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EXCLUSIONARY ELITE BARGAINS AND CIVIL WAR ONSET: THE CASE OF UGANDA

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Exclusionary elite bargains and civil war onset: The case of Uganda

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Uganda offers almost unequalled opportunities for the study of civil war[1] with no less than fifteen cases since independence in 1962 (see Figure 1) – a number that makes it one of the most conflict-intensive countries on the African continent. The current government of Yoweri Museveni has faced the highest number of armed insurgencies (seven), followed by the Obote II regime (five), the Amin military dictatorship (two) and the Obote I administration (one).[2] Strikingly, only 17 out of the 47 post-colonial years have been entirely civil war free.



Figure 1: Civil war in Uganda, 1962-2008
Source: Own compilation.
FRONASA = Front of Salvation; UNLA = Uganda National Liberation Army; UNRF = Uganda National Rescue Front; FUNA = Former Uganda National Army; UFM = Uganda Freedom Movement; NRA = National Resistance Army; FEDEMO = Federal Democratic Movement; UPDA = Uganda People's Democratic Army; HSM = Holy Spirit Movement; UPA = Uganda People's Army; LRA = Lord's Resistance Army; WNBF = West Nile Bank Front; ADF = Allied Democratic Forces.

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[1] Drawing on Sambanis (2004a: 829ff.), I define armed conflict as a civil war if: (a) the parties are politically and militarily organised, and they have publicly stated political objectives; (b) the government is a principal combatant; (c) the main insurgent organisation(s) are locally represented and recruit locally, though there may be additional external involvement and recruitment; (d) the conflict causes at least 500 to 1000 deaths during the first year or at least 1000 cumulative deaths in the next three years; (e) the conflict is characterised by sustained violence, with no three-year period having less than 500 deaths; and (f) the weaker party is able to mount effective resistance, measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party.
[2] Information on the number of war-related deaths and 'effective resistance' is generally scarce and contested. Nevertheless, my review of both the secondary literature and newspaper articles in the Lexis Nexis News database suggests that all of the mentioned fifteen insurgencies match my definition of civil war.

The first reign of Milton Obote (1962-1971) was relatively peaceful by Ugandan standards. Early signs of post-colonial instability included the low-intensity Rwenzururu guerrilla movement in Western Uganda and the army mutiny of January 1964, which was put down without bloodshed. Two years later, Uganda experienced its first civil war, known as the 'Battle of Mengo', in which government troops fought against the powerful Buganda Kingdom.[3] After the latter's violent subjugation, the country returned to relative peace, albeit interrupted by the violence surrounding the imposition of a one-party state in 1969. In January 1971, Idi Amin ousted Obote in the country's first successful military coup.

The reign of Idi Amin was extremely violent by every standard, with tens, if not hundreds of thousands of deaths between 1971 and 1979.[4] In addition to repeated waves of state-directed killings and a dozen known military coup attempts (ARC 1974/1975: B310; ACR 1976/1977: B378; ACR 1978/1979: B425), the Amin administration witnessed two incidents of civil war. The first was the failed insurgency of September 1972 when an exile group of 1300 people – mainly belonging to Obote's forces but supported by Museveni's Front of Salvation (FRONASA) – crossed into Uganda to topple Amin.[5] The second civil war was the anti-Amin rebellion of 1978-79, which involved a total of 28 groups from both within and outside Uganda that were organised under the umbrella of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). This successful insurgency had a very strong international component in that it was Nyerere's Tanzania that – provoked by Amin's invasion of the Kagera Salient on October 30, 1978 – led the Ugandan groups to military victory.

The Amin regime was followed by the intermezzo of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) that witnessed the coming and going of three different presidents between April 1979 and December 1980. The UNLF came to an end with the controversial 1980 elections that brought Milton Obote back to power. The latter ruled until July 1985, when he was toppled in a military coup led by Bazillo and Tito Okello. The period between 1979 and 1986 witnessed five different civil wars. Two of them occurred in West Nile, including insurgencies by the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA). The remaining three civil wars took place in Buganda, the epicentre of violent conflict under Obote II. The two smaller insurgencies involved the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) on the one hand, and the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMO) on the other. However, by far the most sustained insurgency in Buganda was Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA), which launched a guerrilla war in the Luwero Triangle on February 6, 1981 and captured power in early 1986. The total extent of death and destruction caused by the five anti-UNLF/ Obote II civil wars is difficult to estimate. Most sources indicate that a few hundred thousand people died – the bulk of them during the NRA war. [6]

Museveni was sworn in as president on January 26, 1986 and has ruled the country ever since. The official rhetoric of reconciliation notwithstanding, his government has faced seven major insurgencies since 1986 – more than any other government in post-colonial Uganda. The main theatre of civil war has been 'Acholiland' in the North where the 1986 uprising by the

[3] Government estimates put the number of deaths at 40, whereas the Baganda cited a figure between 400 and 4000 (Kasozi 1994: 86). Eyewitness evidence given by palace occupants to the Human Rights Commission (GOU 1994a) tends to support the larger figure.
[4] Estimates range from 12,000-30,000 (Jorgenson 1981: 315), 80,000-90,000 (ACR 1977/1978: B444), 150,000 or more (Kyemba 1997: 115) to 50,000-300,000 (Kasozi 1994: 104).
[5] The failed rebellion claimed the lives of about 500 people (ACR 1972/1973: B276; Museveni 1997: 70).
[6] Estimates range from 300,000 (Mutibwa 1992: 159) to 500,000 (Kasozi 1994: 145ff.).

Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) was soon followed by Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). While the UPDA and HSM insurgencies ended in 1988, the LRA war dragged on until 2006 making it one of the longest wars in post-colonial Africa. Outside Acholiland, the Teso area in the east witnessed the rebellion by Peter Otai's Uganda People's Army (UPA), which lasted from 1987 to 1992. Moreover, the government faced two insurgencies in West Nile. While the first one was launched by the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) (1995-1997), the second was a revival of the Uganda National Rescue Front (labelled UNRF II) that went back to the bush between 1998 and 2002. Finally, there was also one civil war in Western Uganda, namely the rebellion by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (1996-2002). There are few reliable estimates on civil war-related deaths under Museveni. It is certain that most casualties occurred during the LRA war, followed by the HSM, ADF, UPDA and UPA insurgencies, while the West Nile rebellions were clearly less conflict intensive. Altogether, it is roughly estimated that total war-related deaths amount to a staggering 500,000.[7]

What explains recurrent civil war in Uganda? To find answers to this question I will first develop a theoretical framework that focuses on the inclusiveness of the 'elite bargain' − i.e. the inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power. I hypothesise that civil war in Uganda goes back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains, which have produced enduring violence between contending social groups. To test my hypothesis, I start by demonstrating that colonial rule left Uganda with extremely high levels of social fragmentation, evident in pronounced tribal, ethno-regional and religious cleavages. In a next step, I will show that that the Obote I, Amin, UNLF, Obote II and Museveni governments all failed, albeit to different degrees, to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation by forging inclusive elite bargains. Afterwards, I will go on to argue that this failure can be directly related to the various insurgencies that ravaged the country between 1962 and 2008. I conclude with brief reflections on competing explanations and the prospects for future peace and stability.

Theoretical and methodological considerations

The civil war literature was for a long time dominated by theories on the impact of natural resource abundance. Dismissing grievances as a driver of civil war, such theories focused either on the opportunities associated with lootable resource wealth (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or on the political pathologies experienced by rentier states (Fearon and Laitin 2003). While still remarkably influential, the 'resource-curse' approach has now been undermined by methodological shortcomings (Nathan 2003; Cramer 2006) and its striking empirical inconclusiveness (Lindemann 2008). Even more importantly, two competing theoretical approaches have rehabilitated the role of grievances as the key determinant of civil war.

A first approach relates violent conflict to the existence of inter-group inequalities. Taking issue with research on inter-personal inequality, Frances Stewart (2000: 246) argues that violent conflict is not 'exclusively a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against others'. Instead, civil wars normally occur when 'culturally defined groups' mobilise against each other (e.g. ethnic, religious, regional or class groupings). It is suggested that 'horizontal inequalities' – inter-group inequalities in relation to political participation,

[7] Lomo and Hovil (2004b: 4) reported 'hundreds of thousands of deaths', thousands of abductions (mostly children) and 1.4 million displaced people. More recently, the Project Ploughshares (2009) estimated that 500,000 were killed, 20,000 abducted and 2 million displaced.

economic assets and social services – provide the material basis for such violent group conflicts. This hypothesis is supported by considerable case-study evidence (Stewart 2002, 2010) and large-N research (Østby 2008).

The focus on 'horizontal inequalities' is important in that it shifts attention to discriminatory social relationships, which seemed to have been almost forgotten about in the civil war literature. Yet, a few exceptions notwithstanding (Langer 2005, 2007), the approach is limited by the fact that it is primarily focused on horizontal inequalities at the mass level and thereby neglects inequalities at the levels of elites.[8] This is problematic because the latter are – given the key role that leaders play in the construction and mobilisation of groups – arguably more conducive to violent conflict. Moreover, it may well be that mass-level horizontal inequalities are at least partially endogenous to horizontal inequalities at the elite level. As leaders with access to positions of state power will tend to redistribute to their 'own' social groups, there is reason to assume that horizontal inequality at the 'elite level' will produce horizontal inequalities at the mass level. What is therefore warranted to complement and further develop Stewart's approach is a more systematic consideration of inclusive versus exclusionary elite politics.

The latter take centre stage in a second approach that was recently put forward by Andreas Wimmer and colleagues (2009; Cederman et al. 2010). Wimmer et al. propose to focus on the state as an organisation that is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic groups whereby civil wars become the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. This hypothesis is tested based on the new Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups around the world and measures access to executive-level state power for members of these ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2005. The finding is that exclusion and competition along ethnic lines are strongly and robustly associated with civil war, with rebellions in the name of excluded ethnic groups being much more likely than violent conflict in the name of included groups.

The EPR approach has undoubtedly produced a quantum leap in the study of the relationship between ethnic grievances and civil war. Nonetheless, it exhibits a number of problems. First, the EPR dataset relies solely on expert estimates of ethnic inclusiveness rather than on primary data. This raises some doubts about the accuracy of the data. Second, Wimmer et al. do not systematically distinguish between different forms of state power (political, economic, military, territorial), which ignores the possibility that exclusion in one sphere of state power may be offset by inclusion in another. Third, the EPR dataset provides information on absolute access to state power irrespective of a group's demographic under- or overrepresentation. This is problematic in that group size can be expected to be an important factor in explaining civil war. Fourth, due to the quantitative nature of the project, Wimmer et al. cannot distinguish between degrees of representativity of leaders who claim to speak for an ethnic group. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that ethnicity[9] is only one source of social fragmentation along with religious, regional or class cleavages. Accordingly, there is need to further explore the EPR hypothesis from a broader political organisation perspective.

[8] I define elites as 'holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, including dissident ones, who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and significantly' (Dogan and Higley 1998: 15). Elites thus comprise the top leadership of all relevant organisations and movements in a country, including national and local politicians, leaders of political parties, high-ranking bureaucrats, key military personnel, heads of business associations, trade union leaders, traditional and religious authorities, etc.

[9] Ethnicity is defined as 'a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent' (Chandra 2006: 398).

In this paper, I therefore propose an alternative argument that centres on the notion of the 'elite bargain', which was developed at the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC). Drawing on the work by Mushtaq Khan (2000a, b) and Douglas North et al. (2009), the CSRC defines the elite bargain as the 'distribution of rights and entitlements' across groups and classes in society, on which any state is based (DiJohn and Putzel 2009). The elite bargain is typically organised through political parties, which have historically been the most effective types of political organisation (Duverger 1959). While my own work is closely integrated with the CSRC, I adopt a somewhat different focus and define the elite bargain as the distribution of access to positions of state power between contending social groups, not least since those who are in positions of state power ultimately determine the distribution of rights and entitlements.

More specifically, I propose that elite bargains can be captured in two ideal types that describe the extent to which ruling political parties have used the distribution of access to positions of state power to accommodate the dominant cleavages in society.[10] In a first group of countries, the ruling political party managed to forge and maintain an *inclusive* elite bargain by providing contending social groups with balanced access to positions of state power. Such inclusive elite bargains, which roughly correspond to what Africanist political scientists have called the 'fusion of elites' (Bayart 1981; Londsdale 1981; Boone 1994), successfully accommodate the dominant social cleavages. In a second group of countries, by contrast, political parties have established *exclusionary* elite bargains by providing biased access to positions of state power. Such exclusionary elite bargains privilege certain social groups at the expense of others and therefore fail to accommodate the dominant social cleavages.

Borrowing from the post-conflict power-sharing literature (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008),[11] I argue that the inclusiveness of the elite bargain can be measured by the extent to which positions of political, military, economic and territorial power are shared between competing social groups.

1. Political power sharing

Access to positions of political and administrative power is important for competing social groups in that it provides them with visible recognition, a 'say' in decision making and control over government resources. A first obvious indicator in this respect is the *composition of government*. However, an analysis of the composition of government should not – as it is often done – be limited to the distribution of ministers and deputy ministers. Instead, one should also separately consider the distribution of the most important leadership positions in what may be labelled the 'inner core' of political power, not least to uncover strategies of 'window dressing'. As a consequence, the composition of government is measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- deputy ministers;
- ministers (cabinet);
- the 'inner core of political power';[12]

[10] For the classical treatment of social cleavages in Europe see Lipset and Rokkan 1967. On cleavages in Sub-Saharan Africa see Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999.

[11] Note that I borrow Hartzell and Hoddie's (2003) four-part typology of post-conflict power sharing but propose an alternative operationalisation.

[12] The number and nature of positions included in the 'inner core' of political power needs to be determined

- an 'index of representation', which combines the forgoing measures.[13]

A second indicator for political power sharing is the *composition of the ruling political party,* measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- positions in the top party organ.

A third and final indicator for political power sharing is the *composition of the civil service*, measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- permanent secretary positions.

2. Military power sharing

Access to military power is crucial for competing social groups in that it shapes their feelings of physical security and survival. While balanced recruitment at the level of the rank and file may be considered important, it is especially representation at the upper levels of the army that give groups a real stake in the security sector. Key, therefore, in terms of military power sharing is the *composition of the officer corps*, measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- the top command positions;
- the higher ranks.

3. Economic power sharing

Access to economic power is of immediate material interest for competing social groups. However, economic-power sharing is more difficult to define, not least because all other types of power sharing involve control over economic resources and are therefore – albeit indirectly – also a form of economic power sharing. These difficulties notwithstanding, a first useful indicator may be *control over key state-owned enterprises,* which are among the most lucrative public institutions in the patronage-based political systems (Tangri 1999). More recently, the parastatal sector has come under pressure with international donors calling on governments to privatise their state-owned enterprises. While privatisation programmes have made progress since the 1990s, they have often opened new opportunities for patronage deployment. A second relevant indicator for economic power sharing may therefore be *control over key privatised companies.* Both indicators can be measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- board directors;
- senior management positions.

4. Territorial power sharing

Territorial power sharing provides social groups – at least if territorially defined – with an autonomous base from which they may protect their interests. This may be very significant for competing groups and their leaders, not least since high degrees of territorial power sharing may compensate for low levels of power sharing at the centre. Territorial power sharing can take different forms depending on both the type of constitution (unitary vs. federal) (Norris 2008: 164ff.)[14] and the type of decentralisation, mainly including

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separately for each country and time period (see below).

[13] To calculate my 'index of representation', I have simply taken the average of my scores for deputy ministers, ministers (cabinet) and the 'inner core' of political power. This means that the president and key ministers are counted twice – once as part of the cabinet, and once as part of the 'inner core'. This is intentional in that it arguably adequately reflects the particular power and influence of these few individuals.

[14] Unitary constitutions are defined as those states with national and subnational tiers, where the national

administrative, fiscal and political (Treisman 2007; Norris 2008). Administrative decentralisation transfers bureaucratic decision-making authority and managerial responsibilities from central to local government, which may cover the delivery of a variety of services or decisions on budgetary expenditure and in some cases revenue raising. Even though this is the most basic form of decentralisation, it provides local groups with access to lucrative employment, at least as long as the administrative positions are filled by locals. Fiscal decentralisation gives subnational tiers either tax-raising powers or control over a significant proportion of total government spending (or both). Political decentralisation, finally, means that subnational tiers are granted a degree of policy-making authority.[15] The fiscal and political forms of decentralisation tend to be more consequential in that they involve independent control over financial resources and political decision making. A key indicator for territorial power sharing is the degree of territorial autonomy, measured by the extent to which local groups:[16]

- benefit from proportional employment in local government and administration;
- have substantial tax-raising powers (and capacity) and/or receive a proportional share of decentralised budgets;
- have a substantial degree of policy-making authority.

How do differences in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain relate to the onset of civil war? I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains accommodate dominant social cleavages, stabilise the inter-group competition over the control of state power and thereby favour trajectories of civil war avoidance. As competing social groups enjoy inclusive access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power, their leadership does not have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest or even violence against the state. States underlying an inclusive elite bargain are therefore likely to enjoy relatively secure and stable hegemony as a collective system. Exclusionary elite bargains, by contrast, fail to accommodate dominant social cleavages, intensify inter-group struggles over the distribution of state power and ultimately favour trajectories of civil war onset. As certain groups enjoy privileged access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power, the excluded leaders will have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest and violence against the state. Seen from this perspective, the onset of civil war must be understood as resulting from the inability and/or unwillingness of ruling political parties to achieve sufficient degrees of elite accommodation.

My hypothesis can be summarised as follows:

> A country's vulnerability to civil war is determined by the inclusiveness of its elite bargain. While inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.

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government is defined as sovereign over all its territorial units. Federal constitutions are understood as those that distinguish between the national and subnational tiers of government, where each tier has certain specified areas of autonomy. For the classic study on the 'federal bargain' see Riker 1964. Note that territorial power-sharing in federal states is not automatically more far-reaching since centralised federal constitutions may grant only very limited territorial autonomy to subnational tiers.

[15] If local elections are held for local leaders, this is appointment decentralisation (see Treisman 2007). If local authorities also have a say in national policy making, this is constitutional decentralisation.

[16] I acknowledge that territorial power sharing is especially difficult to measure. Assessing the degree of territorial autonomy requires data on whether local employment and decentralised budgets are distributed proportionally between competing social groups – data that are rarely available. As a result, I often had to rely on more interpretive analysis.

Why study Uganda to probe the plausibility of my hypothesis? Following the 'extreme case' method (Gerring 2007: 101ff.), I have selected Uganda because of its extreme value on the dependent variable − i.e. fifteen civil wars since independence in 1962. In other words, I study Uganda because it has experienced far more civil war than most other countries in and outside Africa.

