

## **Acting in synergy or in isolation?**

### **Drivers for the emergence of intense cooperation among Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Greece**

#### *Conceptual Framework*

**Abstract:** Following a long literature on local economic development, this paper argues that inter-firm cooperation is a way to enhance productivity in economies that are characterised by a heavy reliance on SMEs. Although cooperation among producers is generally considered difficult to achieve in Greece for reasons that have to do with culture and the national institutional framework, the paper presents a number of cases from different economic sectors where intense inter-firm cooperation is, in fact, present. This gives rise to the question: Under what conditions does intense inter-firm cooperation arise at local level in Greece and other developed but not highly advanced economies?

“Whether large foreign investments come or not, Greece will continue to be essentially a country of small firms. If these grow, the country will grow, and they don’t, it will not grow.” (Doxiadis 2014: 284)

## 1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present the conceptual framework of my PhD research, which has to do with the political economy of local economic development in Greece and other similar settings. More specifically, I focus on an issue that assumes particular importance in a number of otherwise distinct strands of the local economic development literature, namely the issue of cooperation among Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Indeed, a common element of the literatures on industrial districts, industrial clusters, and regional innovation systems, among others, is the importance they attach on the development of cooperative ties and networks among economic actors as a means of improving their economic performance (Asheim *et al.* 2011: 878). In fact, the more an economy relies on SMEs, and the more economic actors choose production strategies that are based on quality- rather than cost-competitiveness, the more relevant the question of inter-firm cooperation becomes for economic performance (Lyberaki 1998: 236). The broad questions that my PhD research therefore seeks to address are: Under what conditions does intense inter-firm cooperation arise at local level in Greece and other similar countries? What role do local power constellations, local institutional frameworks, and leaders play in the emergence of inter-firm cooperation?

In this paper, I aim to analyse the theoretical underpinnings and demonstrate the relevance of my research topic. I do so by addressing the following questions in the sections that follow, in turn: Why does inter-firm cooperation matter for economic performance? Based on the literature, should we expect to observe intense inter-firm cooperation in Greece? And finally, do we actually observe instances of intense inter-firm cooperation in Greece?

## 2. SMEs and the problem of cooperation

An important feature of the Greek economy is the dominant role of SMEs in the production process (see table 1). If the assumptions of neoclassical economics about zero transaction costs, zero entry and exit barriers, and perfect information reflected reality, then the exceptional reliance of these economies on SMEs would not be seen as problematic; on the contrary, the high number of producers would be considered an asset, which by increasing the level of competition in the market, would lead to higher economic efficiency.

	Share of persons employed in SMEs	Share of value added by SMEs
Greece	87.3%	75.1%
EU-28	66.8%	57.4%

Table 1: The importance of SMEs in the Greek economy (European Commission, SBA factsheet 2016)

However, as a result of the fact that these assumptions typically do not hold in the real world, small producers in many sectors in fact suffer from several disadvantages compared to larger firms. For one, small firms are in a worse position to benefit from the cost advantages that arise as the size of production increases (economies of scale), and as the variety of production activities rises (economies of scope). Furthermore, the existence of high transaction costs, and particularly the costliness and asymmetric nature of information, makes it harder for small producers to discover consumers' preferences, since market research is expensive to conduct. Equally, the same costs make faraway consumers reluctant to buy products with no brand recognition, whose quality is difficult to determine at first sight (North 1990: 27-30). The complex legal and institutional structures that determine who has the right to import and sell specific products from abroad in different countries, and under what constraints, renders small size an obstacle to a firm's ability to establish its presence abroad. In addition, given the unpredictable and disruptive nature of innovation, firms that can invest larger amounts of resources in research and development, and that can afford to take the risk of making investments in new directions whose wisdom can only be determined after the fact, are usually in a better position to adopt innovations compared to small firms.

Because of these considerations, the heavy reliance of the Greek economy on SMEs is usually seen as a liability, and the emergence of additional large enterprises, particularly in the tradable sectors, is seen as crucial for economic development (Doxiadis 2014: 282). Without contesting this argument, I take the view that due to the incremental nature of change, economies that are largely dependent on SMEs are unlikely to overcome this dependence overnight. As a result, in the context of such economies, it is also important to consider ways to make SMEs more productive. As emphasised by the growing volume of academic work that depicts inter-firm networks, clusters, industrial districts, and regional innovation systems as a 'third way' between markets and hierarchies, inter-firm cooperation can help SMEs overcome the deficiencies of small size, thereby offering a means for increasing their productivity.

Indeed, cooperation can offer several advantages to small producers. These include the ability to benefit from economies of scale and scope and to gain joint access to physical resources and specialised services that they could not afford individually; the ability to gain access to knowledge-intensive resources that they could not attain otherwise, through joint R&D and market research activities, and through formal and informal knowledge diffusion channels; the ability to benefit from complementarities arising from related activities of other firms; and the possibility to create a collective reputation, through applying uniform standards along the supply chain, and through engaging in joint marketing activities (Asheim *et al.* 2011: 879; Lamprinopoulou *et al.* 2006: 665). The latter strategy has proven to be particularly beneficial in the agri-food sector, where successfully marketed Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) products generally enjoy high product differentiation and yield better profit margins than average, but it can be equally useful in the manufacturing sector, as shown by the case of "made in Italy" fashion brands that developed in Tuscany. Building this kind of collective reputation relies crucially on the existence of a common entrepreneurial vision and marketing strategy among local producers, as well as a degree of discipline in terms of implementing quality standards.

Inter-firm cooperation to gain such advantages is particularly important in the Greek setting not only due to the economic importance of small firms in the country, but also because of the relevance for Greek products of quality-based competitiveness. For example, as a result of high labour costs, the small size of agricultural plots, and

the hilly landscape, Greek agri-food producers often find it difficult to compete on the basis of price not only with their non-EU, but also with their EU-based competitors. As a Greek olive oil producer put it, “in Spain they have large flat areas, (...) and in the end an ultra-modern machine passes and collects the olives. (...) Given that 70% of our cost comes from collecting the product, while in Spain 80% of inputs are collected industrially, one can understand that the only thing we can do is invest in the quality of the traditional olive grove” (Agricola 2016: 26). Indeed, the types of cooperative activities mentioned in the previous paragraph are especially relevant for quality-based entrepreneurial strategies in traditional economic sectors. Furthermore, inter-firm cooperation can also play a crucial role in enhancing the ability of Greek producers to engage in knowledge-based, innovative, hi-tech entrepreneurship (Caloghirou *et al.* 2012: 39).

### **3. Should we expect to observe intense inter-firm cooperation in Greece?**

Even though, for the reasons cited above, small producers can achieve superior economic outcomes by cooperating rather than by acting alone, political economists have shown that cooperation is often difficult to attain for several reasons. These include the difficulty of making credible commitments when preferences are time-inconsistent, the pervasiveness of the free-rider problem, the possible distributional consequences of strategies that may overall be efficient, the problem of imperfect information, and the possible lack of organizational capacity to implement complex cooperative solutions to joint problems (see indicatively Ostrom 1990: 46-49). According to the literature on cooperation and collective action, in the absence of a coercive force, wealth-maximizing actors are most likely to cooperate and thereby to attain socially optimal outcomes when interactions are repeated, when there is perfect information about each other’s motives and perfect transparency about each other’s behaviour, and when the number of players is small (North 1990: 12). However, given that these conditions rarely hold in the real world, particularly as we move from small-scale personalized exchange within a locality to the type of large-scale, complex impersonal exchange that characterises modern economies, in practice cheating, shirking, and opportunism tend to prevail (North 1990: 56-57).

