

*“The uneasy ‘symbiosis’”. Factionalism and Radical Politics in
Synaspismos.*

Costas Eleftheriou
PhD Candidate
Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration
University of Athens
costasele@gmail.com

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Introduction¹

Synaspismos (Coalition of Left and Progress – From 2003 Coalition of Left, Movements and Ecology) is a radical left party that has marked the Greek party system since 1992. The party was the convergence of several parties and organizations, which constituted the so-called “eniaios Synaspismos”, an electoral coalition formed in 1987. It is the point meeting of two political currents, one of eurocommunist origin expressed by “KKE-es” (Communist party of the Interior) and one of communist origin – “KKE” (Communist Party of Greece). What was significant about Synaspismos was that it managed to combine and synthesize these two currents. However, this convergence caused certain developments in terms of intra-party politics. Factionalism is the most persisting element of Synaspismos’ physiognomy, mainly as a mark of its insistence on intra-party democracy and a stimulus for high fragmentation. Throughout the last 17 years Synaspismos is well-known for the emphasis on issues including the European Union, civil rights, minority rights, its persistent anti-clerical stance and its anti-nationalist rhetoric. Until 2000 Synaspismos could be described as a pro-european left party that favored a mixed-economy model and had an electoral and institutional orientation and a flexible coalition strategy that aimed to a final convergence with PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement).

Since 2000 the party has started to change its political orientation and strategy, addressing more radical positions in some matters and formulating SYRIZA (Coalition of Radical Left) an electoral coalition with several parties and organizations from the extra-parliamentary left. This ‘left turn’ was organized inside the party through a domination of the leftist faction over the renewers.

This paper’s aim is to explain Synaspismos’ so-called ‘left turn’ in terms of intra-party politics. Following Panebianco’s theories of party evolution and party change, we shall argue that this turn is a result of both external and internal factors, while its limits are defined by the party’s genetic model. The main cores of our analysis are the party’s power structure and factions and how the above mentioned political re-orientation affects intra-party competition.

We define as Synaspismos’ genetic traits its centralist, with relatively autonomous and weak local branches, structure and formal factionalism. Our hypothesis is that Synaspismos’ coalitional origin influenced the party’s evolution into a centralized but fragmented party. From its beginning there were two main political currents that fought for the party’s control, both at ideological and strategic levels. The first current, the so-called “renewalist”, emphasized in the party’s pro-european orientation and called for a left identity that was free from communist elements. The second current, the leftist, held a critical stance against the soviet model and tried to build a radical left identity with a soft euroscepticist stance. Electoral failure and certain developments in Greek political system favored a ‘radical turn’, imposed by the leftists through a zero-sum game with the renewers. This turn was characterized by the implementation of a new coalitional strategy


¹ The author wishes to thank his colleagues at the ‘Organized Interests Seminar’ held by the University of Athens “Political Communication Unit” for their insightful comments and especially Professor Michalis Spourdalakis for his help and support.

(SYRIZA) and by youth's enhancement that ensured the leftists' domination. Nevertheless, Synaspismos' genetic code seems to jeopardize 'left turn' integration, defining its limitations.

In the first part we will describe Synaspismos' evolution, its power structure and its factions. In the second part we will explain the 'left turn' and its effects both in the party's power structure and factional competition.

1. Synaspismos' evolution

Our theoretical base stems from Panebianco's theory of party evolution². Panebianco has formulated an explanatory model by discerning two stages of party evolution. The first stage is the so-called 'genetic model'³ that refers to a party's birthmarks. There are three elements that determine a party's genetic model: a) its birth through territorial penetration or territorial diffusion, b) its internal or external legitimization and c) the presence or not of charismatic leader. *Penetration* occurs 'when the center controls, stimulates, or directs the development of the periphery'⁴. *Diffusion* occurs 'when development results from spontaneous germination: local elites construct party associations which are only later integrated into a national organization'⁵. Parties developed through penetration tend to obtain a centralist structure, while parties developed through diffusion assimilate to a de-centralized structure. The second stage is a party's *institutionalization*⁶; a phase that a party consolidates its genetic traits and formulates an organizational culture. There are two indicators that define the degree of institutionalization, the party's autonomy from its environment and the party's degree of systemness. The first indicator refers to the resource exchange process between an organization and its environment, the latter including a party's ancillary or collateral organizations. The second indicator assesses the degree of interdependence between a party's sub-groups. A highly institutionalized party dominates its environment and possesses a high degree of systemness. A party of low institutionalization tends to adapt to his environment, while there are loose connections between its sub-groups, or a domination of one subgroup over the others.



² Panebianco, A. (1988), *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

³ Ibid, 50-53

⁴ Ibid, 50

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid, 53-59

Figure 1: Panebianco's theory of party evolution

Panebianco's basic assumption is that a party organization is a conservative organization, where change can only be the result of a combination between external and internal factors. A party's dominant coalition – which is the party's leadership, as a coalition between factions leading figures that control a party's zones of uncertainty – is formulated at the time of a party's birth, under the influence of certain genetic traits. During the first phase it is the party's leadership that forms the party's identity and goals, providing a system of collective incentives to its members. Through the phase of institutionalization the party organization starts to develop its own preservation goals, providing at this time a system of selective incentives for its members. At this time a party's genetic code – its genetic features – determines the conditions under which a party functions and poses some constraints to its change. In the second chapter we will exhibit the conditions under which, according to Panebianco, a party changes. This does not mean of course that there is a single path of party evolution and that Panebianco's types are 'close'. In many cases there are combinations of the above mentioned procedures and the party-types are hybrid, as Synaspismos for instance.




Figure 2: Synaspismos' evolution according to Panebianco's model

1.1 The founding congress

Synaspismos' genetic model has a significant distinctiveness from Panebianco's initial formulation. The party which was founded in June 1992 constituted the evolution of a former electoral coalition's evolution into a party, after a great split into the Greek Communist Party which had taken place some months before. Synaspismos at its first form was a political agreement between the leaders of the two main radical left parties, KKE and EAR, aiming to penetrate PASOK'S electorate and become the new opposite pole against New Democracy. This tactical choice was facilitated by Soviet Union's

policy change under Gorbachev and the split that took place inside KKE-es at 1986⁷. These incidents enhanced both parties' right-wingers. KKE-es was re-founded as EAR (Greek Left) and the latter along with KKE signed the so-called "Common Conclusion" at the end of 1987.

The responses to this electoral strategy were mixed. For many members of both parties the collaboration with New Democracy in 1989 was considered as a "disgrace" for the greek left, while for others Synaspismos was the only vehicle for a better performance and they supported its evolution to a single unified party. The latter was the object of a great dispute inside KKE, which was intensified after the Soviet Union's collapse. During the critical 13th Congress (February 1991) the "orthodox" faction superseded the "renewers" electing Aleca Papanicolaou as the party's new General Secretary against Yannis Dragassakis⁸. The right-wingers declared their intentions to support Synaspismos by participating to its "Panhellenic Assembly" in June 1991. The counterparts from EAR insisted on Synaspismos evolution to a single party while the KKE-based were relatively cautious about this perspective. KKE's orthodox majority withdrew the party from the coalition, forcing at the same time the right-wingers' to exit. It is estimated that about the two fifths of KKE's membership basis including half the Political Bureau and Central Committee were ousted from the party and entered Synaspismos a few months later. The resolution for the conduct of the Founding Congress in June 1992 was the result of an intra-coalition referendum in January 1992 and was almost unanimous.

The Founding Congress transformed Synaspismos to a single party and formulated its basic ideological and organizational principles. In the Resolution what was declared was its enthusiastic support of European integration, its distance to social democracy and "socialist totalitarianism", a soft support of market economy and a will to interact with several social movements, including the women's movement and the ecological movement. Dispute rose over amongst two matters: the coalition strategies and the matter of factionalism. At this point the former EAR delegates stressed the need to enhance Synaspismos as an autonomous party, while the former KKE delegates were more "open" to a possible collaboration with PASOK. The final formulation was in favor of a cautious stance towards PASOK. The second matter was the role of factions – "taseis" in Synaspismos' vocabulary – in the intra-party procedures. For most of the delegates the legitimate functioning of factions was extremely significant for enhancing intra-party democracy. What was discussed was the factions' degree of autonomy and organization. In the 1992 statutes⁹ it was stated that "it is recognized the potential for the existence and functioning of tendencies and currents [...] tendencies do not necessarily permanent

⁷ KKE-es split took place after the party's 4th Congress (May 1986). There were two main factions at that moment: the left-wingers around General Secretary Yannis Baniyas (Anavathmissi – Enhancement) and the right-wingers around Leonidas Kyrkos (Metekseliksi – Advancement). The dispute was about the abandonment or not of the party's communist title and symbols. The left-wingers left the party, founding KKE-es – Ananeotiki Aristera (Communist Party of the Interior – Renewing Left), while those who remained re-founded the party as EAR – Elliniki Aristera (Greek Left). See Alexatos Y. (2008), *Historical dictionary of the greek workers' movement*, Athina: Geitonies tou Kosmou, 245—251 [In Greek]

⁸ For KKE's 13th Congress see Smith O. (1993), "The Greek Communist Party in the Post-Gorbachev Era" in Bell D.S. (ed.), *Western European Communism and the Collapse of Communism*, Oxford: Berg and Doukas G. (1991), "The thirteenth congress of the KKE: Defeat of the renovators", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 7:3, 393—398

⁹ "Avgi" 5.07.1992

groups, they are not party miniatures with vertical organizational structure and bodies or with their own discipline”¹⁰. And below it was stressed that “the current point of view to this problem is transitional...in the next congress the experience accumulated by this new institution will determine its statutory formulation”¹¹. The basic organizational principle was “unity in diversity”. This relatively loose definition allowed the development of the first “organized” factions, while the statutes’ interpretation on this matter was a permanent stake for all factions, especially in times of tense polarization.

1.2 The organizational and power structure

Therefore, Synaspismos’ genetic model presents two basic traits: formal and established factionalism and a centralist organizational structure with relatively weak and autonomous local branches. The two main counterparts – KKE “renewers” and EAR – were carrying close organizational traditions, which were centralist with a stress – in EAR case – in intra-party democracy. The development of the party structure took the form of territorial penetration, although there were elements of territorial diffusion. In several cases there was a revival and unification of the former KKE and EAR local branches, while there was a respectable number of non-aligned leftists who entered the party individually. In other words there was diffusion in the upper levels and penetration as the party developed downwards.

During the initial processes of the Panhellenic Assembly, a year before the first Congress, the leaderships of the constituent parties and organizations rapidly created a powerful central body– the so called Executive Committee – that was coordinating the coalition’s actions. The Central Political Committee that was elected after the 1st Congress, consisted mainly of members of the former Executive Committee. Maria Damanaki – former KKE deputy - was the first president elected, almost unanimously.

Synaspismos’ structure in 1992 at central level consisted of the a) Central Political Committee (C.P.C.) as the main collective body, elected by the Congress, b) the Political Secretariat (P.S.), elected by C.P.C. and c) the President, also elected by the C.P.C. At local level the party was organized through local branches – the Members’ Political Movements (P.M.) – and at intermediate level through Prefectural Committees (P.C.) that were coordinating the activity of a prefecture’s local branches. There were also professional branches, social movement branches and youth branches.

The main source of power inside Synaspismos seems to be the Central Political Committee and the Political Secretariat. The former elected the President and directed the Congresses’ resolutions implementation inside the party, while the latter, being consisting of the most distinguished counterparts of each faction, led the party’s activity between the CPC’s assemblies and determines their agenda. The President’s position was enhanced after the 1993 extraordinary congress that elected Nikos Konstantopoulos as the party’s new leader. Konstantopoulos was also elected directly by the congress delegates after the 2nd Congress (March 1996), causing the leftists’ reaction and abstention at the election. It can also be argued that apart from the structural redefinition of the President’s position in the party’s power structure, Konstantopoulos was a charismatic leader, more successful than his predecessor Maria Damanaki and extremely

¹⁰ Article 2, Paragraph 5

¹¹ Ibid

popular not only inside the party but also in general. Alavanos' election, eight years after, introduced a more complex leadership nexus. The new statutes (2005)¹² established apart from the president there was established the position of the CPC's Secretary, holding a significant role inside party's procedures and after Tsipras' election (2008) – who was the first non parliamentarian president - , Alavanos' position as parliamentary group leader resulted to a dualism that finally broadened the leftists' domination as it will be shown below.

The relative autonomy of the local branches is concrete in the candidate selection procedures, especially for the municipal elections. Theoretically the local branch determines the party's stance in local elections, in accordance with every prefecture's or municipality's particularity. Coalition strategy – mostly with PASOK candidates – is determined by three factors: *first the capacity of the branch*, in terms of adequate resources to support a candidate of its own. Considering the fact that Synaspismos' organizational strength lies in certain urban areas – Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, Patras – it is possible for many weak branches to provide their support of other party's candidates. *Second the state of local politics* can also determine a strategy and *thirdly the party's overall strategy* during the elections. In municipalities or prefectures that are considered of great political importance, leadership decides about the candidates consulting the branches' secretaries¹³. Until 2002 the overall orientation favored coalition-seeking strategies, while after 2004 priority was given to single candidacies.

In the decision – making processes the dependence of local branches on the centre is more obvious. Despite the fact that there are certain channels through which members and local branches can participate in the formation of the program – like the Permanent Congress which is usually held before elections -, approve CPC's resolutions – every resolution is discussed in every local branch between its members and a CPC delegation – and express their disapproval of leadership's strategies – through referendum – it seems that Synaspismos' members accept central party's lead in central politics matters. As Zielonka-Goei¹⁴ put it “they marginalize themselves”. On the contrary they tend to assert their right to participate and their autonomy, when it comes to local politics. In the only candidate selection procedure where the electorate stands for all Synaspismos members, - the european elections ballot rank referendum - participation ranges between 50% and 70%.

¹² http://www.syn.gr/downloads/SYN_katastatiko.pdf [In Greek]

¹³ There are two eloquent examples for the above mentioned in the municipality of Athens. In 1998 elections the decision for Damanaki's candidacy with PASOK's support was taken without the Prefectural Organization's approval, while in 2006 elections P.O.'s suggestion for Papayannakis' candidacy was ignored in favor of Alexis Tsipras.

¹⁴ Zielonka-Goei, Mei Lan (1992) “Members marginalising themselves? Intra-party participation in the Netherlands”, *West European Politics*, 15:2, 93 -- 106




Figure 3: Synaspismos' Organogram (Source: Statutes 2005)

Synaspismos' membership basis, according to a P.S. member, is "old and introvert". This can be assured from Table 2, where the size is almost equal from 1994 to 2009, but more important is the member participatory culture, which should be the object of future research. One of the most crucial effects from the so-called "left turn" was the spread of a movement-based participation culture throughout a significant part of Synaspismos' member community, as we will see below.

1.3 Factions

Synaspismos' second genetic trait, as we mentioned above, is its formal and institutionalized factionalism. We use here the term faction to refer to any "intra-party grouping which exists for a certain period of time, possesses a minimum of organization, exhibits a common group-consciousness, actively pursues political goals...within a party and which thus can be discerned as a bloc within the party"¹⁵. Studying Synaspismos' factional continuum, one can easily understand that the party is highly fragmented, its factions have reached to a certain level of organization and intra-party competition tends to be polarized and conflict-based. This Synaspismos specificity, i.e. a centralized structure combined with high factional fragmentation, stems from its coalitional background – its main counterparts represent two relatively different political traditions – and the issue of intra-party democracy, which was a statutory care. Nevertheless, in the statutes there is a clear reference: "Synaspismos is a party politically and organizationally unified. It is not the sum of special political groups".

¹⁵ Köllner, P. and Basedau, M. (2005), "Factionalism in Political Parties: An Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies", DUI/GOI Working Paper, No. 12

The length and the limits of factional action weren't very evident, while in times in great polarization the divisions were extremely visible and acute. The level of organization is defined by the intra-party power correlations. The leftists, for instance, have embraced a more delicate, though informal, structure during the renewers' domination. On the other hand the renewers formulated their structure after 2004. In general, a faction intervened during the congresses, CPC sessions and PS meetings. The majority faction was trying to impose its propositions either with a consensual or a conflicting logic. The minority faction was intervening by proposing amendments on the resolutions or by different propositions. In cases of great polarization the factions' vertical structure is being enhanced, while there is an horizontal communication that controls any tensions. Inside the factions the divisions are expressed through their informal bodies, namely the Secretariat – which is constituted by the P.S. members, MP's and the most important CPC and PO officials – and when the stakes are high through the factions' Panhellenic Conferences¹⁶.

Panebianco uses the term “dominant coalition” to describe the coalition between factions and persons that controls the “zones of uncertainty” inside a party. Harmel and Janda¹⁷ contribute a typology that defines the sub-units of the “dominant coalition”. The “dominant faction” is the faction that can determine the strategies and the political orientation of a party, the “participative factions” contribute to the decision-making process and the “outside factions”¹⁸ or “minority elites”¹⁹ are factions excluded or marginalized from the dominant coalition.

Until 2000 Synaspismos' dominant coalition was constituted by three factions. The first faction was “Paremvassi” (Intervention), a group of officials that were directly supporting Konstantopoulos. “Paremvassi” was formed during the 1993 Congress to support Konstantopoulos' candidacy for President. It included mostly former EAR (Lykoudis, Pitsiorlas, Papadimoulis, Theodorakopoulou) and some ex-KKE officials (Balafas, Karangoules). In 1993 they elected Konstantopoulos in the second round against Alavanos, with the support of Papayannakis' faction. In the 2nd Congress they merged with the latter into a single ballot, reelecting Konstantopoulos and marginalizing the leftists at many levels. Papayannakis' faction or “Syspeirossi” (Clustering) was the oldest faction in the party. Papayannakis at the first Congress decided not to participate in the common ballot, filling a separate one. In 1993 he was a candidate for the presidency and after 1993 the initial faction was formulated into “Forum”, a faction with a strong pro-european and ecological orientation. In the 2nd Congress the faction was presented as “EROIKA” (European, Radical and Ecological Left) and along with Paremvassi re-elected Konstantopoulos. Syspeirossi was in favor of a possible convergence with PASOK, especially after Costas Simitis addressed at the 2nd Congress his speech about the “Centre-Left Space”. Its members were mostly ex-EAR officials. Close to “Syspeirossi” there was a smaller and not ideologically distant faction around ex-EAR

¹⁶ The renewers organized their first Conferences after 2001 (as Panelladika Syntonistika), while for the leftists this was a common practice from 1993. These procedures suppose to be open and public, while there are no formal regulations for their conduct, no minutes are kept etc.

