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# ‘A war against our values?’ - an actor-centred comparison of anti-immigration framing in the UK, Netherlands and France.

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## Abstract

Although European radical right parties share the view that immigration to their respective nations should be reduced, the justifications or *framings* for such a position are widely varied. Applying critical discourse analysis to speeches and interviews from Nigel Farage, former leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party in the UK (UKIP), Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV) and Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally in France (RN), this research emphasises the unique combination of nativist, economic, security and liberal framings employed by each party. UKIP underlines the economic problems caused by immigration. The PVV, combining a nativist and liberal frame, highlights the incompatibility of Muslim immigrants with liberal-democratic Western society. The RN, somewhere in the middle, deploys more moderately economic and liberal frames. The parties converge on how immigration destabilises national security. Thus, this project finds a more nuanced relationship between the radical right and liberal values than traditionally theorised. Further, this research provides the opportunity for future work to connect ideological framing of radical right parties to electoral success. Empirically, this project demonstrates two concrete benefits to attending to the agency of radical right parties: first, it enables researchers to establish important differences and similarities between such parties; second, it facilitates the mapping of their shifts in framing over time.

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

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## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

At a 2008 private meeting of white nationalists in Texas, David Duke, formerly Grand Wizard of the KKK, introduced Nick Griffin, chairman of the British National Party (BNP). Griffin proceeded to advance his strategy for the radical right in order to obtain electoral success. Rather than selling-out their policies, taking on positions more like mainstream parties, he suggested they should reframe their ideas, justifying their policies using the principles of “freedom, security, identity and democracy”. Indeed, “nobody could criticise [their positions]” in the way they could criticise those positions justified by nativist sentiment (StephenGeorgeHenryM, 2009). This speech is illustrative of a shift by West European radical right parties towards using more liberal framings for their policies. This provides an insightful counterargument to the argument that populism (a label under which such parties are often classified) and liberalism are in direct opposition (Moffitt, 2017).

However, this nuancing of the relationship between liberalism and populism risks being reductionist, echoing a limitation of structural work concerned with explaining the resurgence in European radical right support. Both strands of thought may insufficiently disaggregate the individual framings of radical right parties. Indeed, although such parties desire a significant reduction in immigration, homogenisation of the group as all being ‘radical right’, either to account for their increased liberal rhetoric or to develop a structural explanation for their resurgence, leaves little space for parties’ individuality. Indeed, it is impossible to properly distinguish in the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) between the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Party for Freedom (PVV) and the National Rally (RN) in

their immigration policies and positions on immigrant and asylum seeker integration. In other words, considering each radical right party's anti-immigration framing enables researchers to break apart the category *radical right* and in so doing, to better highlight the similarities and differences between such parties.



Thus, this project has two empirical purposes:

- To highlight the similarities and differences between the framings of UKIP in the UK<sup>1</sup>, the PVV in the Netherlands and the RN in France used to justify their anti-immigration positions.
- To identify any changes within each case over time.

However, it also has two theoretical intentions:

- To emphasise the nuanced relationship between populism and liberalism.
- To provide an empirical platform for future work to connect ideological framing to electoral success.

Research is actor-centred through critical discourse analysis of speeches by and interviews with: Nigel Farage (UKIP), Marine Le Pen (RN) and Geert Wilders (PVV). This project then adds to and compares its findings with secondary data from the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) and the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP). I also utilise electoral posters to further substantiate each account.

In brief, I argue that UKIP, the PVV and the RN employ different framings for justifying their similar policy positions on reducing immigration. Whilst each stresses security, UKIP utilises such sentiment in addition to an economic frame. At the other end of the spectrum, the PVV combine a nativist and liberal framing and finding midground, the RN employs both an economic and liberal frame. In the literature review there are some brief references to other West European radical right parties to provide relevant additional context.

UKIP's concern for the economy is threefold: they argue that immigration puts pressure on wages, the job market and public services, particularly housing, the NHS and schools. This places blame on the structural-economic conditions in which migrants operate. In

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<sup>1</sup> The Brexit Party is treated as the continuation of Nigel Farage's UKIP politics. As such, his 2019 speech for the Brexit party is included in the UKIP discourse analysis.

contrast, the PVV are willing to underscore the culpability of individual immigrants, de-emphasising any structural constraints. Couching their language in a civilisational clash between the West and Islam, the PVV posits Muslim immigrants hold beliefs incompatible with the liberal-democratic values of Western Europe. This makes their framing both liberal in fronting values such as freedom of speech, intolerance of homophobia and sexism, but also illiberal, as well as nativist, in their reductionist conceptualisation of Islam. The RN's middle ground emphasises both the detrimental economic consequences of immigration, but also emphasises how fundamentalist Islam is an imposition onto everyday public life. They present this as a contravention of the liberal French principles of secularism and equality. These differences in framing are primarily concerned with being internally valid. Equally, if successful, my methodological framework could be used as a model for future comparative work on the radical right.

### **1.1 A roadmap for users**

In the literature review, six sub-topics are explored. First, the debate over how to define the parties which are the subject of this dissertation. I classify them as 'radical right', with populism as a conditional qualifier. Second, I note how grouping radical right parties has enabled structural narratives to explain the resurgence of radical right support. These narratives are problematic on two linked accounts: they smooth over differences between parties and they lack space for radical right agency. In reaction, in the third section, I review critical literature on radical right agency. Fourth, unique to this project, I marry literature on agency to the shifting radical right's framing of anti-immigration sentiment. In the final two sections I briefly outline liberalism's nuanced relationship with populism. Finally, I explore how my project may assist future research in explaining why radical right parties choose to use certain frames and how that affects their electability.

Following the literature review, I introduce my methodology with a brief review of relevant conceptual literature. Then, I present and analyse my findings. Lastly, I conclude with a few evaluations of my work, as well as some suggestions for further research.

## 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Defining the radical right

Edgar (2016) challenges traditional conceptualisations of the far/radical right by noting that usage of the term has been applied to not just fascist and right-populists, but also groups he considers patriot movements, counter-jihadists, neoconservatives, and even philozionists. Indeed, the lack of unifying qualities and the unwillingness by certain parties to accept their status as radical right complicate any categorisation (Eatwell, 2000). A new wave of research led by Mudde (2007) has reconceptualised radical right parties as ‘populist [radical right]’. Parties are seen to contain a blend of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. However, this too has been rightly problematised for centring the term populism, and in so doing, drawing attention away from their nationalist, xenophobic and even elitist qualities (Stavrakakis et al., 2017). Indeed, the label ‘populist’ can act as a legitimising cloak for fascist parties (Eatwell, 2000; Foster 2017; Rydgren, 2017). Connected, Akkerman (2005) suggests that fronting populism diverts attention from the importance such parties place on furthering popular democracy. Separately, Art (2011) sidesteps the debate by considering ‘radical’ to already address populism’s Manichean quality, whilst arguing any engagement by parties in politics proper is definitively non-populist.

