Mediating Among the Elites and Grassroots: Explaining Differential Community Support in the Good Friday Agreement and the Annan Plan Referendums

Joana Amaral

PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of Kent

Abstract

If a mediation process is to be fully successful, the agreement achieved between the communities' representatives must be supported by the communities they represent. While the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was highly supported by 90 per cent from the Nationalist community, the 51 per cent vote from the Unionist community is less expressive. In Cyprus, though the Annan Plan was rejected due to the low 24 per cent vote from the Greek Cypriot community, 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot community actually voted in favour of its implementation. When implementation of peace agreements negotiated between elites is dependent upon their democratic acceptance by the people in referendums, a deeper understanding of the conditions that generate community support for the agreements reached at mediated high-level negotiations is necessary. How can mediation processes be effective in gathering high levels of public support for peace agreements? This crucial dimension of conflict resolution and mediation success lacks a cohesive theoretical grounding drawn from empirical analysis.

Postcolonial Communication: Mediating Cyprus Partition

Maria Avraamidou

Research Fellow

PhD Candidate

Department of Communication and Internet Studies

Cyprus University of Technology

maria.avraamidou@cut.ac.cy

mariaavraamidou@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT: The paper examines the representations of editorials published in the Greek Cypriot press during the negotiations (November 2002 to April 2004) over a UN plan, the Anan Plan aiming in principle to reunite ethnically divided Cyprus under a federation. The paper focuses on how the press was calling the Greek Cypriots to imagine their national community mainly through examining how the 'Us' and 'Others' paradigm worked and how history and the state were represented. Based on preliminary findings it will be argued that, Cypriotness has taken new forms and that the 2002 to 2004 period played a crucial role in these transformations. It will also be argued that to approach contemporary forms and reproductions of nationalism in the context of Cyprus one needs to go beyond the hellenocentric/ cyprocentrism antagonism and examine whether and how 'others' are excluded. Due to the routinization of the negotiation process nationalism is "embedded in routines of life" including the media therefore one needs not to look for fierce forms of nationalism but investigate how it has come to be naturalized and how it functions in a way that secures 'how things must stay forever'. The holistic approaches and the historicity of postcolonialism ensure that media centeredness and 'textualization' are avoided. In this regard, the qualitative analysis of the press 'texts' is informed by the international/ local context within which the negotiations took place and approaches the media as institutions mediating and also constructing reality.

Introduction

The main aim of my presentation is to offer some preliminary empirical results of the qualitative analysis of editorials of all the daily newspapers in Greek language, published between 2002 and 2004 in Cyprus. The study approaches the media as institutions which produce consensus and manufacture consent (Hall 1982). The period of concern includes the negotiations and the two referendums over a UN settlement plan, the Annan plan (the plan) aiming in principle to reunite ethnically divided Cyprus under a federation. The vast majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the plan (73, 58%), whereas the Turkish Cypriots accepted it (64, 91%). The debates over the plan represent a unique example of how after 1960 'intensification of interethnic conflict was fuelled by the domestic elites of both communities intent on perpetuating and/or assuming power and by the interests of foreign powers' (Polis 1996:82). Almost, ten years after, Cyprus remains divided along ethnic lines whereas the role of the media in the conflict remains understudied. Notably, available literature, discusses how 'the institutions relying on the print medium' acted as a 'prototype of the subsequent geographical separation of the two communities' (Panayiotou 2006: 10) and that 'newspapers may have contributed to the consolidation of ethnic differences' (Christophorou 2010: 4) strengthening 'nationalisms and fear of each other' (Bailie & Azgın cited in Way 2010: 30). The paper focuses on how the press was calling the Greek Cypriots to imagine their national community mainly through elaborating how the 'Us' and 'Others' paradigm worked and how history and the state were represented.

Cyprocentrism Vs Hellenocentrism: Some general introductory reflections

'What are you?'/*Ti Eisai*? is a question I rarely wanted to answer from the day I remember my self as a primary student in Cyprus. It felt like signing an oral conscience certificate: By replying that I was Greek Cypriot or Cypriot I would be presumed to being a left-winger. If I responded that I was Greek, I would be presumed a right-winger. The unofficial conscience certificate I talk about represents an aspect of what is identified as the struggle between hellenocentrism and cyprocentrism. In particular, it is argued that two antagonistic forms of nationalism developed within Greek Cypriots, the territorial/ civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Peristianis 2006: 105). In broad terms, territorial/ civic nationalism or cyprocentrism is identified with the state, whereas ethnic nationalism or hellenocentrism emphasizes the Greekness of the Greek Cypriots (Peristianis 2006; Vrikki 2005). Mavratsas also argued that Cypriotism 'has largely developed in explicit opposition to Greek nationalism' (1997: 722). To support any side would mean risking 'of being identified with extreme positions and being accused of betraying the ethnos (antihellenism) or the state (anticypriotism)" (Peristianis 2006: 115). Arguably, cypriotism was also developed as a result of an understanding of Cyprus as a place where different communities coexisted (Panayiotou 2011; Papadopoulos 1964). Personally, I avoided as much as I could avoid, what I considered being a banal identity debate. Then why now return to identity politics? Is it because identity remains the 'watchword of the times' (Shotter cited in Billig 1995: 60)? Neither cyprocentrism nor hellenocentrism is static, and in the present day the answer to the above mentioned banal/ hot question is not interpreted in the same manner. Cypriotness has taken new forms and –as I will be arguing- the 2002 to 2004 period played a crucial role in these transformations. In relation to the Turkish Cypriots, it is argued that the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots led to an increasing tendency 'to express identity in terms of a separate Turkish Cypriotness' (Ramm 2006 cited in Sahin 2010).

