Edited by E. Samprakos, Piraeus 1996

²¹ Papageorgiou T., *Abolishing Cabotage, internal marine transports and tourism*, in *Transports and Tourism 3rd Symposium of transport economics*, Edited by E. Samprakos, Piraeus, 1999

²² This government-created oligopoly, to a certain extent, was facilitated by the fact that most coastal shipping firms were controlled by a small number of business executives.

²³ Newspaper Article To Vima, October 15, 2000

Greek coastal shipping industry. On the other hand, the rest of the actors in the network were still strongly opposed to the opening of the market. The Panhellenic Seamen's Federation was against liberalisation in fear of changes in the working conditions. PNO had allied with important ship-owners, who were reluctant to any kind of change, the latter placing pressure on the government as not to undertake any measures of reform. Given the controversy between state intervention and market liberalization, it is not surprising that the shipping industry failed to undergo any institutional changes at this point in time.

Nevertheless, the tragic accident of Express Samina in 2002, in combination with the exercise of oligopolistic power and the dominance of the shipping market by a few firms, would function as a medium for reform. The State decided to accelerate the adoption of the European Regulation and therefore invited the shipping actors to express opinion, provide information and utilise their gained expertise in order to assist the government's undertaking of forming a new institutional framework.

The negotiation procedure concerning the coastal transport began without the institutional presence of ship-owners. Statements derived from administrators and from ship-owners indicate that in the given period a divergence of views among the coastal companies led to the pressure's group inability to fully utilize recourses and place pressure on the political network²⁴. All the same, the ship-owners via the feeble at that time EEA or via unilateral action of coastal companies tried to influence the policy outcomes. The viewpoint of the economically more powerful ship-owners was shaped against the precipitation of the adoption of the European Regulation 3577/1992 and required the completion of time deviation that had been received from the EU. The Official justifying factor of their attitude was that the Greek coastal companies were unprepared to be submitted to forces of free competition. It is a proven absurdity, particularly in developing sectors of an economy, reforms that will provide the inaugural signal for further economic growth of the industry, to be received with lack of enthusiasm or even intense reactions by the interests groups²⁵. Nevertheless, the dated circumstances (accident Express Samina) and the intense social prerequisite for reform in the coastal sector didn't leave room for postponement.

The process of abolishing cabotage from the internal marine sector was activated on 27 June 2001 with the establishment in the Parliament of Law 2932 titled "Free provision of Services in the marine transports" and which forecasted that by November 2002 the sector would open to free competition. The adoption of the law in question produced conflict between the Greek government and the shipping interests, while at the same time forced the European Committee to send a warning letter to YEN concerning the insufficient harmonisation of the Greek legislation. EEA started processes against Law 2932 as soon as it was put in force demanding its modification or even its potential suppression. The ship-owners had abruptly changed attitude and from attempting to delay the adoption of Regulation 3577/92 turned towards its full implementation. The ship-owners, who had reunited and offered EEA complete internal legitimization to represent their interests²⁶, did not accept the new situation passively especially since it didn't correspond to their demands. They did not accept the new institutional framework and via pressure, threats, disobedience, and other

²⁴ To Vima, January 7, 2000

²⁵ Fernandez R. & D. Rodrik, *Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual Specific Uncertainty*, The American Economic Review, Vol.81, No. 5. December 1991 pp. 1146-1155

²⁶ To Vima, March 3, 2001

means of influence tried to mediate their demands to YEN²⁷. EEA yearning to express its intense opposition to the law, took action at national and European level. The business interests initially tried to persuade YEN through negotiation procedures and participated in committees, attended official meeting with the Minister, utilised given informative resources in order to influence the network. Failing to mediate its demands on the political agenda, EEA turned to harsher resources. The ship-owners denied submitting the itineraries of period 2002-2003 and threatening to switch to various “flags of convenience”. The coastal companies increased their mobilisations and decided the unilateral suppression of obligatory free tickets to more from 20 categories of passengers. Since all measures and means of influence seemed to be failing EEA decided to turn to the European Union. Supported by the fact that one of the most significant motive forces of modernisation in Greece is the fear of the consequences originated by the deferred adjustment to the European legislation, the shipping interests stressed the inadequate harmonisation of Law 2932/2001 to the Community Regulation²⁸. The first action emanated from the Union of Ship-owners of Coastal Shipping was to denounce Law 2932/2001 to the European Committee, stressing the defective harmonisation of Greek legislation to the Regulation of Council (EEC) 3577/1992 with regard to marine transports (coastal cabotage). Two first letters were conveyed before the application of the Law while two more followed its implementation, one of which was transmitted via the Member of Parliament Mr Zampetakis.

The Committee’s response appears to completely recognize the ship-owners demands and to require direct modification of law in order to assimilate the Community legislation²⁹. This justified opinion constituted the sign for further pressure from ship-owners while at the same time it caused a great deal of reaction in the island institutions and the political parties, which claimed that the Committee simply took place in favour of the ship-owners.

The decision of ship-owners to unilaterally adopt Regulation 3577/1992 and open the market to competition on 3rd May 2006, defying the regulations of national law 2932/2001³⁰, was interpreted as an one-side intervention of economic nature. This decision was also accompanied by the announcement of a strike on 16 May. Strikes have always existed in the sector of shipping however they were always used as a pressure feature from seamen. The immobilisation of coastal boats would be an unprecedented action in the modern history of Greece. The Greek government appeared unprepared to face this situation that would take to mean a collapse of the coastal transport system. Two days later the decision to change the institutional frame was announced and so was the further liberalization of the market.

Currently, the National Law isn’t fully harmonised with EU legislation and many issues are still to be dealt with. The business interests are seeking more deregulation and liberalization of the market. Their demands are conflicting to those that the seamen union is trying to maintain and protect, while at the same time the social cohesion of Greece and the economic, social, cultural development of small islands are menaced by complete liberalization. EEA is at variance with all the other groups of the policy network and therefore is once again using the European Community’s ability to enforce the regulation.

²⁷ Elephterotypia, June 17, 2001. Imerisia, June 13, 2001

²⁸ Papatotiriou S., *Modernisation - Reform. The organised interests hold the key*, Association of Social and Economic Research, June 1993

²⁹ National Parliamentary document, June 14, 2001

³⁰ Elephterotypia, May 4, 2006. Imerisia, May 4, 2006

3. Is Europeanization of shipping policy leading to the destabilization of the policy network?

In past years, the setting of the political agenda in the shipping sector was solely carried out by the central government via the Merchant Marine Ministry, while the business and labour interests had easy access to their administrative agency allowing them consequently to influence the agenda's context. However, the widespread globalisation that has arisen over the last decades has led to significant changes regarding the formation of public policies, seeing that this function has exceeded the narrow limits of national jurisdiction. Public policy outcomes are required to be in compliance with international and European regimes and rules. In general, a competence transfer and cession of power to superior levels of policy, as to international organisations or to the European Union is being undertaken. This tendency is analyzed by various theories such as multi-level governance³¹ and Europeanization³². The theory of multilevel governance describes the distribution of the process of political decisions at *supranational, national, regional, and local* levels of policy making. It must be emphasized that multilevel governance is the ability that international organisations have to make political decisions, that are then transubstantiated in to laws or might even be directly applied in the Greek legal system and that shape the economic, social, cultural life of Greek citizens.

This multilevel governing becomes obvious and in coastal shipping with policies being shaped at International (IMO), European (European Union), National (Greek government, YEN) but also at a Local level (Local Self-governments)³³. For instance, the Greek coastal companies are obliged to comply with rules of environmental safety that IMO introduces, the Greek government is obligated to adopt the European Regulation that requires the liberalization of the market, the Greek seamen are protected by Greek regulations and the local self-government is the authority in charge of operating the Greek port network. All these decisions and rules constitute equivalent coastal policies that participants of the shipping policy have to adopt.

The theory of Europeanization describes the cession of power to the European Union. According to Radaelli, Europeanization consists of “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”³⁴.

³¹Bache I. & Flinders M. eds.: *Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. Bache, I., *The Politics of European Regional Policy. Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?* Sheffield, Sheffield University Press, 1998. Hooghe L. & G.Marks, *Types of multilevel governance*, European Integration online Papers Vol. 5 2001. Jordan A. & Richardson J., *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987.

³² Radaelli C., *Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change*, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 4, No. 8, July 17, 2000 Featherstone, K. & Radaelli C., *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. Olsen, J., *The Many Faces of Europeanization*, ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/2, 2002.

³³ Michael R. & Selkou E., *Multi-Level Governance, Shipping Policy and Social Responsibility*, Paper Presented at the International Conference, Shipping in the era of Social Responsibility, In Honour of the Late Professor Basil Metaxas (1925-1996), Argostoli, Cephalonia, Greece, 14-16 September 2006

³⁴ Radaelli C., *Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change*, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 4, No. 8, July 17, 2000

In this context the establishment of the European Single Market indicated a change in direction for coastal shipping as it did in all the economic sectors of European interest. The term internal market is comprehended as a region in which the free movement of people, goods service and capital is allowed. The achievement of the internal market imposed broad regulation on critical productive sectors of the economy, the obliteration of national restrictions and strict rules in order to establish and sustain a liberalized market. Therefore, EU became the political agenda setter for the shipping industry, the network in which the problem of the existing obstacles to the provision of coastal services was expressed. Regulation No 3577/92/EEC that eliminated cabotage rights was a solution to a problem articulated in the European economic and social dimension.

The Europeanization of shipping policy which was just described had an affect on the national policy network. Until recently the liability of policy making was an undeniable national authority and the background for the formation of policy networks. The state was the dominant actor and regulated the network providing stability in the interactions that occurred. But what happens when there is a shift in policy making authority? Does it influence the stability, cooperation, consensus of the network? We try to answer the aforementioned questions by observing and analysing the shipping policy network.

