UKaid from the Department for International Development

Crisis States Research Centre

WORKING PAPERS

Working Paper no. 77
- Development as State-making -

INCLUSIVE ELITE BARGAINS AND CIVIL WAR AVOIDANCE: THE CASE OF ZAMBIA

Stefan Lindemann
Crisis States Research Centre

August 2010

Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2
ISSN 1749-1797 (print) ISSN 1749-1800 (online)

This document is an output from a research programme funded by UKaid from the Department for International Development. However, the views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.

LSE DESTIN Development Studies Institute

Crisis States Research Centre

Inclusive elite bargains and civil war avoidance: The case of Zambia

Stefan Lindemann
Crisis States Research Centre

Sub-Saharan Africa is commonly associated with images of violence and war. Such perceptions have spiralled since the early 1980s, greatly reinforced by Western journalists who have tended to paint the continent in gloomy terms (Marnham 1979; Lamb 1982; Harden 1990). More recently, Robert Kaplan (1994) described Africa as littered with tribalism, failed states and endemic civil war. Similarly, *The Economist* (May 13-19, 2000) decried a 'hopeless continent' where 'wars rage from north to south and east to west' and the 'few candles of hope are flickering weakly'. Even respected Africanists such as Jean-Francois Bayart et al. (1999) or Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) seem to suggest that the entire continent is plagued by violent disorder and state breakdown.



Figure 1: Civil wars, 1954-1999[1]
Source: Sambanis 2004a.

[1] Armed conflict is defined as civil war if: (a) the parties are politically and militarily organised, and they have publicly stated political objectives; (b) the government is a principal combatant; (c) the main insurgent organisation(s) are locally represented and recruit locally, though there may be additional external involvement and recruitment; (d) the conflict causes at least 500 to 1000 deaths during the first year or at least 1000 cumulative deaths in the next three years; (e) the conflict is characterised by sustained violence, with no three-year period having less than 500 deaths; and (f) the weaker party is able to mount effective resistance, measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party (Sambanis 2004a: 829ff.).

At first sight, such unchecked pessimism seems justified. Along with Asia, Africa has been the world's most civil war prone region since 1945 (see Figure 1). Significantly, 24 out of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced at least one period of civil war over the past 50 years (see Table 1). Yet, one should not lose sight of the fact that no less than half of Africa's countries have so far been able to avoid civil war. This shows that many states have proved remarkably immune to the allegedly inescapable 'civil war epidemic' for almost five decades of independent statehood, often even in the midst of persistent regional instability.

Table 1: Civil war in Sub-Sahara Africa, 1945-2008[2]
Source: Sambanis 2004a.

Countries having experienced civil war (24)	Countries having avoided civil war (22)
Angola (4 civil wars), Burundi (4), Central African Republic (2), Chad (4), Congo-Brazzaville (2), Côte d'Ivoire (1), Democratic Republic of Congo (5), Djibouti (1), Ethiopia (3), Guinea Bissau (1), Kenya (2), Liberia (3), Mali (1), Mozambique (1), Namibia (1), Nigeria (2), Rwanda (3), Senegal (1), Sierra Leone (2), Somalia (2), South Africa (1), Sudan (3), Uganda (5), Zimbabwe (2).	Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia.

Zambia is such an 'oasis of peace and tranquillity' (Interview, Marc Chona, Lusaka, July 25, 2008) in an otherwise highly unstable Southern African region. Intense factional struggles notwithstanding, there were only isolated incidents of political violence during the country's First Republic (1964-1972), most notably a deadly clash between supporters of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and members of the opposition United Party (UP) on the Copperbelt in 1968. During the Second Republic (1972-1991), Zambia witnessed several incidents of low-level conflict. Between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, Adamson Mushala and his followers tried to launch an armed rebellion in North-Western Province – the only attempted insurgency in the history of post-colonial Zambia (Larmer and Macola 2007). Even though the Mushala rebellion temporarily destabilised parts of the province, it failed to gain momentum and never came close to qualifying as a civil war.[3] Other forms of political violence were similarly unsuccessful and short-lived. Three military coup attempts in 1980, 1988 and 1990 were either uncovered in the planning phase or put down within a matter of a few hours (ACR 1989, 1990: B674; Phiri 2002). More serious and sustained was a series of violent (and on several occasions deadly) urban riots throughout the 1980s that originated in the context of extreme economic decline, growing urban poverty and the confrontation between the government and the trade unions. In the light of mounting protest, UNIP's fortunes changed in the early 1990s with growing pressure for the reintroduction of multipartyism and a humiliating electoral defeat to the trade union-led Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991. Nevertheless, the country managed a transition to multi-party rule that is still widely regarded as one of the most peaceful in the history of the African continent. During the Third Republic (1991-today), there were again hardly any signs of violent conflict. The only minor exceptions were a failed coup attempt in 1997 (Phiri 2002)

[2] As Sambanis's list ends in 1999, I have added new cases of civil war for the period between 2000 and 2008, including recent civil wars in Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan.
[3] Given the extremely limited available information on the Mushala rebellion, the exact number of war-related deaths is impossible to establish. Nonetheless, information published in Wele (1987), Larmer & Macola (2007) and the ACR (various years) suggests that war-related casualties were in the dozens rather than in the hundreds. Moreover, the insurgents were never able to mount effective resistance.

and short-lived urban riots following the October 2006 elections (*BBC News*, October 1, 2006). On the whole, Zambia has always remained light-years away from the bloody civil wars experienced by many of its neighbouring countries.

How can one explain Zambia's remarkable peace and stability? While there is an abundant literature on war and breakdown in the neighbouring countries, civil war avoidance in Zambia seems to be have been taken for granted. The only exception in this regard is the work by Peter Burnell (2005) who has made an attempt to grapple with 'Zambian exceptionalism'. Burnell stresses the need for 'dynamic explanation' and identifies a number of factors that explain conflict avoidance in Zambia at different moments in time. Yet he only briefly and superficially touches upon what is arguably the key driving force behind 'Zambian exceptionalism', namely the post-colonial governments' ability to accommodate inter-group conflicts by means of 'tribal balancing'.

In the light of these shortcomings, I will first develop a theoretical framework that focuses on the inclusiveness of the 'elite bargain', i.e. the inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power. I hypothesise that civil war avoidance in Zambia goes back to the persistence of inclusive elite bargains, which have prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances. To test my hypothesis, I start by demonstrating that colonial rule left Zambia with high levels of social fragmentation, evident in pronounced tribal, linguistic and class cleavages. In a next step, I will show that the country's post-colonial governments all managed to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation by forging and maintaining inclusive elite bargains. Afterwards, I will go on to argue that this achievement can be directly related to the avoidance of civil war since independence in 1964. I conclude with brief reflections on competing explanations and the prospects for future peace and stability.

Theoretical and methodological considerations[4]

The civil war literature was for a long time dominated by theories on the impact of natural resource abundance. Dismissing grievances as a driver of civil war, such theories focused either on the opportunities associated with lootable resource wealth (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or on the political pathologies experienced by rentier states (Fearon and Laitin 2003). While still remarkably influential, the 'resource curse' approach has now been significantly challenged for its methodological shortcomings (Nathan 2003; Cramer 2006) and its striking empirical inconclusiveness (Lindemann 2008). Even more importantly, two competing theoretical approaches have rehabilitated the role of grievances as a determinant of civil war.

A first approach relates violent conflict to the existence of inter-group inequalities. Taking issue with research on inter-personal inequality, Frances Stewart (2000: 246) argues that violent conflict is not 'exclusively a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against others'. Instead, civil wars normally occur when 'culturally defined groups' mobilise against each other (e.g. ethnic, religious, regional or class groupings). It is suggested that 'horizontal inequalities' – inter-group inequalities in relation to political participation, economic assets and social services – provide the material basis for such violent group conflicts. This hypothesis is supported by considerable case study evidence (Stewart 2002, 2010) and large-N research (Østby 2008).

[4] This section is largely taken from the related Crisis States Working Paper 76 (series 2), 'Exlusionary elite bargains and civil war onset: the case of Uganda'.

The focus on 'horizontal inequalities' is important in that it shifts attention to discriminatory social relationships, which seemed to have been almost forgotten about in the civil war literature. Yet, a few exceptions notwithstanding (Langer 2005, 2007), the approach is limited by the fact that it is primarily focused on horizontal inequalities at the mass level and thereby neglects inequalities at the levels of elites.[5] This is problematic because the latter are – given the key role that leaders play in the construction and mobilisation of groups – arguably more conducive to violent conflict. Moreover, it may well be that mass-level horizontal inequalities are at least partially endogenous to horizontal inequalities at the elite level. As leaders with access to positions of state power will tend to redistribute to their 'own' social groups, there is reason to assume that horizontal inequality at the 'elite level' will produce horizontal inequalities at the mass level. What is therefore warranted to complement and further develop Stewart's approach is a more systematic consideration of inclusive versus exclusionary elite politics.

The latter take centre stage in a second approach put forward by Andreas Wimmer and colleagues (Wimmer et al 2009; Cederman et al. 2010). Wimmer et al. propose to focus on the state as an organisation that is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic groups whereby civil wars become the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. This hypothesis is tested based on the new Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups around the world and measures access to executive-level state power for members of these ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2005. The finding is that exclusion and competition along ethnic lines are strongly and robustly associated with civil war, with rebellions in the name of excluded ethnic groups being much more likely than violent conflict in the name of included groups.

The EPR approach has undoubtedly produced a quantum leap in the study of the relationship between group grievances and civil war. Nonetheless, it exhibits a number of problems. First, the EPR dataset relies solely on expert estimates of ethnic inclusiveness. This raises some doubts about the accuracy of the EPR data. Second, Wimmer et al. do not systematically distinguish between different forms of state power (political, economic, military, territorial), which ignores the possibility that exclusion in one sphere of state power may be offset by inclusion in another. Third, the EPR dataset provides information on absolute access to state power irrespective of a group's demographic under- or overrepresentation. This is problematic in that the size of an excluded group can be expected to be an important factor in explaining civil war. Fourth, due to the quantitative nature of the project, Wimmer et al. cannot distinguish between degrees of representativeness of leaders who claim to speak for an ethnic group. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that ethnicity is only one source of *social* fragmentation along with religious, regional or class cleavages.[6] Accordingly, there is a need to further explore the EPR hypothesis from a broader political organisation perspective.

In this paper I therefore propose an alternative argument that centres on the notion of the 'elite bargain', which was developed at the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC). Drawing

[5] I define elites as 'holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, including dissident ones, who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and significantly' (Dogan & Higley 1998: 15). Elites thus comprise the top leadership of all relevant organisations and movements in a country, including national and local politicians, leaders of political parties, high-ranking bureaucrats, key military personnel, heads of business associations, trade union leaders, traditional and religious authorities, etc.

[6] Ethnicity is defined as 'a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent' (Chandra 2006: 398).

on the work by Mushtaq Khan (2000a, b) and Douglas North et al. (2009), the CSRC defines the elite bargain as the 'distribution of rights and entitlements' across groups and classes in society, on which any state is based (DiJohn and Putzel 2009). The elite bargain is typically organised through political parties, which have historically been the most effective types of political organisation (Duverger 1959). While my own work is closely integrated with the CSRC, I adopt a somewhat different focus and define the elite bargain as the *distribution of access to positions of state power between contending social groups*, not least since those who are in positions of state power ultimately determine the distribution of rights and entitlements.

More specifically, I propose that elite bargains can be captured in two ideal types that describe the extent to which ruling political parties have used the distribution of access to positions of state power to accommodate the dominant cleavages in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In a first group of countries, the ruling political party managed to forge and maintain an *inclusive* elite bargain by providing contending social groups with balanced access to positions of state power. Such inclusive elite bargains, which roughly correspond to what Africanist political scientists have called the 'fusion of elites' (Bayart 1981; Londsdale 1981; Boone 1994**)**, successfully accommodate the dominant social cleavages. In a second group of countries, by contrast, political parties have established *exclusionary* elite bargains by providing biased access to positions of state power. Such exclusionary elite bargains privilege certain social groups at the expense of others and therefore fail to accommodate the dominant social cleavages.

Borrowing from the post-conflict power-sharing literature (Hartzell and Hoddiel 2003; Walter 2002; Jarstad & Nilsson 2008),[7] I argue that the inclusiveness of the elite bargain can be measured by the extent to which positions of political, military and economic authority are shared between competing social groups.

1. Political power sharing

Access to positions of political and administrative power is important for competing social groups in that it provides them with visible recognition, a 'say' in decision making and control over government resources. A first obvious indicator in this respect is the *composition of government*. However, an analysis of the composition of government should not – as it is often done – be limited to the distribution of ministers and deputy ministers. Instead, one should also separately consider the distribution of the most important leadership positions in what may be labelled the 'inner core' of political power, not least to uncover strategies of 'window dressing'. As a consequence, the composition of government is measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- deputy ministers;
- ministers (cabinet);
- the 'inner core of political power';[8]
- an 'index of representation', which combines the forgoing measures.[9]

[7] I borrow Hartzell & Hoddie's (2003) typology of postconflict power-sharing but propose an alternative operationalisation. Note that Hartzell & Hoddie's typology also includes the territorial dimension, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

[8] The number and nature of positions included in the 'inner core' of political power needs to be determined separately for each country and time period.

[9] To calculate my 'index of representation', I have taken the average of my scores for deputy ministers, ministers

A second indicator for political power-sharing is the *composition of the ruling political party,* measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- positions in the top party organ.

A third and final indicator for political power sharing is the *composition of the civil service*, measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- permanent secretary positions.

