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**Youth and Politics in Protracted Conflicts:
a comparative approach on hope for a settlement
and return of IDPs**

Project Report

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University of Cyprus

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Executive Summary

The study and its main findings

A representative sample telephone survey with 536 Greek Cypriots and 550 Turkish Cypriots was completed in the period 22/07/2020--12/08 2020 in the Greek Cypriot community (by the University Centre for Field Studies) and 07/12 / 2020-06 / 01/2021 in the Turkish Cypriot community by LIPA Consultancy Ltd. The method followed was random sampling. The margin of error was 4% with a confidence level of 95%. Post stratification weights were applied by district, urbanisation, gender and age group to reflect the exact demographic structure of the two communities.

The questionnaire was designed by an interdisciplinary research team:

- Charis Psaltis (Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus)
- Eran Halperin (Psychology Department, The Hebrew University)
- Neophytos Loizides (School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent)
- Djordje Stefanovic (School of Social Sciences, University of Adelaide)
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Keywords: Cyprus Problem, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Bizonal Bicomunal Federation, Peace Building

“Despite widespread disappointment the wish for peace and solution on the basis of a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation is expressed by a clear majority in both communities”

Main Findings

Despite widespread disappointment in both communities manifesting itself in low expectations for a positive outcome in the peace process there is nevertheless an overwhelming majority in both communities that wish for peace, for solution of the Cyprus problem, for specific trade-offs between political equality for Turkish Cypriots and security arrangements for Greek Cypriots that safeguard from the influence of Turkey and for a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation. The divergence between wishes and expectations for peace is a common feature of conflict, post-conflict and frozen conflict settings with a history of repeated past failures to resolve the problem. In this report we also produce evidence of similar findings in Israel and Palestine. For instance, in the case of Northern Ireland a BBC poll few weeks before the Good Friday Agreement showed that only 13 percent of the people in the province believed that the negotiations will reach an agreement by May. The poll was released on March 4th while the agreement was made in April 10, 1998 about two months later.

For the Greek Cypriot community, the findings about a clear majority who wishes for a BBF come to add support to a trend observed after the Crans Montana period of increasing rejection of the status quo and a two-state solution and an increasing support for BBF and a Unitary state. For the Turkish Cypriot community lower levels of wish for peace are observed compared to Greek Cypriots but support for BBF and support for peace building activities is still high and equal to that observed in the Greek Cypriot community, despite recent increasing support for keeping the status quo and a two-state solution in the post Crans Montana period. Despite the recent change of leadership in the Turkish Cypriot community and public statements supporting a two-state solution the present findings suggest that the majority of the Turkish Cypriot community and about 50% of Ersin Tatar voters still wish for Bizonal Bicomunal Federation.

The views of the youth (18-35) differ in various ways to the views of older people albeit in different ways in the two communities. The Greek Cypriot youth, but also middle age participants, are less supportive of peace and peace building activities compared to the 55+. They are also less supportive of BBF but importantly, this seems to be related to weaknesses in the educational system in familiarizing them with the concept of federation than the result of prejudiced views towards Turkish Cypriots since their feelings towards Turkish Cypriots are mostly neutral and at similar levels to older age groups. They are also characterized by lower adherence to a negative “ethos” of conflict and less negative feelings

towards Turks from Turkey compared to the other two age groups which is a hopeful sign for the future as it suggests that the youth are slowly overcoming prejudice towards Turkish people from Turkey and is generally open to listening and finding out about the other community if given the opportunity even if in their majority they are not engaged in bicomunal contacts today.

The Turkish Cypriot youth also differs in significant ways from older Turkish Cypriots. Again, younger people along with middle aged people are less likely to wish for peace and support peace building activities compared to the 55+. Nevertheless, this is again not because of more prejudiced feelings towards Greek Cypriots. On the contrary, there is a negative correlation between age and prejudice towards Greek Cypriots and Greeks with younger participants being less prejudiced compared to both of these groups. They also have the lower levels of adherence to a negative “ethos” of conflict compared to both middle aged and 55+ and this could at least partly be attributed to their higher levels of contact of the youth with Greek Cypriots.

All in all, the above age comparisons suggest that education in the recent years started playing a more positive role by avoiding negative indoctrination towards the other community but has at the same time not actively pursued a reconciliation and reunification agenda (with the exception of some isolated initiatives taken by the Bicomunal Technical Committee of Education) since 2016. This is probably due to the continuing ethnocentric character of education in both communities and the internalized feeling of one sided victimization, which still holds for many of the youth, cultivated mainly through history teaching, that is unreflective of mistakes committed by their own community in the past. Another reason for this is the generally very low participation of youth in political events or civil society organization interested in the Cyprus issue. In the case of Greek Cypriots this is a particular characteristic of younger people who do not have the experience of past cohabitation with Turkish Cypriots and in the case of Turkish Cypriots it is a widespread finding across all age groups which is probably due to the opposing master narrative about return intentions for IDPs in the two communities.

Indeed, return intentions of IDPs in both communities are significantly different. Despite the diminishing percentage of Greek Cypriot IDP’s who would like to return in case of a solution to the Cyprus problem in the last years (as they are mostly older people, first generation IDPs) there is still

about 46% of Greek Cypriot IDPs that would like to return under Greek Cypriot administration and around 15% who would be willing to return under Turkish Cypriot administration in case of a solution. Major reasons for not return for Greek Cypriots are security concerns (in the case of return under Turkish Cypriot administration) and integration in their new home setting but less often it is the absence of emotional bond with their original home. Importantly, the present findings show for the first time a clear pattern of Turkish Cypriot IDP's exhibiting better quality of intergroup relations with Greek Cypriots and more support for BBF.

Some important findings in numbers

- 85.5% of Greek Cypriots and 67% of Turkish Cypriots wish for Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that assures political equality for Turkish Cypriots and assures security for Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence
 - 66.5% of Greek Cypriots and 63.6% of Turkish Cypriots wish for a mutually agreed upon accord that will result in a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation
 - A majority in both communities feel generally hopeless when thinking about the Cyprus problem. In the youth age group (18-35) 60.5% of Greek Cypriots and 58.5% of Turkish Cypriot) feel hopeless. In older age group the gap widens with older Turkish Cypriots being more optimistic and older Greek Cypriots being the more hopeless of all groups. In the middle age group (36-54) 69.7% of Greek Cypriots and 61.5% of Turkish Cypriot) feel hopeless. In the older age group (55+) 72.2% of Greek Cypriots and 51.9% of Turkish Cypriots feel generally hopeless.
 - A majority of Greek Cypriots (but not Turkish Cypriots) feel insecure when thinking about the future of Cyprus. In the youth age group (18-35) about 50% of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot feel generally insecure. In older age group the gap widens in opposite directions with older Turkish Cypriots feeling generally more secure and older Greek Cypriots feeling more insecure. In the middle age group (36-54) around 58% of Greek Cypriots and 44% of Turkish Cypriots feel afraid when thinking about the future of Cyprus. In the older age group (55+) 63% of Greek Cypriots and 34% of Turkish Cypriots feel generally insecure about the future of Cyprus. This probably due to the historical experience of the older generation who lived through the events of 63-64 and 74 where Turkey's involvement is a source of security for Turkish Cypriots but insecurity for Greek Cypriots.
- Attendance in informational meetings to discuss the Cyprus problem is positively correlated with age in both communities. Older people are more likely to attend these meetings compared to younger people and this relationship is stronger in the Greek Cypriot community. About 36% of Greek Cypriot youth (18-35) and 20% of Turkish Cypriot youth (18-35) attend such events. In the middle age group (36-54) 52% of Greek Cypriots and 22% of Turkish Cypriots attend such events and in the older age group (55+) 66% of Greek Cypriots and 27% of Turkish Cypriots attend these events.
- Contact between members of the two communities during the pandemic has mostly transferred on social media platforms. We find that 41% of Turkish Cypriot youth (18-35) state that they come in contact with Greek Cypriots over Facebook at least once a month. However, the corresponding percentage for Greek Cypriot youth is low around 8%. Around 30% of Middle-aged Turkish Cypriots and 28 of older Turkish Cypriots also have contact with Greek Cypriots at least once. The corresponding percentages for Greek Cypriots are 9% and 15% respectively. Importantly, for TCs it was found that the frequency of digital contacts with Greek Cypriots was related to decreased prejudice and increased trust as originally predicted by Allport's contact hypothesis.

1. INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot youth have grown separated from each other, deprived of the right to learn about the life and aspirations of each other (UNDP, 2009). The two separate educational systems have largely contributed to this (Makriyianni, Psaltis & Latif, 2011; Philippou & Theodorou, 2014; Zembylas & Karahasan, 2017; Spyrou, 2002; Hajisotiriou, 2012) by forming a certain negative “ethos” of conflict including representations of the past (Psaltis et al, 2017; Smeekes et al, 2017) and transitional justice views of retribution (Psaltis et al, 2019).

Nevertheless, recent research suggests that the opportunities for contact that were made possible after the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 can bring positive changes (e.g prejudice reduction and trust building) by intergroup contact between the two communities (Psaltis, 2012; Yucel & Psaltis, 2019; McKeown & Psaltis, 2017; Zezelj et al., 2017) and allowing for the emergence of formal bi-communal peace education initiatives (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2017). Such initiatives were actively supported by the leaders of the two communities with policy making involving the establishment of the Bi-communal Technical Committee of Education in 2016 on the basis of empirical evidence for the productive role of contact and peace education programs¹.

The purpose of this research project was to explore the views of the youth (18-35 year olds) on the resolution or the Cyprus problem following the operational definition of youth applied by the Cyprus Youth Council where youth is considered to end at 35 years old. Our approach, in contrast to previous similar research (cf. Dizdaroglu, 2021) allows for direct comparisons between the 18-35 and older age groups (36-54 and 55+) since the data we collected did not have an upper age limit. Given that similar research on wishes and expectations about peace has already been conducted by two of our research team members (Leshem, 2017,2019; Leshem et al. 2016; Leshem & Halperin, 2020) in Israel and Palestine our project also allowed for comparisons between Cyprus and Israel/Palestine. In our case the four communities compared will be the two conflicting groups in the context of two different protracted conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, that of Cyprus and that of Jews and Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied territories. Support for peace building activities is expected to be higher in Cyprus and the negative “ethos” of conflict lower compared to Israel and Palestine. This is because the conflict in Cyprus is not hot but frozen and a number of bi-communal

¹ <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/bi-communal-imagine-project-kicks>

technical committees supported by the two leaders and the UN implemented since 2008 a number of confidence building measures in various spheres of the everyday life of Cypriots across the divide (health, humanitarian matters, economy, culture, cultural heritage, environment, gender, education, opening of checkpoints). However, the role of the social psychological variable of hope is expected to be similar in furthering support for peace building initiatives in both contexts.

In this research project we evaluated possibilities for a settlement in the general population (both young and old) and the prospects of return in a subsample of IDPs of both first generation and younger generation Cypriots. The first aspect of comparison is the two protracted contexts of conflict, the second is a comparison of the youth with the older generation and the third is a comparison of IDP's and non-IDPs (first generation IDP's compared with later generation IDPs) on the basis of the collection of representative samples.

One of our basic research questions was to assess the preferences of the youth generally on a negotiated settlement in these two contexts and IDPs in particular. International organizations supporting displaced persons generally emphasize sustainable return as the preferred and durable solution (ECOSOC, 2005; UNHCR, 2013, 2014), Yet despite the normative consensus prioritizing voluntary return, there is little empirical knowledge of how or why displaced persons themselves make the decision to resettle in their pre-conflict residences especially the children and grandchildren of first generation IDPs. Cyprus provides a paradigmatic case where the right of return has been a key priority among Greek Cypriots (less so for Turkish Cypriots) yet comparative IDP-specific research has been sadly missing with the exception of some of the previous research of team members (Psaltis et al., 2020). One of the key theoretical questions that has not been explored yet is the relation between hope for a solution and return intentions. The issue of hope is original in comparison to youth based research in both contexts (cf. Bekerman & Zembylas, 2017) and even more relevant and timely at a time that renewed efforts for a negotiated settlement are underway in Cyprus, some even speculating a new referendum on the resolution of the problem will be made possible soon.