Many authors from different disciplinary viewpoints regard culture as a factor that can mitigate the incentives to act opportunistically, thereby enabling cooperation under some circumstances. Even rational choice theorists like Elinor Ostrom consider that “generalized norms of reciprocity and trust... can be used as initial social capital” to facilitate the emergence of institutions that favour cooperation (1990: 211). In addition to shared norms and beliefs that increase trust among actors, the likelihood of cooperation can also rise as a result of norms that lead to the “censure or even ostracism” of actors who fail to bear a share of the burdens of collective action, and norms that reward the active pursuit of collective goods with “special respect or honor”, which Mancur Olson has termed negative and positive “social selective incentives” respectively (1982: 23-24).

Nevertheless, as illustrated in the following passage by Aristos Doxiadis, neither of these cultural elements is considered to exist in any generalised way in Greece:

“Greece is not such a society [i.e. a society with highly developed mutual trust]. This is evident in everyday life when we violate the rules of coexistence in the city, from parking to throwing garbage. In business transactions, those who have the

opportunity to compare, see that the Greek entrepreneur is more likely to lie or to shirk from an agreement than the Northern European one. We don't trust our neighbour, our colleague, our supplier, apart from people who are very close to us, our relatives. Attitudes surveys reveal that we Greeks are among the most suspicious peoples in the developed world. To the question whether 'one can trust others', we reply negatively more frequently than almost all other Europeans.

At the same time, we don't want to be the willing punishers of our neighbour. On the contrary, we consider anyone who denounces waste and infractions as a snitch. This attitude of tolerance and complicity would have moral value against a foreign, oppressive power. But when the rules that are breached with our tolerance are those that sustain a collective good, then the imaginary resistance is self-destructive." (2014: 131)

It is possible to think of at least two sets of cultural arguments that have been invoked by scholars to explain the apparent lack of generalised social trust in Greece. The first one is reminiscent of Robert Putnam's *long-durée* arguments about the absence of "social capital" and a "civic culture" in Southern Italy (Putnam *et al.* 1993), in that it goes back to historical events that took place centuries ago. This type of explanation refers to the Greek experience under Ottoman rule, when "the abusive and arbitrary exercise of power" by the state bred among Greeks "a profound distrust of all concentration of power outside one's own hands", while "the extended family emerged as the foremost defensive institution capable of offering invaluable protection to its members at all levels of society" (Diamandouros 1983: 45-46). Secondly and relatedly, the literature on clientelism argues that the prevalence of patronage relations in a society is detrimental to trust, as clients tend to request from their patrons not public goods that would benefit the whole community, but "personal material advantages" at the expense of others. At the same time, patrons "seek to prevent the formation of secondary associations among clients," which are the hallmarks of social capital, "as these would represent a potential threat to the personalistic and vertical relationship that links each client to his patron" (Piattoni 1997: 315-316).

In the absence of a facilitative culture, a robust institutional framework imposed and monitored by the state is usually seen as the only alternative way to bring about cooperative outcomes. According to Douglass North, the enforcement of agreements and property rights by a coercive state "has been the crucial underpinning of successful modern economies involved in the complex contracting necessary for modern economic growth" (1990: 35); equally, "the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World" (1990: 54). Clearly, the Greek state is able to guarantee the necessary framework conditions for the functioning of the market, including an essential level of property rights' protection, and thereby doesn't fall under what North calls "the Third World". At the same time, the institutional elements that are required for the state to successfully play the role of "third-party enforcer" are not fully present in Greece, distinguishing the country also from North's category of "developed countries". Indicatively, the Greek institutional framework has well-documented deficiencies with regard to the aims of the uniform application of the law, the existence of an effective judicial system, and the existence of a public administration that monitors and measures outcomes and produces and disseminates data and information (see Doxiadis 2014, esp. chapters 6 and 11).

#### 4. Cases of intense inter-firm cooperation in Greece and research question

Yet, despite the negative cultural and institutional conditions that were outlined in the previous section, several examples of intense cooperation among producers do exist in Greece, and in some occasions they “have even managed to revitalise whole areas with their success” (Vakoufaris *et al.* 2007: 779). A few such examples are listed in the box below.

- **Chios Mastiha Growers’ Association (CMGA):** *Mastiha* is a resin that is gathered from mastic trees, which are cultivated exclusively on Chios island in the Eastern Aegean. The about 4,850 farmers who cultivate mastic trees are organised in 20 first-degree cooperatives and one second-degree cooperative, the CMGA, which is an obligatory cooperative, meaning that by law it is solely responsible for collecting and selling *mastiha*. For decades, the price of *mastiha* was very low, and virtually the only *mastiha* product that was sold outside Chios was chewing gum. Nevertheless, as a result of the CMGA’s efforts to gather information about end-users and promote innovative products, such as *mastiha* liqueur and cosmetics, and the establishment from 2002 on of a network of MastihaShops to sell these products in Greece and abroad, between 1999 and 2010 the price of *mastiha* rose by 102.3%, while there was also a large increase in the quantity produced (Vakoufaris *et al.* 2007; Lioukas 2013).
- **Nimfeo:** Nimfeo is a mountain village in the region of Florina, Greece, which represents an “exemplary case of revival of a mountainous touristic settlement” (EOT 2003: 4-26). Like many other Greek villages, it was deserted after the Second World War. However, the locals made a concerted effort to restore traditional buildings, provide touristic facilities, and market Nimfeo as a touristic destination, and today it is one of the most popular winter destinations in the country. Nimfeo also benefits from the presence nearby of an NGO-run shelter for brown bears, which are an endangered species.
- **Corallia cluster in micro-electronics:** The Corallia cluster in Athens brings together about 80 firms from the micro-electronics sector, which obtain jointly marketing and specialised information services, legal support, export promotion services, and support for obtaining funding. In addition, the firms are co-located in an incubation centre, organise joint recruitment and promotion events, and have established partnerships with most major university departments and research centres in related fields in Greece. The cluster was formed in 2006, owing much to the initiative of the president of a research centre called “Athena”. The cluster was also supported from the beginning with public funding, and is today the poster child of Greek cluster policy (Caloghirou *et al.* 2012).

##### Box 1: Examples of successful networks among producers in Greece

Even though there is no doubt that such examples are numerically fewer in Greece than in areas that are known for having high levels of social capital and facilitative political institutions, such as the Third Italy, nevertheless they are present, and their occurrence cannot easily be explained using our current theoretical tools. By delving deeper into factors that affect producers’ interactions in Greece, and by exploring the drivers for the creation of beneficial synergies among SMEs in a country that usually brushed off as not being conducive to the occurrence of cooperation, I aim to advance our understanding of the political and institutional foundations of successful growth strategies, while at the same time making a contribution to the political economy literature about cooperation and collective action. I hope that my results will apply not only to Greece, but also to other developed but not highly advanced economies that rely heavily on SMEs, such as Southern Italy.

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## **Commoning as a mode of social organization in contemporary Greece**

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### **Abstract**

This presentation points up the significance of two concepts that have gained ground in the field of radical political theory: *commons* and *commoning*. Initially, I will explicate the meaning of these concepts. In addition to this, I will present two active initiatives in Thessaloniki: the Social Solidarity Clinic and the bookstore Akivernites Politeies (Ungoverned States), so as to illustrate the political significance of the commons and the commoning in contemporary Greece. It seems like that in the crisis ridden Greece commoning takes place as a means of resistance and more important as a mode of organizing everyday life with a set of different values by which self-governance, solidarity, sharing, equality and dignity become the main principles for a politics from below.

