

**Title: Cultural Festivals & Cultural Identity in Republic of Cyprus**

**Georgia Spanou, Open University Cyprus, Studies in Hellenic Culture**

**Abstract:**

The paper focuses on the cultural festivals organised in the Republic of Cyprus and their ideological implications on the cultural identity of Greek-Cypriots from Independence (1960) until European Union accession (2004). It further examines the role of the dominant ideological, political framework and values for the formation of their artistic content. The local cultural festivals functioning as a political tool projected national messages and symbolisms focusing on the bipole, 'Hellenocentric-Cypriotcentric'. Additionally, in the 1990's local cultural festivals were used to promote the Eurocentric aspect of the Greek-Cypriots' cultural identity. Hence, the hosting of European artistic 'product' was intensified. The role of the private cultural sector is also examined as a differentiating factor to the state's persistence for transforming the island's cultural policy and management into a vehicle for strengthening the cultural identity of the Greek-Cypriots.

## **INTRODUCTION**

This paper highlights the ideological implications of the cultural festivals in the Republic of Cyprus from the Independence (1960) until the country's accession in the European Union (2004). It attempts to briefly refer to the results of a research that was conducted in the elaboration of the relevant doctoral thesis, which was submitted, supported and approved by the Open University of Cyprus in December 2016. The research constitutes the first critical analysis attempt of local festivals (state and private) and it examines the role of the dominant ideological/political landscape and the collective values for the formation of festivals' artistic content. The questions focus on the correlation of political facts and how they differentiate the locals' cultural identity and the effect on the 'construction' of the artistic programmes during the island's state festivals. Taking into consideration the political ambiance on the island and its influence on the collective memory and cultural identity, the researcher divided the local cultural festivals into two chronological periods. The first period was initiated during the island's Independence (1960) until 1974, the Turkish invasion, and the second period began 1974 until 2004, the accession to the European Union.

From the thorough examination of archival material from organisations and governing bodies, as well as articles written in the Greek-Cypriot press, two main tendencies have been identified in collective consciousness which had a strong impact on the formation of local festivals. These tendencies focus on the Hellenocentric and the Cypriotcentric cultural identity of the Greek-Cypriots'. From 1960 until 1974, the deterioration of the two main communities, the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community, transformed further the island's cultural policy and management into a tool for strengthening the national and the cultural identity of Greek-Cypriots, who in the meanwhile undertook the governance of the new founded state (Spanou, 2016: 111-2). Joep Leerssen (2006) supports that cultural nationalism that was spreading in European societies from the 19<sup>th</sup> century transformed the cultural product into a tool for shaping the collective identity, and Cyprus would not be an exception.

### **FIRST PERIOD OF LOCAL CULTURAL FESTIVALS (1960-1974)**

Guy Debord (2016) in his monumental book, *The Society of Spectacle*, indicates that, 'the spectacle is the epitome of ideology, since it exposes and demonstrates in its completeness the essence of every ideological system'. In this sense cultural festivals as a spectacle functioned as an ideological tool in the Republic of Cyprus after 1960. During the first period of the local cultural festivals (1960-1974), state festivals aimed at the manifestation of the idea for the reunification of Greek-Cypriots with their ancient Greek roots and origins. The main goal was to further consolidate the Greekcentric characteristics of their cultural identity. The state supported artists and activities that promoted the Hellenocentric 'origin' of the cultural possessions. During that period, cultural events organised by the Greek-Cypriot Left, focused, on the promotion of the Cypriot-centered aspects of the locals' cultural identity. However, this attempt had very limited impact in the Greek-Cypriot community, since its majority still dreamed of the political unification with Greece. The state cultural policy and management was ethnocentric and its orientation hindered the implementation of a rational and a coherent cultural plan in the Republic, harming, additionally, the project for a harmonious communal co-existence and collaboration.

The promotion of the 'Greek origin' cultural possessions led in 1963 to the festival, known by the name, 'Week of Ancient Greek Theatre'. The festival took place in the restored ancient

theatre of Salamina, near the city of Famagusta. Its repertoire was mainly consisted by theatrical performances from the National Theatre of Greece.<sup>i</sup> Plays from the ancient Greek dramaturgy - mainly tragedies - were presented to the local audience, which at that moment emotionally sensible and still eager to fight for the unification [*Enosis*] with the ‘motherland Greece’, reacted accordingly. The Greek embassy on the island supported the festival financially, while at the same time the President of the Greek Communal Assembly [*Elliniki Koinotiki Sineleusi*], Constantinos Spiridakis, stressed in his speech at the inauguration that, ‘these performances [in Salamina] have a special significance because they reunify culturally the two countries, which have already had 3000 years ties to bond them’.<sup>ii</sup> The immediate connections between space and time were also important to emerge reflections concerning the collective values of the predominant community (the Greek-Cypriot). Salamina was the ancient town founded by Teykros, hero of the Trojan War, son of King Telamon of Salamina in Greece. Consequently, the performances served additionally to the empowerment of the Hellenocentric identity and the preservation of the ideology of Enosis, which was the dominant ideology among the Greek-Cypriots (Spanou, 2016: 97).

In the first period of the Cypriot cultural festivals (1960-1974) another local festival was organised in Cyprus, this time in Limassol, the second biggest town of Cyprus. The festival was organised in 1969 by the local authorities and was named, ‘International Artistic Festival of Limassol’.<sup>iii</sup> During the first three years of its presence, the festival focused on the promotion of the local – Cypriot – cultural heritage in dance and music and the hosting of Greek groups in dance, music and theatre. Later, it evolved to a more cosmopolitan festival since there were international participations (Spanou, 2016: 108-9). From 1972 and on, the organisers reclaimed the state bilateral cultural agreements that Makarios had signed during the political approach of countries like Soviet Union and countries members of the Non Aligned Movement [*Kinima Adesmeuton*]. So they invited artists from other countries to participate in the festival (Office of Commissioner, 2006). These arrangements offered to the local audience opportunities for new cultural experiences and promoted a more cosmopolitan atmosphere on the island. The Cypriotcentric cultural identity was also more consolidated due to stable participation of local folk dance and music clubs in the festival programme. Local participations were cultivating the idea about the value of Cypriot cultural heritage and the need for sustaining and forwarding it to the next generations.

## **SECOND PERIOD OF LOCAL CULTURAL FESTIVALS (1974-2004)**

The Turkish invasion on the island in 1974 set off a discussion around the collective identity issues among the Greek-Cypriots. There was a disappointment for a considerable number of people in the Greek-Cypriot community about the role of the Greek Junta in the coup in Cyprus during July 1974. There was also frustration about the assistance from Greece that never came, during the Turkish invasion. These were enough reasons to lead more Greek-Cypriots to the understanding that the interests of Greek-Cypriots and Greeks were not always necessarily compatible. Hence, the Cypriotcentric cultural identity seems to be a way out from the ideological and existential dead end, in which Greek-Cypriots entered. A serious reconsideration about their collective conscious also emerged because of the public interventions of Neokypriakos Syndesmos, a group consisted by local Leftist intellectuals. The supporters of this new collective identity, although acknowledged the Greek cultural belonging of the Greek-Cypriots, they also worried about the continuation of the new founded state [Cyprus] and encouraged the bi-communal rapprochement (Neokypriakos Syndesmos 1990, Neokypriakos Syndesmos 2000).