¹⁷ Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994), “An integrated theory of party goals and party change.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6:3, 274—275

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Barberà, O. (2008), “Political alliances and organizational change in political parties: a framework for analysis”, ICPS Working Paper, No. 270, 7

officials, with most important Dimitris Hadjisocratis and Theodoros Margaritis. After 1993 it was formulated as “Ananeotiki Protovoulia” (Renewal Initiative), placing itself at the renewal wing. During the 2nd Congress, along with EAR’s former Secretary Fotis Kouvelis they formed “Enotiki Protovoulia” (Union Initiative) distancing themselves from Paremvasi and Syspeirossi. Hadjisocratis posed an extremely critical stance against Simitis’ address, rejecting any potential for collaboration. After 1996 they gradually merged with “Syspeirossi”. A distinctive feature of the renewers’ factions is their extremely loose structure compared to cadre party’s, consisting mainly by certain party cadres and their supporters.




Figure 4: The “renewers”

On the other side, the minority faction of the dominant coalition was “Aristero Revma” (Left Current). “Aristero Revma” core was constituted by former KKE officials²⁰ and KKE-es left-wingers²¹. The leftists were always influencing the relative majority of Synaspismos’ membership basis, especially in the grassroots. Their organizational culture was more disciplined and centralist and their structure cohesive and concrete. Since the 1st Congress they had lost ideological hegemony to the “renewers”, providing a more organization-based strategy. They have been formulated as an organized faction shortly before the 1993 Extraordinary Congress, to support to Alavanos’ candidacy. Their marginalization after Konstantopoulos’ election forced them to develop a strict vertical structure in three hierarchical levels and coordinators per prefecture. Nevertheless, their influence in the grassroots is evident mainly from the euro-ballot intra-party elections results, where Alavanos both in 1994 and 1999 surpassed Papayannakis. Their ideological orientation included a soft euroscepticism – which has grown, especially after 1998, - stress on the role of the state in economic development and a negative stance against a possible convergence with PASOK. In the 2nd Congress it was the members of “Aristero Revma” who aggressively rejected Simitis’ proposition and tried to avoid a further enhancement of Konstantopoulos’ power, by rejecting his direct election from the

²⁰ Including the renewers’ candidate for KKE’s leadership Yannis Dragassakis, members of Political Bureau and Central Committee Panayotis Lafazanis, Alecos Alavanos, Dimitri Stratoulis, Nikos Chountis.

²¹ Nikos Voutsis, Alecos Flampouraris and former Rigas Fereos (KKE-es Youth Organization) secretary Nikos Filis

delegates. Their insistence in this matter and the convergence of the renewers' factions cost them the majority in the C.P.C., which resulted to their gradual marginalization until 2000. During these 4 years they built their rhetoric around the centre-left axis: “[Our party] cannot direct the society, embracing a blurring centre-left constellation”²². On the other side for its members the functioning of “Aristero Revma” was considered by its members as an upgrading compared to the personalized logic that the other factions were following. “The creation and the functioning of Aristero Revma was characteristic of a tendency or ideological current... it refused of the personalized tendency, the machine-tendency and the occasional rallying before the Congress”²³. “Aristero Revma” structure was more of a mass party, with vertical aggregation and loose hierarchy.




Figure 5: The “leftists”

The logic of intra-party competition could be considered as, at least until 2000, as consensus-based and factional polarization low. The two main renewers' factions were lacking of a vertical structure, while for leftists vertical structure was a necessary reaction to renewers' domination. In addition, there was a horizontal deliberation between the factions, at the level of P.S. and C.P.C., and a tendency for synthetic resolutions. The key factor of this consensus-based logic was Nikos Konstantopoulos himself who was functioning as an intermediate between the factions, keeping intra-party balances. Konstantopoulos had the advantage that he was not coming from the traditional left organizations and he wasn't connected with the great disputes that took place in the 70's and 80's. He was one of PASOK's founding members, leaving the party a year after, the founder of a small group named “Sosialistiki Poreia” (Socialist March), a lawyer with a progressive professional course and one of Andreas Papandreou prosecutors during 1989-90 trials. He was praised for his integrity and his eloquence, but mostly for the fact his popularity exceeded Synaspismos. In that sense Konstantopoulos' presence was absorbing any tensions accrued and imposed moderate solutions.

²² Vitsas D. (1997), “On Centre-left”, *Alpha*, 20, 3—5

²³ Chountis N. (1998), “Coalition of the Left: a united, multi-tendency party”, *Alpha*, 27, 8—9

Nevertheless, the ideological distance between the leftists and the renewers was causing clashes in terms of programmatic discourse and political strategy. For instance the 1998 coalition strategy in the municipality of Athens and its failure, caused a dispute and during the 1999 Permanent Congress for the Amsterdam treaty²⁴. The leftists' proposal was to reject the Treaty, while Papayannakis was in favor of "yes". Finally Konstantopoulos intervened proposing a moderate solution.

Concerning their zones of influence inside Synaspismos' membership basis there are two preliminary observations that must be done. First that there is a respectable number of "non-aligned partisans"²⁵ that determine the current intra-party power correlation and secondly that in Synaspismos there is a culture of personalized politics that sometimes transcends ideological factors. That explains for example why Alavanos was first in votes in the 1994 and 1999 referenda for the European election ballots and the renewers the majority in the CPC after the 2nd Congress. Or why Papadimoulis was successful during leftists' domination. On the other side there are certain regions and branches that endure as solid support bases. For the leftists their strength is based in the urban areas and in almost every local branch. In addition they dominate in the professional branches and after 2000 in the youth organization. The renewers had an important influence in the party's intellectuals – Hadjisocratis was "Avgi"'s (Dawn) editor for many years – and mainly in urban areas. Their stronger presence is recorded in the P.O of Northern Athens, 2nd Salonica, Achaia, Kilkis and Xanthi. They have presence in all Synaspismos' branches. Mobilization among the opposite factions was nearly nonexistent²⁶.

As we will see in the second part, the so-called "left turn" caused several changes in many aspects of Synaspismos' political life, including the factions' functioning and organization and the intra-party competition logic.

2. The 'left turn'

Our approach in this part is based in Panebianco's theory of party change, its re-evaluation by Harmel and Janda and Wilson's²⁷ model of party transformation. As we mentioned above, Panebianco assumes that party change is the result of an external stimulus that mobilizes alterations inside a party's dominant coalition concerning as well its composition and conformation. The goal of organizational stability is always an

²⁴ Tsakatika, M. (2009), "From a 'critical yes' to a pro-european 'no'. What has changed in Synaspismos' european orientation?" *International and European Politics*, 13-14, pp. 157-158 [In Greek] and <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=7167> [In Greek]

²⁵ Rose, R. (1964), "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain", *Political Studies*, 12:1, p. 38 and Sartori, G., (2005), *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 67

²⁶ Due to the leftists' high degree of solidarity and cohesion there is almost no movement of members to the renewers. On the contrary the renewers' factions were highly mobilized between them until 2004 when gradually started to integrate. Nevertheless, there is no movement to "Aristero Revma". The above mentioned refer to the factions' candidates for the C.P.C. for the six Congresses.

²⁷ Wilson, F. (1994). "The Sources of Party Change: The Social Democratic Parties of Britain, France, Germany and Spain.", in Lawson, K. (ed.), *How political parties work: perspectives from within*, Westport: Praeger, 263--265.

important aim for a dominant coalition, so it seems that Panebianco’s approach does not count the intense of intra party conflict in party change procedures. Harmel and Janda recognize two dynamics that can cause change inside a party, a leadership crisis and factional conflict²⁸. Barberà associates the above mentioned internal factors with ‘substantial variations’ in an organization’s exchanges with its environment²⁹. If we surpass Panebianco’s deterministic logic we can draw a conclusion from his hypotheses. A party’s genetic traits and level of institutionalization can draw the limits inside which a party’s transformation can take place. This can always mean that the dominant coalition’s composition and conformation can change, but not its internal power structure. A change is always organized within the current institutional framework and every change that aims to transcend this framework results to a totally different organization, a different party. In that sense a party organization that has formulated its own “survival” goals it is possible to pose certain constraints to anything that threatens it. If the dominant coalition is recognized by its monopoly in controlling a party’s zones of uncertainty, which means that there is a neutral apparatus being used for the exercise of this control. In Michels’ words an ‘oligarchy’. Of course an organization’s survival is connected with its capacity on achieving the party goals. But there are certain transformations that transcend its short-term goals influencing not only one party’s evolution, but the whole party system. Wilson³⁰ argues that party transformation is the result of a series of external factors, which affect different aspects of a party’s change. Socio-economic transformations and changes in a system’s political culture can explain long-term movements, while they have serious impact on more direct factors, such as the political institutions and party competition, which affect closely a party’s transformation.




Figure 5: The ‘left turn’

²⁸ Harmel and Janda, op.cit, 266—268

²⁹ Barberà, op.cit, 9

³⁰ Wilson, op.cit.

2.1 First phase (2000-2004)

In Synaspismos case change there has been a combination of certain factors. First of all, during the period 1998-2000 the convergence with PASOK fell through due to bad electoral results. Damanaki's experiment in Athens failed and during 2000 general elections PASOK's 'double expansion' strategy reduced Synaspismos' results from the previous elections. At the same time a group of 16 CPC members reacting to the party's hostility against PASOK, decided to leave forming a small organization named AEKA (Renewalist and Modernizing Movement of Left). There were also some Synaspismos' officials who participated in governmental positions, raising moral issues in the party's membership³¹. All these caused a sudden change in the dominant coalition's composition. Gradually a part of Paremvassi – officials close to the president, like Pitsiorlas – started to approximate the former KKE-es members of "Aristero Reyma" – Voutsis, Flavouraris - in order to impose a different political orientation. During the 3rd Congress "Aristero Revma" managed to elect 46 members for the C.P.C. and along with "Paremvassi" supported Konstantopoulos' candidacy for a third term.

Support to a convergence with PASOK strategy appeared to be waning, while basic political directions of the party – like the pro-european stance – were doubted. Synaspismos' 'strategic goal' according to the Resolution was 'the socialist transformation of greek society' through the formation of 'a Modern, Democratic and Radical Party of the Left'³².

In general 'left turn's' first phase (2000-2004) included several changes in certain aspects of Synaspismos' party life, mainly its political orientation and strategies. From 2001 to 2004 Synaspismos strategy centered upon three axes: the first one was the connection with anti-globalization movement. Synaspismos' officials took part in Prague (September 2000) and Genoa (July 2001) demonstrations and in the World Social Forum proceedings in Porto Alegre (2001, 2002, 2003). On February 2003 Synaspismos co-founded along with radical left organizations and movements "Greek Social Forum", which was of the 2005 European Social Forum co-organizers, held in Athens. In the context of Greek Social Forum, Synaspismos interacted with radical left organizations and activists, an interaction that influenced a small part of Synaspismos' membership basis. During the 3rd Congress "Kokkino-Prasino Diktyo" (Red-Left Network) appeared, a small leftist faction consisted of activists participating in early expressions of the anti-globalization movement – like the 1995 euro-marches – that addressed an extremely movement-orientated discourse³³. At the same time Synaspismos' local branches started to coordinate their activities with Forum's branches and embody local environmental movements.

The second axis included joint initiatives with radical left parties and organizations under a coalitional perspective. "Space of Dialogue and Common Action of Left" was a coordination of Synaspismos with parties and organizations at central level that prepared inter-plays for the forthcoming elections. In the 2002 municipal and prefectural elections

³¹ For example, during 3rd Congress members of the OSE (Organization of Greek Railways) local branch demanded Nikos Gratsias', an ex CPC member, exclusion from the proceedings, due to the latter's appointment as OSE's President from Costas Simitis three years ago.

³² "3rd Congress Political Resolution" <http://www.syn.gr/downloads/apofasi3ou.pdf> [In Greek]

³³ See the faction's declaration during the 3rd Congress

<http://www.geocities.com/redgreendiktyo/protokeimenokokpras.htm> [In Greek]

Synaspismos supported 55 candidates ‘of left and ecological origin’³⁴. The last axis was the formation of the European Left Party³⁵. Synaspismos was one the main counterparts of the Party, holding its 1st Congress in Athens on October 8, 2005. They also participated as observers in the European Anticapitalist Left.

Following Panebianco’s terminology it seems that there was ‘a succession of ends’ i.e. an identity change. First of all the Programmatic Congress (May, 30 – June, 1 2003) decided the party’s renaming to ‘Synaspismos tes Aristeras, ton Kinimaton kai tes Ekologias’ (Coalition of Left, of Movements and Ecology). In the ‘Programmatic Directions’³⁶ voted, there were certain references in ‘a neoliberal globalization under United States hegemony...that formulates for Europe a framework more different than the one encountered at the first stages of European Integration’ and that Europe’s social character is threatened. PASOK under Simitis ‘has implemented a consensual neoliberal programme...and its politics...have transformed it [PASOK] into an authoritative party’. Synaspismos tried to formulate a radical left identity, with a stress on material issues – state-centered economic policy, employment – and an internationalist character.

In terms of faction politics during these 4 years there was a consolidation of leftists’ domination. The ‘Directions’ were voted by the 80% of the delegates and the change of the name was approved by 60%³⁷. For the 2004 General Elections there was formulated on December 2003 an electoral coalition between Synaspismos, KOE (Communist Organization of Greece)– a maoist group -, AKOA (Renewalist, Communist and Ecological Left) – Baniias’ party -, DEA (Internationalist Worker’s Left) – a trotskyst sect – and a few others small organizations and well-known personalities, like Manolis Glezos. The coalition’s name was SYRIZA (Coalition of Radical Left). SYRIZA’s role and orientation was the subject of a great debate inside the party, which in a sense determined Synaspismos’ agenda, especially after 2004.

2.2 Second Phase (2004-2009)

Konstantopoulos withdrawal from the presidency a little after the 2004 elections raised a serious leadership crisis inside Synaspismos that undermined the previous consensus-based logic in intra-party competition. The leftists’ candidate was Alecos Alavanos, the renewers’ Michalis Papayannakis and a third candidate was Christophoros Papadopoulos from “Kokkino-Prasino Diktyo” faction. Alavanos was elected in the first round with 58.5%, Papayannakis received 33.18% and Papadopoulos 6.94%. In the CPC the leftists increased their influence – from 46 to 61 members-, and supported the members of “Paremvassi” who supported ‘left turn’ 4 years ago – as Pitsiorlas, Karangoules and Theodorakopoulou. It was notable the CPC’s renewal with youth officials as Alexis Tsipras, Andreas Karitzis and Costas Poulakis, while youth organization’s secretary Tasos Koronakis was ex officio member of CPC. Youth’s enhanced role was established through the new Statutes as well as with the introduction of a new institution, CPC’s

³⁴ “Avgi”, 19.07.02

³⁵ See Skevofylax P. (2009), *European Left and European Integration: study of the relationship through a critical assessment of party euroscepticism theories*, unpublished MA thesis, Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens

³⁶ <http://www.syn.gr/downloads/program2003.pdf> [In Greek]

³⁷ <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=2147> [In Greek]

Secretary. Before the April 2005 Statutory Congress, the leftists proposed that the President should be elected by CPC. After renewers' reactions they modified their proposal initiating a Secretary position as a counter balance to the President's power. The first CPC Secretary was Nikos Chountis.

What was new about Synaspismos' intra-party politics was the higher factional polarization and the introduction of a conflict-based logic in inter-faction relations. The renewers started gradually to integrate in order to face majority's challenges. There was a split in Paremvassi, where members disagreeing with the previous convergence with the leftists formed 'Aristeri Ananeoisi' (Left Renewal). The latter managed to extract many Paremvassi's members, especially in the grassroots, and succeeded a relatively high level of organization – which was not a Paremvassi's feature. Syspeirossi has multiplied its attacks against the leftists, along with Paremvassi and Ananeoisi in many cases. SYRIZA's orientation and organization was considered as an extremely serious matter, mainly whether Synaspismos will fall back in favor of stronger SYRIZA. A clash has taken place before the 2004 European elections, considering the candidates' rank in the ballot, resulting to the departure of some of SYRIZA constituents³⁸, while in the intra-party referendum Dimitris Papadimoulis – the renewers' candidate – surprisingly overran Chountis.

Nevertheless, 'left turn' was consolidated through further SYRIZA's enhancement and Synaspismos' participation in a series of actions as the university students' movement on June 2006, the teachers' strike a few months earlier and the European Social Forum proceedings. Synaspismos' new target group was 'neolea' (the youths), being considered as a new political subject³⁹, 'an autonomous social category with inter-class character'⁴⁰. In that sense Synaspismos' functioned as a 'parliamentary delegate' of the students' movement, while at the same time chose Alexis Tsipras as the party's candidate for Athens, against P.O.'s recommendation for Papayannakis. In the 2006 municipal elections insisted 'in the formation of municipal and prefectural movements based on SYRIZA'⁴¹, a strategy that caused disputes between the leadership and some local branches – for example Nea Smyrni, Zografos.