Before the forthcoming liberalization and deregulation of the market, the policy network consisted of a small number of permanent actors who interacted in order to formulate public policy while simultaneously tried to enhance their economic position. For many years the shipping network was characterised as stable and the intervention between the actors produced effective outputs. The main explanation of the stability witnessed is that the participants used to share the same principles, values and norms, which lead to common patterns of understanding regarding shipping policy. The shipping community actors allocated their expertise and information with everyone's interests and goals being fulfilled. The ship-owners were protected through the right of cabotage, the trade (seamen) unions by means of complimentary labour regulations, the passengers and the islanders via the maintenance of prices, the state through the stability of the network and the effective implementation of policies. The policy network was characterised by cooperation and consensus with the intense of the relationships being extremely high.

As the policy stability of the network depends on the shared principles, the norms, the preferences, "the world views"³⁵, the "policy core beliefs"³⁶, the "paradigms"³⁷, the "referentials"³⁸ of the actors participating, it is possible that a shift/change might occur when the above characteristics, which link the network, are incompatible. In the shipping network the main policy paradigm was initially shaped taking into consideration the fact that the state controlled and strictly regulated all aspects of the industry. EEA and PNO had been, for decades, benefiting from the status quo that protected both their interests. Just before the forthcoming liberalization we start witnessing changes in the preferences, in the belief system, in the "world views" of a few ship-owners who started reconsidering the deregulation of the marker

³⁵ Muller P. & Y. Surel, *L'analyse des politiques publiques*, Paris: Montchrestien, 2nd ed 2000

³⁶ Sabatier, P.A., *The advocacy coalition framework: Revisions and relevance for Europe*, Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1), March: 98-130, 1998

³⁷ Hall, P.A., Policy paradigms, social learning and the state. The case of economic policy making in Britain, *Comparative Politics* 25: 275-96, 1993

³⁸ Jobert B. & Muller P., *L'Etat en action*, Paris, PUF, 1987.

and perceiving it as a positive phase. But it wasn't until after the liberalization process began, that the real controversy on the matter arose. The business interests united were demanding institutional change and full liberalization.

On the other hand, the state was willing to undergo certain reforms that would introduce free competition but was reluctant in enforcing full liberalization and deregulation of the sector. Simultaneously, PNO was against any kind of reform that would endanger its members' working rights. PNO declared that liberalizing reforms would encounter strong opposition and generate ongoing protests, strikes and disobedience in the implementation stage. It is obvious therefore that the liberalization was turning into a controversial political issue.

EEA, which remained stable in her preference that the market should be fully liberalized, attempted to directly influence the network through negotiation and allocation of resources. Failing to place the need for reform on the agenda due to the resistance of other participants, EEA initially decided to utilize its significant resources in order to set negative political pressure on the network, forcing it to implement the ship-owners preference. Failing once again to influence the network EEA allocated its resources to the European Union and particularly to the European Commission. Provided that one of the most significant motivating forces of reform in Greece is the fear of the consequences originated by the deferred adjustment to the European legislation, the shipping interests stressed the inadequate harmonisation of Law 2932/2001 to the Community Regulation. The ship-owners started formulating a concrete relationship with the Commission, with ad hoc meetings and sending representatives to Brussels. At the same time EEA turned to the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Communities. EEA was utilizing every available resource in order to accomplish full harmonization of the Greek law to the Regulation. At this point we find what Richardson describes as an alternative policy arena of pressure³⁹. According to this theory the powerful teams of interests in the EU states are in position to promote their interests via other institutions that exceed the national jurisdictions. As resulting from the Europeanization of public policies, the teams of pressure acquire further effective arenas in which they will be able to utilize means and ways of influence, in order to fulfil their demands. Dissatisfied by the national policy they address EU via lobbying or via the utilisation of different resources aiming at the transformation of the existing policy in their country.

All in all it seems that the business interests that used to be privileged participants in the formulation and implementation process of policy outcomes are now seeking new alliances in the European Union seeing that they are failing to influence the national policy network via traditional resources. The shipping interests are becoming European-oriented and are utilizing resources in order to influence European institutions rather than national. If this is the case then the national policy network which is currently unstable will rapidly change. The domination of actors, the regulator of the network relationships, the intense and nature of relationships in the shipping network will have to be reconsidered, based on a European aspect of policy network formation.

4. *Conclusions*

The shipping policy network has changed over the last few years. The network that was developed by a very limited number of participants (YEN, EEA, and PNO)

³⁹ Richardson, J. J., *Government interest groups and policy change* Political studies, Vol 48, 2000, 1006 - 1025.

and was characterised by stability, cooperation, consensus and mutual exchange of resources seems to be undergoing a period of destabilization. The EU's shipping policy did not only result in change in terms of market operation, but also worked as a catalyst for significant change in the structure of the national policy network.

The European Union's directive for deregulation of the sector and liberalization of the market wasn't welcomed in the same way by all the participants of the shipping network. The state and PNO were and are opposed to the full liberalization of the sector. On the other hand ship-owners deny implementing national policies that aren't liberalizing and at the same time are requesting reforming regulations. These conflicting preferences caused the network's destabilization.

Since the State and PNO are dominant actors in the policy network, their opposition to the EU initiative means that the reform process will not be an easy one. If that is the case, it comes as no surprise that shipping interests are redirecting their influence resources towards the EU institution, anticipating that the European Commission would accelerate the liberalization process.

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**Gender equality in Greek Employment policy:
A story of Europeanization?**

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the European Union on Greek employment policy (GEP) with a particular focus on gender equality promotion. It argues that Europe introduced a number of pro-gender equality policy goals, measures, and institutions altering significantly national policy. The interplay between the various forms of EU stimuli and their respective domestic impact identifies three distinctive periods: the pre-EU stimuli period in which gender equality in GEP is absent; during the mid 1980s-1997 period, the GEP only *absorbs* the EU stimuli (consisting of hard law (directives) and EU funded vocational programs) resulting in a piecemeal introduction of gender equality policies; finally, the post Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) period in which the EU through its soft law (EES/OMC guidelines) induces a significant change of GEP by strengthening significantly its gender equality aspect. Yet, the Europeanization effect is classified as *upgrading*.

Introduction

In this paper, I examine the impact of the European social policy on Greek employment policy with a particular focus on gender equality, arguing that Europe introduced a number of pro-gender equality policy goals, measures, and institutions altering significantly national policy. The interplay between the EU stimuli and its domestic impact distinguishes the post-authoritarian era of employment policy into two distinctive periods: the period before and after the institutionalisation of the EES in 1997. More specifically, before the EU membership Greek gender equality promotion in employment policy is scarce if at all existent; after membership and until 1997 the EU influences Greek employment policy mainly with its vocational programmes; the final stage starts with the institutionalization of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) where the EU influences domestic policy with its soft-law. Empirical evidence shows that the highest degree of change took place in the third period where under the influence of the EES there was a significant change both quantitatively and qualitatively as regards to gender equality in employment policy.

This paper is divided into two main parts: the first part discusses the features of Greek employment policy before the EES's introduction. The second part discusses the influence of the EES on domestic employment policy with regard to gender equality promotion. Change is measured using two typologies: the Europeanization typology of domestic change (inertia, accommodation/upgrading, transformation) and Hall's typology of social learning.

1. Pre-EES period: Gender Equality in Employment Policy absent due to ideology, politics and underdevelopment.

Before we examine the influence of the EES on Greek employment policy as regards to gender equality, I will present the main characteristics of Greek employment policy before the introduction of the EES. This analysis is vital for two reasons: first, to present the main characteristics of employment policy before the introduction of the EU stimuli in order to delineate the EU's impact on domestic policy after its introduction; second, to establish that the EU stimuli is indeed an external variable to domestic policy making and not the result of uploading of domestic preferences, policies, etc, to the EU level. In the following, I discuss the features of Greek employment policy of this period with a particular focus on gender equality measures, arguing that the latter was absent because of the combined result of political developments, the new elites and their ideology that emerged during (and institutionalised after) its transition to democracy, and in a less significant extent Greece's lower levels of development compared to the richer EU members.

Gender equality in Greek employment policy before EU entry is crucially affected by the legacy of previous decades. In short, during the post-war period the Greek state gradually increased its involvement in social and economic processes. However, its intervention had a highly ambivalent character as it had scarcely been based on any systematic or co-ordinated planning processes. Moreover, interventionism and centralisation of decision making coexisted with a confusing liberal attitude by the state, whereas *“any clearly defined policy about which social strata or sectors of the economy would benefit from state intervention was absent”* (Petmesidou 1991: 36; see also Petmesidou and Tsoulouvis 1990). Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that the dominant policy model during this period is statism, that is, state's intervention in the economic and social activities. What is more, statism is accompanied with clientelism, which marginalised any autonomous political organisation of the disadvantaged classes or groups (Diamandouros, 1983; Haralambis, 1989). Statism and clientelism was combined with the predominant role of the public sector in providing employment resulting in a strategic use of the public sector from political elites: through the provision of employment in the public sector could satisfy voters and/or expand their electorate. In addition, trade unions are highly subordinate to party politics while the pressure from civil

society, social partners and other societal actors for progressive redistribution is weak (Marinakou, 1998: 241).

Consequently, social provisions and welfare (redistributive) resources were not allocated on the basis of social need and social citizenship rights; rather, they were restricted to those groups that were the winners in the struggle for access to political power and the state machinery –namely, public sector employees (Petmesidou 1991: 32). Moreover, social policy has been restricted to scant, piece-meal measures taken by the state in cases of emergency (Iatrides, 1980). Overall, during this period, a minimalist (almost non existent) welfare state is formed that distributes its ever-increasing part of revenue to households depending on their links to the poles of political power. According to Petmesidou (1991), statism and clientelism instead of underdevelopment or economic pressures (such as periods of recession, lack of recourses) can explain best the non-existent employment policy, and more broadly, the limited, highly fragmented and uncoordinated social policy during the post-war era.