Despite definitional limitations, Mudde’s (2007) grouped radical right is the most successful new party family electorally in Western Europe (Ignazi, 1992). Further, their rise coincides with the dismantling of the post-war *cordon sanitaire* on racist rhetoric (Betz, 2002; Edgar, 2016). Indeed, often directed towards Muslims (Rydgren, 2017), anti-

immigration sentiment is a strong predictor of radical right success (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Noting the debate on populism, this project chooses to use the term ‘radical right’ with ‘populist’ as a conditional qualifier (Rydgren, 2017). I use the already existing classifications of the *PopuList*, Mudde (2007) and the CHES for what parties are constituted as radical right. This project also argues that unhelpful reductions have served to impede strong contextualised analysis; though each of the parties assessed are radical right, over-essentialisation has obscured many of their fundamental ideological differences. It is the intention of this work to explore such differences.

## **2.2 Structural explanations for radical right success**

Indeed, over-essentialisation is particularly evident in the competing structural explanations for the rise of the radical right. This section explores such homogenisation.

A primary debate centres around whether the resurgence has been the result of cultural backlash or economic inequality. Cultural explanations emphasise how dissatisfaction has been produced by the perceived threat to the status of once-dominant groups because of ethnic change and the diffusion of progressive liberal values. Gradually and silently, this process has left sections of society, particularly those older, whiter, more rural and less educated, as feeling culturally endangered and politically unrepresented (Goodwin, 2011; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). This has catalysed support for radical right parties who claim to bring back the voice of such people to politics proper, particularly at the expense of the ethnically-othered immigrant. Conversely, Funke et al. (2015) and Rodrik (2016) have de-emphasised cultural factors, suggesting that the radical right has gained support by blaming immigrants for the stagnation in wages and living standards, increased inequality and insecure employment caused by neoliberal economic policy.

Separately, though with link to the above debate, Chantal Mouffe (2000) steps back to consider the contemporary European governance model's effect on radical right success. Under what she terms the 'post-political' model, crucial decisions are taken without democratic consent (Mouffe, 2005). Furedi (2005) concurs, positing that politicians have been avowedly apolitical, deliberately re-conceptualising their covertly political actions as 'common-sense' or 'necessary'. Implicitly, this logic creates moral boundaries excluding parties who are unwilling to accept policies that have been re-constituted as necessary. This has helped radical right parties create an image of themselves as the ones who dare to speak up and in so doing, they shatter the consensual, cabal-like framework (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007). Thus, although there is a continual struggle to define the boundaries of the legitimate (Brubaker, 1995), the shutting-down of debate on the salient issue of immigration has underpinned radical right success.

Proponents have highlighted a new cleavage transgressing the conventional Left-Right divide, using some or all these explanations (Browning, 2018; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Jessop, 2017; Menon, 2018). This particularly emphasises the role of the education gap (Mayer, 2013).

### **2.3 Agency**

However, none of these explanations leaves space for radical right parties to not be passively moulded by structural factors, such as economic inequality, but also to be "independent variables, actively shaping part of their own destiny" (Mudde, 2007: 293; Pareschi and Albertini, 2018). For instance, although people's feelings of national belonging have always been strong in the UK and their sense of European identity low, both attitudes have been remarkably stable and cannot explain the recent spike in Eurosceptic sentiment. Such sentiment is better explained by considering the actions of the radical right themselves

(De Vries, 2016). Explanations fronting this radical right agency are grouped as being ‘supply-side factors’ (Bos and Van der Brug, 2010).

There is some scholarship here. Mudde (2007) draws a useful distinction between the internal supply-side (factors that relate directly to the parties such as ideology, leadership and organisation) and external supply-side (factors outside the party such as institutional arrangements or the positioning of mainstream competitors). Norris’ (2005) earlier work supports this account, highlighting how the effectiveness with which the radical right has responded to public demands has affected their electoral success. Similarly, Ignazi (2002: 36) and Ivaldi (2015) refer to the importance of “political entrepreneurs” for radical right electability. In a more localised setting, Goodwin (2009) and Eatwell (2003) consider how poor internal organisation and a weak talent pool have contributed to the BNP’s poor electoral showings. However, Art (2011) provides the most comprehensive account of radical right agency by focusing on how size, cohesion, competence, legitimacy and ideological flexibility affect electoral performance. These factors, all agential given they refer to the decisions and strategies made by specific actors, problematise the arguments in the prior section for their failure to consider how any or indeed all such factors may have also played a role in changing support for the radical right.

## **2.4 Ideological agency**

Literature on radical right agency contains some reference to the importance of ideological framing. However, none makes that central to their thesis e.g. (Art, 2011; Goodwin, 2009). Equally, empirical work on radical right changing ideology has not been couched in the language of ‘agency’. As such, this project seeks to connect such theoretical conceptualisation to more specific radical right studies by examining their framing of

immigration. This provides a more holistic basis for future work to synthesise structural and agential accounts to better explain the resurgence of radical right support.

#### *2.4.1 'Liberal' values, an introduction*

For the purposes of this project, liberalism or liberal values are conceptualised as those underpinned by the notion that humans are free and equal. This is not easily falsifiable and many principles not considered liberal can be argued to emerge from this root. As such, I solely understand it in its ideological sense, as opposed to historical or philosophical senses. Thus, adopting the framework of Freeden (2005: 15), I constitute liberalism as “an ideology that contains seven political concepts that interact at its core: liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, sociability, the general interest, and limited and accountable power”. For simplification purposes, the following are taken as core relevant liberal values: freedom of religious practice, freedom of sexuality, freedom of speech and, equality between men and women.

Exploring the relationship between anti-immigration sentiment and the radical right, literature questions the Left-Right continuum by highlighting the ongoing socialist and conservative alliance. The alliance advocates for economic and cultural protectionism, grouping Islamic fundamentalism and rootless cosmopolitanism as the enemy (Lorimer, 2018). Pabst (2016) argues this is emblematic of a new ‘post-liberal era’. In France, this new movement has been labelled ‘ethnosocialism’ (Reynié, 2011). Further, Reynié (2011) delineates how the French radical right has been able to ideologically reposition itself following the success of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 2002 as the protector of the liberal system. Indeed, the RN co-opts the supposed values of a European or Western way of life: individual freedoms, gender equality, secularism, and so forth. In contrast, elites are blamed for having betrayed those liberal values by irresponsibly promoting multiculturalism and

mass immigration, as well as covering up their associated issues (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007). For example, Wilders' film *Fitna* emphasises the dual problem of mass immigration in combination with the cultural-relativism of political elites (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Moffitt, 2017). Farage similarly affirms UKIP's anti-establishment credentials (Pareschi and Albertini, 2018).