**Key words:** *commons, commoning, Thessaloniki, Social Solidarity Clinic, Akivernites Politeies*



## **When the emperor is naked... political fantasy invents new paths**

### *The commons*

The commons, as a diverse body of discourses, include multiple demands and highlight an alternative way of viewing and constructing our social reality beyond the bipolar division of the state and the market. Emphasizing the self-organization of the populations and through the creation of communities both the political and the politics are re-examined in order to be reconstituted in new contexts. Many scholars and activists believe that this emerging politics is able to unite different movements, with different perceptions under a common purpose, but also that it can overcome the restraints of wage struggles. (An Architektur 2010; Federici 2011; 2012a)

Furthermore, the commons broadly defined, is referred to all those -material or immaterial- resources which are necessary for our social reproduction and only come to the fore by struggling communities who aim to preserve and enlarge them. Thus, the commons presuppose three things: *resources*, *communities* and *struggles*. We can also conceive of them as an administrative system, a space where all necessary resources are being organized, within which subjects and groups are related, struggles emerge and a new ethical frame to defend and reproduce this system is being articulated. (De Angelis 2007; Federici 2012a; Fournier 2013).

Along with all of the above-mentioned, it is necessary to clarify that when it comes to resources that could become common, current theories include all those material conditions given by nature and produced by humans as well. In other words, nature provides us with the ecological commons such as air, water and fruits. Moreover, there are immaterial human creations –language, codes, information, emotions etc. - that must also be considered as potential commons that could be further categorized into social commons, notably public health, education and labour and communication commons. (Dyer-Whitford 2007; 2009, Fournier, 2013, Hardt & Negri 2011)

The commons are a way to conceive our world as accessible and belonging to all, providing the space for specific practices to emerge and could be further categorised depending on the level of access to them, (open access or limited access) as well as on the way these commons are being handled by the communities (those regulated under formal or informal rules and those under no regulation or fee whatsoever). (Benkler 2003)

It is worth mentioning that a great part of commons’ genealogy is occupied by the exemplary work of Elinor Ostrom. She has proved that it is possible and indeed very effective common-pool resources to be governed by communities. Ostrom’s work was a direct answer to Hardin (1968) “tragedy of the commons” and opened the space for an alternative way of governance. Further, the work of Ostrom has defined a framework that should be taken into consideration in order to commons have a long-term sustainability. Thus, it is a matter of great importance those who use the common-pool resources to define certain limits. Additionally, it is necessary these rules to be in accordance with the local conditions. The community should contribute in the definition of the rules and to their alteration. Another issue is the application of the rules during the use of the common, and of course the existence of penalties in accordance to the type of the violation in parallel with mechanisms of solving the problems that may occur and lastly communities should invent their own institutions which should not be challenged from outsiders. (Ostrom 2002)

### *Social organization from below: commoning*

Nowadays, in the expanded bibliography is identified that the commons are everywhere, and the relationships that are produced during the struggles so as to defend the commons and the communities are the focus of much attention. Thus, through the commons we can enrich our struggles by reclaiming control of all the necessary means of reproduction and by creating new forms of cooperation far beyond the logic of the state and the markets. This procedure has already begun in many places all around the world, in our country, in our town, in our neighborhood: occupations of land, urban planting, squats and housing projects, social spaces, social markets and hospitals, self-management of factories, struggles for the protection of the environment, alternative ways of exchange, solidarity networks etc. (De Angelis 2013; Federici 2012; Fournier 2013; Gibson-Graham 2006b)

It seems that the extreme neoliberal measures -undertaken by all governments throughout these troubled years- have sparked a series of reactions that highlight the alternatives, by considering the potential of specific circumstances in time and space. The concept of reproduction is the centre of these struggles, in a way that not only social relations enter a field of experimentation, but also partial resistance could be converted into moments of “*collective reproduction and cooperation*”. (Federici 2012: 111) For a social reproduction to take place through the commons the starting point is our everyday life. (Federici 2012; Gibson-Graham 2006a; Gibson-Graham & Cameron & Healy 2013).

It seems reasonable to suggest that we should not conceive the commons exclusively as resources. By focusing on the resources, it is possible to ignore commoning, which constitute a network of social procedures that include the resources, but also the communities and all these practices and values that gives energy to the commons. (De Angelis 2013) Commoning emphasizes the practices, the efforts of being-together under a certain aim: to reproduce our life with dignity beyond the frames of the market and the state. Practicing the commons is a mode of organizing, a way to be with others while sharing, reserving and reproducing resources. Thus, the mode of our reproduction is reevaluated by focusing on different ethical values in order to “*eliminate the distances between the political and the personal*” (Federici, 2012: 147). In such a framework, the chosen case studies of Social Solidarity Clinic and Akivernites Politeies may highlight the importance of the commoning in the current conditions in Thessaloniki.

### **The health commons in Greece: Thessaloniki’s Social Solidarity Clinic**

In November 2011, the Social Solidarity Clinic (SSC) has opened its doors and since then it provides its services to all those in need of primary health care no matter what the profile of the patient is. Even if SSC is supposed to support those who are uninsured, its members take care of everyone who is in need. Thus, it is about an open community constantly expanded. But at the same time, as a member of the movement of universal and public health system, they press the state for free of charge health care for everyone in every level. SSC takes part in a broad alliance between the anti-racist and the anti-fascist movement and in an expanded network of solidarity movements as well. Some of the struggles they support are VIOME (an occupied factory in Thessaloniki), Odysseas (an alternative school for immigrants) and the struggle that the habitants of Chalkidiki give last years in order to protect themselves against the gold mining.

It is important to mention that SSC is the outcome of a struggle that some doctors gave in 2011 when they decided to look after almost 50 immigrants who did a hunger strike in Thessaloniki when a new law would prevent their access at public health system. After this, they understood that the need of primary health care in a country where the most of social benefits was gradually attacked was something more than necessary and urgent. The SSC was constituted by a broad social cooperation of an expanded community of volunteers: doctors, pharmacists and many medically unskilled citizens of Thessaloniki. The whole community of SSC supports the view that *"health is an indispensable and unnegotiated social good that must be provided freely to everyone"*. In its premises that was granted from Labor Center of Thessaloniki one can find dentists, psychiatrists, psychologists, orthopedists, pediatricians, pathologists, pharmacists, and many other specialties as there is also an expanded network of doctors and pharmacists and microbiologists, outside the SSC that support the patients.

But there are more reasons that make SSC politically important. Firstly, doctors are usually known as those in the top of the social hierarchy as their profession gives them an extra prestige and sometimes they thought to be enough distanced from the patient. But this philosophy is outmoded in SSC, as they exhort the patient to: *"make any questions you like about your health problem without any shame or obligation because as human being you have exactly the same rights as we do and because here you will be treated as a human being and not as a merchandise"*.

Secondly, they only accept financial support from anonymous people and they are against every transaction with the church, the EU, the state, the political parties, the market. As a matter of principle, they oppose every racist, fascist, authoritarian and hierarchical logic. SSC stands against the logic of philanthropy that conceals authority under the guise of help always from the top. Furthermore, SSC is politically important because of its self-organized character as it takes its decisions at the general assembly using direct democracy. In the general assembly, each one participate as a person. Additionally, each department operates its own assembly in order to daily issues be organized and to propose topics for the general assembly. But, there are also permanent committees and action groups which organize the events or implement the decisions of the assembly. They prefer the consensus, but sometimes they take decisions with the majority always with respect to the minority and such decisions is subjected to re-evaluation. Daily, the members of SSC experiment with the cooperation, the equality, the parity between them while defining the regulatory framework. Each member of SSC gives and takes and in such a way they maintain an active “factory” of producing the necessary tools to change the world. In its premises, the solidarity is equivalent with the relation- a coequal relation that includes a double responsibility: one to yourself and another to the other. SSC is a space of continual configuration in all the places that it happens: at assemblies, at struggles, at public space, at its medical departments.