The aforementioned features of the Greek social policy, overwhelmingly define employment policy which is almost non-existent; most of the measures that could help promote employment (e.g. training, subsidies to companies to hire unemployed as trainees, employment friendly legislation) are rudimentary. Goals such as the improvement and regulation of human capital have barely been central in the social policy considerations of state officials, politicians and industrialists throughout the post war period (Petmesidou, 1991: 36-37). As a result, contrary to what happens in the majority of the OECD countries, where the corresponding of vacancies and job-seekers becomes the most crucial goal of their Public Employment Services (see OECD, 1984), placement, counselling and vocational guidance was never developed in Greece. For instance, until the 1980s the Greek Employment Offices – which were introduced in 1937 - were merely distributing benefits (Karamessini 2006: 240).

Gender equality in employment policy, furthermore, is completely absent not only in policy measures, goals, etc. but also in policy makers' concern. What is more, the combined effect of statism, the predominant role of the public sector in providing employment, and clientelism made any concern about gender equality redundant: for policy makers the method of direct hiring to the public sector constituted the dominant method of helping their constituents to find employment. In addition, (and related to the previous one) another crucial reason for this absence is the underdeveloped -if at all present- notion of vulnerable groups. The Greek welfare does not show any interest and capacity in

tracing who needs (additional) support in order to create targeted measures that would improve their skills and employment rates. Finally, one should not underestimate the very limited female participation in the labour market combined with the weak feminist movement in Greece. In sum, there were no agents both inside and outside the labour market to promote gender equality in employment policy, whereas the structure of the Greek economy did not necessitate -at least directly- gender equality provisions.

Even though the fall of dictatorship in 1974 marked in many ways a new period for Greece, especially in terms of democratization and a new era for Greek-EU relations, the post authoritarian period until the mid-1980s witnessed minimal change regarding gender equality in employment policy. It was only after the introduction of the EU financed vocational programs targeting women in the mid 1980s that unemployed females could receive some specific help designed and targeted especially for them. This is quite surprising, considering the PASOK successive governments' pro-gender equality agenda. In the following, I argue that gender equality in employment policy has been neglected as a result of the reproduction of the aforementioned model of employment and gender equality policy; despite PASOK's rhetoric about the necessity of change (in Greek Allaghi) and gender equality, none of the aforementioned obstacles regarding the introduction of gender equality in employment policy was abolished.

The first step in understanding the absence of gender equality in employment policy is to outline the context of the decade which begun officially in the 1981 elections. For the first time in Greek political history, a radical left-wing party representing a new coalition of newly left-radicalised social strata (mainly middle and lower middle ones¹) took office (for a more detailed analysis of the 'rise to power' of these strata see Petmesidou 1991: 40-42). These strata became the main supporters of a societal majority in Greece that during the 1980s brought (and kept) to power the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Because their position in the small and distorted Greek market was fragile, their existence and reproduction was owed to the favourable distribution of state resources. Political power, therefore, became in their eyes the only realistic source of improving their welfare.

¹ The socio-professional groups comprising the middle and lower middle strata in Greece are the following: small business owners, crafts people, self-employed professionals and civil servants (Petmesidou 1991: 40). The lower middle strata are employees of public and wider public sector (including banks and public corporations). Although the author uses the term class in plural ('middle classes') to "show the high degree of fragmentation among middle-class strata" (1991:45) using the latter term seems more appropriate in describing the Greek social stratification.

As a result, their expanding influence on the state machinery had a significant impact on state policy orienting it, among others, towards increasing social provisions and a rhetoric emphasizing the need for decentralisation (Petmesidou and Tsoulouvis 1990). Although social expenditure increased significantly, this concerned only pensions² whilst expenditure on other social policies remained unchanged or grew only slightly (Petmesidou 1991: 42). Despite PASOK's extensive rhetoric before and after the 1981 elections for the need of improving welfare provision and policies, along with the overall promotion of social and economic development, no specific tools were formulated for these goals to be achieved nor did any learning process in social and other planning take place (ibid: 45). Similarly to the pre-1981 period, the main concern of policy makers throughout this period was to satisfy the economic demands of their voters through the strategic use of the state apparatus, and its funds, combined with the preferential tax provisions favouring small business and self employed against the state revenue.

Focusing on gender equality, PASOK's liberal pro-equality and pro-women agenda provided a fertile ground for growing hopes of a sweeping step forward regarding equal opportunities during the 1980s. In this respect, the PASOK governments in both of their five-year plans (1981-1985 and 1985-1989) for Economic and Social Development introduced a radical agenda for women's equality in the workplace and protection of motherhood. The decriminalization of abortion and the free provision of family planning by all state hospitals marked a turning point in the role of women in Greek society. These, by any standard, decisive changes regarding the state's treatment of women and their legal and social rights, created a rosy picture regarding the gender sensitivity of PASOK governments. Surprisingly, in the European and American Press, Greece was portrayed almost as a paradise for women (Marinakou, 1998: 245). Nonetheless, most of the pro-gender reforms concerned family policy whilst gender equality promotion in employment policy was neglected. Moreover, despite the legislative reforms, family policy did not include any incentives for the increase of female employment; in the mid-1980s only 5% of children aged up to four years old could find a place in state kindergartens and only 30% of the population of children aged from four to five and half years old could be accommodated in state nursery schools (Pantelidou-Malouta, 1994: 203).

This inefficient family policy, along with PASOK's generous income policy and the lack of any policies to promote gender equality in employment policy had a negative effect on unemployment, which became an acute problem especially among the young and

² In the 1980s expenditure of pensions was doubled without any significant changes in the overall structure and financing of the social security system.

women. During the 1980s female unemployment increased significantly and Greece became one of the countries with the highest unemployment rates –usually second after Spain. Youth, female and long-term unemployment was traditionally one of the highest in the EU-15. A rather popular argument found in the literature regarding the extremely harsh employment situation of these two groups is founded in a rather cultural explanation. According to this analysis, young and women are much less employed in Southern Europe and Greece in particular because they were de-prioritised as a result of the male-breadwinner model of society, economy and welfare: people not seen as family breadwinners find difficult to get employed as it is the family's responsibility to look after the young and the men's to look after wives, sisters, and mothers (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 43; for Greece see among others Papadopoulos 2006). However, the aforementioned analysis suggests another equally plausible explanation: these groups were the ones that were less/not involved in the political process and the clientelistic networks. As a result, they were left behind in the mass hiring policies in the public sector not because of cultural prejudices or preferences but because of lack of direct participation in the tango between political elites and voters.

In sum, despite young and women being the ones struck harder by unemployment there is no concern to identify any vulnerable groups which should receive targeted help. In particular, Greece did not have a policy for gender equality; the only legislation as regards to equal treatment (which is outside the scope of employment policy) can be found in the 1975 Constitution and Law 46/1975 which stipulated for the first time the principle of equal pay for work of equal value (Karamessini 2006: 241). Lack of previous experience, the aforementioned characteristics of the Greek social policy together with a weak women's movement, which despite its contribution to a series of legislative reforms regarding gender equality, has neglected the field of employment are the main explanations for the absence of a gender orientated employment policy (Karamessini 2006: 239).

This changed slightly only with the EU policies on vocational training and gender equality. The EU influences domestic employment policy with its 'hard' legislation (directives) along with subsidies and numerous vocational programmes financed by the CSFs and ESF. The latter had the greatest impact on domestic policy, as recourses and social spending on vocational training and other active labour market policies (ALMPs) increased significantly, upgrading, therefore, the existing rudimentary national efforts as well as institutionalizing new policy goals, measures, logics, practises and target groups

namely young and women. In addition, due to the EU vocational programmes the ALMPs are gradually becoming an important element of employment policy. As the amount of funds increased in the 1990s due to the consecutive Community Support Frameworks (CSF) and ESF programmes for human resources development, the EU programmes became the main policy tool for employment promotion.

Using the Europeanization typology of measuring the degree of domestic change, the impact of the EU stimuli on Greek employment policy in this period amounts to absorption³; the degree of domestic change, therefore, is low. Likewise, drawing on Hall's (1993) typology of degrees of social learning in this period the EU's programmes resulted in a first order change in domestic employment policy with regard to gender equality promotion: the instruments settings are changed in the light of new experience or knowledge while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain the same (Hall 1993: 273).

2. Gender Equality as an EES Pillar (1997-2003): Soft law - strong Europeanization?

The institutionalization of the EES in 1997 was pivotal for the integration of gender equality into the employment policies of most EU member states. Since then, the EU influences domestic policy with its soft-law; it is argued that this soft law led to a significant change both quantitatively and qualitatively as regards to gender equality promotion in Greek employment policy. The development of this 'soft law' is very interesting and understanding its variation and change over time is crucial for measuring the domestic impact of the EES. During its first period (1997-2003), the EES has a number of non legally binding policy guidelines, objectives and targets clustered into four thematic components famously known as 'pillars' of the common Employment Policy Guidelines⁴: *employability* which refers to a new active labour market policy, involving a shift from welfare to work; *entrepreneurship* which lists guidelines that will make it easier to start and run businesses and expand the service sector; *adaptability* referring to the modernisation of the work organisation, that is, to accept a greater variety and flexibility of work contracts; and *equal opportunities* aiming to promote not only equity goals/measures but also to enable greater employment growth through increased female labour force participation (Larsson 2000; Kleinman 2002). The equal opportunities pillar organised policy measures around three objectives: tackling gender gaps in employment

³ The degree of domestic change is labelled as 'absorption' when 'member states incorporate European policies or ideas into their programs and domestic structures, respectively, without substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions.' (Börzel and Risse 2003: 70).

⁴ As defined at the Luxembourg Jobs Summit.

and unemployment (pay and income gender gaps were included later); reconciliation of work and family life; and facilitating return to paid work. What is more, the inclusion of a new guideline in 1999, requiring member states to adopt a *gender mainstreaming* approach throughout their NAPs, provided a significantly additional momentum to the integration of the gender equality objective into employment policy (Rubery et al. 2000). The visibility (and leverage) of the EES was further enhanced by the two commitments made at Lisbon in 2000: first, the inclusion of a specific target (60%) for the female EU employment rate to be reached by 2010, and second, by asking member states to expand childcare provision, with reference to best practice provision in EU member states. The overall EES stimuli, therefore, introduces two parallel goals: mainstreaming and dedicated equal opportunities programmes.