My analysis is based on a comprehensive set of original data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, economic and territorial power, which was put together during fieldwork in Uganda between November 2008 and February 2009. To collect the data, I first tried to compile lists of all ministers, deputy ministers, permanent secretaries, parastatal directors, army officers, etcetera, since independence. While a lot of this information was not available, I still managed to produce lists with more than a thousand different names. In a second step, I identified the group affiliation(s) of every single individual.[17] As this information is not written anywhere, I had to rely on very patient help from many Ugandans, including former and current politicians, long-standing civil servants, former army personnel and academics. In the great majority of cases, this produced highly congruent answers, which makes me confident that my data include only marginal errors. To fill remaining gaps, I used data from the secondary literature, especially from Omara-Otunnu's landmark study on the Ugandan army (1987). My dataset is complemented by evidence from a total of 49 semi-structured interviews with a great variety of stakeholders (see Annex 1).

Uganda and the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation

The territory that would become known through colonial rule as Uganda is home to many tribal groups, none of whom forms a majority of the population. The largest ones include the Baganda in the centre, the Banyankole, Bakiga, Batoro and Banyoro in the West, the Basoga, Bagisu and Iteso in the East and the Langi, Acholi, Lugbara and Karamojong in the North (see Map 1 and Table 1). These groups are also part of different linguistic communities, including Bantu speakers in the South-West, Nilotic speakers in the North-East, and Sudanic (or Madi-Moru) speakers in the North-West.

[17] I identified tribal, ethno-regional and religious affiliations, which are arguably the most salient group cleavages in Uganda (see below).



Map 1: Tribal and regional cleavages in Uganda

Politically, pre-colonial Uganda contained at least two-hundred distinct entities, which varied greatly in terms of size and complexity (Jorgenson 1981: 36; Kasozi 1994: 17ff.; Mutibwa 1992: 1ff.). In the North-East, most people lived in nonstratified (or segmentary) societies where power was spread horizontally through the clan as the main social unit and leaders had little power to extract labour, demand taxes, or enforce laws. In the South-West, people lived in stratified (or hierarchical) societies where power was distributed vertically and centralised in the hands of a leader (either a clan leader, a paramount chief or a king). By the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Buganda had become the most stratified society, with the king (the *kabaka*) having an absolute right to use violence. The kings of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro were also powerful but their authority was moderated by other sources of political power. Altogether, the colonial state came to contain a multitude of tribal groups that were at different stages of political development.

The advent of British rule heightened pre-existing tribal differences. In 1890, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) entered into a military alliance with the powerful Buganda Kingdom to extend its reach throughout the territory (Jorgenson 1981: 44ff.). The most prominent joint military campaign was the conquering of Bunyoro in 1893, after which the Baganda were rewarded with land torn away from Bunyoro (the 'lost counties') – an issue of enduring conflict between the two kingdoms. The preferential treatment of the Baganda continued after the British government took over in 1894 and turned the territory into a protectorate.[18] The 1900 Buganda Agreement provided the Kingdom with considerable

[18] The special role accorded to the Buganda Kingdom was due to two main reasons, including the colonialists' respect for the Kingdom's highly sophisticated political system (Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 3) and the weakness of

autonomy and gave substantial land rights to the *kabaka*, his family and collaborating chiefs. Moreover, the colonial administration tried to establish control over the rest of the territory by imposing the hierarchical Buganda model of administration even on segmentary societies and appointing Baganda chiefs as administrators and tax collectors (Kasozi 1994: 22ff.; Jorgenson 1981: 78ff.). This 'indirect rule' through Baganda chiefs created long-lasting anti-Baganda sentiment throughout much of the colony, especially in the segmentary societies of the North-East. The perception of Baganda 'sub-imperialism' was reinforced by the importation of Luganda as the official language of state administration, education and religion (Kasozi 1994: 227ff.). While most of the Baganda agents had been withdrawn by the early 1920s, the colonial state continued to rule indirectly through chiefs who were presented as representing local customs. In some cases, these 'traditional' chiefs were entirely invented. In other cases, the British perverted the functions of pre-colonial chiefs by transforming the originally constrained authority structures into more authoritarian and arbitrary systems – Mamdani's 'decentralised despotisms' (Mamdani 1996). In almost all cases, these native administrations followed tribal boundaries, which helped to establish tribe as the main source of social cleavage.[19] The first census in 1959 listed 35 different indigenous tribes, while the most recent one in 2002 identified as many 56. Despite some changes in classification, one can identify a fairly stable set of 19 tribes with a population share of more than 1 percent (see Table 1).

Table 1: Tribal groups and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)
Source: East African Statistical Department 1960: 1; UBOS 2006: 46

Tribal group	1959	2002
Baganda	16.3	17.7
Iteso	8.1	6.7
Banyankole	8.1	10.0
Basoga	7.8	8.9
Bakiga	7.1	7.2
Banyarwanda	5.9	3.3
Langi	5.6	6.4
Bagisu	5.1	4.8
Acholi	4.4	4.9
Lugbara	3.7	4.4
Batoro	3.2	2.6
Banyoro	2.9	2.9
Karamajong	2.0	1.1
Alur	1.9	2.3
Bagwere	1.7	1.8
Bakonzo	1.7	2.6
Japadhola	1.6	1.5
Banyole	1.4	1.5
Madi	1.2	1.3
Others	10.3	8.1
Total	100.0	100.0

the British colonial state vis-à-vis the Kabaka and the chiefs (Jorgenson 1981: 44ff.).
[19] In line with my above definition, these tribes are ethnic groups in that membership is determined by the tribal background of the individual's parents, i.e. by descent (East African Statistical Department 1960; UBOS 2006).

The picture was further complicated by ethno-regional divisions. The colonialists divided the territory into four regions (Central, Eastern, Northern and Western), which became an important vehicle of group identification. Accordingly, people began to distinguish between Southerners (Baganda), Northerners, Easterners and Westerners (see Table 2). Such distinctions were shaped by disparities in regional economic development, especially between the North and the rest of the country.[20] In terms of economic opportunities, the higher levels of commerce, industry and agriculture were monopolised by Europeans, while Asians dominated small and medium business. The few economic opportunities that existed for Africans were spread very unevenly between regions (Kasozi 1994: 48ff.). Cash crops – initially cotton, later coffee – were first introduced in Buganda and spread rapidly whereby the Kingdom came to contain more than 40 percent of the country's agricultural wealth. By 1958, almost 80 percent of gross money income was concentrated in Buganda and the East. The Northern and Western regions, by contrast, were designated to become the labour reserves of the Protectorate, exporting migrant labourers to the urban centres and rural cash-crop areas and plantations (Jorgenson 1981: 109ff.). This uneven development was a deliberate policy designed to ensure the continued flow of labour to the cash-crop areas. In terms of education, the Baganda held twice as many secondary school places as the rest of the country by 1960 and were also greatly over-represented at Makerere University College – the only university in East Africa during colonial rule and an undisputed gateway to positions of political and economic power (Kasfir 1976). The only notable exception to southern dominance was the security sector where the British pursued a policy of tribal imbalance in favour of northerners (Acholi, Langi and West Nilers) (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 12ff.).

Table 2: Ethno-regional groups and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)
Source: Compiled based on East African Statistical Department 1960: 1; UBOS 2006: 46

Regional group	1959	2002
Buganda (Southern)	17.2	18.8
Eastern	30.1	28.4
Northern	20.7	22.3
Western	32.1	30.5
Total	100.1	100.0

Colonial rule also reinforced religious divisions. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, British Protestants and French Catholics had fought for control over Buganda. When Kabaka Mwanga II acceded to the throne in 1884, he attempted to expunge all foreign religions by ordering persecutions of Christians (Kasozi 1994: 27ff.; Jorgenson 1981: 47ff.). As a reaction, Catholic, Protestant and Muslim chiefs armed themselves, united and overthrew the Kabaka in 1888. However, the cooperation between the three denominations soon broke down and the Muslim chiefs managed to expel the two Christian groups from government. Buganda was briefly turned into a Muslim state headed by Kabaka Kalema and much blood was spilled. In 1889, the Christian chiefs formed an alliance with the exiled Kabaka Mwanga and succeeded in returning him to the throne. While Muslim chiefs were exiled, the Catholic and Protestants factions – the former backed by the French, the latter backed by the British – divided the chiefly offices between themselves. Disputes about control of land and usufruct persisted, however, and by 1891 the Protestant chiefs, numerically in the minority, found their position

[20] Membership in these groupings is determined not by the region in which the individual currently resides but by descent from one of the region's tribal groupings, which makes them *ethno*-regional groups.

eroding. These tensions culminated in the 1892 Battle of Mengo for control of the state where the Protestant faction defeated the Catholics with the assistance of IBEAC troops. The Protestant victory empowered a minority wing of the Baganda elite and was subsequently enshrined in the 1900 Buganda Agreement. Anglican Protestantism became the established religion, whereas the Catholics – the majority (see Table 3) – took second place and the Muslims were fully marginalised. Throughout the colonial period, the British continued to favour Protestants in access to land and authority, leading to grievances among both Catholics and Muslims.

Table 3: Religious groups and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)[21]
Source: East African Statistical Department 1960; UBOS 2006.

Religious group	1959	2002
Protestant	28.2	36.6
Catholic	34.5	41.6
Muslim	5.6	12.3
Other	31.7	9.5
Total	100.0	100.0

In the light of these divisions, no united nationalist movement developed. Until the late 1940s, African political opposition was expressed by various tribal movements, which were led by emerging traders, farmers and professionals (Jorgenson 1981: 179ff.). In 1952, Ignatius Musazi founded the Uganda National Congress (UNC) – the first countrywide political party that had its strongholds in the export-commodity producing areas and was initially controlled by Baganda and Protestant leaders. Within Buganda, the UNC appealed to growers of cash crops and opponents of the Mengo hierarchy, while concentrating on cotton producers in other parts of the territory. From the mid-1950s, the UNC was riddled by divisions between members from outside Buganda (who favoured a unitary post-colonial state) and members from within Buganda (who took a pro-federal stance). These tensions escalated in 1958 when two anti-Buganda UNC members of the Legislative Council broke away to establish the Uganda People's Union (UPU) with other non-Baganda members of the Council. Two years later, the UPU merged with the anti-Buganda wing of the UNC to form the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), headed by Milton Obote. As the UNC disintegrated, the originally Buganda-born party was replaced by the anti-Buganda but still Protestant UPC. The second main party that emerged was the Democratic Party (DP) (Mutibwa 1992: 13ff.; Jorgenson 1981: 193ff.). It was founded in 1954 by Catholics who not only resented the privileges of the Protestant Mengo hierarchy but also perceived the UNC as just another vehicle of Protestant hegemony. Accordingly, the DP recruited mainly in predominantly Catholic territory. Its strongholds lay in areas with limited or no export-commodity production (West Nile, Ankole and Kigezi) and in Bunyoro where people were still alienated by the Mengo's annexation of the 'lost counties'. The third political party emerged from within the Buganda government at Mengo. Faced with the anti-Buganda UPC and the Catholic DP, the Mengo first tried to declare the Kingdom independent in 1960 (Jorgenson 1981: 190ff.). After the secessionist bid failed, the Buganda government launched its own political party in 1961, the Kabaka Yekka ('The King Alone', or KY), which was soon infiltrated by Musazi's pro-Buganda UNC faction.

[21] Note that the three religious groups are not ethnic in character since membership depends on the choice of a religion rather than descent.

Altogether, colonial rule produced extremely high levels of social fragmentation, evident in the sectarian character of the main political parties. As the country proceeded towards independence, Obote's UPC and the KY entered into an unlikely alliance in October 1961 (Mutibwa 1992: 19ff.). This was mainly due to the fact that the DP had ignored the Mengo's boycott of the March 1961 parliamentary elections and thereby easily won 20 of 21 seats in Buganda (with only about 2 percent of the eligible votes). As the DP also won a majority in the rest of the country, it provided the country's first prime minister in the person of Benedicto Kiwanuka – a Catholic Muganda commoner. Unsurprisingly, the Protestant establishment at Mengo was furious that Kiwanuka had not only ignored the boycott but also dared to place himself in a position superior to the Kabaka. To remove the DP from power, the KY and UPC joined forces in what was essentially an anti-Catholic pact and together won the parliamentary elections of April 1962. As a consequence, Obote – who's UPC had won the majority of seats – became Prime Minister of Uganda and led the country to independence in October 1962.

Uganda's post-colonial elite bargains (1962-2008)

The Obote I elite bargain (1962-1971): the incomplete quest for national integration

At independence, Obote seemed to have a clear 'plan for nationhood', promising 'to use government machinery and funds without favour to either tribe or race, religion or sex' (Obote 1962). In line with such promises, there were indeed sustained – albeit incomplete – attempts for political and economic power sharing. Yet, the quest for national integration remained incomplete due to the absence of military and territorial power sharing.

1. Political power sharing

The distribution of government positions under Obote I was on average carefully balanced along ethno-regional lines. In absolute terms, all four groups received a remarkably similar share of government appointments (see Figure 2a). This was true not only for ministers and deputies but also for the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' of political power. In terms of population share, the Baganda (Southerners) and Northerners were somewhat overrepresented, while Easterners and Westerners were moderately underrepresented (see Figure 2b). If one disaggregates this broader picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that all 19 tribes with more than 1 percent of the population – except the Banyarwanda and Banyole – were represented in government between 1962 and 1970 (see Table 4). Of the Northern tribes, often reputed to have acquired a disproportionate share under Obote I, only the Langi (Obote's group) and Madi were overrepresented, albeit not dramatically.

However, this balanced picture is deceiving. As shown in Figure 2c and Table 4, the Baganda were initially seriously overrepresented. This reflected not only the dominant position of the Buganda Kingdom at independence but also the constraints of the UPC-KY alliance, which obliged Obote to appoint a large number of Baganda ministers. The early prominence of the Baganda increased with the elevation to the Presidency and Head of State of Kabaka Mutesa II on October 4, 1963 (Mudoola 1993: 94; Mutibwa 2008: 65ff.).[22] Trying to contain the old fears of Baganda dominance, Obote managed to lure more and more opposition MPs – from both the DP and the KY – into crossing the floor to the UPC (Jorgensen 1981: 220; Mutibwa 2008: 76). As a result, the alliance with KY soon became dispensable for the UPC and was

[22] This reflected an unwritten pact between Obote and the Kabaka that – as part of the reward for supporting Obote to become Prime Minister – Mutesa II would become President.

formally ended in August 1964. In the aftermath, the Baganda still received a proportional share of government appointments. Yet, the significant decline in influence was a clear threat to Baganda monarchists who were not willing to settle for less than a dominant place in the nation's politics. Even more importantly, the Baganda ministers in Obote's post-coalition government were precisely those that had previously crossed the floor to UPC. As these ministers were little more than traitors in the eyes of the Baganda monarchists (Mutibwa 2008: 76.; various interviews), the Buganda Kingdom at Mengo – the key player in Ugandan politics for the past decades – found itself fully excluded from political power by the mid-1960s. To make matters worse, the position of the Mengo was further damaged by the 'lost counties' referendum in November 1964, which returned two of the three counties to Bunyoro. While the transfer stuck a severe symbolic blow to the pride of the Baganda, it also 'reduced the number of patronage posts available for distribution by the Mengo hierarchy' (Jorgenson 1981: 220).







Figure 2: Distribution of government between ethno-regional groups, 1962-1970
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.
Note: The 'inner core' of political power is defined as including the Prime Minister (President), the Vice-President and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Justice, Finance, Planning & Economic Development, Agriculture & Cooperatives and Regional Administration.

Table 4: Distribution of government between tribal groups, Index of Representation, 1962-1970 (in percent)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.

Tribe	Population (1959)	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970
Baganda	16.3	36.0	27.8	17.1	17.2	18.3
Iteso	8.1	7.0	7.8	10.1	6.1	10.0
Banyankole	8.1	12.1	13.3	11.9	10.4	10.0
Basoga	7.8	9.5	10.6	8.2	1.9	1.7
Bakiga	7.1	2.2	2.2	6.4	1.9	1.7
Banyarwanda	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Langi	5.6	9.2	10.0	8.6	11.1	10.0
Bagisu	5.1	2.6	2.8	1.9	1.9	1.7
Acholi	4.4	2.6	2.2	4.1	4.9	3.3
Lugbara	3.7	0.0	0.0	3.7	3.0	3.3
Batoro	3.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	11.6	11.7
Banyoro	2.9	2.6	2.8	4.1	5.6	5.0
Karamajong	2.0	0.0	2.8	1.9	1.9	1.7
Alur	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.3
Bagwere	1.7	2.2	2.2	4.1	0.0	0.0
Bakonzo	1.7	0.0	2.8	1.9	3.0	3.3
Japadhola	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.9	5.6	5.0
Banyole	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Madi	1.2	2.2	7.8	6.0	5.6	5.0
Others	10.3	9.5	2.8	6.0	5.6	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The quest for political power sharing was also mirrored in the civil service and the ruling party. Between 1959 and 1967, no tribe with more than 1 percent of the population was totally unrepresented in the civil service and the Baganda were the only group to be seriously overrepresented (Kasfir 1976: 182). In terms of permanent secretary appointments, the Baganda were also overrepresented, while the other groups were underrepresented (see Figure 3).

The ruling party was initially weakened by factional conflicts. From its creation in 1960, the UPC had been a loose confederation of 'locally powerful political notables' that had no centralised hierarchy and only limited support at the grassroots (Jorgenson 1981: 221ff.). This loose coalition was even further strained when DP and KY MPs joined the ruling party in mid-1964. As a consequence, factional conflicts within UPC started to escalate from 1964-65. While a 'centre faction' (led by Obote) championed the interests of the 'disadvantaged' of the

North-East, a 'conservation faction' (led by the UPC Secretary General Grace Ibingira) served as an advocate for the interests of the 'privileged' South-West (Mutibwa 1992: 33). To contain the intra-party factionalism, Obote not only ensured a regionally balanced composition of the UPC party cabinet (the highest party organ) from the mid-1960s (UPC 2008) but also deliberately weakened the district party organisation that had in the past facilitated tribal strife (Kasfir 1976: 205ff.).



Figure 3: Distribution of permanent secretaries between ethno-regional groups, 1970
Source: Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; '*The Independent*, January 25, February 7, 2008.