Even though SSC's struggle started as a struggle to defend health as public good and its members does not make use of the commons' vocabulary they have managed to create a common. Clearly, SSC is an administrative system which preserve and expand the health in a community open to multiple significations. The struggles for the preservation and the expansion of health “under the rule” of a certain value system gives a different meaning to solidarity, equality, health care and finally human who is at the centre of this initiative.

### **The labor commons: Akivernites Politeies a social enterprise for the movement**

SSC is one of the commons that have emerged in Thessaloniki. Akivernites Politeies (AP) (Ungovernable States) can help us, further, explore the practices of commoning. AP is a bookstore, a coffee shop and a publisher at the centre of Thessaloniki which was created at October 2013 by five friends (Leuteris, Matina, Eliza, Christos and Lina). All of them had previous experience of the book sector, but they were forced to unemployment. Their initial motive is their love for the books and their desire not to abandon the work they love. Thus, they created a Social Cooperative Enterprise and they aspire to become a bookstore for the movement.

The cooperative aims in the fulfillment of some basic needs. Firstly, they have accomplished to create a space to house those writers and creators that are against the commercialization of the knowledge and away from the obsession of best-sellers. In a second place, they want to come up against the anti-labor and anti-social attack that was born by the crisis. They were enforced by the need to answer to the unemployment collectively. Their main target is a life with dignity, with decent salaries and contracts far away from the competition and the profit. For that reason, they are against the framework of waged labor. Every member is equal and the direct democracy is preferred to all the procedures of decision taking with the majority. Though concerning the issues that is defined in the articles of association is taken with increased majority.

In their effort to live differently, they promote the transparency, the publicity and the limit in the salaries that mean that they don't seek to be rich. They want to promote this model of operation in an effort to stay in the limits of the working class. The claims of the syndicate of the book sector are the maximum of their salaries. Furthermore, they support and they contribute to all the struggles and the strikes of the working class. Their political solidarity is proved by their financial and moral support of many social and labor struggles. For AP the idea of self-management is very important in the current conditions and they try to support other initiatives that are keen to a similar framework.

The AP is a social enterprise and in their discourse, they don't use the vocabulary of the commons, but the political dimension of this initiative and the way that they conceive the labor, as the way that they operate this small community with great influence in the field of alternative initiatives in Thessaloniki makes them a labor common worth researching further.

### **Conclusion**

So far, I have tried to give a small account of the commons and the commoning in a certain environment. Keeping always in mind that so the commons as the commoning cannot be fully defined, I approached the commons as multiple resources that in certain circumstances may become a means of social reproduction for the communities. The emerging practices, known as commoning, may preserve and expand the commons and the communities that defend them. For something like this it is necessary to invent or enrich certain values. Even if commoning is a mode of organization with multiple facets, its political significance is measured by the changes it succeeds in the everyday life of the communities. For me, the two initiatives, that were briefly presented, prove the political significance of commoning in an environment where our basic needs, our human rights and our dignity are sacrificed on the altar of profit.

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
**Eleonas of Athens: Genealogy of Crisis Phenomena and Urban Planning in the city 's backyard.**

**Abstract**

In such an area of multiple identities someone can observe different footprints of the crisis. In order to understand crisis effects, the research examines quantitative data related to the productive activities, enterprises, land and building use change, housing and the real estate market over the past few decades. The research also focuses on planning attempts for Eleonas, that have a long history. Interviews with key informants relevant to planning procedures for the area raised a number of issues and barriers. These matters can be grouped in three main categories. Making conclusion for districts with such a complex character as Eleonas needs a careful and multi level approach. General quotes always run the risk of flattening and stigmatization. And they usually cannot describe reality. So Eleonas is not in general “area in crisis”, “urban gap”, “no man’s land” as it has been characterized. Decline, though, is not causality. There are conditions for a different perspective. But the latter requires radical change of objectives, priorities and orientation of public spending.




## 1. Multiple identities of Eleonas today. The area's profile.



**Map 1.** Map of Athens of 1770 by Julien – David Le Roy (source: Atlas of Eleonas)

*Eleonas* (“olive grove” in Greek) used to be the holy olive tree plantation of ancient Athens. Today it occupies an area of almost 900 hectares just a few kilometers from the Acropolis. The area retained its agricultural character until the 2nd World War. After 1950 there was a rapid industrial development. Firstly a network of consumer industries concentrated along the axis of the metropolitan level highways. At the same time small industrial units set up adjacent to the elementary local street network. After 1950 there was a rapid industrial development. Firstly a network of consumer industries concentrated along the axis of the metropolitan level highways. At the same time small industrial units set up adjacent to the elementary local street network.



**Map 2.** Evolution of Eleonas over time (source: Atlas of Eleonas)

Since the mid 80's, the productive base of Eleonas was diminished. In 1984 the proportion between industrial and wholesaler units was 2,317 to 1,241 when at 2000 it was 980 to 1,560 (G.Boudouraki & A.Gitzias, 2008).

After 80's many factories were abandoned or re-located while maintaining their facilities in the area of Eleonas as storage centres and wholesale trade.

Today the predominant activity in the area is the road transport of goods. Many other economic activities interlinked with haulage companies developed. Car showrooms, car and truck repair services, wrecking yards, gas stations, car painters, car spare part suppliers. The recent process of transformation also involves the construction of metropolitan-scale shopping centres and entertainment parks as well as big office buildings - including the headquarters of Athens Stock Exchange. Amusement parks, multiplex movie theaters, the new IKEA furniture store, and large suburban-style supermarkets are also established.

According to pending plans a mosque, a crematorium and the new intercity bus terminal building are planned to be located in the area. The new Panathinaikos football stadium in combination with a greater regeneration programme has failed because of a combination of causes related to implementation matters and the financial crisis. In part of the area that was destined for regeneration, an extensive refugee camp was established in cooperation with the City of Athens and the Ministry of Interior - G.S. for Migration Policy (Ta nea 2012, Kathimerini 2017, Protothema 2016, SporFM 2017).

The development of recreational activities in central districts adjacent to Eleonas is also worth mentioning as well as major sites of archaeological interest. Special reference should be made to the numerous Christian churches which are still found in the area (Ropaitou-Tsapareli, 2006).


There are very few residential 'islets' in relation to the total size of the area (3.33%). There are 17 residential clusters consisting of different housing types.

Development did not include any provision for a proper street network and basic infrastructure. During the last 5 decades, the area has been a significant source of air pollution of two types, from fuel combustion for energy production and from industrial activities.


Nowadays *Eleonas* in many of its parts looks deprived and partially abandoned, it can be characterized as one of the city's "backyards" (Kathimerini 2012).



## 2. 1991-2011 Urban Change in Eleonas, a brief Panorama



**Map 3.** Location of Eleonas in Attica



**Map 4.** Eleonas area and road connections


## 2.1 Demographics

Significant conclusions from demographic data show that:

- Total population of Eleonas, based on Hellenic statistical authority (ELSTAT) data for the years 1991, 2001 and 2011, was 5.762 - 6.643 - 4.252 inhabitants. From 1991 to 2001 population grew by 881 (+ 15.3%) people, while from 2001 to 2011 it decreased by 2.391 (-36%).(see Index B, Table B1).
- Illiteracy levels have raised through the years from 9,1% to 12,9%, while on the same time much more people complete the 12year education instead of the 9year education. (see Index B, Table B2).
- On Citizenship numbers there is an important change relevant to the migratory flows in Greece. In 1991 a 97,4% of population of Eleonas is Greek compared to 83,7% in 2001 and 78,4% in 2011. The most popular different than Greek nationality in 2001 is Russian compared to Albanian in 2001 and Palistani in 2011 (see Index B, Table B3).
- Single member households have also raised from 16,6% in 1991 to 22,7% in 2011 (see Index B, Table B4).
- The number of inhabited dwellings has reduced by 10% from 2001 (88,1%) to 2011 (78%) (see Index B, Table B5).
- The number of dwelling without heating has risen dramatically from 17,8% in 2001 to 32,7% in 2011 (see Index B, Table B6).
- Building stock appears aged as the vast majority of buildings (80,8%) has been constructed between 1946-1980 (see Index B, Table B7).
- A 40% of households in 2011 does not have a car (see Index B, Table B8).
- A dramatic change is seen in the rates of job seekers from 11,6% in 1991 to 39,1% in 2011 (see Index B, Table B9).