Separately, radical right parties are quick to distance themselves from traditional fascist figures. Fortuyn told the Wall Street Journal "Le Pen [senior] is a petit bourgeois nationalist... I am a citizen of the world" (Brubaker, 2017: 1995). In many ways the heir to Fortuyn, Wilders cooperates much more with the RN following the replacement of Le Pen senior. Additionally, Vossen (2011: 180) suggests his open aloofness from other radical right parties, sympathy for more borderline cases such as UKIP and emotive criticism of open border immigration are indicative of his party's status as "right-wing half-hearted liberal nationalists and populists". However, condemning more extreme parties is not limited to the Netherlands. Former BNP members are forbidden to join UKIP, who claims to be open to "all the people, regardless of their creed or colour" (Tournier-Sol, 2015: 146) and the RN has undergone a process of selective moderation and issue reframing (Almeida, 2013) with Le Pen kicking her father out of the party. This is indicative of the separation that the radical right has attempted to make between their parties, which they consider in some ways liberal and the old far right, which is most certainly not (Ignazi, 2002).

The following sections map out some specific areas in which radical right parties have (partially) utilised liberal sentiment.

#### *2.4.2 From integration to assimilation*

The radical right has challenged multicultural policies on their failure to facilitate domestic social cohesion (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; Tournier-Sol, 2015). Brubaker

(2001) posits this idealises a return to ‘assimilation’ pitted in opposition to ‘integration’.

Here, integration is conceptualised as the celebration of cultural differences within the nation, whilst assimilation is the elimination of such differences. Thus, the stated enemy of the RN is the non-assimilated immigrant, bringing with them non-Western, illiberal values (Stavrakakis et al., 2017).

This sentiment is not entirely liberal. It is employed to make blanket statements regarding the necessity of closing borders to non-western immigrants and the enforcement of assimilation. Further, assimilating Muslims across Europe have had their sincerity questioned and have been subject to cruder rejectionism. Indeed, the PVV has pled for the banning of the Koran and proposed a ‘head rag tax’ (Vossen, 2011). As a result, the Netherlands has become:

The first European country to set a pre-arrival integration exam to prove assimilability, directed principally at... Moroccans and Turks. The ‘syllabus’ includes a DVD entitled ‘To the Netherlands’, which illustrates Dutch life by showing gay men kissing in a meadow and topless women on the beach. (Fekete, 2006: 4).

This is illustrative of the double-movement in the interaction between liberal and illiberal sentiment in immigration policy.

Important to note for this project, Statham et al. (2005) adds that the Dutch approach, originally strongly multicultural, has significant differences with Britain’s ‘race-centred’ cultural pluralism and French policies which resist differentialism. However, their contribution on the different ideological origins of multicultural policy has not been connected to understanding the contemporary differences between radical right parties.

#### *2.4.3 Civilisational conflict*

Brubaker (2017) highlights the movement by the radical right outside of the UK towards a Christian secularist posture. This pits Western freedoms against the Islamic other, perpetuating a discourse of an embattled Christian Europe. Racism here is de-emphasised

(Fekete, 2006), whilst church membership is reconceptualised as benign and secular (Moffitt, 2017). Further, De Lange and Mügge (2015) see this radical right, namely the LPF, PVV and Vlaams Belang (VB), as couching gender equality statements in the same language of enlightenment and modernity. This allows their position to be contrasted with a ‘barbaric’ Islam (Akkerman, 2005; Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007). Such homogenised Islamic culture serves to reinforce dichotomies between in and out groups, as well as choosing between the policies of entirely open or closed borders (Tromble, 2015).

The radical right across Western Europe denies Islam’s status as faith or an individual way of life, but reconceptualise it as a (dangerous) ideology (Akkerman, 2005; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013); the SVP campaign in the referendum on the construction of minarets on mosques in Switzerland cast minarets as a symbol of a religious-political and military claim to power and authority (See Appendix One). For some of the radical right, this re-casting of Islam as political aligns with their foreign policy of non-interventionism; Fortuyn argued given it is unacceptable for ‘Ali Baba’ to tell the West how to live, Islamic countries should not feel obliged to accept Western interference (Akkerman, 2005). Equally, this has not always been reflected in other radical right parties e.g. Wilders’ advocacy of Syrian intervention (Vossen, 2011).

Furthermore, such civilisational discourse is frequently tied to nationalism. Indeed, in making the nation the true meaning of ‘the people’ (Stavrakakis et al., 2017), the radical right collapses the (artificial) separation of civic and ethnic nationalism (Brubaker, 1999). This happens in a context in which civic values have become increasingly prominent in Europe given its hugely varied history and cultural traditions (Halikiopoulou et al., 2013). The embrace of nationalism is done carefully; specific language on being a ‘patriot’ lends the RN a respectability in defending republican values (Lorimer, 2018). Relatedly, Farage is quick to emphasise that the NHS must act first in the interests of the British people and families. He

highlights that they are the ones who have paid into the system for years (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015). However, Halikiopoulou et al. (2013), remark that the RN is more successful than the radical right in the UK because France's civic values of secularism and equality are more depoliticised and therefore less controversial, yet also associated with a specific ethno-religious history.

#### *2.4.4 Gender*

Muslim women are presented as victims of their religion through enforced marriages and female genital mutilation, whilst Western women are presented as at risk of conversion or sexual assault by immigrants (Brubaker, 2017). Indeed, Wilders provocatively stated that Muslim immigration “flushes decades of women's emancipation through the toilet” (in Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015: 29). West European radical right parties have formed unlikely allies with feminists and social democrats, catalysed by events such as the 2002 ‘honour killing’ of Swedish-Kurdish Fadime Sahindal (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007). However, it has been rightly pointed out that this is often a Janus-faced attitude towards gender and freedom of choice. Almost all are conservative on family issues yet liberal in framing when justifying anti-Islamic immigration (Moffitt, 2017; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015). Despite such a paradox, justifications for immigration reduction continue to be mounted by the West European radical right through the lens of gender equality.

#### *2.4.5 Sexuality*

Though the endorsement of gay rights has been more tentative given support for the traditional family structure, some of the radical right have pitted homosexuality, which they see as emblematic of tolerant Western society, against the ‘backwards’ views of immigrants (Brubaker, 2017). Connected, Fortuyn, leader of the LPF, used his homosexuality as a defence against the accusation of being illiberal famously stating “I have nothing against

Moroccans. I've been to bed with so many of them!'. Wilders and the Scandinavian radical right have also been noted to be more liberal in their views on homosexuality (Moffitt, 2017: 155). Indeed, the PVV offered a resolution in parliament allowing gay soldiers to wear their military outfit in a gay parade (Vossen, 2011). Though no party has significantly stretched beyond homosexuality in advancing LGBTQ rights, this framing has been used to cast Islam as homophobic and therefore Islamic immigration as undesirable.

#### *2.4.6 Religion*

There have been some notable differences in radical right parties' support for Judaism and Zionism. Marine Le Pen broke with tradition in the RN by registering with the Delegation for Relations with Israel (Zúquete, 2008), as well as in 2012, when comparing Islam to an occupation, became its first representative to stigmatise an opponent by ultimately characterising it as a 'Nazi' (Reynié, 2011). Similarly, Wilders' overt support for the US and Israel makes it difficult for his opponents to associate his politics with fascism and the Holocaust (Vossen, 2011). Indeed, Israel is frequently deployed in his rhetoric as the frontier of democracy (Moffitt, 2017). Further, he has a personal connection having spent time there as a teenager. There has been nothing written on UKIP's philosemitism.