2. Military power sharing

Access to military power is crucial for competing social groups in that it shapes their feelings of physical security and survival. While balanced recruitment at the level of the rank and file may be considered important, it is especially representation at the upper levels of the army that give groups a real stake in the security sector. Key, therefore, in terms of military power sharing is the *composition of the officer corps*, measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- the top command positions;
- the higher ranks.

3. Economic power sharing

Access to economic power is of immediate material interest for competing social groups. However, economic-power sharing is more difficult to define, not least because all other types of power sharing involve control over economic resources and are therefore – albeit indirectly – also a form of economic power sharing. These difficulties notwithstanding, a first useful indicator may be *control over key state-owned enterprises*, which are among the most lucrative public institutions in the patronage-based political systems (Tangri 1999). Over the past two decades, the parastatal sector has come under pressure with international donors calling on governments to privatise their state-owned enterprises. While privatisation programmes have made progress since the 1990s, they have often opened new opportunities for patronage deployment, sometimes in partnership with foreign interests. A second relevant indicator for economic power sharing may therefore be *control over key privatised companies.* Both indicators can be measured by the inter-group distribution of:

- board directors;
- senior management positions.

How do differences in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain relate to the onset of civil war? I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains accommodate dominant social cleavages, stabilise the inter-group competition over the control of state power and thereby favour trajectories of civil war avoidance. As competing social groups enjoy inclusive access to positions of political, military and economic power, their leadership does not have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest or even violence against the state. States underlying an inclusive elite bargain are therefore likely to enjoy relatively secure and stable hegemony as a collective system. Exclusionary elite bargains, by contrast, fail to accommodate dominant social cleavages, intensify inter-group struggles over the distribution of state power and ultimately favour trajectories of civil war onset. As certain groups enjoy privileged access to positions of political, military and economic power, the excluded leaders will have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest and violence against the state. Seen from this perspective, the onset of civil

(cabinet) and the 'inner core'. This means that the president and key ministers are counted twice (once as part of cabinet, and once as part of the 'inner core'), which reflects their particular power and influence.

war must be understood as resulting from the inability and/or unwillingness of ruling political parties to achieve sufficient degrees of elite accommodation.

My hypothesis can be summarised as follows:

> A country's vulnerability to civil war is determined by the inclusiveness of its elite bargain. While inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.

Why study Zambia to probe the plausibility of my hypothesis? Following the 'deviant case' method (Gerring 2007: 105ff), I have selected Zambia as a country that deviates from the commonly suggested pattern of inescapable violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the civil war literature, researchers habitually focus on countries that have experienced high levels of violence. Hence there is need to learn from countries that have so far been able to avoid civil war.

My analysis is based on a comprehensive set of original data on the inter-group distribution of political, military and economic posts, which was put together during recent fieldwork in Zambia between June and October 2008. To collect the data, I first tried to compile lists of all ministers, deputy ministers, permanent secretaries, parastatal directors, army officers, etcetera, since independence. While some of this information was missing, I still managed to produce lists with more than a thousand different names. In a second step, I identified the group affiliation(s) of every single individual.[10] As this information is not written anywhere, I had to rely on very patient help from many Zambians, including former and current politicians, long-standing civil servants, former army personnel and academics. In the great majority of cases, this produced highly congruent answers, which makes me confident that my data include only marginal errors. My dataset is complemented by evidence from a total of 53 semi-structured interviews with a great variety of stakeholders (see Annex 1).

Zambia and the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation

In pre-colonial times, the territory of present day Zambia contained a multitude of tribes, which all belonged to the Bantu-speaking family The largest ones included the Bemba and Lunda in the North, the Ngoni and Chewa in the East, the Tonga in the South and the Lozi in the West (see Map 1 and Table 2). Politically, a few groups were organised around centralised chieftainships that possessed developed bureaucracies (Roberts 1976: 80ff.). Most centralised was the Lozi Kingdom in the West where the King (the Litunga), as the guardian of land, had built up a following of loyal chiefs by allotting them land on the Zambezi flood plain. The great majority of tribes, by contrast, lived in decentralised societies. Here, chiefs were part of traditional social organisation but bureaucratic institutions remained underdeveloped and weak. The Tonga-speaking people in the South, finally, lived in acephalous communities of cattle herders where chiefs were largely uncommon.

[10] I identified tribal and linguistic affiliations, which are arguably the most salient group cleavages in Zambia.



Map 1: Tribal, linguistic and provincial cleavages in Zambia

The advent of colonial rule did little to fully integrate all groups into one national community. In 1889, the millionaire Cecil Rhodes was able to persuade the British government to grant a charter to his British South Africa Company (BSAC) (Roberts 1976: 156ff.; Hall 1976: 8ff.). This allowed him to make treaties with African chiefs and helped him to establish administrative powers over Northern Rhodesia until the turn of the century. The most important treaty was the Lochner concession (1890) whereby the Lozi King Lewanika – unwittingly – signed away mineral rights throughout his Kingdom. In the aftermath, the BSAC administered the territory with two goals in mind (Posner 2005: 26ff.). On the one hand, it sought to extract labour from the local population to be able to sustain its mining efforts, while trying to minimise its costs on the other. The solution to achieving both goals was taxation that not only generated revenue but – because taxes were payable in cash only – also forced Africans to engage in wage labour in the mines of Southern Rhodesia and Katanga (in which the BSAC had financial interests). To ensure efficient tax collection, the BSAC entered into an alliance with local chiefs who agreed to use their authority to extract revenue from their subjects and, in return, were recognised and protected by the company. While this strategy worked well in the highly centralised chieftaincies, it was difficult to implement in decentralised societies. As a consequence, the BSAC standardised the role of chiefs throughout the territory and boosted their authority, not least in areas where chiefs had previously been weak. Moreover, the BSAC acted to rationalise previously fuzzy tribal boundaries whereby the territory was parcelled up into tribal areas.

Table 2: Tribal groups and their population share, 1969-2000 (in %)
Source: CSO 1973: 28; CSO 2003: 51.

Tribal group	1969	2000
Bemba	18.3	18.1
Tonga	10.5	12.7
Ngoni	6.3	4.0
Lozi	5.5	5.6
Nsenga	5.1	5.5
Chewa	4.8	7.2
Tumbuka	3.8	4.2
Lala	3.1	3.2
Kaonde	2.9	3.0
Luvale	2.4	2.1
Lunda (North-West)	2.3	2.5
Ushi	2.2	2.4
Lamba	2.2	2.2
Bisa	2.0	1.8
Lenje	1.9	1.7
Namwanga	1.6	2.7
Mambwe	1.6	2.3
Mbunda	1.5	1.4
Other	21.9	17.3
Total	100.0	99.9

The 'tribalisation' of local authority structures was taken even further after the British colonial office took over in 1924 and turned Northern Rhodesia into a protectorate. From 1929, a system of indirect rule provided chiefs with control over valuable resources (e.g. treasury funds and land) and unprecedented judicial powers (Posner 2005: 30ff.). This gave the population extremely strong incentives to cultivate their relationship with the chief and thereby entrenched *tribe* as a main source of social cleavage. Ever since then, Zambia is commonly said to be home to 73 tribes – an almost mythical figure that goes back to J. Moffat Thomson's 1934 *Memorandum on the Native Tribes and Tribal Areas of Northern Rhodesia* (Posner 2005: 54).[11] In terms of population share, one can identify 18 tribal groups that have over time accounted for more than 1 percent of the country's total population (see Table 2).[12] The picture was further complicated by the fact that the different tribal identities were clustered into eight (later nine) administrative provinces (see Map 1).

Beyond tribal divisions, colonial rule also favoured the emergence of distinct linguistic group cleavages. The latter became evident in the consolidation of four dominant regional languages, including Bemba in the North, Nyanga in the East, Tonga in the South and Barotse in the West (see Map 1) (Posner 2005: 56ff.). This process was driven by three features of colonial rule: first, missionary schools were unable to teach Africans in all local languages and thus used Bemba, Nyanga, Tonga and Barotse (Lozi) as the only languages of instruction; second, colonial education policies formally adopted the four languages as official languages of instruction to simplify the administration's job; and third, intra-territorial labour migration

[11] Even publications by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO) make reference to the 73 tribes, yet their own listings typically include a smaller number of tribes (CSO 1973, 2003).
[12] In line with my definition of ethnicity, these tribal groups are ethnic in nature since membership is determined by the tribal affiliation of an individual's parents (CSO 1973, 2003; various interviews).

had a profound effect on the country's language map. Once the labour migrants settled in the major urban areas, a single language emerged as a common medium of communication, including Bemba on the Copperbelt, Nyanga in Lusaka and Lozi in Livingstone. A fifth, albeit looser language group came to exist in the North-West where no single dominant regional lingua franca emerged but Lunda, Kaonde and Luvale enjoyed first-among-equals status.[13] On the whole, *language* established itself as the main source of social cleavage. This means that national conflicts were increasingly seen in linguistic terms, while local interactions continued to be framed in tribal terms. In terms of population share, Bemba-speakers have always been dominant, followed by the Nyanga, Tonga, North-Western and Barotse groups (see Table 3).[14]

Table 3: Language groups and their population share, 1969-2000 (in %)
Source: CSO 1985: 3, CSO 2003: 46.

Language group	1969	1980	1990	2000
Bemba	38.8	42.9	43.1	41.7
Nyanga	21.7	22.3	23.8	23.8
Tonga	15.2	13.3	14.8	13.9
North-Western	10.6	7.7	8.8	7.7
Barotse	9.2	8.0	7.5	6.9
Other	4.5	6.0	1.9	6.0
Total	100.0	100.2	99.9	100.0

Colonial economic policies had an ambiguous impact in terms of national integration. On the one hand, the rapid growth of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930s led to the emergence of an export-oriented mono-economy that was mined by foreign multi-national corporations and characterised by highly uneven economic development (Roberts 1976: 185ff.; Hall 1976: 71ff.). The manufacturing and agricultural sectors remained underdeveloped with infrastructure development almost exclusively geared towards the needs of the mining industry. Investment in agriculture was minimal and most rural areas remained condemned to subsistence farming, which was in turn undermined by the absence of able-bodied men who worked in the mines for most of the year. As the rural areas off the 'line of rail' were left behind, [15] the Copperbelt became 'an island of comparative plenty in a vast sea of rural poverty' (Roberts 1976: 187), evident in wide income gaps between rural and urban dwellers. All this played out in a context of a racially segregated society. While Europeans monopolised managerial and professional occupations, Asians were given control over the country's retail trade. Africans suffered from institutionalised racism, including wage discrimination, segregated public services and alienation of the best land to white settlers.

On the other hand, the rise of mining involved rapid urbanisation and transformed the sparsely populated Central African plateau into a tribally-diverse melting pot. This did not

[13] This unique position of the North-West goes back to the absence of the very factors that favoured language consolidation in the rest of the country. While no single common language emerged, Lunda-, Luvale- and Kaonde-speakers are commonly considered to form a North-Western language group (CSO 1973, 2003).
[14] Zambia's five main language groups are – in contrast to claims by Posner (2005) – not ethnic in nature since membership is determined by the predominant language that an individual uses for his/her daily communication rather than by descent (CSO 1973, 2003; various interviews). This means that one can be classified a Bemba-speaker without having parents from one of the Bemba-speaking tribes. Nevertheless, those belonging to one of the Bemba-speaking tribes represent the overwhelming majority of the Bemba language group, etc.
[15] The 'line of rail' refers to the area, which is served by the railway linking the Copperbelt with Lusaka, the capital, and with the border town of Livingstone.

automatically weaken tribal cleavages as the colonial government adopted a series of policies to avoid a 'detribalisation' of urban society and contain destabilising class formation (Posner 2005: 43ff.). Nevertheless, these policies were only partially successful (Roberts 1976: 188ff.). The salience of *class* cleavages became first evident in the 1935 mineworkers strike on the Copperbelt, which displayed a consciousness of common interest and the capability to organise concerted resistance within the urban environment. Such class consciousness increased from the late 1940s when a growing emphasis on mechanisation forced the mining companies to stabilise African mineworkers so that they could acquire and retain certain skills. Accordingly, the African population on the Copperbelt grew from 175,747 in 1951 to 458,654 in 1963 (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 119ff.). African migrants on the Copperbelt could best be described as 'men of two worlds' (Roberts 1976: 201). They were still tribesmen, with homes in distant villages, but they were also workers and townsmen.

The multi-tribal Copperbelt gave rise to a broad-based nationalist movement. Political resistance began with voluntary welfare societies organised by the tiny minority of Africans with a Western primary school education (Roberts 1976: 196ff.). These societies became widespread in towns along the 'line of rail' from the early 1930s and clearly represented a 'detribalised force' (Hall 1976: 59ff.). After a lull in political activity from the mid-1930, welfare societies resurfaced from the 1940s and amalgamated into the Northern Rhodesian Federation of Welfare Societies in 1946, which soon became the African National Congress (ANC) – the colony's first political party. The ANC was led by Harry Nkumbula and worked hard to unite the whole territory in a sense of common purpose, namely opposition to the planned Central African Federation between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Even though the failure to prevent the imposition of the Federation in 1953 had a demoralising effect, the existence of the Federation – that triggered massive white immigration and was clearly dominated by Southern Rhodesian interests – ultimately stimulated the growth of African nationalism.

By the mid-1950s, the ANC had recovered its pre-Federation strength and could boast of more than 400 branches (Hall 1976: 123ff.). At the same time, there was growing dissent within the ANC leadership, opposing a conservative Nkumbula faction to a radical faction led by Kenneth Kaunda. In 1958, Kaunda and his followers broke away to form the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and won widespread allegiance from party branches in the North-East within a matter of weeks. Following its boycott of 1959 elections, ZANC was banned but soon re-emerged as the United National Independence Party (UNIP). In the aftermath, UNIP led a widespread civil disobedience campaign – the Cha-cha-cha movement – that brought the country to a standstill and forced the British government to revise the constitution and clear the way to majority rule. In 1962, UNIP and the ANC together won a majority of Legislative Council seats against the settler-dominated United Federal Party and entered into an uneasy coalition. This provided the death blow to the Federation, which fell apart in 1963. In the same year, UNIP alone won a decisive majority in the colony's first universal adult suffrage election and led the country to independence in October 1964.