Finally, efforts were made to accommodate religious divisions. The main challenge was to appease the Catholics who perceived themselves as victims of the Protestant establishment. Obote – himself a Protestant – succeeded in co-opting such Catholic notables as Felix Onama, Cuthbert Obwangor and Mathias Ngobi who 'appear to have been the unofficial interpreters' between the government and the Catholic Church' (Mudoola 1993: 35). While the government remained dominated by Protestants, Catholics and Muslims received a proportional share of appointments (see Figures 4a and 4b). However, from the mid-1960s attempts to overcome religious divisions were undermined by tribal conflict. On the one hand, the election of the first Anglican Archbishop in 1966 divided the Church of Uganda into two competing factions, opposing the non-Muganda Bishop Eric Sabiiti to the Muganda Bishop of Namirembe, Dunstan Nsubuga (Mudoola 1993: 43ff.). After Sabiiti emerged winner, the new 'UPC archbishop' went on to legitimise Obote's military action against the Buganda Kingdom in 1966 – a step that prompted the lasting alienation of the Namirembe faction. On the other hand, the establishment of the National Association for the Advancement of Moslems in 1965 earned the government the hostility of Prince Badru Kakungulu (the Kabaka's uncle) and his influential Uganda Moslem Community (UMC) ((Mudoola 1993: 51; Mutibwa 2008: 124).



Figure 4: Distribution of government between religious groups, 1962-1970
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.

2. Economic power sharing

Attempts for economic power sharing were initially hampered by the fact that Uganda had little control over its own economy, which limited the scope for patronage distribution outside party and government. As a consequence, the Obote I administration used the late 1960s to increase its stake in the economy. Key in this respect was the 'Commanding Heights Strategy' whereby the parastatal sector was greatly expanded and 'Africanised' (Jorgenson 1981: 231ff.). This involved not only the creation of new parastatals and the reorganisation of existing ones, but also comprehensive nationalisation measures. Significantly, the dramatic expansion of the parastatal sector provided Obote with an enlarged material basis for his elite bargain.

Interestingly, the bulk of this growing 'economic cake' seems to have gone to the Baganda. Figures 5a and 5b detail the ethno-regional distribution of key appointments in 27 major parastatal companies. While all four ethno-regional groups received substantial shares, the Baganda were seriously overrepresented. A similar picture emerges from my own data on the Coffee Marketing Board, the key parastatal along with the Uganda Development Corporation. Here, the 1969 Board of Directors included three Baganda, three Westerners (one Munyankole, one Munyoro, one Mukonjo), two Easterners (one Musoga, one Mugisu) and one Northerner (Lugbara) (CMB 1973). All this taken together refutes Jorgenson's claim that Obote tried to stifle the Baganda economically (Jorgenson 1981: 246).



Figure 5: Distribution of key appointments in 27 parastatals between ethno-regional groups, 1970

Source: Compiled based and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; *The Standard (Tanzania),* February 12, 1971.

3. Military power sharing

Attempts for political and economic power sharing were contradicted by the persistence of a Northern-dominated army. After independence, UPC had not responded to the soldiers' demands for swift Africanisation and improved conditions of service – a situation that fuelled discontent and culminated in the 1964 mutiny (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 48ff.). In contrast to their counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania, the Ugandan government reacted very leniently to the mutiny. It not only continued to expand the size of the army but also granted the mutineers major concessions, including 'phenomenal' pay rises and accelerated Africanisation.[23] Predictably, in line with colonial imbalances, rapid Africanisation led to an army dominated by Northerners – a trend that was reinforced by the repeated purging of Baganda officers (Kasozi 1994: 74, Mudoola 1993: 96). As shown in Figures 6a and 6b, Northerners dominated both the army and military police command, while the Baganda and Westerners were marginalised. In the officer corps, the bulk of the positions was held by the Acholi, Langi and Iteso (see Table 5). The military police command, by contrast, was clearly dominated by the West Nile tribes, including the Lugbara, Alur, Madi and Kakwa. The Northern bias was even more pronounced at the level of the rank and file. In 1969, 61 percent of the soldiers were Northerners against 22 percent Easterners, 12 percent Westerners and 5 percent Baganda (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 82).

[23] Omara-Otunnu (1987: 82) has argued that Obote had little choice but to retain a Northern-dominated army, not least since he relied on a fragile coalition government and needed the support of his fellow Northerners in the army. Yet it is important to ask whether the army was really so crucial to Obote's survival, especially in early 1964 when Obote was still in a strong position. The army was small at the time and could have easily been disbanded, especially if Obote had – like Nyerere in Tanzania – relied on British military support. Also, even though the historical imbalances made the creation of a balanced army difficult in the short run, the rapid promotions after the mutiny suggest that there was considerable leeway. It therefore seems more plausible that Obote simply ignored the possibility of rebuilding the army as a politically neutral and tribally representative institution and instead chose to strengthen the army as his main power bastion.

Table 5: Distribution of the army and military police command between tribal groups, 1966 & 1969 (in percent)
Source: Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 80.

Tribe	Population (1959)	Army command (1966)	Military police command (1969)
Baganda	16.3	9.4	0.0
Iteso	8.1	14.0	5.6
Banyankole	8.1	4.1	5.6
Basoga	7.8	5.8	2.8
Bakiga	7.1	1.2	2.8
Banyarwanda	5.9	0.6	2.8
Langi	5.6	13.5	8.3
Bagisu	5.1	3.5	0.0
Acholi	4.4	15.2	13.9
Lugbara	3.7	8.8	25.0
Batoro	3.2	1.2	0.0
Banyoro	2.9	1.2	0.0
Karamajong	2.0	0.0	2.8
Alur	1.9	5.3	13.9
Bagwere	1.7	1.8	0.0
Bakonzo	1.7	0.0	0.0
Japadhola	1.6	0.0	0.0
Banyole	1.4	0.0	0.0
Madi	1.2	4.7	5.6
Others	10.3	9.9	11.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0





Figure 6: Distribution of the army and military police command between ethno-regional groups, 1966 & 1969
Source: Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 80.

The coexistence of strong Acholi-Langi and West Nile factions soon translated into tensions between Obote and the Army Commander Idi Amin, a Kakwa from West Nile (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 78ff.). Amin tried to bolster his position by mainly recruiting in West Nile, while Obote stuffed the Special Forces and the General Service Unit with his own Langi tribesmen (Hansen 1977: 88; Kasozi 1994: 89).

4. Territorial power sharing

At independence, Uganda inherited a fairly autonomous system of local government (Sathyamurthy 1982; Golooba-Mutebi 1999). The 1962 Independence Constitution cemented high, albeit varying degrees of territorial power sharing (Barongo 1989: 73). Buganda was granted full federal status and therefore enjoyed considerable local autonomy, which was structured around the institution of the *kabaka*, a parliament with directly elected representatives and a local administration organised in ministries. The other kingdoms were given semi-federal status whereby their rulers, political institutions and administrations became part of local government. The non-kingdom areas came to be divided into nine unitary districts, governed through directly elected councils. Altogether, the post-colonial system of local government provided the local leadership of the various tribal groups with a wide range of opportunities for political participation and employment.

Territorial power sharing was increasingly undermined from 1963 when the centre was given more powers over local government finance (Sathyamurthy 1982; Golooba-Mutebi 1999). This trend was reinforced by the abrogation of the Independence Constitution (1966). Under the 1967 Republican Constitution, all Kingdoms were abolished and replaced by 18 unitary districts that suffered from seriously curtailed local autonomy. First, local councils were stripped of most service-delivery functions, which meant that 'local budgets and thus local political arenas' diminished steadily (Kasfir 1976: 251). Second, the reach of the centre was greatly increased, evident in the President's Office's control over local appointments. As local government appointments effectively became party appointments, chiefs and other local staff were replaced by UPC supporters. Altogether, territorial power sharing had been more or less abrogated by the late 1960s. The change was most dramatic in Buganda that was divided into four districts and deprived of its entire local hierarchy.

5. The end of Obote I

In contrast to current descriptions of Obote as a notorious 'tribalist' (Museveni 2000: 118).[24] his first administration displayed clear signs of an inclusive nation-building project, evident in attempts for political and economic power sharing. Yet the quest for an inclusive elite bargain remained incomplete. First, Obote failed to achieve lasting accommodation with the Buganda Kingdom. Second, national integration was undermined by the unresolved legacy of a Northern-dominated army, which increasingly escaped Obote's control. This paved the way to the 1971 military coup. In late 1970, Obote tried to contain the escalating factional struggles in the army by demoting the Army Commander Idi Amin and his closest West Nile associates (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 89ff.). Yet the Amin faction proved strong enough to counterstrike and ousted Obote on January 25, 1971. In doing so, Amin received the silent support of other alienated social forces, including Baganda monarchists, the Anglican Namirembe faction and Prince Badru Kakungulu's UMC.

[24] For a more nuanced appraisal of Obote see Anguria 2006.

The Amin elite bargain (1971-1979): the era of undisguised exclusion

Amin seized power with a very narrow support base. While the downfall of Obote was greeted with jubilation among many Baganda, there was considerable apprehension in the rest of the country. Against this backdrop, Amin tried to present himself as the 'man of peace' (Kasozi 1994: 105ff.; Ravenhill 1974: 231; Mutibwa 1992: 86). Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that Amin's drive for reconciliation was little more than a masquerade. As all political institutions (including Parliament) were suspended, Uganda was henceforth ruled by decree. Moreover, the regime came to be characterised by extremely low levels of power sharing, evident in a striking ethno-religious bias in favour of a Nubian-Kakwa core group and Muslims in general.

1. Military power sharing

True power under Amin lay with the tribally biased army. Initially, the officer corps was dominated by the different West Nile tribes. From 1972, Amin tried to strengthen his hold on the army by ensuring that key positions were in the hands of close affiliates, which meant that it was especially the Kakwa (his own group) and Nubians,[25] and Muslims generally who got the strategic posts. This came at the expense of other West Nile officers (Alur, Madi and Lugbara), many of who were removed or even killed from late 1971 (Hansen 1977: 113ff.). While the Amin regime always continued to have its base in West Nile, the dominance of the Nubian-Kakwa core group became more and more entrenched. By 1977, 32 percent of the 22 key army officers were Kakwa, 9 percent Nubian, 18 percent Sudanese, 27 percent were from other West Nile tribes and only 14 percent were from outside West Nile (see Table 6). Maybe even more strikingly, 17 of the 22 key officers – i.e. 77.3 percent – were Muslims. The army's ethno-religious bias became also evident in the Defence Council, which was originally meant to deal only with military matters but soon became the country's paramount decision-making organ, relegating the Cabinet to a secondary role (ACR 1973/1974: B292). Even though the Council's membership was never fully disclosed, it was clearly monopolised by Amin's ethno-religious cronies (ACR 1977/1978: B434). Similarly, the rank and file was dominated by West Nilers and Southern Sudanese nationals, most of whom were Muslims (ACR 1977/1978: B442; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 107, 134).

Table 6: Distribution of the top army command between tribal groups, 1977 (in percent)
Source: Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; ACR 1977/1978: B442.

Tribe	Population (1959)	1977 (total distribution)	1977 (distribution relative to population share)
Kakwa	0.8	31.8	3877.3
Nubian	0.1	9.1	8990.9
Sudanese	0.4	18.2	4445.5
Other West Nilers	7.2	27.3	278.8
Others	91.5	13.6	-85.1
Total	100.0	100.0	0.0

[25] The Nubians originally came from Southern Sudan where they were recruited by Emin Pasha in the nineteenth century and incorporated into the British forces. Nubians have settled in all parts of Uganda but constitute only about 0.1% of the population. The firm link between all Nubians is their Islamic faith (of the Sunni sect) and their language 'Lunubi', which is based on Arabic (see ACR 1973/1974: B295; Hansen 1977: 109).

Beyond the regular army, Amin's various secret service organisations – responsible for most of the state-directed terror – were also firmly in the hands of the Nubian-Kakwa core group (Kyemba 1977: 111p.; ACR 1976/1977: B374). The notorious State Research Department, the largest secret service with two-thousand agents, was formally headed by Francis Itabuka from Busoga but effectively commanded by Farouk Minawa, a Nubian. The two other key agencies were also controlled by Nubians: while Ali Towili headed the Public Safety Unity, Hussein Marella was in charge of the Military Police.

2. Political power sharing

The extent of political power sharing was similarly limited. Between 1971 and 1979, Northerners were on average heavily overrepresented in terms of government appointments (see Figures 7a and 7b). Westerners, by contrast, were grossly underrepresented, while Southerners and Easterners received a more a less proportional share. Significantly, the 'Northern bias' in government increased over time from 15 percent overrepresentation in 1973 to 237.4 percent in 1979 (see Figure 7c).







Figure 7: Distribution of government between ethno-regional groups, 1971-1979
Source: [1] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 283.
Note: The 'inner core' of political power is defined as comprising the President, the Vice-President, the Army Chief of Staff, the Air Force Commander and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Planning & Economic Development, Cooperatives & Marketing and Provincial Administration. Data on deputy ministers under Amin was not available.

If one disaggregates this broader ethno-regional picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that the overwhelming majority of Northern ministers belonged to Amin's West Nile-Nubian-Sudanese axis, especially after 1975 (see Table 7). Accounting for about 8 percent of the population, the latter provided 47.6 percent and 61.9 percent of all ministers in 1977 and 1979. Their share in the 'inner core' of political power was even higher, with 75 percent in 1977 and 78.2 percent in 1979. All other tribes – except the Baganda – were marginalised by the late 1970s.

Table 7: Distribution of government between tribal groups, Index of Representation, 1971-1979 (in percent)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 283.

Tribe	Population (1959)	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979
Baganda	16.3	19.4	15.5	17.4	19.6	18.3
Iteso	8.1	8.3	9.9	4.2	4.8	2.4
Banyankole	8.1	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.4	2.4
Basoga	7.8	11.1	12.7	4.2	2.4	4.8
Bakiga	7.1	2.8	9.9	4.2	4.8	2.4
Banyarwanda	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Langi	5.6	2.8	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bagisu	5.1	8.3	9.9	7.6	0.0	0.0
Acholi	4.4	5.6	5.6	2.1	0.0	0.0
Lugbara	3.7	8.3	2.8	11.8	13.4	12.7
Batoro	3.2	2.8	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Banyoro	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Karamajong	2.0	2.8	2.8	2.1	2.4	0.0
Alur	1.9	8.3	0.0	2.1	2.4	2.4
Bagwere	1.7	2.8	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bakonzo	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Japadhola	1.6	8.3	9.9	7.6	0.0	0.0
Banyole	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Madi	1.2	0.0	0.0	15.3	17.3	10.3
Kakwa	0.8	8.3	9.9	7.6	8.6	15.9
Sudanese	0.4	0.0	0.0	2.1	11.0	18.3
Nubian	0.1	0.0	0.0	7.6	8.6	10.3
Others	9.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.4	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The religious bias of the Amin governments was even more extreme. On average, Muslims were hugely overrepresented in government between 1971 and 1979 (see Figures 8a and 8b). Over time, Muslim overrepresentation grew from 98.4 percent in 1971 to a staggering 1246.4 percent in 1979 (see Figure 8c). In the 'inner core', Muslims held 87.5 percent and 88.9 percent of all appointments in 1977 and 1979. Protestants were initially extremely prominently represented in government but then found themselves fully marginalised by the late 1970s. The disproportionate recruitment of Muslims reflected a deliberate attempt to 'muslimise' the overwhelmingly Christian country, which became also evident in the increasingly aggressive treatment of the Christian churches (Kasozi 1994: 108p.; ACR 1976/1977: B392). Thousands of Christians were murdered, including the Anglican Archbishop Luwum in early 1977.



Figure 8: Distribution of government between religious groups, 1971-1979
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 283.

3. Economic power sharing

Patterns of exclusion became equally visible in the economic sector. Giving in to growing demands by Baganda bureaucrats and traders for more rapid Africanisation of trade, Amin launched the infamous 'economic war' in late 1972 whereby 50,000 Asians were expelled from the country (Jorgenson 1981: 285ff.). As the latter owned about half of the country's wealth, the expulsion opened the way for the state to take control of Asian assets. The government took over the biggest companies (e.g. the Madhvani Industrial Group), while the remainder of small and medium-sized businesses were redistributed. This move was politically shrewd in that it helped Amin to regain popularity in a country weary of Asian economic domination. More importantly, for the first time it placed the whole of the economy

in Ugandan hands,[26] and substantially increased the available reservoir of patronage.[27] If handled properly, the 'economic war' could therefore have been used to create a more secure economic and social basis for the regime. In practise, the distribution of spoils was again heavily skewed in favour of three overlapping groups, namely the Nubians, the military and Baganda Muslims (ACR 1973/1974: B303; Kyemba 1977: 63; Mutibwa 2008: 64).

4. Territorial power sharing

The regime's ethno-religious bias was also mirrored at the local level. After Amin took over, the move towards political centralisation was carried significantly further than before (Golooba-Mutebi 1999; Sathyamurthy 1982: 28pp). Local councils were abolished along with numerous civil service posts, ostensibly to fight corruption. In 1972-73, the country witnessed an extensive re-organisation of local government. First, the four regions were replaced by nine (later ten) provinces. The newly appointed provincial governors were all high-ranking military officers and almost all Muslim West Nilers (ACR 1973/197: B292; ACR 1977/1978: B447). Second, the districts were henceforth ruled directly by centrally appointed District Commissioners (DCs) who were mostly military men and enjoyed immensely enlarged powers, including control over local expenditure. Army officers were deployed across the country to select thousands of chiefs at village, parish and sub-county and county levels (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 124). While the local chiefs were drawn from both the military and civilian spheres, they came by and large from West Nile, and were mostly Muslims.

5. The end of the Amin regime

By the mid-1970s, Amin had established a highly exclusionary elite bargain, which was based on the Nubian-Kakwa core group on the one hand, and on Muslim support on the other. Despite high levels of state repression throughout the 1970s, this extreme minority regime was ultimately impossible to sustain and was overthrown by the UNLA in 1978-79.

From the UNLF to Obote II and the Okellos (1979-1986): the elusive quest for an inclusive elite bargain

1. The UNLF elite bargains

When the UNLF took power in 1979, it was made up of a broad spectrum of competing political forces, which were divided along both tribal and ideological lines (ACR 1979/80: B347):

- The *(Baganda) monarchists*, including conservatives like Prof. Yusuf Lule, Andrew Kayiira, Sam Sebgereka and Grace Ibingira;
- The *DP centrists*, led by the veteran politician Godfrey Binaisa;
- The *(Marxist) radicals*, divided into two wings. One wing was led by Museveni, while a more orthodox Marxist wing comprised the so-called 'Gang of Four';
- The *UPC/pro-Obote forces*, led by Paulo Muwanga and Brig. David Oyite-Ojok.

[26] Amin declared that 'if they do not remember us for any other good thing, they will at least remember us for having given Uganda her economic independence' (cited after Mutibwa 1992: 97).
[27] The spoils of the economic war consisted of 5655 firms, factories, ranches and agricultural estates, as well as homes, cars and household goods (Jorgenson 1981: 288.). In response to the state takeover of firms, public sector employment grew from 134,000 to 202,000 between 1971 and 1977.