#### *2.4.7 Freedom of speech*

The Netherlands and Scandinavian radical right are considered the strongest users of freedom of speech as a justification for immigration reduction. Fortuyn was particularly adept at exploring what he considered an inconsistency of Western liberalism: tolerance for those who were intolerant themselves. He and now Wilders have argued that the taboo on discrimination should be lifted to allow genuine freedom of expression (Akkerman, 2005). This was particularly salient following the Muhammad cartoon controversy of 2005; Van Gogh was brought up as emblematic of the danger of compromises on freedom (Moffitt,

2017). There has been little written on UKIP and the RN's usage of freedom of speech in defence of their immigration policies.

#### *2.4.8 (Economic) Security, an introduction*

In the space between the radical right and non-liberal justifications for a reduction in immigration levels, there is comparatively little written. However, Brubaker (2017) with an impressively holistic account, does note that Islamic immigration is also seen as a security issue. Security and economic security are particularly important for UKIP. Lacey (2018) notes how immigrants are presented as undermining the livelihoods of ordinary citizens through taking jobs, depressing wages and burdening the welfare state, as well as threatening cultural erosion. Pareschi and Albertini (2018) provide the most in-depth account of UKIP's economic discourse. They note that Farage avoids directly blaming the individual migrant, instead choosing to focus on the economic incentive structure. Reynié (2011) implies the presence in the RN of some of these ideas. It will be the role of this dissertation to flesh this sentiment out in greater detail.

### **2.5 Populism versus liberalism**

The above provides a compelling account against the traditional conceptualisation of populism as the antagonism of liberalism. This has been a reasonably concurrent theme in the literature [see: Müller (2014), Zakaria in Mudde (2004), Chopin (2016) and Krastev (2007) for examples]. Indeed, Jungar and Jupskås (2014) see the Scandinavian radical right as characterised by law-and-order policies, pro-military, traditional family values and, scepticism towards gender equality and gay rights. To better understand the radical right, we must move beyond this reductive conceptualisation. However, differences between such parties must be examined, as well as their individual shifts in framing over time. Indeed, to solely follow the position of Moffitt (2017: 114) would see all radical right parties in Western

Europe as exhibiting similar and unchanged levels of “romantic liberalism” over time. Critically, there are important differences between how much radical right parties emphasise this (partially) liberal discourse.

While this project makes no comment on the complex relationship between democracy and populism (Pappas, 2016), the limitations of populist-agential approaches to the radical right are noted. Indeed, Mudde’s thin-centred ideology insufficiently accounts for the radical right’s potentially liberal qualities. Further, though Weyland’s (2017) suggestion of populism as strategic allows for the radical right to utilise liberal sentiment, he does not distinguish between the types of liberalism that might be appropriated. In addition, such focus cannot mesh with a project that does not seek to qualify whether the shift in ideology is strategic or due to changes in belief. Within these limited research parameters, this conceptual lens requires much conjecture. This provides further confirmation for not focusing on literature analysing the concept of ‘populism’.

## **2.6 Accounting for variance**

Betz (2002) makes a broad agential case, positing that the radical right often utilises *country-specific* popular sentiment. For example, he observes that Lega’s popularity was borne from policies seeking to address the growing sense of frustration over an inefficient and corrupt state that transferred large revenues from the North to fund projects in the South with little tangible benefit. Such contextuality complicates homogenising the ideology of the radical right. Goodwin’s (2009) work on radical right agency supports this account given the importance he places on local nativist subcultures. More substantively, De Lange and Mügge (2015) suggest that diversity of gender ideologies among right-wing populist parties can partly be explained by their different ideological roots. They group the Dutch and Flemish

radical right by those in which leaders previously represented mainstream parties and those that had connections to the extreme right or connections to orthodox Catholic groups (VB).

Other explanations take a similar macro perspective. Though Art (2011) notes that there is no statistically significant relationship between the type of electoral system and vote share for the radical right, Bonnie Meguid's (2005) influential paper on party responses to the radical right demonstrates how electability might be influenced by whether mainstream parties choose to be accommodative or adversarial. Dézé (2003) corroborates this account, emphasising how parties adapt and differentiate themselves within the system. More concretely, this line of thinking has been applied to the Dutch mainstream right's strategy of accommodation (Van Heerden et al., 2014); this has resulted in the growing domestic political salience of immigration, integration and security (Akkerman, 2005).

These sorts of enquiries into explaining the *why* of the *what* (framing) will be significantly aided by the empirical comparisons that this project intends to make. As such, this project stands to advance the capacity for future work to more deeply understand the context in which European radical right parties succeed.

### 3.0 METHODOLOGY

#### **3.1 Discourse analysis theory**

Van Dijk (1993) suggests that the role of the researcher is to challenge the (re)production of dominance. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) views discourse as socially constitutive, creating and reinforcing unequal power relations between groups (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). It is normative, challenging the implicit bias that it finds in texts. Indeed, Wodak and Boukala's (2015) CDA on the speeches of Wilders and David Cameron does exactly that, reflecting on the speeches' hidden assumptions and meanings. However, given this project

reveals framing rather than challenging it, this inherent normativity is a limitation to such a methodology.

In contrast, Krippendorff's (2004) methodology of content analysis is better suited to this research. Whilst empirically grounded, content analysis is exploratory in intent. As such, it is more easily applied to the purpose of providing a platform for future work to generate further hypotheses (Guest et al., 2012). Thus, I operationalise CDA through content or thematic analysis. This constitutes identifying key words, trends, themes, or ideas in the data before undertaking any analysis. This project is not a study of isolated words but the structures of the text (Van Dijk, 2000) recognising that if units such as words or expressions are used, semantic validity may suffer (Krippendorff, 2004). I produced a codebook systematically grouping the observed framings of my texts (Guest et al., 2012). Themes for the coding were identified by synthesising the frames used by others in relevant literature.

### **3.2 Framing, a programmatic design**

Framing is positivist because it assumes an owner (Howarth, 2000). In this project, the frame is owned by the speechmaker/interviewee, but also their party. Entman (1993) highlights the importance of understanding framing, in which a selective emphasis on elements of reality promotes a desired interpretation for the owner.

Migration has been securitised in Europe, with the press playing a critical role in framing the arrival of refugees in Europe since 2015 as a crisis. However, other frames have linked immigration to crime, as well as to economic damage (Entman, 2007). Akkerman (2011) identifies security and freedom of expression as being key themes used by the British press when writing about Wilders. Synthesising this material, I used four main frames with subcategories. Though these subcategories did not always explicitly justify a reduction in

immigration, they were significant in creating a semantic field in which such justification took place. I also included a separate category for speechmakers blaming the establishment.