UNIP disposed of a powerful, mass-party organisation, especially on the Copperbelt, and functioned as an important agent of integration among Africans (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 124ff.). Even though Bemba speakers dominated, non-Bemba speakers from *all* parts of the country played important roles in the leadership of UNIP. Nevertheless, UNIP's support was far from complete. First, the relationship with the powerful trade unions remained ambiguous. Building on a tradition of strike action during 1930s and 1940s, the trade unions – led by the African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) – organised successful industrial activity during the

1950s and became the second centre of African political organisation. Significantly, the authority of UNIP stopped at the union doors. Even though the party enjoyed close personal links with the unions, there was no formal association, with AMWU repeatedly resisting its subordination under the party. As a consequence, UNIP found it hard to obtain any direct control over mineworkers.

Second, the impact of the nationalist movement was uneven across the country. While the liberation struggle was deeply rooted in Copperbelt, Northern and Luapula Provinces, other parts of the country remained largely untouched. In Southern and parts of Central Province, the ANC retained mass support among the Bantu-Botatwe (a synonym for the Tonga, Ila and Lenje tribes), which owed much to a deliberate tribalisation of its support base from the early 1960s (Macola 2008: 29ff.). However, there was also a political economy dimension to the ANC's survival in that it represented the interests of 'rich peasants' in Central and Southern provinces who felt discriminated by the colonial state's credit and marketing systems (Macola 2008; Momba 1989). UNIP handled the persistence of organised opposition in an extremely intolerant manner, harassing ANC leaders and denying them the right of full political citizenship (Macola 2008: 21). In turn, the ANC relied on anti-Bemba propaganda and used violence to prevent UNIP from making substantial inroads into the Bantu-Botatwe areas. Just before independence, Harry Nkumbula – the ANC leader – rebuffed UNIP's offer to form a national front based on the merger of the two parties.

UNIP suffered from a similarly fragile position in Western Province where the Barotse Agreement with the British had granted the Lozi Kingdom the status of a 'protectorate within the protectorate' and thereby enabled the traditional government to maintain a high degree of autonomy throughout the colonial period (Gertzel 1984b: 206ff.). The growth of African nationalism was perceived as a fundamental challenge by the traditional leadership who made repeated, albeit ultimately unsuccessful secessionist bids from the late 1950 in order to preserve its independence and privilege (Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 178ff.; Hall 1976: 184ff.). Young educated Lozi, by contrast, played a key role in the growth of urban nationalism on the Copperbelt[16] – a situation that gave rise to a bitter struggle between Lozi 'traditionalists' (who dominated the Lozi government) and Lozi 'nationalists' (who were prominently represented in the UNIP leadership). Even though the 'traditionalists' could not prevent the penetration of the province by the 'nationalists' (UNIP won massive Lozi support in the 1962 and 1963 elections), they managed to win concessions in form of the May 1964 Barotseland Agreement, which made Barotseland an integral part of Zambia but guaranteed the Lozi Kingdom a special status and preserved its traditional rights.

Altogether, there was considerable potential for conflict when the UNIP led Zambia to independence in October 1964, evident in pronounced tribal, linguistic and – albeit to a lesser extent – class cleavages. The ruling party faced opposition not only from Nkumbula's ANC in the South but also from the traditional government in Barotseland. Moreover, there were even pockets of resistance in the UNIP strongholds in North. This became evident in July 1964 – four months before independence – when Northern Province witnessed the extremely violent conflict between UNIP cadres and the followers of the Lumpa Church in July 1964 (Gordon 2008). Finally, as an indigenous economic class with control of capital or skills was virtually non-existent, access to the offices and resources of the post-colonial state was of key

[16] The prominence of young educated Lozi within the nationalist movement was due to the fact that Barotse-speakers had gained a head start in education over other Africans. The Barotse National School was created in 1906 and remained the only government school in the territory until 1930.

importance and almost inevitably bound to lead to bitter struggles between contending groups.

Zambia's post-colonial elite bargains (1964-2008)

The elite bargain of the First Republic (1964-1972)

Under the multi-party regime of the First Republic, President Kaunda initially ruled the country with a comfortable majority, albeit challenged by the enduring strength of the ANC in Southern Province and the emergence of the Lozi-based UP in Western Province (Tordoff and Molteno 1974a). In 1968, UNIP won the general elections but had to accept defeat to the ANC not only in the Southern but also – after the ban of the UP – in the Western parts of the country. A more serious contender emerged in 1971 when the Bemba-based United Progressive Party (UPP) challenged the UNIP's authority in the North. Intense political competition notwithstanding, UNIP made a sustained attempt to forge an inclusive elite bargain. 'One Zambia, One Nation' being the overarching motto, the government relied on a practise called 'tribal balancing' whereby access to positions of state power was to be distributed equitably among competing groups. This practise was implemented at all levels of the public sector, which became evident in high degrees of political, economic and military power-sharing.

1. Political power sharing

The UNIP governments during the First Republic were on average carefully balanced between the country's main language groups. In absolute terms, government was dominated by Bemba-speakers, followed by the Nyanga, Tonga, Barotse and North-Western groups (Figure 2a). This distribution closely matched the groups' population share, with none of the groups being seriously underrepresented and only the relatively small group of Barotse-speakers (8.6 percent of the population) being clearly over-represented (Figure 2b). Significantly, this proportional balance was achieved not only for ministers and deputies but also for the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' of political power. Moreover, UNIP made sure that the government was also inclusive in racial terms by appointing a few individuals of white or coloured background to influential positions.

However, it took a while to establish this overall balance. Initially, Bemba- and Nyanga-speakers were underrepresented, while the Tonga- and especially Barotse-speaking groups were overrepresented (Figure 2c). The prominence of Tonga speakers was clearly meant to increase UNIP's appeal in the South. Barotse domination was due to the fact that Lozi leaders had used the ultimate threat of withdrawal from the party to insist on being given what they considered adequate ministerial representation (Molteno 1974: 66.). Yet Lozi overrepresentation angered Bemba speakers. According to Sikota Wina (Interview, Lusaka, October 4, 2008), one of the key Lozi ministers at the time, Simon Kapwepwe – the leader of the Bemba-speaking bloc – repeatedly complained about Lozi dominance in government arguing that appointments had to be properly balanced.

The initial imbalances in government were mirrored in UNIP's Central Committee (CC), the key organ of the ruling party. In the early post-colonial days, all major factions were represented, including Simon Kapwepwe (Bemba), Reuben Kamanga (Nyanga), Sikota Wina (Lozi) and Mainza Chona (Tonga). Nevertheless, Nyanga and especially Barotse speakers were overrepresented, while Bemba speakers were again underrepresented (see Table 4). This led to growing disaffection among Bemba speakers who felt neglected relative to their major

contribution to the freedom struggle (Pettman 1974: 233; Molteno 1974: 66.). The perception of relative neglect culminated in the upheavals surrounding the August 1967 UNIP elections (Rotberg 1967). While members of the UNIP CC had previously run for office on a balanced team ticket, now for the first time seven out of the eleven posts were contested (Rasmussen 1969: 422; Tordoff and Molteno 1974a: 24). Bemba-speaking leaders used this occasion to join up with the weak Tonga-speaking faction to unseat leading Lozi- and Nyanga-speaking leaders. As a result, the Bemba-Tonga alliance won all but one of the contested seats (see Table 4).



Figure 2: Distribution of government between language groups, 1964-1972
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, GOZ various years a.
Note: The 'inner core' is defined as including the President, the Vice-President and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Mines, Agriculture, Rural Development, Commerce & Industry, Local Government and Justice.

The imbalances on the UNIP CC alienated Nyanga and Barotse speakers. As a result, a 'Unity in the East' movement sprung up, which reflected the fear that the declining influence of

Nyanga-speaking leaders would negatively affect the group's development share (Molteno 1974: 73). Disaffection in Barotseland was even more deep-seated. Even though Barotse speakers were clearly over-represented, UNIP's support in the West had always remained fragile due to the deep divisions in the Lozi ruling class. Significantly, most Lozi ministers were 'nationalists' and therefore in sharp conflict with the influential Lozi 'traditionalists' (Gertzel 1984b: 206ff.). The 'traditionalists' were further alienated by the dismantlement of the formal structures of the Barotse national government between 1965 and 1970 and the visible loss of Lozi influence at the centre, evident not only in the Lozi defeat during the 1967 party elections but also in the previous dismissal for alleged financial impropriety of two Lozi ministers – one of them Nalumino Mundia who was widely recognised as a vocal spokesman for traditional Barotse interests. Lozi discontent gave momentum to the UP, which had been created in 1966 and was soon taken over by Mundia. The UP, having openly played on anti-Bemba sentiment (Dresang 1974: 1610), was banned after a clash with the UNIP on the Copperbelt in August 1968 (Tordoff and Scott 1974: 136). However, this proved ineffective as the UP continued its activities under the umbrella of the ANC and won most of the seats in Western Province during the 1968 elections. To make matters worse, UNIP's sustained efforts to win over the ANC-dominated South proved futile. Even though Tonga speakers were well-represented in party and government, the ANC still won the 1968 elections in Southern Province. One of the main reasons why UNIP's strategy of political cultivation failed was that many of the Tonga-speaking leaders within UNIP had long been described as 'mere tools of the Bemba regime' and therefore lacked a substantial power base in their home areas (Macola 2008: 36ff.).

Table 4: Distribution of the UNIP Central Committee (CC) between language groups, 1964-1969 (in %)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973; Rotberg 1967; *Times of Zambia*, August 26, 1969.

Language Group	Population (1969)	1964	1967	1969
Bemba	38.8	28.6	45.5	41.7
Nyanga	21.7	28.6	9.1	16.7
Tonga	15.2	14.3	27.3	25.0
North-Western	10.6	0.0	0.0	8.3
Barotse	9.2	21.4	18.2	8.3
Other	4.5	7.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In the light of these divisions, UNIP intensified its quest for unity. In 1969, Kaunda disbanded the UNIP CC and replaced it with a more balanced Interim Executive Committee (see Table 4). Moreover, a new party Constitution (1970) was adopted, which emphasised the 'need to get candidates from all parts of the country' and provided for equal provincial representation at national conferences. Also, the President became even more anxious to project a government with a national image. Accordingly, the distribution of government positions between language groups became remarkably balanced from the late 1960s (see Figure 2c). As the imbalances of the early post-colonial years were being redressed, Kaunda took care to improve the position of the North-Western group and addressed Luapulan concerns about marginalisation within the Bemba-speaking group (Baylies 1984: 163ff.).[17] Moreover, he

[17] From the mid-1960s, leaders from Luapula Province – hitherto part of the Bemba-speaking bloc – had started to complain about political marginalisation. A UNIP stronghold during the nationalist struggle, the Province was not represented in government or the UNIP CC until the late 1960s. The ensuing complaints about political

used his nominating powers to appoint people from Western and Southern Province – a strategy that ensured that both Barotse and Tonga speakers continued to have largely proportional representation. The nomination of J. B. Siyomunji (Lozi) as Provincial Minister for Western Province in 1969 was of particular significance as it reflected a deliberate strategy to win back support among Barotse speakers by seeking closer links with the Lozi 'traditionalists' (Gertzel 1984b: 216.).

Efforts for political power sharing could also be observed in the civil service. The latter's size increased dramatically from 22,561 in 1964 to 51,491 in 1969 (Tordoff and Molteno 1974b: 269). Along with this expansion went a rapid 'Zambianisation' of the administration. In 1964, only 6.3 percent of all permanent secretaries were Zambian – a share that rose to 86.4 percent in 1968 and 100 percent in 1972 (see Table 5). The appointments once again reflected a balance between the country's major language groups. Insiders confirm that this was a deliberate policy meant to ensure that all groups would feel that they have a substantial stake in the administrative running of the country (Interview, Vernon Mwaanga, Lusaka, July 15, 2008). Moreover, the scant available evidence indicates that this balance at the level of permanent secretaries was mirrored at the lower levels of the civil service (Dresang 1974: 1612).

Table 5: Distribution of permanent secretaries between language groups, 1968-1972 (in %)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973; GOZ various years b.

Language Group	Population (1969)	1964	1968	1972
Bemba	38.8	0.0	31.8	28.0
Nyanga	21.7	0.0	22.7	36.0
Tonga	15.2	0.0	9.1	12.0
North-Western	10.6	0.0	4.5	4.0
Barotse	9.2	6.3	18.2	20.0
Other	4.5	93.8	13.6	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

2. Economic power sharing

Attempts for economic power sharing were initially hampered by the fact that Zambia had very little control over its own economy, which limited the scope for patronage distribution. As a consequence, the UNIP government engaged in far-reaching economic reform meant to gain control over the economy and thereby increase the material basis of the elite bargain. In April 1968, Kaunda announced the 'Mulungushi economic reforms' whereby the government took a 51 percent controlling share in twenty-six large industrial and commercial firms and used its power to restrict certain economic opportunities, especially retail trading, to Zambian citizens (Johns 1980: 106ff.). The Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) was given vast new responsibilities and thus became – almost overnight – an industrial corporate giant. In August 1969, the government took a 51 percent ownership of the two copper-mining giants (Anglo American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust), which were placed under the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). INDECO and MINDECO were made subsidiaries of a huge conglomerate, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO).

---

neglect were especially directed against Bemba speakers from Northern Province who were accused of insulting Luapulans and taking over Luapulan National Assembly seats.