2.1. Gender Mainstreaming in the 1st EES period: From piecemeal anti-discrimination measures to Gender Mainstreaming

From a complete absence before the institutionalisation of the EES in Amsterdam, a rather marginal concern in the first 1998 NAP, Greek employment policy witnessed thereafter -for the first time in modern Greek history- an introduction, expansion and essentially institutionalisation of gender equality promotion in employment policy. Both annual planning of employment policy through the NAPs and gender mainstreaming (in equality and employment policy especially) were novel processes for the Greek policy makers (Stratigaki 2002). Surprisingly, despite the lack of any previous experience or policy instruments gender mainstreaming has made progress since the drafting of the first Greek NAP in 1998. Two years after its introduction, the principle of gender mainstreaming marked an additional turning point in Greek employment policy. The main difference between the two periods (before and after 2001) was not primarily the increase of the quantity of measures suggested at the EU level but that the perspective of gender equality in employment became broader and the need for institutional mechanisms to ensure gender mainstreaming was inserted in the Greek context. Nonetheless, the change of the Greek employment policy regarding gender promotion has been neither rosy nor consistent. Gaps do exist, while some policy measures have not been fully implemented.

In particular, since 1998 measures promoting gender equality in employment policy were introduced under all pillars of the EES. One major change that occurred in Greek employment policy regarding gender equality promotion in the context of gender mainstreaming is the law 2839/2000 on the 'Regulation of matters regarding the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Public Administration and other provisions' which was passed in order to implement the EU Council Recommendation (96/694/EC) on the balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process and introduces for the first time a gender quota system in governing councils, administrative boards and collective bodies in the public sector and the Regional Equality Commissions in order to promote and implement equality at the regional level (Ioakeimoglou 2000). In this respect, it should be stressed that EU Recommendations are without legal force and differ from regulations, directives and decisions, in that they are not binding for Member States. The incorporation of this non binding (soft) recommendation which was voted in 1996 into Greek law just one year after the formal introduction of the gender mainstreaming guideline into the EES is not coincidental; indeed, these new policy measures were introduced under the EES's influence (VFA and Metronalysis 2002: 68-69).

Nevertheless, until 2001, the measures included under the first three pillars were very few. After the 2001 NAP, however, their number was significantly increased. In addition, a qualitative turn is observed: whilst, until 2001, they consisted of preferential treatment provisions in job creation schemes and positive action measures to promote female entrepreneurship, after 2001 new positive action measures were included such as training of job counsellors in Employment Promotion Centres (KPA's)⁵. In addition, as a result of the Greek government's response towards the Council's recommendations⁶ of 1999, 2000 and 2001 regarding the relationship between the tax system and disincentives for employing women three laws (Law 2753/1999), (2874/2000), (2837/2000) aiming at providing incentives for hiring low paid employees. In addition the law regarding the promotion of part-time work and other forms of atypical employment (2639/1998) was passed as tool for increasing female employment. All these laws, despite being passed earlier, were fully implemented only by 2001 (VFA and Metronalysis 2002: 33; NAP 2001).

It should cause no surprise that all tax exemptions are targeted on the workers at the lowest pay or on those on precarious employment; this is the type of employment that a majority of women was getting when they managed to become employed. This more 'lousy' jobs' approach in Greek policy making is a direct effect of the EES initial goal of

⁵ See respective table of the Appendix.

⁶ Greece was asked to "Check thoroughly the counter motives that are created from the tax and benefits systems, which are possible to prevent, especially women, from participating in the labour market, in order to increase the female employment rates and examine the possibility of reducing taxes on labour and/or earned income, in order to raise the employment rate"; in addition, "Greece should also encourage, within a gender mainstreaming approach, greater participation of women in the labour market".

full employment which meant increasing employment rates without focusing on the quality of employment. After the 2003 revision, however, the EES added quality of employment in its goals (not only more but also better jobs) in response to the growing criticism that Lisbon agenda was about increasing precarious forms of employment (Karamessini 2006: 252). In Greece, the promotion of part-time employment has been hampered due to the unpopularity of these jobs among Greek women as most of them are created in occupations and sectors that provide salaries below the poverty line. However, successive governments have tried to increase the attractiveness of part-time work by creating jobs in the public sector where working conditions are better than in the private (Rubery et al. 2004: 201).

Similarly, in the 2002 NAP the effort to include gender mainstreaming measures is intensified. Besides maintaining existing measures introduced after the EES (New Jobs and Young Entrepreneurs), new methods of promoting gender mainstreaming as introduced, such as, individualised counselling for women in the regional action plans in the context of KPA, and a quota of 60% for women in training programmes and in subsidised employment. This becomes an overarching policy which makes Greece one of the countries that has strongly gender mainstreamed active labour market measures (Rubery et al. 2007). Third, new programmes are being introduced especially in the field of education and training under all the Operational Programmes of the 3rd Community Support Framework, with special emphasis on improving the skills of women to boost their employability and entrepreneurship⁷. These new programmes are part of the National Action Plan for Gender Equality (NAPGE) 2001-2006, a new institution introduced under the direct influence of EES's gender mainstreaming guideline (VFA and Metroanalysis 2002: 68). The NAPGE promoted four strategic targets: promotion of equality between men and women in economic life⁸; promotion of equal participation and representation in the political social and economic sectors⁹; promotion of equal access and of equal application of social rights for men and women¹⁰; promotion of a change of gender roles and stereotypes¹¹.

⁷ Under the activities of the O.P. Education and Initial Vocational Training' and the Community initiative equal. For further information, see Employability table.

⁸ Actions in the sectors of employment, information society, vocational training, promotion of women's entrepreneurship, of equal pay and harmonisation of professional and family obligations

⁹ Legal regulations institutionalising quotas, actions aiming at promoting women in decision taking in the economic and political fields, the leading boards in the public and private sector, trade union committees and professional agencies

¹⁰ Actions and steps in the legal framework for the completion of Greek legislation or its harmonisation with community legislation, but also in sectors of quality of life like health, welfare and social infrastructure, environment, violence against women and trafficking. Special and integral actions for sensitive groups of

The NAPGE is a major turning point in Greek employment policy as regards to gender equality promotion. First, for the first time in Greece policy making, a concrete and structured plan was set up for gender equality promotion with a particular emphasis on employability, entrepreneurship, and gender mainstreaming. Second, gender mainstreaming is introduced as a strategic goal of policy making especially in relation to the management of the EU funds resulting in operational and regional programmes for the years 2001-2006 which are extensive and promote gender equality. Third, the NAPGE is the result of the close cooperation between two new institutions which have been created under the EU stimuli in order to promote gender equality in Greece, that is, the General Secretariat of Equality¹² and KETHI. According to the European Database on Gender Mainstreaming, it was the collaboration of these two institutions and their active participation in planning the actions for the 3rd CSF and the NAP that resulted in the inclusion of many actions for gender equality in the Operational Programmes¹³, like those of the Ministries of Labour, of Development, of Education and of Agriculture (EDGM 2001). However, according to Karamessini (2006: 251) the inclusion of gender equality as a separate axis (with 10 per cent of the total budget) in these Programmes is not due to these institutions but to pressure from the European Commission during negotiations with the Greek government. In any case, it should be stressed that this policy change which resulted in the promotion of gender equality in employment policy is either indirectly (through an institution created under the EES influence) or directly (through the direct pressure of the European Commission) attributed to the influence of the EU.

In addition, the EES resulted in the establishment of some new institutional mechanisms, processes and instruments that would be responsible for promoting gender mainstreaming. In 1998, the Regional Committees for Equality started to operate in every region aiming at the promotion and strengthening of the Gender Equality. In addition, as already mentioned above, the General Secretariat of Equality was established (VFA and Metronalysis 2002: 68) along with the Special Inter-ministerial Committee for Gender mainstreaming. The former became -along with KETHI- the main institution in Greece to

women socially excluded. Basic action of this target is the application of legislation, the information and awareness rising of the citizens

¹¹ Actions and practices concerning harmonisation of family and professional responsibilities, the models promoted by the media, special interventions and measures for raising awareness in the sectors of education, culture and every expression of life

¹² It was established in the context of the EES's gender mainstreaming guideline (VFA and Metronalysis 2002: 68).

¹³ Operational Programmes: "Employment and Vocational Training" (72 billion drachmas); "Competitiveness" (12 billions); "EPEAEK" and "Education and Vocational Training" (amounting to a total cost of 23.5 billion drachmas).

promote gender equality in employment policy. Both of them implemented a number of studies and research projects regarding gender inequality in employment policy and through their participation in the NAPs and the overall Greek employment policy making introduced a number of new policy measures following the EES recommendations. Although the Special Inter-ministerial Committee had a promising start it has not met since March 2001 (NAP 2001; Rubery et al. 2004). Finally, a number of regional institutions were established and provided for the first time in the Greek context localised support, information and counselling to all women along with institutions such as the ‘Regional Social Integration Units’ for women coming from excluded groups of the population. It should be noted that all the aforementioned institutional developments were accompanied with new funding and hiring of high educated staff (psychologists, sociologists, economists, etc.) in order to realise their mission.