1. Nativism: this is split into soft and hard components. Soft nativism is the notion of being proud of the nation and putting its people first. Hard nativism emphasises the fundamental differences between nationals and immigrants. It is much stronger and on occasion racist/violent suggesting that immigration may lead to ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population.
2. Security: immigration poses a risk due to the violence, crime, terrorism and chaos that it creates. A less extreme component, though still on-theme, is the notion of securing the border.
3. Economic: immigration is economically damaging. It compresses wages, creates unemployment and puts pressure on public services and housing.
4. Liberal: immigration undermines the liberal principles of the nation/Western Europe: particularly equality, tolerance and freedom of speech.

Every time one of these frames was identified within a text, I coded it as appearing within the relevant subcategory. I took a selection of speeches (in and out of parliament), as well as interviews from each leader. This started from circa 2010 (mostly selected by that which had already been transcribed). In total I had 10 texts from UKIP, 8 from the RN and 23 from the PVV. There were differences in frequency of types of content; Wilders had many more speeches accessible, whilst Le Pen's English content was mostly from interview. However, I observed that the framing used did not differ hugely between formats. Thus, though not ideal, content type differentials did not significantly problematise my analysis. Coding was done in order to clearly visualise patterns over time. In order to improve the research's reliability, I followed Krippendorf's (2004) *alpha-agreement* for two observers with binary coding for a sub-set of my texts (See Appendix Two). This produced an answer of 0.779. As such, the

agreement for my coding exceeded expectations by almost 80%. This added to the robustness of my methodology.

Further, I examined literature on anti-immigration framings to see if there were any other methods that had been particularly successful for strengthening analysis. Jungar and Jupskås' (2014) usage of the CHES and the CMP enabled convincing empirical comparisons of Nordic radical right parties. The CHES is an average scoring for parties by a series of 'experts' across a variety of questions. The CMP codes for each mention of a theme in a party manifesto. From these databases I selected those relevant to this project. The dataset was not perfect, for some years not all parties nor themes were addressed. However, using the two in tandem with my own primary research further added to this project's comprehensiveness, as well as provided an interesting platform for examining the differences between an aggregate understanding of the party and the actual discourse that it employs.

I also used visual discourse analysis through certain campaign posters from each party. I was struck by how these visual aids lent Halikiopoulou et al.'s (2013) work a memorable quality that I was keen to emulate in my own work. Thus, I see the usage of posters as a means of illustrating salient points through an alternative medium. Further, posters added to my capacity to provide a holistic account of party immigration framing.

### **3.3 Case justification**


This project uniquely compares the Netherlands, France and the UK radical right's anti-immigration framings. Literature often groups the Netherlands with the Scandinavian right to establish their similarities (Moffitt, 2017), considering UKIP and the RN alone. However, this project is focused on illustrating their very differences. Thus, choosing these three cases together allowed me to move beyond the limited understanding of their little ideological left-right distinctiveness (See Appendix Three), establishing where they differ and where they are

more similar. They are also an interesting three cases given their nations' very different ideological approaches to immigration, as noted in the literature review (Statham et al., 2005). I view the speeches and interviews with radical right leaders as acceptable proxies for the views of their parties given such parties tend to place great emphasis on their frontman/woman (Weyland, 2017) and many in the literature have done the same e.g. (Brubaker, 2017; Moffitt, 2017).

#### 4.0 RESULTS

<b>Frame</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Sub-frame</b>
Nativist	SFT	Soft: nationals come first, there should be pride in the nation
	HRD	Hard: Immigration cause ethnic dilution/cleansing
Economic	WGE	Immigration decompresses wages and creates unemployment
	SRV	Immigration puts a strain on public services/housing
	FNC	Pragmatic (depoliticised): immigration levels too high for society to properly function
Liberal	RCH	We must reach out beyond Europe. The European focus is restrictive and illiberal
	EQL	Immigration challenges the principle that everyone must be expected to conform to the same cultural expectations
	FLT	It is not the individual immigrant's fault, but the structures in which they operate
	ANT	Opposition to racism
	FDM	Importance of freedom of speech
	CVL	Pride in liberal civilisation
	FML	Immigrants are sexist
	HBC	Immigrants are homophobic
	PHL	We must defend the rights of Jews. Immigrants are anti-Semitic.
	Security	TSN
CHS		Immigration is chaotic
VIO		Immigration creates violence and crime
TSM		Immigration leads to terrorism
Populist	POP	The problems of immigration have been ignored by the establishment

Results of the CDA



On initial inspection of the CDA, though the discussion will go into much greater detail, there are clearly pronounced differences between the parties. Beyond all being relatively similar on blaming the establishment, UKIP clearly uses an economic frame most and the PVV a liberal frame most, the RN utilise both, though to lesser extents.

## 5.0 DISCUSSION

For ease of referencing, I use a coded version for each text in the discussion e.g. W1 means Wilders' most recent speech. A full reference is included in the Text & Reference List section.

### 5.1 Cross-case comparison

#### 5.1.1 *Nativist framing*

##### Soft nativism

Across each of the three cases, there is clear evidence of soft nativism. Nigel Farage outlines that his “vision is to put this country and the British people first” (F3). Geert Wilders is more subtle, expressing nativist sentiment through the selective emphasis on moments of national cultural significance. Indeed, when addressing a Czech audience, he reminds them of “Jan Komensky, the great philosopher who also lived in the Netherlands. He was a great European, but wherever he went, he kept writing in Czech and remained a Czech above all” (W2). This is carefully tailored to his audience. In one speech in Germany, he highlights that “Dresden... and the other towns of the former GDR, taught the world an important lesson” (W8). Such language serves to justify that “there is nothing wrong with being proud German patriots” since “there is nothing wrong with wanting Germany to remain free and democratic” (W8). Wilders considers patriotism to be all-the-more important given the receding of its political prominence, as well as its permissibility - “most of the leaders in [his] part of the world – Western Europe – cannot even spell the word national, let alone national

interest” (W1). In response, the people must re-engage with and be proud of their national history. Equally, the importance of pride also manifests in the speeches of Marine Le Pen. She sees the “the emergence of movements devoted to the nation” as “patriotic movements in Europe” to be celebrated. Indeed, she herself is “a mother... a French mother who loves her country” with “immense love for [her] people” (LP8).

Farage’s soft nativism is seen irregularly across the texts used for my CDA. In contrast, Wilders and Le Pen frequently deploy such sentiment. Further, they both embrace the term ‘patriot’ in the manner adeptly underlined by Lorimer (2018) as a depoliticised form of nativism. This is notably absent in Farage’s rhetoric. However, between the two, there are also clear differences. Wilders couches his language in Western liberal-democratic history whereas Le Pen’s position feels more openly partisan in its championing of modern Western ‘patriotic’, political movements.


Subconcluding, on soft nativism, Le Pen and Wilders are closer together. Admittedly, Wilders is more liberal than Le Pen in his nativist context, but it is Farage who stands apart. This differential between radical right parties on the frequency of nativist framing is not noted by either Ignazi (2002) or Mudde (2007), who are strongest on the importance of nativism for the radical right.