This project aims to address this gap in peace studies, social psychological and public opinion research by proposing a novel theoretical approach that looks into the following outcomes in both IDP and non-IDP populations: 1) Wish for peace generally but also of specific political compromises and solution based on Bi-zonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) which is the accepted basis for discussion between the leaders of the two communities since 1977 as well as peacebuilding activities, 2) Expectations for reaching peace, political compromise and BBF, 3) Prejudice and Trust towards Implicated communities and 3) Perceptions about the

likelihood of escalation and the severity of such escalation, 4) For IDPs in specific: attitudes towards return, the other community and peace, political compromise, support of peacebuilding activities and BBF.

After the exploration of the above research questions we discuss specific recommendations for the Cyprus peace process and the development of a transferable methodology for public opinion surveys among IDPs and refugees across divided societies in relation to the theme of hope.

As possible predictors of the outcomes of support for peace building activities and BBF we explored: 1) Digital Intergroup Contact (Given the restricted opportunities for direct contact during the COVID pandemic) , 2) Hope (Wish and Expectations) 3) Adherence to the negative ethos of conflict and 4) Transitional Justice views (Amnesty, Restorative justice, Retributive justice).

Most recent data from Cyprus, on this issue come from a May 2016 phone survey of a representative sample of the Greek Cypriot community (N=1605, see Psaltis et al., 2020) which was the first to provide in detail the numbers, conditions, and demographic profile of potential Greek-Cypriot returnees under future Turkish Cypriot administration or Greek Cypriot administration. Another more recent research (data collected after the Crans Montana failure) compared the views of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and their various options for a solution to the problem. It demonstrated that according to the current preferences of displaced persons (about 50% of the population, taking into consideration both original IDPs and their descendants) a peace settlement is possible. The main findings of this research have been published in a number of newspapers in both communities and academic publications (Psaltis et al., 2020,2021). In light of the recent developments in the Cyprus peace process and the projected resumption of talks in May 2021 and the possibility of a referendum in 2021 the exploration of the role of hope in a settlement has become vital, given that the last three years of stalemate has made many people lose hope for a settlement.

On the basis of existing literature, we postulate two basic hypotheses. The contact hypothesis examines direct and extended forms of intergroup contact of IDPs with the historical outgroup and how those play a potentially crucial role in enhancing trust, prejudice reduction and for IDPs in specific their wish to return under the administration of the outgroup (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Tausch et al., 2010; Psaltis, 2012). It is expected that both direct and indirect forms of contact will lead to prejudice reduction and trust building as well as the acceptance of a mutually acceptable solution. Given the ongoing COVID pandemic during the period of data collection for this project and the various closures of checkpoints opportunities for direct contact were essentially eliminated. For this reason we only explored the possible role of digital contact on

social media (FB in particular) given previous similar research that also showed beneficial prejudice reduction effects of FB friendships in both communities (Zezeljs et al., 2019)

Secondly, theoretical and empirical work about the psychology of hope (e.g., Leshem, 2017; Staats & Stassen, 1985; Stotland, 1969) conceptualizes hope as a bi-dimensional construct comprised of two core components: Wish and Expectations. Thus, gauging hope requires the assessment of the wish to attain a goal (in our case: resolution to a conflict) and the expectation that the goal can be attained. The measurement of these two dimensions of hope are original and very timely for the Cyprus context. Furthermore, adherence to the ethos of conflict and views about transitional justice arrangements have already been identified as feeding on historical antagonistic master narratives (Psaltis, Carretero & Cehajic-Clancy, 2017) as predictors of distrust and prejudice but the role of hope and ethos of conflict as potential predictors of support for peace building measures and BBF has not been explored until today in Cyprus.

In our survey CATI (Telephone survey) questionnaire, we specifically aimed at empirically exploring these various research questions. We also investigated related structural and attitudinal predictors of the determination to return and support for the two candidates for leadership in the Turkish Cypriot community in the second round of the elections (voters of Mustafa Akinci vs voters of Ersin Tatar) that took place just before our data collection in the Turkish Cypriot community. Our questionnaire consisted of questions focusing on pre-conflict cohabitation, return intentions, return experience (if applicable) and general political attitudes like adherence to a negative ethos of conflict including support for specific peace provisions and transitional justice mechanisms, hope (both wish and expectations dimensions).

2. Method

A representative sample telephone survey with 536 Greek Cypriots and 550 Turkish Cypriots was completed in the period 22/07/2020--12/08 2020 in the Greek Cypriot community (by the University Centre for Field Studies) and 07/12 / 2020-06 / 01/2021 in the Turkish Cypriot community by LIPA Consultancy Ltd. The method followed was random sampling. The margin of error was 4% with a confidence level of 95%. Post stratification weights were applied by district, urbanisation, gender and age group to reflect the exact demographic structure of the two communities².

² Weights were not applied when performing multivariate statistical analyses.

The questionnaire was designed by an interdisciplinary research team:

- Charis Psaltis (Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus)
- Eran Halperin (Psychology Department, The Hebrew University)
- Neophytos Loizides (School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent)
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The English version of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. The questionnaire presented in Appendix 1 is the reduced version that was used for data collection in the Turkish Cypriot community in the period 07/12 / 2020- 06 / 01/2021. A more extended version of the questionnaire that also included an additional set of questions that can be found in Appendix 2 was administered in the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community in July and August 2020. However, due to the identification of interviewer effects in quality checks in the Turkish Cypriot community (probably due to pre-election polarization) we requested the research agency to repeat data collection so as to eliminate interviewer effects after the Turkish Cypriot elections in the post-election period of December 2020 and January 2021. With the exception of the Items on Transitional Justice Views and Participation in Political Discussions about the Cyprus problem (see Appendix 2) the data reported are the ones collected for Greek Cypriot community during the period 22/07/2020--12/08 2020 and Turkish Cypriot community in the period 07/12 / 2020-06 / 01/2021 (post election).

2.1 Analytical Strategy

Some of the constructs that we wanted to measure were comprised by multiple items. This was done in order to obtain internally reliable scales to work with thus giving us more trust in our findings in terms of the measurement of our constructs. Therefore, in a first preliminary analysis we proceeded with data reduction by factor analysis of items purported to measure the same construct and then computed the corresponding scale. Then we compared the means of our scales in the two communities with independent samples t-test and compared three age groups with ANOVA within each community. We finally run two hierarchical linear regression models within each community predicting support for peace building activities and wish to see a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) solution to the Cyprus issue.

In the final section of our analysis we focused on the subsample of Internally Displaced Persons in each community and tried to explore the factors that predict their return intentions and obstacles to their return in case of a solution to the Cyprus issue.

2.2 Scales

Wish for Peace was a scale comprising five items ranging on a 1-6 Likert scale (“I have no such wish” =1 to “I wish a lot”=6) . The items can be found in Appendix 1 as Q7, Q8.1-8.3 and Q9. Exploratory Factor using varimax rotation returned a single factor. In the GC community Cronbach’s α was 0.83 and in the TC community is was 0.81.

Expectations of Peace was a scale comprising five items ranging on a 1-6 Likert scale (“No likelihood” =1 to “Very likely”=6). The items can be found in Appendix 1 as Q4, Q5.1-5.3 and Q6. Factor analysis gave a single factor. In the GC community Cronbach’s α was 0.92 and in the TC community is was 0.85.

Support Peace for Building Initiatives was a scale comprising 4 items ranging on a 1-5 Likert scale (“Completely Unwilling” =1 to “Completely willing”=6). The items can be found in Appendix 1 as Q10.1-10.4. Factor analysis gave a single factor in both communities. In the GC community Cronbach’s α was 0.79 and in the TC community is was 0.84.

Expectations of Escalation was a scale comprising 6 items ranging on a 1-5 Likert scale (“Very Unlikely” =1 to “Very likely”=5). Factor analysis returned two factors in each community. The three items referring to escalation relating to bicomunal relations (3 items) and the three items loading on regional escalation in Greek-Turkish relations (3 items) loaded on different factors suggesting that in the minds of participants these were distinct issues. Given that we wanted to evaluate an overall likelihood of escalation irrespective of where it started we nevertheless constructed a single scale with all six items. Cronbach’s α was 0.74 in the GC community and 0.67 in the TC community.

Severity of Escalation was a scale comprising 6 items ranging on a 1-5 Likert scale (“Not that harmful” =1 to “Very harmful”=5) evaluating the harm caused by the escalation scenarios mentioned in the previous question. Factor analysis gave 2 factors in the GC community (bicomunal and regional) and one factor in the TC community. This suggested that whilst Greek Cypriots evaluated the severity on the two dimensions in a different way for Turkish Cypriots both dimensions carried equal weight in severity. A single scale was constructed with all 6 items so that it would correspond to the structure of the previous scale. Cronbach’s α was 0.74 in the GC community and 0.75 in the TC community.

Ethos of Conflict. The scale was comprised by 6 items. Factor analysis gave a single factor in the GC community and two factors in the TC community. However, this second factor was only comprised by a single item. After deleting this item (“IG always aspired for peace”) for both communities a single scale was calculated from all five items. Cronbach’s α was 0.76 in the GC community and 0.70 in the TC community.

Obstacles to return. This scale was comprised of 12 items. Factor analysis gave 3 factors in both communities, however the factor structure was different in each community. A single scale was constructed in both communities with all 12 items. Cronbach’s α was 0.89 and in the TC community it was 0.85.

Political Involvement in Cyprus Issue³- This scale was comprised of 3 items. A single factor emerged from factor analysis. A 3 item scale was constructed. Cronbach's α was 0.77 in the GC community and 0.91 in the TC community.

We also measured prejudice, religiosity, digital contact and trust using single item measures. For prejudice we used the thermometer question (Converse & Presser, 1986) in three variations referring to the other community, the "motherland" of the Ingroup (Greeks for GCs and Turks for TCs) and the "motherland" of the outgroup (Turks for GCs and Greek for TCs) . For the trust measure we used one of the trust items adapted from the European Social Survey (ESS) and for digital contact we used an item from the Cypriot version of the questionnaire of ESS R9.

Finally, we also asked six questions exploring the views of participants about transitional justice in Cyprus. The items related to views about amnesty, forgiveness, and retributive justice (see Psaltis et al. 2020 for a discussion of the relationship between transitional justice views and readiness for renewed cohabitation).

3. Results

We first present a comparison of the means on each scale and single item variables in the two communities. The application of an independent samples t-test returned the results presented in Table 1. Out of the 21 comparisons only six were not significant. This was 1) Support for Peace Building activities which was quite high in both communities, 2) Positive feelings towards the IG "motherland" that was again equally high in both communities, 3) most of the transitional justice views that indicated a rational of retributive justice that was equally high in both communities.

Nevertheless, there are a series of questions that tap the quality of intercommunal relations that point to a pattern where GCs have a better representation of TCs than vice versa. For example, GCs have more positive feelings and more trust towards TCs. This seems to be related to a reduced ethos of conflict in the GC community but not due to intergroup contact since TCs have more contact with GCs than vice

³ This scale was only measured in the first administration of the questionnaire in both communities.

versa. This could be partly attributed to the numerical superiority of the GC community that offers more opportunities for contact for TCs than vice versa. It could also be partly attributed to the stigma of crossings that exists in the GC but not the TC community that could be leading to underreporting of contact between members of the two communities (see Leshem et al, 2019). Interestingly, when it comes to expectations of reaching peace and escalation of conflict TCs seem to be more optimistic compared to GCs.

Overall, the hold of the master narratives of conflict in each community seems to be still strong. GCs have a very negative view of Turks who fits their enemy image but more positive feelings towards TCs with whom they want to reunify the country. On the contrary, TCs have a heightened sense of mistrust towards the numerically larger community that historically was seen as being the perpetrator of their marginalization and victimization before 1974. The sense of closure that was brought with the events of 1974 is stronger in the TC community is also revealed when TC IDPs are much less likely to wish to return in the south compared to GC IDPs and state that they see much more obstacles for returning compared to GC IDPs.