These developments forced the three factions of the renewers to converge in a single faction 'Ananeotiki Pteryga' (Renewal Wing). In the 2007 Permanent Programmatic Congress 11 CPC members from the three factions suggested SYRIZA's dissolution, pointing out that 'the confusion between movements and electoral coalitions is harmful for both of them'⁴². Chountis' response in his speech was that SYRIZA 'is the answer in the problem of Left's fragmentation, makes Left's interference against neoliberalism and two-partyism more effective, gives political perspective to the movements' struggles and is a choice attuned to the Congress Resolutions'⁴³. The 'Declaration'⁴⁴ approved was a

³⁸ They supported the ballot "Gynaikes gia mia alli Evropi" (Women for another Europe).

³⁹ Katsabekis Y. (2008), "Towards a new populism of the Left? Explanations for the present conditions and possible developments", paper presented at the "Modern Greek Politics" Conference, Centre of Political Studies, Panteion University [In Greek]

⁴⁰ CPC Resolution 'Left and youths: a dynamic relationship, a relationship of subversion', CPC Assembly September 17-18, 2005 <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=7225> [In Greek]

⁴¹ CPC Resolution 'Political developments, party's course and action programming', CPC Assembly January 21-22, 2006 <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=7226> [In Greek]

⁴² <http://www.syn.gr/downloads/eisigisi02.pdf> [In Greek]

⁴³ <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=5280> [In Greek]

mixture of anti-neoliberal and euroscepticist elements. A few months later (June 2007) Ananeotiki Pteryga was officially unified, holding its 1st Panhellenic Conference. The faction declared its attachment to a pro-european orientation, expressing its disenchantment by the party's strategies: 'the notorious 'transformation' of the party transforms it to a simple demonstration power that doubts the value of addressing positive proposals for the present, chooses entrenchment and stereotypes, does not care about central politics issues and falls back into neo-communist perceptions and practices'⁴⁵. Concerning the logic of intra-party competition it was recognized that 'today's situation is problematic...all of us are living in an extremely conflicting and polarized climate'⁴⁶. It is significant that Pteryga has developed a relatively high degree of organization, equivalent to leftists' in the '90s. As Sartori puts it: 'organization elicits organization'⁴⁷.

The considerable increase in SYRIZA's quotas in the 2007 general elections has enhanced the belief that current strategy is a successful one: 'we managed to give a new dynamic to the unity left project and express the movements, the people of labor and the youth that resist neoliberalism'⁴⁸. In the 5th Congress (February 7-10, 2008) Alavanos stood down in favor of Tsipras, who was elected as a president achieving the 70.6% of the votes. The leftists managed to elect 76 CPC members, including 17 that were former youth organization's officials. This impressive renewal, both in leadership and CPC, furthered leftists' domination as well as their radical left orientation. Tsipras' opponent, Fotis Kouvelis, managed to achieve a 28.67% of the votes. In the Resolution⁴⁹ there are optimistic remarks for the party's and the coalition's future and several programmatic positions are repeated in a stricter sense: 'the party must consolidate and enhance its ideological and political identity'⁵⁰.

Following Panebianco's scheme, it seems that the above mentioned changes in the party's identity and orientation and the simultaneous introduction of new institutions produce a change in the dominant coalition conformation. With regard to Synaspismos' exchanges with its environment, the party's autonomy is reducing especially after SYRIZA's enhancement. It can be stated that there is a system of mutual exchanges, in which the other SYRIZA constituents use Synaspismos' resources in order to intervene in central stage of greek politics – and promote their own candidates – and the leftists use SYRIZA as a left 'contagion' to ensure their domination inside the party. That explains the fact that in SYRIZA's Secretariat Synaspismos' delegates are from 'Aristero Revma' and 'Kokkino-Prasino Diktyo' and that for many of SYRIZA constituents, the renewers are considered as political opponents⁵¹. Youth's⁵² enhancement also modified the party's

⁴⁴ http://www.syn.gr/downloads/diakirixi_7_3.pdf [In Greek]

⁴⁵ Stefanos Bageorgos' speech at the 1st Panhellenic Conference of Ananeotiki Pteryga, <http://www.ananeotiki.gr/el/readArchives.asp?catID=2&subCatID=0&page=8&textID=1876> [In Greek]

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Sartori, op.cit., p. 68

⁴⁸ SYRIZA Secretariat's Announcement, 20.09.2007 in <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=7527> [In Greek]

⁴⁹ <http://www.syn.gr/downloads/apofasi5ou.pdf> [In Greek]

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ At the municipal elections, Synaspismos' allies struggled against several candidacies that came from the renewers' factions – a good example is Nea Smyrni where the candidate was a former PASOK official.

power structure in favor of the leftists. To a large extent Synaspismos' interaction with social movements was carried out by youth organization, members of which participated actively in many actions. This radicalized youth contributed in the highly polarized intra-party competition; especially after 2008 when many of its members were elected in the new CPC. It is characteristic that in the recent referendum for the European elections ballot rank, Nikos Chountis' victory was owed to youth vote, which voted for Chountis almost en bloc⁵³.

In terms of internal systemness it seems that the former power structure is being reproduced with some exceptions. The majority of Synaspismos' membership supported the so-called 'left-turn', especially after 2004, evaluating its effectiveness in the context of the current political situation – a gap of legitimacy in the greek political system⁵⁴. They even supported the leadership after the December riots, when the party was attacked by the whole political spectrum as co-responsible for the situation. On February 2009 an extremely ambitious programme was voted by a large majority (81.5%), partially as a reaction to these attacks. Nevertheless, those non-aligned partisans are possible to support different positions, due to the fact that in Synaspismos electoral effectiveness continues to be a significant stake. The deepening of democratic procedures after 2005 does not seem to alterate the model of participation in the party. The local branches are still 'old and introvert', nevertheless the new movement-based culture that was imposed on the party, strengthened the autonomy of a small part of the membership in the grassroots, that assumed an anti-party stance. The main decision-making body is still CPC, with the addition of SYRIZA's Secretariat. The conflict-based logic favored the development of a zero-sum game between the factions that preserves a highly polarized climate. SYRIZA's further development is also an issue of great dispute, jeopardizing Synaspismos' internal balances and increasing fragmentation. However SYRIZA's democratic deficit is a major issue that determines its future and its evolution. The solution to this problem is to be found within Synaspismos. And this may be a major change in the dominant coalition conformation.

⁵² Neolaia Synaspismou (Synaspismos' Youth) was founded on 1999. Its predecessor was EAN (Union of Leftist Youths), an autonomous youth organization not formally connected with Synaspismos. The main problem for EAN was the so called 'double membership'. Members of EAN were also Synaspismos' members, undermining the organization's functioning. In several cases there were youth local branches not connected with EAN. 'Neolaia SYN's founding and development, was the result of a compromise between Synaspismos' factions. The leftists, who were close to youth's majority, accepted that the youth members should be excluded from the party's internal procedures – to their harm -, while the renewers' majority agreed that the party should finance and support the youth organization. While Neolaia SYN opposed the party's choices in many cases, in general followed its political orientation. After 2004, provided a zealous support to the 'left turn'.

⁵³ Chountis' variation to Papadimoulis was 754 votes. Youth's votes for Chountis were 770 – while for Papadimoulis voted 108. "Eleftherotypia", 11.03.09

⁵⁴ Vernardakis C., "From two-partyism to multi-partyism? The political and ideological geography of the new party system", in Konstantinidis, Y., Marantzidis, N., Pappas, T. (eds), *Parties and Politics in Greece: the modern developments*, Athina: Kritiki, 133—148 [In Greek]

Concluding comments

Synaspismos' intra-party politics is an extremely significant factor for the understanding of this party's strategies and ideological orientation. During the 17 years of the party's political life many factions appeared with different goals and structure. The larger and most powerful factions were policy-seeking groups that were trying to impose their own view into the party's orientation. They re-produced, and they still reproduce, the party's organizational logic and structure, building collateral institutions similar to the party's bodies. For both leftists and renewers the main functioning of the faction is conducted at the higher levels, specifically at P.S. level. Addresses to their grassroots members were conducted only in cases of great intra-faction conflict and leadership legitimacy crisis. The intra-faction fragmentation is another element that needs further research, in order to define the true character of a faction's functioning. In some instances the interaction of personal goals and ideological-policy aims, determines a faction's composition and its terminal orientation. Over-theorizing can be extremely harmful, if we don't take under consideration the size of the party, its political traditions and historicity, the members' behavior and the various divergences that may occur. In some cases, especially during the congresses, there were groupings, which were constituted around personalities who have disagreed with their previous faction choices. These ill-organized factions gradually were absorbed by the bigger ones. This was affecting a faction's cohesion in one sense, although a faction's cohesion was directly determined by factional polarization and competition.

In the present conditions electoral results seem to undermine 'left turn's' aims. Wilson has stated that "there is a tendency, particularly strong in leftist parties, to prefer doctrinal purity to accommodations based on electoral expediency"⁵⁵. Tsipras after the recent electoral failure in the 2009 European elections declared that "we were tempted to blunt our discourse and our choices in order to include everyone"⁵⁶. Nevertheless, Synaspismos' coalition origin has also formed the party as an election-orientated organization. As we mentioned above electoral defeat was the initial stimulus for the 'left turn' and its consolidation was legitimized by the favorable electoral and the brief popularity that SYRIZA enjoyed for a few months after the 2007 general elections. The critical mass of the non-aligned partisans are coming to decide about the party's future under the dilemma 'ideological purity or electoral success'. At the same time inside the two factions there is a dispute concerning the party's priorities where it appears to be a cross-sections in both factions on SYRIZA's future. In 'Aristeri Enotita' members of Kokkino-Prasino Diktyo, activists, members of youth organizations and the younger officials support SYRIZA's deepening or its transformation to a single party, like the Portuguese Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda), while other older members of Revma insist in Synaspismos' preservation considered as the main priority. In the renewers there is a call by the most moderate for the party's enhancement, while for many hardliners the solution is considered to be maybe outside the party. 'Left turn's' limits are visible in the way that the party's organization is posing some constraints.

⁵⁵ Wilson, op.cit., p. 270

⁵⁶ <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=14949> [In Greek]

As Panebianco recognizes “no institution can...entirely escape from its past”⁵⁷. And he continues: “no matter how extensive the renewal of leadership, change in the organization, or ‘succession of ends may be, many traces of the organization’s ‘genetic model’ remain visible”⁵⁸. The predispositions for a radical turn or for a ‘back to society’⁵⁹ strategy is not only a radical change in the political discourse, but also a renegotiation of the party’s institutional framework and strategic orientation. ‘Left turn’s’ future lies first of all inside the party.

Tables

1989 ⁶⁰	14,31	4	European Parliament Elections
1989	13,10	28	Greek Parliament Elections
1989	10,97	21	Greek Parliament Elections
1990	10,28	19	Greek Parliament Elections
1993 ⁶¹	2,94	0	Greek Parliament Elections
1994	6,29	2 ⁶²	European Parliament Elections
1996	5,12	10 ⁶³	Greek Parliament Elections
1999	5,17	2 ⁶⁴	European Parliament Elections
2000	3,20	6 ⁶⁵	Greek Parliament Elections
2004 ⁶⁶	3,26	6 ⁶⁷	Greek Parliament Elections
2004	4,15	1 ⁶⁸	European Parliament Elections
2007 ⁶⁹	5,04	14 ⁷⁰	Greek Parliament Elections

⁵⁷ Panebianco, op.cit, 261

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Term used by Michalis Spourdalakis

⁶⁰ As an electoral coalition

⁶¹ As a single party

⁶² Alecos Alavanos, Michalis Papayannakis

⁶³ Nicos Konstantopoulos, Stella Alfieri, Vangelis Apostolou, Maria Damanaki, Spyros Danellis, Yannis Dragassakis, Fotis Kouvelis, Petros Kounalakis, Nitsa Loule, Mustafa Mustafa

⁶⁴ Alecos Alavanos, Michalis Papayannakis

⁶⁵ Nicos Konstantopoulos, Maria Damanaki, Fotis Kouvelis, Panayotis Lafazanis, Assimina Ksirotiri, Thanassis Leventis

⁶⁶ As SYRIZA

⁶⁷ Nicos Konstantopoulos, Alecos Alavanos, Yannis Dragassakis, Fotis Kouvelis, Thanassis Leventis, Assimina Ksirotiri

⁶⁸ Dimitris Papadimoulis

⁶⁹ As SYRIZA

⁷⁰ Alecos Alavanos, Yannis Baniias (SYRIZA), Yannis Dragassakis, Pericles Korovessis (SYRIZA), Anna Filini, Grigoris Psarianos (SYRIZA), Michalis Papayannakis, Fotis Kouvelis, Thodoros Dritsas, Thanassis Leventis, Tasos Kourakis, Tsoucalis, Panayotis Lafazanis, Litsa Amanatidou-Paschalidou

2009 ⁷¹	4.70	1 ⁷²	European Parliament Elections
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Table 1: Election results for Synaspismos as a coalition (1989-1990) an as a single party (1993 – present) (Sources: syn.gr, ypes.gr/el/Elections/NationalElections/Results,parties-and-elections.de/greece2.html)

1992 ⁷³	22,971
1994	18,063
1999	19,736
2004	16,376
2009	16,124

Table 2: Synaspismos' membership rates (Sources Avgi 23/1/92, 21/4/94, 17/3/99, <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=1746>, <http://www.syn.gr/downloads/20090310.pdf>)

1992	Common Ballot 85	Papayannakis' list 24	Cheirafetissi Melon 2			
1993	Common Ballot 81	Papayannakis' list 9	Hadjisocratis-Margaritis list 9	Cheirafetissi 2		
1996	Aristero Revma 45	Syspeirossi 48	Enotiki Protovoulia 10	Aristeri Metarrythmistiki Prooptiki 3	others 2	
2000	Aristero Revma 46	Syspeirossi 16	Paremvassi 37	Synthessi 7	Kokkino- Prasino 2	others 3
2004	Aristero Reyma 61	Syspeirossi 16	Paremvassi 23	Kokkino-Prasino 4	Protovoulia 2	others 2
2008	Aristeri Enotita 76	Ananeotiki Pteryga 37	Protovoulia 4	Ypervassi 3	others 2	

Table 3: CPC results and factions (Sources: Avgi, syn.gr)

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⁷¹ As SYRIZA

⁷² Nicos Chountis

⁷³ January 1992 referendum for Synaspismos' transformation into a single party

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Young official, Rank: Political Secretariat member, Faction: Aristero Revma, Origin: Neolaia SYN (July 3, 2009)

Middle-aged official, Rank: Political Secretariat member, Faction: Aristero Revma, Origin: KKE (July 13, 2009)

“Mapping the political elite of Cyprus’s (1988-2008)”.

Yiannos Katsourides, PhD Candidate
Department of Sociology and Political Science
University of Cyprus
Email: katsouridesy@yahoo.com

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to highlight the political, sociological and demographic characteristics of the people that comprise what is referred to as the *political elite of Cyprus* in the years of 1988 onwards. The political elite for the purposes of the present paper, is comprised by the elected officials either in the Presidency of the Republic or the Parliament, the party leaderships and the appointed ministers in the period under examination; that is, the people responsible for the political and public affairs administration of the country.

We pay special attention to political parties since they dominate the political life of Cyprus and consist the major (if not the exclusive) political agencies providing the political elite.

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London School of Economics and Political Science

Introduction

Contrary to Cyprus, research in other countries on the issue of political elite has progressed significantly both empirically and theoretically. It is for this reason that this paper attempts to explore the composition of the political elite in Cyprus based on a number of social, political and demographic variables. The time span under consideration extends from 1988 to 2008 and includes: five presidential elections (1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008) and four parliamentary elections (1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006). We attempt to map the main characteristics of this elite and its relationship to the political parties in the country.

The present paper mainly intends to address two questions. Firstly, we aim to understand the origin and composition of the political elite in Cyprus, through the analysis of its quality and quantity characteristics. Secondly, we purport to examine the influence political parties exercise on the political elite in a strong party system like the one in Cyprus. Someone would expect parties to exercise strong influence on the formation of the political elite. Following this line of thought, the recruitment patterns of the political elite should follow participation and active involvement in political parties. Elite recruitment refers to the process whereby “staffing” of the political roles takes place (Seligman, 1964: 612).

Career patterns comprised of the steps taken by members of the political elite as they strive to attain elite position are also traced since they constitute a vital place in the literature on political recruitment (Cohan, 1973:213-214). If a significant number of political elite members demonstrate similar career paths then a conclusion that a particular career pattern dominates may reasonably be drawn.

The findings of this paper can serve as a starting point for further research on the topic of political elite incorporating more variables and extend the study within and across party lines, namely relating political decisions of legislators and administrators to the interests represented by those making the decisions.

Methodologically, we proceed by examining the biographies of all persons that we define as political elite (see below). All the relevant information is taken from the *curriculum vitae* given by the persons themselves upon the time of their election or appointment. Therefore, the findings are based upon- and limited to- the data available in the House of Representatives published biographical dictionaries and the statements issued by the Public Information Office of the Republic upon the appointments of the cabinet members. This approach relies mostly on descriptive material about the incumbents of elite positions. The implicit assumption of this kind of research is that leadership’s social background and recruitment patterns will facilitate the understanding of the political system and its dominant values. Wider theoretical issues and controversies fall outside the spectrum of the present paper which focuses on the mapping of the political elite within the Cyprus political environment.

Operational definition of political elite

Elite theory’s origins lie mostly in the writings of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels. Mosca (1939) emphasized the elite’s material, intellectual or moral

superiority and the ways in which these small minorities outwit large majorities. Pareto suggested that in ideal circumstances elite would consist of the most talented individuals but in actual societies elites are comprised by those most proficient in employing the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion and those who enjoy advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections (1935). Michels rooted elites (or oligarchies) in the need of large organisations for leaders and experts in order to operate efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information and other aspects of organizational functioning power concentrates in their hands (1962). Guttsman (1960: 138-139) contrasts two different positions on the issue of political elite rejecting them both: the Marxian view which relates political elite almost entirely to the socio-economic relations and Pareto's theory which stands outside the social structure altogether. He believes that political elite should not be equated with the elite as such and that it derives from the social stratification system.