### Hard nativism

The differences are further pronounced on the discursive frame this project terms ‘hard nativism’. None of this is present in any of Farage’s or Le Pen’s texts. However, in Wilders’ rhetoric, such ideas are regularly deployed. For instance, in 2018, Wilders posited “the Dutch increasingly feel like foreigners in their own country... unless there are radical changes to the present policies towards immigration Europe will be lost, for example over 30% of Sweden will be Islamic by the middle of the century” (W1). This idea of an emerging catastrophe as

the indigenous population of the nation is diluted is much stronger rhetoric than ‘putting the nation first’. It is the reduction of immigration to some form of ethnic cleansing. However, this should not be understood as Wilders utilising a liberal framing to justify immigration reduction. As such, this is an instance in which I believe authors who have underlined his liberal qualities e.g. Vossen (2011) and Moffitt (2017) have overestimated their importance. This is violently extreme and entirely illiberal. Here, Le Pen and Farage are closer together, whilst Wilders stands alone.

### Secondary data comparison



Three most important issues for each party. Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Polk et al., 2017.

Party	Most important issue (1)	Most important issue (2)	Most important issue (3)
FN	Immigration	Multiculturalism	Anti-elite rhetoric
PVV	Immigration	Multiculturalism	Ethnic minorities
UKIP	Immigration	EU integration	Anti-elite rhetoric

The CMP corroborates these findings. Coding for favourable mentions of the country's nation, history, and general appeals, the PVV come out as significantly above the other two parties. The RN is also slightly above UKIP. This further demonstrates the importance of nativism (soft and hard) for the PVV. The CHES also hints at the same position. Whilst all parties rank immigration as the most important issue, UKIP moves away from directly nativist sentiment, fronting the salience of EU integration and anti-elite rhetoric. In contrast, the PVV ranks multiculturalism second and ethnic minorities third. These are more clearly linked to nativism. The RN falls somewhere in between the two. These two datasets further emphasise the PVV as the most frequent user and UKIP the least frequent user of a nativist framing.

### *5.1.2 Security framing*

On security, the discourses of the parties are ostensibly similar. Wilders is the most consistent. In almost every single text there was a reference to one of the security sub-frames and in the majority, there was reference to multiple. He emphasises that “Islamic immigrants riot and terrorize the many locals. And when people's throats are slit in the streets, while the murderers shout ‘Allahu Akbar,’ the authorities appease the killers and declare that Islam has nothing to do with it” (W14). This rhetoric ties crime and terrorism to the nature of Islam, as well as to an abdication of responsibility by the establishment. Farage, less vivid in description, is equally willing to play into such themes given “if we want to stop the criminal trafficking gangs from benefiting as they are doing, we must stop the boats coming” (F5), also referring to “the radicalisation that has been taking place in our schools and our prisons...”, as well as the institutionalisation of “sharia law in British cities” (F6). Further, Le Pen couches her anti-immigration rhetoric in the same concerns: the necessity “to fight Islamic fundamentalism in our countries. This fundamentalism is aiming, through politico-

religious organisations to impose Sharia laws instead of our countries' laws... these Islamic fundamentalists are dangerous" (LP7).

However, there are again some differences between the parties. Despite France's repeated terrorist attacks, Le Pen's rhetoric is much lighter than Wilders or Farage on the influence of immigration on security, only mentioning crime once and terrorism twice out of the eight texts analysed. Between the other two, whilst both are repeatedly strong on security, Wilders is more willing to explore the relationship between immigration and both crime and terrorism, Farage focuses mostly on its effect on crime. Linking immigration to terrorism is more contentious than linking it to crime because of the political impermissibility of discussing the relationship between Islam and terrorism (which for many constitutes some form of racist rhetoric). Then, given the PVV's usage of hard nativist framing, it is unsurprising they do not shy away from this link to terrorism. There are moments where the rhetoric is homogenous, on a sense of chaos produced by immigration. However, when chaos is broken apart into problem areas, there are pronounced differences. This has not been addressed in the literature. In fact, only Brubaker (2017) noted Islam as a security issue and this was not contextualised to individual radical right parties.

#### Secondary data comparison



Translation: “*more safety, less immigrants*”

Accessed at: <http://www.verkiezingsaffiches.nl/Affiches/2010/PVV-2010>



Translation “*to expel is to protect*”

Accessed at:  
<https://www.facebook.com/RassemblementNational/photos/a.10150641283185750/10155805650260750/?type=3&theater>



Accessed at: <https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2016/06/16/breaking-point-ukip-launches-largest-ever-national-ad-campaign-immigration/>

In posters, all three parties opt for eye-catching security framings. Indeed, each is willing to refer to the relationship between mass immigration and terrorism. The PVV and RN are more explicit whereas UKIP make terrorism implicit either in the ethnicity of those depicted or focusing on immigration's chaotic nature. Admittedly, this suggests the RN's framing differs from this project's CDA. This can be attributed to two distinct possibilities. First, Le Pen is more careful in her public speaking than in the party's visual material. Second, by virtue of a limited selection of texts, a common facet of her discursive framing has been de-emphasised. However, posters do further validate that the PVV and UKIP are at opposing ends of the security framing spectrum, with the PVV's framings being the most illiberal.

### *5.1.3 Economic framing*

Economically, it is again the PVV who stand out. Whilst both Farage and Le Pen (though not as consistently) continually attack immigration on its economic costs, Wilders only once out of 23 texts raises any economic sub-frame. In contrast, Farage is at his most assertive since "it's no good for our young people and it's no good for our working people to suffer


from wage compression, from unemployment and to see a level of social change in our communities that we simply can't keep up with" (F6). This is an economic frame at front and centre, coupled with the fear of indigenous marginalisation which Inglehart and Norris (2016) term 'cultural backlash'. Farage is unequivocal, arguing immigration "affects the economy. The NHS. Schools. Public services. The deficit" (F7). Further, he uniquely deploys a depoliticised economic-functionality argument - "Anyone who looks at it honestly knows it's not sustainable. UKIP talks about it honestly. Directly. We've had a lot of stick for it. Normal, decent people have been bullied out of the debate" (F7). This statement binds Mouffe's (2005) thoughts on contemporary moral exclusions within politics proper to the claim of immigration being anti-common-sense. Le Pen strikes a similar chord to Farage highlighting "the weight of mass unemployment which immigration only worsens" (LP6). Indeed, "with 6.1 million unemployed people and 9 million living in poverty" she argues "France no longer has the capacity to receive any new migrants" (LP6).

These findings are not surprising since the literature raises an economic frame as having significant weight for UKIP (Pareschi and Albertini, 2018), as well as some traction for the RN (Reynié, 2011). Further, there is no mention of the PVV using an economic frame for immigration. Together, this primary evidence and secondary literature indicate once more that UKIP and the RN are closer together in framing whilst the PVV stands further apart.

### Secondary data comparison



Accessed at: <https://www.channel4.com/news/ukip-anti-immigration-european-parliamentary-election-poster>



Accessed at: <https://metro.co.uk/2014/04/21/nigel-farage-defends-ukips-racist-poster-campaign-4704515/>



Accessed at: <https://metro.co.uk/2014/04/21/nigel-farage-defends-ukips-racist-poster-campaign-4704515/>



Translation: “Immigration costs us 60 billion euros per year. Stop!”