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Loizides argues that in 2004, the Greek Cypriot President and his allies who rejected the plan won the battle of identity framing forming a Greek Cypriot nationalism 'driven by isolationism and lack of trust for the international community' (2007: 184). Panayiotou argued that Papadopoulos' political opponents were also using cypriotness, but their cypriotness was related to the 'unity of the space and internal pluralism' (2011). At the end of Presidents' Papadopoulos speech calling for a strong rejection of the plan, individuals celebrated 'waving Cypriot flags, appropriating those as a symbol of Greek Cypriot identity and resistance to the foreign plots' (Loizides 2007: 184). The leftist's party General Secretary, presenting the decision to reject the plan, noted how those who used to consider the flying of the Cyprus flag a betrayal were now fortifying their nationalism behind it (Christofias, April 2004). In the past, former Greek Cypriot president, Clerides argued referring to the Cyprus flag that "no one would die for it" (Stearns cited in Loizides 2007:173).

These are only little evidence arguing that the hellenocentric/cyprocentric antagonism needs to be reappraised in light of the 2002 to 2004 era. In order to approach their contemporary form(s) one needs to go beyond whether they emphasize the state or the ethnos. By contrast, we need to investigate whether and under what requirements they include or exclude others but also whether this 'imagining' (Anderson 2006) leads to a reproduction of social-relations as merely ethnic ones (Miles 1989 cited in Kyriakides and Torres 2012).

Flagging Us and the Others

Billig is concerned with the banal reproduction of nationalism in the established nations (1995), however, there is a real contribution that his concept can make in studying nationalism and the media in postcolonial Cyprus[1]. The routinization of the negotiation process allowed nationalism to embede the routines of life, including the media. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into details regarding the long-lasting negotiations; suffice to note that since the de facto partition of Cyprus in 1974 to 2002 that the plan was presented, there were sequential rounds of negotiations–and stalemates- without reaching a settlement. The negotiations were taking place in a relatively calm environment despite the high militarization of both territories [north and south] and despite ruptures which threatened the ceasefire situation. This routinization, as Billig would argue lead to 'thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into routine habits and, thus, they [became] enhabited: It has always being 'our' will for a solution versus their non-will; 'our' nationalism was forgotten or justified, whereas 'their' nationalism was irrational and aggressive (*Ibid*.: 38). Phrases that were frequently repeated by politicians, teachers, journalists like 'return of all the refugees [to their occupied houses], 'our borders are in Kyrenia', during the period studied they became mindful. In *Simerini*[2], we find the claim that politicians used emptily these slogans in the past (17 November, 2002):

> And the promises of the [leader] to the people? "[The slogan]
> "I shall not deliver the homeland '?" Our borders are at the
> coastline of Kyrenia "?" No solution unless the last refugee
> goes to his/ her house? "These and all others he cried up (he
> even promised to impeach the high level Agreements of '77),

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[1] The concept of 'banal nationalism' is not used uncritically but in awareness that also this form of nationalism can be contested by individuals. Madianou has encountered for example, how Greek viewers, contested the banal nationalism of Greek TV channels (2005: 103).

[2] The translation of the editorials from Greek to English is mine.

what were they? Where they lie? Were they misleading and
deceptive?

Let us present some more examples from the editorials of the Us and the Other paradigm: It is Us who will need to 'struggle hard […] to reach a fair and under the circumstances, a workable and viable solution' (*Alithia*, 17 November 2002). It is Us who are called to say the big "yes" or the big "no" (*Haravgi*, 17 November 2002). It is our side which is fragile and vulnerable but which bears a historic responsibility (*Fileleftheros*, 17 November 2002) and it is Us who 'for 40 years, we turn to the United Nations to find our rights'(*Simerini,* February 15, 2004).

All editorials studied to greater or lesser extend use the term Cypriots or people/ *laos* to mean Greek Cypriots. For example *Fileleftheros* argues that, 'even the last Cypriot' recognizes Hellas' [sic.] contribution to Cyprus EU access (*Fileleftheros*, 15 December 2002). This is somehow different from the findings of Papadakis' on history books which 'employ the term Cypriots (Kyprioi) as equivalent to Greeks' (2008:7). The editorials seem to bend towards a more Cypriot-centric approach but still in an exclusive manner.The inclusion of Turkish Cypriots is explicitly done through references such as 'the Cypriot people as a whole' (*Simerini* 23 February, 2004), otherwise their presence is stimulated through their absence.

History and the State: Cyprocentric Codes and Greek fixity

Mavratsas argued that Cyprus historiography is 'highly ideologized, with both the ethnonationalists and the Cypriotists utilizing arbitrary and selective strategies of historical interpretation' as they are 'perfectly aware that ideological hegemony over the present requires an appropriation of the past' (1997:731). Papadakis has showed how history taught at Greek Cypriot schools is hellenocentric and is utilized 'to propagate a narrative focusing on the 'suffering of the nation and to legitimate its political goals' (2008:1). The editorials confirm how selective historical narratives are used to underpin political choices. However, there is a shift in terms of which history is utilized. *I Simerini* (February 15, 2004), calls the Greek Cypriots to reject the plan based on the last 50 years of Cyprus history:

> The people, however, and their real life do not go into
> diplomatic folders. This is what the history of all people says,
> especially the Cypriot history of the last 50 years...