The political economy dimension of the nationalisation measures was all too obvious in that the reforms extended patronage opportunities into the productive sectors (Burdette 1988: 85ff.). As the number of jobs in the parastatal sector expanded substantially (Szeftel 1982: 6), Kaunda could distribute patronage outside state and party jobs. Interviewees claim that there was a very deliberate attempt to share these rewards equitably between the country's language groups (Various interviews). While detailed information on the distribution of key parastatal appointments during the First Republic is not available, my own data for the Second Republic corroborate such claims (see below).

3. Military power sharing

UNIP also promoted military power sharing. At independence, the Northern Rhodesian Regiment was renamed into the Zambian Defence Forces that came to consist of three pillars, including the Zambia Army, the Zambia Air Force and the Zambia National Service (ZNS). Recruitment was based not only merit but also on the principle of 'tribal balancing', not least since the ruling party recognised that tribal imbalances had played a major role in military coups across Africa (Haantobolo 2008: 136). At the level of the rank-and-file, a newly introduced quota system prescribed that army units were to be composed of soldiers from all provinces and districts – a system that ensured that all tribal groups had a stake in the army (Interview, General Malimba Masheke, Lusaka, August 7, 2008). Similarly, the officer corps was deliberately drawn from all parts of the country (see below). Interestingly, insiders claim that national integration within the army was facilitated by the fact that the first Army Commander, General Chinkuli, was from the small Lenje tribe – a situation that helped to avoid patterns of tribal dominance:

> 'If we had started with someone from a big tribe like the Bemba, maybe the tribal disease would have grown. But we started with a brilliant young man from a small tribe.' (Interview, Peter Matoka, Lusaka, July 16, 2008)

The national outlook of the military was further enhanced by the existence of the ZNS, which was initially recruited from the UNIP Youth Wing but soon came to involve all Zambians between 18 and 35 who – upon graduation – became members of a reserve army (the so-called Home Guard) (Haantobolo 2008: 146ff.). The ZNS proved useful in different ways. First, it combined military training with training in food production and thereby bridged the gap between the broader population and army personnel in a productive way. Second, the government's policy of dispersing ZNS camps throughout the territory anchored the military in every corner of the country and contributed to the emergence of a nationwide sense of belonging.

4. The slide to one-party rule

Despite the high levels of power-sharing, it proved difficult to keep the broad-based coalition together. From the early 1970s, it was again the Bemba speakers who felt neglected. Even though Bemba-speaking leaders remained well-represented in party and government, they were offended by the dissolution of the UNIP CC – a move that was perceived as depriving them of an electoral victory. As a result, Kapwepwe resigned as Vice-President in protesting the 'victimisation' of his fellow tribesmen (ACR 1969/1970: B231). Bemba disgruntlement came to a head in August 1971 after Kaunda suspended four Bemba-speaking ministers. Kapwepwe and his supporters created the UPP and managed to win one of the by-elections in late 1971. While the UPP was Bemba-dominated, its emergence also reflected the alienation

of the old 'freedom fighters' who resented the growing influence of younger, more technocratic leaders (Gertzel et al. 1984: 14; Scott 1978: 327). More broadly, the UPP attracted all those who were frustrated by UNIP's failure to accommodate class cleavages, especially on the Copperbelt where expectations were difficult to fulfil (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 125ff.). UPP was therefore a heterogeneous coalition of workers, trade unionists, small businessmen and party militants − many of them Bemba but not all of them. Faced with this challenge, the government banned the UPP in February 1972 and detained Kapwepwe and other key figures.

Altogether, UNIP found itself on the verge of becoming a regional party in the early 1970s. While the ANC continued to control both Southern and Western Provinces, the great popularity of Kapwepwe's UPP challenged its authority in the Northern parts of the country – UNIP's stronghold during the days of the nationalist struggle. The introduction of the one-party state in December 1972 was therefore seen as the only way to preserve UNIP's authority and contain the increasingly destabilising factional struggles.

The elite bargain of the Second Republic (1972-1991)

At the beginning of the Second Republic, UNIP found itself in a difficult position. The banned opposition parties were still well-entrenched and support for the ruling party was probably lowest since independence. The main challenge was therefore to establish a broader support base. However, this required a better 'institutional balance between participation and control' as increased participation after independence had heightened factional struggles (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 4).

To increase control, the new constitution provided for a centralisation of political power. Above all, it increased the powers of the president, who now acted at his discretion on a wide range of issues (ACR 1972/1973: B302). Moreover, it introduced a division between party and government, with the former being supreme. Yet, the centralisation of power was combined with the attempt to establish the broadest possible support base. Accordingly, UNIP tried hard to (re)build support in the former opposition areas. The first 'settlement' was reached with the ANC and publicly celebrated on June 17, 1973 when Nkumbula called ANC members to join UNIP (ACR 1973/1974: B326). The reconciliation with the Lozi faction of the former ANC was less formalised and did not start until 1974 when the ex-UP leader Mundia was released from prison and 'allowed' to win a parliamentary seat in a by-election (Gertzel 1984b: 218ff.). The relationship with the former UPP faction was most uneasy. Even though Kapwepwe and others were released in late 1972, UNIP remained highly suspicious of former UPP supporters who were often prevented from joining the ruling party (ACR 1973/1974: B327). Nevertheless, UNIP sought accommodation with the UPP top leadership by making them financial overtures and using the mediation of UNIP Bemba leaders (Larmer 2008: 112). After prolonged negotiations, Kapwepwe and four of his senior aides were readmitted into UNIP on 9 September 1977 for the 'sake of complete unity' (ACR 1977/1978: 467). To bolster this new unity, Kaunda maintained the practise of 'tribal balancing' throughout the Second Republic.

1. Political power sharing

Government appointments during the Second Republic remained on average carefully balanced between the country's main language groups (see Figures 3a and 3b). In terms of my 'Index of Representation', the Bemba, Nyanga, Tonga and North-Western groups were

almost perfectly represented, while only the small Barotse-speaking bloc was overrepresented.[18] This proportional representation was a fairly constant phenomenon between 1974 and 1990 (Figure 3c). Interestingly, government appointments continued to be used strategically to anchor the one-party state in former opposition areas. Instructive in this respect is an informal agreement that the prime minister would always be either a Tonga or a Lozi (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996: 186). Accordingly, three out of the six prime ministers during the Second Republic were Tonga speakers (M. Chona, E. Mudenda and K. Musokotwane), while the remaining three were from the Barotse-speaking bloc (D. M. Lisulo, N. Mundia and M. Masheke). The appointment of Mundia – the former dissident – as Prime Minister in February 1981 was of particular significance and finally restored solid links between Western Province and the centre.

If one disaggregates this broader picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that some of the larger tribes were on average underrepresented, including the Tonga, Nsenga, Tumbuka and Ngoni (see Table 6). The reverse was true for some of the smaller groups, in particular the Lunda and Lenje. On the whole, however, it is striking that none of the country's 19 tribal groups with more than 1 percent of the population were entirely excluded from government between 1974 and 1990. Moreover, only four of these 19 groups (Namwanga, Lamba, Luvale and Mbunda) never had a minister in the 'inner core' of political power. Finally, even the numerous smaller groups subsumed under 'Other' were prominently represented.

[18] This refutes claims that Barotse-speakers remained outside the 'fusion of Zambian elites' (Englebert 2005).



Figure 3: Distribution of government between language groups, 1974-1990
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; GOZ various years a. Data for 1988 are missing.
Note: The 'inner core' is defined as comprising the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Development Planning, Mines, Agriculture, Works & Supply, Commerce, Local Government & Housing and Legal Affairs.

The quest for political power sharing became also evident in the UNIP CC – the key decision-making body during the Second Republic (Tordoff 1980: 17). Accordingly, the UNIP CC was broadly reflective of the country's main language groups between 1973 and 1988 (see Figures 4a and 4b). While Bemba and Nyanga speakers were very slightly underrepresented, the smaller groups were moderately overrepresented. The UNIP CC was generally known as Kaunda's 'sacred cow', representing many of the nationalist leaders of the independent struggle (the 'old guard') who were still influential behind the scenes and had to be included. Moreover, former opposition stalwarts were brought on board to foster accommodation. A key appointment in this respect was that of Edward Liso – Nkumbula's lieutenant – who was

unanimously voted to UNIP's CC in December 1973 (ACR 1975/1976: B383) and remained one of Southern Province's key leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In a similar vein, Mundia and other key Lozi-speaking politicians were integrated into the UNIP CC from the late 1970s to restore support in Western Province. The attempt to use the highest party organ for purposes of national integration also became visible in the appointments of both Illuete Yeta IV (the Litunga) and Chitimukulu Mutale Chitapankwa (Bemba Paramount Chief) in 1983 – a move intended to weld the influential traditional rulers more firmly into the political structures (ACR 1983/1984: B870; Interview, Dr Patrick Manda, Lusaka, July 29, 2008).

Table 6: Distribution of government between tribal groups, 1974-1990 (in %)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years a.

Tribe	Population (2000)	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1990
Bemba	18.1	24.4	17.3	16.2	15.5	15.2	15.0	11.8	11.8
Tonga	12.7	14.4	13.9	11.4	4.6	4.4	5.8	6.1	4.3
Chewa	7.2	7.0	7.8	11.3	10.8	9.6	9.1	9.6	12.8
Lozi	5.6	8.3	8.6	12.5	16.6	19.5	15.9	16.7	9.3
Nsenga	5.5	2.8	3.0	3.8	1.4	0.0	1.5	1.6	9.1
Tumbuka	4.2	4.4	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.6	2.0
Ngoni	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	5.5	3.8	0.0	1.0
Lala	3.2	4.4	1.3	1.2	4.6	4.4	2.9	4.6	2.0
Kaonde	3.0	2.8	4.8	3.8	3.1	3.0	2.9	0.0	5.4
Namwanga	2.7	2.8	3.5	5.1	1.7	3.0	1.4	1.4	1.7
Lunda (N/W)	2.5	5.8	5.6	3.8	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.0	0.0
Ushi	2.4	0.0	1.3	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.5	5.6	6.4
Mambwe	2.3	4.4	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Lamba	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	2.9	1.4	2.9	3.3
Luvale	2.1	1.4	3.0	4.9	3.1	4.4	2.9	3.0	1.0
Bisa	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.7	4.1	3.8	4.0	5.4
Lenje	1.7	2.8	1.8	3.8	1.7	1.5	5.3	5.6	6.1
Lunda	1.4	1.4	8.6	1.2	1.7	3.0	10.6	7.2	6.4
Mbunda	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Other	15.9	13.0	15.2	16.2	16.9	16.6	12.0	15.2	11.0
Total	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



Figure 4: Distribution of the UNIP Central Committee between language groups, 1973-1988
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; UNIP various years.

'Tribal balancing' also continued to be practised in the civil service. The latter's size grew from 51,491 in 1969 to 126,260 in 1977 (Szeftel 1982: 6) and still numbered around 90,000 in the late 1980s (ACR 1987/1988: B828). In general the need to accommodate 'the fluctuating pressures of strategic provincial and other interests' remained a constant concern (Dresang and Young 1980: 86). The result was a fairly proportional distribution of senior civil service appointments between the country's major language groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see Figures 5a and 5b). Even though some groups were at times slightly better or worse off, the overall picture was of balancing the claimants.



Figure 5: Distribution of permanent secretaries between language groups, 1976-1985
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; GOZ various years b.

2. Economic power sharing

In terms of economic power sharing, the picture was similarly balanced. By the late 1970s, the size of the parastatal sector had grown to 128,350 (Szeftel 1982: 6) and provided the Zambian government with a huge reservoir of well-paid employment. My data indicate that these rewards were distributed in a remarkably equitable manner. As shown in Figures 6a and 6b, all language groups – with the exception of the North-Western group – received proportional shares of appointments to the boards of directors and the senior management of the country's three major parastatals (ZIMCO, INDECO and the mining parastatals). At the same time, individuals of white or Asian background continued to hold prominent positions throughout the Second Republic (subsumed under 'Other'). Parastatal positions were generally more lucrative than positions in the civil service and often used to co-opt influential opposition figures. In the context of the below-discussed conflict with the trade unions, for instance, Kaunda appointed four key Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) leaders (F. Chiluba, C. Sampa, N. Zimba and H. Bweupe) to the ZIMCO board in 1983 (ACR 1983/1984: B872).



Figure 6: Distribution of parastatal appointments between language groups, 1974-90 averages
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; ZIMCO various years; INDECO various years; MINDECO various years; ZCCM various years.

3. Military power sharing

In the military sector, the inclusive recruitment and promotion policies that had been introduced after independence facilitated the emergence of an officer corps with a national outlook. While detailed data on the composition of entire officer corps are not available, a close look at all Zambian Army Commanders during the Second Republic shows that all of the country's five major language groups have over time enjoyed substantial representation at the very top of the military hierarchy (see Table 7).

Table 7: Distribution of Army Commanders between language groups, Second Republic
Source: Own data compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke, Lusaka, August 7, 2008; Interview, Godfrey Haantolobo, Lusaka, July 31, 2008.

