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## **AFRICA'S SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS : SEAMLESS WEB OR PATCHWORK ?**

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## **Africa's Sub-regional Organisations: Seamless Web or Patchwork?**

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### **Introduction**

The African Union (AU) neither intends to manage, nor would be capable of managing, the entire continent's armed conflicts or other problems. Hence, the African security architecture developed by the AU envisages a considerable outsourcing of responsibilities to the various sub-regional organisations, usually referred to as the RECs (the regional economic communities). The formula for this is 'subsidiarity', the pros and cons of which are discussed in the following section (Møller 2005). There is certainly much to be said for such decentralisation, but there are also complications, as it is far from clear that all these organisations are up to the task.

One constraint may be the lack of leadership as only a few of them have any member able to play the role of hegemon, combining strength with legitimacy in the eyes of the other members – the latter also a reflection of the absence of values and norms shared by everybody. Not only are most of the RECs not harmonious communities, but in quite a few of them, members actually fight against each other, either in the form of international wars or, more frequently, proxy wars. In the world of real architecture, buildings would simply be torn down and new ones, more suitable to the purpose, constructed in their place, but in the world of international politics there is a strong tendency to make the best of existing organisations. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a concrete analysis of the main RECs covering Africa's five sub-regions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

The emerging picture is, alas, not really one of a seamless web of strong organisations, but rather a patchwork of sub-regional organisations of varying strength and with quite a few gaping holes, in the sense of organisational weakness where it is most needed. As a consequence, the AU may be relieved from some of its responsibilities, but it will most likely still be forced to take action in quite a few contingencies, at least for the foreseeable future.

### **Subsidiarity, Hegemony and Architecture**

The origins of the principle of subsidiarity go way back in history where it was initially intended as a guideline for national politics, but it has also been applied to the international level, for example as a guiding principle for the division of responsibility and authority between the European Union and its member states (Henkel 2002). It is also implicitly enshrined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which assigns important roles to 'regional arrangements' as instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts is concerned (Sidhu 2007; Møller 2008a).

We can thus construct a hierarchical order with global organisations, individual states at the bottom, and regional and sub-regional organisations occupying middle rungs (Table 1), showing both how responsibility is shifted and authority delegated downwards.

**Table 1: Subsidiarity**

	Mode		Level	Mode	Actor	When?
3 <sup>rd</sup> Intl. Resort	R e s p o n s i b i l i t y	↑	Global	D e l e g a t i o n ↓	UN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ‘When all else fails’</li> <li>▪ Use of force required</li> </ul>
2 <sup>nd</sup> Intl. Resort			Regional		AU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No REC available</li> <li>▪ REC insufficient</li> </ul>
1 <sup>st</sup> Intl. Resort			Sub-regional		RECs (AMU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, SADC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ States unable to resolve their differences</li> <li>▪ Intra-state problems not solvable at national level</li> </ul>
Intl. Resort Zero			National		States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Bilateral disputes between states</li> </ul>
1 <sup>st</sup> Resort			Intra-state		Local authorities The actors themselves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ‘Normal circumstances’</li> </ul>

For all its merits, there are also drawbacks to subsidiarity. The closer states are geographically to a conflict, the less they may be able to remain impartial and the more this may incapacitate the organisation to which they belong. Moreover, there seems to be a rather strong correlation between the efficiency of an organisation and the presence of a hegemonic power among its members; but unfortunately a hegemon also tends to be even more involved in the sub-region’s conflicts than other members.

The AU pays tribute to the subsidiarity principle ‘upwards’ by acknowledging the supreme authority of the UN Security Council, but ‘downwards’ there are no references to the sub-regional organisations as instances of first (international) resort. Rather they tend to be referred to as ‘implementing organs’. AU documents abound with terms such as partnership, consultation, harmonisation and co-operation, but are vague with regard to divisions of labour and responsibilities. More concrete plans have, however, been developed with regard to the African Stand-By Force, entailing the fielding of five regional on-call units as well as a standing brigade at the AU level (African Military Experts 2003). The plans for their use follow the subsidiarity principles quite closely, as they are envisioned to undertake the less time-critical missions whereas the AU brigade is envisioned to be tasked with both swift deployment to intervene in an emergency and with filling possible gaps at the sub-regional level.

In 1976, the Organisation of African Unity stipulated that there are five regions in Africa, without specifying which states were to belong to which sub-region. This matter seems at long last to have been resolved, but unfortunately the existing RECs do not quite correspond to the sub-regions and their memberships overlap (see Appendices 1 and 2).

Even though both COMESA and CEN-SAD are sometimes also counted as RECs (AUC 2004), the most relevant as well as those which most closely correspond to the five sub-regions are the AMU in North Africa (but excluding Egypt and including Morocco, which is not an AU member); ECOWAS in West Africa; IGAD in Northeast Africa; ECCAS in Central Africa; and SADC in Southern Africa. In the following sections we shall provide a brief historical narrative of all five, an outline of their organisational structure and a tentative analysis of their peace and security-related ambitions and activities.

Based on the assumption of international relations ‘realists’ that power matters and that hegemony may promote (or even be a precondition of) regional collaboration, statistics are provided for at least some of those ‘aggregate capabilities’ on which, according to Kenneth Waltz (1979: 131), power is based. However, even though hegemony may be based on power, it also requires the ability to persuade the other members that the hegemon’s wishes correspond to the common interests, which presupposes a certain commonality of values (Møller 2009a).