Efforts to produce a general theory of political elite have not been fruitful so far (Cammack, 1990: 415). The concept is variously defined in the literature according to the particular research focus of the scholar using it (Edinger and Searing, 1967: 428). Furthermore, no type of elite is compatible with the democratic ideal.

Despite these shortcomings one needs to apply an operational definition. Elites may be defined as *“those persons placed in strategic locations within society and organisations that are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially and as such, national political elites are not large in number”* (Burton and Higley, 1987: 296). Political elites in all political systems constitute a small minority of actors which hold a strategic role in public policy making. They wield their influence by virtue of their exceptional access to political information and their key positions in the system which in turn results to highly disproportionate control over public policy making and communication process which relate society to polity and governors to governed (Edinger and Searing, 1967: 428).

In any case, it should be noted that a vast number of elite scholars have not distinguished the political elite from the socioeconomic elite. Moreover, in some countries – particularly in those with traditional systems and ‘pyramidal’ social structure – the political elite are undistinguishable from the rest of the elite.

Nevertheless taking into consideration the fact that in contemporary western societies the political elite are institutionally divided both ‘horizontally’ and ‘vertically’, we point out two parameters a) the internal differentiation of the political elite, and b) patterns of recruitment to the political elite.

However, for the purposes of this paper, we include under the term political elite the incumbents of key elected offices and those who owe their power to appointment by some elected authority (in our case the President of the Republic): all elected presidents of the Republic of Cyprus, all elected MPs, the party leaderships during the time period under consideration and finally, all appointed cabinet members. This gives us a total ideal number of 367 individuals in these 20 years.¹ Out of these, approximately 55 per cent are people elected or appointed more than once something that reduces significantly the actual number of those constituting the political elite of the country. One could include

¹ Personal information on two ministers was impossible to retrieve.

the elected mayors in the 33 municipalities of Cyprus; an effort was made to this direction but it proved very hard to acquire the information needed.

Methodology: Social, demographic and political variables

Elite composition and political behaviour is assumed to be related with intervening variables that are a function of socio-economical, historical, political and other characteristics. The linkage is thought to be these background data and the socialization process and experiences through which leaders are inducted into political processes (Edinger and Searing, 1967: 430). Social background categories chosen for the purposes of the present research include: age of election or appointment, gender, place of birth, marital status, religious affiliation, length of incumbency, previous party or public offices held, level and country of education, occupation, and political party affiliation. Having in mind that some background characteristics have more relevance than others in particular political systems I have also included the *EOKA* variable in the data which portrays the number of incumbents that took part in the 1955-59 struggle which is one of the most controversial issues in the political discourse between the left and right forces in the country.

As already noted, Mayors were not included in the survey due to the difficulty in data collection. Members of the European Parliament were not included because the electoral process was under way during the writing of the paper. Certain public offices (e.g. participation in Boards of Administration of the various semi-state organisations) and Civil Society Organisations (NGOs) were not incorporated either. The rural-urban origin of political personnel along with information regarding their families were also omitted due to the lack of this kind of information in the majority of the biographical notes issued.

For some of these variables, the data are counted and presented regardless of the overlapping observed between the members of the political elite because in this way the data are presented more comprehensively. For instance, regardless of the times an MP is reelected, his/her occupation, level and country of education, age of election, gender, religious affiliation, previous offices held are counted separately each time in order to discover the balances within each election period as well in the overall analysis.

In order to place our research into a context frame, some background information about the political and party system of Cyprus is needed. To the degree a party system is considered strong or weak it influences the environment within which political and other processes take place and for the purposes of our study the patterns of elite recruitment and socialization.

Political and party system of Cyprus

The political system of the country was in need of reconstruction after the independence of 1960. Due to the late achievement of independency, Cyprus was given little chance to develop a civic and democratic culture: it suffered sporadic intercommunal violence and has been de facto divided since the Turkish invasion of 1974 (Lonnqvist, 2008: 1).

The constitution of the Republic provides for a clear separation of powers. Executive power is exercised by the President who appoints the Cabinet and is not held accountable to the Parliament. The President's direct election by the people imposes the need on the political parties to seek for alliances since no party or candidate can break the 50% plus one vote threshold on their own. Changes in parliamentary elections have therefore limited impact on the government (Christophorou, 2001: 97).

The party system was consolidated after 1976 with the domination of four parties which occupied more than 95% of the votes: left wing AKEL, socialdemocratic EDEK, centre-right Democratic Party (DIKO) and right-wing Democratic Rally (DISY). Other smaller parties did not manage to break this pattern until the mid 1990's when among other factors proportional representation was introduced in June 1995 which lowered the entrance barrier to the minimum (1.79%) and the franchise was extended to all adults above the age of 18 in 1997. Voting is, to this day, compulsory for national elections.

Albeit the signs of erosion or change and regardless of the different meanings employed in the concept of partisanship, we can still witness the pervasiveness of the party identification and partisan loyalties in Cyprus. Continuity in vote patterns is the most striking feature of Cyprus despite small changes in electoral influence (Christophorou, 2001: 97). These changes reflect mainly the relative increase in the vote share of smaller parties which occupy around 10% of the electorate. The premises of party identification theory which suggests that most electors feel a general allegiance to a party which is inherited through the family, thus influencing voter's perceptions is still very much illustrated in the political life of Cyprus.

Findings

The presentation of the data will follow a sequence pattern. Separated findings on each subset of political elite will be presented differently and then some generalized findings will be illustrated both in general and within party lines.

Presidents of the Republic

Cyprus has had only six Presidents since gaining its independence in 1960 (see Appendix 1). Two of them served only one term, one is currently serving its first one, while the other three served two or three terms. It's interesting to notice that those who came to office only once were those supported by the left wing AKEL. Makarios, the first President of the Republic was the only President supported by all parties in his three tenures (except the first one).

The period under study saw four Presidents coming to office. All Presidents were male and Christian Orthodox, all were married and 75% of them were born in the capital city of Nicosia. The average age of election in office is 65.5 years with Vassiliou being the youngest one and Clerides the oldest when elected. The average duration of incumbency is 5.3 years with Clerides holding the office for 10 years. All four of them received university education and half of them were lawyers that studied in the UK. Two Presidents took part in the *EOKA* struggle while the two that didn't were those supported

by AKEL: its former leader (the current President D. Christofias) and G. Vassiliou in 1988.

All but one have held party or public offices before their election; the only one who did not have any party affiliation was Vassiliou. Two of them served as Presidents of the House of Representatives before their election in the presidency, three of them as MPs and three of them were party leaders.

Party leaders

During the period under examination there have been 11 political parties and 20 party leader holders (actual number is 18 since two party leaders served more than one party) in Cyprus (see Appendix 2). Three of these parties no longer exist (ADISOK, Free Democrats Movement and New Horizons) since they were merged to form new ones (EDI and EVROKO). Party leadership seems to be an attractive and long lasting position for those holding it. All party leaders except one (Matsis – DISY) have been in office for more than 5 years. The only exception in this pattern is those party leaders currently serving the post who have all been elected very recently.

The average term served in party leadership is 8.8 years with the longest being Lyssarides (EDEK) who held the post for 32 years and the shortest being A. Kyprianou (AKEL) and I. Panayiotou (Green Party) who served less than 6 months. A very striking finding that is consistent throughout the research is the very low score of women. Within the time frame of the research, only two females were elected as party leaders in the two smallest parties of the island. Both of them have been in office for less than a year. The average age of election in party leadership is 52.65 years of age. Most of the party leaders were elected during their 40s or 50s (14) with no-one elected under the age of 40.

All but four have held party offices before their election in the party's highest post with two of these four coming from a split in their former parties where they held elected offices. Three of them resigned from their post when they were elected as presidents of the Republic (all except Sp. Kyprianou). With regard to public offices five of them did not hold one before their election, seven of them were MPs, one was Minister, four of them were both MPs and Ministers, one of them President of the Republic (Vassiliou) and one President of the House of Representatives (S. Kyprianou).


60% were born in the capital city of Nicosia and only six (30%) took part in the *EOKA* movement. The dominant cultural value regarding the marital status is marriage since only two of the party leaders were not married when coming to office and all but one were Christian Orthodox; the other being Armenian. The overwhelming majority of the party leaders have held a university degree with Greece and the UK being the most attractive academic destinations. 70% or fourteen party leaders studied in one of those two countries or their combination. Lawyers (35%), businessmen (25%), and party employees (15%) constitute the bulk of their professional background.

Cabinet members

During the 21 year-period under examination five presidential elections took place and four Presidents were elected. Under these Presidents served 103 cabinet members. For


two of these cabinet members no data was found. Out of the remaining 101, six ministers served as caretakers for a very short period until the next presidential election and four of them as acting ministers until a formal one was appointed. All ten of them though, are included in the data counting. Fourteen (14) ministers served more than once in a cabinet but only five of them under different Presidents.

During these 21 years only five women served as cabinet members, only one minister was not Christian Orthodox (Latin) for a very short period of two months as caretaker. 91% were married and only 9% were single or widowed.




Graph 1: Average length of incumbency (ministers)

The average length of tenure for all cabinet members is 2.93 years with the highest average 3.53 in the Vassiliou administration (1988-1993) and the lowest the current Christofias one with 1.27 years; that is because the Government has been in office only 16 months. The longest serving minister remained in office for 7.5 years (Christodoulou in the Clerides presidency) and the shortest were the four caretakers' ministers who served only one month each. The oldest (70 years old) and the youngest (34 years old) ministers were appointed by the same President: Papadopoulos (2003-2008).




Graph 2: Previous offices held by Ministers on the date of appointment

Half of the ministers did not hold any previous public office before their appointment while the figure for occupying party offices drops to 36%. One should be careful though since this does not tell us whether they had previous party affiliation which is not stated in most of the ministers' CV's. It is estimated though, that 59% of the ministers have had a political party affiliation with most of them coming from the ranks of DIKO (19%). 17% had served as ministers before reassuming a cabinet position, 16% as MPs and 8% have held both offices prior to their appointment (not at the same time).




Graph 3: Members of the Cabinet ages of appointment

The average age of appointment for all cabinet members is 54 years of age while the bulk of the appointees fall in the 41-60 cohorts (68%), 28% between 61-70 and only 4% were appointed in their 30s.




Graph 4: Country of Education of the Ministers

With regard to their education, 94% have had university education and only 6% received other kind of education (military, high school, college). The most preferred country of education is Greece (33%), UK coming second with 21% and the combination of the two countries accounts for the 8% of appointments. Another 7% was educated in UK and the USA something that takes the total percentage of the cabinet members educated in either Greece or the UK at some stage of their studies to 63%. Graduates from the former socialist countries appointed to cabinet seats are not found in the Clerides 10-year administration.



Graph 5: Occupations of the Ministers

The occupations of the ministers reveal that the most popular one is the business-manager model (totaling 30%), followed by the civil service sector which accounts for the 21% of appointments (including 4% retired civil servants) and third, the law profession which accounts for 19% of the cabinet members (including 3% coming from the judicial system).



Graph 6: Percentage of ministers that took part in *EOKA*.


Finally, the *EOKA* factor characterizes only 14.6% of the ministers with the bulk of them being appointed during the Clerides administration (12%) something very logical since

Clerides was supported by DISY and DIKO; the two parties of the centre-right that sheltered the majority of *EOKA* members and followers. Amongst the political parties, the most cabinet members with an *EOKA* past come, not surprisingly, from the ranks of DISY.

Members of the Parliament

The members of the Cyprus House of Representatives sum to 56 plus another three coming from the three ethnic minorities (Latinos, Maronites, and Armenian) that chose to integrate themselves in the Greekcyriot community upon the establishment of the Cyprus Republic in 1960. Those three MPs have no voting rights and are elected by their community members in separate elections. The time span under examination in the present research covers four (4) parliamentary election periods: 1991-96, 1996-2001, 2001-2006, and 2006-onwards. In an ideal situation a total of 224 MPs would be elected. This number is extended to 240 when we take into account those that stepped in to replace others that left the Parliament mainly because they were appointed in the cabinet. The ideal number is significantly different from the actual results when we count the list of names. This occurs because an important number of MPs are elected more than once. Therefore, the total actual number of MPs that served the House of Representatives accrues to 134 persons; that is 55.8% of the total possible number of MPs. The four major parties provided the Parliament with 95% of the total number of MPs.


The period 1991-96 saw the most newcomers entering the Parliament. 36 MPs out of the 61 that served were elected for a first time (59%). The reason behind this development was the total renewal of AKEL's parliamentary team. 17 out of the party's 18 MPs were elected for a first time. The figures drop in the coming terms since 37%, 36.06% and 36.06% were newly elected in the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections respectively.



Graph 7: Number of terms served by MPs


The longest serving MP is V. Lyssarides who served a record of 8 terms before stepping down in 2006. Taking into account the four terms under study we can see that seven MPs served all four times, 19 served three times, 47 served twice and 61 served once. The newcomers figure is qualified though, by two elements: firstly, 22 of them have been elected in the current period and therefore could run for election and reelected in 2011; secondly, 24 MPs stepped down after the 1991-96 period and were never reelected which for the purposes of this research were counted as serving one term. 11 of them had served prior to the 1991 election. The average year of election for a Cyprus MP is 50 years of age. Almost the same figure appears throughout the four election periods: 49.44 in 1991-96, 50.92 in 1996-2001, 49.96 in 2001-2006, and 50.28 in 2006 onwards. The average year of entry for a newly elected MP is 46.74 years of age. Within the parties the lowest average is found in DISY team of 2001-2006 with 47.11 years of age and AKEL's team in 1991-96 with 47.5 years of age. The oldest parliamentary team was EDEK's in 1996-2001 with an average age of 57.8 years. Throughout the four election periods the youngest parliamentarians are those of DISY with an average of 47.94 years of age and the oldest are the MPs of EDEK with a 53.04 average age.

The parliamentary office is highly occupied by married Christian Orthodox men. Only 25 women became MPs during these 17 years in a total number of 240 persons that served the House of Representatives (10.4%) a very disappointing figure. In the first two election periods only six women served (three in each term) with the highest score found in the current period (11 women). Within the parties nine women holders of a seat in the Parliament came from the ranks of AKEL, eight from DISY and seven from DIKO. With regard to their marital status only 9% of the MPs were not married upon their election while only four MPs came from the three ethnic minorities of the island (one Armenian, and two Maronites; one of them served twice). Immigrants and foreigners are totally excluded.



Graph 8: MPs countries of study (those with a university degree)

The vast majority of the MPs hold a university degree (90%). Of the remaining 10% almost half (44%) have attended high school and 16% elementary school. The most preferred countries of study are Greece and the UK. Greece amounts to 38.9% of the total holders of university degree, UK 15.89%, a combination of the two countries 5.4%, USA graduates are 2% of the aggregate, 16.7% come from the former socialist countries, and 5.4% from the rest of Europe. None of the MPs has received a university degree from Cyprus since the University of Cyprus was only founded in 1992.



Graph 9: Occupations of MPs


Occupation analysis reveals that the bulk of the MPs come from six categories of professions: 31.8% lawyers, 14.6% party or union employees, 12.5% doctors, 12.1% managers and businessmen or businesswomen, 5% civil servants and 4.6% teachers.

All MPs elected were under the list of a party combination. No independent MP ever managed to be elected something that proves the power of Cyprus' political parties to exercise full control over the recruitment channels. Only a small percentage of MPs were elected in cooperation with the parties in these four election periods (6%). This pattern is further enhanced by the fact that only 14.6% of the elected MPs did not hold a party office prior to their election. This means that not only elected MPs are affiliated with a party but the overwhelming majority of them are coming up the "offices ladder" through the party ranks.

Year	1991	1996	2001	2006	TOTAL
OFFICE					
MPs	22	29	29	24	104
Ministers	4	1	-	3	8
Local Government	7	2	8	5	22
Combination Of at least 2 Offices	3	7	5	12	27
Other	-	1	-	-	1
No office	25	17	19	17	78
Total MPs served	61	57	61	61	240

Table 1: Public offices held by MPs prior to their election

Turning to public offices held by the MPs prior to their election the dominant pattern sees the typical MP of the Cypriot House of Representatives holding at least one public office. This occurs for the 67.7% of the MPs that served the Parliament from 1991 onwards. The combination of at least two offices means that a person served two offices before being elected; those offices could have been mayor and minister, MP and minister, MP and municipal councilor, etc.




Graph 10: MPs with an *EOKA* past

Participation in the *EOKA* struggle is increasingly losing significance over the years. We observe a diminishing rate of people that took part in the 1955-59 uprising something of course related with the time distance from the events. In the current House of

Representatives, no MP has an *EOKA* background. The only member of the Parliament with an *EOKA* past elected in 2006 was appointed minister in 2008. In the 1991-96 period there was a 26% of the MPs that participated in *EOKA*, the figure drops to 16% in 1996-2001 period, decreases further to 10% in 2001-06, and finally, almost disappears in 2006 elections. Someone would expect most of the participants coming from DISY. Paradoxically the highest number of participants is found in DIKO: 40.6% of those that took part in *EOKA* come from the ranks of this party, 31.25% from DISY and 18.75% from EDEK.

Discussion

The ethnic and religious backgrounds of the political elite are of the mainstream variety; that is Greekcypriots and Christian Orthodox. Greekcypriots practically dominate election or appointments in any office. Immigrants and foreigners are totally excluded from political representation while only one Armenian, one Latino and two Maronites have managed to break this dominant pattern of representation.



Graph 11: Percentage of political persons with *EOKA* participation past.


The *EOKA* variable was introduced in order to measure the impact of that turbulent period on subsequent years. Some elites appear upon the scene in response to situational circumstances and these include amongst others a colonial or neocolonial context; that is participation in anti-colonial struggle (Rejai and Phillips, 1988: 111). In the first years of independence, a person attaining reputation through the *EOKA* struggle entered political office without prior experience in local government or parties. This route has changed in the last decades.