## 2.2 Productive Sectors

In this section we present data primarily collected from the databases of the General Secretariat for Information Systems (GSIS) and Real Estate Market Analysis section of the Bank of Greece. Data were collected for the postcodes (10442, 10447, 11855, 12131, 12241, 12242, 17778, 18233) and refer to an area larger than the institutional boundaries of Eleonas. We call this area Greater Area of Eleonas.



**Map 5.** Purple: Eleonas area according to Presidential Decree 1995, yellow Greater Area of Eleonas - boundaries of the post code areas mentioned above.

(sources: GSIS, geodata, ENVECO)

	Total number of enterprises	Percentage change in total number of enterprises (national rate)	Legal Persons (national rate)	sum SA, Ltd., EU (national rate)	individual companies (national rate)
1991	20686	-	54,77% (39,76%)	17,78% (9,1%)	45,3% (60,29%)
2001	23669	12,6% (20%)	48,9% (34,1%)	17,67% (8,66%)	51,1% (66,04%)
2008	24335	2,74% (10,64%)	50,4% (35,52%)	18,85% (9,34%)	49,61% (64,67%)
2011	23920	-1,7% (-0,68%)	52,15% (36,98%)	19,86% (9,91%)	47,87% (63,17%)

**Table 1.** Enterprises in Greater Area of Eleonas (yellow on map).

For the years 1991, 2001, 2008, 2011 we gathered the number of enterprises according to the activity code numbers of the GSIS. The information was organised into 53 categories for the results we mention below.

All the categories of activities exhibit uniform upward trend from 1991 to 2001, (except railways). Businesses in all sectors are rising greatly in the last decade of the 20th century (GSIS, FEIR 2005). From 2001 to 2011 there are different trends in the number of firms.

A number of branches of the secondary sector were declining before the outbreak of the crisis and the decline continued during the period 2008-2011. (textiles - clothing - footwear, woodwork - wickerwork, prints - bookbinding, production of various chemicals, production of plastics, glass, ceramics production, production of non- structural metal products, metal production and metal products, manufacture of electrical machinery, furniture construction, other manufacturing). Other types of activities were increasing until 2008 and then showed a significant reduction (production of food and drinks, activities related to the manufacture, trade related to motor vehicles, wholesale and retail trade, transport and supporting activities, accommodation, cinema - radio - television, engineering activities and related occupations, support activities of the tertiary sector, public administration, public education except higher education - artistic creation, gambling). Smaller decrease was recorded in the sectors of manufacturing of electronic systems and components, equipment repairs, activities related to computers, information - advertising, financial and accounting services - insurance - real estate, research - higher education, health - medical professions, social care and personal services .

Stable remain industries in the primary sector, mining - extraction, paper, waste management and offshore organizations and agencies.

There is an increasing trend in production / supply of electricity, steam and water, TAXI services, postal services, publishing of printed products, hospital activities, sports, theme parks - fun - entertainment, other organizations (employers, political, trade union, etc.).

InfoBank Hellas Stat (IBHS) - "i-mentor" database also provides with business data. For the year 2014 for the same area based on postcodes (Greater Area of Eleonas) includes 2666 companies. 187 (7%) are individual enterprises, 1206 (45%)

are SAs, 409 (15%) are LTDs and (24%) 652 limited and general partnerships , while the rest (9%) refer to other forms.

For 1213 of them, we know the number of employees, which corresponds to 42959 employees (who do not work in Eleonas as a whole, since many of them are counted in Elaionas because their headquarters are there, but the number of employees refers to all their branches). It is though a significant crowd, as it corresponds to only 1213 of the 22,366 businesses that existed based on the area according to GSIS data for 2011.

Even if we count 2-3 people on average for 20,000 companies, the total approaches 50,000 employees. According to data of the Ministry of Environment in the 1980s 70.000 people had their jobs in Eleonas.

Turnover data for 783 out of 2666 businesses in 2014 sum up the amount of 9,432,040,538 euros. This amount refers to very large companies and concerns their activity at national level. It is also significant share of the market.

Data for the year of establishment of a total of 2355 still existing companies show that there were 51 companies established between 1900-1959, 32 between 1960-1966, 75 between 1967-1973, 91 between 1975-1979, 137 1980-1984, 247 between 1985-1989, 303 between 1990-1994, 371 between 1995-1999, 650 between 2000 and 2008, 398 between 2008 and 2016.

Spatial distribution per municipality show that 587 companies are headquartered in Rentis, 315 in Peristeri, 466 in Egaleo, 841 in Athens and 456 in Tavros.

Combining criteria for both municipality and productive sectors we can see:

**Manufacture** 631 (23%) companies, 156 in Rentis, 69 in Peristeri, 87 in Egaleo, 196 in Athens and 123 in Tavros.

**Wholesale** 990 (37%) companies, 268 in Rentis, 104 in Peristeri, 123 on Egaleo, 298 in Athens and 192 in Tavros.

**Construction** 272 (10%) companies, 32 in rentis, 49 in Peristeri, 60 in Egaleo, 108 in Athens and 23 in Tavros.

**Retail** 236 (8.85%) companies, 34 in Rentis, 35 in Peristeri, 74 in Egaleo, 57 in Athens and 36 in Tavros.

**Transporting and Storage** 126 (4,73%) companies, 32 in Rentis, 9 in Peristeri, 32 in Egaleo, 40 in Athens and 13 in tavros.

**Finance, Insurance, Real Estate** 103 (3,86%) companies, 17 in Rentis, 10 in Peristeri, 20 in Egaleo, 40 in Athens and 16 in Tavros.


There are also remarkable findings for some sub-sectors. These are number of companies in **printing** (60), **Paper industry** (27), **Food and beverage industry** (66), **Textile industry and clothing** (61), **Leather and Footwear industry** (47), **Car trading** (59), **Publishing** (23), **Radio, television, cinema** (13), **Information technology** (19), **Advertising and research market** (25), 7 **Entertainment - theme parks** (6 out of 7 in Rentis).

The following maps (6-7) show a total picture of spatial distribution of these enterprises, while maps A1-A11 in Index A give detailed information.









**Map 7:** Businesses on 1995 land use map

### *2.3 Real estate market in Greece during the crisis, Elements for Eleonas*

During the global crisis property market has played a special role. In contradiction to what happened in other countries the roots of the crisis in Greece are not detected in the real estate market and the financial system, sectors which are victims of recession and not the cause. (Sampaniotis & Hardouvelis, 2012).

The dramatic decline in construction investment is indicative of the depressed real estate market. The latter is in recession since 2008 and medium-term expectations remain negative. The Bank of Greece Governor's Annual Report for 2012 notices "The substantial increase in the tax burden on real estate in the past few years and, above all, the unstable economic environment of the country, as well as restricted bank financing, have had a significant impact on the Greek real estate market" (Bank of Greece, 2013).