Significantly, only Museveni and the pro-Obote forces had substantial support in the 'hotchpotch' UNLA – the real locus of power along with the Tanzanian army (ACR 1979/80: B361p.; Jorgenson 1981: 335).

Initially, the radicals lined up with the DP centrists and Baganda monarchists to gain the majority in the UNLF, thereby excluding the pro-Obote forces. This anti-Obote coalition had chosen the Muganda Prof. Lule as President. However, Lule turned out to be a heavy-handed president who quickly alienated all major political forces (Interview, Yona Kanyomozi, Kampala, February 9, 2009). Most problematically, Lule heightened divisions by his unbalanced appointment policies. Even though all major political factions were represented, this could hardly disguise the fact that his government was dominated by the old 'Mengo clique' of conservative elements in Buganda (see Figure 9 and Table 8). Accordingly, the Baganda – mostly monarchists such as Sam Sebgereka, Andrew Kayiira or Arnold Bisase – were greatly overrepresented.[28] These imbalances were greatly reinforced by Lule's cabinet reshuffle on June 7, 1979 (ACR 1979/80: 354). Among other changes, the President demoted both Muwanga and Museveni from key ministries, while replacing them with conservative Baganda. This alienated the militarily powerful pro-Obote and pro-Museveni forces and dealt a severe blow to the UNLF balance of power. Furthermore, Lule introduced a proposal on army recruitment that foresaw a quota system where the number of recruits from each tribal group should be proportionate to its population share (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 146). While this proposal may have been well meant with a view to overcoming the legacy of a tribally biased army, it was perceived as entailing a high intake of Baganda and further alienated the pro-Museveni and pro-Obote factions.[29] In the end, the inability to accommodate the major UNLA factions became the key driving force behind Lule's downfall on June 20, 1979.



Figure 9: Distribution of government between ethno-regional groups, 1979-1985
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 338.

[28] A major blunder was also the manner in which the Lule regime distributed the businesses of Amin's supporters who had fled the country for fear of reprisals: Lule's closest associates, especially from among his fellow Baganda, were taking a lion's share of the assets (Tindigarukayo 1988: 609p.; Gertzel 1980: 479).
[29] Museveni (1997: 110) bitterly complained about the fact that Lule wrote him an official letter requiring him to disband the FRONASA forces he had just recruited.

Lule was replaced by another Muganda, Godfrey Binaisa – a choice that was meant to make sure that the ousting of Lule could not be construed as an anti-Baganda move (Museveni 1997: 112). Binaisa initially sought to restore the UNLF balance of power. As Muwanga and Museveni were reinstated to their key ministries, his government came to contain key representatives of all major political factions. Nevertheless, it remained tribally biased, still privileging the Baganda at the expense of the other groups (see Figure 9 and Table 8).[30] Binaisa's fragile elite bargain was further undermined when the pro-Obote forces manipulated the president to remove Museveni from the powerful Ministry of Defence (Avirgan and Honey 1982: 210). The temporary alliance between Binaisa and the pro-Obote group was rooted in a shared fear of Museveni and his FRONASA forces – a fear that was not unfounded as Museveni had used his position to enlist a disproportional number of recruits from his tribal base in Ankole, and from closely related Kigezi (see Figures 10a and 10b). But Binaisa soon realised that the pro-Obote forces were only using him and desperately sought to undermine their growing power base – first by unsuccessfully trying to remove Muwanga from the cabinet and then by bluntly sacking the powerful Army Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok on May 10, 1980. Faced with this challenge, the UNLF Military Commission assumed power on May 13, 1980.

Table 8: Distribution of government between tribal groups, Index of Representation, 1979-1985 (in percent)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 338.

Tribe	Population (1959)	Lule (1979)	Binaisa (1980)	Military Commission (1980)	Obote II (1981)	Obote II (1983)	Obote II (1985)
Baganda	16.3	42.5	40.1	18.8	17.1	17.1	17.1
Iteso	8.1	5.0	10.9	11.2	13.1	13.1	13.1
Banyankole	8.1	16.3	12.7	16.6	11.3	11.3	11.3
Basoga	7.8	11.3	14.7	12.5	7.8	7.8	7.8
Bakiga	7.1	2.5	1.8	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.4
Banyarwanda	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.8	1.8
Langi	5.6	0.0	1.8	9.8	10.8	10.8	10.8
Bagisu	5.1	8.8	1.8	1.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Acholi	4.4	13.8	10.9	17.5	9.0	9.0	9.0
Lugbara	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	2.9	2.9
Batoro	3.2	0.0	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.8
Banyoro	2.9	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.9	2.9	2.9
Karamajong	2.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.9	2.9	2.9
Alur	1.9	0.0	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.8
Bagwere	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bakonzo	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.8	1.8
Japadhola	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.8
Banyole	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Madi	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2
Others	10.3	0.0	1.8	1.4	7.3	7.3	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[30] Significantly, all Baganda ministers (except Arnold Bisase) were now of either DP centrist (Jack Sentengo) or radical orientation (Bidandi Ssali) – a situation that alienated the Baganda monarchists from the centre.

The military government, headed by Muwanga, marked the return to power of the pro-Obote forces, evident in government where Northerners (i.e. the Langi-Acholi axis) regained considerable influence, mostly at the expense of the Baganda (see Figure 9 and Table 8). The Military Commission itself consisted of six members, including Muwanga (the Chaiman), Oyite-Ojok, Okello, Omaria, Museveni and Maruru. It remained divided between the two political factions that were left in the UNLF power struggle – the pro-Obote forces on the one hand and Museveni on the other. However, the real rulers in the Military Commission were Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok, while Museveni was little more than a 'figurehead' (Museveni 1997: 115).

The controversial parliamentary elections of December 1980 sealed the victory of the pro-Obote forces. Irrespective of whether the elections were rigged,[31] the pro-Obote forces now not only controlled military power but also held a comfortable parliamentary majority. The UPC gained 74 parliamentary seats (plus 22 nominated MPs) against 51 for Ssemogerere's DP and only 1 for Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) whereby Milton Obote – who had returned from his Tanzanian exile on May 27, 1980 –once again became president.



Figure 10: Distribution of military recruitment between tribal groups, November 1979
Source: Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 150.

2. The Obote II elite bargain

Obote had promised a government of national unity to contain the unresolved divisions. However, this promise was at best partially fulfilled, not least since all ministers were UPC members. Northerners were overrepresented, especially the old Langi-Acholi axis (see Figure 11 and Table 8). Westerners were mostly underrepresented (except the Banyankole),

[31] While most observers identify abundant evidence for rigging (e.g. Mutibwa 1992: 138ff.; Kasozi 1994: 136ff.), the Commonwealth Observer's report came to the following conclusion: 'Despite the imperfections and deficiencies to which we have drawn attention, and subject to the concern expressed on the question of nominations and unopposed returns, we believe this has been a valid electoral exercise which should broadly reflect the freely expressed choice of the people of Uganda' (cited in ACR 1980/81: B370).

whereas Easterners and the Baganda received largely proportional representation. Nevertheless, the prominence of the Baganda, especially in the ‘inner core’ of political power, is deceiving. As the UPC had been denied even a single parliamentary seat throughout the whole of Buganda during the 1980s elections, Obote used his right of nomination to ensure Baganda representation. However, the nominees were long-standing members of the UPC and therefore lacked a constituency in Buganda. Most prominently, the key Muganda in government, Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paulo Muwanga, had been a staunch UPC supporter since the 1960s and was now widely considered to be a Northerner. Against this background, the Baganda monarchists were again fully excluded from political power.

More consequential was the persistence of a Northern-dominated army, suggesting that Obote had learned little from the past. While detailed figures are not available, Obote himself estimated that in 1985 the rank-and-file comprised 60 percent Acholi, 20 percent Langi and 20 percent other tribal groups (ACR 1985/86: B478). This picture was mirrored in the officer corps, which was heavily dominated by the Acholi, Langi and Iteso (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 158ff.; various interviews). Admittedly, there was a certain path-dependency in these imbalances in that the Acholi and Langi had already dominated the anti-Amin struggle along with Museveni’s FRONASA forces and were now the only ones left when the latter followed Museveni into the bush after the 1980 elections. While this made the creation of a balanced army difficult in the short-term, the government made only limited efforts to correct the imbalances.[32] Instead, Obote seemed to regard the UNLA as his own army that would ultimately keep him in power.[33]



Figure 11: Distribution of government between ethno-regional groups, 1981-1985
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU various years.
Note: The ‘inner core’ of political power is defined as comprising the President, the Vice-President and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Justice, Finance, Planning & Economic Development,

[32] According to Obote’s son, the President tried to create a more balanced army around a number of non-Northern army officers who had been recruited from the political party wing and were extremely loyal to Obote (Interview, Jimmy Akena, Kampala, December 5, 2008). However, this alienated the ‘old guard’, especially the Acholi faction, and thereby contributed to the 1985 coup.
[33] This became evident during the 1980 election campaign when Obote challenged the DP leader Paul Ssemogerere to show him ‘his generals’ (Mutibwa 1992: 150).

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In the end, the persistence of a tribally biased army again gave rise to factional struggles. When the respected Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok (a Langi) died in a plane accident in 1983, Obote chose to replace him with Lt.-Col. Smith Opon Acak (another Langi) – a decision that alienated more senior Acholi officers (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 160). As a result, the President was increasingly opposed by an Acholi faction led by Prime Minister Otema Alimadi, Army Commander Tito Okello and Brig. Bazillio Okello. The Acholi's perception that Obote was trying to eliminate them ultimately led to the military coup by the Okellos on July 27, 1985.

3. The Okellos

Once in power, the new government led by Tito Okello as Head of State and Bazillio Okello as Chief of Defence Forces proclaimed their intention to form a government of national unity (Omara-Otunnu 1987; Mutibwa 1992: 172). As a consequence, all rebel groups – with the exception of Museveni's NRA – signed a peace agreement and gained representation on the Military Council depending on their military strength. The NRA's refusal to join the government of unity was overcome by the conclusion of the Nairobi peace accord on December 17, 1985. The latter amounted to a power-sharing agreement between all fighting forces who agreed on a fairly inclusive composition of the Military Council: UNLA (7), NRA (7), FEDEMO (2), UMF (1), FUNA (1) and UNRF (1). Also, it provided for the creation of a nationally representative army. Nevertheless, the power-sharing agreement soon collapsed and Museveni's NRA captured power.

The NRM elite bargain (1986-2008)

> 'No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard: it is a fundamental change in the politics of our country. In Africa, we have seen so many changes that change, as such, is nothing short of mere turmoil. We have had one group getting rid of another one, only for it to turn out to be worse than the group it displaced. Please do not count us in that group of people.' (Yoweri Museveni, 1986 inauguration speech, cited in *The Monitor*, January 29, 2010)

When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power, the former guerrilla force had only a limited political base in that its leadership exhibited a marked tribal bias in favour of the Western and Southern parts of the country. As a consequence, it urgently needed a formula that would convince people in all parts of Uganda that it was not just another 'change of guard' but interested in 'fundamental change'. The NRM's answer to this problem was the introduction of a political system based on an inclusive 'Movement' rather than on traditional political parties where party activity was banned and elections were held strictly between individual candidates (Kasfir 2000; Oloka-Onyango 2000; Carbone 2008).[34] A key component of 'Movement' democracy was the promise to establish a broad-based government. Even though the notion of broadbasedness was never clearly defined, it was clearly linked to the NRM's declared intention to eliminate all forms of tribal, regional and religious sectarianism (NRM Ten-Point Political Programme, in Amaza 1998: 242ff.). The essence of broad-based government was therefore to offer the leaders of all groups access to positions of power and influence in order to extend the NRM's reach into Ugandan society (Various interviews).

[34] The idea of 'no-party politics' is rooted in Museveni's (1997) interpretation of Uganda's history as a spiral of violence caused by communally based parties.

Yet, the NRM's approach of broad-based government was at best partially implemented. At the central state level, the distribution of political, military and economic power has been biased in favour of Southern and Western Uganda. Territorial power, by contrast, has been shared more equitably, evident in the substantial decentralisation policy from the mid-1990s.

1. Political power sharing

Despite the introduction of an Anti-Sectarian Law in 1988, the NRM governments have on average been heavily skewed in favour of Southerners and Westerners, especially as far as the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' are concerned (see Figures 12a and 12b). As shown in Figure 12c, this bias has remained a fairly constant phenomenon since the NRM took power in 1986. This refutes the often-heard claim that the Museveni government was initially broad-based but then became exclusionary over time (Various interviews; Green 2006: 380; Rubogoya 2007: 72; Carbone 2008: 24).

The main beneficiaries of the NRM's favouritism have been tribal groups from Western Uganda. Most key positions have gone to the Banyankole, especially to Museveni's Bahima subgroup, while the Bakiga, Banyoro and Batoro have also been prominently represented (see Annex 2). The second largest share of government appointments has gone to the Baganda who were, at least initially, amply rewarded for their support during the NRA war. More recently, however, the Baganda share in government has suffered a serious decline (see Figure 12c). Moreover, some of the Baganda ministers who retain prominent portfolios have fallen out with the Mengo and are therefore no longer considered as 'true' representatives of the Buganda Kingdom. Altogether, there is a growing feeling of marginalisation among many Baganda, not least with respect to the increasingly blatant dominance of Westerners (Interview, John Baptist Kawanga, Kampala, November 26, 2008).







Figure 12: Distribution of government between ethno-regional groups, 1986-2008
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; GOU Various Years.

Easterners and Northerners, by contrast, have always been marginalised in government. This is maybe somewhat less the case for Easterners. While most tribal groups from the East have been underrepresented since 1986, Easterners – especially from Bantu-speaking Busoga – have at least received a minimum share in the 'inner core' (see Annex 2). The position of the northern tribes has been even more marginal. Most problematically, they have been almost entirely excluded from the 'inner core' of political power, leading to complaints that all the 'juicy ministries' are monopolised by Southerners and Westerners (Interview, Kitara McMot, Gulu, January 17, 2009). In the case of the Acholi and Langi, the dominant groups under Obote, it is even hard to think of any key figure that has remained in government for a substantial period of time. Furthermore, interview evidence suggests that the position of the few ministerial appointees from the North has been undermined by two forms of 'window dressing' (Various interviews). First, there seems to be a tendency to disempower ministers from the North by appointing 'Westerners' as deputy ministers or permanent secretaries in the same ministry who then wield 'real' power. Second, many of the appointees are said to lack a substantial constituency in the North and are therefore not regarded as 'true' representatives of their groups.[35] In the context of the unabated distrust for Museveni and the NRM in the North, the situation has gotten to a point where most ministers from the North lose popular support once they are appointed to government.

The tribal bias in government is mirrored in the ruling party. During the days of 'no-party democracy', the NRM functioned through the structures of the Ugandan state (Carbone 2008). After the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 2006, it had to organise itself as a political party. The key organ of the ruling party is now the NRM Central Executive Committee. While the latter is commonly said to yield little influence, it is heavily dominated by Westerners (mostly Banyankole) and Baganda (see Figure 13 and Table 9).

[35] A prominent example is Cosmas Adyebo from Lango who was Prime Minister in the early 1990s.



Figure 13: Distribution of the NRM Central Executive Committee between ethno-regional groups, 2008
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; NRM 2008.

In the civil service, finally, Northerners and Easterners were allegedly the firsts to suffer from retrenchment after the NRM took power.[36] This is confirmed by my data for permanent secretaries in 1991 and 2007, which again show a strong bias in favour of the Baganda and Westerners (mostly Banyankole) – a bias that has become worse over time (see Figure 14 and Table 9). Furthermore, recent parliamentary debates suggest that the North is marginalised even at the lower levels of the civil service (GOU 2009a: col. 3.11).



Figure 14: Distribution of permanent secretaries between ethno-regional groups, 1991 & 2007
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; GOU 1991, 2008a.

36 Interview, Cecilia Ogwal.

2. Military power sharing

In the army, arguably still the locus of real power in Uganda, tribal imbalances are even more pronounced as the officer corps of the NRA (later renamed Uganda People's Defence Forces – UPDF) is still heavily biased in favour of Westerners. Since 1986, no less than five out of six Army Commanders were from Ankole (Elly Tumwine, Salim Saleh, Mugisha Muntu, James Kazini and Aronda Naykairima), and all but one (Muntu) were from the Bahima subgroup.[37] Moreover, all officers appointed to the rank of full general since 1986 are Bahima – Museveni, Tumwine, Tinyefuza, Nyakirima and Saleh (*The Independent*, February 22-March 6, 2008). The heavy Western bias is mirrored in the current distribution of the 23 UPDF Top Command positions (see Figures 15a and 15b). Here, Westerners account for 61 percent of all positions, including 44 percent Banyankole (mostly Bahima) (see Table 9). The Baganda are also overrepresented, while Easterners and Northerners are again seriously underrepresented. The ethno-regional bias in the UPDF officer corps becomes less pronounced when analysing the current distribution of the top five army ranks (see figures 15a and 15b).[38]

At the level of the rank-and-file, the NRM has made more serious efforts for tribal balancing. Accordingly, the government introduced a quota system whereby each district is required to send a specific number of recruits to the army (Muhereza and Omurangi Otim 1998: 199). Moreover, many of the defeated armies were absorbed into the NRA (later renamed Uganda People's Defence Forces – UPDF), including the UNLA, FEDEMO, UNRF, UPDA and UPA (Mudoola 1991: 239). Altogether, however, the Banyankole-Bahima dominance in the army remains firmly entrenched. Interestingly, the paramount role of the 'historicals' from Western Uganda is even enshrined in the 2005 UPDF Act that explicitly mentions 20 such historicals and grants them a lifelong right to sit on the top two military bodies, namely the High Command and the Defence Forces Council (GOU 2005). This clearly shows that the UPDF is still first and foremost Museveni's army, a partisan organisation that owes allegiance not to the state but rather to the President and what he considers 'his' people.

[37] The only non-Munyankole Army Commander was Jeje Odongo, an Itesot, who is reported to have yielded very little real influence (various interviews).

[38] General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier and Colonel.





Figure 15: Distribution of the UPDF officer corps between ethno-regional groups, 2007
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; GOU 2008b.

Table 9: Distribution of key positions in party, administration and the army between tribal groups, 1991-2008 (in percent)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; GOU 2008b.