Accessed at: <http://vivianericard.unblog.fr/2014/02/12/le-front-national-lance-une-petition-nationale-pour-lorganisation-en-france-dun-referendum-sur-la-politique-dimmigration/>

Posters further cement the importance of an economic frame for UKIP. Leading up to UKIP doing extremely well at the 2014 European elections, this rhetoric was made front-and-centre for their posters. Intriguingly, the economic frame was not just limited to immigration but was also omnipresent in justifying Euroscepticism. This suggests the diffusion of an economic master-frame across a significant proportion of UKIP policy. Similarly, there is an economic frame in the RN’s campaign posters, yet none for the PVV.

#### 5.1.4 Liberal framing

Following the literature review, one would expect to find a liberal framing particularly in the rhetoric of the PVV (Moffitt, 2017; Vossen, 2011). In fact, as aforementioned, the usage of such liberal framing is more nuanced than expected. Further, there is evidence of the other parties also using some components of a liberal framing.

Freedom (of speech)

UKIP's liberal framing is most pronounced in highlighting the UK's liberal-democratic tradition. Critically, Farage reflects on England's status "as the land of liberty. Here you had the possibility of dissent. Of free thinking. Independent minds and actions" (F7). Such principles are married to UKIP's self-characterisation as "the party of radical alternatives and free speech" of which speaking out on the failures of immigration is one such virtue (F7). Equally, Marine Le Pen couches her language in "freedom of expression and of the press, the rule of law, and freedom of conscience" (LP6). However, she is more explicit with its 'other'. Indeed, precarious freedoms are "the targets of some barbarians" (LP6). Interviewed by Laura Kuenssberg in 2014, she hints at this difference between her and UKIP's framing; though "the ideas that he [Nigel Farage] defends are very similar to ours, like a rejection of mass immigration", she highlights that he misses "the seriousness of the situation... if he understood how serious the EU's situation is, he would support the collaboration, of all patriotic movements, and he wouldn't resort to tactics and strategy" (LP7). Indeed, Farage's reticence to collaborate, labelled by Le Pen as 'strategy', is underpinned by the differential between Le Pen's enemy of freedom of speech (Islamic fundamentalists) and Farage's enemy (the unwilling to speak up establishment). In short, UKIP's enemy is more structural, referring to an amorphous establishment, whilst the RN's takes a more material, visible shape.

However, on an axis where UKIP is at one end, the RN is only towards the other side. The PVV's sub-frame of freedom of speech is more pronounced. It has two key forms. The first, like soft nativism, takes an intellectual form in which Wilders refers to the history of liberalism. He quotes Abraham Lincoln to highlight that "those who deny freedom to others, deserve it not for themselves" (W5). This is the selective liberalism that Akkerman (2005) refers to, in which only those who tolerate are considered worthy of being tolerated themselves. Wilders himself says exactly that, quoting Karl Popper to argue "unlimited

tolerance leads to the disappearance of the tolerance” (W1). The second form is the even more explicit link than the RN between the curtailing of freedom and Islam. For Wilders, “freedom, our way of life, our culture, our identity and national security are at stake and heavily under attack. And the reason for that is mass immigration, islamization combined with the total failure and even betrayal by weak politicians who are unwilling to fight back” (W1). This is not to suggest that Wilders’ overt championing of freedom is speech is more ‘liberal’ than the RN or UKIP but that he is more explicit about immigration and Islamic immigration being the enemy of such freedom of speech. This provides further evidence against the PVV being the most liberal of the three, posited by several in the literature review (Akkerman, 2005; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013).


### The locus of civilisation

Lorimer (2018) comments on the prominence of civilisational rhetoric for the radical right. Such evidence is more nuanced than she suggests, following the patterns of framings in previous areas. Whilst both Le Pen and Farage refer to liberal civilisation, they do so with reference to their own nation-state. In contrast, Wilders’ civilisation is much more all-encompassing. This distinction is aptly characterised in the difference between Le Pen highlighting that her “mission to save France is so important” (LP1) or Farage delineating that England is “the land of liberty” (F7) and Wilders referring to how “Brussels wants to inundate us with Third World immigrants” – this ‘us’ being “the EU member states”. Indeed, for Wilders it threatens the dilution of “the Judeo-Christian and humanist identity of our nations” (W2). This is a clear and fundamental difference in worldview. Whilst Le Pen and Farage focus on their own nation-state, Wilders extends this sense of belonging across Western Europe. Perhaps this selective inclusivity is why the PVV is seen as more liberal than UKIP or the RN; in many ways it is a step beyond traditional nationalism.


### Vulnerable groups

Coding for vulnerable groups, Wilders' liberal credentials stand out. Farage does not once refer to the links between immigration and the following: women's rights, homophobia or antisemitism. Continually seeming to be some sort of halfway house, Le Pen references each of these three in one interview in 2015. However, Wilders in 13/23 texts links immigration to women's rights, on three occasions refers to the homophobia of immigrants and on 18/23 occasions pits Judaism against (antisemitic) immigration. This liberal framing cannot be ignored. The relationship is often explicit, with Wilders willing to underline that "Islam calls us pigs. It says our women are whores. It commands to kill all Jews and homosexuals" (W3). He has continual praise for Israel and on multiple occasions emotively condemns the actions of those taken against the Jews the Holocaust (W22). Rightly, this has been pointed out in the literature as a semi-unique facet of the PVV's anti-immigration framing (Reynié, 2011).

### Secondary data comparison



The CHES shows a clear differential between the parties for liberal policy. Not only is the PVV much more liberal than the RN or UKIP but that gap has steadily widened since 2006 with the PVV suggesting more liberal policies and UKIP suggesting less liberal policies. This trend is mostly followed in their views on democratic freedoms and rights (See Appendix Sixteen). The emphasis given to vulnerable groups by Wilders substantiates these aggregate



positions. However, his discourse is not entirely in line with this thinking. Indeed, his civilisational rhetoric may be only slightly more liberal and his fronting of freedom of speech is only selectively liberal given his homogenisation of Islamic immigrants as the ‘other’. Further, his illiberal nativist rhetoric is not picked up by this dataset. This highlights a much more nuanced picture than either the secondary data or the academic literature portrays.

#### 5.1.5 Summary: the assignment of blame

The aforementioned series of distinctions are best exemplified through conceptualising where each party attributes blame. Despite each regularly attacking the failures of the establishment, their other targets are hugely varied:

For UKIP, it is the economic system that is the problem. Farage is quick to explicate that it is not the fault of the individual migrant: “we don't blame people from Romania and Bulgaria for wanting to come here, goodness me, I'd be packing my bags now! Well, it's - it is - it's about money, isn't it? It's about opportunity” (F10). UKIP don't seek to change this reality but accept it as the status-quo, arguing such conditions elicit unwanted immigration for the UK.