The Cypriotcentric ideology is traceable already in the first fourteen years of the Republic but it had a weak influence in the local political context. In the second period, from 1974 till 2004, due to political changes, Cypriot-centralism played a critical role in the political field of the Republic of Cyprus and the cultural developments. However, this did not mean that the influence of Hellenocentrism had ceased from being a dominant factor in the Greek-Cypriot community. On the contrary, it continued to exist and kept up a constant antagonism between Hellenocentric and Cypriotcentric identity, which emerged as the main characteristic in the coming years. In this debate, the ideological construction of the helleno-centrism was used as a protection shield from the Turkish threats (Mavratsas, 2005), an argument expressed especially from the supporters of the ethnocentric Right Wing Party [*ΑΗ.ΣΥ.*] in the Greek-Cypriot community.

Until 1993, the year of the victory of the local Right Party in the presidential elections, the state festivals were devoted to the reinforcement of the Greekcentric cultural identity, as the state cultural policy proposed. The biggest state cultural festival ‘Kypria’, which was inaugurated in 1993, invited and hosted in its repertoire mainly the Greek cultural ‘product’ and the occidental one. The contemporary Greek-Cypriot artistic community and its creation was ignored by the organisers, causing intense protests, as indicated in the press (Sxiza, 1993). The local cultural exclusion could be attributed to reasons relevant to a collective underestimation of the local product and its value and to an overestimation of the Greek and European cultural product, which was regarded as strong cultural shield in the instable and insecure political state of the island. The manifestation and the enactment of the so-called Defense Doctrine, called as *Eniaio Amintiko Dogma*, between Greece and Cyprus, in a period of political relation unrest amongst Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community, affected accordingly the local cultural field. Hence, it was characterised by the signing of new cultural agreements between Cyprus and Greece and the renewal of other older ones. The Greek Minister of Culture, Evaggelos Venizelos, during his visit to the island in 1998 referred, to it as a ‘single cultural space’,<sup>iv</sup> proving that a ‘cultural dogma’<sup>v</sup> was re-inaugurated during the decade, and this [dogma] was functioning as a tool for the further revitalisation of the Greek-central cultural identity of the islands’ inhabitants.

At the same time spot, because of the political target set by the new leadership for full accession in the European Union, state festivals hosted aspects of the contemporary European cultural creativity for the local audience. However, the festival organisers simultaneously underlined the important role of the Greek culture in the shaping of the European culture, emphasising again a diverse kind of Hellenocentric cultural nationalism to the local people. As Vasos Argyrou (1996: 39-48) claims, there has been and still is an uprising of the Eurocentrism, with which the Greek-Cypriots visualise themselves as part of Europe and European cultural heritage. This view had a tremendous impact in the ‘construction’ of the repertoire of the state cultural festivals till 2004. Local thematic festivals for contemporary dance, music and performance were constructing their content based on hosting European artistic groups in order to strengthen the Eurocentric cultural identity of Greek-Cypriots, along with the ethnocentric identity. The European embassies further demonstrated a willingness to enable and finance cultural exchanges, indicating an ongoing establishment of cultural diplomacy dogma on the island.

During the decade of 1994-2004, local authorities – mainly town municipalities and local authorities in villages – organised festivals that aimed at the recreation of the audience aligning, with the beliefs and values of the political leadership that was in charge at the time. The agenda on the cultural field was a mixture of socio-political necessities once again. Therefore, the

Leftish authorities promoted the Cypriot tradition and cultural heritage during festivals through dance and music. Their priorities were the entertainment of the public and the introduction of the local audience to familiar cultural product promoting in this way the Cypriot-centric identity. On the other hand, the Right Political Wing [ΔΗ.ΣΥ.] insisted on promoting the Hellenocentric cultural identity by inviting and hosting the Greek cultural product. Their views about the importance of Greek and European productions sprang from the idea that contact with either of them would benefit the preparation and adjustment of the local audience to its new cultural family, the European Union.

In the last decade of the second period of the Cypriot cultural festival, from 1994 until the beginning of the new millennium, the appearance of private cultural institutes and agencies differentiated substantially the local festival landscape, despite the ongoing dispute among the Cypriotcentric and the Greekcentric cultural identity and the reduced role of the other bipole of 'Europe-Cyprus'. Alternative sources for financing their cultural activities, especially from private sponsors, had partly freed them from the state financial and ideological control. Under these new circumstances, their presence initiated changes regarding the perception and the role of culture in the local society. In addition, their emancipation from the state political-ideological aspirations led to the launch of cultural events and festivals, which aimed at the aesthetic development of their audience, initiating its contact with new creative art forms.

## **EPILOGUE**

The international literature on festivals highlights that these cultural institutions may contribute to: (1) the consolidation of a certain cultural/national identity to the masses, (2) the establishment of a tourist brand identity, which can enable the attraction of cultural tourists and hence improve the country's economic indicators and, (3) the creation of a cosmopolitan atmosphere, where cultural exchange with other cultural 'otherness' would facilitate the emergence of alternative identities, promote peace, co-existence and multicultural dialogue. It seems that the last two festival-functions never existed in the Cypriot paradigm. Cultural festivals in the Republic of Cyprus from 1960 till 2004 were mainly politically reclaimed by the state, which was the distribution body of state sponsorship in culture.

The monolithic dimension, within which the state viewed the festivals, restricted or even suppressed their impact in the other sectors of public life. Local festivals were led to a cultural anachronism because of a persistent obsession coming from the unsolved Cyprus Problem, which is still used as a convenient excuse for neglecting the modernisation of sectors in public life. Hence, it is necessary a massive reform of the state cultural policy to be launched in order to allow the festivals to emerge their multiple prospects, away from ideological considerations. This reform should focus on the modernization of the state cultural institutions and on the construction of a decentralized cultural model in the country, where private funding of cultural activities would be facilitated and encouraged. Hopefully, in the near future with the proper institutional adjustments the Greek-Cypriot festivals will be placed with claims on the international festival map attracting international and local audiences.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

Argyrou, V. (1996). *Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean: The Wedding as Symbolic Struggle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Debord, G. (1995). *The Society of Spectacle*. New York: Zone Books.

Office of Commissioner. (2006). *Index of Treaties of the Republic of Cyprus 1960-2005*. Nicosia: Office of Commissioner.

Leerssen, J. (2006). *National Thought in Europe. A Cultural History*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Mavratsas, C. (2005). 'Ελληνοκυπριακή ταυτότητα και συγκρουόμενες ερμηνείες', in N. Trimikliniotis (ed.), *Το Πορτοκαλί της Κύπρου*. Athens: Nisos, 113-154.

Neokypriakos Syndesmos. (1990). *13 Ερωτήματα σε 13 Ερωτήματα*, Nicosia: Neokypriakos Syndesmos.

Neokypriakos Syndesmos. (2000). *Καταστατικό*, Nicosia: Neokypriakos Syndesmos.

Spanou, G. (2016). *Κυπριακά Πολιτιστικά Φεστιβάλ: Πολιτιστικές Πολιτικές και Διαχείριση στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία από το 1960 μέχρι το 2004*, unpublished PhD, Open University Cyprus, December 2016.

Sxiza, M. (1993) 'Περί Φεστιβάλ ο λόγος', *Phileleftheros*, 4 September.

---

## **ENDNOTES**

<sup>i</sup> Eleftheria (1963) 'Εις το Αρχαίο Θέατρο Σαλαμίνας εδόθη χτες η πρώτη παράσταση του Εθνικού με την τραγωδία «Αίας»', 25 September.

<sup>ii</sup> Phileleftheros (1963) 'Η επίσκεψις του Εθνικού Θεάτρου εις Κύπρον', 5 September. Phileleftheros (1963) 'Το Εθνικό Θέατρο της Ελλάδας θα δώσει παραστάσεις εν Κύπρω την τραγωδία «Αίας» και «Ελένη»', 10 September.