Tribe	Population (2002)	NRM CEC (2008)	Permanent Secretaries (1991)	Permanent Secretaries (2007)	Top UPDF command (2007)	Top five UPDF ranks (2007)
Baganda	17.7	28.6	26.3	33.3	26.1	28.0
Banyankole	10.0	19.0	21.1	33.3	43.5	28.0
Basoga	8.9	9.5	0.0	4.8	0.0	1.3
Bakiga	7.2	9.5	5.3	4.8	8.7	6.7
Iteso	6.7	4.8	7.9	0.0	4.3	4.0
Langi	6.4	0.0	10.5	4.8	0.0	0.0
Acholi	4.9	0.0	2.6	4.8	8.7	13.3
Bagisu	4.8	0.0	2.6	4.8	0.0	0.0
Lugbara	4.4	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.3
Banyarwanda	3.3	0.0	2.6	4.8	0.0	0.0
Banyoro	2.9	9.5	2.6	0.0	4.3	2.7
Batoro	2.6	0.0	7.9	4.8	4.3	2.7
Bakonzo	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Alur	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
Bagwere	1.8	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Japadhola	1.5	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	2.7
Banyole	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Madi	1.3	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7
Samia	1.2	4.8	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Karamajong	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Others	6.9	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3. Economic power sharing

The Ugandan economy has undergone comprehensive liberalisation since 1986, most notably in the parastatal sector that had been a source of patronage under previous regimes. Before the launch of privatisation in 1992, there were more than 140 parastatals, most of which were majority-owned by the government (GOU 2008c). To date, 89 public enterprises have been divested, while another 33 companies were liquidated. Ironically, this process of structural economic reform seems to have created more rather than fewer opportunities for patronage deployment, which have mainly benefited the President's ethno-regional core constituency.

First, the opening of the economy created a need for institutions to regulate the liberalised sectors (Mwenda and Tangri 2005: 456ff.; Mwenda 2007: 30). Accordingly, the government began to establish specialised statutory bodies to carry out the newly emerging economic and administrative tasks. By 2003, the country had 95 semi-autonomous agencies that commanded huge budgets and provided nearly 50,000 people with well-paid employment. All

available evidence indicates that the NRM government has used these agencies to 'reward its political and ethnic clients from the south-western part of the country with jobs' (Okuku 2002: 38). Most recently, a northern MP presented parliament with a list, which details the ethno-regional distribution of jobs in a total of 87 remaining parastatals, semi-autonomous agencies and commissions (GOU 2009b: col. 7.17). The document showed a very marked bias against Northerners and Easterners. Such claims are supported by my own data for two of the country's key semi-autonomous agencies, namely the Uganda Revenue Authority and the Uganda Coffee Development Authority (see Figures 16a and 16b).



Figure 16: Distribution of employment in key semi-autonomous agencies between ethno-regional groups, 1996-2008

Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; *New Vision*, January 29, 2008; UCDA Various Years

Second, the privatisation process itself was used for patronage deployment. Of the 89 privatised companies, 46 were sold to Ugandan investors, while the rest was acquired by foreign buyers (GOU 2008c). However, the process from the beginning was undermined by stories of corruption. The latter concerned the President's relatives, especially Salim Saleh (Museveni's brother) and Sam Kutesa (Museveni's in-law) who were both heavily involved in the scandals surrounding the divestitures of various companies (Tangri and Mwenda 2001: 118ff.). Despite public criticism, Saleh and Kutesa never faced criminal charges – a situation that is hardly surprising given that the heads of anti-corruption agencies were themselves mostly loyal supporters from Museveni's home area. While the flagship assets were mainly distributed among Westerners, some of the smaller assets were awarded to political supporters in all parts of the country.[39] This can be interpreted as a form of rent sharing meant to appease the local leadership.

4. Territorial power sharing

At the local level, by contrast, there are signs of far-reaching change. While local government was tightly controlled from the centre between 1966 and 1986, the Museveni government

[39] Examples include the Acholi Inn (Col. Otema Awany – Acholi), the Lira Hotel (Sam Engola – Langi), the Soroti Hotel (Mike Mukula – Itesot) or the Mount Moroto Hotel (Cornelius Kodet – Karamajong).

adopted a comprehensive decentralisation policy, which gives local authorities substantial political, administrative and fiscal powers.



Figure 17: Local government and administrative units, 2006
Source: Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 137.

In 1987, the NRM introduced political decentralisation by spreading its system of Resistance Councils (RCs), with their origins in the bush-war period, throughout the entire country. Accordingly, the existing RC system was converted into a pyramidal, five-tier structure of Local Councils (LCs), linked through complex political and administrative arrangements (see Figure 17) (Steffensen et al. 2004; Ahmad et al. 2006; Ssewankambo et al. 2008). In rural areas, the highest tier is the district (LCV), followed by counties (LCIV), sub-counties (LCIII), parishes (LCII) and villages (LI), whereas urban areas are divided into the city of Kampala (LCV), municipalities (LCIV), towns (LCIII), wards (LCII) and zones (LCI). Districts, municipalities, sub-counties and towns are headed by an elected executive (the chairperson) and a Local Government Council. Significantly, LCs were given decision-making functions on all matters except security, national planning, immigration, foreign affairs and national projects. Administrative decentralisation followed political decentralisation apace since the devolution of responsibility for a large number of key public services, including primary education and health, required substantial administrative capacity at the local level (Ahmad et al. 2006: 8). The consequences were an elaborate administrative system with several sector departments and a steadily growing number of local civil servants (see Figure 18).

The extent of fiscal decentralisation is high by regional standards. The size of local revenue almost quintupled between 1998 and 2006 (see Figure 19a), whereby locally available revenue as percentage of total government revenue increased from 19.8 percent to 31.1 percent (see Figure 19b). On the downside, fiscal decentralisation has been rather modest with

respect to local revenue generation. Even though local authorities are empowered to raise revenue through local taxation, the latter's share in total local revenue has fallen from about 15 percent in 1998 to only some 5 percent in 2006 (see figure 19a). This narrow tax base has been further undermined by the recent abolishment of the Graduated Tax, which had previously accounted for more than two thirds of local tax revenue (Steffensen et al. 2004.; Muhumuza 2008: 68). As a consequence, local governments are highly reliant on grants from central government that now contribute more than 90 percent of local revenue. Moreover, almost 90 percent of these grants are conditional (Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 137).



Figure 18: Size of the civil service, 1993-2007
Source: Compiled and calculated based on Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 141.

The process of decentralisation has been accompanied by an increase in the number of local government units. While the country had 22 districts when the NRM took power in 1986, the number has since then literally exploded to no less than 94 in 2009 (*New Vision*, May 19, 2009; Green 2008) – a development that is increasingly criticised for its economic non-viability not only in the public (*New Vision*, December 4, 2008; *New Vision*, October 23, 2009), but also in the higher ranks of the NRM (*New Vision*, March 30, 2009).

What are the main drivers of decentralisation? The NRM has rationalised decentralisation in terms of popular participation, accountability and improved service delivery (GOU 1994b). Yet there is reason to argue that the process has been driven by political objectives. More specifically, decentralisation has been used to build political support in all parts of the country by 'buying off' local leadership through access to paid employment, political influence and government resources. The number of 'co-opted' elites at the local level is considerable. Mwenda and Tangri (2005: 457) estimated that more than 400,000 local councillors were receiving government salaries or sitting allowances in 2003. Combined with the almost 200,000 civil servants employed in the local administration (see Figure 18), there are well more than 500,000 local elites across the country who have benefited from decentralisation.



Figure 19: Local revenue, 1998-2006
Source: Compiled based on IMF 2009.

Significantly − and this is key to effective territorial power sharing − these jobs are filled with locals. A recent study by Therkildsen and Tidemand (2007: 71; also Francis and James 2003), for instance, found that staff in local government is mostly recruited locally (typically from the same tribal group or even sub-group in the district), not least since 'sons and daughters of the soil' are considered 'more understanding' of community problems. Wherever this is no longer the case, locals have tended to protect 'their' share of territorial power. This has become evident in Bunyoro where the 'indigenous' people vehemently complained that Bakiga settlers had taken over important positions in local government. In line with the political rationale of decentralisation, President Museveni reacted by publicly proposing to 'ring-fence' local leadership positions in the whole of Bunyoro region for the indigenous people, except in urban areas (*Daily Monitor*, July 31, 2009).

Altogether, decentralisation has brought about a degree of territorial autonomy that is unusual by historical standards. While the process is increasingly inefficient in economic terms, it has helped the NRM to 'buy' political support throughout the territory.

Exclusionary elite bargains and civil war onset (1962-2008)

> 'If you are head of a family, and you treat one or two of your children better than the others, chances are that you are going to have a rebellion in your house. A country is just like family.' (Interview, Ben Wacha, Kampala, December 17, 2008)

I argue that recurrent civil war onset in Uganda between 1962 and 2008 can be traced back to the persistence of mostly exclusionary elite bargains. The main thrust of this argument was widely confirmed during my interviews in Uganda. When asked about the key drivers of Uganda's civil wars since 1962, the overwhelming majority of my interviewees made immediate and prominent reference to problems that are more or less explicitly linked to my notion of an exclusionary elite bargain. Accordingly, the repeated insurgencies were said to be due to 'domination by ethno-regional groups', 'tribal divisions', 'ethnic grievances', 'a

sense of injustices felt by communities', 'imbalances in the distribution of jobs and resources', 'politics rooted in tribal differences', 'an unequal sharing of the national cake', 'the North-South divide' and 'structural injustices interpreted in ethnic terms' (Various interviews).

In what follows, I will briefly discuss each of the fifteen civil wars since 1962 and show that they can all be causally related to the persistence of largely exclusionary elite bargains.

The Battle of Mengo (1966)

The Achilles' heel of the Obote I elite bargain was clearly the marginalisation of the Baganda monarchists, evident in the latter's progessive loss of political, military and territorial power. As a result, the Buganda government at Mengo felt seriously disadvantaged – a situation that paved the way for the 'Battle of Mengo' in 1966.

In reaction to the break-up of the UPC-KY alliance in 1964, the Baganda monarchists did not immediately seek open confrontation with the Obote government but instead sought to exploit the UPC's weak organisational base. Aware of the factional divisions within the ruling party, the Mengo decided to disband KY and instructed its members to join the UPC in early 1965. Trying to fight the UPC 'from within', the Baganda monarchists entered into an informal alliance with Ibingira's 'conservatives'. The emergence of a strong 'conservative' faction within UPC constituted a very real threat to Obote's hold on power (Jorgenson 1981: 229). On February 4, 1966, during Obote's absence from Kampala, the Ibingira faction successfully introduced a motion in Parliament calling for the suspension of Idi Amin and an investigation into the alleged receipt of gold and ivory from Congolese rebels by Amin, Obote, Onama and Nekyon – the four key figures in the ruling coalition and all from the North. At the same time, the 'conservatives' turned to the Army Commander Opolot, who had married the daughter of a minister in the Buganda government and was therefore considered the Kabaka's man (Mutibwa 1992: 36). Opolot and the Kabaka – as President still titular Commander-in-Chief – started recruiting a secret army and shifted officers and units loyal to Obote to the periphery (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 74).[40]

Obote struck back on February 22, 1966 by arresting the core of the 'conservation' faction and taking over all powers of government. The same day, he appointed Opolot's deputy Idi Amin as Army and Air Force Chief of Staff, while demoting Opolot to the powerless position of Chief of Defence Staff. The army now fully placed in his hands, Obote abrogated the 1962 Independence Constitution – the key expression of territorial power sharing. Confronted with the total exclusion from both political and military power and the 'untimely dismantling of federalism' (Interview, John Ken Lukyamuzi, Kampala, February 3, 2009), the Buganda Parliament ordered central government to withdraw from Buganda soil on May 24, 1966. Faced with this open secessionist threat, the army – led by none other than Idi Amin himself – invaded and captured the Kabaka's palace after brief but fierce fighting. Altogether, the 1966 'Battle of Mengo' clearly resulted from Obote's failure to ensure a lasting integration of the Baganda monarchists into his elite bargain.

The anti-Amin insurgencies (1972, 1978-79)

Idi Amin's elite bargain was exclusionary by every standard. This extreme degree of ethno-religious exclusion became the key driver behind the two anti-Amin insurgencies.

[40] This was later admitted by the Kabaka himself (Mutesa 1967: 186). The Kabaka even tested the idea of ousting Obote with a number of Western embassies (ACR 1980/81: B353).

The failed 1972 insurgency originated precisely among those tribal groups that had suffered by far the most pronounced exclusion in the early days of the regime: namely the Acholi and Langi. Significantly, the post-coup reorganisation of government and the army came largely at the expense of these two groups who had held key government positions under Obote I. Unsure about their loyalty, Amin began to systematically purge Langi and Acholi from all positions of influence, most notably in the army. These violent purges occurred in four waves between January 1971 and September 1972 (ACR 1971/1972: B229; ACR 1972/1973: B277p.; ACR 1976-1977: B376pp.; Kyemba 1977: 44). While thousands of Langi and Acholi were secretly eliminated, others managed to escape to Tanzania where they joined Obote who had gone into exile after the 1971 coup. This heightened Amin's sense of insecurity, motivated further purges against the Acholi and Langi and ultimately caused still more of them to flee. Beyond the extreme case of the Acholi and Langi, it was especially Westerners who were marginalised during the early years of the regime. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the 1972 insurgency was driven by Obote's Acholi-Langi fighting force and supported by Museveni's Front of Salvation (FRONASA) from Western Uganda.

A similar argument can be made in relation to the 1978-79 insurgency. As Amin's elite bargain grew more and more exclusionary, 28 Ugandan opposition groups emerged both within and outside the country and began to coordinate their efforts to remove the regime (Avirgan and Honey 1982). Given that Amin's 'minority regime' excluded large parts of Ugandan society, the various groups came from almost every tribal and ideological background.[41] It is however no coincidence that the only two rebel movements with significant military muscle – Obote's *Kikoosi Maluum* and Museveni's FRONASA from Ankole-Kigezi – hailed from the two areas that suffered from the most serious marginalisation. This was especially the case for the Acholi and Langi who experienced enduringly high levels of exclusion and repression throughout the 1970s (ACR 1972/73: B277p.; ACR 1976/1977: B374). Similarly Westerners, especially the Banyankole, continued to be denied access to positions of state power. Easterners, by contrast, were treated with relative favour as both the Busoga and Iteso were – at least until the late 1970s – well-represented in the circles of both military and political power. Buganda, finally, was home to many commercial elites that benefited from the Africanisation of trade (Jorgenson 1981: 314). Prominent among the latter were Baganda Muslims who – led by Prince Badru Kakungulu – supported the regime (Mutibwa 2008: 159ff.). Even when Kakungulu became too powerful and was sidelined, the alliance between Baganda Muslims and Amin remained an important bedrock for the survival of the regime in all matters that were not military.

The hour of the UNLA came in mid-1978 when Amin's narrow base among the Nubian-Kakwa core group began to disintegrate (ACR 1978/1979: B424ff.). Increasingly concerned about Amin's excesses, the influential Nubian community in Bombo asked Vice-President Adrisi to push for a civilian administrator general. As a consequence, fighting broke out between Amin and Adrisi and caused a split within the innermost circles of the regime. As a result, a mutiny began within one of Amin's most loyal units, the Malire Mechanised Regiment. Even though Amin managed to quell the mutiny, he was now in serious trouble. Trying to cover up for his disintegrating power base, Amin's army invaded Tanzania and occupied the Kagera Salient. Supported by several thousand Tanzanian soldiers, the UNLA used this occasion to invade their own country and overthrew the Amin regime in April 1979.

[41] For a list of all Ugandan resistance groups see ACR 1978/1979: B445.

The anti-UNIF/Obote II insurgencies (1980-1986)

The collapse of the UNLF elite bargain and Obote's return to power produced three main 'losers': (1) West Nilers; (2) the Baganda; and (3) Museveni with his followers from Ankole-Kigezi. Significantly, all three of these groups reacted to their marginalisation by launching armed insurgencies against the government. In this sense, the five different civil wars that ravaged Uganda during the first half of the 1980s were all closely related to the failure of the post-Amin governments to establish a truly inclusive elite bargain.

1. **The West Nile insurgencies**

Those that had lost out from the moment the UNLF took power were West Nilers who had monopolised state power under Amin and were now purged from all positions of influence. This became most visible in the case of Amin's army, which was regarded as a West Nile institution and therefore ousted and driven into Sudan (Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 5ff.). After the war, the UNLF – allegedly a broad-based coalition – made no attempt to reach out to West Nile leaders. In the UNLA – dominated by pro-Obote forces that had suffered most at the hands of Amin's soldiers – the total exclusion of West Nilers was almost to be expected. But their marginalisation also became apparent in the UNLF and Obote II governments, where the West Nile groups were seriously underrepresented. The exclusion from the new elite bargain was worsened by the UNLA's general attitude of stigmatisation and revenge (Avirgan and Honey 1982: 225). As a result, former UA soldiers and West Nile civilians were subjected to indiscriminate violence by UNLA soldiers.

Feelings of political and military marginalisation coupled with UNLA violence provided a fertile breeding ground for rebellion. Accordingly, the remnants of Amin's defeated army launched a series of attacks on UNLA targets in West Nile in October 1980, before splitting into two factions (Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 5ff.). One faction came to be known as the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), headed by Moses Ali and mainly composed of members of the Lugbara, Aringa and Madi communities. Ex-combatants rationalise the UNRF insurgency in the following terms:

> 'The problem in Uganda is the culture of pushing out a whole army and replacing it with a new one. Then you have people who are so well trained. Then you start harassing the former soldiers. What do you expect? Why should the whole of West Nile be forced to feel guilty for Amin's sins? Human beings were pegged to the ground alive, left dying, rotting. So could we just sit and not fight the government of the day? People had to fight against such injustices'. (Cited in Lomo & Hovil 2004a)

The UNRF remained in Uganda, scoring a number of victories between 1980 and 1982. Less active was a second faction called the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) that that was essentially composed of the Nubian-Kakwa core of Amin's defeated army. The FUNA – whose leadership remained unclear – retreated into the Sudan and the DRC, launching occasional ambushes against the UNLA. Both rebel groups lost momentum due to internal divisions but continued to attack government forces until the 1985 coup.

2. **The Baganda insurgencies**

The second group that had lost out from the UNLF intermezzo was the Baganda who had initially enjoyed a prominent position. With Lule and Binaisa, there had been two Baganda presidents and both of them had provided their tribesmen with a disproportionate share of appointments. By the time the UNLF came to an end, the Baganda were not only again

excluded from power but also saw their arch-enemy, Obote, being returned to the presidency. As a result, they were far more disaffected than any other tribe in the country.