Political elite members with an *EOKA* background incorporate a heroic past against colonial rule *vis a vis* the left wing AKEL within society according to the proponents of this line of thought. In the first years of independence the *EOKA* “participation certificate” was the best qualification for climbing the power ladder within the right forces and the state apparatus (Christophorou and Xadjikiriakos, 1996: 3). Their numbers is significantly reduced as we move away from the year of Cyprus’s Republic establishment. The Parliament in its current form has no representative of *EOKA* in its ranks. The *EOKA* variable is found only once in the ranks of AKEL in the parliamentary elections of 2001 and 2006 (the same person). This is rather surprisingly bearing in mind the fact that AKEL was against the armed method of struggle of *EOKA*. Viewed

otherwise this is something pointing to the accommodation of this conflicting issue within the party competition.

Occupation analysis

The analysis of the occupations of legislators, ministers and party leaders reveals some interesting information. We can distinguish some groupings within them. Firstly, people who come from the ranks of the commerce, finance or industry (the businessmen and managers). Secondly, those coming from the so called “free professions”: e.g. lawyers, doctors, etc. These two categories represent the vast majority of those composing the political elite of Cyprus. The career route in Cyprus politics for a great number of people goes through an esteemed profession. Thirdly, those who choose to follow a political career as their occupation. They come mostly from the ranks of the left wing AKEL in the form of party or union employees. On the other hand, we witness the almost total absence of those groups of the population who follow manual occupations, farmers, etc. This demonstrates an imbalance of the parliamentary and cabinet representation. This indicates two career pathways: the “pure politician” who uses the political escalator exclusively, and politicians who enter politics by way of other occupational routes. The pure politician is often the party official who moves into elective office (Seligman, 1964: 621).



Graph 12: Total number of political person’s occupations.

More precisely, political elite members in Cyprus originate from five categories of occupations that comprise 83.4% of their total number. The majority prefers the legal

occupations (lawyers and judges) with a percentage of 28.5%, followed by people from the business sector (includes businessmen, managers, bank employees, publishers) with 21%, party employees 12.3% (most of them from the ranks of AKEL), civil service technocrats 11.2%, and doctors 10.4%. Two different career pathways are observed: the cabinet members on the one side and the other members of political elite on the other. While the latter is dominated at a rate of approximately 85% by political party affiliation and the holding of public office prior to election, the cabinet model deviates from this path. As we have seen, only 36% had held party office before being appointed and half of them did not possess any public office whatsoever. This indicates that the cabinet model has a more technocratic nature.

Elite Recruitment patterns: party dominated

The elite recruitment pattern both reflects and affects the society (Seligman, 1964: 612-613). As a dependent variable, it expresses the value system of the society, the type of system representativeness, the basis of social stratification and the structure and change in political roles. As an independent variable, it determines avenues for political participation and status, influences the kind of policies pursued, etc. As an indicator of change it reflects economic changes from rural to urban environments, shifts in political infrastructure and the kind and degree of people's participation.

In most cases the nomination procedures for all kind of elections and cabinet appointments stem from within the parties. Political parties perform the most crucial role in the selection and recruitment of political elite at all levels. 78% of the political elite has held a party office prior of his/her election or appointment. The fact that no independent MP has ever managed to infringe the Parliament is indicative of this pattern. Mainly with reference to the parliamentary elections again the fact that 85.4% of the elected MPs had held a party office prior to their election proves that candidates must prove their party loyalty if they want to stand good chances of being elected. The presidential selection procedure is usually dressed as an independent decision of the candidate president but the candidate is always either a party leader or a significant personality selected and supported by one political party at least (e.g. G. Vassiliou in 1988). All other Presidents of the Republic have been party leaders themselves. Cabinet appointments do not follow the exact same path since the President is always allowed room for maneuvering. Being dependent on the party or coalition of parties that have elected him to office, the elected President has to take into account the parties' views.

Political parties are the principal agencies for accomplishing the selection and representation of political elites. The party experience variable proves to be the most important one in explaining the composition of the political elite. Membership in political parties seems to be heavily weighted in the political system of Cyprus. Non partisan citizens are practically excluded from the political elite especially with reference to the MPs. Members of the political elite are exposed to political ideologies and participate in political activity as indicated by their political party affiliation and membership in party organs. Elite legitimation stems from the party procedures and is later verified by the people.


This state of affairs should not be perceived as weird. The dominance of politics in Cyprus is a common feature in what scholars refer to as “surrounding late development” (Mitsuo, 1982) or “societies of later development” (Mouzelis, 1994: 20), a phenomenon that leads to a “mimic socialization” (Gouliamos, 2008). Politics penetrate all aspects of social and institutional life whether these are sports, education or religion. State authorities and party mechanisms in the Cyprus society constitute the principal arena of social life (Mavratsas, 2003: 120; Demetriou and Gurel, 2008: 9). The entire political life has been prescribed by the existence of the “Cyprus problem”; a fact that contributes greatly to the politicization of the Cypriot society (Yiallouridis, 1993: 184). The dominance of political parties over virtually every aspect of the public sphere is acknowledged by CIVICUS Report (2005) the most comprehensive one undertaken concerning civil society in Cyprus.

Developments and changes that took place in Western Europe in previous decades pointing to a demise of party (Poguntke, 1987: 76; Mair, 1984) slowly made their way to Cyprus as well. These developments have been altering attitudes and positions held and this is expected to be reflected in elite composition in the coming years. We can already see one party- DISY- has already elected 3 MPs from the civil society pool.²

Overlapping in office

A central feature in the composition of the political elite in Cyprus is the overlapping in offices. As already pointed out 55% of the total ideal number comprising this elite are people that have served in at least two offices. In actual numbers this is translated to 199 persons serving more than once in an ideal number of 367. The members of the political elite in Cyprus have held party offices at a percentage of 78% and 62% of them have held public offices either elected or appointed before their election (or reelection) or appointment. One should bear in mind that dual mandates are prohibited with regard to public offices. The legal system raises barriers against a person holding two public offices at the same time.

² Christos Stylianides former President of the Movement for Political Modernization, Eleni Theocharous former President of Doctors of the World (Cyprus branch) and Stella Kyriakidou former President and now active member of the board of Europa Donna (CSO involved in breast cancer prevention for women).



Graph 13: Total number of political person’s public offices.

As illustrated by the findings above, service in party or some public office is considered almost a prerequisite in moving upwards the “offices ladder”. Many people perceive their current positions as stepping-stones to higher offices. Lower valued offices such as seats in the municipal councils or party organs are considered as pathways to higher esteemed offices such as members of Parliament. Therefore we see 78% holding party offices before being elected or appointed in a public office and 22% holding a local government office before being elected MPs. The reverse is rare but it occasionally shows up. One former President of the Republic had run successfully for election in the House of Representatives.

This career pattern is slightly different for the cabinet members since 67% of them have not served in a “lower office” before being appointed in office. The structure of the political system offers the explanation for this deviation. The cabinet is appointed by the President with no direct influence from the political parties. All presidents have tried to recruit ministers from the technocratic pool contrary to what applies for the House of Representatives.

Gender discrimination

The findings of this study with regard to female participation in political elite are depressing. Only 32 (or 8%) of the political personnel are female. This indicates a discriminatory elite recruitment policy against the half of Cyprus population. According to the women’s political organisations the basic assumption that family caregiving is the exclusive responsibility of women permeates the social value system.³ Women face difficult choices regarding their careers when they become wives and mothers, and are usually expected to commit themselves to their family obligations. This double standard

³ Conclusions of a round table discussion organized by the Women’s Cyprus Lobby in Nicosia on the 20th of February 2009.

career advancement is reflected in informal interactions, workplace cultures and personal beliefs despite changes taking place (Coltrane, 2004: 218). Gender discriminations continue to shape socialization and recruitment into political elite positions.

Length of tenure

Elite turnover in Cyprus is very low. This is demonstrated by the actual number of people who possess the elite positions during these 20 years. 199 people served the 367 elite positions in the country in these 21 years under examination. Long tenure in party and public offices seems to be the rule in Cyprus. The proportion of newcomers in the House of Representatives is 59%, 37%, 36.06%, and 36.06% respectively in the four legislative periods. Based on these results we can not speculate on whether a *new* political elite with different political attitudes has emerged. The percentage of newcomers in the Parliament is kept steady over the periods approximately around 36% with the exception of 1991 and the average age of the MPs is also kept steady around 50 years of age. Whether this elite turnover contributes to major or minor shifts in the policies pursuit is of interest, however it falls outside the scope of this paper. The views on this issue are controversial (Brunk and Minehart, 1984: 568).


This is best demonstrated in the party leaders and MPs data. For a significant number of the political elite, Parliament seats and party leadership are treated as long-term careers. The average period of holding party leadership is approximately 9 years with three party leaders serving for more than 20 years. Within the parties more than half of the MPs of the four major parties that provided the Parliament with 95% of the total number of MPs, have served more than one term. The ratio for AKEL is 25:17, for DISY 23:23, for DIKO 14:15 and for EDEK 6:4 (in actual numbers of MPs; the first number being those who served more than one term).

Most western democracies have undergone profound social and political change during the last decades. Increasing affluence, the changing structure of the labour force, expanding educational opportunities, religious secularization, greater social mobility, changes in the media structure and information explosion reshaped those societies (Dalton, 1987: 976; Poguntke, 1987: 76; Mair, 1984; Aylott, 2002: 8; Katz and Mair, 1995: 7; Luther and Rommel, 2002: 8). These changes are thought to have altered the composition of the political elites. Newcomers representing a new generation with different value systems and different political orientations toward the political processes have made their way in political institutions. The question for Cyprus would be whether these changing conditions produced the basis for a new generation of political leaders mirroring the reduced class and left *versus* right polarization.

Education

Greekcyriot political elite is highly educated, in its vast majority, outside Cyprus. This is explainable by the fact that the University of Cyprus was only founded in 1992 and its first graduates are still in their mid thirties. Greece and the UK are the two most preferred studying destinations mainly for historical and cultural reasons. The two countries together have educated 62% of the political elite of Cyprus. In the former socialist

countries has studied 14.5% of the holders of political offices with all but one being politically active in the ranks of AKEL.



Graph 14: Total number of political person's country of university education.

Concluding remarks

Despite the critics elite theory draws which in many cases are valid elites are central actors in politics. Elite theory has no place for idealized visions of democracy and the theory that centers on them is unlikely to have many enthusiastic adherents.

The availability of the kind of information presented above allows us to compile at first an inventory of social and political variables that characterize the political elite of the country. Membership in Cyprus' political elite seems to follow a path which includes certain attributes. Put otherwise, the typical member of the political elite in Cyprus is: male, Greekcypriot, Christian Orthodox, married, highly educated mainly abroad (Greece or UK) and affiliated to a political party. The pattern of political advancement goes through the political parties.

Research should move forward now in other aspects of elite theory, perhaps more important ones: the relation of these social background variables with the political personnel's political behaviour, the relations between certain elite types and especially across and within political parties. Questions concerning the relative strength of one variable over another and which variables best predict which attitudes remain to be studied.

Other set of issues raised could be whether the changing social and political conditions in the country have been mirrored in the attitudes of political elites toward the political process. In the past, many people thought that there were major differences between political parties and therefore a change in the possession of power mattered. The convergence of political elites toward consensual politics is thought to be the rule now. Dalton (1987: 979) questions this argument and believes that the intense debate over new political issues was accompanied by a revival of ideological conflict over the traditional socioeconomic issues. This seems to hold true for Cyprus during the right wing decade of administration (1993-2003). The conservative forces attacked the welfare state, privatized or attempted to privatize industries of the national sector which lead to an ideological response by the leftists.

Elite legitimation is a highly controversial topic as its sources are related, among other aspects, to the ramification of a rising power and policy choices. Cyprus' political elite derives its legitimacy from the party's procedures which themselves are highly questioned as exhibited by the rising rates of abstention in the last elections for the European Parliament where more than 40% of the electorate have chosen or/and decided not to vote. Whether this indicates a party de-legitimization or an overall systemic crisis remains to be studied further.

Appendix 1: Presidents of the Republic

No	Name	Length of incumbancy	Gender	Previous office held		Age of election	Political Party Affiliation	Place of Birth	Marrital Status	Level of Education	Country of Education	Occupation	Religion	EOKA
				Party	State									
1	Vasiliou George	5	M	no	no	57	no	Ammoxostos	married	university	Switzerland, Austria, Hungary	Bussinessman	Christian Orthodox	no
2	Clerides Glafkos	10	M	yes	MP, President of Parliament	74	DISY	Lefkosia	married	university	UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	yes
3	Papadopoulos Tassos	5	M	yes	MP, Minister	69	DIKO	Lefkosia	married	university	UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	yes
4	Christofias Demetris	1.2	M	yes	MP, President of Parliament	62	AKEL	Lefkosia	married	university	RUSSIA	Party employee	Christian Orthodox	no

Appendix 2: Party leaders

No	Name	Party	Length of incumbancy years	Gender	Previous office held		Age of election	Place of Birth	Marrital Status	Level of Education	Country of Education	Occupation	Religion	EOKA
					party	State								
1	Kyprianou Spyros	DIKO	24	M	yes	minister	54	Limassol	married	university	UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	yes
2	Papadopoulos Tassos	DIKO	6	M	yes	MP, minister	66	Nicosia	married	university	UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	yes
3	Karogian Marios	DIKO	3	M	yes	no	45	Nicosia	married	university	Italy	party employee	Armenian	no
4	Clerides Glafkos	DISY	17	M	yes	MP, President Parliament	55	Nicosia	married	university	UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	yes
5	Matsis Ioannis	DISY	4	M	yes	MP	62	Nicosia	married	high school	Cyprus	Bussinessman	Christian Orthodox	yes
6	Anastasiades Nicos	DISY	12	M	yes	MP	51	Limassol	married	university	Greece-UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	no
7	Christofias Demetris	AKEL	21	M	yes	no	42	Nicosia	married	university	RUSSIA	Party employee	Christian Orthodox	no
8	Kyprianou Andros	AKEL	0.5	M	yes	MP	54	Nicosia	married	college	Cyprus	Party employee	Christian Orthodox	no
9	Lyssarides Vassos	EDEK	32	M	no	MP	49	Larnaca	married	university	Greece	Doctor	Christian Orthodox	yes
10	Omirou Yiannakis	EDEK	8	M	yes	MP, minister	50	Paphos	single	university	Greece	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	no
11	Vasiliou George	FREE DEMOCRATS MOVEMENT	3	M	no	President Republic	62	Ammoxostos	married	university	Switzerland, Austria, Hungary	Businessman	Christian Orthodox	no
12	Vasiliou George	EDH	6	M	yes	MP, President Republic	65	Ammoxostos	married	university	Switzerland, Austria, Hungary	Bussinessman	Christian Orthodox	no
13	Antoniadou Praksoula	EDH	1	F	yes	no	50	Nicosia	married	university	UK	Central Bank	Christian Orthodox	no
14	Syllouris Demetris	EVROKO	4	M	yes	MP	48	Nicosia	married	university	UK	Civil Engineer	Christian Orthodox	no
15	Perdikis George	GREENS	7	M	yes	MP	40	Nicosia	married	university	Greece	Civil Engineer	Christian Orthodox	no
16	Panayiotou Ioanna	GREENS	0.5	F	yes	no	47	Nicosia	divorced	university	Greece	businesswoman	Christian Orthodox	no
17	Papapetrou Michalis	ADHSOK	6	M	no	MP	47	Nicosia	married	university	Greece-UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	no
18	Papapetrou Michalis	EDH	3	M	yes	MP, minister	58	Nicosia	married	university	Greece-UK	Lawyer	Christian Orthodox	no
19	Michaelides Dinos	ADHK	9	M	yes	MP, minister	62	Limassol	married	university	Greece	Civil service	Christian Orthodox	yes
20	Koutsou Nicos	NEOI ORIZONTES	9	M	no	no	50	Ammoxostos	married	university	Greece	Businessman	Christian Orthodox	no

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
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Changing Social Cleavages and the formation of Electoral Behaviour in Greece of the late “Metapolitefsis” (1996 – 2007).

4th Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium

Constantinos Pierides
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens
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Changing social cleavages and the formation of electoral behavior in Greece of the late “Metapolitefsis¹” (1996 – 2007).

*Paper for the 4th Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium,
Constantinos Pierides*

Keywords: Theories of electoral behavior, persistence of traditional cleavages, emergence of new value, post – materialist cleavages, patterns of electoral behavior.

The notion of social cleavages is a fundamental aspect of contemporary political science. Scholars, since the 1980s, have engaged themselves in the process of interpreting what a social cleavage is, and consequently how social cleavages influence electoral behavior, patterns of party organization, and above all party systems. This paper, shortly analyzes the concept of social cleavages, based on the elaboration of the theories that emerged for their interpretation. Hence, it seeks to incorporate the essence of interpreting social cleavages in the in-depth examination of the Greek political system, its inner social divisions and the analogous electoral behavior of the Greek citizens. In other words, this paper, intends to examine a connection between the indisputable social reforms and the ongoing nature of Greece’s social divisions, in a theoretical, as well as, in a tangible framework.

The evolution of social cleavages that characterize Greece from the era of the early ‘Metapolitefsis’ up to the mid 1990s and the subsequent changes in the voting behavior of Greece’s electorate are the fundamental axes that concern this paper.

What follows is a brief analysis of the concept of social cleavages and the transitional trajectory from patterns of stability to patterns of change. Right after the theoretical analysis of social cleavages, what follows is an overview of Greece’s special political characteristics and mainly the four parliamentary parties that constitute the country’s predominant political forces. Finally, the last section of this paper is dedicated to the methodological tools and the suggested scientific methods that are going to be used for the adequate completion of the PhD thesis.

Social Cleavages: decline or concealed persistence of traditional cleavage structure importance? From patterns of persistence to change?