2.2. ‘Traditional’ Gender Equality: Promoting gender equality through provision of care for dependants

The EES resulted in introducing new policies with the rest of gender guidelines that promoted traditional gender equality policies. Focusing on Greece, one example of the strong influence of the Council’s recommendations is the 2002 NAP: its authors seem to be preoccupied with meeting the 2002 Council’s recommendation¹⁴ which urges Greece to extend the care facilities for children and other dependants in order to reduce the employment and unemployment gaps. The new policy initiatives exclusively referred to public care services for children and elderly aiming to tackle the main problem of Greek women that halts them from entering the labour market, namely, taking care of the vulnerable members of the family (NAP 2001; NAP 2002). These measures are the following: the extension of operating hours in nurseries and the institution of daylong kindergartens and primary schools; the creation of new crèches, nurseries, and kindergartens; the establishment of care centres for the elderly, and the finally, the creation of new after-school recreation centres for children. All the aforementioned measures, the majority of them appeared in the beginning of the EES in 1998 as small pilot programmes, grew significantly in each consecutive NAP in the number of institutions and staff employed, the allocation of financial resources and coverage in the period until 2003 (NAP 2003). The EU funds (ESF, CSF programmes) were crucial in

¹⁴ According to the 2002 council’s recommendations Greece should “take effective and comprehensive action to reduce the employment and unemployment gender gaps. To this end, care facilities for children and other dependants should be extended.

financing many of these projects in their early phase and onwards; however, most of them (especially the new educational institutions) were funded through national resources.

It has to be stressed that the EES reinvigorated a policy which had started in the early 1980s after the rise of PASOK into power, that is, to provide the necessary institutional framework that will alleviate women from the responsibility of taking care of dependants in order to enter the labour market. However, as it has been analysed above, this policy was rather incremental, piecemeal and ineffective. In contrast, the EES marked a qualitative and quantitative turning point in Greek employment policy: qualitatively, the EES altered the process of policy design and implementation by introducing a more holistic approach to the issue of reconciliation and above all a clear demarcation from the previous period; quantitatively, the EES induced change in the numbers of the new institutions, measures and allocation of funds to them. Likewise, the Greek government - for the first time- tried to incorporate the social partners in promoting gender equality. Besides the training and activation of trade unionists on gender equality issues, a significant development of this period is the National General Collective Agreement (EGSIE) for 2002-3. Two of its articles (6 and 7) provide for more favourable conditions for single-parent families to obtain childcare leave and annual paid leave. These legislative measures are the result of agreements and actions taken by the state with the direct/indirect involvement of the social partners in the framework of incorporating the EU Employment Guidelines (Kretsos 2003).

In addition, due to the EES guideline concerning tackling gender gaps, since 1998 a number of policy initiatives have been introduced aiming to raise awareness, knowledge and reduce the differences between genders in pay, representation and social stereotypes. These constitute mainly studies on gender gaps and educational programmes aiming at tackling social stereotypes and promote gender equality. However, in this period there are very few legislative reforms to tackle gender gaps in the labour market. Even though some new measures were implemented¹⁵, the level of implementation should be considered low especially in the private sector where labour protection is at best weak. This problematic implementation should be seen in the general dual labour market between the public sector employees with high protection and the private sector ones who are not enjoying the equal rights granted by law. In addition, the lack of cooperation from social partners who generally are either indifferent or negative towards gender equality is a crucial reason for the lack of significant progress in this policy area.

¹⁵ Such as the extension of provisions to protect pregnant and breast-feeding women in all workplaces and other various measures to promote equality at the workplace listed in the Appendix.

3. The impact of the EES after 2003: Fading Europeanization?

In the following, I argue that both EES revisions (2003 and 2005) resulted in the weakening of the EES stimuli regarding gender equality promotion; this altered significantly EES's domestic impact on Greek employment policy. Consequently, a direct correlation between the EU stimuli and the domestic reforms emerges. In this section the domestic impact of the EES after its first revision is discussed. The distinction between the two periods is necessary since the EU stimuli regarding gender promotion in the context of the EES changes: from one of the pillars under which a number of guidelines are structured it becomes only one guideline (among ten). Even though the essence of the previous guidelines is still existent, gender mainstreaming is less visible (Rubery et al. 2004). Moreover, a new key institution in promoting the EU stimuli is the Employment Task-force Report (KOK report) which undermines the promotion of gender mainstreaming (see Rubery et al. 2004). In addition, member states do not have to respond annually but in a three year perspective a development that puts less pressure on the domestic level to incorporate the EU stimuli. Even though gender equality and gender mainstreaming remains an essential goal of the EES, the hypothesis to be tested is that the 2003 revision has a negative impact on the EU leverage to promote domestic reforms.

3.1. Gender Mainstreaming: a continuation of the previous period?

Even though, in the NAP of 2003 some gender mainstreaming measures are reported, they constitute a continuation of previous measures and logic. In this respect it should be stressed that, contrary to the authors of the 2003 NAP, these measures do not constitute a real progress regarding gender mainstreaming promotion; rather, a marginal effort to promote gender employability and entrepreneurship. The authors of the NAP 2004 report that some new programmes are introduced 'as a response to the EU's recommendations' with a particular focus on women (see employability and entrepreneurship table). In addition, a new policy amendment focuses on the promotion of female (mothers of minor children is set as a target group and the quota of 60% out of the unemployed that are hired should be women) part-time employment in the public sector to fill vacancies in new kinds of social services (Rubery et al. 2004: 116). Even though the proposal for promoting female part-time work is a reiteration of the EES recommendations from earlier years, the links with boosting women's employment have been made more explicit in this new period –especially in the 2004 NAP (ibid: 205). A

negative aspect of these reforms is the lack of any reference to the impact on gender segregation (ibid: 226).

Nonetheless, an important development which took place in this period is the second National Plan for Equality 2004-2008. In a similar fashion to the first, the Plan sets new goals, measures and programming for gender equality promotion. The second plan, however, is important for two additional reasons: first, -for the first time in Greek employment policy- the plan was followed by a progress report been published in 2006. The report reviews initiatives taken thus far, including relevant policy measures and practical support services. The review also assesses progress in the regulatory framework and with regard to training provisions. Proposals for future plans and actions are then outlined (Karakioulafis 2007)¹⁶. – continuing progress).

Second, the plan highlights the general change of perspective, goals and discourse regarding gender equality promotion in employment policy. Contrary to the early 1980s when gender equality was promoted as an issue of social justice, under the EES influence gender equality was perceived also as an issue that hinders economic development and competitiveness. It is this general perspective that through the gender mainstreaming guideline was incorporated into national employment policies which had neglected the issue of gender equality. This change of perspective, goals and discourse can be traced directly in the National Plan for Equality 2004-2008 which highlights this particular swift in Greek policy making under the influence of the ‘Lisbon Process’. According to the authors of the NPE (2004), even though gender equality is promoted by numerous international institutions besides the EU, such as, the UN, the Council of Europe, and the ILO, it is only the EU that stresses the economic and developmental aspect of gender equality; all the others focus only on the political aspect, that is, on equality of rights, participation, etc.

In addition, Greece provides for the first time gender disaggregated statistics on stocks and flows of registered unemployed, as well as their participation in active labour market programmes (ibid: 76, 137-138). The latter is a direct result of the EES which necessitates under the gender mainstreaming guideline adequate monitoring of the gender equality measures. Finally, in this period, a welcome change is the upgrading of the equality bodies in the drafting of the NAPs (ibid: 213).

However, setting national employment targets for both sexes which were included in the NAP of 2003, does not happen indicating a less focus on rising (female) employment

¹⁶ Further research is necessary in order to assess this programme as it is still ongoing.

rates (Rubery et al. 2004: 73). Nevertheless, this should not be overestimated; the omission of the employment rates is for both sexes and in 2004 there is a change of government in Greece that may have disrupted the linear domestic response of the past. Even though the disappearance of employment rates is a negative development, it may not be directly related to gender mainstreaming and a disregard for female employment. What is more indicative of a backtracking on gender mainstreaming is the disappearance of the target of 2% annual growth in female employment until the year 2010. Despite being introduced in 2003 it is not mentioned in 2004.

3.2. Gender Equality Policies (former fourth pillar): a loss of momentum?

Concerning the promotion of the dedicated gender equality measures in employment policy, the second period of the EES does not have a distinct impact compared to the previous period. Indeed, the main development of this period is the continuation of existing policies especially the continuous expansion of institutions providing care to dependants. Even though the EGGSIE expert for Greece argues that in 2004 the closing of the employment gaps in relation to men and to the Lisbon target is the top priority (Rubery et al. 2004: 40), there are no new measures to promote reconciliation of family and work life –a key obstacle to entering the labour market of Greek women. The same applies, furthermore, to the goal of reducing gender gaps. Even though in the 2004 NAP a range of policy measures are said to assist in meeting the target to reduce the gender gap, these are not new measures. Rather, they are maintained from the previous period of the EES. However, considering the significant problems which Greek women face in regards to entering the labour market, the huge gender gaps, the inadequate provision of care and social services and the low level of return to paid work of the inactive population, this period is characterized by a low degree of influence of the EES on the Greek employment policy.

Nonetheless, a significant change of this period was the overall budgetary commitments for new social measures regarding the implementation of the aforementioned actions. According to the data presented at the 2003 NAP, the financial resources for ‘New spending on employment and the family’ from non-existent in 2003 would be increased to 426 millions (Euros) in 2004, rising to 545 in 2006 up to 905 in 2008 – an increase of 905 millions of Euros over the next 5 years (NAP 2003: 22). The importance of this change is twofold: first, the financial upgrading of new social measures relevant to employment and family –the two key areas for improving female employment-

and second, the introduction of programming in the policy making process as -for the first time- Greek policy makers introduce a concise schedule of social policy financing for a five-year period.

4. The impact of the EES after the Lisbon Re-launch: the end of gender equality and of Europeanization?

The 2005 revision of the EES under the re-launch of the Lisbon process marked an even greater downgrading of the EU stimuli as regards to gender equality promotion. In particular, there is no specific gender equality guideline and the EES has been integrated with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). Consequently, member states have to respond in the same document both to macro and micro economic issues and to employment. Third, instead of specific policy measures, member states have been granted the freedom to report general policy priorities/principles; as a result, member states can report vague statements as their response to the EES guidelines without worrying about concrete domestic reforms. Now it is up to them to mention gender equality promotion measures or even any measures to improve employment (for example Italy does not include anything on employment in its 2005 NAP). Nevertheless, two significant developments take place regarding gender mainstreaming and gender equality policy at the European level during 2006. These include the agreements to a 'road map for gender equality' and to a gender equality pact by the Council of Ministers. These developments along with the recommendations of the EU council regarding the promotion of gender equality in member states' employment policy should in principle have placed a considerable obligation on member states to promote gender equality in their implementation reports of 2006 (Rubery et al. 2006: 14).