This feeling of marginalisation translated into the insurgencies that sprung up in Buganda from early 1981. Accordingly, a group of Baganda monarchists – who had been sidelined with the ousting of Lule – founded the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) and were later, after the removal of Binaisa, joined by a number of Baganda DP centrists (Various interviews; Kasozi 1994: 166ff.). Headed by Andrew Kayiira, the UFM launched two abortive coups attempts in early 1981. From 1982, following the failed attack on the Lubiri Barracks in Kampala (*Associated Press*, February 23, 1982) and the destruction of UFM training camps by government forces, the UFM lost momentum but continued to exist until 1985. A second rebel group was George Nkwanga's Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMO), which emerged from 1982-83 and was also exclusively based among the Baganda. While some sources indicate that FEDEMO was the successor of the UFM (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, August 6, 1985), the two groups were later separately recognised under the 1985 Nairobi peace agreement. The UFM and FEDEMO were both clearly motivated by the perception that the Baganda were excluded from access to state power. Francis Bwengye (1985: 259), for instance, who initially joined UFM and later played a key role in FEDEMO, criticised the tribally biased composition of the Obote II government and identified this as a major impediment for peace and reconciliation.

3. The NRA insurgency[42]

The third major social force that had been progressively deprived of influence under the UNLF was Museveni and his followers from Ankole-Kigezi. Originally a key figure in the UNLF, Museveni had been demoted by both Lule and Binaisa, sidelined in the Military Commission and forced to contest multi-party elections he knew he could not win with his only recently created UPM. Afterwards, he faced the prospect of a government led by his arch-rival Obote, from whom he could not expect anything.

Museveni (1997) has portrayed himself as a principled nationalist who had to fight against a system of 'petit bourgeois' politicians and military officers who maintained power by manipulating sectarian cleavages of religion and ethnicity. Interestingly, however, he reveals that when the UNLF was destroyed and multi-party elections were announced in late May 1980,

> '[i]t was from that point that some of us know that we would eventually have to resort to arms yet again to fight the system, and from then on, we decided to make our position very clear'. (Museveni 1997: 116)

The point in time Museveni refers to – the coup by the Military Commission he had little control over and the announcing of multi-party elections he knew he could not win – is exactly when his own political marginalisation had been sealed. It therefore seems most plausible to argue that the NRA insurgency was motivated by the progressive sidelining of Museveni and his followers within the UNLF. This is implicitly confirmed by Kirunda-Kivejinja (1995: 251), Museveni's long-standing comrade, who locates the beginning of the NRA war in Binaisa's fateful decision to oust Museveni from the Ministry of Defence:

> 'The fall of the UNLF and subsequent events that hinged on the gun as the arbiter of political debate has roots in this decision taken in the Ministry of Defence. It is

[42] For a more extensive discussion of the NRA civil war see Museveni 1997; Amaza 1998; Kasfir 2005.

> safe to say that the country would have been spared this ordeal if this reshuffle had not taken place. History could have been different'.

Was Museveni fighting his personal exclusion or on behalf of his tribe, the Banyankole? Significantly, and this is often overlooked, Museveni could hardly claim to be fighting on behalf of the Banyankole as a whole. On the contrary, the Banyankole were prominently represented under the UNLF and especially – Ankole being a traditional UPC stronghold – under Obote II. Key to understanding this apparent contradiction are the 'politics of Ankole' with the uneasy relationship between the two main sub-groups – Bairu farmers (the majority) and Bahima cattle owners (the minority). Historically, the UPC in Ankole was dominated by Protestant Bairu (Kasozi 1994: 186). Even though the Bahima (Museveni's group) were also Protestant, they realised that they were being edged out of positions of social significance and therefore voted for the Catholic DP. This in turn became a serious threat for the Protestant Bairu in the UPC, who now faced the combined vote of the Protestant Bahima, the Catholic Bairu and the Catholic Banyarwanda. Significantly, the UPC was actively playing on these divisions by labelling FRONASA as 'anti-Bairu' (Museveni 1997: 98) and denying some Bahima – along with the Banyarwanda and Catholic Bairu – the right to vote during the 1980 elections. Also, all Banyankole ministers under Obote II were Protestant Bairu, thereby accentuating both the inner-Ankole divisions and the alienation of the Bahima (Interview, Yona Kanyomozi, Kampala, February 9, 2009). Altogether, Museveni had only the core support of the small Bahima community and some followers in nearby Kigezi – a situation that made it impossible to begin the insurgency in Western Uganda. This is precisely why the NRA chose to launch their guerrilla war in Buganda, where the opportunity to mobilise popular support was greatest due to the almost unreserved resentment for Obote (Interview, Maj.-Gen. Jim Muhwezi, Kampala, January 15, 2009).

While the NRA guerrillas were initially perceived as 'outsiders', the merger with another Baganda rebel group, namely Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF), helped to boost their support among the Baganda (Kasfir 2005: 283). As a consequence, the NRA became a 'Bantu alliance', which was mostly headed by Bahima commanders and otherwise composed of Baganda foot soldiers. The NRA's anti-tribalist rhetoric notwithstanding, the bush war had a strongly 'anti-Northern' (and especially anti-Acholi) undertone, which reflected the rebels' shared hatred for the pro-Obote forces, who hailed mostly from Northern Uganda. This is even confirmed by otherwise laudatory NRA insiders (Amaza 1998: 62). Museveni's true motivations were revealed in the often-cited interview with the *Drum* magazine in October 1985 (Cited in Nabudere 2003: 34):

> 'The problem in Uganda is that the leadership has mainly been from the north. The southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a peripheral role all these years since independence in 1962'.

4. The failure of the Nairobi Peace Accord (1985)

Why did the 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord – a seemingly inclusive power-sharing agreement – not bring about lasting peace? First, there were once again divisions over the distribution of access to positions of state power. On the one hand, there were complaints about Acholi dominance in appointments to government, the army and the parastatals (Barongo 1989: 83). On the other hand, a key stumbling block was the unresolved scramble for the Ministry of Defence, with both the UNLA and NRA knowing that whoever controls the military ultimately holds political power (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 168). Second, the agreement

threatened vested military interests by providing for the establishment of a national army that would initially number only 8,480 (Tindigarukayo 1988: 620). As a consequence, many of the 15,000 UNLA soldiers knew that they would soon be demobilised. Facing a bleak future for employment, they reacted by engaging in looting and murder. The NRA finally used these enduring human-rights violations as a pretext to take full control of Kampala in late January 1986, and thereby satisfied their own hunger for power.

The anti-Museveni insurgencies (1986-2008)

> 'The people from Western Uganda took it as their turn to lead Uganda and therefore fell into the same trappings as the first governments: Recruit your tribespeople to the army, fill all the public service positions with your people and disempower the rest of society. And of course this leads only to one response: Fight back! Just fight back!' (Interview, Salaamu Musumba, Kampala, January 14, 2009)

1. The Acholi rebellions

In Northern Uganda, Museveni was widely perceived as 'a man of Southern Uganda' who had removed 'their own government' whereby the NRM victory came to be interpreted as one of the South over the North (Various interviews). The feeling of defeat and disempowerment was particularly pronounced in Acholiland – the locus of the most violent and sustained anti-NRM rebellions. Here, the loss of state power had dramatic dimensions. In July 1985, for the first time in Ugandan history, both political and military supreme positions were held by Acholi. Only six months later, the NRM had set aside the power-sharing provisions of the Nairobi Peace Accord – causing a long-standing sense of betrayal – and ousted the Acholi from all positions of real power. As the NRM failed to mobilise the North politically by incorporating its leaders into its ranks, it looked like a 'Southern government, as regionally exclusive as the previous regimes' (Mahmood Mamdani, cited in Branch 2005: 12). Even more consequentially, the loss of military power – the 'traditional' domain of Acholi influence – was perceived as particularly humiliating, not least since it was now in the hands of the Banyankole. This is well-explained by the current RDC of Gulu District, Walter Ochora (Interview, Gulu, January 22, 2009), who is himself an Acholi and a former participant in the UPDA insurgency:

> 'The Acholi … think they are very strong, they are very fit because they eat millet. And other tribes like the Banyankole, they call them opoko. Opoko is a goat … So they say the Banyankole are lazy, they cannot do anything as far as the army is concerned … When Museveni overthrows the government, the people cannot contemplate how a weak tribe could displace them from the army. When they hear Aronda, the CDF, is a Munyankole, when they hear the Chief of Staff is a Muturo, when they hear this, they remember those past days of glory when they used to command. And therefore what is now their alternative since the army has been hijacked from them?'

It is in this overall context that the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) launched the first Acholi rebellion in August 1986. Often described as the 'war of the generals', the insurgency was led by a section of the Okellos' ousted army officers who had fled north after the NRA victory. According to its political wing, the principal goal of the UPDA was:

> 'to vindicate the right of the people from all parts of the country to participate in government.' (Cited in Omara-Otunnu 1992: 456)

Behind this lay the generals' determination to fight in order to negotiate for readmission into the military and receive an equitable share in national government, which they perceived to be heavily dominated by Westerners (Nabudere 2003: 45; Lomo and Hovil 2004b: 5). Feelings of marginalisation were coupled with the excessive atrocities that the NRA committed in Acholiland, including massive anti-civilian violence and a veritable 'witch-hunt' for former UNLA soldiers (ACR 1987/88: B443ff.; Branch 2005: 9ff.). Moreover, the Acholi were alienated by an unprecedented looting of their wealth by Karamajong cattle-rustlers in 1986-87, which the NRA soldiers did not prevent and even colluded in (Gersony 1997: 31).[43] Altogether, feelings of exclusion, the experience of NRA violence and the loss of cattle provided a fertile breeding ground for the UPDA civil war. The latter was brought to an end through the Gulu Peace Accord on March 17, 1988, which guaranteed the reintegration of 2000 UPDA officers and soldiers into the NRA (Lamwaka 1998: 152ff.). While this satisfied the immediate concerns of some rebels, others had either left before or now refused to surrender. This was not least due to the fact that the peace deal did not address the wider issues of exclusion and human-rights violations.

A parallel insurgency had broken out in late 1986 when Alice Auma – a young Acholi woman who claimed she was a medium for the holy spirit 'Lakwena' – started to raise an army, which she called the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). According to Heike Behrend (1999), the HSM was not only fighting against an 'external enemy' represented by the NRM but also against 'internal enemies' in the form of impure soldiers and witches. The motivations underlying the war against the 'external enemy' concerned not only the marginalisation of the Acholi in the public sector but also the escalating NRA atrocities. The political agenda of the HSM became evident in Lakwena's announcement that the movement was fighting to depose the Museveni government and unite all people in Uganda (Allen 1991: 395). More specifically, the link between Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain and the HSM war becomes evident in the following poem of one unnamed Holy Spirit soldier (Cited in Behrend 1999: 163ff.):

> 'Now as time come for him [Museveni] in power …, only the Westerns [sic] having good posts in all gov't depts. Pailarmany [sic] bodies … This gov't has undergone the System of tribialism [sic] … But now, only the westerns [sic], have good progress in education … Is this really national progress?'

But unlike the UPDA, the HSM had also a very strong spiritual dimension focusing on the internal conditions in Acholiland. Here, the Acholi soldiers returning from the 'Luwero triangle' were considered as impure and identified as the cause of all evil. The rebellion was therefore also an attempt to redeem soldiers who had become 'internal strangers' in Acholiland, which explains the prominence of rituals to purify soldiers of evil and witchcraft. Unsurprisingly, the message of both political empowerment and spiritual redemption from violence found widespread echo not only among the Acholi, but also in other areas experiencing insecurity and exclusion. Accordingly, the HSM marched from Kitgum to Soroti, Kumi, Mable and Tororo and found willing recruits among the Langi, Teso and Japadhola. It was only when the HSM reached Busoga – a *Bantu* area well-integrated into the NRM elite bargain – that the rebels were defeated in late October 1987.

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[43] The cattle population in Gulu and Kitgum was reduced from 285,000 in 1985 to about 5,000 in 1997, less than 2 percent of the earlier number.

The third and most sustained Acholi insurgency, Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), started in June 1987 as a splinter of the UPDA (Lomo and Hovil 2004b: 141; Kayunga 2000: 114). The LRA shares many of the HSM's rituals and beliefs, including the idea that Acholiland requires spiritual cleansing. Kony allegedly sees himself as a messenger of God and strives for a government based on the Ten Commandments. At the same time, the LRA has become notorious for its extremely brutal violence against the Acholi population, including abductions, mutilations and indiscriminate mass killings. This has made it relatively easy to dismiss Kony as a religious fanatic or mere lunatic. Such a position is typically taken by NRM politicians in Kampala (Interview, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Kampala, December 17, 2008) or NRM representatives in the North who consider Kony a madman 'who believes he talks with God twice every day without airtime' (Interview, Walter Ochora, Gulu, January 22, 2009). Similar assessments can be found in the press (*The Independent* (UK), November 8, 2008) and in the academic literature, where some scholars place the LRA entirely outside politics (Gersony 1997: 103; Chabal and Daloz 1999: 86; Van Acker 2004: 348).

Nevertheless, the 'Kony as maniac' hypothesis is a too easy dismissal of one of the longest civil wars in postcolonial Africa. Instead, there is (albeit scattered) evidence that the LRA insurgency involves a political agenda that speaks to the marginalisation of the Acholi people. Interviews with former LRA combatants, for example, suggest that Kony claimed to be fighting to overthrow the government and justified this in terms of specific Acholi grievances such as the 'overstayed rule of the Banyankole' or land issues (Lomo and Hovil 2004b: 16). Similar grievances are also expressed in a number of LRA manifestos (Finnström 2008: 122ff.). A political agenda also became evident after the failed 1994 peace talks, when the LRA launched an information campaign in the villages, explaining to civilians how the NRM government had sabotaged the peace talks (Branch 2005: 18). Similarly, the rebels announced a ceasefire for the 1996 elections, encouraging the population to support Museveni's opponent, Paul Ssemogerere. However, the most important manifestation of the LRA's political agenda occurred in the context of the recent Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008). During the negotiations, the LRA delegation made broad political demands, including the establishment of an independent commission to oversee the reconstruction of northern and eastern Uganda, a referendum on federalism within two years, compensation of cattle stolen during the war, land reform and the creation of a new national army reflective of Uganda's tribal diversity (ICG 2007: 5). Later, it demanded that Northerners and Easterners be assured 35 percent representation in military, government and ambassadorial posts (ICG 2008: 2) – claims that are obviously related to patterns of ethno-regional exclusion at the centre.

But does this really prove that the LRA insurgency was caused by the marginalisation of the Acholi? The answer remains heavily contested – even among those Acholi leaders who were closely involved in the peace talks. Norbert Mao (Interview, Gulu, January 23, 2009), one of the most eloquent spokespersons of the Acholi cause, remains convinced that the LRA does have a political agenda, which is however poorly articulated and deliberately denied by the national and international media:

> 'The fact that you cannot articulate an agenda does not mean that you do not have one. And I think this has been the problem with the LRA. The LRA has been extremely inarticulate. And for me who spent at one time one full week in the LRA camp talking to the rebels and talking to Joseph Kony, I can tell you very plainly that the Joseph Kony phenomenon was just a symptom of deep-seated resentment of Museveni's assumption of power … In fact, Joseph Kony has been speaking out. Only that there is a narrative, which was accepted by the media and the Western World, that this is a madman. And even when Joseph Kony tries to

> articulate the causes of his grievances, it is just pushed by the wayside … I never saw any religious zealotry for all the one week that I spent there. I never saw any religious rituals. Most of this is an invention of the Western media, it is propaganda'.

Others find the LRA's political demands irreconcilable with its brutality against Acholi civilians (ICG 2004; Interview, Richard Todwong, Gulu, January 18, 2009). Again, others have vehemently questioned the authenticity of the LRA's political demands. A key issue in this context is the role played by the Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM), the political arm of the LRA that is organised by members of the Acholi diaspora. Significantly, the LRA delegation during the Juba Peace Talks was dominated by diaspora Acholi, which has led to accusations that the LRM does not actually represent the rebels on the ground but has opportunistically imposed its own political agenda from the outside (Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya, Gulu, January 21, 2009).

On the whole, however, elements of political opportunism, religious zealotry and unjustifiable brutality do not disqualify the LRA from having a political agenda. The Kony insurgency clearly originated in a political context of ethno-regional exclusion and still speaks to deeply felt Acholi grievances. It therefore remains – just like the UPDA and the HSM – a product of the unresolved marginalisation of the North. The NRM has been unwilling to tackle this root cause and thereby – somewhat ironically – has given some credence to a brutal and wretched war.

2. The Teso rebellion[44]

In Teso, the only major non-Bantu area in the East, the NRM victory led to a considerable loss of influence. Under Obote II, the Iteso had enjoyed privileged access to positions of state power, especially in the army and police. Most importantly, Obote had introduced a paramilitary police, the so-called Special Forces, where 5000 out of 8000 recruits originated from Teso. The latter were led by Colonel Omaria and played an instrumental role under Obote II, not least in trying to defeat Museveni's guerrillas. After Obote's fall, the Iteso lost much of their former influence. As the NRM began to reorganise the public sector, it not only dismissed large parts of the security forces but also sacked the entire Special Forces. This resulted in huge unemployment among the Iteso and gave rise to strong perceptions of exclusion and neglect. To make matters worse, exclusion was combined with a deteriorating security situation, which was caused by two factors. First, the NRM decided to disband local militias that had been set up under Obote in order to defend Teso against cattle rustlers from neighbouring Karamoja. As a consequence, a series of raids in 1986-87 destroyed the cattle stocks of the Iteso, with estimated losses being as high as 500,000 (or 93 percent). The fact that the government did little to stop the Karamajong warriors was commonly interpreted as a deliberate policy of intimidation aimed at punishing the Iteso for their support of Obote and depriving them of their main source of livelihood. Second, the NRA engaged in serious human-rights abuses against both Iteso leaders and the local population.

As in Acholiland, the combination of political and military marginalisation, Karamajong cattle rustling and NRA violence ultimately motivated disgruntled former Iteso officials – mostly from the disbanded special forces – to take up arms against the Museveni government in 1987. The ensuing Uganda People's Army (UPA) insurgency was led by Peter Otai, Obote's former minister, and pursued military action against the government until 1992. The UPA civil war was concluded not via a formal peace accord but through the efforts of the

[44] The following paragraphs draw heavily on Buckley-Zistel 2008.

NRM-sponsored Teso Commission (1990-2000), which was composed of respected Iteso and sought advice from a broad range of stakeholders. Among the Commission's major outcomes were the reduction of army presence in Teso, the recruitment and training of local defence units and the reinstatement of former security personnel. Moreover, former rebel leaders were co-opted into national (e.g. Omax Omeda) and local government (e.g. Hitler Echweru), which had a significant impact on the termination of the UPA rebellion and helped to improve Iteso representation in the NRM elite bargain, at least until the late 1990s.