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and t-test comparisons between the two communities on scales and questions

	Community	N	Range	Mean	SD	p value*
Wish for Peace	GCs	535	1-6	5.07	1.11	0.001
	TCs	550		4.24	1.54	
Expectations of Peace	GCs	535	1-6	2.49	1.18	0.001
	TCs	550		2.84	1.50	
Support for Peace Building	GCs	530	1-5	3.39	1.15	0.69
	TCs	549		3.36	1.36	
Expectations of Escalation	GCs	522	1-5	3.26	.91	0.001
	TCs	549		2.94	.97	
Severity of Escalation	GCs	508	1-5	3.75	.86	0.001
	TCs	548		3.99	.95	
Ethos of Conflict	GCs	505	1-5	3.58	.96	0.001
	TCs	549		3.84	.98	
Obstacles to return	GCs	182	1-7	3.80	1.61	0.01
	TCs	212		4.22	1.58	
Political Involvement in Cyprus Issue	GCs	482	1-7	3.59	1.80	0.001
	TCs	505		2.74	2.01	

Thermometer towards OG	GCs	490	0-10	5.55	2.65	0.001
	TCs	546		4.34	3.28	
Thermometer (positive feelings) towards OGM (Turkey/Greece)	GCs	485	0-10	2.22	2.64	0.001
	TCs	527		3.53	3.23	
Thermometer (positive feelings) towards IGM (Greece/Turkey)	GCs	487	0-10	8.23	2.06	0.76
	TCs	546		8.28	2.39	
They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace	GCs	465	1-5	2.72	1.60	0.001
	TCs	478		3.10	1.65	
They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims' families	GCs	464	1-5	3.38	1.55	0.79
	TCs	486		3.79	1.49	
They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished	GCs	468	1-5	3.96	1.38	0.84
	TCs	489		3.93	1.43	
War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims	GCs	464	1-5	4.13	1.29	0.78
	TCs	482		3.91	1.36	
The Turkish state should pay financial compensation to victims	GCs	472	1-5	4.54	.985	0.001
	TCs	477		3.82	1.39	
They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted	GCs	457	1-5	3.00	1.61	0.39
	TCs	474		2.91	1.60	
Contact with Turkish/Greek Cypriots on social media (eg. facebook)	GCs	483	1-5	1.42	1.00	0.001
	TCs	545		2.11	1.57	
Do you think most Turkish/Greek Cypriots would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance or would they try to be fair	GCs	465	0-10	5.41	2.66	0.001
	TCs	528		3.17	3.53	
Identification (Cypriocentric Orientation)	GCs	478	1-5	3.42	.82	0.001
	TCs	528		3.13	.90	
Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms, etc., how often do you go to church/mosque?	GCs	481	1-5	2.93	1.27	0.001
	TCs	540		2.29	1.57	

3.1 Age group Comparisons within each community

We created three age groups (youth, middle age and older). An interesting pattern of findings emerged where the youth group and middle ages were usually very similar whilst they both differed from the oldest age group of 55+ that was usually significantly more positive in wishing for peace, supporting peace building initiatives and supporting transitional justice views that were closer to the rationale of amnesty or a truth and reconciliation committee. Given that this older age group was comprised by participants who were 8 years or older during the events of 1974 it is likely that their more positive

predispositions are due to having the experience of cohabitation with Turkish Cypriots. It is also likely that they are the group more likely to wish for a solution as a route to returning to their properties in case they are IDP's as suggested by their significant lower score on obstacles to return. They also have more contact on FB with TCs compared to younger groups although they have no higher levels of trust or prejudice towards the other community. However, they do score higher on the ethos of conflict and are more prejudiced towards Turks which is expected given their negative experience with the events of 1974 and the Turkish invasion. The only question that the youth group differed from the other two was their lower frequency of practicing religion.

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of scales and questions for the Greek Cypriot community by Age Group

Age Groups in the Greek Cypriots Community	N	Mean	SD	p from ANOVA	Tukey post-hoc test	
Wish for Peace	17-35	98	4.68	1.25	0.0001	1
	36-54	165	4.93	1.19		1
	55+	247	5.33	.92		2
Expectations of Peace	17-35	98	2.41	1.12	0.10	1
	36-54	165	2.35	1.06		1
	55+	247	2.59	1.26		1
Support for Peace Building	17-35	96	3.23	1.07	0.006	1
	36-54	165	3.22	1.18		1
	55+	246	3.55	1.15		2
Expectations of Escalation	17-35	97	3.34	.80	0.10	1
	36-54	164	3.34	.88		1
	55+	242	3.17	.97		1
Severity of Escalation	17-35	97	3.71	.69	0.827	1
	36-54	160	3.77	.86		1
	55+	236	3.73	.94		1
Ethos of Conflict	17-35	96	3.34	.86	0.006	1
	36-54	162	3.52	.90		1,2
	55+	236	3.70	1.02		2
Obstacles to return	17-35	31	4.17	1.38	0.017	1
	36-54	61	4.15	1.46		1
	55+	87	3.47	1.71		1
Political Involvement in Cyprus Issue	17-35	92	3.22	1.73	0.001	1
	36-54	158	3.31	1.74		1

	55+	221	3.96	1.81		2
Thermometer towards Turkish Cypriots in general	17-35	95	5.17	2.52	0.286	1
	36-54	160	5.60	2.44		1
	55+	224	5.68	2.88		1
Thermometer towards (positive feelings) OGM (Turks)	17-35	95	2.87	2.57	0.027	2
	36-54	159	2.05	2.44		1
	55+	221	2.07	2.77		1
Thermometer (positive feelings) towards OGM (Greeks)	17-35	95	8.05	1.94	0.544	1
	36-54	160	8.33	2.13		1
	55+	222	8.30	2.06		1
They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace	17-35	90	2.41	1.45	0.004	1
	36-54	153	2.54	1.57		1,2
	55+	212	2.99	1.64		2
They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims' families	17-35	92	2.98	1.54	0.001	1
	36-54	149	3.10	1.56		1
	55+	213	3.72	1.48		2
They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished	17-35	92	4.11	1.19	0.535	1
	36-54	154	3.91	1.42		1
	55+	212	3.95	1.43		1
War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims	17-35	91	4.09	1.13	0.940	1
	36-54	149	4.15	1.22		1
	55+	214	4.12	1.40		1
The Turkish state should pay financial compensation to victims	17-35	92	4.36	.99	0.125	1
	36-54	153	4.61	.88		1
	55+	217	4.56	1.03		1
They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted	17-35	92	2.71	1.55	0.004	1
	36-54	150	2.79	1.58		1
	55+	206	3.26	1.61		2
Contact with Turkish/Greek Cypriots on social media (eg. facebook)	17-35	92	1.30	.78	0.020	1,2
	36-54	149	1.27	.79		1
	55+	220	1.54	1.14		2
Do you think most Turkish/Greek Cypriots would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance or would they try to be fair	17-35	91	4.98	2.37	0.266	1
	36-54	149	5.52	2.45		1
	55+	216	5.45	2.91		1
Identification (Cypriocentric orientation)	17-35	92	3.45	.81	0.937	1
	36-54	155	3.41	.84		1
	55+	221	3.42	.81		1
Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms, etc., how often do you go to church/mosque?	17-35	93	2.44	1.09	0.001	1
	36-54	158	2.92	1.23		2
	55+	221	3.12	1.32		2

In Table 3 the corresponding analysis for the Turkish Cypriot participants can be seen. Here another interesting pattern of finding emerges which is often the opposite of the trend reported for GCs. In terms of prejudice there is a linear trend with younger participants being less prejudiced towards GCs compared to older TC participants, showing less ethos of conflict and being more concerned about escalation and its consequences compared to older people. Less prejudice is also probably driven by higher intergroup contact in the youth. Still, the pattern of more support for peace building activities in older compared to younger participants can be found in the Turkish Cypriot sample also. The middle age group seems to be the most pessimistic of all three groups. Interestingly, there is no significant difference on all past oriented questions relating to transitional justice. Interest in public discussions about the Cyprus issue is also very low across all age groups.

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of scales and questions for the Turkish Cypriot community by Age Group

Age Groups in the Turkish Cypriot Community		N	Mean	SD	p from ANOVA	Tukey post-hoc test
Wish for Peace	17-35	179	4.16	1.52	0.001	1
	36-54	206	4.04	1.60		1
	55+	163	4.61	1.42		2
Expectations of Peace	17-35	179	2.87	1.40	0.049	1,2
	36-54	206	2.66	1.43		1
	55+	163	3.04	1.66		2
Support for Peace Building	17-35	178	3.32	1.34	0.003	1
	36-54	206	3.19	1.35		1
	55+	163	3.66	1.36		2
Expectations of Escalation	17-35	178	3.19	.94	0.001	2
	36-54	206	2.84	.90		1
	55+	163	2.79	1.04		1
Severity of Escalation	17-35	177	4.12	.84	0.066	1
	36-54	206	3.89	1.01		1
	55+	163	3.98	.96		1
Ethos of Conflict	17-35	178	3.63	.97	0.002	1
	36-54	206	3.90	.96		2
	55+	163	3.98	.98		2
Obstacles to return	17-35	69	4.33	1.44	0.253	1
	36-54	61	4.23	1.68		1
	55+	81	4.15	1.59		1
Political Involvement in Cyprus Issue	17-35	142	2.58	1.90	0.122	1

	36-54	203	2.67	1.98		1
	55+	125	3.05	2.11		1
Thermometer towards Greek Cypriots in general	17-35	177	4.77	3.24	0.049	2
	36-54	206	4.32	3.20		1,2
	55+	161	3.89	3.36		1
Thermometer (positive feelings) towards OGM (Greeks)	17-35	175	4.00	3.20	0.024	2
	36-54	198	3.49	3.18		1,2
	55+	152	3.03	3.24		1
Thermometer (positive feelings) towards IGM (Turks)	17-35	177	8.06	2.24	0.220	1
	36-54	205	8.48	2.34		1
	55+	162	8.24	2.62		1
They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace	17-35	136	3.10	1.64	0.728	1
	36-54	189	3.10	1.69		1
	55+	119	2.96	1.70		1
They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims' families	17-35	137	3.92	1.38	0.260	1
	36-54	193	3.78	1.54		1
	55+	120	3.61	1.61		1
They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished	17-35	138	3.86	1.43	0.082	1
	36-54	194	4.09	1.35		1
	55+	122	3.73	1.58		1
War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims	17-35	140	3.81	1.41	0.407	1
	36-54	189	4.01	1.31		1
	55+	119	3.87	1.43		1
The Turkish state should pay financial compensation to victims	17-35	135	3.71	1.45	0.382	1
	36-54	186	3.91	1.36		1
	55+	122	3.75	1.42		1
They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted	17-35	137	2.92	1.61	0.655	1
	36-54	186	2.85	1.64		1
	55+	116	2.73	1.61		1
Contact with Turkish/Greek Cypriots on social media (eg. facebook)	17-35	176	2.42	1.70	0.005	2
	36-54	206	2.01	1.53		1
	55+	161	1.89	1.42		1
Do you think most Turkish/Greek Cypriots would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance or would they try to be fair	17-35	171	3.47	3.67	0.365	1
	36-54	198	2.95	3.39		1
	55+	157	3.10	3.54		1
Identification (Cypriocentric orientation)	17-35	169	3.24	.86	0.152	1
	36-54	198	3.06	.93		1
	55+	159	3.12	.87		1
Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms, etc., how often do you go to church/mosque?	17-35	175	2.04	1.46	0.001	1
	36-54	202	2.61	1.62		2
	55+	161	2.12	1.52		1

In order to bring the findings from Tables 1-3 in a singular framework for comparisons some comparative figures across ages in the two communities are very helpful and these can be seen in the 17 figures below that were selected as being indicative of the whole set of findings.