In order to validate this paper's hypothesis about the degree of influence of soft law under the EES the Greek response in this period should show the following pattern: after 2005 gender mainstreaming and gender equality promotion loses momentum at the EU level and Greece's effort to promote gender equality falters. This should change only in 2006 due to the developments at the EU level; these developments which not only reiterate EU stimuli on gender equality but also make an explicit call to member states to incorporate EU guidelines will cause a more substantial response from Greece in order to incorporate the EU stimuli. In other words, *soft law can induce a greater domestic change when it is high on the agenda, creating thus a momentum, or adds new obligations to member states.*

4.1. Gender Mainstreaming

In the Greek 2005 NRP even though gender mainstreaming is not mentioned, a new focus on female labour market participation and promoting equal opportunities are specified as top 5 policy priorities (Rubery et al. 2005: 14). In addition, there was greater emphasis (than the previous two NAPs) on female labour market participation rather than female employment that is on supply rather than demand issues. The 2005 revision of the European Employment Strategy and especially the Council's recommendations certainly contributed to this turn of emphasis (ibid: 61). For Greek policy makers, reaching the Lisbon targets for female employment depends primarily on the promotion of flexible labour relations, especially part-time work, and special employability programmes for unemployed women. In this respect, there is the promise of flexible labour relations to increase employment opportunities for young people and women.

The new centre-right government of New Democracy passes two laws which follow and materialize this policy goal (see Appendix). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that promoting flexibility in order to meet mainly the need of employers has a twofold impact: although it may result in increasing female employment rates, as more women will be employed in precarious forms of employment, this policy may have negative effects for women and reconciliation of work and family life (ibid: 124). Albeit part-time work contributes to raising employment rates this particular law is quite problematic since all jobs offered are offered are fixed-term and do not provide either employment security or a stepping stone to longer-hour jobs neglecting thus one of the most beneficial aspects of part-time employment (ibid 130). As in 2004, Greek policy makers cite the existence of educational and vocational programmes especially for women aiming to their entry to the labour market. The only new measure in 2005 is the orientation of distance learning education programmes to 'working students or women obliged to stay at home' under the human capital guideline.

In contrast, after 2006 a number of new policy reforms regarding gender equality are taking place at the domestic level. Even though programs aiming in enhancing employability and entrepreneurship are a constant aspect of Greek employment policy throughout the EES, after 2006, some novel developments are taking place. First, some new programmes are implemented based on the notion of 'integrated intervention' which is materialised through integrated intervention schemes for unemployed women only (see respective tables for further details about these new programmes). The beginning of integrated intervention schemes is a qualitative turning point in gender equality promotion

in Greek employment policy because women are not simply the target of training but of an overall intervention which combines counselling, training, personalised approach and support after the vocational training. In other words, women receive a much more structured and organised support compared to the past. In addition, after 2006, following a period of immobility, new institutions are established as the advisory centres of KETHI are increased by the establishment of five new branches.

In 2006, furthermore, there is a breakthrough regarding the participation of social partners in promoting gender equality in employment policy. For the second time in Greece, gender equality will be an issue not only of governmental policy but also of social partners as ‘social deliberations’ between the government and the ‘most representative’ Employers’ Organisations (SEV, ESEE, GSEVEE, EVEA) and the Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility, aiming to facilitate the participation of women in employment and the reduction of women’s unemployment were successful resulting in: the signature of a Protocol of Cooperation between the social partners aiming to promote equal opportunities for women and men in enterprises and of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the General Secretariat for Gender Equality and the Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility, aiming at further promoting equal opportunities between women and men in enterprises.

4.2. Gender Equality Policies

Similar to the gender mainstreaming measures, in 2005 there are very few new developments regarding the specific gender equality measures. As regards to reconciliation measures the existing ones are maintained with a particular focus on improving community care facilities for dependants. In this respect, childcare services are improving while in all NRPs of this period, the policy to maintain and expand daylong schools national funding is reaffirmed. Nevertheless, in 2005 it has not been effectively implemented due to delays in hires and wage cuts for the temporary personnel hired to provide courses and activities (Rubery et al. 2005). Finally, there is a new proposal to provide incentives for large corporations to run day-care centres but without details on the form and type of incentives; moreover, there is no evidence so far on the degree of implementation. It should be stressed, however, that despite the tangible improvement on child care facilities since the beginning of the EES¹⁷, Greece had the largest gap with

¹⁷ Until 1998 there were hardly any institutions to provide care services or any all day schools in order to alleviate the family responsibilities of women. In 2006 there are 396 structures operational (partially funded from the O.P. ‘Employment and Vocational Training’), employing 1.972 persons and serving a total of

respect to the Barcelona targets in child care provision among the old EU-15 members. Overall, these measures do not constitute any significant change of policy; considering the great distance between the Greek situation and the Barcelona targets we could safely conclude that the EES does not apply significant pressure or influence in domestic reforms in 2005.

Nonetheless, in an identical to the gender mainstreaming measures fashion, after 2006 there is a significant progress in promoting reconciliation of work and family. In particular, besides the annual improvement of community care institutions, the reconciliation of work and family life aspect of Greek employment policy is enhanced substantially through two main developments that take place in 2006. First, a new institutional framework for the promotion of Women's employability is introduced, aiming at the reconciliation of work and family life based on the application of individualized approach. Second, a number of new legislative measures in the new Code of Civil Servants (Law 3528/2007¹⁸) which was agreed between the government and ADEDY (i.e. the Supreme Administration of Civil Servants' Associations) promote significantly reconciliation and help women in family responsibilities with a special focus on unmarried mothers as well as for mothers of many children (for further details about these measures see appendix). Third, and quite surprisingly, Greece provides a positive programme of policy action in its new 2006 legislation on Equal Treatment in employment relations focusing on the private sector. This development marks a turning point in Greek employment policy as until then there were no policies on increasing gender inequality in the private sector¹⁹. Finally, in 2007, the policy of reconciliation is further enhanced with new programmes which are implemented by the K.E.TH.I, which acts as a coordinating agency (for further details see appendix). Even though more action is necessary, these new measures are of paramount importance in promoting gender equality in employment policy.

With regard to tackling gender gaps, furthermore, empirical evidence show a similar domestic response: while in 2005 there are no policy initiatives, after 2006, under the influence of the European pact for gender equality which reiterates the closing of gender

50.000 people (the elderly, children and those requiring assistance); the Regional Operational Programmes are supporting the operation of 1,120 structures employing 4,400 individuals and serving another 50,000 persons⁷. In sum, as of 2006, 1516 care facilities were operational employing 6372 persons and serving 100.000 persons. In addition, until the end of 2006, there will be in operation 4,500 all-day schools and 2,000 all-day kindergartens. All these institutions have been created under the EES influence (NAP 2006: 45).

¹⁸ The measure was announced in the 2006 NRP as a draft Code; in the 2007 NAP it is mentioned as a new law.

¹⁹ Further research is necessary in order to establish the reasons behind this development.

gaps and the combating of social stereotypes, a plethora of new measures are introduced in order to tackle gender gaps in education and combat social stereotypes regarding gender relations (see appendix). However, even though Greece (along with Malta, Spain, and Italy) has the highest gender employment and pay gaps in Europe,²⁰ it remains one of the few countries in the European Union with no policy on tackling the gender *pay* gap. Gender equality in employment is interpreted in terms of closing the gender employment rate gap, not the gap in the quality of employment. For these reasons the gender pay gap is not a preoccupation of the 2005 and 2006 NRPs. (Rubery et al 2005; 2006). The rise of the female activity rate depends only on the development of social care services. Likewise, mobilisation of the inactive is realised through the admission of the inactive into all active labour market programmes (a policy that is not mentioned in the NRP) and through the development of community care services (mentioned in the NRP) (ibid: 103-104).

5. Assessing the EES's domestic impact

In evaluating the impact of the EES on Greek employment policy, the same two previously used typologies are employed. Using the Europeanization typology the EES's impact has been equal to accommodation/upgrading²¹ with a clear trend towards transformation²². Even though the degree of domestic change is high this classification is more appropriate than transformation due to the gaps and low degree of implementation of the institutional reforms as well as to the low degree of statistical monitoring. Likewise, the EES's domestic change in policy amounts to a situation which is between Hall's (1993) second and third type of learning.

Despite the high degree of domestic change, there should be no illusions about the overall gender equality promotion in employment policy: Greece is far from having a completely gender equal employment policy. In other words, even though the EU mainly through the EES changed significantly employment policy as regards to gender equality promotion this does not mean that what is necessary in order to have a gender equal

²⁰ For all of these countries the gender gap in employment for the low educated women is above 33%; even though in most EU countries the gender gaps for the high educated women is low, these countries along with Luxembourg are again on the top with gender gaps exceeding 10%. In Greece, in particular, the gap was widened in 2004 from 10.9% to 14.1% (Rubery et al. 2005: 11).

²¹ The degree of domestic change is labelled as 'accommodation' when 'member states accommodate Europeanization pressures by adapting existing processes, policies, and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understanding attached to them. One way of doing this is by 'patching up' new policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing the latter (Héritier 2001). The degree of domestic change is modest.' (Börzel and Risse 2003: 70).

²² The degree of domestic change is labelled as 'transformation' when 'member states replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed. The degree of domestic change is high.' (Börzel and Risse 2003: 70).

employment policy was introduced. In this respect, gaps do exist, policies are insufficient and more effort and measures are needed in all fields of employment policy in order to claim that domestic policy is achieving gender equality (Rubery et al 2004; 2005; 2006). Undeniably, the European influence has been paramount; likewise, it has not been enough.