Mahi, just before the referendums urged the Greek Cypriots to reject the plan based on a more prolonged history. The title of the editorial reads: "9000 years of history are staring at you" (17 April, 2004). The last fifty years are connected with the history of the Cyprus Republic whereas the 9000 years emphasize the 'ethnos' but they are not necessarily in contradiction as the aim of both is the rejection of plan. With *Simerini*'s editorial a version of the contemporary Cypriot history takes its place in the public sphere in a celebrated manner, though delayed. Why is this a shift? As discussed, the focus over Cypriotness instead of Greekness was considered anti-national. Notably, the shift concerns the use of Cypriotness in the public sphere and not the existence of a Cypriot conscious[3].

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[3] Panayiotou has elaborated on the development of a Cypriot consciousness despite the hegemony of Greek and Turkish nationalism.

In another editorial, *Simerini* explicitly refers to three events of the last 50 years: the so-called Turkish mutiny/tourkoantarsya, the July 1974 Greek Hunta-instigated coup against the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish invasion/occupation (28 March 2004):

> The Annan Plan leads to the dissolution of the Republic of
> Cyprus that withstood the Turkish mutiny the coup and the
> Turkish invasion and occupation.

These events, for *Simerin* challenged the existence of the state and the plan is their current equivalent. The use of the term '*tourkoantarsi*a' meaning Turkish mutiny is indicative as it is usually used to describe the 1963 intercommunal violence as an outcome of mainly Turkish Cypriots actions. *Simerini's* (*Ibid.*) reference to history despite being Cypriot-centric, it still excludes the Turkish Cypriots. *Mahi* (17 April, 2004) adopts a premordial understanding of nations:

> The Greek of Cyprus [first person singular] is not a nomad in
> this land. He did not come as a conqueror and grabber. He was
> here from the beginning of time and space. Therefore he has a
> "timeless historical consciousness." He feels 9,000 years of
> history staring at him!

There is no need to clearly identify who the others are; it is enough to note that they came as 'occupants', contrary to us, the Greeks of Cyprus who have been here eternally. However, the same editorial also uses Cypro-centric codes when glorifying Cypriots for resisting American pro-solution plots.

Alithia argued that the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots would lead to the recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (29 February, 2004). *Simerini*, consistently argued that the plan would lead to the dissolution of the State and presented the state as 'the only weapon and rampart of an international struggle'. This coincides with President's Papadopoulos statement, "I received a state internationally recognized and I will not deliver a community" (Tassos Papadopoulos, April 2004). By contrast, the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ('TRNC') was an 'illegal regime' (*Alithia*, 15 December 2002) which had to be obsolete. In the left wing rhetoric, the existence of two states cannot be tolerated also on the grounds of universalism: "I do not know if there is a leftist or progressive human who will accept the elevation of an apartheid wall that separates Christians and Muslims into two purely religious zones as Denktash claims" (*Haravgi*, 29 February 2004). The editorials are reproducing 'the predominant discourses of state-government recognition' (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2001) which 'produce essentialist and totalizing visions of the other' seeking as in the past 'to demonise, marginalize' them *(Ibid.: 133)*

'The Republic of Cyprus, namely the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus', says *Simerini* stressing the bicommunality of the state *(28 March, 2004)*. In principle there can be no Republic of Cyprus, without the Turks but in practice, for around 50 years the state functions, internally and externally without the Turkish Cypriots. The versions of history used, exterminate further the sincerity of the argument of a bicommunal state. The state that was once characterized as a 'strange mixture of a protectorate, condominium, and independent statehood' (Constantinou and Papadakis 2001:127) was about to prove that it was more independent than a protectorate as Greek Cypriots were to reject a plan against the will of the international community. "The only weapon of Greek Cypriots against Turkey's might", the international recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (Peristianis, 2006:104) was now used

against an unwanted settlement[4]. The argument for an eventual dissolution of the state was not only drawn in legalistic lines. Statehood represented a proof that the locals could be successfully self-ruled and it had offered – untill that time- to Greek Cypriots, economic prosperity –despite its postcoloniality[5].

Beyond the Us/Other framework: Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as the 'other'?

The preliminary findings suggest that emphasis on the state and on a certain view of history naturalized further the division between Us and Them. Reference to Turkish Cypriots' rights, as Barthes would argue, is not an alibi of Greek Cypriot's [past and current] attitude towards their 'other' but the 'very presence' of such attitude (1972). The myth for the Greek Cypriot reader 'is a story once true and unreal' (*Ibid*.: 127). Suffice to note at this stage that the repetitions for a 'viable and functional solution that will safeguard the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots' (*Mahi,* 15 December 2002) are associated with past demands in relation to the conflict and their repetition in this context maintains the framework of Us and the Others. In addition, another absent-present category emerges along with the Turkish Cypriots, that is the Greek Cypriots and it refers to how the press represented the Greek Cypriots. For example, the editorials appear to reproduce the Cyprus issue as a responsibility of the elites:

> [The people] left to the leadership the responsibility and the responsibilities to fulfill its promises and its declarations [in relation to the Cyprus Issue] (*Mahi* 17 November, 2002)

This reproduction is indicative not only of the presumed role of the people but also of how they must stay forever (Hall 1982). In April 2003 however, the masses of Cypriots queuing to cross from one side to the other of the partition line for the first time after 30 years were setting the limits of the public discourse[6], threatening to become the 'gatekeepers'. This will be the focus of later research.