Le Pen too is careful to avoid blaming the individual immigrant. When Laura Kuenssberg accuses the RN of scapegoating French Muslims, Le Pen pivots, asserting that it is Kuenssberg herself who “amalgamates Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists” (LP7). She is the true liberal since “there are a lot of French Muslims on [her] side” (LP7). She is quick to ground her rhetoric in preventing “violation of [her] country's laws” and since “secularism is a founding principle”, this is not about Islam as a religion, but individual fundamentalists who she sees as distinct and dangerous (LP7). Referring to Islamist fundamentalism is a “cancer”, she clearly delineates that there “is a healthy body. The religion of Islam itself is a healthy body but there are cancerous cells” (LP7). This allows her to oppose immigration but without essentialising Islam itself.

However, Wilders wavers on who is the subject to blame. Whilst he accepts that “there are many moderate Muslims” (W11), he also posits “Islam is totalitarian” (W15). This rejects Islam's status as religion instead reconceptualising it as a religious-political ideology. Further, the individual within that ideology is implicated since “80 per cent of the Turkish youth in Holland, one of the biggest minority groups here say that violence against Christians and Jews is not a bad thing” (W4). This makes the PVV's position towards the individual unclear. Whilst the primary target is the ideology, Wilders is willing to hold those accountable under it. This is not the ‘healthy body’ afflicted by cancer that Le Pen sees. Indeed, the PVV underlines that the religion itself is entirely corrupted.

Once more, this places Farage and Wilders at opposing ends of the spectrum, with Le Pen in between. Le Pen is probably nearer to Wilders on the problems of Islam but on the usage of an economic frame is closer to UKIP. To restate, though Wilders' positions on vulnerable groups are more liberal, this has received too much emphasis in academic literature. The PVV's nativist and illiberal views on multiculturalism suggests that holistically they are not significantly more liberal than the RN or UKIP in framing.

## **5.2 Within-case transformation**

Though my CDA did reveal some possible trends over time, it was difficult to establish whether these were random or based on the topic of the speech rather than a tangible shift in discursive framing given that for UKIP and the RN my range of texts (totalling 10 and 8 respectively) was not massive. As such, rather than attempting to make bold conclusions from insubstantial evidence, this project does not make any comments on within-case transformation for UKIP or the RN. However, the PVV's much more widely available material made it easier to pick up on a slight shift in discourse over time.

Speaking in the US in 2011, Wilders makes a clear distinction between Islam and Muslims given "There are many moderate Muslims, but there is no such thing as a moderate Islam" (W17). On another occasion later that year he does the same arguing "[he has] no problems with Muslims, but [he does] have a problem with the totalitarian Islamic ideology of hate and violence" (W20). This theme is repeated in both 2012 and in 2013. By 2013, he is at his most sympathetic to individual people - willing to suggest that "the moderates are the prisoners of the barbaric system of Islamofascism" and that he was "overwhelmed by the kindness, friendliness and helpfulness of many people [in the Islamic world]" (W16).

However, this discourse shifts by 2014. Addressing a Danish audience in November that year, he firmly posits "it is wrong to think that the moderates are a majority" (W10). This

position is affirmed by a poll in which “three quarters of all the Muslims in the Netherlands say that Dutch Muslims who go and fight in Syria are heroes” (W10). No longer are individual Muslims exonerated, since “there are not just a few extremists in our midst; there are many thousands of them” (W5). Rather, by 2018, he explicitly implicates the majority – “the silent majority [that] allows bad things to happen” (W1). This maps a distinct discursive shift by the PVV. In earlier speeches whilst Islam is conceptualised as radical, the individual Muslim is granted some relief from the criticism of their religious-institutional structure. By later speeches, the individual Muslim is now attributed much more accountability. In this sense the PVV has used more of a nativist and security framing over time, coupled with a reduction of a liberal framing. This has not been picked up in any other literature on the West European radical right.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

This project has examined the framings of UKIP, the PVV and the RN in justifying their anti-immigration policy. Too often in the academic literature are such parties considered one and the same. Rather, their arguments are underpinned by different value systems. The CDA highlighted that UKIP’s primary motivation for reducing immigration is to prevent economic chaos, the RN is concerned with how the French principles of equality and secularism are threatened by immigration from the Islamic world and the PVV believes Islamic immigration undermines Western liberal-democratic values. These make for similar policy but varied ideology. No wonder such parties struggle with cooperation.

Lingering throughout my research has been the question of why radical right parties choose to use a particular frame. Why is it that UKIP uses an economic frame? Is it strategic? Would a liberal framing resonate with the British public? Or even if it would resonate, is it unused because it does not mesh with the values of UKIP’s political entrepreneurs? This

would suggest that their framing is not strategic. Undoubtedly, further research can and should grapple with this question. Part of such research might benefit from examining the relationship between types of framing and electoral success. Indeed, a stated objective of this project is to provide a platform for future work to connect structural explanations to ideological-agential accounts of the radical right. This would help to better explain the resurgence of radical right support.

As always, there are limitations to one's research that must be underlined. There were five key methodological shortcomings. First, the classification was not totally consistent, even if it was subject to a robustness check. Second, the research would have benefited from a larger pool of texts, especially for establishing within-case transformation for the RN and UKIP. Third, there could have been more consistency of source material i.e. all from parliamentary speeches. Fourth, this project chose not to go one level deeper in coding, categorising the type of language used i.e. vivid, violent, depoliticised and such. This would have elicited further data-points for comparison. Lastly, at the early stages of research I considered using Orban's Fidesz or Salvini's Lega as a fourth case. These would have provided greater perspective for the placement of radical right parties' framing on an axis, as well as an interesting counterweight to the somewhat liberal framings often used by the chosen case studies. Unfortunately, this project did not have the capacity for an additional case.

Despite these limitations, this project meaningfully contributes to the importance of framing for immigration policy. Through paying close attention to such framing, it breaks apart the category of the radical right and shows where UKIP, the PVV and the RN are closer together and further apart. As academics, we must be acutely aware of how reductive categorisation can create an illusion of homogeneity where those loosely belonging together may critically differ in distinct areas.

## 7.0 TEXTS & REFERENCE LIST

### 7.1 Texts (coding)

#### Geert Wilders

W1: 17.11.18. Restoration weekend, Palm Beach US. Accessed at: <https://geertwilders.nl/in-de-media-mainmenu-74/nieuws-mainmenu-114/94-english/2135-speech-geert-wilders-restoration-weekend-palm-beach-usa-november-17-2018>. Accessed on: 09/08/2019.

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## 8.0 APPENDIX

### Appendix One



(Lees, 2014) - <http://suffragio.org/2014/02/09/swiss-immigration-vote-threatens-access-to-eu-single-market/#more-4566>.

### Appendix Two


<b>J</b>	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
<b>E</b>	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	
<b>0</b>	12	2	14
<b>1</b>	2	22	24
	14	24	38

$$\alpha = 1 - (38 - 1) \times 2 / (14 \times 24)$$

$$\alpha = 0.779 \text{ (~0.8/80\%)}$$

### Appendix Three



(Polk et al., 2017)