Closing remarks: Back to theory

People who love soft methods and hate iniquity forget this; that reform consists in taking a bone from a dog. Philosophy will not do it.

John Jay Chapman (American Poet 1862-1933)

Most of the literature on the EES reflects Chapman's harsh saying: soft law has more or less been weak in promoting real change in member states' employment policy (Foden and Magnusson 2003; Govecor 2004; Jacobsson and Viffell 2007). Fortunately, the literature does not suggest introducing iniquity; for some, the answer is to strengthen the links of the EES with the hard law pillar of European Employment policy in order for the EES to acquire a 'real bite' in domestic policy making. This would happen either by using instruments of soft law to facilitate the implementation of hard law, or by using hard law to ensure the implementation of soft-law directives (Rhodes 2005: 302; see also Sharpf 2002).

The findings of this research, however, seem to challenge these arguments. First, the EES has been crucial in introducing and shaping gender equality measures in employment policy; it was only after the EES when Greece reformed significantly both quantitatively and qualitatively its domestic employment policy in order to facilitate gender equality by introducing the following novelties: new institutions with new staff and funds, new policy measures, tools, targets and methods, a number of legislative reforms to promote gender equality in labour law, and a change in the process of policy design and implementation. Second, the EES promoted a very specific 'recipe' for reforms: in order to promote gender equality the focus is on the promotion of flexible labour relations, especially part-time work, and special employability programmes for unemployed women. With regard to the female activity rate, its rise depends on the development of social care services. Gender equality in employment is interpreted in terms of closing the gender gap only in employment rates and not in the quality of employment. This approach explains why the gender pay gap has not preoccupied domestic policy makers (Rubery et al. 2005: 72) and why this policy was informally delegated to the social partners (Rubery et al. 2001).

Third, by comparing the three periods of the EES and their domestic impact on the Greek case, a very interesting realization takes place: the main problem that hinders the EU's effect in gender equality promotion is not that its policies are based on soft law; the EU stimuli since the beginning of the EES have been characterized by the same degree of 'softness'. This did not obstruct the EU to initiate and determine national reforms regarding gender equality promotion in employment policy. Instead, it is the weakening (after 2003) and marginalisation (after 2005) of the EU stimuli in terms of visibility, priority, precision, and specificity. In addition, the change of focus of the EES and the Council's from purely employment issues to micro and macro economic stability resulted in the decrease of employment policies' importance and their inclusion in a 'growth and stability' logic. National reforms follow this change of focus. As a result, gender equality promotion in employment policy lost momentum. Similarly, when in 2006 the EES stimuli were reiterated then Greece followed suit and revitalised reforms. The same applies to the procedural aspects of the EES: during the first period the EES cycle is annual resulting in a much more intense progress compared to the two following ones. Thus, soft law is effective when it is adequate in terms of specificity, creates momentum and puts some kind of pressure to member states.

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APPENDIX

New Measures (32 total) Promoting Female Employability (Mainstreaming)

- Higher Amount of subsidy for women in all job creation schemes (NAP of 1999);
- Quotas for women in all employability measures equal to the female share in Employment (NAP of 1999);
- Work Experience programme for the improvement of women's skills in rural, mountainous or insular areas (NAP of 2000);
- Promotion of part-time work and other forms of atypical employment (2639/1998) (2000)
- New Jobs programme: subsidies for full-employment four-year programmes, part-time four-year programmes and limited contracts of 9 months duration. The programme provided for gender mainstreaming through the provision of special incentives for women (2000, 2001, and 2002).
- Pilot project for the social integration of Muslim women in Metaxourgeio – Athens (2000);
- Exemption from social security contributions for full time-employees receiving the minimum wage (2837/2000) (2001)
- Training of job counsellors of the Employment Promotion Centres (KPAs²³) to assist unemployed women (2001)
- Introduction of individualised counselling for women in the regional action plans in the context of KPA (2002)
- Education and training programmes for women in new technologies, e-commerce, management, etc. financed by the social partners (2001)
- Programme to combat exclusion from the labour market of single-parent families (2001)
- A quota of 60% for women in training programmes and in subsidised employment (2002)
- Vocational programmes focusing on the promotion of equal opportunities for access to the labour market and improving women's access to the labour market (O.P. Education and Initial Vocational Training') (2002)
- In the Community Initiative Equal the training contributes through integrated interventions to combat discrimination and gender inequality in the field of employment

²³ The NAP 2004 created by the new government of New Democracy in an effort to assess the policies of the past it reports that until then, 71 KPAs had been developed employing 471 labour advisers who provide the unemployed with a personalized approach. The authors of the NAP qualify this by adding that is done 'to a limited scale until today'. Specifically, according to the data provided by the Employment Observatory Research-Informatics (PAEP) on 31/8/2004, 17% of the registered unemployed had benefited from personalized services, while the corresponding percentage for women amounts to 20%. Nevertheless, progress is considerable as women, the young, handicapped persons and other sensitive groups are better supported either by special measures or by selective treatment resulting from general measures. Thus the 2004 NAP stresses the re-determination of the role of the KPA's and outlines an extensive relevant reform to be implemented (more details will be provided in a different chapter regarding the institutional changes that the EES induced).

- New job programmes for women, intended to provide work experience and promote the employment of unemployed women aged 18-65. It provides 5,000 jobs and lasts for 21 months (2003).
- Programmes to provide vocational experience (Stage) in IT and Communications skills for unemployed graduates, with a special stage for facilitating entry of women into the ICT labour market (Part of the O.P. 'Information society') (2003).
- Actions to promote tele-working, with priority given to business plans which will help an increase in employment in regions experiencing difficulty of access to productive centres, and to vulnerable population groups and women (Part of the O.P. 'Information society') (2003).
- The development of a network of community services acting as a stimulus to the creation of new jobs and as a precondition allowing women to seek employment (2003).
- Employers' contributions for hiring unemployed women with at least two children are subsidized for one year (2003).
- This measure is strengthened and upgraded in NAP 2004 as it is included in the Law 3227/04 "Measures for the remedy of unemployment and other provisions" (2004)
- Employers' contributions on behalf of replacements for women on maternity leave are also subsidized (2003).
- OAED implements a 'New Jobs Programme' for 5,000 women aged 18-65 (18 months) (2003)
- Policy measure on the promotion of part-time employment in the public sector to fill vacancies in new kinds of social services developed by the public sector: not only are 'mothers of minor children' are considered to be one of the target groups of this initiative but also the 60% quota for women applies in the case of other target groups comprising unemployed individuals (2004).
- The provision of accompanying support actions to 9,000 unemployed women and their promotion in employment policy actions, with co-financing from various Operational Programmes (the project will also continue during 2004-2005)
- Further increase of subsidies to the amount of the employer's contribution for businesses employing unemployed mothers (2004)
- Distance learning education programmes with a particular focus on 'working students or women obliged to stay at home' (2005)
- New law on working time which enhances temporal flexibility for the employer by encouraging flexible weekly working time, working time over a four month period and permits annual working time whereas combining flexible working-time arrangements with overtime hours is also permitted (2005).
- New law on part-time work in the public sector which has been specifically aimed at women. Albeit part-time work contributes to raising employment rates this particular law is quite problematic since all jobs offered are offered are fixed-term and do not provide either employment security or a stepping stone to longer-hour jobs neglecting thus one of the most beneficial aspects of part-time employment (2005).
- Special programmes for unemployed women, whose participation is encouraged by the provision of special incentives (2005, 2006).
- Signature of a Protocol of Cooperation between the GSGE and the SEV, GSEVEE, ESEE, EBEA, in relation to promoting equal opportunities for women and men in enterprises. The Protocol is in force for an indefinite period of time and it is subjected to evaluation after the first two years of its implementation. The protocol states that the parties should jointly undertake a political commitment to carry out a

range of coordinated actions for the purpose of monitoring, raising awareness of and ultimately addressing the incidence of unequal treatment of men and women in access to employment, certain occupations, vocational training, career advancement, pay levels, and with regard to terms and conditions of employment in general (Karakioulafis 2007). In particular, the employer side will take initiatives to sensitise their members in gender equality issues; promote women's entrepreneurship and lifelong learning; use an existing Fund (L.A.E.K.) to finance the replacements during maternity leave and other reconciliation measures in SMEs, and consider promoting new forms of work organisation assisting reconciliation of work and family life. The General Secretariat for Equality will fund research and studies, grant financial and non-financial incentives and award annual prizes to firms promoting gender equality at the workplace (Rubery et al. 2006) (2006)

- Signature of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the General Secretariat for Gender Equality and the Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility, aiming at further promoting equal opportunities between women and men in enterprises (2006)
- A new institutional framework for the promotion of Women's employability, aiming at the reconciliation of work and family life, based on the application of individualized approach. This new institutional framework will be put into force after the 30th of April 2007 (2006)
- New Program «Positive Actions in favour of women in Small-medium and Large Enterprises» implemented by the General Secretariat for Gender Equality in the framework of the O.P. "Employment and Vocational Training". Approximately 1,300 women have benefited in 2006 and in the first semester of 2007. For the second round of this project 143 Plans, with a budget of €14.2 million, have been approved and the beneficiaries will be in total 19,800 women (2006, 2007)
- In all New Self-Employed Programmes, women who have children under 6 years old, or who take care of relatives with disabilities, are given the option of using their own residence as the headquarters of their enterprise. As a result, a total number of 40,500 women benefited from the employment and self employment programmes during the period 1.1.2006 – 30.4.2007.
- Special integrated intervention, combining counselling on how to enter into the labour market by either acquiring work experience, subsidization of an employment position, or setting up an independent business activity (beneficiaries: 3,880 women) (2007)
- New Programme "Improvement of the conditions for the inclusion of women from disadvantaged groups into the labour market" (2007)

New Measures (18) Promoting Female Entrepreneurship (Mainstreaming)