<sup>iii</sup> Phileleftheros (1969) 'Δεκαήμερον Φεστιβάλ τέχνης οργανούται από το Δήμο Λεμεσού', 3 April.

<sup>iv</sup> Phileleftheros (1998) 'Ενιαίος Πολιτιστικός Χώρος', 16 September.

<sup>v</sup> Phileleftheros (1995) 'Ενιαίο Πολιτιστικό Δόγμα Κύπρου-Ελλάδας', 15 October.

**Title:** Branding Orthodoxy: Religious Diplomacy and the Makarios Legacy in Sub-Saharan Africa

**Authors' names:** Costas M. Constantinou and Maria Tselepou

**Affiliation:** University of Cyprus, Department of Social and Political Sciences

### **Abstract**

This article investigates religious diplomacy and its branding potential and power ramifications, focusing on Cypriot missionary work in Sub-Saharan Africa. It analyses the diplomacy of Archbishop Makarios III, the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, who branded Orthodoxy as an anticolonial alternative to the African 'colonial religions'. Makarios used religious diplomacy instrumentally for domestic and international legitimacy as well as for enhancing Cypriot statehood during periods of internal and external contestation. The article also examines the current work of the Greek Orthodox (Cypriot) Mission in Kenya, the continuities and shifts with regard to the initial aims of Makarios's religious diplomacy. It looks at the extent to which the Mission has been internationalized and potential to function as a 'reverse mission' also representing Kenyans-Africans in Cyprus. The article is based on archival research, press coverage, interviews and participatory observation.

## Introduction

How far can religious and public diplomacy combine to project a country's image abroad? How can small and less powerful states and non-state actors exploit niches and distinctive cultural assets to exercise soft power in postcolonial Africa? And what might be the intended and unintended consequences of such practices, the material and symbolic effects of religious diplomacy?

In responding to these questions, we use the case of Cyprus as an example, its historical involvement with missionary work in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya. We consider the Cypriot case especially interesting in the way a small European state tried to brand its religion in a region where religious missionary work had been tainted due to its association with western imperial expansion.

The Cypriot involvement in sub-Saharan Africa bears similarities but also distinctive differences to this colonial diplomatic practice. On the one hand, it is a white European mission, seeking to convert and bringing another version of Christianity and White messianism to unredeemed Africans. On the other hand, it is historically and symbolically a *postcolonial* mission. It is sent from a country, which was itself colonized and initiated from a political leader with impeccable anti-colonial credentials: Archbishop Makarios III. Consequently, Cypriot religious diplomacy although it reinforced established racial-colonial inequalities vis-à-vis Africans, at the same time it offered symbolic capital for overcoming them.

To be specific, Cypriot religious diplomacy capitalized on a cultural niche, promoted by the island's major religious-political celebrity. The first Cypriot President happened to be the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of the island, who also led the anti-colonial struggle. As we suggest below, Makarios fully exploited this historical legacy, including his links to and his subsequent active involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement. This helped him to successfully brand Orthodoxy as a *post-colonial religion par excellence*. Makarios managed to become something of an honorary African and played a leading role in spreading Orthodoxy in Africa by conducting mass baptisms and laying the foundations of an Orthodox theological seminary in Nairobi.

Nowadays, Cypriot missionary involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa continues and involves significant developmental and humanitarian work, but it is something of a *perplexing inheritance* for the Cypriot state. The current Orthodox Archbishop of Kenya is a Cypriot, and his name is also Makarios – a symbolic continuation. But the days of an Archbishop-President are long gone. As are the days of proud and vocal participation in the Non-Aligned Movement and association with Third World demands. That the Cypriot state has clearly shifted diplomatic priorities is evident by the 'suspending of operations' of its resident diplomatic mission in Nairobi in 2013. To that extent, we examine the changing goals and shifting uses of religious diplomacy, including the extent to which the current Cypriot Archbishop in Kenya is not only an agent for Cypriot diplomacy with access to Kenyan society but also a conduit for the occasional representation of Kenyan and African interests in Cyprus.



## **Makarios as a Diplomatic Celebrity**

Cypriot religious diplomacy and branding fully utilized what subsequently became known as celebrity diplomacy (Cooper 2008; Tsaliki *et al* 2011) and the biggest asset Cyprus had at the time of independence of a celebrity diplomat. Makarios III was the Archbishop and primate of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus from 1950 until his death in 1977. During the 1950s he became the political leader of the anti-colonial struggle of the Greek-Cypriot movement EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) that fought against British colonial rule. Consequently, because of his dual role, Makarios became the Ethnarch: the de-facto leader of the Greek ethnos in Cyprus.

At the international front, Makarios participated in the first Afro-Asian Conference, which took place in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 where the foundations for a Non-Aligned Movement were laid out and Makarios launched his profile as an anti-colonial leader (Anagnostopoulou 2013). The Bandung move was highly symbolic and imaginative. The Conference was an entirely Afro-Asiatic meeting, with no other European and no other Christian bishop – the religion of the colonizers (Vanezis 1971). This association with the Third World continued. Years later as an independent state, Cyprus chose to join the Afro-Asiatic Group of states at the United Nations and is still a member of the Asiatic group, even though for all other terms and purposes it defines itself as a European state (Constantinou 2004: 109-111).

Following independence, Makarios became the first and longest-serving president of the Republic of Cyprus (1960 – 1977) while also being Archbishop. This meant that Cyprus had been broadly and unofficially projected on to the world stage as a semi-religious actor. Although in some ‘modern’ quarters this appeared undesirable and anachronistic, among more ‘traditional’ actors Cyprus was successfully branded through its religious history and biblical origins. As put by Vanezis (1974: 41): ‘It is not often realised that the Orthodox Church of Cyprus is one of the oldest Christian churches of the world, much older than the Patriarchate of Constantinople itself or the Church of Metropolitan Greece’.

Makarios’s celebrity status cannot be singly explained by reference to either his political or religious authority. (Hatzivassileiou 2013: 227). It was rather a combination of both. He expressed a centuries-old tradition, which was both spiritual and political, and pre-dated state authority. (Emilianides 2011: 104).

Makarios’s strategy was to publicize and internationalize the Cyprus question through speeches, travelling and symbolic gestures. In the post-independence era, now as Head of State and celebrated anti-colonial hero, he travelled in addition to many other countries and arranged for the filming of many of his visits, creating a series of documentaries mainly for domestic consumption.

In his visits to Africa, he was welcomed as a typical African leader who combined politics and religion and even held a staff like any other African chief (Interview with Julius Katholo 1/7/2015). He visited many African countries, especially countries where Christianity was prominent, but he had a special relationship with Kenya. He first

passed through Mombasa on his way to Seychelles, exiled there by the British government. This memorable short pass of Makarios through Kenya established contacts and elevated him into an emblem of anti-colonial struggle. Moreover, just like many African leaders, Makarios naturally used religion for political emancipation.

Progressively, Makarios personifying the Cypriot anti-colonial struggle became known in Sub-Saharan African countries, even before the beginning of Cypriot missionary work. President Nyerere, expressed his admiration for the Cypriot anti-colonial struggle precisely because of the smallness of the nation making it a source of inspiration for bigger nations, like Tanganyika. (Kranidiotis 1963, FA1 343/43/3). President Jomo Kenyatta, suggested that Makarios's name was deemed a synonym for freedom in Kenya. (PIO Press Release 16 January 1970). Indeed, following mass baptisms in Kenya in 1971 the majority of those baptised chose the name Makarios (Tillyrides n.d).