### West Africa: ECOWAS

ECOWAS was established as a vehicle for economic collaboration, but has largely failed in this, as have most other African initiatives (Adebajo 2004). However, the organisation has gradually become rather deeply involved in conflict management, and with some success (Adebajo 2002: 23-42; Adibe 2000; Aboagye 2004; Berman 2000: 75-149).

One explanation may be that it unites nations facing common challenges and problems ‘spilling over’ from one country to its neighbours, and thus crying out for multilateral solutions, such as organised crime and small arms proliferation. What also ties the region together is the presence of an obvious hegemon, namely Nigeria, which surpasses all other members in most respects (Table 2).

**Table 2: The Basis of Hegemony in ECOWAS**

Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452.

Parameter State	Territory sq.kms.	Population	GDP US\$bill ppp.	Military Expenditure US\$mil.	Troops Thousands
Benin	112,620	8,791,832	13.150	55	5
Burkina Faso	274,200	15,746,232	19.340	95	11
Cape Verde	4,033	429,474	1.808	8	1
Cote d'Ivoire	322,460	20,617,068	33.780	290	17
Gambia	11,300	1,782,893	2.044	4	1
Ghana	239,460	23,832,495	34.520	104	14
Guinea	245,857	10,057,975	11.070	52	12
Guinea-Bissau	36,120	1,533,964	0.904	15	6
Liberia	111,370	3,441,790	1.741	na	na
Mali	1,240,000	12,666,987	14.980	157	7
Niger	1,267,000	15,306,252	9.657	46	5
Nigeria	923,768	149,229,090	328.100	980	80
Senegal	196,190	13,711,597	22.980	193	14
Sierra Leone	71,740	6,440,053	4.418	29	11
Togo	56,785	6,019,877	5.428	42	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,112,903</b>	<b>289,607,579</b>	<b>503.920</b>	<b>2070</b>	<b>193</b>
<b>Nigeria share</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>41%</b>

### *History and Structure*

ECOWAS was founded in 1975 and its membership has remained stable since then, the only exception being Mauritania, which left the organisation in 2000 (Africa Research 2000). The founding Treaty of Lagos was exclusively devoted to economic and social integration and did not even mention peace and security issues, but in 1978 ECOWAS adopted a 'Protocol on Non-Aggression', followed in 1981 by a 'Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence'. It was also decided to establish a Defence Council and a Defence Commission, as well as to earmark units from the national armed forces to participate in multilateral forces. Nevertheless, virtually nothing came of this, just as the non-aggression pact was violated on several occasions, for example during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.


By the time these two challenges appeared, ECOWAS was readying itself to play a security role, but was still far from ready, necessitating improvisation. Partly drawing on the lessons of these two armed conflicts, the Lagos Treaty was amended in 1993, and the new Treaty of ECOWAS included several innovative measures in the field of peace and security. The preamble thus envisioned a 'partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community', and member states committed themselves to strengthen existing mechanisms and to establish 'a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate' (ECOWAS 1993).

ECOWAS now has a fairly elaborate organisational structure (Figure 1). The main bodies are the Authority, consisting of the Heads of States and Government, a Council of Ministers, a Community Parliament, an Economic and Social Council, a Community Court of Justice (Ajulo 2001), a Commission (formerly Secretariat) and a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development.

In 1999, a 'Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security' was adopted (Adibe 2000: 157-165; Adebajo 2002: 137-163; Berman and Sams 2000: 138-145; Abass 2000). Besides the Authority and the Secretariat, it involves a Mediation and Security Council (MSC), in which decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority of states. The MSC is mandated to authorise all forms of intervention and decide on the deployment of political and military missions. Under the auspices of the MSC a number of organs were further established, including:

- A Defence and Security Commission, consisting of chiefs of staff, officers responsible for internal affairs and security and civil servants from the foreign offices;
- A Council of Elders, consisting of 'eminent personalities' envisaged to serve as 'mediators, conciliators and facilitators';
- ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), comprising armed forces as well as civilian personnel charged with observation and monitoring, peace keeping and restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention, enforcement of sanctions, preventive deployment, peace-building, disarmament and demobilisation and policing activities;
- An early warning system consisting of an Observation and Monitoring Centre in charge of data collection and analyses, and four observation and monitoring zones.

**Figure 1: ECOWAS Organigram (simplified)**



The protocol further envisaged ‘a graduated strategy for building peace’, including such missions as supervision of elections and general support for the development of democratic institutions, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, also for child soldiers and measures to control the flow of small arms. Considerable effort has gone into the latter problem – e.g. producing a ‘Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons’ signed in 1998, followed in 2006 by a ‘Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials’, which has yet to enter into force (Murray 2000; Bah 2004).

In 2001, an supplementary protocol was adopted, dealing with democracy and good governance, establishing a set of mandatory constitutional principles, including separation of powers, free and fair multi-party elections and a ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’. Provisions were made for election monitoring, and sanctions such as suspension from decision making within the organisation were foreseen for violation of these norms. That this is not mere talk was demonstrated when the organisation imposed diplomatic sanctions on the new government in Togo, regarded as usurpers because the military had, upon the death of the dictator, Gnassingbe Eyadema, manipulated his son into power (Banjo 2008).

### *Peacekeeping Operations and/or Humanitarian Interventions*

ECOWAS has also launched military operations, generally labelled 'peacekeeping', even though 'humanitarian interventions' may be a more appropriate term.