The real estate market contributed significantly to the high rates of economic growth presented by the Greek economy for many years (Benos, Karagiannis & Vlamis, 2011; Vlamis, 2012). Changes in property prices, rents and mortgage rates affect aggregate demand and inflation and therefore play an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and economic trends (Mitrakos & Akantziliotou, 2012).

In commercial real estate the downward trend continued in 2012 accompanied by downward pressure on rents especially for properties in the city center, warehouses and office buildings. During the crisis transfers have been reduced, while properties offered for sale or lease have increased. Moreover, restricted financing, coupled with the overall uncertainty about the economic environment, fuel the relative reluctance to develop new investment plans" (Bank of Greece, 2013).

In the Greater Area of Eleonas, according to the Bank of Greece, data for apartments and houses reveal sharp decline in the number of transfers and sales, which was initiated as follows: In 2007 there were 982 transfers, 778 in 2008, 514 in 2009, 520 in 2010, 273 in 2011 and 189 in 2012. The average price per square meter for the same years declined between 2010 and 2012. Specifically, the price was as follows: 1774, 4€ in 2007, 1821,1€ in 2008, 1886,6€ in 2009, 1786,1€ in 2010, 1612,5€ 2011 and 1323,9€ 2012. Based on the data of the BoG the situation in commercial real estate which is dominant in Eleonas is worse.


### **3. Urban Planning Failure, typology of barriers**

Planning attempts for Eleonas have a long history. From 1954 until 1985 studies, laws and decrees had no result. The strategy plan of Athens in 1985 prescribed 70% land use of manufacture and industry, 18% residential – mixed uses, and other special uses (ORSA, 1996). The first city planning project for Eleonas began in 1984 and concluded in 1991 leading to a Presidential Decree (Official gazette No 74/d/1991). The latter was never enacted due to the disagreement of the municipal authorities and other institutions. The revision of the 1991 plan by a research group of the Organization of Athens and a research group of the National Technical University of Athens finally concluded to a new Presidential Decree in 1995 (Official gazette No 1049/d/1995). This decree with some newer amendments

constitutes the statutory framework for Eleonas until today. In fact until 1995, the region was developed without regulation.

Interviews with key informants relevant to planning procedures (interviews 2012-2013) for the area raised a number of issues and barriers. These matters can be grouped in three main categories: A. Governance and management weaknesses, B. issues relevant to the implementation of the plans and there is rare reference to C. strategic matters.

**A.** Eleonas is administratively divided into five parts. The division of the area into five distinct municipal domains raised contradictions and disagreements about appropriate policies and the future of Eleonas as a whole. (Sapountzaki & Wassenhoven, 2003). Furthermore there was a lack of coordination between industry policies and spatial regulations. There were examples of corporations which invented enormous amounts of money with the permission of the Ministry of Industry in out-of-plan areas, which were later characterized as residential or green areas.



**Map 8.** Administrative Division of Eleonas

The 1995 plan reported that “the creation of a development corporation is considered a precondition for the implementation of the plan”. A corporation was



finally formed in 2002, the board of which was finally appointed by the government only in 2010 and it is inactive until now. The main reasons for the failing in founding a corporation with enough power to control the implementation of a plan was the strong resistance on behalf of the municipalities against the idea of delegating authorities to another organization. But this was not the only reason. According to the international experience – even in the cases where the “market flag” was triumphantly waving investment of the state in infrastructure was never missing.

What happens in Eleonas is indicative of how the Greek state works. It declares to be extremely intrusive and finally the "hand of the market" finds here the warmest nest. With elaborate legislation everything is allowed and everything is prohibited and in this context land speculation is being reinforced. The lack of a single management structure contributes to this game and makes it even more complicated.

According to Greek legislation the application of any town plan is implemented through an “Implementation Act”. In Eleonas instead of one implementation act for the whole area, each municipality carried out its own, resulting to the non-accomplishment of implementation acts for a big part of the area. Small-scale, i.e. ‘lot by lot’ implementation acts followed the 1995-96 new legislation. The implementation acts at municipal scale were “frozen” for many years mainly, because of lack of financing.

**B.** This partial implementation and the collection of economic contributions by separate administrations led to the inability to implement large public areas especially in the Municipality of Athens. As time was passing by contributions were even more difficult to calculate for many owners and heirs. Additionally after eight years there were owners who were exercising their legitimate right to request removal of expropriation due to non-implementation of the plan. Under these circumstances the implementation for the whole area of 900 hectares was unable to complete. Partial implementation also affected the land prices, which were getting higher and this was a second relevant problem. In this area the properties are very big and include extensive building surfaces leading to exorbitant amounts for both contributions and expropriations. For example the amount of the contributions for the PITSOS industry property (for electrical appliances) are equal to the necessary amount in order to build a factory in Russia. As a result the company decided to sell its property in order to transfer its developments somewhere else in Attica. And because of that it was pushing the change of the land use from industrial to commercial in order to achieve higher profit.

That was how the situation was before the discussion for the newer “double regeneration project”. The first law concerning this project passed in 2006 and it was later rejected by the Council of the State. During the last few months a new one was approved. In the meantime the relevant construction company bankrupted due to sizeable borrowing. The loans were to be paid by rents from pre-existing office space that the company owned and the new buildings in Eleonas as well. Due to the crisis, many tenants requested rent reductions or emptied the commercial properties, large estates owned by the company passed to the banks, while the implementation of the project in Eleonas was “frozen”.

These initially specific implementation difficulties described above are converted in key shortcomings of planning and in conjunction with a number of other strategic weaknesses create the framework of institutional failure that is associated with the crisis of space. The delay in implementing makes an untimely project and its

valuation almost impossible. But it is more than that. It is not so simple, it is not a matter of having good plans and bad implementation.

C. The decade between the 1995 plan and the first law for the “double regeneration project” in 2006 is crucial and also indicative of planning strategic weaknesses.

The sweeping change in development direction that accompanied the Olympic Games and the EMU integration (large road projects, transfer of the national airport, siting of Olympic projects, etc.) led to an increase in economic sizes grounded in construction and trade without creating conditions that will lead to innovative restructuring of production activities. The Strategic Plan for Athens in 1985 adopted an orientation to "halt the expansion of economic activities and redirect investment to the periphery." Therefore, a partial programming framework was created or even worse there was a total lack of programming which often strengthened the abandonment and stigmatisation of central areas and led to urban sprawl.

The Olympic Games 2004 policies did not predict any project in the area of Eleonas. It is not a coincidence that during the Olympic Games Eleonas was literally transformed into the backyard of Athens. Cars, debris, and all the useless were transferred there. It is a question though if this was just wrong planning or a logical consequence of how priorities of the city are evaluated and who do they concern. In any case, the problems of this area were found in backseat.

Eleonas became the battlefield where different aspects came into collision. Opposing estimates about the future industrial activity, the relocation or not of the remaining activities, dilemmas concerning the priority of the real estate market or that of forwarding an integral state planning, the conditions of a successful combination of them, the boundaries, scale and type of policies needed etc (NTUA, 1995).

Planning was not able to understand the complexity of Eleonas. It is not just about regulating land uses on a map. The 1995 plan “was a compromising solution, which regulates land uses, but does not solve the problems [...] Its role is passive and limited to land use control, if and when the appropriate private interest is manifested”. On the other hand, sometimes contradictions between urban design theory and practice are reduced in times of regional instability and social unrest. Urban design becomes more successful when the capitalist urbanization faces great difficulties. Difficulties have a direct impact on the lives of the working class and the new conditions include the risk of developing uncontrolled class conflicts and social unrest. Under such a threat the capitalist state forwards reforms in the urban space. Within these periods the most significant reform legislations have passed for the development of urban space but also the most essential control systems have been enabled.