The concept of social cleavages was introduced in 1967 by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their renowned scientific article: «Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”. Since then, the concept of cleavages acquired essential salience for the world of political science. «The notion of a cleavage implies much more than a mere division, more even than an outright conflict» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 264). For Lipset and Rokkan, a cleavage contains three tangible connotations: «First, a cleavage involves a social division

¹ The term ‘Metapolitefsis’ denotes the contemporary era of Greece’s history, since the demise of the military coup in 1974 up to nowadays.

that separates people who can be distinguished from one another by key social structural characteristics. Second, the groups involved in the division must be conscious of their collective identity and must be willing to act on this basis. Third, a cleavage must be expressed in organizational terms» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 264-265). Apart from the above characteristics that constitute a cleavage, Lipset and Rokkan introduced four basic types of traditional cleavages: i) The Centre - Periphery cleavage, ii) the Rural - Urban cleavage, iii) the Church - State cleavage, and iv) finally the Class, Workers - Owners, cleavage². It needs to be mentioned that the notion 'traditional', clarifies the most essential, historically speaking, trend of formulating the patterns of electoral behavior. Since the 1920s and the establishment of the massive suffrage, until the post war era, and especially until the end of the 1960s, the traditional social cleavages indisputably characterize the majority of the Western democracies, setting thus the rules of the electoral game.

The plethora of massive social, economical and subsequently political changes that took place in the post war decades from the 1960s and onwards in the majorities of the Western European democracies, led to the emergence of academics arguments that illustrated the declining salience of the traditional social cleavages. Therefore in 1984, R. Inglehart was the first who noticed and argued for the ongoing, changing structures of the social cleavages. Hence, in his article «the changing structure of political cleavages in Western Society», Inglehart asserted that «there are evidences of a diffusive essential change from material to post material needs among the world of the progressive industrial societies» (Inglehart, 1984: 27, in Dalton et al).

Hanspeter Kriesi recognizes the emergence of moral – value cleavages, implying however, at the same time, that this change does not necessarily means the end of structured politics and social divisions. On the contrary, Kriesi asserts that the new cleavages have emerged from the political heritage of the traditional ones (Kriesi, 1998:165). The decline of the traditional cleavages importance and the parallel emergence of new value – moral cleavages, are strongly interconnected with the emergence of a 'new middle class', «that constitutes the major population fragment in the Western European democracies» (Kriesi, 1998: 168). In a similar post – materialist vein, Dalton argues for the emergence of a new more modern and more politically sophisticated electorate that holds an enhanced individual economic status, and has access, particularly through television, to a huge amount of information regarding politics. Consequently, this more educated and with a higher quality of life electorate, acts more as an individual³, rather than on a collective and sub cultural basis. «Hence, the old politics, based on a massive scale on the class cleavage⁴, are being replaced by some new politics, based on a whole of social cleavages» (Dalton et al, 1984: 21).

In a more neutral stance between 'stability', on the one hand, and 'change', on the other hand, Franklin expresses an alternative point of view. He acknowledges that «from 1970s

² It proved to be the most important, as it signified the political systems of Europe, from the 1920s and the establishment of massive suffrage, since the modern era (Marks, Wilson, 2000: 173).

³ The term individual can be in turns be reflected here as a 'process of individualization of the voters' (Sjoblom), or as 'a process of αστικοποίησης of the voters' (Lipset, Mair).

⁴ Meaning the social cleavage Workers – Owners.

and onwards, change became the normal pattern in many countries» (Franklin et al, 1992: 7). However, he conceives the nature of the changes occurred in a different way from that of the proponents of post-materialism. For Franklin, social change should not be arbitrarily connected with political change, «in a sense that electoral volatility, which seems to be only bloc volatility» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006) and the change in voting behavior does not necessarily mean the emergence of new cleavages. It rather means that the traditional cleavages had become less relevant to partisanship, and the massive decline in their importance is indissolubly associated with the wide 'decolorization' of the citizens' ideology.

However, the arguments for the potential stability, persistence of traditional social structure, in the contemporary Western European polities, still remain inadequate, as they neglect the significant social changes that took place in a worldwide level since the 1970s. The emergence of a new middle class, the 'embourgeoisment' of the blue collars (Sjoblom, Kriesi), the advent of the T.V. and the evolution of the mass media, created, more or less, mental shifts in the social structures of the Western contemporary democracies. These changes profoundly shape the electoral behavior and the idiosyncrasy of the voters, which increasingly started to act more and more as individuals, neglecting their collective identity (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 284). The working class, started to adopt middle – class lifestyles, or even in some cases a bourgeois lifestyle. The insurance of material needs, remained the first priority for all social classes, and at the same time post- materialist, moral, value needs, required a steadily increased salience.

Putting it all together, in the context of the theoretical dialog, on the one hand the advocates of the traditional cleavage structure's persistence neglected the emergence of new social strata and their post-materialist needs. On the other hand, post – materialists neglect the fact, that 'value cleavages' can only be conceived as extensions, and not potential substitutes of the traditional-materialist cleavages. Moreover, post-materialism, perceives traditional cleavages only as materialist, socio-economic or demographic. On the contrary, Bartolini and Mair, acknowledge the existence of ideological and cultural factors within them. «By treating a cleavage such as class, as being primarily socio-economic or demographic – such a perspective neglects the fact that ideological or cultural factors, lie at the very root of any definition of self-awareness» (Bartolini, Mair, 2000: 214). Therefore, «the imputed opposition between 'value' cleavages, on the one hand and economic cleavages on the other obscures more than it reveals» (Bartolini, Mair, 2000: 214). The societal and political divisions that are incorporated in the concept of traditional cleavages are intrinsic with the very nature of our political world. Hence, traditional cleavages would probably never be fundamentally substituted by new value or ethical types of cleavages. Even though, the changing nature of our societies, would in certain cases provoke the emergence of new value cleavages that might acquire considerable importance. «We can see that contemporary Western European politics is characterized at least as much by continuity, as it is by change» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 296).

Theories of social cleavages and party response to them within in Greece:

Greece's distinct political spectrum seems a scientifically intriguing case for conducting a research regarding the existing social cleavages. The intriguing case lies to the articulation of the traditional cleavages⁵ very nature within the Greek context, as well as, to the apparent decline in their salience and the coinstantaneous emergence of new ones. Moreover, the texture of the new emerged cleavages could not be totally collated with the emergence of value, post materialistic cleavages, since the mid 1990s. This paper intends to contemplate the characteristics and features of the pre – 'Metapolitefsis' existing social divisions of the Greek society, the examination of a potential degradation of their importance and the subsequent emergence of new social divisions from 1996 to 2007. Hence, what needs to be initially determined is what exactly started to forfeit its importance, before examining what actually emerged to take its place or complement its declined persistence. Additionally, what need to be illustrated are the main reasons that led this research proposal to decide on the era 1996-2007 for the examination of the transition from stability to change hypothesis.

The special features of the traditional social cleavages in Greece:

On sight, Greece holds a lifelong tradition of democratic regimes, as the concept of parliamentary democracy has been dialectically formulated in the Western world. This is to say, that Greece's polity has been historically embedded under the liberal principals of the French revolution, as well as, by the class stratification that took place under the industrialization process of the early 20th century. However, Greece's class stratification earned a distinct dimension compared to the other Western democracies, due to the country's poor industrial production. Since the collapse of the military junta in 1974 and the establishment of democracy, the majority of the Greek citizens were poor, uneducated farmers, and only a small proportion of Greece's total population, mostly dwellers of large cities, could be conceived as typical proletariats. Correspondingly, only a small proportion of large cities dwellers could be conceived as bourgeois strata, not only economically, but also socially speaking. Therefore, the increased salience of the agricultural production, a process that is geographically connected far away from large cities and the poor country's industrial performance induces the unification of two traditional cleavages: The Rural – Urban cleavage and the Workers – Owners cleavage.

The existence of the Greek Orthodox Church designates another abnormality of Greece, compared to the Western European democracies and the way in which Catholicism signifies their polities. One the one hand, Orthodoxy is a cognate and familiar religious dogma with Catholicism, but on the other hand, it always influenced and still influences the Greek polity

⁵ Taking into account all the possible explanations that the term 'traditional' acquires in Greece. Namely, this term does not imply the co identity of Greece's traditional cleavages with the respective ones that emerged in the Western Democracies and in the analogous literature. On the contrary, the social cleavages that signify Greece's polity posses a concrete, visible distinctiveness.

with an unseen way. Up to nowadays, Greece is official a secular state, but because «the Greek Church was a priori constituted within the country's political environment, it exists a certain typical context in which the Church's relations with the official political authority are being conducted» (Georgiadou in Lyrinzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 247). Thus, the Greek Church, sometimes acquires an essential political role, by influencing the beliefs of the believers, or by drilling straightforward pressures to the political system⁶. However, «a religious cleavage was never established in Greece, nor do the Greek political parties hold a mere religious provenience» (Georgiadou in Lyrinzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 275). Yet, this fact does not presupposes, the potential political power that the Greek Orthodox Church holds, acknowledging that it forces⁷ the political parties to formulate their ideological manifesto by taking into account the de facto prevalence of Orthodoxy in the Greek society. The massive impression⁸ of the Orthodox dogma in the Greek society, in some cases it even overshadows the social division Centre – Periphery, by replacing the national characteristics of minorities with the corresponding religious ones. For example, to some certain dwellers of Eastern Trace, called as the Pomakoi - Pomacs⁹, the term 'Muslims', as a definitional term, is attended imminently, prevailing essentially to the more valid ethnical orientation of this minority. Thus, the party political protagonists of the Greek polity, always attended to conclude to their high level party personnel, persons who preserved excellent relations with the Greek Church and therefore functioned as links with the political pursues of the Orthodoxy. It is neither arbitrary, nor accidental that the Greek Communist Party, since it's initially era of a stiff and inflexible Marxism, sustains an ideology that appreciates

⁶ One of the characteristic features of Greek Orthodoxy in its lifelong presence, has been its meant and at the same time its unmeant effort to penetrate Greece's political system. Since the foundation of the Greek state, up to nowadays, contemporary Greece constitutes a clear paradigm of continuing encountering relations between the Church and the polity. «In the era of Metapolitefsis, there is a certain absence of a concrete way in which each political party behaved against the Greek Church and it's proclaims» (Georgiadou in Lyrinzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 247,248).

⁷ The relation is binary, as during the era from 1974 to 2000, the relation between the political parties and the Greek Church is moreover perplexed due to the party's traditional strategies of concealing it's pursues and their political actions with features that are widely socially accepted or at least difficult to be questioned. Since 1989, PASOK and the New Democracy usually appealed to the citizen's strong religious attachments, especially when addressing issues that arose in the Balkan Peninsula. However, it needs to be mentioned that «despite the preferential, institutional and ideological consolidation of the Orthodox Church in the Greek society, the Church did not manage to build a durable, tangible and mere religious communication with the Greek society, in order to control the field of its dogmatic impact» (Georgiadou in Lyrinzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 253).

⁸ For Greece is a country immiscibly Orthodox (98% of Greece's population declare themselves as Christian Orthodox believers). The institution of the Greek Church is nowadays widely accepted, and is considered to be, based on the results of all public opinion surveys, as the institution with the wider entrustment and influence (Vernardakis in VPRC, 2002: 29). «The indicator of religiousness ranges Greece in the second position of the European Union, anteceding from Portugal and preceding from Italy and Spain, countries with very powerful Catholic Churches» (Georgiadou, Nikolakopoulos, 2000).

⁹ In the wider prefecture of Trace there were a historical mixture of nations, and in particular Greeks and Turks. What especially characterizes the distinctiveness of this population is the fact that due to the 1930 Lausanne treaty between Greece and Turkey, the Turks dwellers of Trace, as well as, the Greek dwellers of Constantinople were not included in the treaty's population exchange obligation. Therefore, in eastern Trace there still exists a plethora of Turkish origin citizens named as Pomakoi. Additionally, the perception of a religious minority, more than an ethnic minority is a favorable concept among the Greek citizens.

Greece's religious customs, and consequently does not disputes, under any circumstances, the very essence of Christian Orthodoxy.

The international environment commends change:

It is more than obvious that «the changes that marked Greece's international environment prevail in the Greek political scene with a significant time lag» (Loulis, 1996: 545). The country's economic undergrowth since the post war era, and the geostrategic exceptionalities of the Balkans, provoked a severe time lag in the transitions from protocapitalism to state capitalism and finally to neo - Liberalism¹⁰, with the notion of the 'institutionally open' European market, as it was conceptualized in 1986 by the Single European Act (SEA) and was implemented by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. «In general terms, Greece showed a diminished capability of comprehending the changes that occurred on its Western European economic and social environment since the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s » (Voulgaris, 2005: 281). While Greece, was struggling to set the foundation of the economic, political and social development, its progressive European allies, had already undergo their 'silent revolution' of transforming Liberalism to neo - Liberalism, as well as, a series of other consequent social reforms that profoundly changed their societies: a) The evolution of the working class to more economically well – off and more educated middle class and b) transition from the concept of collective identity to the sense of individual consumers (Kitschelt, 1994: 34). This indisputable time lag is the main reason why this paper suggests that the era 1996 -2007 should be the appropriate era for addressing the hypothetical questions of transitioning from patters of stability to patters of social and electoral change, as the reforms that signified the Western democracies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, finally make its presence felt in the Greek society. Additionally, the chronicle interval 1996 – 2007, ensures the adequate context, for examining the establishment of these reforms and the corresponding social cleavages, or their provisional nature that might potentially mean the return to the traditional¹¹ social cleavages embankments.

The 1980s: The foundation towards change.

In the early Third Hellenic Democracy era, the confrontation of political parties is being conducted under the ideological and political Left/Right axis. However, this does not signify the existence of class, religious, or minority social cleavages in the Greek society. The formulation of Greece's party system and the profile of the systemic parties, were not designated by class stratification, cultural or demographic social divisions. «In the post – military coup democratic Greece, as well as, in the era right after the completion of the civil

¹⁰ «Since the 1980s in the progressed Europe the hegemony of the principals of neo – liberalism and neo – conservatism with nibs Thacherism in Britain and Reganism in the United States, prevailed» (Voulgaris, 2007: 281).

¹¹ Taking into account all the possible explanations that the term 'traditional' acquires in Greece. Namely, this term does not imply the co identity of Greece's traditional cleavages with the respective ones that emerged in the Western Democracies and in the analogous literature. On the contrary, the social cleavages that signify Greece's polity posses a concrete, visible distinctiveness.

war until the military coup, a mere class vote¹², or a clear religious cleavages was never established» (Voulgaris, 2007: 51). Although, the comparative quantitative surveys, illustrate that during the 1980s in Greece, the citizens ideological self-definition¹³, as well as the parties self-positioning on the Left/Right scale, constituted the basic key for interpreting the citizen's electoral preferences (Nikolakopoulos in Featherstone, 2007: 69-95). The stabilization of democracy, in combination with the pelting international and domestic incidents¹⁴, steadily led to the demission of the Left/Right division and to the emergence of new social and electoral cleavages.

The year of 1985 is a turning point in the history of contemporary Greece. The multidimensional reforms that took place were related to the character and the ethics of the persistent patterns of party competition, to the general process of the decision – making process as it was established and to the wider political culture and the attitudes that shaped the public opinion (Voulgaris, 2007: 259, 260). At the same time, since 1985, the declining trajectory of political participation and the steady loosening of party's ideology began.

The 1990s: The change is visible.

The beginning of the 20th century last decade induces in a concrete framework a number of fundamental economic, political and social reforms. The massive outburst of the television, overwhelmed every single household, and in 1989 the first private TV channels were founded. The press steadily emancipated itself from vindicating each and every government and more and more private newspapers were founded. Hence, the nature of political communication steadily began to change. In addition, the numbers of annual growth were amplified, as well as, the annual individual income. The more well – off and more educated Greeks, were obviously entering in a new epoch. Since the beginning of the 1990s we can experience in Greece the economic, political and therefore social changes that signified the Western European democracies during the 1980s. At the same time, the country, receives a number of economic immigrants from eastern European and ex- soviet countries and becomes for the first time in its history a country that receives immigrants (Lyrintzis in Featherstone: 2007, 61). In addition, the Greek citizens steadily loose their interest about politics, and thus political competition becomes more colorless. The party competition is being obsessed by an apolitical and 'resilient' harangue, which begets individualism and alienation. Until the end of the 1990s, both PASOK and New Democracy, Greece's governing

¹² Neither the New Democracy, nor PASOK, nor even the Greek Communist Party acquired a massive consolidated influence from a certain social class or minority, so as to be considered as the representatives of this segment.

¹³ Undoubtedly, the ideological and political self – definition of being 'Right', 'Centrist', 'Left', consists a complex incidental entity in which the social, value, economical and other aspects have been conserved as amagalm. In other words, the confrontations in the field of production and distributing goods, in the habitation of authority, the whole of the confrontational societal instances, were not articulated in a class, or wider cultural massive confrontation, but rather in a political – ideological. It is then explicit that in Greece of the early 'Metapolitefsis' we cannot speak of a class vote, as not only the country's social articulation, but also the electoral base of the parties does not authorize it (Voulgaris, 2005: 52).

¹⁴ The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) 1985 that set the goal of Europe's free market and the election of Michael Gorbachev in the leadership of the Soviet CCCP is some of the most important international incidents of the 1980s, setting new economical and political datum.

parties, have developed a moderate, 'administrative' and minimalistic profile, which reflects the actual convergence between the two parties. The year of 1996, constitutes a milestone, for changing ultimately the nature of a completely polarized party competition norm. «Pragmatism and the prevalence of economy rather than politics, the more flexible, the more adjustable and the more renewable individualized social contracts, the accession in a clear theory of rational acting overshadowed the preexisting divisions, and above all the Left / Right division (Vernardakis in VPRC, 2002: 129). «The Greek political system, found itself in front of a profound change. In front of the gradual transformation of its main contemporary division Left / Right to the value division Conservation / Progress, and from there to the cultural division Modernization / Anti-modernization. This cultural division cuts horizontally, all the political configurations, without neglecting any political force» (Beck, 1996: 132). New, debutante needs arose for the Greek society close to the end of the 20th century, and the dominance of the traditional cleavage structure, as they have been formulated in Greece, steadily become to change.