### **The Work of the Cypriot Mission in Kenya**

Makarios Tillyrides, is the current Archbishop of Kenya, and became the natural inheritor of Archbishop Makarios's missionary project in the country and through the Seminary to the missions throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1971-1972, Archbishop Makarios established the Orthodox Seminary in Kenya and in 1975 he asked Tillyrides – a doctoral student at Oxford University – to join the mission, which he eventually did in 1977 after the completion of his studies. Despite periodic absences, Tillyrides remained there as a layperson until 1992 when he became a priest and he fittingly changed his name from Andreas to Makarios (*Fileleftheros* 17 February 2002). The Orthodox mission is officially under the Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria but effectively under the Cypriot Orthodox Church because of the legacy of Makarios.

According to Makarios Tillyrides (Interview 29/6/2015) the foremost target of the Cypriot mission is to deliver the word of the Gospel. However the mission also conducts social, developmental and humanitarian work; it builds and supports clinics, hospitals, orphanages, and schools. In line with other Christian missions in Africa its role is pastoral in both the material and spiritual senses. The current Archbishop is the spiritual guide to close to one million parishioners but also a tireless manager, with two mobile phones in hand, roving the country, in charge of numerous social welfare and humanitarian projects. Although faith is not conditional for receiving assistance from the Mission, it is clear that joining Orthodoxy may give the faithful specific advantages and a better future through education.

Currently there are around 1000 people attending at the Seminary and the schools in the surrounding area. Moreover the Mission cooperates with the Cypriot Branch of Doctors of the World and together they develop food programmes and support clinics (*Fileleftheros* 25 March 2007) as well as collaborating with a number of other Cypriot Foundations operating in Africa: e.g. the A.G. Leventis Foundation, the Sophia Foundation for Children, the George and Androula Vasilliou Foundation.

Conducive to the success of this Cypriot mission is the liturgical translation and

innovation but also the flexibility with which the Orthodox dogma is applied to the African faithful. The work of the Seminary is versatile as it spreads the message of the gospel in more than twenty local languages and dialects, very important in terms of innovation and outreach as no other Christian mission did anything similar until recent times (*Pantainos* January/February 2006: 70-73). Moreover, in many instances, polygamy and circumcision are allowed and celebrated among certain traditional communities. The Mission also uses African traditions such as ululation, clapping and dancing, integrating them into the austere Byzantine liturgy of Christian Greek Orthodoxy. The current Archbishop Makarios symbolically joins them in their dances, and he states that ‘Many cannot imagine a bishop dancing... [They find] it unthinkable in our tradition. But here we do it. It does no harm to anybody’ (Markides 2007).

The Cypriot Orthodox Mission in Kenya receives excellent publicity through laborious hard work. The Archbishop is a prolific author, writing articles in both Greek and English and publicises them in various Orthodox magazines, the Cypriot, Greek and Kenyan Presses as well as online websites describing his activities and the financial aid given and projects supported through the Mission. Many actions of Archbishop Makarios are gestures of excellent public relations and communications strategy. Consequently, the award of the Orthodox Patriarchate School by the International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations, a further enhancement of Makarios Tillyrides’s image, came as no surprise (*Panta ta Ethni* January-February 2008: 11).

In addition, the current Archbishop, Makarios Tillyrides, acts as a ceremonial unofficial ambassador of Cyprus in Kenya especially since 2013 when the Republic of Cyprus decided to ‘suspend the operations’ of its resident diplomatic mission.

Probably Archbishop Makarios’s most recent success story of conducting public religious diplomacy was held in 2012, when the son of the then Prime Minister of Kenya, Raila Odinga, named Fidel Castro, was baptised into the faith before marrying. The young Fidel received the name Makarios and the ceremony attracted wide publicity, given how he was seen as a successor to his father and groomed for a political leadership position in Kenya. (*Enateniseis* September/December 2012: 172-175). The young man retained both names and became known as Fidel Castro Makarios Odinga, until his sudden death in January 2015. Two revolutionary names in one – enhancing both the Orthodox and the Cypriot logo.

## **Conclusion**

As shown, Cypriot religious diplomacy and missionary work in Sub-Saharan Africa started with an ambitious-visionary leader. It was a means through which Makarios sought to enhance his international legitimacy and leadership within the Non-Aligned Movement but also his political and ecclesiastical power at home. Makarios’s public diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa also helped to successfully brand Orthodoxy as an anticolonial, liberation faith and this has allowed the Cypriot Mission to significantly increase its congregation and influence in the region.

The Cypriot Orthodox Mission displays the subtle power of ‘weak power’. When compared to the traditional European missions to Africa or the more recent and larger Evangelical missions from the United States (Huliaras 2006), the Cypriot mission has been, in the words of a Kenyan academic, a surprisingly *silent mission* and quite successful probably because of that silence (Damaris Parsitau interview 3/7/2015).

Our case study has also revealed two other issues that inform debates about the ‘Good Country’ benefit that Cyprus acquires, inter alia, through its religious-humanitarian actions (see <http://www.goodcountry.org> with Cyprus currently on 18<sup>th</sup> place). At the same time, however, the activities of the Mission complicate the national exclusivity and one-dimensional perception of the Mission. First, it appears that in the last decade or so, especially because of Archbishop Makarios Tillyrides’s initiatives, the Cypriot Orthodox Mission in Kenya is progressively changing into an *international* Orthodox mission. This is due to two main reasons: First, there is not enough interest by the Republic of Cyprus as evidenced by the shift in its diplomatic priorities, despite the continuation of financial aid given to the Mission, although significantly reduced. Second, Archbishop Makarios has begun to cooperate with organisations from all over the world such as the Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. In other words, *Orthodoxy is still branded through the Mission, but Cypriot statehood not exclusively so.*

Secondly, the current Archbishop Makarios seems to have developed roles that are quite distinct from those President Makarios envisaged when he established the mission. One might say, there is a *reverse mission* now with more Kenyans currently living and operating in Cyprus, than Cypriots in Kenya. That is contrary to the 1960s and 70s. Thus the current Archbishop often acts as representative for these Kenyans and their interests in Cyprus, not merely representing and branding Orthodoxy and Cyprus in Kenya (Interview with Makarios Tillyrides, 29/6/2015). There are currently Kenyan priests and students who work and/or are being educated in Cyprus, some with scholarships arranged by the Cypriot Mission in Kenya, and who see Makarios as *their* bishop, and *their* ambassador (Interview with Panaraitos 4/8/2015). No longer just the Cypriots’ ‘Man in Nairobi’, Makarios is the Kenyans’ ‘Man in Nicosia’. It will be interesting to see how both the initial and the reverse missions develop, following Makarios’s eventual retirement from ‘the mission’.

## **Acknowledgment**

This paper is based on research for the project ‘Cypriot Presence and Public Diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Historical Perspective’, (2014–16), funded by the A.G. Leventis Foundation.

Also, it is based on the published article, Constantinou M. C., and Tselepou M., ‘Branding Orthodoxy: Religious Diplomacy and the Makarios Legacy in Sub-Saharan Africa’, *Journal of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* (2016).