### 3. Conclusion

Making conclusion for districts with such a complex character as Eleonas needs a careful and multi level approach. General quotes always run the risk of flattening and stigmatization. And they usually cannot describe reality. So Eleonas is not in general “area in crisis”, “urban gap”, “no man’s land” as it has been characterized. The devil in this case is really in the detail.

As I showed productive activities do not appear to have common trends and uniform characteristics. Some of them decline, but there are sectors that exhibit resistance or increasing trends even during the crisis period. Genealogy of crisis phenomena is related to the choice of gathering all the “undesirable” activities in one place, where it is the backyard of the city. This choice reinforces important spatial inequalities and conditions of sufficiently serious environmental degradation. Planning suffers from strategic weaknesses. Improving residential and working conditions for the people was not a priority. “Developmental mutation” of Athens had other priorities.

Planning couldn’t have solved social inequalities, but it could have differently handle spatial inequalities by alternative allocations of positive and negative in the city. Under these circumstances planning became a part of the problem. It was not about good plans badly implemented. A multi coloured duvet – land use plan was made and underneath there is a different reality. Decline, though, is not causality. There are conditions for a different perspective. But the latter requires radical change of objectives, priorities and orientation of public spending.

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
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







A2. Wholesale






A3. Transporting and Storage





A4. Construction






A5. Retail






A6. Finance - Insurance - Real Estate






A7. Manufacture: Textile and Clothing




A8. Manufacture: Food and beverage industry






A9. Manufacture: chemicals, plastics, metals



A10. Manufacture: Printing Industry





A11. Manufacture: Paper Industry

## Index B. Tables - Demographics

### B1. Census 1991-2001-2011

	1991	2001	2011	1991-2001 change %	2001-2011 change %
Athens	629	1037	343	+ 64,9%	- 66,9%
Tavros	771	700	547	+ 9,2%	- 21,9%
Egaleo	707	638	553	- 9,75%	- 13,32%
Peristeri	28	131	25	+ 367,9 %	- 80,9%
Rentis	3627	4137	2784	+ 14,1%	- 32,7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5762</b>	<b>6643</b>	<b>4252</b>	<b>+ 15,3%</b>	<b>- 36%</b>

1991	Males	Females
Athens	322	307
Tavros	371	400
Egaleo	351	356
Peristeri	13	15
Rentis	1740	1887
<b>Σύνολο</b>	<b>2797</b>	<b>2965</b>
2001	Males	Females
Athens	548	489
Tavros	380	320
Egaleo	317	321
Peristeri	71	60
Rentis	2146	1991
<b>Σύνολο</b>	<b>3462</b>	<b>3181</b>
2011	Males	Females
Athens	207	136
Tavros	289	258
Egaleo	275	278
Peristeri	18	7
Rentis	1466	1318
<b>Total</b>	<b>2255</b>	<b>1997</b>



## B2. Education level

1991	Phd, Master's, University Degree	Bachelo r's	Stude nts	high school diplom a (12y educati on)	high school diplom a (9y educati on)	Abandoned compulsory education	Illiterate	Under 10 years old
Athens	10	9	5	81	52	340	66	66
Tavros	11	2	6	127	87	368	72	98
Egaleo	7	1	8	111	74	379	66	61
Peristeri	1	1	0	5	5	9	3	4
Rentis	52	28	51	605	350	1833	315	393
<b>Total</b>	<b>81 (1,4%)</b>	<b>41 (0,7%)</b>	<b>70 (1,2 %)</b>	<b>929 (16,1% )</b>	<b>568 (9,9%)</b>	<b>2929 (50,8%)</b>	<b>522 (9,1%)</b>	<b>622 (10,8%)</b>
2001	Phd, Master's, University Degree	Bachelo r's	Stude nts	high school diplom a (12y educati on)	high school diplom a (9y educati on)	Abandoned compulsory education	Illiterate	Primary school students
Athens	99	71		305	104	332	70	56
Tavros	19	31		193	86	243	90	38
Egaleo	17	32		162	82	277	36	32
Peristeri	17	8		28	13	43	12	10
Rentis	112	162		982	576	1619	468	218
<b>Total</b>	<b>264 (4%)</b>	<b>304 (4,6%)</b>	<b>(--%)</b>	<b>1670 (25,1% )</b>	<b>861 (13%)</b>	<b>2514 (37,8%)</b>	<b>676 (10,2%)</b>	<b>354 (5,3%)</b>
2011	Phd, Master's, University Degree	Bachelo r's	Stude nts	high school diplom a (12y educati on)	high school diplom a (9y educati on)	Abandoned compulsory education	Illiterate	Born after 2005
Athens	31	8		70	1 (x)	6	58	17
Tavros	23	42		158	77	162	58	25
Egaleo	27	44		142	66	206	18	29
Peristeri	0	0		6	1 (x)	6	5	6
Rentis	103	172		697	413	855	409	132
<b>Total</b>	<b>184 (4,3%)</b>	<b>266 (6,3%)</b>	<b>(--%)</b>	<b>1073 (25,2% )</b>	<b>558 (13,1% )</b>	<b>1235 (29%)</b>	<b>548 (12,9%)</b>	<b>209 (4,9%)</b>

For the calculation it was assumed that X = 1, because of that the sum up is not always equal to 100%.

### B3. Citizenship 1991-2001-2011

1991	Total Population	Greek	Number of other nationalities	1st most populous other citizenship	2nd most populous other citizenship	3d most populous other citizenship
Athens	629	610	5	Pakistan	Iran	-
Tavros	771	762	3	Russia	Albania	-
Egaleo	707	700	1	Iraq	-	-
Peristeri	28	28	0	-	-	-
Rentis	3627	3513	12	Russia	Iraq	Turkey
<b>Total</b>	<b>5762</b>	<b>5613</b> (97,4%)		<b>Russia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>
2001	Total Population	Greek	Number of other nationalities	1st most populous other citizenship	2nd most populous other citizenship	3d most populous other citizenship
Athens	1037	893	18	Albania	Pakistan	Ukraine
Tavros	700	595	11	Albania	Bagladesh	India
Egaleo	638	583	10	Romania	Albania	-
Peristeri	131	121	3	Iraq	Albania	USA
Rentis	4137	3369	29	Albania	Pakistan	India
<b>Total</b>	<b>6643</b>	<b>5561</b> (83,7%)		<b>Albania</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>India</b>
2011	Total Population	Greek	Number of other nationalities	1st most populous other citizenship	2nd most populous other citizenship	3d most populous other citizenship
Athens	343	234	7	Pakistan	Albania	-
Tavros	547	476	10	Albania	India	Bagladesh
Egaleo	553	473	9	Albania	Pakistan	-
Peristeri	25	17	2	-	-	-
Rentis	2784	2134	27	Pakistan	Albania	India
<b>Total</b>	<b>4252</b>	<b>3334</b> (78,4%)		<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>India</b>

For the calculation it was assumed that X = 1

The symbol (-) means that the crowd is not rated as significant.

