THE MERIT OF MISFORTUNE: TAIPING REBELLION AND THE RISE OF INDIRECT TAXATION IN MODERN CHINA, 1850S-1900S

Hanzhi DENG | H.DENG8@LSE.AC.UK | Department of Economic History


SCENARIO SETTING: Political Disorder and Fiscal Capacity with Evidence from Late Imperial China

The Making of a Modern Fiscal State

- Public Financial History: Schumpeter (1954), Dickson (1967), Ormrod et al. (1999), Bonney (1999)
- conomics: North and Weingast (1989), Fratianni and Spinelli (2006), Drelichman and Voth (2008), Dincecco (2009)
- Historical Sociology: Brewer (1988), Tilly (1992), Downing (1992)

Why a Comparative Perspective?

- Constructive but Controversial Elements of a Fiscal State: power consolidation, bureaucracy, monetarized taxation, indirect taxation, credit tools, etc. (Brewer, 1988; O'Brien and Hunt, 1999; Epstein, 2002)
- Non-European Evidence in Various Historical Contexts: (2012), He (2013), Frankema and Van Waijenburg (2014), Ko et al. (2018)





RESEARCH FOCUS: The Role of Taiping Rebellion in the Rise of the Indirect Taxation in Late Imperial China

Question: Besides international wars, what was the role of the domestic chaos in the Late Qing fiscal transitions?

Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) The largest internal war in Chinese history

12 provinces occupied

silver taels of 171M military spending

14 years for suppression

70M casualties



Mechanism

The central government, given the scarce fiscal resource and the inability to suppress the rebels, had to delegate its power to local governments by encouraging their private militias.

To finance the militias, local governments started levying commercial tax (lijin) from local trade; the lucrative taxation persisted even after the suppression of the Rebellion and made the local fiscal systems highly autonomous.

ypothesis: There is a positive link between military conflicts during the Taiping Rebellion and the rise of local indirect taxation (lijin) as an autonomous

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: Cross Sectional Data and OLS estimates for 266 prefectures in China

Cross Sectional Data for 266 prefectures

Compiling information on Taiping battles and locating them to prefectures: evaluate the severity of the battles and give scores to them


1856 1854 1855 1857 1858

Three Measurements Dummy Duration

Severity

Dummy

Duration



Severity

Compiling information about lijin stations, staffing and revenues from provincial financial reports of 1908 Fiscal Reorganization Campaign

Controls



 $= \beta_0 + \beta_1$

Three Measurements Main Iijin Stations Lijin Employees Estimated Annual lijin Revenue (all weighted by land size)

Density of Main Stations





Empirical Strategy

Controlling other factors that affected lilin taxation: geographical / demographic condition, pre-1850 fiscal condition, post-1850 shocks, etc.

Why cross-sectional data? 1. Persistence of lijin taxation from 1860s to 1900s: 2. High data quality only for the 1908 surveys



= Density of Scatter Plot without Controls

Interpreting the Magnitude: Ceteris paribus extra 12-month Taiping battles led to 1.57 new main lijin stations, the effect of which equals that of a treaty port run for 24 years (given average prefectural land size 16,332 km²).

Taiping Severity Yangzi Rive Land Tax p.c. 1820 Domestic Custom Treaty Port Duration Natural Disaster -0.5 Taiping Severity Yangzi River Latitude Land Tax p.c. 1820 Domestic Custom Taiping Severity Coas Yangzi Rive Latitude Land Tax p.c. 1820 Domestic Custom 75



MECHANISMS AND IMPLICATIONS: More Identification Strategies and Discussions on Long-Term Economic Consequences

1. Using Panel Data for a Dif-in-Dif Specification

- 2. Linking Indirect Taxation to Local Industrialization with Taiping Warfare as an IV
- Relevance: strong correlation between the Rebellion and the scale of the indirect taxation Exclusive Restrictions: exogeneity of the
 - Rebellion no impact on local industrialization via other channels