The first was to Liberia, where a chaotic civil war was created by the insurgency of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in 1989. Following the signing of a ceasefire with which none of the warring parties complied, and in the conspicuous absence of any UN attempts to solve the crisis, ECOWAS stepped into the breach with a hastily assembled, and predominantly Nigerian, regional peacekeeping force. Euphemistically labelled 'ECOWAS Monitoring Group', ECOMOG was deployed to Liberia in 1990. It was a mixed success, as the peacekeepers even failed to protect the life of the deposed president, Samuel Doe (Alao et al. 1999; Howe 1996; Cleaver and May 1998). It was finally withdrawn in 1998 after the rather surprising election of Charles Taylor as president of the country he had ravaged so mercilessly (Harris 1999), and it played only a very insignificant role when the next round of the civil war broke out towards the end of the millennium.

Next came a deployment to Sierra Leone, where a rebellion had been launched by the Revolutionary United Front, supported by Taylor's NPFL (Keen 2005; Richards 1998; Gberi 2005). Following several failed mediation attempts and a haphazard deployment of national armed forces of several member states, in 1997 ECOWAS decided to deploy 'ECOMOG II' to Sierra Leone, partly by 'rehatting' forces already there (Adebajo 2002: 79-109; Mortimer 2000; Berman and Sams 2000: 111-128; Adibe 2000: 125-133, 145-153). They managed to reinstate the deposed president Kabbah, even though most of this was in fact a unilateral Nigerian operation. The situation was further complicated by the overlap between the ECOMOG/Nigerian mission and a small and ineffective UN mission (UNOMSIL), followed by a unilateral British intervention (Fowler 2004). Following the election of Obasanjo as president of Nigeria, it began a phased withdrawal that forced the UN to deploy a genuine peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) to Sierra Leone (Findlay 2002; Ofuately-Kodjoe 2003). Even this force, however, needed reinforcement by 3,000 Nigerian troops.

Both deployments were arguably reasonably successful and the performance of the ECOMOG forces largely satisfactory, albeit far from flawless (Adebajo 2008b). Moreover, its services came cheap. Whereas the *per capita* troop costs of the UN's forces in Liberia were \$500,000, those of ECOMOG were a mere \$30,406 (Adibe 2000: 145). Perhaps even more importantly, ECOMOG forces have proven to be far less casualty-scared than, say, those of the Western powers, with the total Nigerian casualty toll estimated at nearly one thousand (Adebajo 2002: 141).

The third ECOWAS intervention took place in Guinea-Bissau where an armed conflict broke out in 1998-1999. The first regional response was a joint intervention by Senegal and Guinea without ECOWAS endorsement, followed by ECOWAS mediation efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CPLP (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*) (MacQueen 2003) leading to the deployment of a small and inefficient peacekeeping force, which ended in failure. According to Adekeye Adebajo (2002: 112), this failure was partly due to the absence of Nigeria: 'Lacking the regional Gulliver, the Lilliputian peacekeepers had to withdraw from Bissau by June 1999' (see also Adibe 2000: 133-136, 153-157; Berman and Sams 2000: 128-138).

The fourth test of the organisation came when a civil war broke out in Côte d'Ivoire, which had previously been an anchor of stability in the region. ECOWAS quickly became involved.

Following the signing of the so-called Marcoussis Accords, in 2003 ECOWAS deployed a ceasefire-monitoring operation, the 1,400-strong MICECI/ECOMICI (*Mission de la CEDEAO en Côte d'Ivoire/ECOWAS Mission to Côte d'Ivoire*) to supplement a very small UN mission. The ECOWAS troop contributors were Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo, but significantly not Nigeria. An element in this was a rather bizarre military operation, conducted jointly with French forces, the government armed forces and those of the former rebels in pursuit of rogue elements and (mainly Liberian) mercenaries – all with a ‘Chapter VII mandate’ from the UN Security Council. Only in February 2004 was the UN mission expanded to a regular peacekeeping mission under which the ECOWAS forces were then subsumed (ICG 2003).

#### *Conclusion: Nigeria's Central Role*

The greatest weakness of ECOWAS may be its critical dependency on the contribution of Nigeria, both in military and other terms (Saliu 2000). The deployments have all placed severe strains on the capacity of the smaller member states, and there is little reason to expect this to change. Fortunately for regional collaboration, however, Nigerian foreign policy seems remarkably stable, so any major changes in its orientation seem unlikely, even though they cannot be ruled out (Obi 2008; Adebajo 2008a). The hegemonic position of Nigeria also means that ECOWAS will be unable to do much about a significant share of the region's conflicts, namely those situated ‘in the belly of the beast’ itself – e.g. the Muslim versus Christian unrest in northern Nigeria or the insurgencies in the southern parts of the country, not to mention the possibility of yet another coup by the Nigerian military.

#### **Southern Africa: SADC**

To almost the same extent as ECOWAS, the Southern African REC, SADC, exhibits a distribution of strengths that should be conducive to hegemony, with South Africa cast in the role as hegemon (Legum 2000) (Table 3). However, the establishment of actual hegemony has been blocked by the presence of rivals of comparable strength (at least in certain dimensions), such as Angola and Zimbabwe, and the widespread lack of trust in South Africa, widely perceived as economically dominant and regarded as inherently expansionist (Hudson 2007; Schoeman 2007; Alden and Soko 2005).



**Table 3: The Basis of Hegemony in SADC**

Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452.