	Unified command structure (1976)	
	Zambia National Defence Force	
	Gen. G. K. Chinkuli (Tonga)	
	Lt.-Gen. P. D. Zuze (Nyanga)	
	Lt.-Gen. B. N. Mibenge (Bemba)	
	De-unified command structure (1980)	
Air Force	*Army*	*National Service*
Maj.-Gen. C. Kabwe (Bemba)	Gen. M. N. Masheke (Barotse)	Brig.-Gen. C. J. Nyirenda (Nyanga)
Lt. Gen. A. Lungu (Nyanga)	Lt.-Gen. C. S. Tembo (Nyanga)	Brig.-Gen. F. S. Mulenga (Bemba)
Maj.-Gen. Simbule (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. G. M. Kalenge (North-Western)	Maj.-Gen. T. Fara (Nyanga)
Lt.-Gen. Simutowe (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. F. G. Sibamba (Barotse)	

To further promote the integration of the military into the elite bargain, the Second Republic witnessed a progressive 'politicisation' of the army and a 'militarisation' of politics. On the one hand, UNIP organs commonly referred to as 'Works Committees' were introduced in the barracks and appointments to key army positions were generally given to those believed to be loyal to the ruling party. Moreover, all ranks had to participate in political education seminars where party policy was explained and loyalty to the one-party state was promoted (ACR 1975/1976: B384). On the other hand, high-ranking army leaders were offered lucrative positions at all levels of government. This began as early as 1973 when Kaunda nominated the three heads of the armed services to Parliament and appointed all three of them as Ministers of State (ACR 1973/1974: B333). Such strategy of cooptation was maintained throughout the 1970s and 1980s with many current or former army officers being appointed to Cabinet, the UNIP CC or as district governors.

4. The decline of the UNIP elite bargain

From the 1970s, UNIP managed to forge an increasingly stable elite bargain where access to positions of political, economic and military power was distributed in a remarkably equitable manner. However, escalating economic crisis from the early 1980s put a severe drain on patronage, caused serious legitimacy problems and ultimately led to political realignments.

The Achilles' heel of UNIP's elite bargain was clearly the failure to effectively accommodate class cleavages, evident in the insufficient incorporation of the Copperbelt. This problem went back to the breakaway of UPP in the early 1970s that had destroyed much of the ruling party's support in what had been its stronghold since the nationalist struggle. Even though UNIP had survived and officially attempted to 'reconcile' with former UPP supporters, the party on the Copperbelt remained deeply affected by suspicion and accusation (Larmer 2008: 108). As a consequence, the Copperbelt failed to retrieve its old prominence in both the ruling party and government. While Copperbelt MPs had provided a significant proportion of both party and government cadres during the First Republic, the 1973 general elections removed virtually the whole generation of Copperbelt nationalist politicians from leadership (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 135ff). As the new MPs had strong local connections rather than links with the centre, the urban population on the Copperbelt was left without recognisable leadership of

national stature. The declining representation of Copperbelt in government is illustrated in Figure 7.



Figure 7: The representation of Copperbelt Province in government, 1964-1990
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years a.
Note: Data for 1988 are missing. The graph indicates how many ministers and deputies were elected in Copperbelt constituencies rather than how many members of government were of Copperbelt descent.

UNIP's inability to exercise control over the Copperbelt could initially be compensated for by providing stable consumer prices to urban consumers, especially subsidised maize – the nation's staple food (Johns 1980: 114.; Bates and Collier 1995: 122ff). However, in the context of economic decline it became increasingly costly to 'buy off' urban consumers. As subsidies were reduced and economic hardship increased, the unions began to fill the political void on the Copperbelt. During the 1970s the government had gained considerable influence over organised labour by placing party faithful into the leadership of the ZCTU and making the latter a branch of UNIP (Burdette 1988: 128). Despite signs of accommodation, union leaders could hardly ignore the grievances of their members, especially from the late 1970s when economic decline resulted in growing unemployment and declining real wages (Larmer 2006a: 167ff). The result was mounting tensions between government and the unions, which became more and more powerful with a membership of 367,000 in 1980 (double that of UNIP) (Gertzel 1984a: 92). The confrontation escalated in 1980 over the reorganisation of local government in mine townships and culminated in a series of strikes, the suspension of 17 union leaders and the detaining of some, including the ZCTU leader Frederick Chiluba (Gertzel 1984a; Larmer 2006a: 169ff).

The government-union power struggle was temporarily defused with the release of the detained union leaders in late 1981 and their appointment to key parastatal positions in 1983/84 (see above). Nevertheless, union mobilisation soon resurfaced in the light of the unabated economic crisis and controversial structural adjustment policies (Larmer 2006b: 297ff). In late 1986, the removal of price control led to the doubling of the price of 'breakfast' mealie meal and sparked violent riots on the Copperbelt. These 'food riots' revealed the weakness of the one-party state and marked the starting point of efforts to reintroduce

multipartyism. Significantly, UNIP was no longer able to effectively co-opt the union leadership. Whereas Chiluba is believed to have turned down overtures to join UNIP's leadership in the late 1980s, others accepted appointments but were subsequently considered as 'sell-outs' and removed. Ultimately, the unions became the main driver behind the opposition's rise to power with the fledgling MMD structures being built around the local branches of ZCTU's member unions.

The unions received support from other 'middle class' elements who were disillusioned by combined effects of one-party dominance and economic crisis. Paradoxically, the unions' key allies were businessmen who mobilised opposition against the regime's socialist economic policies that favoured state enterprises at the expense of the private sector (Bartlett 2000: 434ff.; Simutanyi 1996: 830ff). Opposition first became apparent in 1977 when a business community-dominated Parliamentary Select Committee criticised the inefficient party and government structures. In October 1980, a number of influential businessmen participated in a failed military coup plot. Afterwards, business leaders remained a centre of opposition and provided campaign funds to the union-led democratisation movement. Beyond this 'class compromise between business and labour' (Bartlett 2000: 444), the opposition movement also included churchmen, academics and intellectuals. Finally, the broad-based coalition over time also attracted more and more one-time UNIP leaders who had been purged or defected from the ruling party's 'inner core'.

Altogether, UNIP came to face an opposition movement that was very similar to itself – an inclusive coalition that drew together various organised interests and representatives from all parts of the country. The emergence of broad-based opposition centred on the trade unions was only the logical consequence of an elite bargain that was non-sectarian in nature but had only shallow control over the urban areas, especially the Copperbelt. Using both popular discontent and the fall of the communist bloc in 1989 as 'windows of opportunity', MMD proved strong enough to develop national appeal and swept to victory in the 1991 elections.

The elite bargain of the Third Republic (1991-2008)

The Third Republic did not revolutionise Zambia's political culture. A first element of continuity was centralised political power. While MMD had campaigned for a parliamentary system, power continued to be concentrated in the presidency (Burnell 2001: 104). The second element of continuity was the predominance of one political party. In 1991, MMD won a large majority, losing only in Eastern Province, which remained a UNIP stronghold (Baylies and Szeftel 1992). In 1996, MMD – benefitting from UNIP's electoral boycott – even managed to win a majority throughout the entire country whereby multi-party politics remained more formal than real (Baylies and Szeftel 1997). The situation changed in 2001 when the new MMD candidate Levy Mwanawasa won the presidency by a very narrow margin and even failed to gain a majority in Parliament (Burnell 2002, 2003).[19] However, MMD's position was again strengthened in 2006 when Mwanawasa won by a larger margin and recaptured a solid parliamentary majority (Gould 2007; Larmer and Fraser 2007).[20]

[19] While MMD retained control of the North (Copperbelt, Northern and Luapula Provinces), the three main opposition parties dominated in the rest of country, including UNIP in East, the Forum For Democracy and Development (FDD) in Lusaka and the United Party for National Development (UPND) in Southern, Western and North-Western Provinces.

[20] While UPND retained control of Southern Province, the Patriotic Front (PF) emerged as the main opposition party sweeping Lusaka and the Copperbelt and garnering substantial support in Luapula and Northern Provinces. Mwanawasa's second term was abruptly ended by his death in July 2008. He was replaced by Vice-President Rupiah Banda who won the presidential poll in October 2008 (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010).

Altogether, MMD has always remained the only political party with considerable political support in all parts of the country. Continuities between MMD and the former ruling party were also evident in the substantial presence of former UNIP cadres in the MMD ranks (Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 83) – a pattern that still continues.

The third – often overlooked – element of continuity was the enduring attempt to forge an inclusive elite bargain. Significantly, both Chiluba and Mwanawasa continued to make a UNIP-style attempt to accommodate linguistic and tribal cleavages by forming a 'maximum coalition' (Van Donge 1995: 214), evident in high degrees of political, economic and military power sharing.

1. Political power sharing

Officially, the Chiluba government rejected the convention of 'tribal balancing' arguing that such an approach would be undemocratic and economically harmful (Chikulo 1996: 33). But does this really mean that 'tribal balancing' was abandoned? Many scholars seem to think so and report a growing 'Bemba bias' in appointments, typically related to the fact the Chiluba himself is a Bemba-speaking Lunda from Luapula Province (Chikulo 2000: 171; Osei-Hwedie 1998: 235p.; Burnell 2001: 99). Similarly, many political insiders complain about a generalised 'Bemba bias' under Chiluba (Various interviews).

Table 8: Distribution of the MMD National Executive Committee between language groups, 2001-2008 (in %)
Source: Compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; Hulterström 2004: 103; MMD.

Language Group	Population (2000)	2001	2008
Bemba	41.7	50.0	42.1
Nyanga	23.8	12.0	14.0
Tonga	13.9	16.0	21.1
North-Western	7.7	12.0	12.3
Barotse	6.9	9.0	8.8
Other	6.0	1.0	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Such accusations are however unjustified. This is not to deny that MMD was initially dominated by Bemba speakers. At the National Convention in 1991, Chiluba captured the party presidency, while leaders from Western and North-Western Provinces lost out (Bartlett 2000: 433). At the same time, elections for the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) produced a clear bias in favour of Bemba speakers, who held 18 out of 28 (or 64 percent) of all positions – a situation that produced open complaints about 'tribalism'. Over time, however, the 'Bemba bias' within the higher ranks of the party has eased (see Table 8). Even though Nyanga speakers remain underrepresented, the MMD party leadership now reflects a broadly national outlook.

A national outlook was also retained in the civil service where permanent secretary appointments continued to be distributed more or less proportionally among the country's major language groups (see Figures 8a and 8b). This contradicts claims that all senior civil servants were fired and replaced by Chiluba's Bemba-speaking financiers and supporters (Mphaisha 1996: 81). In general, the government struggled hard to avoid cuts in the size of the civil service (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 63). This means that an important bastion of Zambia's elite bargain remained largely untouched.



Figure 8: Distribution of permanent secretaries between language groups, 1992-2008
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years b, d.

Most importantly, 'tribal balancing' was also informally retained in government, albeit to a lesser extent than under Kaunda. In absolute terms, Chiluba's governments were on average dominated by Bemba-speakers (see Figure 9a). In terms of population share, however, Bemba speakers were only very marginally overrepresented. All other language groups received relatively proportional representation, even though some of them were at times slightly better or worse off (see Figures 9b and 9c). The only exception was the Nyanga-speaking group that was underrepresented from the beginning, which reflected the fact that UNIP had won all parliamentary seats in Eastern Province in 1991. Nonetheless, Chiluba subsequently used his right of appointment to bring Nyanga speakers on board.[21] Even though Nyanga speakers remained underrepresented, they were continuously represented in the 'inner core' of political power. Finally, Chiluba also maintained the tradition of racial inclusiveness by appointing a significant number of ministers of white or Asian background.

In terms of tribal groupings, some of the larger groups were clearly underrepresented in Chiluba's governments, including the Chewa, the Tonga and – interestingly – even the Bemba (see Table 9). The reverse was true for some of the smaller groups, in particular the Bemba-speaking Lunda from Luapula Province, the President's own group. On the whole, however, none of the country's 19 largest tribes were fully excluded from government between 1992 and 1998. Moreover, even many of the numerous smaller tribes with less than 1 percent of the population (subsumed under 'Other') were prominently represented.

[21] The key appointment in this respect was clearly that of Brigadier General Miyanda who first served as the powerful Minister without Portfolio (third in the hierarchy) and later became Vice-President (second in the hierarchy). After the 1996 elections, Miyanda was replaced by General Tembo – another Nyanga-speaker from the Tumbuka tribe.



Figure 9: Distribution of government between language groups, 1992-1998
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years a.
Note: Data for 2000 are missing. The 'inner core' is defined as including the President, the Vice-President, the Minister Without Portfolio and the Ministers of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries, Commerce, Trade & Industry, Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Legal Affairs, Local Government & Housing and Mines & Mineral Development.

The broad-based nature of the Chiluba regime limited the prospects of tribal mobilisation. This is not to deny that MMD was affected by factional struggles, especially in 2000/01 when Chiluba unsuccessfully tried to extend his second term of office into a third term (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 29ff; Phiri 2006: 202ff). However, most of the proliferating opposition parties were off-shoots of the ruling party and typically rooted in personal ambitions rather than in cohesive group grievances. One exception was the Lozi-based National Party (NP), which was created in 1993 to protest the alleged marginalisation of Barotse-speaking leaders but failed to gain lasting ground (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996: 188p; Bartlett 2000: 441). A second exception was the creation of the United Party for National Development (UPND) in

1998, which was commonly seen as an 'anti-Bemba formation' expressing latent feelings of neglect among the North-Western-, Barotse- and especially Tonga-speaking groups.[22] Interestingly, this neglect was clearly more perceived than real since all of these three groups were well represented in party and government. Yet, the perception of neglect allowed UPND to establish itself as the main opposition party. The widespread fear of Bemba domination ultimately forced Chiluba to pick a non-Bemba as his successor (Interview, Njekwa Anamela, Lusaka, July 30, 2008). In this sense, L. Mwanawasa – a Tonga-speaking Lenje from Central Province – was regarded as a suitable candidate to defuse anti-Bemba sentiment.[23]

Table 9: Distribution of government between tribal groups, Index of Representation, 1992-2008 (in %)
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years a.