#### B4. Households size 1991-2001-2011

1991	Number of households	Single member	2-4 members	5-6 members +
Athens	224	53	152	19
Tavros	251	37	180	34
Egaleo	245	45	176	24
Peristeri	10	1	9	0
Rentis	1214	186	903	125
<b>Total</b>	<b>1944</b>	<b>322 (16,6%)</b>	<b>1420 (73%)</b>	<b>202 (10,4%)</b>
2001	Number of households	Single member	2-4 members	5-6 members +
Athens	448	112	299	37
Tavros	290	54	205	31
Egaleo	245	69	154	22
Peristeri	39	6	28	5
Rentis	1459	307	990	162
<b>Total</b>	<b>2481</b>	<b>548 (22%)</b>	<b>1676 (67,6%)</b>	<b>257 (10,4%)</b>
2011	Number of households	Single member	2-4 members	5-6 members +
Athens	123	1	73	2
Tavros	203	45	139	19
Egaleo	217	53	147	17
Peristeri	6	1	3	2
Rentis	1014	255	660	99
<b>Total</b>	<b>1563</b>	<b>355 (22,7%)</b>	<b>1022 (65,4%)</b>	<b>139 (8,9%)</b>

For the calculation it was assumed that  $X = 1$ , because of that the sum up is not always equal to 100%.

B5. Type of habitation and ownership 1991-2001-2011

1991	Number of dwellings	Inhabited	Tenants	Owners
Athens	292	216	72	131
Tavros	280	246	58	166
Egaleo	305	242	32	196
Peristeri	16	9	2	7
Rentis	1524	1188	221	885
<b>Total</b>	<b>2417</b>	<b>1901 (78,7%)</b>	<b>385 (20,3%)</b>	<b>1385 (72,9%)</b>
2001	Number of dwellings	Inhabited	Tenants	Owners
Athens	477	355	110	227
Tavros	310	233	67	147
Egaleo	309	236	36	179
Peristeri	49	39	7	32
Rentis	1582	1539	319	933
<b>Total</b>	<b>2727</b>	<b>2402 (88,1%)</b>	<b>539 (22,4%)</b>	<b>1518 (63,2%)</b>
2011	Number of dwellings	Inhabited	Tenants	Owners
Athens	202	44	42	X (1)
Tavros	255	201	39	161
Egaleo	295	186	X (1)	162
Peristeri	10	3	X (1)	X (1)
Rentis	1347	1212	249	699
<b>Total</b>	<b>2109</b>	<b>1646 (78%)</b>	<b>332 (20,2%)</b>	<b>1024 (62,2%)</b>

B6. Home comforts 1991-2001-2011

1991	Number of dwellings	Without heating	Other kind of heating	External / without wc
Athens	294	42	171	21
Tavros	280	20	159	7
Egaleo	305	267	21	11
Peristeri	16	0	11	1
Rentis	1524	148	1105	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>2419</b>	<b>477 (19,7%)</b>	<b>1467 (60,6%)</b>	<b>97</b>
2001	Number of dwellings	Without heating	Other kind of heating	External / without wc
Athens	478	52	110	21
Tavros	311	47	111	17
Egaleo	309	80	222	15
Peristeri	49	0	12	0
Rentis	1593	310	956	78
<b>Total</b>	<b>2740</b>	<b>489 (17,8%)</b>	<b>1411 (51,5%)</b>	<b>131</b>
2011	Number of dwellings	Without heating	Other kind of heating	External / without wc
Athens	202	102	X (1)	2
Tavros	255	x	71	8
Egaleo	295	69	158	0
Peristeri	13	x	X	2
Rentis	1350	519	312	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>2115</b>	<b>692 (32,7%)</b>	<b>543 (25,7%)</b>	<b>29</b>

B7. Period of housing construction 1991-2001-2011

1991	Number of dwellings	Before 1945	1946 - 1980	1981+	
Athens	292	28	242	22	
Tavros	280	26	244	10	
Egaleo	305	2	301	2	
Peristeri	16	1	15	0	
Rentis	1524	58	1426	40	
<b>Total</b>	<b>2417</b>	<b>115 (4,8%)</b>	<b>2228 (92,2%)</b>	<b>74 (3.1%)</b>	
2001	Number of dwellings	Before 1945	1946 - 1980	1981+	
Athens	477	27	341	97	
Tavros	310	12	268	9	
Egaleo	309	12	297	0	
Peristeri	49	0	36	2	
Rentis	1582	83	1435	27	
<b>Total</b>	<b>2727</b>	<b>134 (4,9%)</b>	<b>2377 (87,2%)</b>	<b>135 (4,95%)</b>	
2011	Number of dwellings	Before 1945	1946 - 1980	1981-2000	2001+
Athens	202	36	155	1	1
Tavros	255	9	119	37	12
Egaleo	295	5	285	1	1
Peristeri	10	0	2	0	1
Rentis	1347	31	1144	71	112
<b>Total</b>	<b>2109</b>	<b>81 (3,8%)</b>	<b>1705 (80,8%)</b>	<b>110 (5,2%)</b>	<b>127 (6,3%)</b>

B8. Cars per household 2011

2011	Number of households	No car	1 car	2 cars	3+ cars
Athens	123	58	48	14	3
Tavros	203	70	92	33	8
Egaleo	217	90	98	24	5
Peristeri	6	3	3	0	0
Rentis	1014	405	486	101	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>1563</b>	<b>626 (40,1%)</b>	<b>727 (46,5%)</b>	<b>172 (11%)</b>	<b>38 (2,4%)</b>

B9. Gender and employment status 1991-2001-2011

1991	population	working	Looking for job	Working (males)	Working (females)	Looking for job (males)	Looking for job (females)
Athens	629	232	29	167	65	18	11
Tavros	771	257	21	180	77	14	7
Egaleo	707	226	18	160	66	15	3
Peristeri	28	8	1	5	3	1	0
Rentis	3627	1094	141	779	315	80	61
<b>Total</b>	<b>5762</b>	<b>1817</b>	<b>210 (11,6%)</b>	<b>1291</b>	<b>526</b>	<b>128 (9,9%)</b>	<b>82 (15,6%)</b>
2001	population	working	Looking for job	Working (males)	Working (females)	Looking for job (males)	Looking for job (females)
Athens	1037	450	57	297	153	24	33
Tavros	700	294	40	217	77	18	22
Egaleo	638	246	61	167	79	30	31
Peristeri	131	49	6	35	14	3	3
Rentis	4137	1653	172	1205	448	99	73
<b>Total</b>	<b>6643</b>	<b>2692</b>	<b>336 (12,5%)</b>	<b>1921</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>174 (9,1%)</b>	<b>162 (21%)</b>
2011	population	working	Looking for job	Working (males)	Working (females)	Looking for job (males)	Looking for job (females)
Athens	343	116	54	94	22	40	14
Tavros	547	187	48	114	73	46	2
Egaleo	553	175	61	114	61	35	26
Peristeri	25	11	2	11	0	2	0
Rentis	2784	920	386	640	280	260	126
<b>Total</b>	<b>4252</b>	<b>1409</b>	<b>551 (39,1%)</b>	<b>973</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>383 (39,4%)</b>	<b>168 (38,5%)</b>



B10. Professional Position 1991-2001-2011

1991	Employed	Employers	Self-employed	Salaried - hired
Athens	232	25	33	165
Tavros	257	24	41	177
Egaleo	226	6	27	192
Peristeri	8	6	0	2
Rentis	1094	50	168	851
<b>Total</b>	<b>1817</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>1387 (76,3%)</b>
2001	Employed	Employers	Self-employed	Salaried - hired
Athens	450	34	39	375
Tavros	294	38	20	231
Egaleo	246	19	11	215
Peristeri	49	5	5	39
Rentis	1653	93	132	1417
<b>Total</b>	<b>2692</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>2277 (84,6%)</b>
2011	Employed	Employers	Self-employed	Salaried - hired
Athens	116	5	3	62
Tavros	187	1	33	135
Egaleo	175	7	16	151
Peristeri	11	0	7	4
Rentis	920	38	87	776
<b>Total</b>	<b>1409</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>1128 (80,1%)</b>