Political efficacy is higher in the TC community and its unrelated to age or generational effects (see Figures 1 and 2). The big majority of the youth in both communities (around 60%) feel hopeless about the future of Cyprus as it relates to the solution of the Cyprus issue but in the older generation TCs seem more hopeful compared to older GCs. There is generally more insecurity in the GC community compared to the TC community and especially in the older generation of GCs whilst older TCs seem more resilient compared to younger TCs. All questions relating to the wish for peace (with the exception of the BBF related question) show a similar pattern of findings. Greek Cypriots scoring higher than Turkish Cypriots with a linear increasing age trend in Greek Cypriots and a curvilinear, U-shaped trend in the Turkish Cypriots suggesting that the younger and 55+ show higher wish for peace compared to middle age TCs. On the wish for Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) the TCs score higher with the exception of the older age group (55+) where again older GCs score higher than older TCs. Support for peace building initiatives is equally high in both communities and bigger in older than younger people but on (Figures 11 and 12) on willingness to support a political candidate that would make concessions in order to reach peace or compromise on land issues TCs appear to more supportive compared to GCs. Finally, some very important and very clear differences emerged in the two communities concerning the political participation in discussions about the Cyprus issue and Digital Bicomunal Contacts on FB (Figures 13 and 14). Whilst the majority of GCs was involved in discussions about the Cyprus problem (especially the older participants) only a minor percentage of TCs, across all age groups acted similarly. On the contrary, for Digital Intergroup contacts the pattern of findings was reversed with many TCs having online interactions on FB with GCs, especially younger TCs where 41.7% of this age group has contact with GCs more than once a month. On the contrary in the younger age group only 7.7% of GCs stated that they have digital contact with TCs. The conclusion from reading Figures 13 and 14 together is that GCs are much more interested to discuss the Cypriot issue but they mostly do it amongst themselves than with TCs. Importantly, this is not because GCs are more prejudiced or distrustful towards TCs because as suggested by Figures 15 and 16 the contrary is the case. It is probably because of adherence to the master political and historical narrative that “our problem is not with TCs but with Turkey” as most GCs view the Cyprus problem as an international problem with Turkey as the perpetrator and

violator of international law and Cyprus as the victim (see Psaltis, 2016) of its aggression or expansionist plans.

Given the COVID-19 pandemic and the absence of physical contact between members of the two communities the exploration of possible prejudice reduction effects via digital contacts on FB became relevant. As it can be seen in the Bivariate correlation tables of the two communities Table 6 and 7 frequency of FB contact was unrelated to prejudice, trust and ethos of conflict. However, in the GC community a number of findings in the direction of Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis emerged since significant and moderate negative correlations were registered with prejudice, trust, ethos of conflict and additionally wish and expectations for peace.

FIGURES




Figure 1. Political efficacy (1)




Figure 2. Political efficacy (2)




Figure 3. General Hope




Figure 3. General Insecurity




Figure 4. Wish for Peace (1)




Figure 5. Wish for Peace (2)




Figure 6. Wish for Peace (3)




Figure 7. Wish for Peace (4)




Figure 8. Wish for Peace (5)




Figure 9. Support for peace building activities (1)




Figure 10. Support for peace building activities (2)




Figure 11. Support for peace building activities (3)




Figure 12. Support for peace building activities (4)




Figure 13. Political participation on Cyprus issue




Figure 14. Digital Intergroup Contact




Figure 15. Prejudice towards the other community




Figure 16. Distrust towards the other community

3.2 Internal displacement across generations

In the younger group there are no participants who personally experienced displacement. However, in participants born before 1974 about 1/3 in each community personally experienced displacement. However, younger participants could still have relatives (parents, grandparents) who personally experienced displacement or they could have inherited properties in the other side of the barricades thus affected by the property arrangements in the Cyprus issue.

One of the main research questions of this project was to explore whether IDPs or those with properties on the other side of the Green line differ in any way from the rest of the population. The questionnaire included three relevant questions: 1) Did you personally have had to leave your home in the south/north (ie displaced / refugees) due to the events of 1974 or 1963-1964 or 1958 in Cyprus? (1-Yes, 2-No), 2) Did one or two of your parents or grandparents have had to leave their home in the south/north of Cyprus (ie became displaced / refugees) because of the events of 1974 or 1963-1964 or 1958 in Cyprus? (1-Yes, 2-No) and 3) Do you personally own property in the south/north Cyprus? (1-Yes, 2-No).

As expected the percentage of personally displaced people 47 years after their displacement in 1974 is now down to 19% in the GC community and 15% in the TC community. The means of all variables of Table 1 of personally displaced and not were compared with an independent samples t-test. In the Greek Cypriot community no significant difference emerged except a difference on religiosity and participation in political events relating to the Cyprus issue that was expected with the personally displaced being significant more religious than non-displaced and more involved in organised events and discussions about the Cyprus issue. In the TC community however a number of significant differences were revealed. On both wish and expectation for peace personally displaced individuals scored significantly higher compared to non-displaced. They also stated significantly higher support for peace building activities compared to non-displaced and they were also less religious and in terms of identification exhibited a more Cypriocentric orientation compared to non-displaced participants which was to be expected given that in the non-displaced groups there was a significant number of settlers/immigrants from Turkey with voting rights.

Comparisons between participants who had parents and grandparents IDPs with those who did not did not give any significant results in the GC community but gave a number of significant differences in the TC community along the same lines as for the personally displaced. Those with parents and/or grandparents IDPs scored higher on both wish and expectation for peace, support for peacebuilding activities. They were also less prejudiced towards GCs, showed higher levels of trust, less ethos of conflict and they were more Cypriocentric in orientation and less religious. On the whole they seem to feel closer to the Greek Cypriot community.

Comparisons on the third binary variable differentiating those with property in the south were similar to the ones for the previous variable. There was no difference in the GC community in none of the variables but on various of the variables in the TC community. In this comparison the differences were even bigger.

3.3. Return Intentions of IDPs

For further analysis we followed the strategy used in Psaltis et al (2020) of creating a variable which was true if any of the three IDP related variables was true. For this variable that was true for 41.5% of GCs and 42.4% of TCs we asked further questions about their return intentions generally and specifically under GC or TC administration. In the case of the GC community 55% stated that they often think about returning generally. In the TC community the corresponding percentage was much lower at 19.2% which was expected given the opposing discourses about IDPs in the two communities. When asked specifically about their return intentions under Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot administration their answers varied greatly under the two different conditions. GC IDPs when asked specifically how likely they were to return under GC administration 46.1% of stated that they would likely return. However, under GC administration only 11.9% of TCs responded that they would return. Under TC administration only 15.3% of GC IDPs stated that would likely return. The corresponding percentage for TCs was as expected higher at 46.9%. Interestingly both percentages of return intentions by GCs were lower in comparison to the data reported in Psaltis et al. (2020) that were collected in 2016. In that research return intentions of GCs under GC administration were at 59.5% and 25.5% under TC administration.

The IDPs were also asked whether various reasons for not returning applied to them or not on a Likert scale that run from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (definitely applies) with a midpoint of 4. The major reasons for not wishing to return in descending order are presented below first for GCs in Table 4 and then for TCs in Table 5.

Table 4. Reasons for not returning given by Greek Cypriot IDPs.

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
I'm worried about my family's safety	175	1	7	4.66	2.45
There will be significant costs involved in the upgrading of my old home	172	1	7	4.66	2.40
I am worried about my personal security	176	1	7	4.29	2.50
The other members of my family do not want to go back	165	1	7	3.92	2.47
I am worried that very few in my community will come back	172	1	7	3.90	2.31
I'm worried about hospitals and other social services	178	1	7	3.89	2.50
I've made my life here and I do not want a restart	180	1	7	3.83	2.52
I do not want to live close to those who need me to leave my home	173	1	7	3.59	2.45
I am worried that there will be no schools to send my children	177	1	7	3.55	2.54
I would feel isolated	171	1	7	3.38	2.31
I'm worried about finding a job	171	1	7	3.14	2.44
I stopped having an emotional connection to my old place	175	1	7	2.50	2.23

Importantly, the various obstacles to return above related to age in both communities in the direction of older people facing less obstacles to return. In the GC community men were also less likely compared to women to face these obstacles. In the TC community there was a tendency for more educated people to face less obstacles in returning.

In the subsample of IDPs education was one of the main demographic predictors of support for peace building activities. Interestingly, the direction of the findings went in opposite direction with more educated GCs being less supportive and educated TCs being more supportive of peace supporting initiatives. Further analysis showed that this relationship disappeared in the GC community when the variable that measured obstacles to return was accounted for suggesting that at least in the GC

community the reason why more educated GCs are not as supportive of peace building activities as less educated is because the more educated have significantly more obstacles to return compared to the less educated.

Table 5. Reasons for not returning given by Turkish Cypriot IDPs.

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
The other members of my family do not want to go back	205	1	7	4.93	2.41
I've made my life here and I do not want a restart	210	1	7	4.80	2.60
I stopped having an emotional connection to my old place	209	1	7	4.38	2.69
There will be significant costs involved in the upgrading of my old home	202	1	7	4.34	2.78
I do not want to live close to those who need me to leave my home	207	1	7	4.34	2.71
I am worried that very few in my community will come back	207	1	7	4.31	2.55
I would feel isolated	206	1	7	4.26	2.49
I'm worried about my family's safety	210	1	7	4.20	2.59
I am worried about my personal security	210	1	7	4.08	2.60
I'm worried about hospitals and other social services	209	1	7	3.97	2.59
I'm worried about finding a job	207	1	7	3.90	2.75
I am worried that there will be no schools to send my children	208	1	7	3.46	2.61

Controlling for the various demographic variables a model could be built which indicated unique positive and significant contribution on support for peacebuilding activities in the IDP subsample. In the GC community positive predictors were : wish for peace ($b=0.34$, $p=0.001$), positive feelings towards TCs ($b=0.18$, $p<0.05$) and a tendency for usually having thoughts about return ($b=0.13$, $p=0.085$). Total variance explained by the model was 32% (Adjusted R square). In the TC community positive predictors were : wish for peace ($b=0.66$, $p=0.001$) and a tendency for expectations for peace ($b=0.10$, $p=0.070$). whilst the ethos of conflict was a negative predictor ($b=-0.15$, $p=0.017$). Total variance explained by the model was 53% (Adjusted R square).

Greek Cypriot community: Bivariate Correlations Table	1. Gender (Male=1, Female=2)	2. Age	3. Area (Urban=1, Rural=2)	4. Education	5. Income	6. Not Own Property on other	7. Support Peace Building	8. Wish for Peace	9. Expectations of Peace	10. Expectations of Escalation	11. Severity of Escalation	12. Ethos of Conflict	13. Obstacles to Return	14. Contact on FB	15. Feelings towards TCs	16. Trust towards TCs	17. Feelings towards Turks	18. Feelings towards Greeks	19. Identification-Cyriocentric	20. Religious Practicing
1	1																			
2	-.12**	1																		
3	.00	-.05	1																	
4	.00	-.42**	-.09*	1																
5	-.19**	.04	-.13**	.43**	1															
6	.02	-.16**	.01	.05	-.02	1														
7	.01	.15**	.01	-.18**	-.00	-.05	1													
8	-.01	.24**	-.04	-.07	.09*	-.02	.48**	1												
9	-.00	.12**	-.01	-.07	.06	.02	.33**	.23**	1											
10	.10*	-.05	.13**	-.03	-.03	.04	-.02	-.06	-.01	1										
11	.08	.04	.01	-.06	.01	.00	.12**	.11**	.06	.25**	1									
12	.08	.15**	.02	-.19**	-.08	-.04	-.15**	-.11*	-.03	.21**	.07	1								
13	.22**	-.24**	.05	.04	.00	.02	-.05	-.07	.02	.12	.03	.22**	1							
14	.01	.08	.02	-.09*	-.12*	-.03	.00	.04	.08	.01	-.04	.04	.01	1						
15	-.05	.03	-.02	.11*	.17**	.01	.36**	.34**	.22**	-.04	.04	-.37**	-.17*	.05	1					
16	-.09*	.00	-.02	.14**	.15**	-.02	.32**	.25**	.19**	-.10*	.00	-.34**	-.19**	-.00	.53**	1				
17	-.01	-.07	-.05	.14**	.08	-.02	.22**	.17**	.10*	-.13**	.00	-.34**	-.17*	.02	.45**	.27**	1			
18	.10*	.01	-.01	.00	-.04	.00	-.06	-.01	.00	.08	.06	.26**	-.01	-.03	-.08	-.08	-.08	1		
19	.07	.02	-.02	-.14**	-.03	-.08	.17**	.16**	-.01	.01	-.05	-.13**	.10	.09	.11*	.02	.07	-.29**	1	
20	.13**	.25**	.10*	-.20**	-.05	-.09*	.00	-.00	.10*	.10*	.11*	.24**	.05	-.01	-.12**	-.03	-.04	.16**	-.12**	1