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[4] The Republic of Cyprus regardless of a solution to the Cyprus issue was also to become a member of the European Union some weeks after the April 2004 referendums. In other parts of this study the use of the EU prospect by the editorials in question is studied.
[5] Attalides notes how before 1974 there was an economic prosperity which made Cypriots see Statehood – despite being contested- in a 'sympathetic light' (1979:59)
[6] Demetriou has shown how the opening of the crossing points was presented in the overall understanding of the Cyprus issue as static and for which no surprises should be expected (Demetriou 2007).

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Local Political Responses to European Integration: The case of North Cyprus.

Abstract

This paper analyses how local political actors instrumentalize legal and normative framework provided by the European integration process by linking their political agenda to the EU to re-formulate policies, approaches and discourses regarding the conflict in the case of North Cyprus. What is the underlining reason of the local actors' method and preferences of linking their political agenda to the EU? How the dynamics of European integration alters the power balance between local political actors? What consequences does this have for the conflict resolution process?

The paper argues that while the preference of political actors to link their agenda with the Integration process is determined on the one hand by their position towards further integration with the EU, and on the other hand the degree of overlap between their political orientation and the EU, their ability to facilitate change depends on the image and performance of the EU as a credible actor.

Cemaliye Beysoylu

PhD Student

University of Leeds

School of Politics and International Studies

Introduction

The role of the EU in conflict resolution is not only limited to the Union's interventions as an actor, "it also takes place through the discursive, legal and institutional framework offered by the integration and association process" (Albert et al. 2008:26). Through these discursive, legal and institutional frameworks the Union provides a favourable environment for local political actors "to link their political agendas with the EU and through reference to integration, justify desecuritisating moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate" (Albert et al. 2008:27)[1]. Yet, local political actors who possess the ability to trigger mass movements in a conflict can also abuse the framework of European integration to construct stronger securitization discourses and impede positive development.

What is the underlining reason of the local actors' preferences? How the dynamics of European integration alters the power balance between local political actors? What implications does this have for the conflict resolution process?

This paper aims to answer these questions by analysing how local political actors use the integration framework to re-formulate their policies in the case of North Cyprus.

Pre-Accession Period

In the case of Cyprus, the instruments accompanying the European integration process range from the terms of the Copenhagen criteria, to various Council Presidency conclusions and to statements of the Commission, the Parliament and member states delivering support messages for reunification. Especially, the agreement reached at Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 at the presence of Greek Cypriot and Turkish leaders, provided a solid framework for local political actors in North Cyprus to "legitimise whatever concessions each side would have been asked to make internally" (Demetriou 2008:78-79). Turkish Cypriot civil society and opposition parties did not miss this opportunity and starting from 2002 they gathered under the movement of 'This Country is Ours Platform' (Bu Memleket BizimPlatformu)[2], not only instrumentalise the positive atmosphere created by the Copenhagen Council Meeting, but using the entire European policy framework and the

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[1] Albert et al. 2008 builds this theoretical explanation on the capacity of the EU's legal and normative framework base on Buzan et. al. 1998's analysis on security.
[2]Included number of civil society institutions (including labour and trade unions) and opposition parties of CTP, BKP, YBH, CAP etc.

possibility of the European membership to legitimize their alternative approach to bi-communal negotiations. The Platform organized some of the biggest demonstration of Turkish Cypriot history to challenge the intransigent position of the incumbent leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community, Rauf Denktas and existing etno-political discourses[3].

For the oncoming elections, the EU integration process is "used by progressive Turkish Cypriot parties to craft their political strategy" (Yakinthou 2009:313).

The EU's principles of justice, democracy and right for free speech and political pluralism utilised to argue by the opposition forces that this is the shape that the TRNC politic needs to take as well (Yakinthou 2009:314). The EU is presented as a force for good and a symbol of brotherhood and unity that will bring security and peace for Cyprus as well[4]. The new political strategy legitimized a stance that is more reconciliatory than the hardliner president Denktas. This resulted in the victory of the main opposition party CTP's in December 2003 by promising Turkish Cypriots more moderate approach to negotiations that will bring peace, EU membership and better standards of living. CTP and other pro-solution parties such as BDH won more than half of the seats in the parliament.

Prominent analysis agrees that without this "catalyst effect" of the prospect of the European membership, and the risk of Greek Cypriot led Republic of Cyprus achieving it without Turkish Cypriot participation altered the stance of Turkish Cypriot community (Lacher and Kaymak 2007; Yakinthou, 2009). The positive instrumentalisation of this framework by civil society and opposition parties' convince Turkish Cypriot to vote positively for referenda (Lacher and Kaymak 2007; Yakinthou, 2009). They also actively participated and expensively benefitted from the EU organized education seminars and bi-communal events[5]

In the North, political forces are mainly divided between the right wing parties that support the idea of 'taksim' (partition) and the left wing that is in favour of 'reunification'. After 1974 in the North, politics scene is monopolised by the nationalist right wing pro-taksim parties (UBP and DP). "Pro-taksim parties regularly gained more than 60 per cent of the vote in elections from 1974, and increased this to a two-thirds majority in the 1998 general elections" (Lacher and Kaymak 2005: 154). Right wing parties that dominated the political life in the North for a few decades refer to their community as 'Cyprus Turks', implying ethnic ties with 'motherland' Turkey. The incumbent president of de-facto Turkish

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[3] This argument is on the same line with Demetriou 2008 and Sommer 2005.
[4] Interview with a member of Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce.
[5] Interview with a politician from CTP, 2011.

Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC), Dervis Eroglu (2010) clearly states his position by explaining that "The people of Cyprus are Greek and Turks. Yes, I was born in Cyprus, but here we came from Turkey. We are proud to be Turk and we never made any compromise". The right regards the 1974 division as a peace movement, the end point of the conflict; therefore they form their policies for protection and recognition of TRNC. Nearly every aspect of life was securitized by these parties using ethno-nationalistic discourses (Diez 2002 quoted in Lacher and Kaymak 2005:152). This led to marginalisation of the left due to their moderate stance and it's even led to accusation of betrayal to their nation (Lacher and Kaymak 2005:152).

The European Integration challenged the dominance of these ethno-nationalist securitization policies and discourses and enabled pro-solution actors to find a legitimate ground for their peace propaganda and eventually eroded the commitment of the TCC to nationalist actors.

After coming to power, not only at the discourse level but also in practice, pro-solution parties made an effort to go beyond temporary policy changes and attempted form the ground for permanent de-securitizing. This was first done by changing the ethnocentric history books that were taught in schools. Secondly despite the lack of directions or support from the EU institutions the new leadership initiated self-motivated EU integration process that is supported by civil society to adapt the *acquis*[6].

Post-Accession Period

Despite the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan, as the positive atmosphere continued in the North, during the 2005 elections, pro-solution forces managed to stay in power. The biggest pro-solution party CTP entered the early parliamentary elections of February 2005 election campaigns with the slogan, "We have a promise, To Cyprus to Europe"[7], referring to their motivation to solve the Cyprus problem under the EU framework and increased their votes to %44.5[8]. Yet, the real change of power balance between pro-unification and pro-taksim political forces in the North, emerged as a result of the presidential elections of 2005. The election results carried the pro-solution CTP's leader Mehmet Ali

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[6] Interview with a politician from CTP; Interview with a civil servant from EU Coordination Centre.
[7] Author's own translation
[8] Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Legislative Elections of 20 February 2004. Available From: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/n/northcyprus/northcyprus2005.txt

Talat to presidency, ending the era of the hardliner R. Denktas who was in power since the unilateral declaration of independence.

Nevertheless, as the progress of bi-communal negotiations and the hopes for EU integration dramatically decreased in the following years due to the lack of concrete results reached, the positive atmosphere gave way to great disenchantment and dissatisfaction among Turkish Cypriots.

Gradually, the argument and policies of the new president Mehmet Ali Talat and other pro-unification forces lost ground to instrumentalise integration framework to employ de-securitization policies. "They continuously lost votes starting from pro-EU, pro-solution mayors to government and at last the president; they are all gone"[9]. With the decline of pro-unification forces, the process of adaptation to the *acquis* decelerated and at the time of writing it was standing still. Consequently, pro-unification forces not only lost their transformative power, due to the enabling impact of integration but they also lost the following elections. In North Cyprus, some still believe that the integration process will not happen in a day therefore this self-designed accession processes must proceed. However the EU is not providing enough incentive to make the process feasible[10].

The failure of pro-unification forces to dominate local politics to adopt de-securitazition policies through enabling impact is firstly due to disappearing hopes of a European future as advertised by many pro-unification forces[11]. Secondly, Turkish Cypriot community realised the fact that the only impediment to a solution is not the hardliner leader Denktas[12]. "Having defeated the status quo forces in the North, the pro-settlement parties and civil society organizations only belatedly came to realize that few on the Greek Cypriot side share their eagerness for reconciliation" (Lacher and Kaymak 2005). Thirdly, the promise of the EU to lift isolations, proposals of Direct Trade, Financial Aid and Green Line Regulations are utilized by pro-solution forces for a while yet, EU failing to fulfil its promises caused great disenchantment. As a result, the idea of "modern and fair" EU left its place an "unrealiable and biased" EU[13] and" the position of the EU damaged pro-solution parties very badly"[14]. On the other hand, the decision of some Greek Cypriot political actors to utilize some key EU principles to craft the idea of European Solution decayed the EU's image as a force for good

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[9] Interview with a civil servant from EU Coordination Centre.
[10] Interview with a member of Cyprus-EU Association.
[11] Interview with an academic from Cyprus Policy Centre.
[12] Interview with a politician from CTP; Interview with a civil servant from EU Coordination Centre.
[13] Interview with a civil servant from EU Coordination Centre.
[14] Interview with a civil servant from EU Coordination Centre.

among Turkish Cypriots. The main advocate of this approach is the EVROKO and a prominent party member explains that;

> "We believe that now we are in the EU, this creates the framework of the solution of the Cyprus problem. The fact that Turkey itself is proceeding to EU, it reinforces even more our opinion that the solution must be what we called as a party is the European solution. European solution means all the people of Cyprus leave according to the European rules, *acquis communautaire* and European principles"[15].

The arguments seems harmless and even convincing, but in many aspects it also contradicts the common framework of the bi-communal negotiations that has hardly been reached by two sides; the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. Same interviewee further explains this point that "the fact that the others project the so called bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is only because they do not accept the European principles and human rights and they want to use this very vague political frame to undermine, human rights and European principles"[16].

It is true that the agreed common framework of negotiations[17] is contradicting the European principles, especially the free movement of persons and capital. However, the European Union declared both with Protocol No. 10 to the Act of Accession that the EU could accommodate a settlement that would contain derogations from the *acquis*: "'ready to accommodate the terms of such a settlement [in Cyprus] in line with the principles on which the EU is founded". The notion of 'European Solution' favours "a unitary state where the Turkish Cypriots are relegated to the position of a privileged minority" (Cremona and Skoutaris 2009:382). This perception makes it harder for Greek Cypriot society to accept the necessity of a compromised agreement. By containing the name of Europe and instrumentalising the European principles of free-movement of people and capital and basic human rights, it is at the same time damaging the credibility of any political actor who attempts to utilise the EU's principles to legitimize any desecuritization policies in the North.