## Bibliography

- Adler-Nissen, R. (2008) 'The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration Strategies' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46(3): 663-684.
- Anagnostopoulou, S. (2013) 'Chapter 10: Makarios III, 1950-1977: Creating the Ethnarchic State', in Varnava, A. Michael, N. M. (eds.), *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Anholt, S. (2009). 'The media and national image', *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 5: 169–179.
- Avraham, E. (2014). 'Spinning liabilities into assets in place marketing: Toward a new typology', *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 10: 174–185.
- Baczyanska, G. Heneghan, T. Reuters (October 2014). 'The Russian Orthodox Church Acts As Putin's Soft Power in Ukraine'.
- Bartoli, A. (1999). 'Mediating peace in Mozambique: The role of the community of Sant'Egidio', *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex world*, 245-274.
- Bjola, C., & Kornprobst, M. (2013). *Understanding international diplomacy: theory, practice and ethics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bohn, Jessica. (2002). 'An essay on Liberation Theology in Culbertson, Howard', *Theology of Christian missions*.
- Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and symbolic power*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Butterfield, H. (1953). *Christianity, diplomacy and war*. London: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press.
- Constantinou, C. M. (2004). *States of political discourse: words, regimes, seditions*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Constantinou, C. M. (2006). 'On homo-diplomacy', *Space and Culture* 9(4): 351-364.
- Cooper, A. F. (2008). *Celebrity diplomacy*. Boulder: Paradigm Publications
- Cooper, A. F., & Shaw, T. M. (eds.). (2009). *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cornago, N. (2013) *Plural Diplomacies: Normative Predicaments and Functional Imperatives*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Cyprus State Archives (CSA): FA1 343/43/3.
- De Kock, L. (1996). *Civilising barbarians: Missionary narrative and African textual*

*response in nineteenth-century South Africa*. Witwatersrand University Press.

Deos, A., & Pigman, G. A. (2010). 'Sustainable Public Diplomacy: Communicating about Identity, Interests and Terrorism' in C.M. Constantinou and J. Der Derian, eds., *Sustainable Diplomacies*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Einstein, M. (2007). *Brands of faith: Marketing religion in a commercial age*. London and New York: Routledge.

Emilianides, A. C. (2011). *Religion and Law in Cyprus*. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International.

Fallaci, O. (1974). *Interview with History*. London: Liveright Publishing Corp. (Available from: <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/makarios%20-%20interview%20with%20fallaci.html> Accessed 25<sup>th</sup> June 2015)

Fineman, H. The Huffington Post (December 2013). 'This Pope Disrupts Old Ways With Social Media Savvy (Or Habenus Twitter)'. (Accessed 17<sup>th</sup> September 2015 <http://goo.gl/D0vzhM>)

Garkand, C. Los Angeles Times (August 2013). 'Vatican Social Media Guru: Catholics should give Internet "a soul"'.

Griffin, L. (2009). 'Strategic Religious Dialogue: A Chaplain's Perspective on Religious Leader Liaison', *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 7(4): 71-76.

Haynes, J. (2001). 'Transnational religious actors and international politics', *Third World Quarterly* 22(2): 143-158.

Hayes, S. (1996). 'Orthodox mission in tropical Africa', *Missionalia* 24(3): 383-398. (<http://www.orthodoxytz.com/orthodoxmission.asp>)

Huliaras, A. (2006). 'Evangelists, oil companies, and terrorists: the Bush administration's policy towards Sudan', *Orbis* 50(4): 709-724.

Huliaras, A. (2008). 'The evangelical roots of US Africa policy', *Survival* 50(6): 161-182.

Iqbal, A. (1975). *The Prophet's diplomacy: the art of negotiation as conceived and developed by the Prophet of Islam*. C. Stark.

Johnston, D. (2003). *Faith-based diplomacy: Trumping realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnston, D., & Sampson, C., eds, (1995). *Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kirby, Dianne (ed.). (2003). *Religion and the Cold War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Kuus, M. (2013) *Geopolitics and expertise: Knowledge and authority in European diplomacy*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Kuzma, A. *et al* (2009). *How Religion has Embraced Marketing and the Implications*

- for Business. *Journal of Management and Marketing Research*, Volume 2.
- Lachmann, N. (2011). In the labyrinth of international community The Alliance of Civilizations programme at the United Nations. *Cooperation and Conflict* 46(2): 185-200. Loskota B and Flory R (2013) Why Religion Matters in the World in Seib, P. ed. *Religion and Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 9-26.
- Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Markides, C. Cyprus Mail (July 2007). 'The Kenya Orthodox Experience: where tribal dances meet Byzantine chants'.
- Mayes, S. (1960). *Makarios and Cyprus*. London: Putnam and Co Ltd.
- Mbembé, J. A. (2001). *On the postcolony*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
- Melissen, J. ed. (2005). *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. London and New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.
- Mouritzen, H. and Wivel, A. (2005). *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*. London: Routledge.
- Neumann, I. B. and Gstöhl, S. (2004). *Lilliputians in Gulliver's World: Small States in International Relations*. Reykjavik: Centre of Small State Studies, University of Iceland.
- Neumann, I. B. (2012). *At home with the diplomats: inside a European foreign ministry*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Opondo, S. (2010). 'Decolonizing Diplomacy: Reflections on African Estrangement and Exclusion' in Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian Eds., *Sustainable Diplomacies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Park, A. (2009). 'Selling' a small state to the world: Lithuania's struggle in building its national image. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 5: 67–84.
- Pentin, E. (2013). The Pope as Diplomat: How the Vatican Does Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs* (February 2013). [Accessed 17<sup>th</sup> September <http://goo.gl/mFjgsy>]
- Platt, W. C. (1989). The African Orthodox Church: an analysis of its first decade. *Church History* 58(4): 474-488.
- Pigman, G. A. and Deos, A. (2008). Consuls for hire: Private actors, public diplomacy. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4: 85–96.
- PIO Press Release (1970). *Ο Μακαριότατος εις Ναϊρόμπι [His Beatitude in Nairobi]*. Cyprus Public Information Office.
- PIO Press Release (1971). *Statement by the H.B. the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios at Nicosia airport on his arrival from Kenya*. Cyprus Public

*Information Office.*

Robert, D. L. (2008). *Converting colonialism: visions and realities in mission history, 1706-1914*. Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.

Panke, Diana. (2008). *The Influence of Small States in the EU: Structural Disadvantages and Counterstrategies*. UCD Dublin European Institute Working Paper 8(3).

Pouliot, V. (2010). *International security in practice: the politics of NATO-Russia diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roudometof, V. (2014). *Globalization and Orthodox Christianity: The Transformations of a Religious Tradition*. New York: Routledge.

Seib, P. ed. (2013). *Religion and Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stanley, B. (1990). *The Bible and the flag: Protestant missions and British imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*. Illinois: Intervarsity Press.

Tatum, D. C. (2002). *Who Influenced Whom? Lessons from the Cold War*. Oxford: University Press of America.

Temporal, P. (2011). *Islamic branding and marketing: Creating a global Islamic business*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Thorhallsson, Baldur and Wivel, Anders. (2006). Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19(4): 651-668.

Thorhallsson, Baldur. (2012). 'Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7: 135-160.

Tillyrides, M. (n.d.) The Makarios legacy in Kenya. *Orthodox Research Institute*. Available from: [http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/church\\_history/makarios\\_tillyrides\\_makarios\\_legacy.htm](http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/church_history/makarios_tillyrides_makarios_legacy.htm). (Accessed 10th July 2015)

Tsaliki, L. *et al* (2011) *Transnational celebrity activism in global politics: changing the world?* Intellect Books.

Uysal, E. Ü. (2013). Branding Istanbul: Representations of religion in promoting tourism. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 9: 223-235.

Vanezis, P. N. (1971). *Makarios: Faith and Power*. London: Abelard-Schuman.

Vanezis, P. N. (1974). *Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism*. London: Abelard-Schuman.

Wellman, D. J. (2004). *Sustainable Diplomacy: Ecology, Religion and Ethics in Muslim-Christian Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Winston, D (2013). Capturing the World's Attention: Buddhist Media Diplomacy in Myanmar, in Seib, P. ed. *Religion and Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave



Macmillan, pp. 157-180.