Table 6. Bivariate correlations between the variables in the Greek Cypriot community

Turkish Cypriot community: Bivariate Correlations Table	1. Gender(Male=1, Female=2)	2. Age	3. Area(Urban=1, Rural=2)	4. Education	5. Income	6. Not Own Property on other side	7. Support Peace Building	8. Wish for Peace	9. Expectations of Peace	10. Expectations of Escalation	11. Severity of Escalation	12. Ethos of Conflict	13. Obstacles to Return	14. Contact on FB	15. Feelings towards GCs	16. Trust towards GCs	17. Feelings towards Greeks	18. feelings towards Turks	19. Identification-Cypriocentric	20. Religious Practicing
1	1																			
2	-.23**	1																		
3	-.08*	.04	1																	
4	.14**	-.32**	-.13**	1																
5	-.17**	.19**	.00	.12*	1															
6	.082	-.14**	.02	-.12**	-.16**	1														
7	.00	.06	-.03	.17**	.03	-.21**	1													
8	-.01	.09*	.00	.13**	.06	-.17**	.67**	1												
9	.00	.03	-.02	.00	-.00	-.15**	.49**	.46**	1											
10	-.02	-.15**	.05	.00	.00	-.00	.00	.00	-.03	1										
11	.04	-.06	.05	.04	-.07	-.06	.20**	.19**	.03	.22**	1									
12	-.17**	.15**	.11**	-.16**	.06	.12**	-.27**	-.17**	-.21**	.18**	.01	1								
13	-.12	-.03	.05	-.13*	.04	.11	-.23**	-.20**	-.29**	.19**	.08	.42**	1							
14	.01	-.15**	-.09*	.16**	-.11*	-.10*	.21**	.19**	.17**	-.04	.00	-.30**	-.31**	1						
15	.07	-.11**	-.03	.22**	.01	-.07	.43**	.39**	.27**	-.03	.09*	-.34**	-.29**	.32**	1					
16	.07	-.04	-.03	.12**	-.08	-.12**	.42**	.40**	.30**	-.11**	.06	-.42**	-.33**	.33**	.48**	1				
17	.002	-.19**	-.03	.27**	-.04	.00	.38**	.36**	.28**	-.02	.04	-.29**	-.22**	.25**	.68**	.43**	1			
18	.01	.04	.06	-.01	.07	-.01	-.15**	-.10*	-.02	-.05	-.04	.09*	.07	-.09*	-.13**	-.10*	-.14**	1		
19	.15**	-.06	.00	.13**	-.07	-.12**	.25**	.24**	.15**	.00	.10*	-.19**	-.18**	.12**	.20**	.22**	.17**	-.13**	1	
20	-.31**	.01	.06	-.18**	.01	.22**	-.27**	-.27**	-.13**	.03	-.11**	.25**	.09	-.06	-.23**	-.23**	-.19**	.10*	-.19**	1

Table 7. Bivariate correlations between the variables in the Turkish Cypriot community

3.4. Predicting Support for Peace Building Activities

In order to identify the various possible variables that could predict support for peace building activities we tested a two-step hierarchical linear regression model. Demographic variables were included in the first block and the rest of the possible predictors were included in the second block. The results for the Greek Cypriot community are presented in Table 8 below. From all the demographic variables only education played a significant negative role. With the rest of the variables included in block 2 the effect of education became even stronger. Given that this effect is over and above any age effect or other social psychological variables the most likely explanation as mentioned earlier has to do with the increased possibility of integration in the system south of the existing divide. An alternative explanation given previous research findings that university education in the Greek Cypriot community played a positive and not negative role is that the negative effect reported here is mostly driven by participants with high school education versus just elementary school education which is usually working class participants more susceptible to the reconciliation ideology of the working class party AKEL.

The second major finding here is that both components of hope (wish and expectations for peace) were significant predictors of support for peace building activities over and above any expected effect from prejudice and intergroup trust that was also found here.

Table 8. Hierarchical regression Model predicting support for peace building activities in the Greek Cypriot community

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
Block 1	(Constant)	3.345	.518		6.461	.000
	Age	.007	.004	.105	1.698	.090
	Gender	.165	.122	.072	1.355	.176
	Urban/Rural	-.008	.127	-.003	-.064	.949
	Education	-.145	.050	-.194	-2.872	.004
	Income	.079	.054	.090	1.465	.144
	Own property in the north (1=not own, 2=own)	.073	.126	-.031	.581	.561
Block 2	(Constant)	1.382	.600		2.301	.022
	Age	-.001	.003	-.015	-.276	.782
	Gender	.194	.103	.085	1.893	.059
	Urban/Rural	.011	.106	.004	.100	.921
	Education	-.178	.043	-.238	-4.164	.000
	Income	.012	.045	.014	.274	.784

Own property in the north (1=not own, 2=own)	-.004	.104	.002	-.040	.968
Wish for Peace	.351	.048	.355	7.300	.000
Expectations of Peace	.156	.044	.164	3.576	.000
Likelihood of escalation	-.020	.056	-.016	-.358	.721
Severity of Escalation	.011	.058	.008	.183	.855
Ethos of Conflict	.014	.057	.012	.241	.810
Feelings towards TCs	.070	.022	.170	3.149	.002
Contact in FB with TCs	-.094	.052	-.079	-1.815	.070
Intergroup Trust	.056	.021	.135	2.631	.009
Identification	.048	.061	.037	.792	.429
Religious Practicing	-.061	.042	-.069	-1.447	.149

Adjusted R² = 0.36

We also tested exactly the same model in the Turkish Cypriot community. Demographic variables were included in the first block and the rest of the possible predictors were included in the second block. The results for the Turkish Cypriot community are presented in Table 9 below. From the demographic variables education played a significant **positive** role. Owning property in the south and age also played a positive role.

With the rest of the variables included in block 2 the effect of education and owning property in the south became non-significant suggesting that these two variables were having their influence on the outcome measure via other social psychological variables that showed significant links with the outcome variable. Given that the effect of age is still significant in block 2 suggests that this effect is over and above any other effect of demographic and social psychological variables with the most likely explanation being the unique experience of having lived in a united Cyprus before 1974 .

One of our major findings in the Greek Cypriot community was the relevance of hope, with both of its dimensions (wish and expectation for peace) as predictor of support for peace building activities over and above other well known social psychological variables (like prejudice and trust). This finding is replicated here in the Turkish Cypriot community also as hope is having a positive effect over and above the negative effects of prejudice and the ethos of conflict. On the contrary both expectations for escalation and severity of consequences of this escalation was unrelated to support for peace building activities in both communities.

Table 9. Hierarchical regression Model predicting support for peace building activities in the Turkish Cypriot community

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
Block 1	(Constant)	3.223	.683			4.718	.000
	Age	.014	.005	.158		2.983	.003
	Gender	.073	.140	.026		.522	.602
	Urban/Rural	-.148	.136	-.053		-1.090	.276
	Education	.209	.066	.167		3.174	.002
	Income	-.016	.029	-.027		-.544	.587
	Own property in the south (1=not own, 2=own)	-.567	.154	.181		-3.681	.000
Block 2	(Constant)	.473	.639			.739	.460
	Age	.009	.003	.106		2.657	.008
	Gender	-.035	.107	-.013		-.327	.744
	Urban/Rural	-.140	.098	-.050		-1.425	.155
	Education	.088	.048	.070		1.809	.071
	Income	.002	.021	.004		.097	.922
	Own property in the south	-.165	.117	-.053		-1.412	.159
	Wish for Peace	.385	.040	.425		9.669	.000
	Expectations of Peace	.167	.036	.185		4.662	.000
	Likelihood of escalation	.066	.050	.047		1.299	.195
	Severity of Escalation	.102	.052	.071		1.952	.052
	Ethos of Conflict	-.135	.059	-.094		-2.283	.023
	Feelings towards GCs	.050	.017	.119		2.914	.004
	Contact in FB with GCs	-.010	.033	-.012		-.304	.761
	Intergroup Trust	.020	.017	.051		1.176	.240
	Identification	.084	.055	.056		1.535	.126
	Religious Practicing	-.032	.035	-.036		-.922	.357

Adjusted R²= 0.52

3.5. Predicting Support for Bizonal Bicomunal Federation

In order to identify the various possible variables that could predict support for Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) we tested a two-step hierarchical linear regression model. Demographic variables were included in the first block and the rest of the possible predictors were included in the second block. Given that Support for BBF was part of the scale *Wish for Peace* this scale was deleted from the possible predictors list in block 2. Support for Peace Building activities on the contrary was added in the list of possible predictors.

The results for the Greek Cypriot community are presented in Table 10 below. From all the demographic variables only age played a significant positive role suggesting that wish for BBF was significantly stronger in the older participants. With the rest of the variables included in block 2 the effect of age was somewhat reduced but still significant. Given that this effect is over and above any effect of other demographic variables or other social psychological variables the most likely explanation for this support is the unique experience of the older generation in having shared power, at least for some time with TCs in the consociational constitution of the 1960s.

As expected, support for peace building activities and expectations of reaching peace was a positive predictor of wish for BBF given that this is a compromise solution. A more Cypriot-centric orientation on national identification was also predictive of wish for BBF but frequency of attending religious services was a negative predictor. The likelihood of escalation was also a negative predictor of wishing for BBF.

Table 10. Hierarchical regression Model predicting support for Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) in the Greek Cypriot community

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Block 1	(Constant)	2.968	.843		3.519	.000
	Age	.020	.006	.200	3.182	.002
	Gender	.115	.199	.031	.580	.562
	Urban/Rural	-.370	.206	-.096	-1.796	.073
	Education	-.015	.082	-.013	-.185	.853
	Income	.086	.088	.061	.979	.328
	Own property in the north (1=not own, 2=own)	.199	.206	-.052	.966	.335
Block 2	(Constant)	.426	1.074		.397	.692
	Age	.016	.006	.160	2.744	.006
	Gender	.073	.184	.020	.400	.689

Urban/Rural	-.210	.189	-.054	-1.114	.266
Education	.054	.078	.045	.697	.486
Income	.024	.079	.017	.305	.761
Own property in the south (1=not own, 2=own)	.161	.186	-.042	.866	.387
Support for Peace Building Activities	.472	.090	.294	5.256	.000
Expectations of Peace	.176	.079	.115	2.235	.026
Likelihood of escalation	-.255	.101	-.129	-2.521	.012
Severity of Escalation	.063	.103	.030	.617	.538
Ethos of Conflict	.049	.102	.027	.482	.630
Feelings towards TCs	.051	.040	.076	1.264	.207
Contact in FB with TCs	-.073	.094	-.038	-.782	.435
Intergroup Trust	.005	.038	.008	.144	.886
Identification	.285	.108	.134	2.649	.008
Religious Practicing	-.139	.075	-.098	-1.846	.066

Adjusted R²= 0.23

The results for the Turkish Cypriot community are presented in Table 11 below. From all the demographic variables only age played a significant positive role suggesting that wish for BBF was significantly stronger in the older participants. With the rest of the variables included in block 2 the effect of age was somewhat reduced but still significant. Given that this effect is over and above any effect of other demographic variables or other social psychological variables the most likely explanation for this support is the unique experience of the older generation in having shared power, at least for some time with TCs in the consociational constitution of the 1960s.

As expected, again support for peace building activities and expectations of reaching peace was a positive predictor of wish for BBF given that this is a compromise solution. Trust also as predicted was a significant positive predictor also. However, a counterintuitive finding also emerged which had to do with the ethos of conflict emerging as a positive predictor of wish for BBF. Given that the beta weight was rather low and the p value close to 0.05 this should probably be a spurious finding. Severity of consequences of escalation was unrelated to support for BBF but the expectation of escalation had opposing effects in the two communities. Whereas in the GC community it decreased wish for BBF in the TC community it increased wish for BBF.