The interesting fact is that the loss of power did not alter many of these actors' support for the resolution and re-unification of Cyprus, Instead, they abandoned instrumentalising the EU framework for their policies or/and utilising the prospect of EU membership as an incentive to have wider community agree with them. Despite feeling betrayed by their Greek

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[15] Interview with a politician from EVROKO.

[16] Ibid.

[17] 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements, which is confirmed by Christofias and Talat in 2008 as the parameters of a solution, suggests that the framework of settlement bases on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation under equal representation of two communities.

Cypriots counterparts and the EU, in the North pro-solution actors still believe an agreement under the EU framework is a better option[18]. This idea based on the lower security risks attached to the any solution that will reach as an EU member because they anticipate the EU institutions and principles will protect their rights[19]. Yet, since the image of the EU has changed this over time the idea does not take place in public discourses of political actors anymore[20]

When nationalist forces turned back to power, firstly with the parliamentary election of 2009 and then in the following presidential elections of 2010 they reversed some of the progress recorded before. UBP, who is the biggest winner of the elections, did not used EU framework to legitimize desecritization, to the contrary they benefitted from the allegedly biased position of the EU to promote idea that the EU is unreliable so the only option Turkish Cypriots have is integration with Turkey[21]. With this argument they won both parliamentary and presidential elections in 2009 and 2010 respectively. "Currently in the North, being opposed to the EU sells at a premium. Resisting the EU, defending our own rights and not to be subordinated is the position"[22].

Conclusions

Consequently the paper argues that regardless of the normative and legal framework the EU provides, the preference of political actors linking their agenda with the integration process is determined by their political orientation. The EU integration provides a favourable environment for the pro-solution actors to legitimize their stance regarding the conflict. But at the same time this framework can be utilized by others as well in order to introduce further desecuritization moves. The decision of the local political actors to utilise the EU in one way or the other, in the case of North Cyprus is stemming from these parties' previous stances about the conflict. The process of instrumentalization of the EU to craft new policies is accompanied by the changes in power balance between local political actors. Yet this change can either be in favour of pro-solution actors or the opposite. Because the change comes as a result of gaining the support of a wider community and regardless of the legal and normative

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[18] Interview with a politician from CTP.
[19] Interview with a politician from CTP.
[20] Interview with a former member of the Turkish Cypriot negotiation team.
[21] Interview with a politician from CTP.
[22] Interview with a politician from CTP.

framework this is directly linked to the EU's performance of the EU as an actor and the position of the other side.

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Unification or Partition
Lessons from Bosnia for Cyprus

Peter Kacziba
PhD candidate
Department of Political Studies
University of Pécs

Abstract

The Cypriot and the Bosnian ethnic conflicts are significant cases of the European contemporary history. Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as BiH) have had a long history of valuable and operable ethnic cooperation, however their convergent societies broke into pieces after the collapse of a colonial and a multi-ethnic governmental system. The fall of British Empire and Yugoslavia rose the tensions in both regions, the nationalist political ideas became popular by the sponsorships of regional powers (Greece, Turkey and Serbia, Croatia), meanwhile each of the ethnic groups begun to determinate themselves as part of an ethnically "clean" nation and not as a multi-ethnic community. The regional powers played important role in this new nationalistic self-determination and they encouraged their favored entities to brake the former join them with their territories and brake their former system of co-operative society. When the whole situation ended in a inhuman civil war the so called Great Powers has decided to adopt a compromised solution both for Cyprus and Bosnia, wherein the involved sides were forced to accept the terms. The agreements of 1960 and treaty of Dayton in 1995 created a federal solution for Cyprus and Bosnia, however the prospective inhabitants of these states did not wish to live together.

The presentation will attempt to examine how the Bosnian state were functioning after its establishment and will ask the question what are the similarities and differences between the Cypriot and Bosnian ethnic conflicts, and what kind of lessons could give the Bosnian model for Cyprus. The discussion will highlight the importance of a functionable state structure; try to summarize the external role in the reconciliation; stress the ineffectiveness of territorial separation, and emphasise significance of creation a national ideology which could be shared by the majority of the inhabitants.

1. Introduction

Ethnically diverse regions has always challenged the state founders and law-makers, especially during the 20th century, when the democratic belief encouraged the rule of majority to provide rights for minorities, or even to share the political power with them. The establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 1960 was trying to follow this conception, and created a constitution which identified and recognized the two major communities of the island and adopted their origin, language, culture and religion. Although the agreements of 1960 attempted to design an operable, unitary-based but bi-communal consociational democracy, the foreign powers – United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey – founded only a state not a nation. The lack of belief in Cypriotism and the complicated governmental structure – associated with the growing nationalism of Greece and Turkey – poisoned the cooperation of Greek Cypriots (hereinafter referred to as GC) and Turkish Cypriots (TC) and caused the breakdown of Republic of Cyprus. The entire situation became more complex with the Turkish occupation of North-Cyprus in 1974, which generated a long-term deadlock for the case of Cyprus.