State	Parameter Territory sq. kms.	Population	GDP US\$bill ppp.	Military Expenditure US\$mil.	Troops Thousands
Angola	1,246,700	12,799,293	114.600	2,264	107
Botswana	600,370	1,990,876	29.170	317	9
DR Congo	2,345,410	68,692,542	21.080	166	151
Lesotho	30,355	2,130,819	3.384	40	2
Madagascar	587,040	20,653,556	21.620	82	14
Malawi	118,480	14,268,711	11.820	42	5
Mauritius	2,040	1,284,264	15.750	27	0
Mozambique	801,590	21,669,278	19.680	57	11
Namibia	825,418	2,108,665	11.590	239	9
South Africa	1,219,912	49,052,489	505.100	3,753	62
Swaziland	17,363	1,123,913	5.708	na	na
Tanzania	945,087	41,048,532	56.220	162	27
Zambia	752,614	11,862,740	17.830	247	15
Zimbabwe	390,580	11,392,629	2.292	na	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,882,959</b>	<b>260,078,307</b>	<b>835.844</b>	<b>7,396</b>	<b>441</b>
<b>South African Share</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>14%</b>

*History and Structure*

The fall of the apartheid regime largely coincided with the end of the Cold War, which had affected the sub-region more than most others (Berridge 1990). Hence, Southern Africa was transformed from a 'conflict system' into at least a nascent 'security community,' between the members of which war was rapidly becoming inconceivable (Ngoma 2003; Cawthra 1997). This would seem to offer almost ideal conditions for the creation of a strong sub-regional organisation, but the actual achievements have been somewhat disappointing.


SADC came into being in 1992 through a merger of two other sub-regional organisations, both of which were created as counterweights to apartheid South Africa (Omari and Macaringue 2007), the so-called Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (Ngoma 2005: 79-93). In 1994, South Africa was welcomed as a member of SADC followed by Mauritius in 1995, the DRC and the Seychelles in 1998 and Madagascar in 2005 – of which the Seychelles left the organisation from 2004 to 2008, and Madagascar's membership has been suspended.

The founding Treaty of the SADC in 1992 stated several rather unrealistic objectives, such as promoting interdependence and integration, as well as basic principles such as sovereign equality of member states, solidarity, peace, human rights and democracy. It also described the organisational structure of the organisation with a summit of heads of state and government at the pinnacle, where decisions would be taken by consensus 'unless otherwise provided', the quorum being two-thirds of the member states (SADC 1992) (Figure 2). When the treaty was amended in 2001, the main innovations were the introduction of a 'troika' institution under which the incumbent chair would be assisted by both his predecessor and his successor, and constitutional provisions for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS). It was further decided that all member states should establish 'SADC national committees', including representatives of civil society, albeit merely with a consultative role (SADC 2001a; Isaksen and Tjønneland 2001).

The most important institution for the purposes of this paper is undoubtedly the OPDS, usually referred to as ‘the Organ’. It was established in 1996, but was initially not subordinated to the ordinary SADC structures, partly because its first chairman, Zimbabwean president Mugabe, obstinately clung to the office until 2001 even though the chair was supposed to have rotated on an annual basis (Osei-Heide 2002; Nathan 2000). The Organ was based on a commitment to ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ and tasked with developing a common foreign policy, joint lobbying in international fora, regional security and defence, conflict-prevention management and resolution, mediation and preventive diplomacy by means of an early warning system, peace-keeping, collective security and collective defence (Cilliers 1999: 37-45; Berman and Sams 2000: 160-161, 166-167).

**Figure 2: SADC Organisational Structure (simplified)**

Source: Based on [www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/sadc/organogram.pdf](http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/organogram.pdf)



In 2001, the Organ was finally subsumed directly under the SADC, and comprises the ministers of foreign affairs, defence and public or state security. Like the SADC summit, it is headed by a troika, the chairman being elected by the summit from its own ranks and on a rotational basis, yet with the stipulation that no state can hold both chairmanships simultaneously. It has two subordinate bodies: the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), comprising the ministers of defence and of state or public security; and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs. The former has a fairly elaborate structure, incorporating, for instance, a Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Committee (SARPCCO) (Meyns 2002).

Whether SADC has been a success in the peace and security field is debatable. Even though there have been very few armed conflicts between member states, this cannot automatically be attributed to SADC, as there have simply been few issues worth going to war over. When Namibia and Botswana were on the verge of an armed confrontation over the disputed riverine island of Kasikili, Robert Mugabe, in his capacity as chair of the Organ, sought to

mediate, but had to refer the matter to arbitration by the International Court of Justice (Ngoma 2005: 155-156).

Both the Organ and SADC are stern defenders of state sovereignty, which has precluded the handling of crises between member states. The three main challenges have surely been the civil wars in Angola and the DRC and the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe. SADC played virtually no role in the Angolan war, but three member states did intervene in the civil war in the Congo, just as South Africa played a major diplomatic role in brokering a political solution to the conflict by hosting the inter-Congolese dialogue and subsequently by contributing peacekeepers, but significantly not under the auspices of SADC (ICG 2001). Throughout the crisis in Zimbabwe, SADC has attempted some mediation – mainly through South African ‘quiet diplomacy’ – but it has refrained from anything more ‘muscular’. Not without justification, it has thus been perceived as aiding and abetting the regime (ICG 2007).