Table 11. Hierarchical regression Model predicting support for Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) in the Turkish Cypriot community

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
Block 1	(Constant)	3.836	1.094		3.506	.001
	Age	.018	.007	.136	2.484	.013
	Gender	.003	.225	.001	.013	.990
	Urban/Rural	-.166	.217	-.038	-.762	.447
	Education	.123	.106	.063	1.165	.245
	Income	.008	.046	.008	.162	.871
	Own property in the south (1=not own, 2=own)	-.496	.246	.102	-2.013	.045
Block 2	(Constant)	-.821	1.239		-.663	.508
	Age	.011	.007	.083	1.644	.101
	Gender	-.072	.207	-.017	-.346	.729
	Urban/Rural	-.107	.190	-.024	-.561	.575
	Education	-.013	.094	-.007	-.139	.889
	Income	.029	.041	.033	.714	.476
	Own property in the south (1=not own, 2=own)	-.039	.226	.008	-.175	.861
	Support for Peace Building Activities	.485	.088	.312	5.522	.000
	Expectations of Peace	.196	.070	.140	2.803	.005
	Likelihood of escalation	.197	.098	.091	2.006	.046
	Severity of Escalation	.067	.102	.030	.660	.510
	Ethos of Conflict	.243	.115	.109	2.118	.035
	Feelings towards GCs	.034	.034	.052	1.010	.313
	Contact in FB with GCs	.044	.064	.033	.686	.493
	Intergroup Trust	.101	.032	.167	3.115	.002
	Identification	.013	.107	.005	.120	.905
Religious Practicing	-.058	.067	-.042	-.857	.392	

Adjusted R² = 0.26

3.6. Differences in the positions of E. Tatar- M. Akinci voters

Given the fact that the data in the Turkish Cypriot community were collected just two months after the elections for the new Turkish Cypriot leader in October 2020 a specific question that requested participants to state what they voted during the second round of election between E. Tatar and M. Akinci offered the opportunity for a comparison of the views of the voters of the two candidates. Such an analysis is very important given the recent public statements by Mr E. Tatar who along with Turkish officials states that he is not planning to negotiate on the basis of BBF and is asking for a solution on the basis of two states which raises the question of whether the people who voted for him still accept or reject BBF which is the solution insisted upon not only by the Greek Cypriot and Greek side but also the EU, UNSG and latest Security Council resolutions.

Interestingly the analysis below on the most important political questions clarifies that about half of the supporters of Ersin Tatar are supporters not only of peace but also of the compromises necessary to find a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of BBF. This finding clearly supports the rejection of the argument that the recent results of the election in the north was a referendum on BBF and its future.

Table 12. Wish or No wish for Peace, Solution of the Cyprus issue, trade off, BBF

Wish/No wish	Ersin Tatar voters		Mustafa Akinci voters	
	Wish	No wish	Wish	No wish
Achieving peace (as you define and understand it) between the two communities in Cyprus	34%	66%	79.8%	20.2%
Ending the Cyprus problem	56.2%	43.8%	90.4%	9.6%
Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that addresses the core needs of both communities.	69.5%	30.5%	91.6%	8.4%
Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that assures political equality for Turkish Cypriots and assures security for Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence.	68.5%	31.5%	84.7%	15.3%
A mutually agreed upon accord that will result in a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation	50.5%	49.5%	82,2%	17.8%

As far as *expectations for reaching peace* is concerned, scores on this scale also differ significantly between the voters of E. Tatar and M. Akinci. The vast majority of E.Tatar voters are pessimistic about a positive outcome but only half are pessimistic in the case of Akinci supporters.

Table 13. Evaluation of success prospects for Peace, Solution of the Cyprus issue, trade off, BBF

Evaluation of success	Ersin Tatar voters		Mustafa Akinci Voters	
	Likely	Unlikely	Likely	Unlikely
Achieving peace (as you define and understand it) between the two communities in Cyprus	18.8%	81.2%	43%	57%
Ending the Cyprus problem	24.7%	75.3%	48.1%	51.9%
Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that addresses the core needs of both communities.	32,5%	67.5%	55.5%	44.5%
Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that assures political equality for Turkish Cypriots and assures security for Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence.	34.8%	65.2%	49.7%	50.3%
A mutually agreed upon accord that will result in a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation	31.6%	68.4%	50.1%	49.9%

Finally, as the table below suggests again about 50% of Ersin Tatar voters would be ready to support various peace building activities between the two communities.

Table 14. Willingness to support Peace Building Activities

Willingness to support	Ersin Tatar voters			Mustafa Akinci Voters		
	Willing	Neutral	Unwilling	Willing	Neutral	Unwilling
Support peacebuilding initiatives between the two communities	51.9%	14.1%	34.7%	83.8%	7.1%	9.1%
When possible, take part in a joint demonstration demanding peace	30.3%	8%	61.7%	77.3%	5.2%	17.5%
Vote in the next elections for a candidate or party that is willing to make concessions in order to reach peace.	48%	9.4%	42.6%	85.2%	3.9%	10.9%
Compromise on land issues in order to reach peace.	42.1%	10.2%	47.7%	84.6%	6.4%	9%

3.7 Comparison with the Israeli-Palestine case

The issue of hope has been examined in Israel and Palestine before by members of the research team. For comparative reasons we compared scales and relationships between variables in both Israelis and Palestinians that could afford comparisons to due measurement in similar ways. The scales that were available were the following: 1) Wish for Peace⁴, 2) Expectations for Peace, 3) Support for Peace Building, 4) Likelihood of escalation and 5) Severity of escalation. Table 15 below presents the means and standard deviations of the above variables and a comparison of the means in the two groups after the application of an independent samples t-test.

Table 15. Comparisons between Israelis and Palestinians

	Community	N	Range	Mean	SD	p value*
Wish for Peace	ISR	500	1-6	4.94	1.07	.001
	PAL	500		4.53	1.19	
Expectations of Peace	ISR	500	1-6	2.27	1.15	.001
	PAL	500		2.73	1.30	
Support for Peace Building	ISR	500	1-5	2.27	0.99	.29
	PAL	500		2.21	0.90	
Expectation of Escalation	ISR	500	1-5	4.00	1.02	.019
	PAL	500		3.82	1.39	
Severity of Escalation	ISR	500	1-5	3.59	1.24	.91
	PAL	500		3.60	1.50	
Ethos of Conflict	ISR	500	1-5	3.90	0.63	.001
	PAL	500		4.16	0.81	

The findings from this different context of a hot conflict are both different and same to the findings from the frozen conflict of Cyprus. Starting from the similarities, the differences between wish and expectations for peace are very big with most people in both communities wishing for peace but not expecting to see it materialise. Severity of escalation, as in Cyprus is expected to be high but the expectations for escalation seem to be much higher in Israel compared to Cyprus which is to be

⁴ The wish for peace scale is based on 4 wish items, expectations for peace scale is based on 4 expectation items. Cronbach's α is Wish for peace: (ISR = .80, PAL = .73); Expectations for peace: (ISR: .92, PAL: .81). Support for peacebuilding is based on 5 items. Cronbach's alpha is (ISR = .82, PAL = .62). Expectations and severity of escalation was assessed with one item each. Ethos of Conflict scale is based on 5 items. Cronbach's alpha is (ISR = .76, PAL = .52).

expected given the ongoing conflict in Israel and Palestine. Ethos of conflict is somewhat higher in Israel which is again expected which also negatively affects support for peace building activities as suggested by a strong negative correlation registered in Table 16 ($r=-0.63$) and a weaker one in Table 17 ($r=-0.18$) below for Israelis and Palestinians correspondingly. Overall support for peace building activities is much higher in Cyprus compared to Israel and Palestine which suggests that the situation in Cyprus is much more ripe for conflict transformation and resolution.

The correlation Tables below (Tables 16 and 17) are largely similar in structure and magnitude to the corresponding ones in Cyprus on variables comparable to the two contexts. In particular, both components of hope (wish and expectations) are moderately and positively correlated with support for peace building activities in both the Israeli and Palestinian sample as it was the case in Cyprus in both communities. Interestingly there is a clear pattern of findings relating to age in the Israeli sample, similar to the pattern identified in the Greek Cypriot community where older people were more likely to support peace and have higher wishes and expectations for peace compared to younger people.

Table 16. Bivariate Correlations (Israeli Sample)

	Gender	Age	Education	Support for Peace Building	Wish for Peace	Expectations of Peace	Expectations of Escalation	Severity of Escalation	Ethos of Conflict
Gender	1								
Age	-0.04	1							
Education	-0.06	0.06	1						
Support for Peace Building	0.04	0.19***	0.14***	1					
Wish for Peace	0.04	0.20***	0.07	0.54***	1				
Expectations of Peace	0.05	0.09*	0.04	0.42***	0.24***	1			
Expectations of Escalation	0.09*	-0.22***	-0.03	-0.05	0.00	-0.25***	1		
Severity of Escalation	0.35***	-0.13**	-0.04	0.14**	0.20***	-0.00	0.32***	1	
Ethos of Conflict	-0.05	-0.18***	-0.12**	-0.63***	-0.28***	-0.35***	0.19***	0.00	1

Table 17. Bivariate Correlations (Palestinian Sample)

	Gender	Age	Education	Support for Peace Building	Wish for Peace	Expectations of Peace	Expectations of Escalation	Severity of Escalation	Ethos of Conflict
Gender	1								
Age	-0.10*	1							
Education	0.06	-0.32***	1						
Support for Peace Building	-0.04	0.05	0.03	1					
Wish for Peace	0.08	0.04	-0.06	0.36***	1				
Expectations of Peace	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.34***	0.28***	1			
Expectations of Escalation	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.08	-0.09*	1		
Severity of Escalation	0.09*	0.12**	-0.10*	0.08	0.12**	-0.06	0.33***	1	
Ethos of Conflict	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	-0.18***	-0.00	-0.20***	0.19***	0.06	1

4. DISCUSSION

In order to make sense of these findings it might be best if present findings are placed within a time perspective. In Appendix I we present the trends from previous findings of research with representative sample surveys in the Greek Cypriot community conducted by the University Centre for Field Studies at the University of Cyprus and its various research partners in other universities. In Appendix II the corresponding Figures are presented for the Turkish Cypriot community.

The figures of Appendix I and II suggest that there are variables that show stability through time and others that show malleability and change. For example, identification is generally stable since 2007 with a slight strengthening of the Cypriocentric orientation in the last years in both communities. However, prejudice seems to be more malleable and to some extent dependant on election processes and developments around the negotiations in the Greek Cypriot community. In the Turkish Cypriot community there seems to be a steady decrease of prejudice in the last years which is probably mostly due to contact made possible by the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 (see Psaltis, 2012; Yucel & Psaltis, 2019,2020). Views about the status quo are more volatile and this is expected because they probably depend on regional developments around the East Med in the last few years and for GCs especially the threat of opening Varosha under TC administration. In the Turkish Cypriot community there seems to be an increasing cultivation of a federalist mentality since 2007 with a majority now being clearly supportive of BBF despite a post-Crans Montana fatigue and disappointment which resulted in higher acceptance of the status quo and two states by TCs. As far the propensity to a YES or NO vote in a possible referendum the results are really interesting as they go against popular views that GCs are more prone to a NO than to a YES vote and TCs being more prone to a YES than a NO vote. In fact in recent years there is a general tendency for the opposite trend with YES voters outvoting NO voters by 2:1 in the GC community and NO Voters outvoting YES voters by 2:1 in the TC community. This finding in the GC community bodes well with an increasing support for BBF after the Crans Montana period and relating to an increasing rejection of the status quo.

Wish for BBF in the present research was registered by a clear majority of 66,5% in the Greek Cypriot community and 63,6% in the Turkish Cypriot community. The question relating to the stance on BBF was somewhat different compared to the way it was put in previous research reported in Appendix I, Figure AI.6 where participants were offered three options (Against, In favor and Neither Against nor in favor but I would tolerate it if necessary).