Conclusively:

The multidimensional economical, political and social reforms that took place in Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, became visible in Greece in the last decade of the 20th century. Hence, this paper, acknowledges that since the mid 1990s, when the plethora of the worldwide and domestic changes have been assimilated into the Greek society, the adequate chronicle era for the examination of the decline or even the substitution of the traditional cleavage structure¹⁵ by newly emerged ones¹⁶, is presented. From this point of view, Greece could be perceived as an ideal context of implementing the dialog of prevalence or replacement, temporary or permanent, of the traditional cleavages due to an ongoing, contemporary existing momentum.

Finally, one evenly important factor that would constitute a distinct field of study is the Greek political parties themselves. In this paper, as well as in this thesis, the parties that will be discussed are the four main electoral protagonists of the Greek political system, namely the 'New Democracy', The 'Panhellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK', the 'Greek Communist Party – KKE' and the 'KKE – Interior', 'Hellenic Left – E.AR', or finally 'Synaspismos'. In the parliamentary elections that took place since 1990 up to nowadays¹⁷, apart from some few marginal cases, these four parties were the only that managed to preserve representatives in the Greek parliament.

The Greek political parties:

The New Democracy - ND:

The New Democracy, the organic party of the conservative parataxis, was founded on 28 September 1974 with the personal protestation of its natural leader Constantinos

¹⁵ For example the non-class, but rather political and ideological Right / Left division.

¹⁶ For example the value division 'Conservation / Progress' and the ethical division 'Catharsis / Corruption'.

¹⁷ (1991, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007).

Karamanlis. One of Karamanlis main principals goals was to ensure that New Democracy had nothing to do with the pre- dictatorship Greek Right, and therefore New Democracy presented itself as the great liberal party, attached to the goal of stabilizing the country's democratic institutions and assuring Greece's accession to the European Community. From the foundational declaration of the New Democracy, there is a conscious and appreciable absence of terms such as 'Conservative' or 'Right wing party'. Therefore, the party officers and its leaders consistently denied being characterized by concrete ideological terms, since the establishment of the New Democracy up to nowadays.

Thus, from its foundation, New Democracy is a party without exceptionally thorough ideological manifestations, without ideological competitors and additionally the natural follower of a cohesive parataxis. In an organizational level, and especially during the first years of its existence, New Democracy was not essentially organized as a mass party. On the contrary, it was rather based on the radiant personality of its celebrated officers. «From the point of political values and institutions, New Democracy emphatically intended to highlight itself, as the main liberal parataxis, which electorally covers the Centre of the political spectrum and the historical statements of a 'Centrist Liberalism'. The aim was the establishment of an anti-dictatorship national force that would transcend not only the ideological and political profile, but also the historical and political sphere of the pre-junta Greek Right» (Voulgaris, 2007: 61). For the New Democracy, anticommunism, the predominant ideological feature of the pre-junta right, belayed being a premier feature, and Karamanlis replaced it, by introducing the notion of 'Radical Liberalism'¹⁸ as the party's ideological platform (Alexakis, 2001: 146). However, the loose, ideological synthesis of New Democracy, and the dramatic electoral successes of PASOK¹⁹ in the 1980s, led to the incorporation of wider elements of a stiff anti - Democratic Right into a more massive parataxis, which from the standpoint of party competition should retain a close connection with the Centre of the political spectrum. Therefore, within New Democracy, a plethora of different political trends can be traced, all of them covering the Right wing spectrum. Populist Right politicians, Liberalists, neo-Liberalists, Conservatives, even pro - Military and pro – Dictatorship followers²⁰, can be traced under the platform of the New Democracy. There are members of the party with certain pro – kingship opinions, and others with special affiliation with the Greek Church and far – Right groups. For all these distinct terms, a key

¹⁸ The term 'Radical Liberalism' was mainly used as an ideological benchmark without being translated into definite liberal politics (Lyrantzis in Featherstone, 2008: 54).

¹⁹ The electoral wins of PASOK on 1981 and 1985 provoked trends of vindictive and polarized conflicts between the New Democracy and the governing party. Under, Averof's leadership, the New Democracy was again perceived as the party of the pre-dictatorship national Right that confronted PASOK as a radical Left party that denounces individual property. This trend facilitated the emergence of far - Right elements within the New democracy, such as the party's youth organization the 'Centaurus', which endorsed the party's political profile (Voulgaris, 2007:245).

²⁰ Although, there are not enough evidences and scientific data for the political stance of the modest Greek Right – wing citizens towards the dictatorship, during the years of the military coup, we know from later periodical quantitative surveys of political culture and electoral behavior, which were conducted for the National Centre of Social Surveys (EKKE) in 1985, that a significant part of New democracy's electoral base had positive or tolerable stance towards the 1967-1974 dictatorship, a fact that implies that ND's leadership felt the need of a clear cut with its past in a more intensive way from the larger fragment of its base (EKKE, 1988: Maurokordatos and Nikolakopoulos).

feature that more or less unites all the distinct ideological streams of the party is the Greek Orthodoxy²¹. «In New Democracy, a party of the Centre – Right, namely the conservative political sphere, which is actually deprived from solid ideological principles, Orthodoxy found a priori a field of massive popular appeal» (Georgiadou in Lyrantzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 275). Thus, acknowledging, the fact that in Greece does not essentially exist a religious social cleavage and that within the European Parliament, New Democracy, finds ideological allies among the parties that constitute the European People’s Party and not among the Christian Democratic Parties, we can assert that the party bases its existence and its undisputable electoral appeal to other social cleavages. Since the 1980s, New Democracy, under the vehicle of Radical Liberalism was the party that ideologically embraced the great economic objectives of the upper social classes, as well as the aspirations of the traditional middle - class strata. Although, throughout its own electoral successes and losses, and due to the ongoing evolutionary Greek society, New Democracy steadily transformed into a catch-all²² party that appealed to the whole society, independently of the social stratification. «At the end of the 1990s, it was more than obvious that the neoliberal ideas were not attractive anymore, and the party intended to combine Liberalism²³ with a more social profile» (Alexakis, 2001: 170). Eventually, under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis²⁴, was made clear that the party intended in a more organized manner, to present itself as a contemporary modest version, of a renewed Centre – Right force. The changed structure of the Greek society, forced the vanguard of New Democracy to adopt a more cohesive party synthesis, based even more in a Centre – Right profile²⁵, denouncing the extreme political options. These change, excluded some far –Right elements from the party, and weakened all the connections, officials and unofficial, with nationalists and extremists. As a matter of fact this explains Karamanlis intentions for the stabilization of the party’s ideological equilibrium that took place with the obliteration of Georgios Karatzaferis and other officials of New Democracy, and led to the subsequent emergence of the far – Right party of LA.OS²⁶. It is worth to be mentioned that since 1996 and the modernizational turn of PASOK’s leadership, as well as, the return of New Democracy in power on 2004, an apparent confusion in the traditional electoral base of both parties was provoked. This is to say, that the social strata that were harmed economically from the politics of PASOK and were led to the social margins, founded electoral shelter under New Democracy, even if the Centre-Right party was ideologically in accordance with the politics of PASOK. Hence, New Democracy, was forced to adopt, critical stances against the modernizational intention as a whole. Therefore, the Centre – Right party, within the

²¹ According to data from the Eurobarometer, the religious beliefs, as well as, the frequency of visiting the Church remains high for the majority of New Democracy’s voters, even at the end of the 1990s. From its voters, the 52% (1989) denote as religious, while the 60% present forcible weekly attendance to the Church and the 52% present modest weekly attendance to the Church (Georgiadou, 1997: 276 footnote 66).

²² Gary Marks adds the term ‘Post – Authoritarian’ to the term ‘Catch – All’ for New Democracy (2000: 456).

²³ Concerning privatization and the restrained role of the state.

²⁴ Was elected New Democracy’s president on 1997.

²⁵ Following the more or less Right turn of the Greek electorate. A product of pragmatism and not a concrete, determined ideological framework (Loulis, 1996: 559, 560).

²⁶ LA.OS – Popular Orthodox Alert.

trajectory of a paradox but absolutely real party competition, returned to power by relying on: a) the bourgeois strata and the upper, economically speaking classes, namely its old traditional electoral base, but also b) on the poor popular strata that was left without political representation by the shift of PASOK's political decisions (Vernardakis, 2002: 29).

The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement:

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement was founded on 3 September 1974 and came to power on 18 October 1981. At this party have historically been attached several ideological connotations for the characterization of its profile: centrist, populist, socialist – radical, modernized. But PASOK's interpretative adventure lays on the fact that PASOK eventually consisted of all these distinct ideological trends and learned to survive by acknowledging the controversies that coexisted.

On the declaration of its foundation²⁷, PASOK presented itself as a Radical Socialist movement that set as an ultimate political goal the establishment of an autonomous socialist economy. In contrast, with the pro - Soviet, communist Greek Left, PASOK communicated with the Greek electorate in more convincing way. Throughout its political harangue, PASOK established a new version of the old rupture, between the Right forces on the one hand, and on the anti-Right forces on the other hand (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 50). During the 1980s, the leadership of the party followed the strategic option of polarized political confrontation, exploiting the divisional line between the Right forces and the so – called Democratic, Progressive forces²⁸, setting as a teleological end the political representation of the latter. Therefore PASOK posited itself, as the legal representative of the Progressive, Democratic forces, between on the one hand, the authoritarian Right, and on the other hand, the utopian, non – democratic Left forces. However, since its establishment the connections of the party with the ideological connotations of socialism and the worldwide Left were apparently loose. These ideological vagueness of PASOK, attended certain political expedencies that ultimately altered the party's political intentions (Voulgaris, 2007: 70). During its first period in power, PASOK substantially grounded its existence on the class cleavage, on the order of how this cleavage emerged in Greece, holding a popular profile and defending the needs of the non – privileged Greeks, especially the farmers and the workers.

²⁷ It needs to be mentioned that, the appeal to this declaration of foundation of the party, became an exit strategy, especially in some troublesome occasions during PASOK's life.

²⁸ As it can be proved by the empirical research of this era, almost the half of the Communist Left electoral base perceived PASOK in a positive way. The most catalyzing factor was the relatively common ideological synthesis, in the level of the electoral base of the two anti – Right forces political forces, which illustrate as their main ideological axis the negative stance towards the United States, the representatives of the capital, as well as their experience from the post – civil war state of the Right (Nikolakopoulos in Featherstone, 2007: 75-76).

However, since its first electoral success on 1981²⁹, PASOK's radicalism was steadily declined and the party avoided confronting with issues, especially regarding external relations, on which it primarily possessed a clear stance, such as the accession of Greece to the European Community and the relations of the country with NATO (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 50 - 51). It transformed to a catch – all party, penetrating with ease and efficiency into the electoral body of the Centre – Right parataxis (Georgiadou, 1996: 275). The obscurity of its political beliefs concealed the way PASOK governed Greece, and the Right / Anti-right dilemma remained the unifying argument of PASOK's governance. Thus, PASOK's effort to orientate itself continued to be met, under the concept of a legitimate representation of the anti – Right forces. The party's even more decorated class orientation, became even more anti – Right, constraining suffocatingly the circle of the privileged Greeks that PASOK was fighting against. «Hence, the suspenseful and controversial effort of self – definition as a Left force, found recourse in the anti – Right parataxis» (Voulgaris, 2005: 88). Since the 1980s, the social base of PASOK corresponds to the social base of the mass European parties of the Left, with all the necessary reconciliations to the Greek polity: middle - class city dwellers, public servants, farmers, freelancers; Strata that were drawn away in a in depth transformation, as they discovered around them potentials of social mobility and therefore participated in massive political procedures (Voulgaris, 2007: 279). This picture is indispensable for conceptualizing the patterns of social disintegration that the electoral base of PASOK is going to experience since 1985 and to a greater scale since the 1990s. Even after its second consequent electoral win in 1985³⁰, PASOK continued to trace down its ideological identification through orientating its major political opponent, - the New Democracy - as the 'Right'. PASOK proved to be extremely attentive and pragmatist with its principal provision, namely, the stabilization of its solid and concrete organizational and electoral base. This venture was actualized throughout the implementation of a populist strategy that was designed in order to tranquilize the electorate and ensure a strong attachment of PASOK's voters with the party (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 51).

A cornerstone point for the evolution of PASOK, was the change in the party's relation with the Greek society. With the exception of 1989 -1993, PASOK was in power for almost two consequent decades, as the New democracy only achieved to overthrow it for the interval 1989 - 1993. While the first period (1981 – 1989) is characterized as populist, the second one, 1993-2004, is perceived as the effort to modernize³¹ the Greek society. Since 1992, under the evolution of the European Union, PASOK abandons, in some cases superficially, but in others in an essential way, populism, abandons its typical class orientated perspective of the Greek society, and embraces a new ideologically loose political manifesto that

²⁹ The first electoral success of PASOK «operated as an initial collision to the external reality and denoted the initiation of a corrective trajectory which did not occur under abrupt, open and justified turns, but under two parallel and interconnected procedures. The first was the inner- party clearance and the second was the conscious and contemplated loose transition of the nibs in the party's political manifesto (Voulgaris, 2007: 83).

³⁰ PASOK drew voters from the Left and especially from the Greek Communist Party, from youth voters, the lower social strata and the women.

³¹ On the contrary with populism, the modernization procedure did not have as a goal the mollification of the society, but rather the rationalization and the development of the Greek society, despite the potential political cost (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 56).

includes all the existing social classes as potential voters. In addition, PASOK adjusts its political manifestations, in order to create an adequate coherence with the new reality, a shift that more or less mends the end of anti-Right politics. Therefore, an adoption of a distinct strain and ethical political struggle was followed in an effort to fundamentally renew the party. Since the mid 1990s it is obvious that the new modest and more pragmatist approach that the government of PASOK followed, especially in the field of its economic policies, was literally uncompromising with the polarization caused by the Right / anti-Right division³² (Spourdalakis, 1998: 41). «Under the Kostas Simitis leadership, PASOK managed to succeed in the 1996 and 2000³³ elections, marking the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century» (Lyrintzis, Nikolakopoulos, 1999). The greater reforms within the Greek society are strongly connected with eras of PASOK's administration³⁴, especially during the 8th year technocratic administration of Kostas Simitis, from 1996 to 2004. In this 8th year period of Greece's governance, an apparent societal injunction of modernizing the country emerged, following the modules of the Western European democracies, as well as, the challenges of the European Union. The economic policy, the external relations, the frontal confrontations with the Greek Orthodox Church, the accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU), the pro-European stance of Greece towards Turkey's accession to the Union as it was illustrated in Helsinki, are significant factors that highlighted and at the same time orientated this effort. Additionally, this modernizational effort was further enhanced with the intention of PASOK to correlate all the other political actors, namely the New Democracy and the Left forces as mere reactionary and regressive powers. The analysis of the results of 1996 elections³⁵, illustrate that «the social classes in which PASOK presented the most significant losses of its power are those which were always considered to be represented by the old PASOK» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 306). Thus, «a transparent trend of PASOK's electoral alienation from the working class and a transformational trajectory from a party of class orientation to an outright catch

³² While the latter division has never extinguished from PASOK's rhetoric, the central axis that replaced it, became the modernization, since Kostas Simitis took on the leadership of the movement (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 51).

³³ In the electoral procedures of 1996 and 2000 «the modernizational PASOK managed to prevail among the salaried of the public sector and of the private sector, as well as, among the numerous strata of freelancers, namely among social strata that refer to its old social base. It managed, however, to increase its influence among the middle social strata and especially among those who exploited during the last years from the evolutionary politics and additionally among the upper social classes (employers, commercial and industrial capital, upper executive enterprises). On the contrary, its shrinkage among the farmers strata, among the employees of the public sector – one of the electoral bastions of the past – among the unemployed, among the poor, non – active population of the country (pensioners of the public and private sector, pensioners of traditional occupational groups, housekeeper) was impressive (Vernardakis, 2002: 29)

³⁴ Especially due to the open to shifts party officers, as well as, to the solid effort for a wider modernization of the country.

³⁵ «i) PASOK essentially increases its powers on the urban areas and the country's large cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. [...] ii) PASOK presents a contained decline (3-4%) in the middle – class, petit bourgeois neighborhoods of Athens and Thessaloniki. [...] iii) The same party, on the contrary, presents a dramatic decline in the lower class neighborhoods, a decline of 8-12% not only in Athens, but also in Thessaloniki» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 305).

– all party³⁶, can be noticed» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 307). The party steadily reappointed its stance towards the class social cleavage. The notion that «society is being penetrated from a number of multilevel antitheses and therefore the dipole Workers – Owners is even more distant» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 312) illustrate the catch –all identity of PASOK and at the same time, implies the emergence of new social cleavage. In the shifts of PASOK's ideological manifestos since 1996 and onwards we can ascertain, not only a) the new apprehension regarding the country's social stratification and the b) characteristics of a new social dialog, but also c) the intense presence of ethics, a trend connected to the practical political reasons and the post – materialist influences that are exercised on the new Social Democracy (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 311, 316).

Nowadays, since the seriate electoral wins of 2004 and 2007, PASOK is still in a process of change, unbrokenly connected with the fluidity of the masses. The modernization of the Greek society was used as a general and vague plan, which provided a new political profile, indispensable for the mobilization of the disappointed with the socialist – populist rhetoric voters. However, since 2004 the election of George Papandreou in the leadership of PASOK, a new political dialog was introduced, shifting the emphasis from modernization to participational democracy, to the society of citizens, to multiculturalism and above all in the research of a new party organizational pattern.

The Greek Left:

The ideological bloc of the Left is parliamentary represented by the Greek Communist Party and the Coalition of the Radical Left and progress – or Synaspismos. «The Communist parties of the country abandoned illegality since the collapse of the military coup delectating increasing prestige and honor because of their anti-dictatorship political stance. They were the parties of the heroes and of all those who gave the fight against the military coup with self – abnegation» (Voulgaris, 2007: 104). Hence, especially during the first years of the 'Metapolitefsis', the parties of the Greek Left attempted to orientate themselves within the margins of a diligent democratic regime.