- Higher Amount of grants to unemployed women for business start-ups in areas of high unemployment (1998)
- Creation of structures for Female Entrepreneurship (through NOW initiative) (1999)
- Special programme for women entrepreneurs in manufacturing (1999 and 2000)
- Support and networking of women's cooperatives and businesses in rural areas (2000)
- Measures providing financial and technical support to unemployed women willing to start a small business (2001)
- Special incentives (mainly subsidies) and training to women entrepreneurs (2001, 2002)

- Subsidies to Young Entrepreneurs to create new businesses. The programme incorporated the equal opportunities dimension through the provision of special incentives for women (2001, 2002)
- Support of female entrepreneurship in rural areas and in rural tourism, handcraft and cottage industries (2001)
- Removal of administrative barriers to business start-ups for women (2001)
- Development of local networks, on the initiative of the Confederation of Industry, to provide counselling with the aim of promoting female entrepreneurship (2001).
- A series of Female entrepreneurship programmes starting from January 2003 (2003)
- The General Secretariat for Equality, in collaboration with the OAED, implements numerous projects for the reinforcement of women's entrepreneurship during 2004-2006. Two innovations are introduced:
 - Young women/entrepreneurs can (this is financed by the OAED) to establish their own small business, to use their home as their place of business, in case they have pre-school children or care for relatives with a disability, and
 - The fees paid to the day care centre for children will be considered in the documents required (for approval of the proposal) (2004 - 2007).
- Implementation of action plans for equality in businesses, aiming at promoting equal opportunities and the hierarchical advancement of working women within businesses. It is estimated that 7,000 working women will benefit (the project continues also during 2004-2005)
- Special programmes for unemployed women, whose participation is encouraged by the provision of special incentives (2006)
- Special integrated intervention, combining counselling on how to enter into the labour market by either acquiring work experience, subsidization of an employment position, or setting up an independent business activity (beneficiaries: 3,880 women) (2007)
- New Programme "Improvement of the conditions for the inclusion of women from disadvantaged groups into the labour market" (2007)

Promoting Gender Equality Policies in Employment Policy (fourth Pillar)

1. Institutions and Measures (beyond the other pillars) to improve Gender Mainstreaming (7)
 - 13 Regional Centres for Equality (1998)
 - Regional Equality Committees (2000)
 - New Branches of KETHI (1999-2002, 2007)
 - Inter-Ministerial Committee for Gender Mainstreaming
 - Regional 'Information and Counselling Units' for women
 - Regional 'Social Integration Units' for special groups of women
 - The Equality Implementation Guide (2003)
2. Tackling Gender Gaps (23)
 - Information and Entrepreneurship Centres for Women – Now Initiative (1998)
 - Creation of Regional 'Information and Counselling Units' by KETHI for women

(1999-2002, 2007)

- Review of curricula and textbooks in primary and secondary education to remove gender stereotypes (1999, 2001)
- Training and activation of trade unionists on gender equality issues (1999, 2000)
- Awareness of teachers on equality issues – Pilot programme (1999)
- 30% quota for the representation of women civil servants on promotion panels (2000)
- Research projects on pay differentials by gender and career advancement of women (1999, 2000, 2002)
- Development partnerships to promote measures for equality at the workplace and employment of women in new economic sectors (2001)
- Completion of 13 studies directly related to the guidelines in Pillar 4, as part of the programme «Development of KETHI structures – O.P. Combating Exclusion from the Labour market» (2001)
- Extension of provisions to protect pregnant and breast-feeding women in all workplaces (2001)
- Indicators-based monitoring and evaluation of the progress made on equality issues (2002)
- Creation of an Observatory for Equality Issues (in the framework of the EPEAEK) (2002)
- Reform of undergraduate curricula and creation of inter-departmental programmes, seminars or lessons on issues of gender equality (EPEAEK) (2002)
- Incorporation of gender perspective into production of new teaching material for primary, secondary, general and technical education, on the basis of the specifications of the Pedagogical Institute and the Interdisciplinary Framework for Curriculum (2002)
- Changes in the Careers Guidance lesson at school in order to reconstruct stereotyped attitudes to men's and women's professions (2002)
- Positive actions for equal opportunities between men and women in small and medium-sized enterprises and large businesses (2004)
- Provision of supportive services to women belonging to vulnerable groups by specialised structures of the Research Centre for Gender Equality (2006).
- To promote equality between women and men in the educational procedure – combating stereotypes
 - Implementation of education programmes for teachers promoting gender equality (2006)
 - Establishment of an Observatory for Gender Equality in Education in Greece to promote gender studies and gender equality in higher education which is going to operate as a Documentation Centre for the effective and scientific collection, record, and processing of data concerning this field. The Programme is a product of cooperation between the General Secretariat for Gender Equality, which is responsible to plan the gender equality policy in all fields, and the K.E.TH.I., and has a total budget of € 951,000 (2006)
 - Integrated intervention schemes for unemployed women only (2006)
 - 12 projects (in eight Universities and four Technological Education Institutions) in order to reform the undergraduate curricula, by including therein courses on equality (2006) funded by the O. P. “Education and Initial Vocational Training”.
 - Three major Research Programmes (Pythagoras, Heracleitos, Archimedes)

within which several research projects on equality issues have been developed (2006)

- Educational visits/ informational lectures to teachers and pupils of the three last classes of elementary schools/secondary schools/Technical Educational Schools all over Greece (2007)

3. Reconciliation of work and family life measures (29, excluding continuation of measures).

- Extension of opening hours of public kindergartens – pilot programme (1998)
- Daylong Kindergarten (1999 - 2006)
- Daylong primary school (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006)
- Increase of the financial support available for existing after-school Centres of Creative Activities for Children (1998)
- New after-school Centres of Creative Activities for Children (1999 - 2006)
- Extension of opening hours of public nurseries – pilot programme (1998)
- Child-care and nursery centres to be open in the late afternoon (1999-2006)
- New public crèches and nurseries (1999 - 2006)
- Home help programme for the elderly – pilot programme (1998)
- Creation of Social Welfare Units for Care of the Elderly (1999 - 2006)
- Institutions for Social Support and Reintegration of Disabled Individuals, under the Operational Programme ‘Health-Welfare’ 2000-2006 (2001)
- Pilot implementation of afternoon hours in ten public services (2001)
- Development partnerships to promote new patterns of work organisation, facilitating reconciliation of work and family life (2001)
- Programme of cash maternity allowances to working women who cannot claim these benefits from any insurance fund or are uninsured, and also do not have a satisfactory standard of living (2003)
- Programme of subsidies for single-parent families, prepared by the Child Welfare Department of the EOKF (National Organization for Community Care) (2003)
- Children’s Country Camps (EOKF and Social Welfare Department of the local prefecture) (2003)
- Proposal to provide incentives for large corporations to run day-care centres (2005)
- New Code of Civil Servants (Law 3528/2007) (2006):
 - Granting parental leave to fathers as long the mother employee does not make use of it; this right is also recognised to the single parent of single-parent families;
 - In case of birth of a third child or more, it is provided that the employees are granted upbringing leave of three months with full wages;
 - The first three months of the parental leave are paid to parents of many children (after the third child). For every child beyond the third one, the leave after childbirth increases per two more months;
 - The further prolongation of the facilitation of reduced working hours for two more years is provided in case of a fourth child.
 - Facilitations are provided for the mother who adopts a child, in order to make the transition to her new family life easy.
- Positive programme of policy action in a new law on Equal Treatment in employment relations focusing on the private sector. This programme obliges employers to promote equality at the workplace and to provide information to

workers and their representatives about a) the gender composition of employment at different organisational levels and b) the measures they intend to implement in order to improve imbalances.

- The K.E.T.H.I, as a coordinating agency, implements a programme entitled: «Equal Partners: Reconsidering Men's Role at Work and Private Life», which is co-financed by the European Committee (80%) and the General Secretariat for Gender Equality (20%). The project aims at informing and raising public awareness, mainly of men and fathers, in the need of reconciling and harmonizing their work obligations and family life, through redefining stereotypes concerning the role of father (2007)
- The O.P. «Administrative Reform 2007-2013» includes a special priority axis entitled «Reinforcing gender equality policy» (2007). This target refers to:
 - The improvement of quality and effectiveness of gender equality policies planned and implemented in the country;
 - The integration of gender equality in the whole range of public action, at the level of central and local administration, through the alliances with the private sector as well as through activating civil society and N.G.O.s;
 - The reinforcement of the position and participation of women in the public and social sector, and, especially, in decision-making centres.

4. Facilitating return to paid work (4)

- Discounts in employer social security contributions for low-paid workers and the newly hired (Law 2753/1999) (2001)
- Reduction in the Employers' social security cost for underpaid employees (2874/2000) (2000)
- 7.5% premium on hourly wages of employees working 1-3 hours daily (2874/2000) (2000)
- Monthly allowance to long-term unemployed over 35 years who take up part-time jobs of at least 4 hours daily (2874/2000) (2001)

Adaptability

- Law 3250/2004 "Part-time Employment in the Public sector, Local Administration Organizations and Institutions of Public Law": introduction of quotas for women unemployed regarding the background of the personnel to be selected for part-time posts in the public sector: Mothers of minors are engaged by a quota of 20%, while for the first three out of five categories of social groups (mainly long term unemployed above 30) that have preferential treatment of 30%, 20% and 20% respectively, a quota of 60% is filled by women. (2004)

All New Institutions to promote Gender Equality in Employment Policy

Research Centre for Gender Equality (KETHI)

Expansion of the KETHI Information and Counselling for Women Units in the regions.

Staffing the 5 branches of KETHI with trained personnel (60 persons)

Further expansion (5 branches)

Inter-Ministerial Committee for Gender Mainstreaming

Regional Committees for Equality

Regional 'Information and Counselling Units' for women

Regional 'Social Integration Units' for special groups of women

Daylong Kindergarten

Daylong primary School

Creation of Social Welfare Units for Care of the Elderly

Support for existing and creation of new Centres of Creative Activities for Children