In this research no middle option of “could tolerate if necessary” was present and the question was framed as “wish for solution on the basis of BBF” with options 1,2, and 3 stating variations of “no wish” and 4,5,6 stating variations of “wish”. No middle option was given this time so it was only expected that the percentage of wish will be somewhat lower to the one we got in March 2020 (Loizides et al., in press) where the percentage of those in favor BBF together with those who could tolerate it if necessary added up to 76%. Thus this is the fourth finding in the last four years after the Crans Montana failure that indicates support for a solution on the basis of BBF in both communities by a clear majority.

The possible explanations to the rise of Greek Cypriot support for federalism (BBF) could be driven by changes across various demographic groups (not just ‘urban Nicosia’ as often reported in the media). Greek Cypriot refugees are now more likely to support power sharing and certain trade-offs compared to the past. This was demonstrated in the analysis of data from 2016 and 2017 surveys (Psaltis, Cakal, Loizides, Kuscu, 2019). This was not obvious in the Annan Plan referendum results or surveys conducted after the Annan plan period (e.g. Lordos, 2009). It is a mistake to see refugees as a declining constituency. In the 2016 survey we found that a majority 51% of the Greek Cypriot population relates to refugee status either via property, parents, grandparents or spouse (see Stefanovic, Psaltis, Loizides, 2016⁵). It is also evident in the social media as most of the vocal reunification voices tend to be refugees. There is a sense of betrayal that promises given in 2004 have not been implemented now more vocal than ever in the social media. Additional corroborating evidence is the new party representing Famagusta for Cyprus and its wider appeal. Exclusion of the refugees as a demographic group from decision making is another factor as we observe almost no representation of IDPs in the cabinet, national council or negotiation team. Developments in Varosha, have added to the mobilization of this group. This is supported by current findings where we have seen that IDPs who entertain thoughts about return are more likely to support peace initiatives and wish for peace. Given the obvious possibility of return under Greek Cypriot administration for IDPs from Varosha they would be more likely to support BBF. Nevertheless, what was notable in the present research is that we found a similar finding of IDPs favouring a solution more than non-IDPs not in the GC community but this time in the TC community. This could be because of the recent developments around Varoshia. From a GC IDP perspective seeing the new Turkish Cypriot leader playing along Erdogan’s plans to open Varosha

⁵ <https://unitecyprusnow.org/cyprob/opinion-polls/121-current-views-of-greek-cypriot-displaced-persons-on-return-and-property-restitution-university-of-cyprus-university-of-kent?fbclid=IwAR0YCWAAAMgtBN4bC-o39cjujicnseKfkGkDn--qvfaT0ZRwBci-hy-M3--I>

under TC administration could be seen as adding salt to the wounds of IDPs and despite the mobilization of many GC IDPs originating from Varoshia for those IDPs from other parts of Cyprus that would not get the chance to return in case of a solution this could just be an additional verification of the expansionist Turkey that could demobilize an equal number if not even more than the Famagustians from supporting a solution. On the contrary the prospect of opening Varoshia could make TC IDP's realize that the Cyprus problem would close without a solution which is a development that would indefinitely perpetuate the insecurity of the ownership of the properties they now use in the north or complete abandoning of any aspiration on retrieving their own properties in the south. It could also be that as IDP's themselves they were more likely to sympathize with the agony of GC IDPs from Varosha who were seeing their properties being snatched in front of their own eyes by the Turkish Cypriot leader and Erdogan.

Another reason for the support of BBF is prejudice reduction via contact. Previous research findings demonstrate that increasing bicomunal contact during the period after the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 has led to more reconciliatory attitudes (see Psaltis & Yucel, 2019,2020). The active engagement of bicomunal associations is driving this trend among broader sectors of the society; another evidence is how quickly these groups re-organized themselves online during the pandemic .

Finally, there are also political developments that support a more pro-federalist turn. Unlike 2004, AKEL is now fully in favour of Federal reunification; the party's own base elected Niyazi Kizilyurek to the European parliament. Kizilyurek's election had an impressive positive impact contrary to many predictions. AKEL has now a positive storyline and more importantly a bicomunal positive ethos that has spread to its grassroots. Support for the so-called centrist parties is declining while DISY seems to be now aware of its weakening support among pro-federalist voters (Loizides, 2012)⁶.

Another interpretation of this turn could be that the 2020 crises in the Eastern Mediterranean have added to fears of a new escalation where Cypriots risk bearing the consequences. However, the present findings would seem to support this interpretation more in the TC than the GC community. This is because we have seen that expectations of escalation were positively related to wish for BBF in the TC community whilst negatively related to wish for BBF in the GC community. The Guterres package

⁶ https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137100801_11

ironically addressed these fears through its security and implementation mechanisms (its key approach to the Cyprus settlement was safeguarding political equality for the Turkish Cypriots while assuring security to Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence).

Overall, the present findings bring to the surface the important role played by hope in peace processes and the negative impact it has on support for peace building activities and an agreed compromise solution on the basis of BBF. Given the new 5+1 meeting it now seems imperative that the two leaders do their utmost to bring back hope to the people about the future of a reunited island. The high level of distrust (especially in the TC community) could be addressed by new CBMs and the reopening of the checkpoints under a regime that allows people to cross by showing rapid test results that could be offered for free at the checkpoints. Whilst digital contact seems to feel some of the gap in prejudice reduction mechanisms in the TC community left by the lack of physical contacts unfortunately we found no evidence of beneficial effects of the frequency of digital contacts in the GC community which is disconcerting and underlines the need for the resumption of crossing through the checkpoints as soon as possible.

On the positive side of things, the constituency of the newly elected leader in the north not unanimously or even in its majority against BBF. This suggests that there is space for him for political maneuvering in the upcoming 5+1 meeting if the GC leadership accepts without conditions the political equality as described in UN Security Council resolutions which was a constant demand of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that assures political equality for Turkish Cypriots and assures security for Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence was found to be supported by 84% of the GCs and 60% of TCs in the present research.

Finally, the present findings stress the urgency of finding a solution to the Cyprus issue as soon as possible. This comes from the age related findings. Every year that passes by with the Cyprus issue unresolved thousands of first generation of IDP's are lost which are now a positive force for a solution and keeps the spirit of return alive. This is not to deny that the ethos of conflict is losing its force with passing time in both communities as we see that the scores of the youth on this scale are lower compared to the scores of older people. Still lesser ethos of conflict is not necessarily translated into wish for a solution on the basis of BBF and this is because it becomes apparent that the youth (especially in the GC community) are more reluctant to accept BBF which is probably due to a lack of

education in this system of governance which has been discussed at the political level since 1977. There is therefore an urgent need not just for intergroup contact schemes like the Imagine programme but also of a revision of history textbooks that still cultivates the one sided sense of victimization in both communities which leads to threats, prejudice and distrust but also for civic education lessons and an information campaign about what a Federation is and why it is the supported solution by the UN and the international community since 1977.

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APPENDIX I

FINDINGS FROM THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN THE PERIOD 2007-2020




Figure AI.1. Prejudice levels of Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots in the period 2007-2020




Figure AI.2. National Identification of Greek Cypriots in the period 2007-2020




Figure AI.3. Stance towards keeping the current situation (Status Quo) in the period 2010-2020




Figure AI.4. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards Unitary State in the period 2010-2020




Figure AI.5. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards Two States in the period 2010-2020



Stance towards Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation 2010-2020 (Greek Cypriots)

Either in favour or I would tolerate if necessary (2020)



Acceptance Percentage 2010-2020



Note: Data collection in 2017 was completed 3 months before Crans

Montana (UCFS) and 5 months after Crans

Montana (International Cooperation 5 Universities)

2019 data collection completed in first months of 2019 (ESS R9)

In 2020 it was completed in March 2020 (KENT-UCFS)



In the last decade the percentage of people who reject BBF has been significantly reduced. On the contrary the people with a federalist mentality have more than doubled. The two bigger groups today are either the people who support BBF or could tolerate it as a solution of necessity. Together they form a majority of 76% according to more recent data available in 2020

Figure A1.6. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF) in the period 2010-2020




Figure AI.7. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards referendum scenario in the period 2013-2020

APPENDIX II

FINDINGS FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN THE PERIOD 2007-2020




Figure All.1. Prejudice levels of Turkish Cypriots towards Greek Cypriots in the period 2007-2020




Figure AII.2. National Identification of Turkish Cypriots in the period 2007-2020




Figure AII.3. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards keeping the current situation (Status Quo) in the period 2010-2020




Figure All.4. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards Unitary State in the period 2010-2020



Stance towards two states 2010-2020 (Turkish Cypriots)

% In favor of Two state solution in 2020



Percentage of Acceptance 2010-2020



Note: Data collection in 2017 was completed 5 months after Crans Montana (International Cooperation 5 Universities)

In 2020 it was completed in March 2020 (KENT-UCFS)



After the Crans Montana failure there is an increasing acceptance of the two state solution in the Turkish Cypriot community



Figure AI.5. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards Two States in the period 2010-2020




Figure AII.6. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards Bizonal Bicomunal Federation (BBF) in the period 2010-2020



Figure AI.7. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards referendum scenario in the period 2013-2020

APPENDIX III

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TELEPHONE SURVEY (In Green highlight adjustments for the Greek Cypriot version can be seen below).

Intro

Good morning/day. My name is and I am calling you from (Lipa Consultancy in the Turkish Cypriot community/ University Center for Field Studies of the University of Cyprus in the Greek Cypriot community). We are conducting a pancyprian research on recent social and political developments and your opinion is important to us. The questionnaire takes only 15 minutes and all the information will remain anonymous and confidential. Would you like to participate in our research?

Screening - Are you above 18 years old and have voting rights in Cyprus?

YES	NO
1	2

Q1. First, we want to hear your opinions on the relations between people and political situations. Some people feel that citizens can influence politics while others think citizens can have no influence on politics. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means *Completely disagree* and 5 *Completely agree*, how much do you agree with the statements below?

		1 Completely disagree	2 Somewhat disagree	3 Neutral	4 Somewhat agree	5 Completely agree	99 N/A – D/K
1	As citizens, there is always something we can do to change the political situation	1	2	3	4	5	99
2	Public opinion can have a powerful impact on governments	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q2. Now we want to hear your personal attitudes towards uncertainty. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means *Completely disagree* and 5 *Completely agree*, how much do you agree with the statements below?

		1 Completely disagree	2 Somewhat disagree	3 Neutral	4 Somewhat agree	5 Completely agree	99 N/A – D/K
1	It's OK that some things about our future are uncertain	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q3. Now we would like to learn about your feelings about the *future* of Cyprus in relation to the Cyprus issue.

Please think about the far future and mark your feelings towards the following sentence:

“When I imagine the future of Cyprus if feel....

		1	2	3	4	5	6		99 (N/A, D/K)
1	Hopeless	1	2	3	4	5	6	Hopeful	

Now we would like to learn about your feelings about the *future* of Cyprus in relation to the Cyprus issue.

Please think about the far future and mark your feelings towards the following sentence:

“When I imagine the future of Cyprus if feel....

		1	2	3	4	5	6		99 (N/A, D/K)
2	Afraid							Unafraid	

Q4. As we all know, there is a difference between what people wish for and what they expect will happen. In the next questions, we are interested to learn only about your wishes for the future.

On a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means 'I have no such wish and 6 means 'I wish very much'', how much do you wish for the following statements to materialize?

		1 I have no such wish	2	3	4	5	6 I Wish very much	99
1	Achieving peace (as you define and understand it) between the two communities in Cyprus	1	2	3	4	5	6	N/A, D/K

Q5. We want to learn more about your wishes for the future. On a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means *I have no such wish* and 6 means *I wish very much*, how much do you wish for the statements below:

		1 I have no such wish	2	3	4	5	6 I Wish very much	99
1	Ending the Cyprus problem	1	2	3	4	5	6	N/A, D/K
2	Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that addresses the core needs of both communities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	N/A, D/K
3	Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that assures political equality for Turkish Cypriots and assures security for Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence.	1	2	3	4	5	6	N/A, D/K

ONE ANSWER PER ITEM

Q6. Here too, we would like to learn only about your wishes. On a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means *I have no such wish* and 6 means *I wish very much*, how much do you wish for the statements below?