### *Collective Defence and the Interventions in the DRC and Lesotho*

SADC is officially committed to function as a collective defence organisation, and in 2003 a Mutual Defence Pact was signed (SADC 2003), committing members to (unspecified) mutual assistance against attack. However, even before this pact was signed, SADC had arguably undertaken two collective defence missions:

- In response to the joint Rwandan and Ugandan military intervention in the DRC in 1998, when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent forces to protect the besieged regime of Laurent Kabila, which might be seen as collective defence in the sense of the UN Charter’s article 51. Even though the mission had received no formal SADC mandate, it was subsequently granted *ex post facto* endorsement.
- In 1998, South Africa and Botswana launched an intervention in Lesotho, officially in order to prevent a military coup, which likewise received an SADC mandate of sorts after the fact, even though the mission failed in most respects (Likoti 2007).

As far as genuinely multilateral military activities are concerned, the Pact envisions collaboration in military training and joint exercises. Some joint training in peacekeeping activities has taken place –, for example at the (now effectively defunct) Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare (De Koenig 2004) – and a couple of military exercises have been conducted, including the ‘Blue Hungwe,’ ‘Blue Crane’ and ‘Blue Angel’ (Berman and Sams 2000: 169-172; Ngoma 2005: 203). No actual joint deployments have, however, taken place, and this seems to presuppose the participation and leadership of South Africa. Unfortunately, however, it is almost equally unlikely that the regional giant will be willing to play such a role or that this would be accepted by the rest (Barber 2004: 182-195).

For the foreseeable future SADC’s contribution to regional security will thus probably be in the field of ‘soft’ measures. It has, for instance, taken some steps to address the serious problem of small arms proliferation in the region (e.g. with a ‘Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials’) and some weapons have actually been collected and subsequently destroyed (SADC 2001b). It is also conceivable that SADC may play a role in protecting democracy, thereby helping prevent conflict. In sharp contrast to its handling of the Zimbabwe crisis, SADC showed some ‘muscle’ when Madagascar’s president was forcefully removed in a coup in March 2009 (IRIN News, March 16, 2009; March 25, 2009), not only refusing recognition to the usurpers, but also suspending the country from all SADC institutions (SADC 2009).

### *Prospects for the Future*

It is hard to be optimistic about SADC's future. The main problem may be that there is much less to the common values often referred to than meets the eye (Nathan 2006; Hammerstad 2005), with South Africa standing (so far, at least) for values such as democracy and human rights that are not really shared by countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola or the DRC – to say nothing of a country such as Swaziland that does not even pretend to be committed to them (Hodges 2002; ICG 2005, 2006).

Moreover, some member states may not really belong in this REC as their security concerns lie elsewhere. One may, for instance, make quite a convincing argument to the effect that Tanzania belongs to Eastern Africa and the DRC to the Great Lakes Region or Central Africa, which may in fact also be the case with Angola. Hence, the SADC might be better off ridding itself of states belonging elsewhere, but institutionalisation is notoriously 'sticky' in the sense that international organisations only rarely expel member states, just as states rarely leave organisations, preferring to 'hedge their bets' and remain members whilst limiting their actual commitment.

### **Eastern Africa: IGAD**

The IGAD suffers from the same mismatch between membership and security concerns as does the SADC. What further limits its potential is the absence of foundations for hegemony (Table 4), showing that the most obvious candidate for such a role, Ethiopia, is much weaker in relative terms than Nigeria and South Africa in their respective sub-regions (Iyob 1993). Far from being unipolar, the IGAD sub-region is tripolar: Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya each prominent in different dimensions of power and none of them strong enough for domination.

Moreover, virtually all IGAD member states are weak states, and Somalia is a textbook example of a failed state. Most member states are also experiencing armed conflicts, quite a few of which 'spill over' into neighbouring countries – usually other IGAD-member states. This problem is exacerbated by the unfortunate propensity of states in the region for 'proxy wars' against each other, most recently Sudan versus Uganda and Ethiopia versus Eritrea (Prunier 2004; Abbink 2003). Finally, the sub-region has been host to Africa's only two 'real' international wars: the Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1978 and the Ethiopia-Eritrea war from 1998 to 2000 (Gorman 1981; Negash and Tronvoll 2000).

**Table 4: The Basis of Hegemony in IGAD**

Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452.


<b>Parameter</b> <b>State</b>	<b>Territory</b> Sq. kms.	<b>Population</b>	<b>GDP</b> US\$bill ppp.	<b>Military</b> <b>Expenditure</b> US\$mil.	<b>Troops</b> Thousands
<b>Djibouti</b>	23,000	516,055	1.930	17	10
<b>Eritrea</b>	121,320	5,647,168	3.965	na	202
<b>Ethiopia</b>	1,127,127	85,237,338	63.440	336	138
<b>Kenya</b>	582,650	39,002,772	66.480	681	24
<b>Somalia</b>	637,657	9,832,017	5.756	na	2
<b>Sudan</b>	2,505,810	41,087,825	88.950	na	109
<b>Uganda</b>	236,040	32,369,558	34.230	232	45
<b>Total</b>	5,233,604	213,692,733	264.751	1,266	530
<b>Ethiopia Share</b>	22%	40%	24%	27%	26%
<b>Kenya Share</b>	11%	18%	25%	54%	5%
<b>Sudan Share</b>	48%	19%	34%	na	21%

### History and Structure

IGAD was founded in 1996 on the basis of the IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development), which had been launched in 1986 (Berman and Sams 2000: 207-210; Juma 2003; Terlinden n.d.). Its membership has remained quite stable ever since, comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan. Eritrea joined following its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, but unilaterally suspended its membership in 2007 (Ethopian Herald, April 27, 2007).