The Greek Communist Party – KKE:

The Greek Communist party, up to now is one of the few communist parties that did not alter its ideology and its daily practices, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Representing the more revolutionary dimension of the Greek parliament, KKE remains a typical Marxist – Leninist party that seeks the revolutionary implementation of communism. Intrinsic to the essence of its existence, even after the transition from illegality to legalization, ensured forcible relations with the CCCP and the Soviet Union³⁷. However, the

³⁶ Organizationally, the concept of the catch – all party is reflected from the loosening of party's members obligations and the non – massive participation in the procedure of decision making. «The process and the criteria of joining PASOK as a member are being simplified and we can even assert they forfeit any ideological sense, with the essence that any ideological accordance between the candidate member and the party that wants to join, lacks.

³⁷ The Pro – Soviet stance of the KKE, influenced indissolubly all the aspects of its political practices. From example, the election of Gorbachev in USSR leadership in 1985 led the party's central

special social conditions of the Greek society, in which KKE emerged, shape some paradox ideas and practices of the party. The absence, for example, of composed industrial units in Greece, and the subsequent lack of typical proletariats, turned KKE to the ideological embracement of the farmers, combining thus in a great scale the Workers – Owners and Urban – Rural social cleavages. Additionally, due to the deeply rooted Christian Orthodox attachment of the Greek society and the uncompromising with this fact ideological platform of dialectical materialism, KKE even if officially denounces any metaphysical idea, does not persist in the condemnation of the Christian Orthodox dogma³⁸ for the working class that it defends. In a similar vein, KKE highlights the national character of its distinct communism, embracing the cultural exceptionalities, the folklore habits and customs of the Greek nation. As KKE, describes itself it as a patriotic communist party.

The Greek Communist Party follows a stable policy, which is turned against Globalization and Europe, a strategy that could be described as ‘Nationalist Populism’ (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 65). Up to nowadays, it remains the fundamental representative of the traditional communist Left in Greece. KKE represents and at the same time arrogates the conceptions, the stereotypes, the world views, which are historically embedded to the political and cultural subculture of the Greek society and are connected with the communist Left (Voulgaris, 2007: 109). In addition, KKE holds a quite offensive stance towards the other parties of the Greek left. Since the end of the 1980s, the party developed an offensive rhetoric against all the parliamentary political parties that possessed pro - working class sentiments, by appealing electoral and capitalist plans for the disorientation and the exploitation of the masses. Due to its own heavy historical legacy, in the field of the Left forces in Greece, it seems quite easy for the Greek Communist party to effectively use the catchword “There is only one party for the Greek working class”, something that indicated the characterization of the KKE – Interior as a reformist party and the conceptualization of PASOK as a faddish reformist party³⁹.

During the 1980s, the KKE neither joined the anti – Right campaign that PASOK had proclaimed, nor preferred a polarized confrontation against the New Democracy. On the contrary, KKE, perceived New Democracy with conditions of a contemporary social enemy. As the party archives assert, «the problem for a Marxist – Leninist party is not to demand the change of political conveyor, rather the class dominance that sustains it». Nevertheless, in an electoral level, since the 1980s and especially since 1985, KKE sought to penetrate in

committee to thoughts for a potential ideological dischargment in a theoretical way and in the effort of electorally detaining PASOK with the creation of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Greek Communist Party denounced Gorbachev’s reformism and retracted to the ideological embankments of Stalinism.

³⁸ It needs to be mentioned that the non – straightforward condemnation of the Greek Orthodox Christianity is a political choice of accordance with the unready for such a denouncement Greece’s working class, and under any circumstances it does not implies mild or even friendly relations between the KKE and the Greek Orthodox Church. Besides the Greek Communist Party was always obviously pro – secularization, demanding the split of the Greek Church from the Greek state (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Sotiropoulos, Nikolakopoulos, 1996).

³⁹ «PASOK represents a faddish reformist party. Faddish from the standpoint of its social base, its origin, its structure, its politics and in general from a series of idiosyncrasies of the Greek reality» [KKE 1992, 11th conference, documents (14-19/12/1982)].

PASOK's electoral base. The party experienced its electoral decline in the large cities, the working class neighborhoods⁴⁰ and the lower economic social strata. Consequently, since 1985, apart from the already negative ascertainments for PASOK, KKE initiated a straightforward assault to the governing party, in order to enhance its own electoral percentages and to escape from its electoral dead end. «KKE abandoned the anti - Right orientation⁴¹ and started to hold equivalent distances not only from the New Democracy, but also from PASOK, which establishment on the progressive parataxis was no longer considered as grounded (Voulgaris, 2007: 271). KKE remains close knitted in a stiff electoral base, without the ability to attract potential voters from a wider social spectrum. During the 1990s, and shortly after KKE's ideological reorganization since USSR's demise, the party remains an original representative of Stalinist Marxism. The emergence of a new middle - class, the increase in the Greeks educational level, the new trends of the electoral body, such as the massive rejection of the world of politics as a whole, are interpreted by the Greek Communist Party as evolutionary phases of capitalism, according to party's linear dialectical analysis. Within this framework, the 'Party of the Revolution' remains a vivid part of the Greek political scene, and KKE's main goal still remains the revolutionary overthrow of this regime.

The KKE Interior – Synaspismos:

The emergence of the Eurocommunist Left since 1968 and the massive non parliamentary organizations, apart from the special Hellenic exceptionalities, was included in the great upheavals that took place in the communist movement during the 1960s, as well as to the special political and cultural shifts of the western democracies during the same era (Voulgaris, 2005: 99). Since the mid 1960s a form of an anti-Soviet communism⁴² has emerged and a plethora of European parties' intended or even instinctively searched the path of renewal for their communist movement. In a theoretical framework these are the reasons for the emergence of the KKE – Interior, a party that stemmed out of the Greek Communist Party in 1968 and consisted the long afterwards uterus of the 'Hellenic Left Party – E.AR', of the 'Coalition of the Left and Progress' and finally of 'Synaspismos'. The first essential concern of KKE – Interior was its ideological and practical division from the KKE. Although, the evolutions that took place during the 1980s, the stabilization of democracy, and the social and electoral emergence of PASOK, posited KKE- interior, in of between two different but essentially intrinsic political poles. On the Right, dominated the governing PASOK with its radical and populist profile and on the Left prevailed the stiff, pro-Soviet KKE. Hence, the KKE – interior was established in the political scene of Greece, surviving

⁴⁰ For example the areas 'Mantamado', 'Georgianoi', 'Geraneia', are known for their pro – KKE electoral orientation as 'the three little Moscows' (Marantzidis, 1997).

⁴¹ A typical example of abandoning the anti – Right orientation was the municipality elections on October 1986. «The party broke the tradition of an 'anti-Right solidarity', usually appeared on the second round of the elections and called its voters to vote freely and not on the basis of an anti – Right option» (Voulgaris, 2007: 322). In addition, the peak of its anti – PASOK effusion was its participation on the coalition with the New Democracy in the 1989 government.

⁴² Eurocommunism, Maoism, 'Third – world communism by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara and the increased salience of Trotskyism are some of the most renowned versions of the anti – Soviet communism.

politically and mainly ideologically as another version of the communist Left and as an everlasting challenge for the KKE and for PASOK.

KKE- interior's discontent with PASOK's governmental services and the party's reaction to the blackmailing character of the electoral dilemma Right / anti-Right led to the steady evolution of an anti-PASOK sentiment among the party's core followers. «Its slight penetration into the traditional Left sphere and the obstacle of its potential electoral expansion due to the emergence of a new socialist conveyor, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, led to the establishment of the KKE – interior as a party with officials that hold a massive influence on the sphere of intellectuals, of educated people and of the youth. The party, therefore, became a sensual indicator of ideological – value fermentations and shifts, providing ideas and politics without being able to reap the fruits of these actions» (Voulgaris, 2007: 118). Moreover, KKE – interior stabilized its sophisticated profile by criticizing the dogmatic communism of KKE as well as, the totalitarian regimes of the existing Soviet socialism, while it legalized Greece's accession in the European Union.

KKE - interior from the first period of the PASOK's governance believed that it could play the role of PASOK to the Greek society, of course following different policies. But, the notion that PASOK came out of nowhere and exploited the ideas of the Left in order to get in power, intruded KKE – interior to the extent that PASOK was seen as the major enemy, and a strong anti – PASOK feeling has eventually emerged for the majority of KKE - Interior followers. Regarding the New Democracy, KKE – interior, from its foundation, expurgated that it comprehends ND's renewal and distinctiveness comparing to the pre- dictatorship Greek Right. Thus, it hesitated more, concerning two distinct political options: Straightforward confrontation or confection of some sort of an open dialog with PASOK and KKE, despite an obligated critique.

Ultimately, the decay of PASOK's governmental trajectory, especially since its second electoral success on 1985, and synchronously the election of Gorbachev as USSR leader, led the KKE – Interior to a strategic concept of convergence with the KKE. The renaming of the party to 'Elliniki Aristera' – E.AR ("Hellenic Left) was the first pretended but also essential step for the Coalition of the two Greek communist parties; a fact that eventually took place on the elections of 1989, under the organizational vehicle of the 'Coalition of the Left and Progress'. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the vast international evolutions, led the core of the orthodox KKE to its ideological backing – out and its regression to the embankments of Stalinist Marxism. These events provoked the end of the united Coalition, on December 1991. All those who remained to the united Coalition, not only politicians that came from the E.AR, but also, politicians that came from the KKE preserved the name Coalition – Synaspismos, for a party that progressed in a political mixture of Left reformist ideas, with intervening and reformative logic regarding capitalism and the ways in which it should be overthrown or reformed and a plethora of post – materialist ideas, such as its ecological sensitivity.

As a whole, Synaspismos, accuses Soviet communism and even the revolutionary logic of KKE, adopting a pro – European, but at the same time Eurosceptical manifesto, with new value interests, such as ecology, women's rights, social minorities rights and immigrants. It

holds a certain anti - Clerical stance and asks for a clear secularization of the Greek state, asking the division of the state and the Church in Greece. Nowadays, its electoral performance is absolutely a matter of urban areas and its voters come from the higher educated social strata (Vernardakis, 2002: 35).

Undoubtedly, in a proposal, based on ideas of diffusive nature, that could be potentially interpreted in many ways, such as social cleavages, the luminous and evident orientation of the hypothesis the aim and the context of the research, as well as, the necessary methodological tools that are needed for the useful and valid conduction of concrete conclusions.

Subject, Aim, Content:

The suggested doctoral thesis will consist of **three parts**:

- i) In the **first part** (Literature Review) I will analyze on a theoretical level the theories of political cleavages. The aim of this first part is to ascertain and state valid conclusions with regard to the opposing theories of the traditional political cleavages and the value-based post-materialistic cleavages. This literature review and analysis will be mainly based on academic articles and books in English, French, Spanish and Greek.
- ii) In the **second part** (Case Studies – Empirical Findings) the aim is to examine and analyze political cleavages, either traditional or potential newly emerging ones, which have marked the Greek society during 1996 –2007 and consequently shaped the electoral behaviour of Greek citizens. The successful completion of this second part requires a clear methodology and specific quantitative and qualitative data which will be analyzed in detail further on in the methodology chapter.
- iii) Finally, the **third part** (Discussion) of this suggested thesis is the scientifically and methodologically valid combination of the above two parts: that is, the application of the theoretical conclusions on the corresponding conclusions of empirical study findings. In this framework, the aim of this thesis is to examine the political cleavages in the late changeover Greece, 1996 – 2007.

In conclusion, the substantial scientific contribution of this thesis consists of the following:

1. The study of the social cleavages theory and the examination of the retention of traditional political cleavages or the emergence of new cleavages with different patterns.
2. The methodological innovation of qualitative analysis in secondary statistical, political and electoral data for the period 1996 – 2007. This option allows us to approach the dynamic change existing in the arrangement of the Greek political parties' social foundation in the 21st century. At the same time, the 1996 – 2007 decade offers a time background to examine the establishment or not of the said changes.
3. The study of voting social coordinates, which allows the framing of critical assumptions, regarding the changing electoral behavior in the social basis of post changeover political parties. The trend of change is already seen in the 1996 elections, emerging more intensely in the elections of 2000 and seemingly establishing itself in the electoral procedures of 2004 and 2007.

Methodology:

The suggested thesis will be based more on secondary and less on primary research. In particular, the **first part** of the doctoral thesis will be based almost entirely on the international scientific literature, and the **second part** will be based both on literature research and the analysis – evaluation of already existing social and political research. The literature review regarding the second part of the suggestion, deals with the volumes of polls, political and social surveys and electoral analyses which have been conducted and published by several companies of social and political research in the country and regard the 1996 – 2007 decade. At the same time, in addition to the published material, most of the private public opinion companies, the EKKE (National Center of Social Research) and the Institute of Social Politics (INKPO⁴³) possess an extremely significant statistic data, useful in the compilation of suggested thesis' second chapter. It is fortunate that throughout the suggested – for the reasons presented above – decade of 1996 – 2007, there has been significant development on a private level for the companies of political and social research.

The National Center of Social Research:

The data provide by EKKE, which are absolutely necessary for this doctoral thesis in order to research the political cleavages of the Greek society during 1996 – 2007, are included in the “Political Standards and Political Behaviour Research” which is part of the Social Data and Indicators Archive. In particular, out of the three volumes of these periodical researches which have been issued, the suggested doctoral thesis requires the data of the volume with publication manager Mr. Panagiotis Kafetzis, titled “Political Standards and Political Behavior Research (November 1989 and April 1990)” to study and examine the change prerequisites noticed in the decade examined. In addition, even more significant is the use of the periodical report titled “Comparative National Elections Programme - CNEP (September, October 1996 and February, March 2004)”, since the research's aim is focused on the forms of political information and the way it is acquired, the attitudes towards democracy and the basic value directions which are at the same time a medium for electoral motivation. Also, critical secondary data for the implementation of the current suggestion are the results of political standards and political behavior 1985 – 1988 – 1996 research. Either way, as we have also stated above, the secondary data are a basic source of information to examine the political cleavages in the 1996 – 2007 decade. Finally, from EKKE's Social Data Bank as well as from the record of the Council of European Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA), we can use the information of the secondary process and management of socioeconomic data and indexes website and in particular the research theme units titled: i) forms of social conflicts in Post Changeover Greece (1974, 1994 KSyME), ii) Politics and Political Institutions (PPI) and iii) National Elites. The said website serves the needs of the research community and at the same time is the country's main infrastructure for secondary analysis of socioeconomic data.

⁴³ In particular the use of Social Indicators.

The Private sector – Companies of political and social research:

The changes of the party and political system of the Third Hellenic Democracy from the beginning of the 90s, have led to the amplification of the role and importance of polls in Greece as well. “A trademark in this process are the parliamentary elections of 1996, both for the establishment of pre-election polls and the establishment of exit polls in the private television networks and public television” (Mavris, 2002: 3). Thus, polls, their publication in the country’s press and the politicians’ willingness to harmonize themselves with newer, more scientific terms of political competition, led to the performance of various political researches under the scientific supervision of ESOMAR/AGMORC. Hence, in addition to the EKKE, private organizations were massively established, particularly with the onset of the 21st century, assuming the periodic performance of public opinion research. From an initial research and contact with the companies mentioned next, we present the most significant statistical material / archive of data required to examine the phenomenon of social political cleavages in the 1996 – 2007 decade. For the 1996 – 2000 period, particularly important are the regular monthly researches – time series of company **M.R.B.**, one of the few to have performed a methodic temporal research during the early period of the Simitis government. Also, for the period 1996 – 2004 a significant database is provided by the social and political research of company **Kapa Research**. Established in 1990, the company offers a rich database of its research archives. From 2000 to 2004, the political and social research is much more extensive than in previous years, along with the number of companies performing it. A special interest is seen in the time-series of company **VPRC** and in particular the publications of data of the company’s most important political and social research⁴⁴ in an effort to establish a scientific level of theoretical discussion and discourse. From 2002 to 2004 also important are the data emerging from the subscribers’ quarterly political – social research of Pan-Hellenic and wide coverage ‘Metron’ Forum by company **Metron Analysis**.

Finally, complementarily we may add as useful methodology tools to complete the research, interviews with the suitable persons: politicians, experienced executives of political parties⁴⁵, academics, sociologists, political scientists and researchers of large poll companies. In addition to personal interviews, group discussions with institutional persons from the Greek state may provide useful empirical conclusions.

⁴⁴ «I koini gnomi stin Ellada 1999 – 2000», (“Public opinion in Greece 1999-2000), «I koini gnomi stin Ellada 2001» (“Public opinion in Greece 2001), «I koini gnomi stin Ellada 2002», (“Public opinion in Greece 2002), «I koini gnomi stin Ellada 2003», (“Public opinion in Greece 2003), «I koini gnomi stin Ellada 2004 – Ekloges, Kommata, Omades Simferonton, Horos kai Koinonia” (“Public opinion in Greece 2004 – Elections, Parties, Interest Groups, Area and Society”).

⁴⁵ In addition, the archives of political parties, their official documents, political programmes, political lectures of their executives in the parliament and statements in the press, articles or books they write on occasion with specific political issues, are increasingly important to examine the considered transition from traditional to new political cleavages of different nature.

By way of epilogue:

Examining the nature of political cleavages in modern Greece, on the level of research for the establishment or not of the new political cleavages and the produced electoral behavior of the changing Greek society during 1996 – 2007, are issues with intense and current scientific interest. Hence, this paper, acknowledges that since the mid 1990s, when the plethora of the worldwide and domestic changes have been assimilated into the Greek society, the adequate chronicle era for the examination of the decline or even the substitution of the traditional cleavage structure by newly emerged ones, is presented. From this point of view, Greece could be perceived as an ideal context of implementing the dialog of prevalence or replacement, temporary or permanent, of the traditional cleavages due to an ongoing, contemporary existing momentum.

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