Woodhouse, C. M. (1985). *The rise and fall of the Greek colonels*. London; New York: Granada.

Zhang, J. (2013). China's Faith Diplomacy in Seib, P. ed. *Religion and Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 75-98.

# IDENTITY, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PRESS (1994-2015)

MUSTAFA CIRAKLI

*Lancaster University*

## ABSTRACT

*Much scholarship has focused on the spread of nationalism and identity construction in media discourse (Anderson 1991; Johnson and Ensslin (eds) 2007; Yumul and Ozkirimli 2000). This paper examines how leading newspapers in northern Cyprus have framed the twin issues of immigration from Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish 'settlers' in ways that articulate competing discourses on Turkish Cypriot identity. To that end, the paper provides a critical discourse analysis into the reporting of a selection of political events in the context of Cyprus' EU accession. The paper argues that the rhetoric utilised by the newspapers not only influence the nationalistic imagination in the Turkish Cypriot community but has also been shaped by the prevailing, rival discourses of Turkishness and Cypriotness that seek to capture the social imaginary. Such discursive structuring of immigration and the citizenship offer valuable insights into perceptions toward a 'patron-state' (Turkey) and further points out to the pervasiveness of the unresolved conflict in all spheres of life, with important implications for the construction of inclusive identities and the domestic balance of power. The insights in this paper thus hold comparative value to other cases of identity politics in post-conflict settings, unrecognised states and others involving kin-states.*

## Introduction

Much scholarship has focused on the spread of nationalism and identity (re)construction in media discourse (Anderson 1991; Johnson and Ensslin (eds) 2007; Yumul and Ozkirimli 2000). This paper examines how the Turkish Cypriot newspapers have framed the twin issues of immigration from Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish settlers in ways that articulate competing discourses on Turkish-Cypriot identity. To that end, the paper begins by providing a brief overview of the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers and their enduring relationship with the domestic politics of the island, namely nationalism and the 'Cyprus Problem'. This is followed by a critical discourse analysis of a selection of political events significant to the immigration debate and their framing by various mainstream newspapers and their columnists in the context of the Cypriot accession into the EU (1995-2015).

## Turkish Cypriot Print-Media: A Brief Overview

The news media are thought of as an integral part of any political system, informing, prioritising, shaping and controlling events, opinions and society itself (Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2001). Cyprus, and the northern part of the island more specifically, is no exception to this. On a closer look, discourses articulated in the Turkish-Cypriot media closely reflect those of the mainstream narratives that dominate the political field, i.e. those preferred by politicians and the political parties. This overriding feature of the media in northern Cyprus as a highly-politicised domain and a conduit of political discourse is captured well by the “polarized pluralist model” developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004: 68-73) consisting of a politically oriented press, high political resonance in journalism, prevalence of the State as an owner and regulator and a high degree of ideological diversity. Indeed, the Turkish-Cypriot media (but also its Greek-Cypriot counterpart in the south, see Avraamidou and Kyriakides 2015; Christophorou *et al.* 2010) is enmeshed in pervasive contemporary political economic, social and cultural dynamics marked by the ongoing conflict, also known as the ‘Cyprus Problem’. It is in this sense placed at the heart of the (re)production of that conflict, either promoting the status quo to signify the ‘imagined nation’ while reproducing suspicion toward the ‘other’, i.e. the Greek-Cypriot community or, to the contrary, an oppositional discourse, contesting the dominant ethno-national notions of peace and belonging. In this context, the media is also part of a complex public sphere that forms and redefines collective identity.

### Media discourses on immigration on the eve of anticipated European integration

In the aftermath of the island’s partition as a result of the Turkish military invasion/intervention, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership continued to assert that the Greek-Cypriots still posed an existential threat and that any form of internal dissent would harm the ‘national cause’ by undermining ‘national unity’ and serving, in effect, the Greek-Cypriot cause of *enosis*, or unification with Greece (*Zaman* 1975). As such, the opposition newspapers came under heavy attack with such accusations and often labelled as ‘traitors’ when they appeared to take a critical line over the government’s handling of domestic problems, or on the broader issues of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and the bilateral relations with Turkey (see, for example, *Zaman* 1976; *Birlik* 1988 but also Küçük 1976).

It was precisely within the context of this contestation that *Turkishness* was further politicised and identity became a central cleavage of Turkish-Cypriot politics, rendering the newspapers a key site where two competing visions of national/collective identity strived for hegemony. While the nationalist, establishment newspapers such as the *Halkın Sesi* and the *Birlik* promoted the *Turkishness* discourse which construed the Turkish-Cypriot community as part of the ‘greater Turkish nation’ and the Greek-Cypriots as the threatening ‘other’, the newspapers of the leftist opposition such as the *Yenidüzen* and the *Ortam* increasingly promoted an alternative notion of identity characterised by a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. It was precisely in this context that the ongoing migration of Turkish mainlanders into northern Cyprus that begun in 1983 as part of a ‘settler-recruitment programme’ would, serve as an important cleavage, for these competing identity discourses aimed at constructing distinct ‘imagined communities’.

For the oppositional, leftist newspapers, the settler dispute soon became the focal point of their identity discourse. The migration of Turkish nationals into Cyprus and their naturalisation was framed as a serious challenge and at times, an existential threat to the distinct identity of the Turkish-Cypriot community but also its autonomy. One of the most prominent features of the leftist media narratives on immigration during this time was therefore the production and amplification of a discourse of fear with reference to the scenarios of disorder, loss of sovereignty and political subjugation. Within it, the Turkish settlers/migrants who first began to arrive as a ‘much-needed workforce’ were presented by and large as ‘troublemakers’, ‘unassimilable persons’ undermining cohesion and cultural authenticity, and as ‘cheap labour’ taking jobs away from the native Turkish-Cypriots. These nativist anxieties also helped promoted the view that immigration from Turkey was harming the identity of the community by undermining the demographic equilibrium and diluting its autonomy through large-scale granting of citizenships, giving settlers the right to vote in the local and national elections. (*Ortam* 1985; *Yenidüzen* 1986a and 1986b; *Kıbrıs* 1989). By the end of the 1990s and with Cyprus’ EU accession now imminent, the fierce discussions regarding the future of Cyprus then began to spill over the issue of immigration. The influence of settler constituency on the political outlook of the Turkish-Cypriot community, more precisely that ‘the settler votes would be pivotal in a possible referendum’ (Adalı 1996) would resonate deeply ahead of the looming referendum on Cyprus’ reunification on the eve of its EU accession.

The controversy first blew up in the run up to the December 2003 legislative elections. At the heart of the citizenship dispute during this time was the fear on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot opposition parties (and the pro-EU, pro-reunification civil society) that their chances of ousting the nationalist leadership were being undermined by the large-scale granting of citizenship rights to Turkish immigrants. In other words, Turkish settlers who had been given citizenship by the UBP-DP coalition government, the opposition feared, would seemingly oppose the UN-sponsored ‘Annan Plan’ and torpedo Turkish-Cypriot prospects of joining the EU. Whilst the ensuing citizenship suits, subsequent protests and a one-day strike held at the ‘immigration office’ were extensively covered by all outlets (*Kıbrıs* 2003b 2003c 2003d; *Halkın Sesi* 2003; *Afrika* 2003), some newspapers also sensationalised on the reports of “long queues”, Turkish immigrants “swamping the hospitals [for health certificates required for citizenship applications]” and “violent brawls breaking out” at various government departments describing the scenes as a “disgrace” (*Kıbrıs* 2003a). The *Kıbrıs* (‘Cyprus’) newspaper, that began to shift during this time toward a moderate standpoint, also took a more critical stance, charging government officials or “those in favour of the status quo” with “treachery”, by effectively “betraying the political will of the Turkish-Cypriot community” through the granting of illegal citizenships (*Kıbrıs* 2003b). The *Yenidüzen* newspaper also lashed out on the Turkish-Cypriot authorities for the large-scale granting of citizenships ahead of the elections, charging that the arbitrary naturalisations were a direct policy of electoral manipulation.