Tribe	Population (2000)	1992	1994	1996	1998	2002	2004	2006	2008
Bemba	18.1	12.8	9.5	15.8	16.2	16.6	18.2	2.3	5.3
Tonga	12.7	7.4	8.7	8.9	17.5	1.9	7.4	6.7	6.6
Chewa	7.2	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	2.4	8.1	7.1
Lozi	5.6	5.1	6.4	8.7	8.2	11.6	7.4	9.0	7.2
Nsenga	5.5	3.9	4.9	6.0	2.1	1.5	0.0	3.2	4.5
Tumbuka	4.2	5.2	3.5	5.8	5.3	1.5	2.5	2.3	0.9
Ngoni	4.0	5.0	1.6	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	2.7
Lala	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	8.3	8.3	2.3	6.2
Kaonde	3.0	5.2	5.7	2.2	0.0	4.9	2.5	4.6	8.4
Namwanga	2.7	1.1	4.9	2.9	5.3	1.0	0.0	1.4	1.3
Lunda (N/W)	2.5	1.1	2.1	2.2	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.2	6.2
Ushi	2.4	6.0	3.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	0.8	1.9	1.8
Mambwe	2.3	6.0	4.9	0.0	0.8	2.9	3.3	2.3	2.2
Lamba	2.2	1.3	4.6	4.5	4.5	9.2	6.6	8.6	8.8
Luvale	2.1	0.0	0.8	0.8	1.6	1.0	0.8	6.7	3.6
Bisa	1.8	3.9	1.3	2.2	4.9	1.5	1.7	1.9	0.0
Lenje	1.7	6.0	6.6	2.3	2.9	9.7	10.0	8.8	9.6
Lunda	1.4	7.8	8.2	8.8	6.2	8.7	6.6	5.3	5.3
Mbunda	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.3
Other	15.9	21.1	20.7	23.6	17.3	13.5	18.2	12.5	11.1
Total	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

After Mwanawasa took over as President in 2001, the need for a tribally balanced government continued to be recognised. Accordingly, Mike Mulongoti (Interview, Lusaka, July 15, 2008) – formerly Minister of Information and one of the President's closest confidants – argued that:

> '[i]t would be naive for any political leadership to ignore the sensitivity to the issue of tribal balancing. If you are building a nation, everybody must think they are part and parcel and you must carry them along deliberately.'

[22] Since the early 1990s, feelings of marginalisation had been especially pronounced among leaders from the Tonga tribe in Southern Province (Ihonvbere 1995: 9ff.). Such feelings of neglect favoured the rise of UPND and earned the party a 'Tonga' label (Phiri 2006: 219).
[23] Note that Mwanawasa's father is a Lenje from Central Province (Tonga speakers), while his mother is a Lamba from Copperbelt Province (Bemba speakers).

In line with such statements, there were indeed signs that that Mwanawasa sought to forge another 'maximum coalition'. After the 2001 elections, this was difficult since MMD had almost no MPs outside its strongholds in the North. As a consequence, the President chose to co-opt several prominent opposition MPs and appointed them as ministers or deputy ministers (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 31ff). This not only helped MMD to regain a parliamentary majority but was also meant to create support in the opposition areas. Moreover, the President used his appointment prerogatives to nominate prominent individuals from opposition areas as ministers. This conciliatory attitude ensured that the Barotse and North-Western language groups were prominently represented (see Figure 10c). Nyanga speakers, by contrast, were initially almost entirely excluded, which gave rise to complaints about marginalisation (Interview, Haswell Mwale, Lusaka, September 15, 2008). To rebuild support in the East, the President appointed Rupiah Banda, a Chewa, who successfully campaigned for MMD before the 2006 elections and was subsequently made Vice-President. The re-emergence of MMD as a 'national' party in 2006 facilitated the establishment of a more balanced government during Mwanawasa's second term. Altogether, the Mwanawasa governments on average retained a broadly national outlook (see Figures 10a and 10b).

Despite signs of continuity, the MMD elite bargain came to suffer from a number of cracks. First, efforts for 'tribal balancing' were contradicted by the existence of the so-called 'family tree', evident in the prominence of Mwanawasa's Lamba and especially Lenje relatives not only in government (see Table 9) but also in the civil service (Various interviews; *Times of Zambia*, June 17, 2004). Second, the President has progressively fallen out with the Bemba-speaking bloc. While Mwanawasa had received massive Bemba support in 2001, Bemba-speaking leaders soon complained about the appointment of opposition politicians and the growing influence of the 'family tree'. Moreover, Bemba speakers were alienated by Mwanawasa's decisive anti-corruption stance that not only targeted the former President Chiluba but also some of his close associates, many of them Bemba (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 67ff.; Van Donge 2009). This favoured the rise of the PF led by Michael Sata, who had broken away from MMD in 2001 (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 631). The fallout between Mwanawasa and Bemba speakers became apparent during the 2006 elections when most of the Bemba-speaking North voted for Sata. At the same time, Bemba representation in government declined for the Bemba-speaking group as a whole (see Figure 10) and, even more so, for the Bemba tribe (see Table 9). Most political insiders, including the PF Vice-President G. Scott himself (Interview, Lusaka, July 15, 2008), agree that the strength of PF is first and foremost a 'response to Mwanawasa's fall out with the Bemba' (Interview, Mbita Chitala, Lusaka, July 29, 2008).

Third, MMD has also failed to rebuild support in the South. After the death of UPND leader Anderson Mazoka (a Tonga) in 2006, the party's leadership insisted that his successor had to be a Tonga whereby the young Hakainde Hichilema became party president, at the expense of two influential Lozi politicians (Interview, Sakwiba Sikota, August 6, 2008). While this provoked an exodus of non-Tonga members, the UPND retained control over Southern Province and became entrenched as a regional party. Even though Tonga speakers have on average been overrepresented in government (see Figures 10), the bulk of these appointments has gone to Mwanawasa's small Lenje group (see Table 9); and even those few Tonga that have been appointed typically lack a political support base in Southern Province (Various interviews). Finally, MMD also lost political control over the urban areas, especially over the Copperbelt. Initially, the Copperbelt had been the ruling party's major stronghold, evident in the initial prominence of Copperbelt politicians in government (see Figure 11). Moreover, the powerful trade unions initially viewed Chiluba as one of 'theirs' and did little to oppose

formerly controversial policies (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 65). Over time, however, the importance of Copperbelt politicians within MMD declined, while the unions were 'paralysed' by the effects of economic and political liberalisation (Rakner 2003; Larmer 2005). MMD's increasing failure to accommodate class cleavages in urban areas created a political void that was skilfully filled by Sata's PF. Accordingly, PF does not only express Bemba grievances but also articulates urban discontent – a strategy that won the party many votes not only on the Copperbelt but also in Lusaka (Larmer and Fraser 2007; Gould 2007; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010).



Figure 10: Distribution of government between language groups, 2002-2008
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years a.
Note: Data for 2000 are missing. The 'inner core' is defined as including the President, the Vice-President and the Ministers of Agriculture & Cooperatives, Commerce, Trade & Industry, Defence, Finance & National Planning, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Legal Affairs, Local Government & Housing and Mines & Mineral

Development.

Altogether, political competition during the Third Republic has brought about a constellation, which is strikingly similar to that of the First Republic. In both periods, the ruling parties started out with largely 'national' appeal that was especially strong among Bemba speakers in the North. The main opposition parties – ANC and UP during the First Republic and NP and UPND during the Third Republic – had their organisational and electoral strength among the Lozi- and Tonga-speaking groups of Western and Southern provinces. Over time, both ruling parties lost ground in the 'Bembaphone' North, especially in urban areas of the Copperbelt, where strong opposition parties emerged (UPP and PF).



Figure 11: The representation of Copperbelt Province in government, 1992-2008
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ various years a.
Note: Data for 2000 are missing.

2. Economic power sharing

In the economic sector, Zambia has undergone comprehensive liberalisation since 1991 (Rakner 2003: 67ff). A key aspect of economic reform was the privatisation of the country's bloated parastatal sector, which had been a key bastion of UNIP's elite bargain. Officially launched in 1992, the privatisation programme gathered momentum from 1995, with 262 companies out of a total working portfolio of 285 privatised by 2006 (ZPA 2006a). Of particular significance was the extremely controversial privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines between 1992 and 2000 – Zambia's largest commercial enterprise (Craig 2001; Larmer 2005).

The rapid – many say precipitous – privatisation of the parastatal sector reduced the scope for patronage distribution outside party and government. Yet it soon became apparent that privatisation – and the liberalisation of the economy more generally – opened new avenues for rent-seeking and increased rather than decreased the scale of corruption (Chikulo 2000: 165ff.; Szeftel 2000: 217ff.; Van Donge 2009). Accordingly, office holders in politics and administration used the often opaque privatisation process to acquire public assets cheaply,

especially small-scale companies, and enrich themselves. In many cases, the cheaply acquired companies were simply stripped of their assets rather than recapitalized or fully relocated to other countries in the Southern African region – a process that resulted in an enormous loss of wealth (Interview, Rueben Lifuka, Lusaka, August 1, 2008; Szeftel 2000: 219).

Who benefited from the looting of state assets? There is no doubt that the main beneficiaries were Chiluba and his friends and relatives, some of whom were later targeted during Mwanawasa's anti-corruption drive (Van Donge 2009). Dipak Patel, at the time Minister for Commerce, Trade and Industry and thus responsible for the privatisation programme, recalls that Chiluba repeatedly pressured him to 'sell properties to his cronies' (Interview, Lusaka, September 9, 2008). Some even claim that privatisation generally benefited the Bemba-speaking group (Various interviews). However, such accusations can not be confirmed. Taking into account all companies sold to political leaders, Zambian individuals and Zambian corporate bodies, there is no evidence for a generalised 'Bemba bias' in the distribution of privatised assets (see Figures 12a and 12b). While Bemba speakers did indeed receive the largest share of privatised companies, they were even slightly underrepresented in terms of their population share. The only clearly discernible bias was in favour of Zambians of Asian background, who acquired a highly disproportional share of the privatised companies. This confirms public perceptions that privatisation really benefited foreign investors and 'non-Zambian' citizens. Altogether, the example of privatisation shows that the spoils of economic reform were not monopolised by certain groups.



Figure 12: Distribution of privatised companies between language groups
Source: Own data compiled and calculated based on ZPA 2006b.

3. Military power sharing

In the army, the end of the one-party state meant that the civilian and military spheres had to be de-linked (Phiri 2002: 12; Haantobolo 2008: 203). As a result, party structures and political education in the army were abolished and alleged UNIP loyalists were retrenched. Yet, the Chiluba government did not fully abandon UNIP's strategy of promoting civil-military integration by appointing former military personnel into high political office. Accordingly, two out of three vice-presidents were of military background. Even under

Mwanawasa former military officers occupied key cabinet positions, while many others were given lucrative posts as ambassadors.

More importantly, MMD deliberately retained UNIP's tradition of inclusive recruitment and appointment policies. According to Mbita Chitala, member of the Defence Council under Chiluba, 'tribal balancing' was continued at all levels of the armed forces to ensure 'that the whole country is represented' (Interview, Lusaka, July 29, 2008). Similarly, G. Mpombo, Minister of Defence under Mwanawasa, used the 2007 debate on the military budget to emphasise the enduringly national character of the Zambian army and re-affirmed that no district was disadvantaged in terms of recruitment (GOZ 2007). Such claims are confirmed when analysing the composition of the officer corps during the Third Republic. While comprehensive information is not available, my data suggest that the top command positions in the army are still distributed fairly equitably among the country's major language groups (see Table 10).

Moreover, 'new' forms of patronage help 'buy off' the top army leadership and ensure that the army remains part of the MMD elite bargain. Under Chiluba, the military leadership was known to be heavily implicated in the proliferating corruption scandals, which involved considerable material benefits. Such allegations have now been confirmed by the fact that several of Chiluba's high-ranking army officers were prosecuted and convicted in civil courts after Mwanawasa took over in 2001, including, among others, Lieutenant-Generals Funjika, Kayumba, Singogo and. Musengule (*Saturday Star*, March 10, 2004; *Agence France Presse*, December 30, 2006; *Times of Zambia*, March 3, 2009). More recently, the MMD government has managed to keep the army busy by sending large numbers of military officers to participate in lucrative peace-keeping missions. By now, the country is involved in a total of nine peace-keeping missions worldwide (IISS various years). This has left behind a rather small number of officers who can be more easily monitored.

Table 10: Distribution of Army Commanders between language groups, Third Republic
Source: Own data compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke, Lusaka, August 7, 2008; Interview, Godfrey Haantolobo, Lusaka, July 31, 2008).

Air Force	***Army***	***National Service***
Lt. –Gen. R. Shikapwasha (Tonga)	Gen. N. M. Simbeye (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. W. G. Funjika (North-Western)
Lt.-Gen. S. Kayumba (North-Western)	Lt.-Gen. S. L. Mumbi (Nyanga)	Maj.-Gen. M. Mbao (Nyanga)
Lt.-Gen. Ch. Singogo (North-Western)	Lt.-Gen. G. R. Musengule (Bemba)	
Lt. Gen. S. Mapala (Nyanga)	Lt.-Gen. I. Chisuzi (Tonga)	Maj.-Gen. R. Chisheta (Bemba)

Zambia's inclusive elite bargains and civil war avoidance

I argue that civil war avoidance in Zambia can be traced back to the persistence of inclusive elite bargains. Without the post-colonial governments' sustained attempts to accommodate the dominant social cleavages by means of 'tribal balancing', the at times hefty factional struggles between the country's major groups would have undoubtedly escalated into open violence and war – as they did in many other African countries.

When asked about the drivers of Zambia's peace and stability, the overwhelming majority of my interviewees made immediate reference to UNIP's motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation' and Kaunda's practise of 'tribal balancing'. To give an example, Haswell Mwale (Interview, Lusaka, September 15, 2008), a long-standing minister under Kaunda, explained Zambia's peace in the following terms:

> 'When we got independence, we had the motto of One Zambia One Nation. Under this One Zambia, One Nation we organised all the 73 tribes in Zambia to be one…. That's why the country has been stable…. Us, as the old freedom fighters, we created Zambia as one country and one people.'