2. The Case of Bosnia

Although the Bosnian and the Cypriot issues have different origins, the reunification process of BiH and its consequences could give valuable lessons for Cyprus. The present Bosnian state has been created by the Annex 4 of the Treaty of Dayton in 1995, which document wished to reunify the original multi-ethnic shapes of the country. For this reason the international community has established a federal system and has divided the BiH into two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Republika Srpska) with three constituent ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats). The two member states enjoy wide autonomy, each entities have their own territory, population, constitution, president, government, parliament, taxation and jurisdictional system, military, police etc.

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into three decision making levels. The municipalities and local authorities represent the first, the cantons the second, and the national institutions the third level. The ten cantons (from which 5 Bosniak, 3 Croat, 2 Mixed) have their own provincial governments and parliaments – based on their constitutions –, which offer them wide autonomy on the field of education, culture, jurisdiction, law enforcement, regional development, media etc, and guarantee the equality for Bosniak and Croat citizens as well. On the national level the President and the Vice-President personify the office of the head of state, the executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers, while the legislative power is practiced by the bicameral parliament (House of Representatives and House of People).

The unitary state structure of Republika Srpska is less complicated, since it represents just one entity. The Serbian member-state of BiH is divided into two level: to the level of municipalities and local authorities, and to the national level. The whole system is more centralized than the Bosniak-Croat federation: the President and Vice-President have the same representative functions, the executive authority is practiced by Council of Ministers, while the bicameral parliament (Parliament of Republika Srpska and House of People) has the legislative power.

In the Bosnian consociational system all the basic state institutions are structured according to the principle of proportionality and parity. On the federal level the political rights are shared between the entities, the bicameral parliament, the mutual presidency and governance give equal political power for all ethnic groups, however the powers of the central state institutions are limited to foreign policy and trade, customs, monetary, and migration policies, air-traffic control, the implementation of international obligations and regulations, the regulation of transport, and so on.

The internal affairs of BiH is monitored and controlled by the international board of Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and especially by the Office of High Representative (OFR) of BiH. The OFR has wide authority to maintain the peace process: the special envoy has power to replace

politicians, to abolish problematic laws and create new ones. The emissaries have been widely practicing their rights, between 1997 and 2006 the OFR deposed around 190 politicians and created more than 800 regulations.

3. Consequences of Treaty of Dayton

It is seems obvious that in one hand the Treaty of Dayton sought to establish a state structure where the constituent ethnic groups have equal representations and rights, but on the other hand it has created a very complicated system, where the cooperation is very difficult and the reforming is almost impossible. The territorial separation and the federal system legalized the division of ethnic groups and did not encourage the repatriation of the refugees, while the purpose to reinstall the multi-ethnic cooperation has failed. Moreover, the distrust effected an emigration wave after the war, and the territories of the member-states has become almost homogeneous. The common economic space of the country has been separated and the system of the state obviously does not encourage the business cooperation. The complicated and divided taxation system makes the centralization process more difficult and create perfect conditions for corruption. An other significant problem is that the Bosnian constitution – as the consociational constitutions usually – defines several possibilities for each of the constituent ethnic groups to use veto power. This opportunity creates similar difficulties as the veto regulations of constitution of Cyprus generated after 1960, however the wide power of OFR always averts the complete failure of the Bosnian state and keep the balance between ethnic groups. After all, the OFR alone can not create a livable country, and especially not under the current shapes of Bosnian state. Constitutional changes are needed and highly recommended in Bosnia, however one of the entities always block this process. As the UN sponsored National Survey of 2007 demonstrated, the majority of Bosniak and Croat respondents – sooner of later – would change the structure of BiH for a more centralized system, while the Serbs prefer the present frame of the state. Another survey corroborate these differences, since it is obviously showes that the majority of the Serb respondents – since they are the minority who wish to have wider autonomy – are more satisfied with Dayton Peace Agreements than the Bosniaks and Croats, who are willing to live in a more capable country. The variance also obvious if we wish to examine the self-identification of BiH, where Bosniak and Croat respondents embrace a primary BiH citizen's identity more enthusiastically (57.8%) than their Serb compatriots (18.9%), who are prefer to say that above all they are Serbs.

We have mentioned numerous negative aspects of the Dayton Peacemaking process, however we have to highlight that recent researches discovered positive developments as well. These results have to be taken with great care and we can not be sure until the Bosnian authorities did not announce the conclusions of the census of 2013, but we have to point out that the National Survey of 2007 reported that 43,0%, while the sample census of BiH 2013 claimed that 35% of their respondents – especially the younger generations – declared themselves to be – first and foremost – BiH citizens. This outcome would mean that state identity might be stronger than expected, moreover, would make this group presumably larger than the number of Serbs and certainly more than Croats. In case these results are replicated country-wide, it would have considerable consequences and might even question the necessity of the complicated federal model.

4. The case of Cyprus

In Cyprus the constitutions of 1960 created a country, wherein the constituent entities – the GCs and TCs – did not wish to live together and the loud majority preferred either *Enosis* or *Taksim*. The Cypriot state – as the Bosnian as well – has been created as a compromise, which did not give full satisfaction for none of the involved sides. The frames of Republic of Cyprus has been disputed from the beginning: the GCs supported a more centralized state, while the TCs insisted their rights for veto and attempted to wider their autonomies. As the BiH, Cyprus was also under the effective

control of foreign powers, however only the internalization of Supreme Court was affected positively the state affairs, the role of Greece and Turkey and their growing regional differences just worsened the situation in Cyprus, as we could see in 1974 after the overthrow of president Archbishop Makarios by the Greek Junta and the occupation of North-Cyprus by Turkey.