**Figure 3: IGAD Organisational Structure (simplified)**

Source: Based on ‘Operational Structure of IGAD’ at [www.igad.org/about/op.html](http://www.igad.org/about/op.html), ‘Profile: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’ at [www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/igad/organogram.pdf](http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/organogram.pdf) and the organigram of IGAD-CEWARN at [www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/igad/cewarn.pdf](http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/cewarn.pdf)



The central organs of the organisation are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat, which is located in Djibouti and headed by an Executive Secretary (see Figure 3). As with the other RECs, IGAD is based on the principle of sovereign equality of member states and the need for consensus, albeit with the (rather hypothetical) option of taking decisions through two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers.

IGAD’s main objectives were initially economic, but the IGAD Agreement also highlighted the goals to ‘promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue’ and to ‘facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and displaced persons and demobilized soldiers’. The agreement also obliged member states to deal with disputes ‘within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organisations’ (IGAD 1986).

In 2003, an 'IGAD Strategy' was adopted, mainly as a guideline for the work of the Secretariat, enumerating a broad panoply of missions such as promoting good governance and human rights (IGAD 2003). This may partly reflect the important role played by the donors, on whose support the running of the organisation to a large extent depends and who are organised in an IGAD Partners Forum (IGAD 2002).

The same may be the case with one of the recent initiatives, the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) (Juma 2007). Even though the incidence of terrorism was, at least until the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, quite low (Møller 2006: 39-44), the United States regards the region as a 'hotspot' of international terrorism. Hence quite generous funds are available for whatever is ostensibly devoted to counter-terrorism, allowing states to tap into a rich resource pool for financing their security sectors simply by claiming that the purpose is counter-terrorism.

### *Peace Efforts in Sudan and Somalia*

IGAD's efforts at conflict resolution have focused on Sudan and Somalia (Woodward 2004). It thus played quite a central role in the peace process between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement) (Adar 2000), establishing a permanent secretariat, appointing special envoys and hosting negotiations between the two sides. The first main achievement was the 2002 Machakos Protocol, setting out the contours of a settlement featuring power sharing between the North and South, extensive autonomy for the latter followed by a referendum on secession after a six-year transitional period. Then came protracted negotiations on the details, producing a series of protocols that were then wrapped up in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 (Thomas 2009). While this was certainly an achievement, IGAD has neither been involved in the implementation of the CPA, nor done much about the civil war in Darfur, leaving this to the AU.

Even though IGAD had not been involved in the negotiations that in 2000 produced a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia it did, somewhat reluctantly, grant some recognition to the TNG (Anonymous 2002; Bryden 2003). In 2002, it provided the auspices for a new set of negotiations, producing an agreement on a federalist political dispensation, followed in 2004 by the establishment (on the basis of clan-quotas) of a transitional federal parliament and government (TFP and TFG) (ICG 2004a, 2004b). Having thus served as 'midwife' it is hardly surprising that IGAD remained unwaveringly on the side of this so-called 'government', even though it lacked democratic legitimacy (as none of the delegates had ever been elected) and showed no capacity to govern the country (Møller 2008b, 2009b). IGAD effectively condoned the Ethiopian invasion in support of the TFG in late 2006, followed by two years of *de facto* occupation, producing one of Africa's most severe humanitarian emergencies (Menkhaus 2007), and left it to the AU to send a peacekeeping force, AMISOM, ostensibly intended to allow for an Ethiopian withdrawal.

### *Conflict Prevention and Military Activities*

In 1998, IGAD embarked on the implementation of a five-point programme on conflict prevention, resolution and management. In 2002, an elaborate protocol was adopted on the 'Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States' (CEWARN), and in 2003 a CEWARN unit was actually opened in Addis Ababa (Mwaura and Schmeidl 2002).

CEWARN is very ambitiously intended for both early warning and response, but seems to entail little more than an exchange of information. In addition to the central mechanism, the intention is to establish national conflict early warning and response units (CEWERU), and to liaise with NGOs and civil society organisations involved in the gathering of information. By early 2009, three ‘clusters’ were operational, all devoted to localised and mainly pastoral conflicts, labelled the Afar-Issa, Karamoja and Somalia clusters, the latter focusing exclusively on the border regions of Kenya.

While this may count as a partial success, the organisation’s efforts at fielding one of the five sub-regional brigades for the AU must be categorised as a complete failure. IGAD initially showed considerable commitment to fielding an Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and held numerous meetings on the topic, but eventually it was decided to establish EASBRIG outside the framework of IGAD (Mulugeta 2008).

### *Conclusion*

The IGAD thus seems to be considerably weaker than ECOWAS and even the SADC, having neither a balance of power nor ‘ties of amity and enmity’ conducive to the creation of a functioning sub-regional organisation. The main achievement is surely the Sudanese peace, but it seems very doubtful whether this will hold. Neither with regard to international wars such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea, nor state collapse and civil war such as that of Somalia, has the IGAD been able to make much of a difference. In fact, in the latter case it may well have inadvertently exacerbated the situation, both by bringing into existence the TFG and by effectively rubber-stamping the Ethiopian invasion. The organisation has also been completely passive with regard to the conflicts in Uganda (pitting the government against the Lord’s Resistance Army), the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan, the several conflicts in Ethiopia and the recent disturbances in the otherwise quite stable Kenya. There seems to be no reason to expect this to change in the foreseeable future and thus few grounds for even cautious optimism.