Similarly, General M. Masheke Interview, Lusaka, August 7, 2008), Prime Minister during the 1980s, maintained (:

> 'Tribal balancing has helped to prevent violent conflict. There is nothing more frustrating for a group of people in a country than knowing that they are not taken care of because of their tribal background. That was taken care of.... They were made part and parcel of Zambia…. You can have ministers from one tribe only and they can be efficient in terms of doing their work. But they will be inefficient in the fact that they will not be accepted in other areas..

Interestingly, such assessments were widely shared not only among UNIP stalwarts but also among former opposition politicians, civil society representatives and academics. In the words of Dipak Patel (Interview, Lusaka, September 9, 2008), formerly a key MMD minister:

> 'It is not possible to govern this country if you don't deal with balancing. The day you remove balancing, the country will disintegrate into civil war'.

But how can one further substantiate the link between Zambia's inclusive elite bargains and civil war avoidance? In the case of civil war countries, the challenge is to understand whether the given degree of tribal exclusion can plausibly explain events that *did* occur (i.e. the onset of civil war). This can be done by investigating the specific historical contexts of the observed insurgencies and the underlying motivations of their protagonists. In the Zambian case, things are more complicated. Here, the challenge is to understand whether the given degree of tribal inclusion can explain an event that *never* occurred (i.e. the absence of civil war). This is obviously more difficult (and speculative) since there are simply no successful insurgencies to investigate and no protagonists to interview. The only solution to this problem is counterfactual reasoning – a method for evaluating claims of causation by exploring what might have happened had the causal event not occurred (Menzies 2009). This means that I have to reason what might have happened if there had been no inclusive elite bargains in Zambia. I suggest that this can best be done by looking at distinct moments of crisis since 1964.

A first moment of crisis occurred in the wake of independence when UNIP faced the still looming secessionist threat from Barotseland. The ruling party responded to this threat by playing on the deep-seated divisions between Lozi 'traditionalists' and Lozi 'nationalists'. As detailed above, the traditional Barotse leadership favoured independence to preserve its autonomy and privilege, whereas young educated Lozi played a key role in the nationalist movement and saw no economic future for an independent Barotse state. The Kaunda government skilfully managed to drive a wedge between these two factions by giving in to the Lozi 'nationalist' faction's claims for a generous allocation of government and party positions. Admittedly, this did by no means appease the 'traditionalists' since most of the appointed Barotse speakers were from within the inner circles of the 'nationalist' faction. This

partly explains the emergence of the UP from the mid-1960s despite Lozi overrepresentation in party and government. Nevertheless, Kaunda's move co-opted the 'nationalists' and thereby prevented the emergence of a united secessionist movement in Barotseland. If the President had rejected the nationalists' demands for a prominent share of key appointments, the 'nationalist' faction might have joined forces with the traditional Barotse government. It seems plausible to suggest that such a united secessionist movement would – if faced with persistent exclusion – ultimately have resorted to violent means.

A second moment of crisis occurred after the 1967 UNIP CC elections when the victory of the Bemba-speaking bloc and the ensuing imbalances in party and government produced widespread fears of Bemba domination throughout much of the country. This was arguably the most serious political crisis in Zambia's post-colonial history and threatened to tear apart the still fragile unity of 'One Zambia, One Nation'. Kaunda himself was deeply shocked by the extent of tribal divisions and used his address to the UNIP Party Council after the divisive 1967 party elections to proclaim (cited in Rotberg 1967: 33):

> 'We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a state of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, colour and religion, which is the negation of all that we stand for in this party and government…. It is very easy to shout 'ONE ZAMBIA, ONE NATION' but very difficult to think and act in that way honestly and sincerely. As we discuss this matter here, I don't want to hide from you all that there are very few fields in the life of this nation which have not been adversely affected. How difficult it is to build, but how easy to destroy.'

These intense tribal tensions were however defused by the subsequent appointment of a more balanced Interim Executive Committee and reinforced attempts to increase the national outlook of government and administration. If the controversial 1967 UNIP CC had not been dissolved, this would almost certainly have caused lasting alienation among the Nyanga- and Barotse-speaking factions and might ultimately have led to the emergence of violent conflict. Instead, the UNIP government always sought to placate the grievances of the disaffected groups, evident in the continued efforts to win (back) support among Tonga and Barotse speakers throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. The deliberate appointment of Lozi 'traditionalists' may have been of particular significance in this context as it facilitated a rapprochement with the traditional Barotse government and thereby further mitigated the threat of secessionist violence.

A third moment of crisis occurred after the imposition of the one-party state in 1972-73, which involved the banning of all opposition parties – most notably the UPP – and therefore caused considerable frustration and disaffection. If the introduction of one-party rule had been accompanied by systematic discrimination against the core constituencies of the banned opposition parties, the likely outcome would have been violent conflict. However, this was never the case. While the one-party state was undoubtedly autocratic in nature and did not hesitate to victimise those individuals who challenged its authority, there is no evidence that groups as a whole were ever discriminated against. This pattern can be illustrated by looking at the example of UPP. As discussed above, many known or suspected UPP members were actively prevented from rejoining politics or even imprisoned throughout much of the 1970s. Yet the Bemba – both as a tribe and language group – always continued to have remarkably proportional representation at all levels of the public sector. Significantly, this prevented the

emergence of cohesive group grievances that are arguably especially conducive to violent mobilisation. In the end, the extremely inclusive elite bargain of the Second Republic helped to systematically accommodate sectional cleavages and thereby achieved more unity than critics typically concede, especially when taking into account the severe economic and regional crises that faced the country at the time.

A fourth moment of crisis occurred in 1976 when Mushala launched the only attempt of armed insurrection against the Zambian post-colonial state. Initially a member of UNIP, Mushala joined the UP in the late 1960s and then became – after the UP was banned – ANC Provincial President in North-Western Province (Larmer and Macola 2007). Unlike the top ANC leadership, Mushala and a few followers boycotted the negotiations over the one-party state and – after having received limited training and support in South Africa – ultimately launched a guerrilla war in North-Western Province in 1976. Typically characterised as mere 'bandits' or 'South African puppets' by members of the ruling party (Interview, Marc Chona, Lusaka, July 25, 2008), the rebels claimed to be fighting the one-party state and the marginalisation of North-Western Province. Even though the low-level rebellion dragged on until late 1982 when Mushala was killed, it failed to gain substantial support. The main reason for this failure was arguably that the mainstream of the North-Western leadership was fully integrated in the country's elite bargain throughout the Second Republic. As shown above, this was not only true for the North-Western group as a whole but also for all three tribes in the Province, including the Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. Of particular interest in this context is the position of the Lunda leadership – Mushala and most of his followers were Lunda – who were extremely prominently represented not only in government but also in other parts of the public sector. If the Lunda leadership had been marginalised, the insurgency might have been more successful. But as this was far from the case, Mushala remained a relatively isolated figure who proved unable to mobilise significant support.

A fifth period (rather than moment) of crisis occurred during much of the 1980s when Zambia was hit by extreme economic decline and mounting social unrest. If the worsening economic crisis had – as happened in other African countries – been accompanied by a biased distribution of the dwindling 'national cake', this would have caused a 'tribalisation' of political competition, which might ultimately have turned violent. But this was never the case. Instead, there is evidence for what one might label an 'inclusive sharing of losses'. V. Mwaanga (Interview, Lusaka, July 15, 2008), a former Minister under Kaunda, recalls that:

> 'even at the time when resources were very extremely limited, an attempt was made to equitably share jobs and resources among the various competing interests.... It was not always easy but at least an attempt was made.'

Similarly, Reverend F. Sakala (Interview, Lusaka, Lusaka, August 1, 2008), one of the country's most outspoken clerics, remembers:

> 'When we suffered we suffered together. There wasn't a privileged section of Zambian society which enjoyed immunity when the economy went down. We all suffered.'

On the whole, the persistence of an inclusive elite bargain even in times of economic crisis prevented the country's disintegration into violent group conflict. At the same time, however, UNIP's inclusive handling of economic decline could not prevent generalised discontent across sectarian lines and thereby produced – somewhat ironically – a broad-based opposition movement that proved strong enough to displace if from power.

A sixth moment of crisis occurred during and after the transition to multi-party politics in 1991. Both protagonists and observers generally agree that this transition was peaceful mainly because the MMD was an extremely broad-based movement whose leadership cultivated a national image through the trade unions (Various interviews). If MMD had come to be dominated by one language group or even a single tribe, this would almost certainly have caused alienation and violence. This can be shown with the example of the Barotse-speaking group. The latter had originally played an important role within MMD, evident in the prominence of Lozi-speaking leaders such as A. Wina or A. Lewanika. However, after Chiluba captured power, Barotse-speaking leaders were sidelined in party and government, which culminated not only in the creation of the Lozi-based NP but also in renewed claims for the restoration of regional autonomy under the Barotseland Agreement (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996: 188).[24] In mid-1993, representatives of the Barotse Royal Establishment even made open secessionist demands, which were vehemently rejected by the Chiluba government (*Agence France Presse*, July 22, 1993; *IPS-Inter Press Service*, July 20, 1993).[25] Two years later, secessionist demands in Barotseland resurfaced over the passage in parliament of a bill that withdrew the power to allocate land from traditional rulers and transferred it to the President (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, November 6, 1995). Tellingly, protests eased with the improved representation of Barotse speakers in party and government from the mid-1990s. While secessionist talk did not entirely disappear, especially in the context of the Namibian Lozi Caprivi rebel movement (*The Post*, November 19, 1998; *The New African*, March 1999), it had clearly lost momentum by the late 1990s (*Xinhua News Agency*, November 18, 1998; *Times of Zambia*, November 18, 1998; *Africa News*, February 17, 1999; *Africa News*, October 30, 2002).

A seventh moment of crisis occurred in the context of the controversies surrounding the 'third term' debate, which caused considerable conflict within the ruling party and ultimately resulted in its loss of a parliamentary majority during the 2001 elections. As discussed above, tribal sentiments were of minor importance during the 'third term' debate. Nevertheless, there is reason to argue that the broader debate over Chiluba's succession did involve tribal connotations in that there was a widespread perception of Bemba dominance, which found expression in the growing strength of the UPND. If the President had picked a Bemba speaker as his successor in this kind of a situation, the succession crisis might have led to lasting alienation in other parts of the country. Instead, the choice of Mwanawasa – a Tonga speaker who subsequently tried to rebuild MMD support in the non-Bemba-speaking areas – can be considered a shrewd example of 'tribal balancing', which prevented the consolidation of cohesive grievances along language group lines.

A final moment of crisis occurred after Mwanawasa's unexpected death in mid-2008. While the country remained remarkably stable even during this uncertain succession period, the ruling party came to be characterised by intense factional struggles, which proceeded along both personal and tribal lines. According to political insiders, there were three main contending groups within MMD at the time (Various interviews). One group was led by Katele Kalumba, the MMD National Secretary, who not only enjoyed strong support among

[24] Officially attacking the government over corruption, A. Lewanika's resignation in 1992 also reflected the Lozi's dissatisfaction with the manner in which their demands were handled by the MMD government. A. Wina was dismissed as Minister of Education in 1993.

[25] When rumours spread that the Litunga was about to be arrested over the secessionist demands, the traditional war drum was sounded in Barotseland and up to 2500 men congregated at the Litunga's palace to offer him protection. Realising how sensitive the situation was, the MMD government decided to back down (Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 188).

the lower party cadres but also maintained close links with the Chiluba faction.[26] A second group included influential members of the 'family tree' who supported the candidature of Ng'andu Magande, the Minister of Finance, but had limited support within the party. A third faction grouped around Rupiah Banda, the Vice-President, who was however commonly regarded as an 'outsider' within the party. The choice of Kalumba as the MMD presidential candidate would have angered the non-Bemba, whereas a 'family tree' candidate might have further alienated the Bemba bloc. As a consequence, the former UNIPist and party outsider Banda was elected as MMD candidate and subsequently replaced Mwanawasa. This can be interpreted as another shrewd choice of 'tribal balancing'. On the one hand, the election of Banda ended the relative under-representation of the Nyanga-speaking group within the MMD. On the other hand, Banda is said – through Kalumba as his 'kingmaker' – to enjoy close connections with the Chiluba faction, which may help to reintegrate the Bemba-speaking bloc, albeit at the expense of Mwanawasa's anti-corruption drive.[27]

Has the importance of 'tribal balancing' declined over time? Some political observers claim that national unity is by now so firmly entrenched that it can no longer be reversed. One of my interviewees (Interview, Reverend Foston Sakala, Lusaka, August 1, 2008), for instance, argued that:

> '[n]o politician can ever divide Zambians. It is too late, One Zambia, One Nation has succeeded…. It is a good thing that Kaunda overstayed in politics because this gave him enough time to forge a nation'.

While the motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation' has undoubtedly left deep traces in Zambia's political culture, such assessments are contradicted by the recent 're-tribalisation' of political competition, which is at least reminiscent of developments during the First Republic. Linguistic and tribal cleavages clearly continue to matter for voter alignment and even more so for party affiliation (Erdmann 2007), not least evident in the enduring strength of PF and UPND. The enduring salience of tribal cleavages becomes also evident in contemporary political debates (*Times of Zambia*, September 23, 2009; *The Post*, June 18, 2007; January 15, 2008; April 2, 2008; September 24, 2007;) or the recent proliferation of tribal associations (Interview, Mbita Chitala, Lusaka, July 29, 2008). Dr. Neo Simutanyi (Interview, Lusaka, September 22, 2008), one of the country's foremost intellectuals, describes the phenomenon in the following terms:

> 'Tribe is a taboo subject in public but is actually canvassed privately. When like-minded people meet, they look around the table, make sure they are all from the same place and then ask: Now, how do we deal with those Bemba?'