### **The framing of Turkish migrants/settlers in the post-2004 period**

Whilst the simultaneous referenda held in April 2004 on the UN Peace Plan failed to secure a deal before the whole of Cyprus was admitted into the EU, there was still considerable optimism in the northern part of the island that the Turkish-Cypriot commitment to reunification and EU membership would ease the community’s ostracisation and that the international actors would act

to bring the Turkish-Cypriot community 'in from the cold'. To that end, the 'Cyprus problem' continued to dominate news stories in the post-referendum period, though with less intensity. More remarkably, the settler issue in the immediate aftermath of the referendum was temporarily downplayed and found substantial coverage only in the years following the referendum and primarily in the context of the new round of negotiations with the election of the moderate Demetris Christofias as the new President of the Republic in 2008. The *Kıbrıs* newspaper in particular, provided extensive coverage of the political discussions that took place in the southern part of the island on the settler issue, and sometimes with headlines portraying an intolerant, uncompromising stance (2009) going as far as charging the Greek-Cypriot politicians with 'racism' (2010a). Yet, a number of developments toward the end of the decade in relation to the ongoing Cyprus problem, but also in the context of bilateral relations with Turkey would once again place immigration-related anxieties on top of the public and political agendas of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

An important outcome of the clear disillusionment of Turkish-Cypriots perhaps with such promises of international and European integration was the gradually diminishing prominence of the EU as an oppositional narrative. The *Afrika* newspaper during this time became especially vocal in its criticism of the government's citizenship policy. In one particular headline, the newspaper claimed that the demographic outlook of the northern part of the island was undergoing a complete overhaul and that the process of 'Turkification' was in full swing following the election of Derviş Eroğlu as the new Turkish-Cypriot leader (*Afrika* 2010). Its editorial also argued that Turkish-Cypriots were now a minority largely thanks to the opposition who had now embraced the settlers as the 'new Cypriots' and sponsored their citizenship rights (*Afrika* 2010). The so-called 'Survival Rallies' organised during this time by a group of trade unions and opposition parties were also to bring further media attention onto the issue (*Kıbrıs* 2010a 2010c). In its coverage of the second rally in March 2011, the *Kıbrıs* newspaper, which had limited its attention on the status of settlers in the context of the Cyprus talks in the post-referendum period, began to highlight the domestic controversy surrounding the issue (2011a). Citing previous census data, the paper claimed that the number of people on the electoral roll had grown twofold between 1976 and 2005 and that 'no one knows of the precise immigration figures' (2011b).

Yet another key factor which facilitated the discursive shift on part of the opposition toward a more critical stance on immigration was the austerity measures orchestrated by Ankara. In this sense, privatisation of public assets was seen as threatening Turkish-Cypriot autonomy by further consolidating Ankara's control in its domestic affairs. Turkish-Cypriot identity was defined here in 'existential' terms as the fundamental stumbling block of the political community and with reference to its precarious autonomy that was threatened by Turkey through a double whammy of austerity/privatisation policies and the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals (*Afrika* 2012).

For its part, the *Turkishness* discourse continued to frame the settler issue in the columns of the *Halkın Sesi* newspaper and in *Kıbrıs* to a lesser extent. In this vein, the presence of Turkish immigrants and their naturalisation are viewed within an explicitly nationalist framework characterised by the much-cherished Turkish-Cypriot relationship with Turkey and on the basis of ethnic-kinship. the presence of 'settlers' more explicitly within the context of the ongoing negotiations. In this sense, 'boosting the numbers' through new citizenships to ensure a numerically stronger Turkish-Cypriot community is seen as a 'crucial policy' in order to secure better consociational returns on the negotiating table, but also to "undermine Greek-Cypriot negotiating position which claims sole ownership of the whole island based on their numerical

superiority [...] offering, in turn, mere minority rights for the Turkish-Cypriot community” (Aydeniz 2015). A number of economic arguments are also utilised in this vein to promote the argument for a laxer immigration regime to respect human rights but also to maintain a flexible labour force (Tolgay 2015).

## Conclusion

As the paper has shown, the nationalist *Turkishness* discourse based on independent statehood (in the form of the ‘TRNC) and an overarching Turkish identity was further entrenched in the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention/invasion. Under this representation, Turkish-Cypriot identity was effectively subsumed as a form of ethnic/local variation whereas *Turkishness* took pride of place. The establishment newspapers such as the *Halkın Sesi* that had begun circulating in the pre-1974 period subscribed without much hesitation to these official narratives and promoted Turkish nationalism or the ‘national cause’. The so-called ‘national cause’ (*milli dava*) conceived statehood as an ‘inseparable part of the motherland Turkey’ requiring perpetual protection from the Greek-Cypriot ‘other’. In the same vein, the presence of Turkish immigrants and their naturalisation have been viewed on the basis of ethnic-kinship, characterised also by the ‘much-cherished’ and ‘existential’ Turkish-Cypriot relationship with Turkey. More recently, in an effort to regain political legitimacy, the nationalist rhetoric has been discursively expanded to appeal to popular anxieties in relation to the economy, emphasising the positive contribution of Turkish immigrants/settlers into the economy (and similarly, the negative economic repercussions of limiting migration) but also to include a ‘human rights discourse’ in lashing back at attempts to introduce stricter immigration and citizenship laws.

Though this appeal to some notion of human rights combining economic and cultural arguments may at first seem a progressive transformation from a highly rigid essentialist discourse, the study shows that such reference to human rights remain firmly couched in a distinctly ethno-nationalist framing which is aimed at legitimising the rather asymmetrical relationship between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community. In this sense, the citizenship status of the Turkish immigrants is justified on the basis of ethnic-kinship, level of contribution to the economy, but above all its importance in the context of bilateral relations with Turkey in which the latter is privileged in ethno-mythical terms as the ‘motherland’. Moreover, in the context of the Cyprus problem, the *Turkishness* discourse also tries to capitalise on the alleged benefit of immigration and citizenship in boosting the Turkish-Cypriot population numerically in order to maintain a stronger position on the negotiating table. As such, it is devoid of democratic concerns. This is an important finding since it highlights the deployment and articulation of a range of civic and ethnic elements within the *Turkishness* discourse in its attempt to contest for a certain hegemony.

The left-leaning newspapers (such as the *Yenidüzen*, the *Ortam* and later on the *Afrika*) for their part, capitalised on the immigration cleavage from the 1980s onwards to challenge the hegemonic *Turkishness* discourse with an alternative notion of belonging which emphasised a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. This media rhetoric on immigration and citizenship stem from a securitised *Cypriotness* discourse in which the presence of populations from Turkey are treated as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘ways of living’ of the Turkish-Cypriot society. Within this discourse, moreover, Turkish settlers are seen as a homogenous constituency that invariably support Turkish tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs.