3. The West Nile rebellions

In 1986, the situation in West Nile was different from Acholiland and Teso. This was mainly due to the fact that Museveni's NRA and Moses Ali's UNRF had signed a 'declaration of unity' in 1985 (Nabudere 2003: 34). It was agreed that if the NRA won the anti-Obote II war, Ali would become Vice-President, and vice-versa. After the war, UNRF was rapidly integrated into the NRA and its leaders were actively working to build support for the NRM regime among their own people. As a consequence, the NRA met no resistance when it reached West Nile in late March 1986 (Gersony 1997: 84). Moreover, the NRA forces initially maintained high levels of discipline thereby defusing fears of human-rights abuses. All this explains the relative peace in West Nile during the early years of NRM rule.

From the late 1980s, however, it became clear that the power-sharing pact between Museveni and Moses Ali was at best partially honoured. Moses Ali himself never became Vice-President but was first made a minister and then – after his temporary arrest in the early 1990s – enjoyed enduring political influence as Deputy Prime Minister between 1996 and 2006. Accordingly, the Madi, Ali's group, are the only West Nile tribe that has been relatively prominently represented in the NRM government since 1986. Others have been confined to rather marginal positions, especially during the mid-1990s. The half-hearted incorporation of West Nilers into the NRM regime became even more evident in the army. First, not all of the ex-Amin soldiers had been absorbed into the NRA after 1986. While most FUNA combatants remained in exile in north-eastern Zaire, some ex-UNRF were deemed unqualified for NRA service (Gersony 1997: 87). Those who were absorbed into the NRA often complained that the initial agreement between Museveni and Ali had not been adequately honoured. In the words of a former UNRF II combatant (Cited in Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 11):

> 'The agreement was that UNRF combatants were to retain their ranks. But people were demoted instead … . Many UNRF deserted the army, others retrenched, others retired. The whole process of integration was not done. All these things demonstrated lack of government commitment to the agreement, that the government was insincere to the whole agreement'.

The retrenchment mostly occurred in the early 1990s, when the overall size of the NRA was reduced from 100,000 to 50,000. As educational qualification was a criterion in demobilisation, Muslims from northern Arua tended to be disproportionately affected. To make matters worse, feelings of marginalisation combined with mounting insecurity in West Nile from the late 1980s, evident in the constant harassment of UNRF members who were assaulted, imprisoned or even killed (Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 12). Among those arrested in the early 1990s was not only Moses Ali but also other prominent West Nile leaders such as Rajab Rembe, Major Alidiga and Major Noah Talib. Also, the NRA attempted to assassinate Major General Bamuze – the future leader of UNRF II. This undermined the initial confidence in NRA discipline and caused fears that West Nile was bound to suffer another round of bloody revenge.

Eventually, the familiar pattern of exclusion and violent repression led to the formation of two rebel groups in West Nile. In 1995, Juma Oris – formerly a minister under Amin and then a member of FUNA – launched the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) that was mainly based among those ex-Amin soldiers who had not been integrated into the NRA. The WNBF insurgency capitalised on the widespread feeling of political and economic neglect (Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 14). Former combatants complain about a generalised lack of employment in the area, especially in the army that was perceived to be monopolised by the 'Banyankole or Baganda' (Cited in Lomo and Hovil 2004a). The rebellion was at times accompanied by high levels of violence (*Xinhua News Service*, March 17, 1997), but ultimately lost momentum due to acts of violence against local communities. It was put to an end in 1997 through a combination of military defeat, a government amnesty and the skilful mediation of the UPDF officer Major General Katumba Wamala (Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 18ff.). The second West Nile insurgency, the revival of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II), was launched in 1998. According to its leader, Major General Bamuze, the insurgency was an immediate reaction to the perceived breach of the agreement between Museveni and Moses Ali, the repeated harassment of former UNRF soldiers and the overall feeling of political and economic neglect (Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 11ff.). Significantly, it was mainly based among the marginalised and repressed Lugbara-Aringa communities, and especially among those Muslim soldiers who had been retrenched in the early 1990s. The link between UNRF II and Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain also became evident in subsequent negotiations over a peace deal where the rebel leaders specifically asked for positions in government, the parastatals, the foreign service and the army (*The Monitor*, April 29, 2002; *New Vision,* October 23, 2002). Some of these demands were fulfilled in the December 2002 peace agreement, which granted the rebels ten positions in government, allowed former UNRF commanders to retain their military ranks and provided for the re-integration or resettlements of UNRF combatants (*New Vision*, December 27, 2002).

4. The rebellion in Western Uganda

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are a case apart in that most of their fighters came from Buganda and operated in Western Uganda, the two main pillars of the NRM's support base. As a consequence, the link with Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain is less straightforward than in the case of the northern insurgencies, yet not entirely absent.

The ADF war has been described as 'rebellion without a cause' (Hovil and Werker 2005: 14). However, this is misleading, since ADF brought together a number of small and disparate anti-NRM elements, which all had their specific political grievances.[45] The first group was a radical Muslim movement, known as Tabliq, that turned political in 1989 when the Ugandan Supreme Court ruled in favour of one of the rival factions within the Muslim community (Kayunga 2000: 115ff.). Interpreting this as state interference in Muslim affairs, the Tabliq henceforth considered the constitution of an Islamic state as the only way to protect Muslim interests in Uganda. In 1991, hundreds of Tabliq activists were jailed after they occupied by force the Kampala Central Mosque. After their release from prison in 1993, a radical Tabliq group soon re-appeared under the name of Uganda Muslim Freedom Fighters. Two other Buganda-based splinter rebel groups emerged in 1995. The Uganda Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) had its base among Baganda Muslims and vowed to fight alleged violence and discrimination against Muslims. The Allied Democratic Movement (ADM) was created by Baganda ultra-monarchists. While the NRM was firmly rooted in Buganda, a small monarchist faction was unhappy that Museveni had restored the Buganda Kingdom only in a

[45] If not marked otherwise, this paragraph draws heavily on Prunier 2004: 367ff.

diminished, non-political form, and therefore decided to take up arms against the government. A final rebel group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), was a revival of the old Rwenzururu movement in Western Uganda, which had fought for the restoration of the Bakonzo Kingdom since the 1950s.[46] Significantly, the Bakonzo were not only alienated by the NRM's refusal to restore their Kingdom,[47] but also by the fact that they were the only major tribal group in Western Uganda who were excluded from access to positions of state power.[48]

From 1996, the four rebel groups came together to form the ADF, aided and abetted by the Sudanese government (Prunier 2004: 373ff.). The incorporation of NALU was of key importance, since it provided the rebels with a good peasant grounding in local realities. Also, the Rwenzori Mountains were not only strategically ideal for rebellion but also offered the advantage of the DRC as nearby refuge. The heterogeneity of the involved groups explains the absence of a coherent political agenda. Whereas the ADM elements claimed to be fighting 'to re-introduce multi-party politics' and 'stop Museveni's nepotism giving all the juicy jobs to Westerners', the Tabliq and NALU components sought to establish an Islamic state and an autonomous Bakonzo kingdom. From late 1997, the ADF was progressively undermined by its own violence against the civilian population (Hovil and Werker 2005) and soon shifted to urban terrorism (*New Vision*, May 21, 2007).

5. The recent decline in violent conflict

> 'It is now perceived as if we can now recruit our people from home. The centre is less important, the periphery can decide on its own'. (Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya, Gulu, January 21, 2009)

One puzzle remains. Over time, the scope and intensity of civil war have diminished. While the violence peaked during the anti-NRM insurgencies of the late 1980s, the more recent rebellions have never developed the same momentum with lower levels of mobilisation, casualties and civilian displacement. By the early 2000s, five out of the seven insurgencies (UPDA, HSM, UPA, WNBF, UNRF II) had been formally brought to an end. The ADF has been more or less inactive since 2003, while the LRA has not operated in Uganda since the start of peace negotiations in 2006. What is behind this recent decline in violent conflict?

I argue that tensions over the tribal bias at the centre have been eased by the process of decentralisation. As the LC system was spread throughout the country and divided into an ever-growing number of districts, hundreds of thousands of local leaders – including former rebels – from all tribal backgrounds have been able to obtain access to paid employment, political influence and government resources. Since jobs and resources are no longer exclusively controlled at the central state level, the value of holding national power has declined – a powerful disincentive for rebellion.

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[46] In the early 1900s, the Rwenzururu Kingdom of the Bakonzo people had been arbitrarily subjected to the Toro Kingdom. After demands for their own district had been refused by the colonial government, the Bakonzo launched a low-intensity guerrilla struggle against the British, which they continued throughout all the independent governments following decolonisation. It was only in 1982 that the Rwenzururu leadership finally signed an armistice with the Obote II government (see Kasfir 1976: 130ff.; Prunier 2004: 367).

[47] The Bakonzo Kingdom was finally restored as a cultural institution on October 19, 2009 (*Sunday Vision*, October 17, 2009).

[48] Note that Crispus Kiyonga, a key minister in Museveni's government since 1986 and often thought to be a Mukonzo, is in fact from the tiny Banyabindi tribe. As such, he was long the 'headmaster' of those opposed to the restoration of the Omusingaship and therefore strongly opposed by most Bakonzo.

The LC system as a locus of territorial autonomy has only developed over time, especially in the North. Here, the spread of the LC system was initially uneven and often subject to heavy interference from the centre. A good case in point is Acholiland in the late 1980s, when council members or civil servants suspected of rebel collaboration were often dismissed or even arrested (Branch 2005: 16). As the RCs became mere tools of the central state, there was little scope for the development of independent Acholi leadership. This situation seems to have changed over time as Acholi leaders are now in a position to use the LC system to develop local constituency and mobilise opposition against the national government. The best example in this regard is Norbert Mao, who resigned from Parliament in 2006 and then successfully ran for the position of Gulu LCV Chairman. Afterwards, he declared (Cited in Green 2008: 432) that he had been

> 'tired of being a commentator in Kampala: in local government, you are in charge. In fact I wish I had gone there earlier'.

The increased political space for independent Acholi leadership at the local level has reduced the need to reverse the persistent tribal bias at the central state level. Even though the latter is still vehemently criticised by Acholi leaders, lucrative alternatives in local government arguably undermine support for existing or future rebellion.

The relationship between decentralisation and peace can also be observed in West Nile. Here, most of the UNRF II combatants were drawn from Aringa county, which was formerly part of Arua District but was later elevated to district status and named Yumbe District. Interestingly, the fact that Aringa county initially lacked district status was a specific focus for grievances, as evident in the following complaint by a former UNRF II member (Cited in Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 13):

> '[M]arginalization was a major cause of the war. When we were under Arua, central government funds were not making it to Yumbe'.

This issue was resolved with the creation of Yumbe District in 2000 – in the midst of the UNRF II rebellion. It seems safe to argue that the jobs and resources that accompanied the newly created district have facilitated the rapid conclusion of the conflict.

All this is not to claim that the assumed relationship between decentralisation and conflict avoidance is straightforward. While the NRM's manipulation of local government structures has helped to buy support and stability in the short- and medium term, it may not be sustainable in the long run. As the 'patronage empire' at the local level continues to grow, Museveni's 'politics of survival' are likely to become increasingly unviable and unstable. This is especially the case since district creation has already bred a number of local-level tribal conflicts (*The Independent*, June 30, 2009; Green 2008; Morris 2009). Another important source of conflict surrounding the decentralisation process is that the Baganda have always demanded more far-reaching autonomy in the form of a federal system of government (Federo) (Mutibwa 2008). To many Baganda, this is a lot more important than influence at the level of the central state (Interview, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Kampala, January 15, 2009). In 1993, the NRM government did restore the Buganda Kingdom, albeit only as a purely cultural institution, which remains constrained by the centre's control over its finances (Carbone 2008; Mutibwa 2008). Moreover, it has only offered a more limited 'regional tier system', which the Mengo has repeatedly rejected as insufficient. In recent years, tensions over frustrated demands for federal autonomy have built up and contributed – along with other factors – to the outbreak of violence during the September 2009 'Buganda riots'.

Tellingly, the Mengo publicly reiterated its 'federo demands' at the height of the crisis (*New Vision*, September 18, 2009).

Competing explanations

What other factors may account for recurrent civil war in post-colonial Uganda? As mentioned above, the most influential explanation focuses on the link between natural resource abundance and civil war onset. Most prominently, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) hypothesise that natural resources constitute a 'honey pot' that generates violent forms of rent seeking. It is suggested that resource-rich countries are more prone to civil war by providing insurgent groups with the opportunity to use the 'looting' of natural resources as a means to finance the 'start-up costs' of rebellion. However, this approach can hardly explain the persistence of violent conflict in Uganda, which is an agrarian economy with coffee, cotton and tea among its main exports. Yet, the missing opportunity to use the 'looting' of natural resources as a means to finance armed insurgency has not prevented Uganda from becoming the most conflict-prone country on the African continent. A second argument links the 'resource-civil war nexus' to the phenomenon of the 'rentier state'. Rentier states are late-developers that live largely off unearned income (natural resource rents and foreign aid), which relieves them from the need to raise revenue through domestic taxation (Moore 2004). This is said to favour the emergence of certain 'political pathologies', including – among others – the absence of developmental ambitions, weak bureaucratic structures and vulnerability to violence. James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) have introduced this line of reasoning into the quantitative civil war literature arguing that resource wealth causes weak and non-responsive state structures, which in turn increases the probability of civil war. This 'Political Dutch disease' hypothesis has even less explanatory power. As Uganda faces the need to raise revenue by taxing its farmers, one should expect enduring peace in the country – a prediction that is in sharp contradiction with the real world.

A second influential explanation assumes that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends on its economic performance (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2004a, b). The two most commonly discussed factors in this context are income levels (GDP per capita) and economic growth. In Uganda, economic performance has been poor, especially until the 1990s (see Figures 20a and 20b). Yet this poor economic record can hardly be considered the main driver behind recurrent civil war. Under Obote I, Uganda experienced slowly rising GDP per capita and positive, albeit erratic growth rates. In this sense, it would be difficult to link the 1966 'Battle of Mengo' to poor economic performance. Similarly, the anti-Obote II insurgencies can hardly be explained by economic decline since the early 1980s were characterised by growing GDP per capita, positive economic growth rates of about 5 percent, falling inflation and growing prices for cash-crop producers (ACR 1981/82: B299p.; Tindigarukayo 1988: 615). The reign of Idi Amin, by contrast, gave rise to a disastrous economic performance with sharply declining GDP per capita and negative growth rates, especially in the late 1970s. Particularly ruinous was the expulsion of the Asian community in the early 1970s, which resulted in a dramatic reduction in skilled human resources and highly unproductive forms of rent seeking. Under 'Operation Mafutamingi' (Operation Get-Rich-Quick), the new owners typically showed little interest in the acquired Asian properties and preferred conspicuous consumption over productive investment – a situation that resulted in a tremendous destruction of wealth (Jorgenson 1981: 283; Mamdani 1983: 53; Mutibwa 1992: 117). Against this background, scholars have argued that economic crisis and the corresponding decline in distributable wealth ultimately caused the violent overthrow of Amin's regime (Kasozi 1994: 116ff.; Brett 1995; 137). Even though

this seems plausible at first sight, there is reason to argue that economic decline during the 1970s was largely endogenous to Amin's minority regime.[49] Finally, if low economic performance was really the main driver of conflict in Uganda, why would most of the country's civil wars occur in the 1980s and 1990s when per capita income and economic growth were on the rise?[50]



Figure 20: Uganda's economic performance, 1962-2008
Source: Compiled and calculated based on data by Angus Maddison, available at

[49] As shown above, Amin established an extreme minority regime, which had only a very limited stake in Ugandan society. As a result, it lacked an 'encompassing interest' and thereby resembled Olson's (1993) roving bandit who prefers predation and consumption over public good provision and productive investment – a constellation that is prone to economic decline. While economic decline did weaken the financial and repressive capacity of the regime and made it more vulnerable to violent challenge, the origins of economic ruin arguably go back to Amin's exclusionary policies.
[50] On post-1986 economic recovery in Uganda see Reinikka and Collier 2001.

http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.

A third influential explanation claims that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends on its regime type, typically measured by the 'Polity score' (Marshall and Jaggers 2005).[51] A first hypothesis holds that the more democratic a country, the less likely it is to experience civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The rationale is that only democracies permit the expression of opposition and thereby facilitate the non-violent resolution of conflicts. If democracy was the key driver behind civil war, we should expect consistently low levels of democracy in Uganda. As shown in Figure 21, democracy levels in Uganda have indeed been low since the 1960s. Accordingly, some political insiders locate the beginnings of civil war in the 1966 abrogation of the Independence Constitution, which set a bad precedent and deprived the country of an 'institutionalised mechanism for peaceful and democratic change of government' (Interview, Paul Ssemogerere, Kampala, December 3, 2008). Similarly, Museveni claims that the NRA insurgency was motivated by the rigged elections of 1980 (Museveni 1997). Yet, there is reason to believe that the link between the absence of democracy and civil war onset may be spurious. If war in Uganda was driven by low levels of democracy, why did all insurgencies originate precisely among those tribal groups that were denied access to the structures of the post-colonial state? In this sense, it seems more plausible to argue that recurrent civil war goes back to the exclusionary nature of the post-colonial regimes rather than to the absence of democracy per se.[52]



Figure 21: Democracy in Uganda, 1962-2008
Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2008, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2008.xls.

A second hypothesis holds that civil war risks are highest not among democracies or autocracies, but among intermediary regimes. The idea is such 'anocracies' neither permit the

[51] The 'Polity Score' captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores are usually converted to regime categories, including 'autocracies' (-10 to -6), 'anocracies' (-5 to +5), and 'democracies' (+6 to +10).
[52] This is underlined by an NRA insider who reveals that most combatants were motivated not by 'idealistic notions such as democracy' but rather by patterns of self-experienced discrimination and repression along tribal lines (Amaza 1998: xiv).

expression of opposition (like democracies) nor are they in a position to suppress dissidents effectively (like autocracies) – a situation that makes them especially prone to civil war (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In the case of Uganda, however, this is hardly convincing since the country experienced civil war even during the autocratic military regime of Idi Amin and the early authoritarianism of the Museveni government (see Figure 21).