### **Central Africa: ECCAS**

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1983 on the basis of two smaller economic organisations. The members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tomé and Príncipe (Berman and Sams 2000: 201-206).

As is apparent from Table 5, there is very little basis for hegemony within ECCAS, although there are two obvious candidates – Angola and the DRC – one of which is economically dominant (albeit not quite enough for it to really matter) whereas the other is economically weak, but strong in terms of population and troops. Moreover, both these countries have only recently come out of protracted and quite nasty civil wars, as have other members such as Burundi. State weakness is thus a prevalent feature of most member states, which bodes ill for the organisation. The protracted and extremely destructive war in the DRC was especially damaging as it pitted two members, Angola and Rwanda (which has since left the organisation), against each other on the territory of a third (Chouala 2008).

**Table 5: The Basis of Hegemony in ECCAS**

Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452.

<b>Parameter</b> <b>State</b>	<b>Territory</b> sq. kms.	<b>Population</b>	<b>GDP</b> US\$bill ppp.	<b>MILEX</b> US\$mil.	<b>Troops</b> Thousands
<b>Angola</b>	1,246,700	12,799,293	114.600	2264	107
<b>Burundi</b>	27,830	8,988,091	3.215	78	20
<b>Cameroon</b>	475,440	18,879,301	44.030	297	14
<b>CAR</b>	622,984	4,511,488	3.262	18	3
<b>DR Congo</b>	2,345,410	68,692,542	21.080	166	151
<b>Eq. Guinea</b>	28,051	633,441	18.620	8	1
<b>Gabon</b>	267,667	1,514,993	22.160	123	5
<b>Rep. Congo</b>	342,000	4,012,809	14.790	94	10
<b>Sao T./P</b>	1,001	212,679	0.278	na	na
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,357,083</b>	<b>120,244,637</b>	<b>242.035</b>	<b>3,048</b>	<b>311</b>
<b>Angola's Share</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>34%</b>
<b>DRC's Share</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>49%</b>
<b>Legend:</b> CAR: Central African Republic; DR: Democratic Republic; GDP: Gross Domestic Product; MILEX: Military Expenditure; ppp: purchasing power parity; Sao T./P.: Sao Tomé and Príncipe; sq. kms: square kilometres					

Nor does it help that several members have divided loyalties, also belonging to other RECs, such as the SADC, to which both Angola and the DRC belong. Another challenge may be the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (Awoumou 2008). Although not a designated REC, in 2002 it fielded a peacekeeping mission, FOMUC (*Force multinationale en Centrafrique*) to the Central African Republic with the official endorsement of the UN Security Council and lasting until 2008. FOMUC's size was quite limited, with around three-to four-hundred troops being provided by three member states, the Republic of Congo, Chad and Gabon (Zwanenburg 2006; Alusala 2007: 9-27); and in 2008 it was transformed into a Mission for the Consolidation of Peace (MICOPAX), now under the auspices of ECCAS and with the additional participation of Angola and Cameroon and a total size of 640 personnel (Opérations de Paix 2008).


In its founding treaty ECCAS was mainly intended to create a customs union, but the organisation was given a rather elaborate organisational structure, the main bodies being a Conference of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice, a General Secretariat and a Consultative Commission, in addition to which the establishment of a number of technical committees was envisioned (see Figure 4) (ECCAS 1983). However, ECCAS was almost completely dormant until 1999, when efforts were undertaken to revitalise it.

In 2000, ECCAS adopted a 'Mutual Assistance Pact' (Mubiala 2003: 7-14), committing member states to come to each other's assistance in the case of aggression and to prepare for this through joint military manoeuvres. Furthermore, in 2000 a protocol was adopted on a 'Peace and Security Council for Central Africa' (COPAX), underlining sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs as guiding principles, but also mentioning confidence-building measures and common approaches to such problems as refugees and internally displaced persons as well as transnational crime and arms trafficking (ECCAS 2000). Out of this have sprung decisions in 2002 to establish a Defence and Security Commission (DSC), a Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and an early warning mechanism (MARAC) (ECCAS 2002a). FOMAC is described as consisting of 'interservice, police, gendarmerie contingents and of civilian modules' with the size of up to three brigades with appropriate naval and air



support and tasked with missions such as observation and cease-fire monitoring, preventative deployment, peacekeeping, enforcement of sanctions and even humanitarian interventions, on behalf of ECCAS, the AU and the UN (ECCAS 2002b). MARAC is supposed to be responsible for data collection and analysis about impending crises and conflicts, to be gathered by national bureaus and collated in a central data base (ECCAS 2002c).

**Figure 4: Structure of ECCAS (simplified)**



It remains to be seen whether anything tangible will come out of these decisions, and by mid-2009 there were still no signs of this, leaving ECCAS as an even weaker REC than the IGAD.

**North Africa: The AMU**

The weakest of all the designated RECs is surely the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), dominated as it is by the two sub-regional powers of approximately equal strength, Algeria and Morocco (Table 6). As these two countries are each other’s arch-enemies, it is small wonder that AMU is extremely weak, bordering on complete insignificance. The only hypothetical development that might change this would be an accession to the organisation by Egypt, which would appear a natural hegemon, but there are no indications that this will ever happen. The government in Cairo did apply for, but was refused, membership in 1994 (Coshy 1995).

The AMU was founded in 1989 and comprises Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania (Aghrout and Sutton 1990; Berman and Sams 2000: 193-197; Mortimer 1999; Brunel 2008). Even though its founding treaty mentions the objective of ‘contributing to the preservation of the peace based on justice and equity’ (AMU 1989), it has never made any contribution to this, and the organigram in Figure 4 also exhibits no institutional signs of any such ambition.