In this sense, the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers benefited from strategies not only emphasising perpetuation but also transformation i.e. articulation of more recent anxieties in their appeal to popular sentiments. As indicated above, this has been the case with the introduction of a 'human rights' element within the *Turkishness* discourse together with a neoliberal argument to further frame immigration as much-needed 'cheap labour' mainly as a reaction to the oppositional rhetoric of the *Cypriotness* discourse which seems to have dominated the discussions in the second half of the time-period under study. For the *Cypriotness* discourse, on the other hand, the most notable change since 2004 has been in relation to the framing of Turkey. While the *Afrika's* views on Turkey as an 'occupier' or immigration as an illegal population transfer did not change, what is striking is that once seen as marginal, similar views are now being taken by the more moderate *Yenidüzen*. Though the paper has continued to refrain from using an explicit 'occupation' rhetoric, certain elements of this discourse has nonetheless spilled into its narrative. In this vein, the newspaper has taken a more explicit stance against Turkey and the increasingly authoritarian AKP government there, tying a number of elements including austerity and religiosity onto immigration in its articulation of the *Cypriotness* discourse. Such discursive structuring of immigration and the citizenship rights of Turkish settlers within prevalent perceptions toward Turkey point out to the pervasiveness of the unresolved 'Cyprus Problem' in all spheres of life and with important implications for the construction of inclusive identities, domestic balance of power and the framing of the conflict itself.

## Notes

1. This paper does not deal with the legality of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of northern Cyprus and the legitimacy of its governing institutions. Northern Cyprus (with a small 'n') is the term generally preferred in this study to designate the distinction of the Turkish-Cypriot political space. For purposes of analytical clarity, public institutions are nonetheless referred here by their original name, as used by the Turkish-Cypriots themselves ('president', 'government', 'minister' etc.) The term 'settler', though not part of the Turkish-Cypriot political lexicon, is modified in its usage here with a view to reveal the complexity (and the contingency) of the context in which it is utilised. Other categories, such as 'immigrants' and 'citizens' are also used in tandem, to further distinguish between different groups with varying legal statuses and rights in a real albeit unrecognised regime.
2. It is important to note that the analysis undertaken here concentrates less on the linguistic (de)construction of particular texts than on the change and continuity in the articulation of core concepts that have been important to particular discourses on Turkish 'settlers' and on identity.
3. The focus during this time was on the number of Turkish settlers who would be given the right to remain following a deal.
4. First launched in July 1974, chiefly in reaction to a coup attempt orchestrated by the Junta in Greece to overthrow President Makarios, and again in August that year to 'restore peace', the Turkish military intervention is described as 'peace operation' and 'invasion' in official Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot narratives respectively.
5. In a somewhat IMF-style relationship, Turkish-Cypriot macroeconomic policy is formulated and directed by Turkey in the form of bilateral economic protocols. The latest

financial protocol signed in December 2012 and included controversial austerity measures envisaging a drastic reduction in the size of the public sector, but also the privatisation of key Turkish-Cypriot assets including electricity, telecommunications and harbours. The Protocol stipulated that the Turkish-Cypriot government had agreed to implement the bilateral economic programme entitled “Towards a Sustainable Economy 2013-2015” in order to reduce its balance deficit to 315 ml Turkish Lira(TL); controversial policy measures included the privatisation of the harbours and the electricity authority (Articles 5.2.4.2.1 and 5.2.5.2 respectively) and market liberalisation in telecommunications; (5.2.4.2.3) (TRNC 2013).

## **Bibliography**

Adalı, K. (1996). ‘*Yardım Kime Yarıyor?* [Who is benefitting from the assistance?]', *Yenidüzen*, 02 April.

*Afrika* (2003). Editorial, 13 March.

*Afrika* (2010) ‘*Golifa Gibi* [As if it was *Golifa*]’, 30 April.

*Afrika* (2012) ‘Toplumsal Varoluş Hareketi ‘Mücadele Eylemi başlattı [Communal Survival Movement begins Survival Protest]’, 31 January.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Avraamidou, M. and Kyriakides, C. (2015). ‘Media nationalism and the negotiation of inter-ethnic peace in Cyprus’, *Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition*, 10: 2, 1--21.

Aydeniz, O. (2015). ‘*Şu Yurttaşlıklar Konusu* [The citizenship issue]’, *Halkın Sesi*, 13 February.

*Birlik* (1988) ‘*KKTC Olgusunu Yıpratmaya Yönelik Sorumsuz ve Çirkin Kampanya* [Ugly and irresponsible campaign to smear the TRNC]’, 14 January.

Christophorou, C. (2010). ‘Greek Cypriot Media Development and Politics’, *The Cyprus Review*, 22: 2, 235--245.

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.

*Halkın Sesi* (2003) ‘*Muhaceret Dairesinde KTAMS grevi* [KTAMS goes on strike at the Immigration Office]’, 10 October.

Hallini, D.C. and Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: three models of media and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Johnson, S. and Ensslin, A., eds. (2010). *Language in the Media, Representation, Identities, Ideologies*. London: Continuum

*Kıbrıs* (2003a) ‘*Vatandaşlık Rezaleti* [New citizenships in shambles]’, 08 October.

*Kıbrıs* (2003b) ‘*Büyük Tepki* [Strong Reaction]’, 10 October.

*Kıbrıs* (2003c) ‘*1 Günde 1563 vatandaşlık* [1563 New citizenships in a day]’, 04 November.

*Kıbrıs* (2003d) ‘*Büyük Protesto* [Big Protest]’, 15 October.

*Kıbrıs* (2009) ‘*Tümü gidecek* [All be sent back]’, 08 March.

*Kıbrıs* (2010a) ‘*Sendikalar: Dayatmalara karşı mücadelemiz sürecektir* [Unions: we will continue our struggle for impositions]’, 15 October.

*Kıbrıs* (2010b) ‘*Toplum yok oluyor* [Community is disappearing]’, 16 October.

*Kıbrıs* (2011a) ‘*Kaldıramıyoruz* [We can’t bear it]’, 03 March.

*Kıbrıs* (2011b) ‘*Artık Yeter* [Enough is enough]’, 04 March.

Küçük, F. (1976). ‘*Dış ve İç İşlerimiz* [Our external and internal affairs]’, in *Halkın Sesi*, 30 June.

Tolgay, A. (2015). ‘*İnsan hakları, işgücü ve ekonomimiz* [Human rights, labour force and our economy]’, *Kıbrıs*, 30 December.

TRNC (2013). ‘*Ekonomik Program 2013-2015* [Economic Programme: 2013-2015]’, available at: [http://www.kktcbasbakanlik.org/Portals/1031/EKONOMIK\\_PROGRAM-2013-15.pdf](http://www.kktcbasbakanlik.org/Portals/1031/EKONOMIK_PROGRAM-2013-15.pdf) (accessed 22 April 2017).

*Ortam* (1995) ‘*Onlar da mı vatan haini* [Are they traitors too?]', 19 September.

Wodak, R. (2001). ‘The discourse-historical approach’, in Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage, 63--94.

*Yenidüzen* (1986a) ‘*Göç* [Migration]’, 20 January.

*Yenidüzen* (1986b) ‘*Egemen sınıf CTP’siz demokrasi istiyor* [The ruling class wants a democracy without the CTP]’, 10 February.

Yumul, A. and Ozkirimli, U. (2000). ‘Reproducing the nation: ‘banal nationalism’ in the Turkish Press’, *Media, Culture and Society*, 22: 6, 787--804.

*Zaman* (1975) '*Denktaş: Dava Bitmiş Değildir, Mücadele Çetin Bir Safhadadır* [Denktaş: The cause is not over; the struggle is in a critical stage]', 19 September.

*Zaman* (1976) '*CTP Mensuplarının Londra'da Rumlarla İşbirliği Yaptıkları Belgeleriyle Kanıtlandı* [The CTP members' collaboration with the Greek Cypriots in London proven by documents]', 28 June.