After all, Cyprus today is a de facto divided country, where the UN and seemingly all the involved sides are working on a reunification process. Recently the so called Annan Plan attempted to solve the issue, however the international community preserved the complicated multicomponent consocional model. The plan offer to establish the Unified Cyprus Federation which would consist of the Greek Cipriot Federal State and the Turkish Cypriot Federal State. On the federal level the executive power would be practiced by six members of the Presidential Council and by the Federal Government, while the legislation would be exercised by the bicameral parliament. On the communal level each of the entities would enjoy wide autonomy, with own territory, population, constitution, government, parliament, taxation and jurisdictional system, police etc. The internal affairs would be monitored by the a Reconciliation Commission, by the Monitoring Committee, and by the original agreements of 1960 – which the Annan Plan wished to preserve –.

The reunification process did not provide any certain settlement conception since the Annan Plan was rejected by 76% of GC voters. Moreover, after the Annan Plan it has always been difficult to determine what are the latest unification conceptions. In 2010 former TC leader Mehmet Ali Talat stated that recently 31 joint documents had been prepared, which includes federal system with power over external and EU relations, citizenship, budget, and economic coordination. It appears that the two sides agreed on bicameral legislature with an equally represented Senate, and a proportionally based House. President Christofias repeatedly proposed a six-year term rotational presidency, with a weighted cross-community voting and direct election system. An other understanding that one side would hold the position of foreign ministry and the other would deal with the EU relations, while Cyprus would be represented in the EU by four Greek and two Turkish Cypriot.

5. Lessons for Cyprus

The Bosnian peacemaking and reconciliation process demonstrated that unification is a very difficult procedure, however the partition can not be the interest of the majority. Recent poll findings in Cyprus proved that large majorities (68% GC, 65% TC) wish that the negotiations will lead to a settlement, and only a minority (14% GC, 21% TC) prefers that nothing comes out from the process. If we examine the other results it is obvious that 80% of the GC respondents and 76% of the TC respondents would accept the bi-communal federation, while 79% of the GCs rejects the partition of the island and 60% of the TCs see the unitary state as an unacceptable outcome. For this reason the reconciliation progress definitely has to deal with unification, and not partition concept since the separation or the unitary state is always unacceptable for one of the communities, but the bi-communal federalism is acceptable as a compromise for the majority.

Although the case of Cyprus concerns only two not three entities, the Bosnian lessons could offer valuable examples for the divided island, especially if they wish to create a similar federal system. If we wish to summarize again these important lessons, we have to highlight the following experiences:

1. The hostile past and the long period of enmity has deeply affected entities of the country. For this reason the consociational federalism can not provide productive political and economic cooperation and the reforming is almost impossible.
2. The territorial separation and the federal system legalized the division of ethnic groups, and does not encouraged the evolution of a common self-identification.
3. The neutral foreign involvement with a relatively wide authority over Bosnian internal affairs compensated the veto power of the entities and maintained the daily functioning of the state.

4. On the other hand the external participation – without the willingness of internal actors – were not able to create a livable country.
5. Recent researches seems to prove that certain measures were probably able to establish common values, which could be the basic principles for the real reconciliation.

In Cyprus the Annan Plan obviously did not learn from these Bosnian lessons, nor from the mistakes of the constitution of 1960. The conception would create a very complicated state structure with a federal and a communal level, which includes rotating presidency, disproportional representation of the Turkish Cypriots in the Senate, in the Chamber of Deputies, and in the civil service. More importantly the Annan Plan would give even more veto power as constitution of 1960 did, but did not offer wide interfering control for the external observers which would help to keep the balance between the entities and would preclude the failure of the country. The plan would also count with territorial separation, which – as we seen in Bosnia – would legalize the division of the communities, and with its strict regulation on property and repatriation issues the conception would not encourage the re-installation of island's multi-ethnic shape. Moreover, the plan did not support the concept of Cypriotism, but would inspire the separate self-identification. Last but not least, the territorial division would not unify the economic space, but would preserve the current situation.

Although former president Dimitris Christofias stated that they were going to discuss "just viable, and functional solution", the recent negotiations did not prove that the decision makers would bear in mind that the future state of Cyprus has to be functionable. As we seen before, at the moment it is difficult to design what was conception of the recent talks of Hristofias and Talat and Eroglu, and it is also complicated to anticipate what the future will hold for the negotiation of Anastasiades and Eroglu, but it seems certain that the compromise will be a federated system which gives territorial and – in some cases – political autonomies for the entities. There are still lot of other disputed cases, but we have to stress that this unofficial agreement will be functionable just if the foreign powers support and control the reconciliation progress and more importantly, if the Cypriots finally forget their past and start to build a common future.

6. Conclusions

It is obvious from the lessons of Bosnia that reconciliation needs a functional state, where the decision making is relatively fast, the reforms are not always blocked, the political parties and the people are able to cooperate, and the democratic rights are ensured for every citizens and every community. The state structure – either unitary or federal – should be as simple as possible, while the effective pressure of neutral foreign powers could maintain the cooperation. After all, this does not mean that the international community has to establish a country what is not desirable for its inhabitants, but means that there is a need for a neutral side who help to find compromise. If Cypriots and the international community wish to create a long term settlement than the bi-communal federation system seems to be the only solution, however to reach this goal they have to start to re-establish the concept of Cypriotism, instead of raising nationalist tensions. With this progress hopefully they will be able to prevent most of the negative examples of the Bosnian case, and would able to diminish the numbers of supporters of unitary or partition conceptions.

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