While standard explanations of civil war are of little use when trying to understand civil war in Uganda, two other factors turn out to be more relevant. Most importantly, and as already shown above, all fifteen civil wars since 1962 – with the partial exception of the ADF rebellion – were caused not only by the exclusion of certain tribal groups from the ruling coalition but also by concurrent violent repression against the excluded groupings. The 1966 'Battle of Mengo', to begin with, was triggered not only by the progressive marginalisation of the Baganda monarchists but also by the army's attack on the Kabaka's palace. The anti-Amin rebellions were caused not only by the exclusionary nature of the regime but also by repeated waves of state-directed terror, especially against the Acholi and Langi.[53] Similarly, the FUNA and UNRF rebellions in West Nile in the early 1980s went back not only to the total exclusion of West Nilers from the post-Amin elite bargain but also to enduring UNLA violence against former soldiers and the local population. The three anti-Obote II insurgencies in Central Region did not only reflect the political sidelining of both Baganda monarchists and Museveni's followers from the West, but also harsh state violence against the Baganda peasantry and Banyarwanda refugees. The three anti-Museveni insurgencies in Acholiland were caused not only by the political and military disempowerment of the Acholi, but also by excessive NRA violence against both former UNLA soldiers and the civilian population. Finally, the anti-NRM insurgencies in West Nile and Teso did not only mirror the exclusion of former security-service personnel, but also their violent persecution and harassment by NRA soldiers. In some cases, violent state repression against both former combatants and civilians was possibly even the more immediate trigger of violent conflict. This is true not only for the two anti-Amin rebellions but also for the FUNA, UNRF, UPDA and UPA insurgencies, which are all often portrayed as defensive wars of survival (Various interviews).

Furthermore, there is evidence that some of Uganda's civil wars involved important regional spillover effects. This is true for the LRA, WNBF, UNRF II and ADF insurgencies that were part of a 'proxy war between Uganda and Sudan' (Prunier 2004). While the Sudanese government provided Ugandan rebel groups with financial and military aid, the NRM did in turn back John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). As for the Kony war, Sudan made contact with the LRA from 1992-93 and has since provided it with weapons and training facilities (Prunier 2004: 366; ICG 2004: 24) – a situation that leads NRM politicians to describe Kony as a mere 'surrogate of the Khartoum administration' (Interview, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Kampala, December 17, 2008). Similarly, the Sudanese provided both the WNBF and the UNRF II with considerable military and logistical support (Gersony 1997: 88; Lomo and Hovil 2004a: 13; Prunier 2004: 376). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the three rebel groups were strongly rooted in local realities and therefore first and foremost a product of the Acholis' and West Nilers' feeling of exclusion and persecution in the Ugandan polity. The case of the ADF may be different in that the role of Sudan in setting up the insurgency was extremely instrumental (Prunier 2004: 373ff.). Even though the four ADF components were also anchored in perceptions of neglect, they were rather small splinter groups in areas that were otherwise deeply integrated into the NRM elite bargain. It

[53] In the words of Museveni (1997: 33), Ugandans were fighting Amin 'because he was a killer'.

therefore seems doubtful that ADF would have emerged without the decisive support of Sudan.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that recurrent civil war in Uganda can be traced back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains under all post-colonial governments, which have – albeit to different degrees – produced enduring antagonism between the country's major tribal groups and thereby become a key driving force behind the various insurgencies since 1962. Obote's initial failure to fully accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation was replicated not only by the Amin, UNLF and Obote II regimes, but also by the Museveni government that is still to deliver the promised 'fundamental change'.

My argument can be summarised and refined in five main lessons. First, the Uganda case provides strong evidence that civil war onset is especially likely in the wake of important relative changes in the elite bargain − i.e. if a group has recently experienced a *relative loss of power*. Such relative losses of power were experienced by the Baganda monarchists under Obote I, the Acholi and Langi under Amin, West Nilers, Baganda monarchists and the Museveni faction under UNLF/ Obote II, and the Acholi and Iteso under Museveni. Significantly, all of these groups reacted to their downgraded power status by launching armed insurgencies against the government of the day. Groups that have always had little more than a marginal role, by contrast, have not been motivated to fight to regain something they never had. This is especially true for the Karamojong in the North-East who have always been on the periphery of the colonial and post-colonial state (Mirzeler and Young 2000).

Second, it has become clear that a country's propensity for peace or conflict depends on the depth of the elite bargain − i.e. the extent to which the *'inner core' of state power* is shared between competing social groups. In Uganda, the 'inner core' of political power has mostly been dominated by certain tribal groups, including the Nubian-Kakwa core group under Amin, the Baganda under Lule and Binaisa, and the Banyankole and Baganda under Museveni. The only partial exceptions were the two Obote regimes, in particular the Obote I administration – tellingly the most peaceful period in Uganda's history. Even more importantly, the top command positions in the Ugandan army – arguably the real locus of power since the mutiny of 1964 – have always been monopolised by small minorities, including the Acholi, Langi and West Nilers under Obote I, the 'Nubian-Kakwa' core under Amin, the Acholi and Langi under Obote II, and the Banyankole (especially from the Bahima subgroup) under Museveni. This extreme bias in the distribution of 'real' power and influence has been a prominent concern in Uganda's civil wars.

Third, there is reason to argue that the likelihood of civil war depends on the scope of the elite bargain − i.e. the extent to which all of the *different spheres of state power* (political, economic, military, territorial) are shared between competing social groups. The Ugandan elite bargains have mostly been limited in scope. Under Obote I, the powerful Baganda monarchists were not only excluded from military power but also suffered from declining influence in national government and the abrogation of constitutional provisions for territorial power sharing. Under Amin, the Acholi and Langi were systematically purged from all spheres of state power, whereas the same happened to West Nilers under UNLF. Under Museveni, the Acholi and Iteso were not only deprived of their positions in the security forces, but also fobbed off with little more than 'token' representation in government. These cases of consistent exclusion across all dimensions of state power have given rise to feelings

of total disempowerment and thereby provided a fertile breeding ground for violent rebellion. More recently, however, violent conflict over imbalances at the centre has been eased by increased territorial power sharing since the mid-1990s, which has provided the local leadership in all parts of the country with access to jobs and resources and thereby integrated them into the elite bargain. This indicates that patterns of exclusion at the central state level can be compensated for by patterns of inclusion at the local level.

Fourth, my research suggests that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends on the representativity of the elite bargain − i.e. the degree to which the included elites are really *considered as legitimate representatives* of the social groups they belong to. Under Obote I and II, the Baganda were proportionally represented in government. Yet, the Baganda ministers were all long-standing UPC members and therefore lacked political clout among the Baganda monarchists – the dominant faction among the Baganda. Similarly, the fact that Obote II had many Banyankole in his government could hardly appease Museveni and his Bahima followers, since the Banyankole ministers were all from the rival Bairu subgroup. Under Museveni, finally, many of the few ministers from the North actually lack a substantial constituency in their home areas and are therefore not regarded as 'true' representatives of their tribal groups, which means that the widespread feelings of marginalisation persist.

Finally, I have shown that the seemingly never-ending cycles of civil war in Uganda were not only caused by tribal marginalisation but also by concurrent *violent repression* against the excluded groupings. The occurrence or non-occurrence of violent state repression has clearly emerged as the single most important competing – yet complementary – explanatory factor. The story of Uganda's post-independence instability is therefore a story of both exclusion and repression along tribal lines.

What are the prospects for future peace and stability? In general, it is safe to say that the current peace in Uganda remains fragile. This has become evident in threats of northern secession (*New Vision*, April 30, 2009) and rumours about the emergence of new rebel groups (*New Vision*, June 29, 2009). Moreover, my own interviews in Uganda suggest that many fear that the country may be sitting on a 'time bomb' and predict genocidal violence against members of Museveni's tribal core constituency if the imbalances are not redressed (Various interviews). Such predictions may be somewhat exaggerated and motivated by the opposition's attempt to discredit the NRM government. Nevertheless, the recent 'Buganda riots' (*The Monitor*, September 13, 2009), which indeed involved sporadic violence against people believed to be Banyankole (*New Vision*, September 11, 2009),[54] show that such predictions may be not entirely unfounded. It can therefore not be excluded that anger over the potential misconduct of the 2011 elections or the unexpected death of the President will escalate into a 'Kenya-like' scenario.

To avoid future conflict and violence, the NRM will need to move beyond its anti-sectarian rhetoric and finally start to bridge the North-South divide that has become strikingly entrenched, not least psychologically. In this context, the country will need a new political framework that gives more substance to the notion of broadbasedness. This could involve a new national dialogue on the tribal question and the place of the different communities in Uganda. The much-talked about introduction of a federal order is by no means a 'magic bullet' since distributional conflicts over jobs and resources would not disappear. But it may

[54] According to eyewitnesses, people were dragged out of cars at road blocks in several parts of the city for looking like Banyankole, and beaten up.

provide a stronger institutional framework for the accommodation of social cleavages and thereby become an important step towards the overdue ‘fundamental change’.

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Annex 1: List of interviews

Name & Function of interviewee	Location & date of interview
(1) Hussein Kyanjo ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Justice Forum (JEEMA)	Kampala, 25 November 2008
(2) John Baptist Kawanga ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Democratic Party (DP)	Kampala, 26 November 2008
(3) Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Land & Natural Resources (under Lule, Binaisa & the Military Commission) ▪ Former NRM Minister of Local Government ▪ Former NRM Minister at the Prime Minister's Office ▪ NRM Minister of Relief and Disaster Preparedness ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Kampala, 27 November 2008
(4) Jaberi Bidandi Ssali ▪ Former NRM Minister of Local Government ▪ President, People's Progressive Party (PPP)	Kampala, 28 November 2008
(5) Kintu Musoke ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Transport (under the Military Commission) ▪ Former NRM Minister of Information & Broadcasting ▪ Former NRM Minister of Presidential Affairs ▪ Former NRM Prime Minister ▪ Senior Presidential Advisor/Presidential Affairs	Kampala, 2 December 2008
(6) Mwambutsya Ndebesa ▪ University Lecturer, Department of History, Makerere University	Kampala, 2 December 2008
(7) Paul Ssemogerere ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Labour (under Binaisa) ▪ Former NRM Minister of Internal Affairs ▪ Former NRM Minister of Foreign Affairs & Regional Cooperation ▪ Former NRM Second Deputy Prime Minister ▪ Former President, Democratic Party (DP)	Kampala, 3 December 2008
(8) Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga ▪ University Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Makerere University	Kampala, 3 December 2008

(9) Imam Idi Kasozi ▪ Chairperson, Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly	Kampala, 4 December 2008
(10) Jimmy Akena ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Kampala, 5 December 2008
(11) Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu ▪ Former commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA)/ Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 9 December 2008
(12) Betty Ocan ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 9 December 2008
(13) Sam Njuba ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister in the President's Office ▪ Former NRM Minister of Constitutional Affairs ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister of Justice ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Deputy President, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 10 December 2008
(14) David Mafabi ▪ Secretary to President Museveni in charge of Political Affairs	Kampala, 12 December 2008
(15) Livingstone Sewanyana ▪ Director, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI)	Kampala, 15 December 2008
(16) Brian Kalenge ▪ Executive Director, Law and Human Rights Foundation (LHRF)	Kampala, 15 December 2008
(17) Ben Wacha ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Independent	Kampala, 17 December 2008
(18) Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda ▪ Former NRM Minister of Health ▪ Former NRM Minister of Transport & Communications ▪ Former NRM Minister of Information ▪ Former NRM Minister in charge of the Presidency ▪ Former NRM Minister of Water, Lands, and the Environment	Kampala, 17 December 2008

▪ Former NRM Minister of Internal Affairs ▪ Ugandan Permanent Representative at the United Nations ▪ Member, NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC), Chairperson, NRM Electoral Commission	
(19) Cecilia Ogwal ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Independent	Kampala, 18 December 2008
(20) Peter Walubiri ▪ Secretary General, Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Kampala, 18 December 2008
(21) Kasirye Mayanja ▪ Secretary for Districts & Constituency Affairs, Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Kampala, 19 December 2008
(22) Prof. Joe Oloka Onyango ▪ Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Makerere University ▪ Director, Makerere University Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC)	Kampala, 12 January 2009
(23) Omar Kalinge Nnyago ▪ Secretary for Information, Justice Forum (JEEMA) Dr. Frank Nabwiso (FDC) ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Secretary General, Inter Party Cooperation (IPC)	Kampala, 13 January 2009
(24) Salaamu Musumba ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Deputy President, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 14 January 2009
(25) Jim Muhwezi ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister of Education & Sports ▪ Former NRM Minister of Health ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement (NRM) ▪ Member, NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC), Chairperson, NRM Veterans' League	Kampala, 15 January 2009
(26) Dr. Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi ▪ Researcher, Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), Makerere University	Kampala, 15 January 2009
(27) James Atoh ▪ Executive Director, Human Rights Focus	Gulu, 17 January 2009
(28) Kitara McMot	Gulu, 17 January 2009

▪ LC-V Vice-Chairman of Gulu District	
(29) Richard Todwong ▪ Special Presidential Advisor for Northern Uganda	Gulu, 18 January 2009
(30) Santa Oketa ▪ Secretary for Gender, Gulu District	Gulu, 19 January 2009
(31) Martin Ojara ▪ Speaker of Gulu District	Gulu, 19 January 2009
(32) Margaret Odong ▪ Grassroots Women Association for Development	Gulu, 20 January 2009
(33) Michael Lakony ▪ Speaker of Amuru District	Gulu, 20 January 2009
(34) Alex Otim ▪ Secretary for Works & Technical Services, Gulu District	Gulu, 21 January 2009
(35) Fabius Akumu-Alya ▪ Director, Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University	Gulu, 21 January 2009
(36) Michael Otim ▪ Director, Gulu District NGO Forum	Gulu, 21 January 2009
(37) Archbishop John Baptist Odama ▪ Archdiocese of Gulu	Gulu, 22 January 2009
(38) Walter Ochora ▪ Resident District Commissioner, Gulu District	Gulu, 22 January 2009
(39) Norbert Mao ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), Democratic Party (DP) ▪ LC-V Chairman, Gulu District ▪ President, Democratic Party (DP)	Gulu, 23 January 2009
(40) Charles Mwanguhya ▪ Political Editor, The Monitor	Kampala, 28 January 2009
(41) Beti Kamya ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Leader, Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA)	Kampala, 28 January 2009
(42) David Mpanga ▪ Minister of State for Research, Buganda Kingdom	Kampala, 29 January 2009
(43) Dr. Chris Dolan ▪ Director, Refugee Law Project, Faculty of Law, Makerere University	Kampala, 3 February 2009

(44) John Ken Lukyamuzi ▪ President, Conservative Party (CP)	Kampala, 3 February 2009
(45) Yonasani Kanyomozi ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Cooperatives & Marketing (under Binaisa) ▪ Former UPC Minister of Cooperatives & Marketing (under Obote°II)	Kampala, 9 February 2009
(46) Amanya Mushega ▪ Former Chief Political Commissar, National Resistance Army (NRA) ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement (NRM) ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister of Defence ▪ Former NRM Minister of Local Government ▪ Former NRM Minister of Education ▪ Former NRM Minister of Education & Sports ▪ Former NRM Minster of Public Service	Kampala, 11 February 2009
(47) Chango Macho ▪ Former NRM Minister for Mineral & Water Development ▪ Senior Presidential Advisor	Kampala, 11 February 2009
(48) Prof. Jean Barya ▪ Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Makerere University	Kampala, 11 February 2009
(49) Rose Othieno ▪ Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)	Kampala, 12 February 2009

Annex 2: Distribution of government between tribal groups, 1986-2008

Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006; GOU Various Years.

Tribe	Population (2002)	Position	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008
Baganda	17.7	'Inner Core'	36.4	36.4	46.2	46.2	46.2	27.3	27.3	50.0	45.5	45.5	36.4	30.8
		Ministers	37.5	36.4	40.0	39.3	39.3	24.0	25.0	31.0	30.8	26.9	25.0	26.7
		Deputies	23.5	17.6	21.4	25.0	28.6	29.0	27.6	32.4	22.7	20.0	22.2	20.5
Banyankole	10.0	'Inner Core'	9.1	9.1	23.1	30.8	30.8	36.4	36.4	16.7	18.2	18.2	27.3	30.8
		Ministers	9.4	9.1	14.3	21.4	21.4	28.0	29.2	27.6	19.2	19.2	25.0	23.3
		Deputies	35.3	41.2	19.0	15.0	14.3	12.9	13.8	2.9	18.2	13.3	11.1	22.7
Basoga	8.9	'Inner Core'	9.1	9.1	7.7	7.7	7.7	9.1	9.1	8.3	9.1	0.0	9.1	0.0
		Ministers	6.3	6.1	5.7	7.1	7.1	12.0	8.3	10.3	3.8	3.8	4.2	10.0
		Deputies	11.8	11.8	7.1	10.0	9.5	6.5	6.9	0.0	6.8	4.4	6.7	6.8
Bakiga	7.2	'Inner Core'	18.2	18.2	7.7	0.0	0.0	9.1	9.1	8.3	9.1	18.2	27.3	23.1
		Ministers	9.4	9.1	8.6	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.2	6.9	11.5	11.5	16.7	10.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Iteso	6.7	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	5.7	7.1	7.1	8.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	6.5	3.4	5.9	6.8	8.9	8.9	4.5
Langi	6.4	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.6	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	6.5	6.9	2.9	4.5	4.4	4.4	0.0
Acholi	4.9	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
		Deputies	5.9	5.9	7.1	20.0	19.0	6.5	6.9	5.9	4.5	4.4	4.4	0.0
Bagisu	4.8	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	9.1	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	6.3	6.1	2.9	3.6	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	7.7	4.2	3.3
		Deputies	5.9	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	3.4	5.9	4.5	4.4	2.2	4.5
Lugbara	4.4	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.6	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	3.8	4.2	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	2.4	5.0	4.8	3.2	3.4	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.2	0.0
Banya-rwanda	3.3	'Inner Core'	9.1	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	2.3	6.7	6.7	2.3
Banyoro	2.9	'Inner Core'	9.1	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	5.7	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.2	3.4	3.8	7.7	8.3	6.7
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	6.5	6.9	8.8	9.1	8.9	6.7	4.5
Batoro	2.6	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	9.1	8.3	9.1	9.1	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.2	6.9	3.8	3.8	0.0	3.3
		Deputies	5.9	5.9	4.8	5.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	4.4	4.4	2.3
Bakonzo	2.6	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Alur	2.3	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

		Deputies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	3.4	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.2	4.5
Bagwere	1.8	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
		Deputies	5.9	5.9	2.4	5.0	4.8	3.2	3.4	2.9	0.0	2.2	2.2	2.3
Japadhola	1.5	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3
Banyole	1.5	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Madi	1.3	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	8.0	8.3	6.9	7.7	7.7	8.3	0.0
		Deputies	5.9	5.9	4.8	5.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3
Samia	1.2	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	0.0	0.0	2.2	4.5
Karamajong	1.1	'Inner Core'	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Ministers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	2.4	5.0	4.8	3.2	3.4	5.9	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.5
Others	6.9	'Inner Core'	9.1	9.1	7.7	7.7	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7
		Ministers	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.6	3.6	8.0	8.3	3.4	7.7	7.7	4.2	3.3
		Deputies	0.0	0.0	4.8	5.0	4.8	3.2	3.4	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.2	6.8

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