		1 I have no such wish	2	3	4	5	6 I Wish very much	99
1	A mutually agreed upon accord that will result in a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation	1	2	3	4	5	6	N/A, D/K

Q7. Now, we are interested to learn only about your expectations about the future of the Cyprus problem. In other words, we want to know how much you expect the following proposition to actually materialize. On a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means *no likelihood whatsoever* to and 6 means *very high likelihood*, how likely do you think the following propositions will actually materialize?

		1 No likelihoo d	2	3	4	5	6 Very Likely	99
1	Achieving peace (as you define and understand it) between the two communities in Cyprus	1	2	3	4	5	6	N/A, D/K

Q8. We want to learn more about your expectations for the future. On a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means *no likelihood whatsoever* to and 6 means *very high likelihood*, how likely do you think the following propositions will materialize?

		1 No likeliho od	2	3	4	5	6 Very Likely	99 N/A, D/K
1	Ending the Cyprus problem	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
2	Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that addresses the core needs of both communities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
3	Ending the Cyprus problem in a way that assures political equality for Turkish Cypriots and assure security for Greek Cypriots from any Turkish influence.	1	2	3	4	5	6	99

Q9. Here too, we would like to learn only about your expectations. On a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means *no likelihood whatsoever* to and 6 means *very high likelihood*, how likely do you think the following propositions will actually materialize?

		1 No likelihood	2	3	4	5	6 Very likely	99 N/A, D/K
1	A mutually agreed upon accord that will result in a Bizonal Bicomunal Federation	1	2	3	4	5	6	99

Q10. Now we are interested in learning about your willingness to act. Please rate the extent you'll be willing to do the following things if you could. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means *completely unwilling* and 5 means *completely willing*, how much you willing to:

		1 Complet ely Unwilling	2 Somewh at Unwilling	3 Neutral	4 Somewh at willing	5 Complet ely Willing	99 N/A, D/K
1	Support peacebuilding initiatives between the two communities	1	2	3	4	5	99
2	When possible, take part in a joint demonstration demanding peace	1	2	3	4	5	99
3	Vote in the next elections for a candidate or party that is willing to make concessions in order to reach peace.	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Compromise on land issues in order to reach peace.						

Q12. Now we interested in your perceptions about several scenarios of escalation. We start with minor issues and continue with more major ones.

We are first interested in your assessment of the likelihood that the following escalation scenarios will happen. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means very unlikely and 5 very likely, how likely do you think the following scenarios will occur?"

		1 Very Unlikely	2	3	4	5 Very Likely	99 N/A, D/K
1	Both Sides will use sanctions against each other (e.g. unilateral closing the borders)	1	2	3	4	5	99

2	When borders are reopened, people from my community will be discriminated against when cross to the other side	1	2	3	4	5	99
3a	Greek Cypriots will push the EU to suspend aid to the North/ Turkish Cypriots will open and colonize the city of Varosia	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Political Tensions between Greece and Turkey will evolve into confrontations between Greece and Turkey	1	2	3	4	5	99
5	Regional confrontations will spill over to inter-communal violence within the island	1	2	3	4	5	99
6	Armed conflict will commence in the Island	1	2	3	4	5	99

ONE ANSWER PER ITEM

Q13. "Second, we wish to learn about your concerns regarding the amount of harm caused for your community if these scenarios were to actually happen. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means not that harmful and 5 means very harmful, please rate how much harm you think will be caused for your community if the following scenarios would indeed happen.

		<i>not that harmful</i>	2	3	4	<i>very harmful,</i>	99 N/A, D/K
1	Both Sides will use sanctions against each other (e.g. unilateral closing the borders)	1	2	3	4	5	99
2	When borders are reopened, people from my community will be discriminated against when cross to the other side	1	2	3	4	5	99
3a	Greek Cypriots will push the EU to suspend aid to the North/ Turkish Cypriots will open and colonize the city of Varosia	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Political Tensions between Greece and Turkey will evolve into confrontations between Greece and Turkey	1	2	3	4	5	99
5	Regional confrontations spill over to inter-communal violence within the island	1	2	3	4	5	99
6	Armed conflict will commence in the Island	1	2	3	4	5	99

ONE ANSWER PER ITEM

Q14. The next sentences are about national beliefs. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means *completely disagree* and 5 *completely agree*, how much do you agree or disagree with the statements below:

		1 Completely disagree	2 Somewhat disagree	3 Neutral	4 Somewhat agree	5 Completely agree	DK/NA
1	Turkish Cypriots/ Greek Cypriots have always aspired for peace	1	2	3	4	5	99
2	Turkish Cypriots / Greek Cypriots have always been subjected to disproportionate aggression from the side of the Greek Cypriots	1	2	3	4	5	99
3	I do not believe in the peaceful intentions of the Greek Cypriots/ Turkish Cypriots	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Untrustworthiness has always characterized the Greek Cypriots/ Turkish Cypriots	1	2	3	4	5	99
5	We should not let the Greek Cypriots / Turkish Cypriots see that there are disagreements within our community regarding the resolution of the conflict	1	2	3	4	5	99
6	Encouraging loyalty towards the Turkish Cypriots / Greek Cypriot community should be one of the education system's most important goals	1	2	3	4	5	99

ONE ANSWER PER ITEM

AGE. We would like to ask you now when you were born.

.....

FILTER- IF in Q1 PARTICIPANT BORN AFTER 1974 THEN GO TO QUESTION Q17, IF PARTICIPANT WAS BORN BEFORE 1974 GO TO Q 16

Q16. Did you personally have had to leave your home in the South Cyprus/ **Occupied part** (ie displaced / refugees) due to the events of **1974** or 1963-1964 or 1958 in Cyprus? (1-Yes, 2-No)

Yes	1
No	2
(Refusal)	7
(I don't know)	8

Q17. Did one or two of your parents or grandparents have had to leave their place of occupation in the SOUTH Cyprus (ie became displaced / refugees) because of the events of 1974 or 1963-1964 or 1958 in Cyprus? (1-Yes, 2-No)

Yes	1
No	2
(Refusal)	7
(I don't know)	8

Q18. Do you personally own property in the SOUTH Cyprus? (1-Yes, 2-No)

Yes	1
No	2
(Refusal)	7
(I don't know)	8

Q18.A Where are you displaced from/or have property in south Cyprus/**occupied area**?

--

Q20. On a scale of 1-7 where one means NEVER and 7 means ALWAYS how often do you think about returning to the place from which you are displaced?

Never						Always	N / A
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99

Q21. On a scale of 1-7 where 1 means VERY UNLIKELY and 7 means VERY LIKELY how possible is for you to return and live in the house you lived before 1974 within 3 years after the settlement, if the Cyprus problem is resolved in the next two years?

		Very unlikely						Very likely	N / A
<u>1</u>	<u>Under Greek Cypriot administration</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
<u>2</u>	<u>Under Turkish Cypriot administration</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99

Q22. Referring to the issue of return, what of the following factors, if any, are you worried about the prospect in case of return to your old house ?

		Does not apply						Definitely applies	
1	I've made my life here and I do not want a restart	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
2	There will be significant costs involved in the upgrading of my old home	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
3	I'm worried about finding a job	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
4	I'm worried about hospitals and other social services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
5	I am worried that there will be no schools to send my children	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
6	I am worried about my personal security	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
7	I'm worried about my family's safety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
8	I stopped having an emotional connection to my old place	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
9	I do not want to live close to those who need me to leave my home	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
10	I am worried that very few in my community will come back	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
11	I would feel isolated	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
12	The other members of my family do not want to go back	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99

ONE ANSWER PER ITEM

Q23. As we said the purpose of this research is to investigate the opinions of the Cypriot society on various social issues of the Cypriot society.

The following questions concern your feelings towards Various groups in general. Please rate EACH group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one hundred (100) degrees. The higher the grade the warmest or positive you feel towards this group. The lower the degree, the coldest or negatively you feel towards that group. If you feel neither warm nor cold towards this group place your mark at 50.

How do you feel toward....?

	Very cold or negative					neutral					Very hot or positive	<i>refusal</i>	DK
1. towards Greek Cypriots/ Turkish Cypriots in general?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
2. towards Greeks/ Turks in general?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
3. towards Turks/ Greeks in general?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99

Q25. Thinking of social contacts – communicating and talking - how often do you have contact these days with Greek Cypriots in each of the following situations? READ OUT...

		Never	Less than once a month	Once a month	Several times a month	Once a week	Several times a week	Every day	NA	DK
1.	On social media (e.g. Facebook)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	88

ONE ANSWER

Q26. Do you think most Greek Cypriots would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance or would they try to be fair?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
Most Greek Cypriots would try to take advantage of me										Most Greek Cypriots would try to be fair	<i>Refusal</i>	<i>I don't know</i>

ONE ANSWER

Q27. Which of the following identities best describes yourself?

ONLY ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE [IT WILL BE ADJUSTED FOR TCS CORRESPONDINGLY]

Only Turk and not Cypriot	More Turk than Cypriot	To the same extend Turk and Cypriot	More Cypriot than Turk	Only Cypriot and not Turk	DK/N A
1	2	3	4	5	99

ONE ANSWER

Q28. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms etc., how often do you go to mosque/church ?

Never	Once a year	Once a month	Once every two weeks	Once a week	D/K
1	2	3	4	5	99

ONE ANSWER

Q31. Regarding the past Presidential elections held in 11th of October in North Cyprus which of the following candidates did you vote for? (For the GC community a question was asked about future presidential elections with Greek Cypriot candidates)

Answers - Normal (as entered)

- 1 MUSTAFA AKINCI
- 2 KUDRET ÖZERSAY
- 3 ERSİN TATAR
- 4 TUFAN ERHÜRMAN
- 5 SERDAR DENKTAŞ
- 6 ERHAN ARIKLI
- 7 OTHER
- 8 I Did not go to vote
- 9 DON'T WANT TO ANSWER /REFUSAL

Q32. Who DID you vote for in the second round of the recent presidential elections held in October 18th?

1	MOUSTAFA AKKINCI
2	ERSIN TATAR
99	DK/NA

DEMOGRAPHICS

DEM1.SEX

Male	1
Female	2

DEM2. In which District do you live?

	DISTRICT
Nicosia	1
Trikomo/Limassol	2
Morphou/Larnaca	3
Kerynia/Paphos	4
Famagusta	5

DEM2.A. Do you live in urban or rural area?

	AREA
URBAN	1
RURAL	2

DEM 5. Education (over 18)

Reads and writes	1
Completed Elementary	2
Completed Gymnasium	3
Completed Lyceum	4
Completed College/ATI	5
Completed University	6
Completed Postgraduate studies	7
NR	98
DK	99

DEM 6. What is your PERSONAL NET monthly income in Euros. (Categories were adjusted in Turkish Lira for the Turkish Cypriots).

€250 - €800	01
€801 - €1700	02
€1701 - €2600	03
€2601 - €4300	04
€4301 - €6000	05
More than €6000	06
No income	07

NA	99
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE TIME YOU DEVOTED TO THIS RESEARCH!

We have reached the end of our survey! Thank you very much for your time and cooperation!

Additional Questions that were asked in the Greek Cypriot version of the Questionnaire and the Turkish Cypriot pre-election questionnaire

Q 24. What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or other Greek Cypriots during the conflict (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 – NR

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not sure	Agree	Strongly Agree	NA /DK
24.1	They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace	1	2	3	4	5	99
24.2	They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims' families	1	2	3	4	5	99
24.3	They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished	1	2	3	4	5	99
24.4	War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims	1	2	3	4	5	99
24.5	The Turkish state should pay financial compensation to victims	1	2	3	4	5	99
24.6	They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted	1	2	3	4	5	99

Q29. The following statements are about your political views regarding the Cyprus problem. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means NEVER and 7 means Frequently, how often you engage in the following? (READ OUT):

		Never						Frequently	NA
1.	I attend informational meetings to discuss the Cyprus problem.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
2.	I attend talks in favour of my or my group's political perspective to the Cyprus Problem	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
3.	I attend a political organization's meeting in favour of my or my group's political perspective to the Cyprus Problem.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99