**Table 6: The Basis of Hegemony in AMU**

Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452

Parameter State	Territory sq.kms.	Population	GDP US\$bill ppp.	Military Expenditure US\$mil.	Troops Thousands
Algeria	2,381,740	34,178,188	240.200	4,270	147
Libya	1,759,540	6,310,430	92.010	656	76
Mauritania	1,030,700	3,129,486	64.920	19	16
Morocco	446,550	34,859,364	137.400	2,409	196
Tunesia	163,610	10,486,339	83.400	470	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,782,140</b>	<b>88,963,807</b>	<b>617.930</b>	<b>7,824</b>	<b>471</b>
Algeria Share	41%	38%	39%	55%	31%
Moroccan Share	8%	39%	22%	31%	42%

**Figure 4: Structure of the AMU**

Source: Based on ‘Profile: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)/Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)’ at [www.issafrika.org/](http://www.issafrika.org/)



The organisation has been almost moribund ever since its creation, and has not met at the summit level since 1994. A decision was taken in 1999 to relaunch the AMU (Africa Research 1999), but very little came out of this. The main reason for this is probably the never-ending dispute between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara (Sahrawi) (Zoubir 1990; Zunes 1995).

**Conclusion: Seamless Web or Patchwork?**

However good they may look on paper, the AU’s plans for an African security architecture based on the RECs are thus fraught with problems. Existing RECs do not constitute a ‘seamless web’ of sub-regional security organisations covering the entire continent but, at best, a patchwork with several gaping holes. While ECOWAS has a proven capacity to deal with conflicts with its sub-region, except those in Nigeria, neither SADC nor IGAD has the same capacity, and both ECCAS and the AMU have practically none.

Besides the all-pervasive shortage of resources, in turn a reflection of poverty and low state capacity, the explanation may be that several states are misplaced in the sense that their most urgent security concerns are not addressed by the REC to which they belong. Ideally, the

'who goes where' question should be approached from scratch by disbanding existing RECs and creating new ones, corresponding to actual security concerns, but this is almost certainly not going to happen, and the best one can hope for is a piecemeal transformation where individual countries gradually switch allegiances.

Another problem – likewise related to resource scarcity – is the lack in AMU, ECCAS and IGAD of powers able and willing to play the role of hegemons with leading roles, but also with responsibilities to provide some of the resources that the rest lack, to which should be added (for the sake of acceptability) a certain humility and a preparedness to do things multilaterally and in conformity with common rules that the state in question would actually be capable of doing unilaterally. So far, Nigeria and South Africa have come close – but perhaps not quite close enough – to this ideal in their respective sub-regions, but in the three other REC even the material foundations of hegemony are missing.


## Appendix 1: Africa, Sub-regions and International Organisations

Sub-Region	Members Organisation	Reg.	Sub-regional (REC)					Others			
		AU	AMU	ECOWAS	IGAD	SADC	ECCAS	COMESA	CEN-SAD	EAC	LAS
North Africa	Algeria	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
	Egypt	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓
	Libya	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓
	Mauritania	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓
	Morocco	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓
	Sahrawi	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Tunisia	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓
West Africa	Benin	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Burkina Faso	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Cape Verde	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Cote d'Ivoire	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Gambia	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Ghana	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Guinea	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Guinea-Bissau	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Liberia	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Mali	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Niger	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Nigeria	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Senegal	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
	Sierra Leone	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
Togo	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	
Eastern Africa	Comoros	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓
	Djibouti	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓
	Eritrea	✓	-	-	✓*	-	-	✓	✓	-	O
	Ethiopia	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	-
	Kenya	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-
	Madagascar	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-
	Mauritius	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-
	Rwanda	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-
	Seychelles	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-
	Somalia	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓
	Sudan	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓
	Tanzania	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	✓	-
Uganda	✓	-	-	✓	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	
Southern Africa	Angola	✓	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
	Botswana	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
	Lesotho	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
	Malawi	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-
	Mozambique	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
	Namibia	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
	South Africa	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
	Swaziland	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-
	Zambia	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-
	Zimbabwe	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-

Central Africa	Burundi	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓	-
	Cameroon	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
	Central African Rep.	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
	Chad	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
	DR of Congo	✓	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-
	Equatorial Guinea	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
	Gabon	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
	Rep. of the Congo	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	-
	Sao Tomé & Príncipe	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
<b>Africa</b>	<b>Total Membership</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7*</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10<sup>†</sup></b>
Notes: AMU: Arab Maghreb Union; AU: African Union, CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC: East African Community; ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development; LAS: League of Arab States; O: Observer; SADC: Southern African Development Community; * Eritrea suspended its membership in 2007; <sup>†</sup> The total membership of the LAS is 21 plus 3 observers, including Eritrea											

Source: Institute for Security Studies: 'Profile: African Union (AU),' at [www.issafrica.org/](http://www.issafrica.org/)

**Appendix 2: The African Union and the Regional Economic Communities**



**NOTE: THE SMALL ISLAND STATES (COMOROS, CAPE VERDE, MAURITIUS, THE SEYHELLES AND SAO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE) HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED. LIGHT BLUE INDICATES EITHER THAT THE COUNTRY’S STATUS IS DISPUTED (SAHRAWI) OR THAT MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN SUSPENDED (ERITREA).**

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