Against this background, it should be kept in mind that the political culture of 'One Zambia, One Nation' is a result of deliberate political action and can be undone if such approach is no longer deemed necessary.

Competing explanations

What are other possible factors that may account for civil war avoidance in Zambia? As mentioned above, the still most influential explanation focuses on the link between natural resource abundance and civil war. Most prominently, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) hypothesise

[26] Kalumba himself served as a minister under Chiluba and later faced corruption charges in court (*Times of Zambia*, October 13, 2004.

[27] Evidence of this is that corruption charges against Chiluba were suddenly dropped after years of investigation (*Times of Zambia*, August 18, 2009).

that natural resources constitute a 'honey pot' that generates violent forms of rent seeking. It is suggested that resource-rich countries are more prone to civil war by providing insurgent groups with the opportunity to use the 'looting' of natural resources as a means to finance the 'start-up costs' of rebellion. At first sight, this argument seems to be relevant. While Zambia is heavily dependent on copper, the latter is a non-lootable resource whose exploitation requires high investments in capital and technology. Yet both the literature and interview evidence provide not even the slightest hint that the absence of lootable resources in Zambia may have prevented potential rebels from launching armed insurgency against the government. The recent discovery of diamonds in Barotseland is said to have inspired secessionists (*The Post*, October 12, 1999) but has by no means led to violent conflict. A second argument links the 'resource-civil war nexus' to the phenomenon of the 'rentier state'. Rentier states are late-developers that live largely off unearned income (natural resource rents and foreign aid), which relieves them from the need to raise revenue through domestic taxation (Moore 2004). This is said to favour the emergence of certain 'political pathologies', including – among others – the absence of developmental ambitions, weak bureaucratic structures, and vulnerability to violence. James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) have introduced this line of reasoning into the quantitative civil war literature arguing that resource wealth causes weak and non-responsive state structures, which in turn increases the probability of civil war. This 'political Dutch disease' hypothesis has even less explanatory power. Zambia can be considered a 'rentier state' that lives largely off unearned income from copper. Accordingly, one should expect civil war in Zambia – a prediction that is in sharp contradiction with the real world.

A second influential explanation assumes that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends on its economic performance (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2004a, b.). The two most commonly discussed factors in this context are income levels (GDP per capita) and economic growth. However, the Zambia case shows that poor economic performance does not automatically lead to violent conflict since the country has remained peaceful despite dramatic economic decline. After a brief copper-based economic boom during the late 1960s, the Zambian economy was hit by a number of external shocks (Andersson et al. 2000; Chisala et al. 2006). Oil prices increased threefold, while the reduced demand for copper resulted in a price drop of 40 percent in 1975. The shocks led to rising trade deficits, escalating inflation and mounting foreign debt. In 1978, Zambia entered into a conflict-ridden relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but subsequent rounds of structural adjustment could not halt the continued economic decline. As a consequence, the country experienced below African average growth rates and one of the worst declines in per capita income in the history of post-colonial Africa (see Figures 13a and 13b). After 1991, the MMD government engaged in a new round of IMF-sponsored structural adjustment. Yet, economic performance continued to be undermined by the enduring decline of the mining sector that suffered from another collapse of world copper prices. The result was low economic growth and declining GDP per capita throughout the 1990s. It is only more recently that the copper boom has helped to slowly reverse Zambia's long-standing economic stagnation.





Figure 13: Zambia's economic performance, 1962-2008
Source: Compiled and calculated based on data by Angus Maddison, available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.

A third influential explanation claims that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends on its regime type, typically measured by the 'polity score' (Marshall and Jaggers 2005.).[28] A first hypothesis holds that the more democratic a country, the less likely it is to experience civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The rationale is that only democracies permit the expression of opposition and thereby facilitate the non-violent resolution of conflicts. If democracy was the key driver behind civil war, we should expect consistently high levels of democracy in Zambia. However, as shown in Figure 14, this is not the case. Instead, the country has been able to maintain peace despite high

[28] The 'polity score' captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The polity scores are usually converted to regime categories, including 'autocracies' (-10 to -6), 'anocracies' (-5 to +5), and 'democracies' (+6 to +10).

levels of autocracy during the Second Republic. Moreover, in contrast to claims by Burnell, improved levels of democracy during the Third Republic have hardly yielded a 'democratic domestic peace' (Burnell 2005: 122ff.). Instead, the return to multi-party politics favoured political fragmentation along tribal lines, which has arguably made Zambia's peace more fragile. A second hypothesis holds that civil war risks are highest not among democracies or autocracies, but among intermediary regimes. The idea is that such 'anocracies' neither permit the expression of opposition (like democracies) nor are they in a position to suppress dissidents effectively (like autocracies) – a situation that makes them especially prone to civil war (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, in the case of Zambia this is hardly convincing since the country has been able to avoid civil war despite displaying all signs of an anocracy during the First and Third Republic (see Figure 14).



Figure 14: Democracy in Zambia, 1964-2008
Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2008, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2008.xls.

This is not to deny that regime type may have mattered, albeit in a different form than commonly suggested. Advocates of the 'anocracy favours civil war' argument suggest that repression under the autocratic one-party regime contributed to the stability of the Second Republic (Burnell 2005: 118). Indeed, the one-party state entailed considerable repression against those who were suspected of opposing the official doctrine of 'one party participatory democracy' (Phiri 2006: 162ff.; Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 7). Yet, even critics of the one-party state concede that repression was always relatively 'mild' when compared with other countries and can therefore hardly explain the absence of violent conflict (Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, Lusaka, July 4, 2008). More consequential was the fact that one-party rule limited political competition and thereby helped to contain the destabilising factional struggles of the First Republic. 'Tribal balancing' alone could not prevent the emergence of opposition parties that threatened to unravel the ruling coalition. This was because the post-independence context of multi-party competition – and more specifically the option of defection into the opposition – favoured fragmentation and made stable elite accommodation inherently difficult to achieve. The introduction of the one-party state put an end to 'the crisis of fragmentation' (Interview, Sikota Wina, Lusaka, October 4, 2008) and thereby stabilised political competition over the distribution of spoils. This is not to

claim that one-party rule was a direct cause of Zambia's peace, not least since the latter also prevailed under multi-party politics. But it did help to stabilise Zambia's inclusive elite bargain.

While standard explanations of civil war are of little use when trying to understand civil war avoidance in Zambia, three other factors turn out to be more relevant. First, there is the 'leadership factor'. Interestingly, Zambia has always had political leadership capable of acting as a credible mediator between competing groups. The most prominent example in this respect would be the first president, Kaunda. Although born among the Bemba in Northern Province, Kaunda's Nyasaland parentage and his anti-tribal stance made him to be regarded as the only one capable of playing politics 'above tribe' (Phiri 2006: 148). The Bemba could respect him because he had grown up among them, while the other tribes could accept him because he was not a 'real' Bemba – a constellation that earned him the status of a unifier and enabled him to hold the fragile elite bargain together even during the hefty factional struggles of the late 1960s (Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, Lusaka, July 4, 2008). The second president, Chiluba, while more controversial than Kaunda, was strongly rooted in the urban, non-tribal trade unions and therefore also qualified as a mediator. Moreover, he was a Bemba-speaker but from the small Lunda tribe in Luapula Province, which may have eased old fears of Bemba domination. Mwanawasa, the country's third president, was essentially a compromise candidate who had been vice-president in the early 1990s but had largely stayed away from the intra-MMD struggles surrounding the 'third term' debate. Also, his parentage from the small Lenje and Lamba tribes allowed him to defuse unabated fears of Bemba domination.

Second, there was the 'regional factor'. Significantly, post-colonial Zambia found itself in a context of extreme regional instability, including liberation wars in many of its neighbouring countries (Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique) as well as recurrent destabilisation attempts from apartheid South Africa. The liberation struggle in Southern Rhodesia had the most dramatic impact on Zambia. Accused of harbouring liberation fighters, the country was on several occasions subject to Rhodesian air raids in 1978/79, which were destructive both in terms of loss of life and property, but also psychologically (ACR 1978/1979: B450). Moreover, the presence of thousands of war refugees on Zambian territory threatened to embroil the country in its neighbour's affairs (Burnell 2005: 116). Interestingly, however, these regional spill-over effects proved to be an integrating force. Rather than causing internal conflict, the presence of an external threat strengthened UNIP's domestic authority and ultimately helped to unify the country. However, this was only made possible by the existence of an inclusive elite bargain, which meant that neighbouring countries had few opportunities to destabilise Zambia by playing on feelings of marginalisation. A case in point is the South Africa-sponsored Mushala insurgency, which failed to gain ground in the North-West due to the absence of cohesive group grievances. In the end, the inclusive elite bargain helped to insulate Zambia from the potentially destabilising regional spill-over effects.



Figure 15: Urbanisation in Zambia
Source: World Bank 2009.

Finally, there is the 'urban factor'. As detailed above, the growth of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930 led to rapid urbanisation whereby Zambia exhibited above African average levels of urbanisation upon independence (see Figure 15). Afterwards, the share of the urban population rose from about 20 percent in the mid-1960s to about 40 percent in the late 1970s, making Zambia the second most urbanised country in Africa at the time. Even though urbanisation rates have declined since the 1980s, the influence of urban areas – especially those in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt – on the rest of the country is immense (Phiri 2006: 199). Most importantly, urbanisation has blurred linguistic and tribal cleavages. First, urban migration has reduced language barriers in that there are Bemba speakers on the Copperbelt who do not come from one of the Bemba-speaking tribes, just as there are Nyanga speakers in Lusaka who do not come from the Nyanga-speaking tribes. Second, urbanisation has resulted in high levels of inter-tribal marriages whose off-spring are considered 'proper' Zambians. Posner calculates that about 46 percent of all married Zambians in urban districts and 32 percent of those living in rural areas haves spouses from different tribes (Posner 2005: 92). Many of those who I interviewed argued that high levels of urbanisation and inter-tribal marriages make inter-group violence impossible. As many Zambians owe allegiance to several groups, collective action based on linguistic or tribal identities is said to be 'almost unthinkable' (Interview, Marc Chona, Lusaka, July 25, 2008). This is convincing, albeit only partially. First, I have shown that language and tribe remain salient social cleavages even in times of high urbanisation. Second, a brief glance at other African countries suggests that urbanisation alone is by no means sufficient to prevent civil war. In 2009, countries that were more urbanised than Zambia included, among others, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, Nigeria and Somalia – countries that have all experienced civil war (World Bank 2009). Moreover, the case of Kenya underlines that even high levels of inter-tribal marriages do not guarantee the absence of inter-tribal political violence (*Deseret News (Kenya)*, January 27, 2008).

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that Zambia's enduring peace and stability goes back to the persistence of inclusive elite bargains, which manifested themselves in high degrees of political, economic and military power sharing between competing linguistic and tribal groups. This helped to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation, prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby laid the foundations for Zambia's lasting peace. At the same time, civil war avoidance has also been facilitated by the presence of credible political leaders as mediators 'above tribe', the existence of an external threat in form of regional instability and high levels of urbanisation, which have blurred linguistic and tribal cleavages and thereby made inter-group violent conflict even less likely.

While Zambia's peace and stability seems solidly entrenched, it should not be taken for granted. Signs of continuity notwithstanding, the Mwanawasa elite bargain came to exhibit a number of serious cracks, which were strikingly similar to those of the First Republic. On the one hand, the Mwanawasa administration witnessed a certain 're-tribalisation' of political competition, evident in the strength of the PF in the Bemba-speaking North and the UPND in the Tonga-speaking South. On the other hand, the ruling party has lost ground in the urban centres where Sata's PF has emerged as a serious contender. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that a PF victory in the upcoming 2011 general elections might further polarise Zambia along both tribal and class lines. This underlines that the political culture of 'One Zambia, One Nation' and the corresponding peace should not be taken for granted.

References

Africa Contemporary Record (ACR). Various years. *Annual Survey and Documents*. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Anderson, Per-Ake, Bigsten, Arne and Persson, Hakan. 2000. 'Foreign aid, debt and growth in Zambia', *Research Report* 112, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Bartlett, Daniel M. 2000. 'Civil Society and Democracy: a Zambian Case Study', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429-46.

Bates, Robert H. and Collier, Paul. 1995. 'The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia', *Journal of African Economies* 4(1): 115-43.

Bayart, Jean-François. 1981. 'Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire: Questions de méthode', *Politique Africaine* 1(1): 53-82.

Bayart, Jean-François, Ellis, Stephen and Hibou, Béatrice. 1999. *The Criminalisation of the State in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.

Baylies, Carolyn. 1984. 'Luapula Province: Economic decline and political alienation in a rural UNIP stronghold', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris, 1992. 'The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy* 19(54): 75-91.

Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1997. 'The 1996 Zambian elections: still awaiting democratic consolidation', *Review of African Political Economy* 24(71): 113-28.

Boone, Catherine. 1994. 'States and Ruling Classes in Sub-Saharan Africa: The enduring contradictions of power', in Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), *State Power and Social Forces*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Burdette, Marcia. 1988. *Zambia: Between Two Worlds*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Burnell Peter. 2001. 'The first two MMD administrations in Zambia: millennium dawn or millennium sunset?' *Contemporary Politics* 7(2): 95-111.

Burnell, Peter. 2002. 'Zambia's 2001 elections: the tyranny of small decisions, non-decisions and not decisions', *Third World Quarterly* 23(6): 1103-20.

Burnell, Peter. 2003. 'The tripartite elections in Zambia, December 2001', *Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies* 22: 388-95.

Burnell Peter. 2005. 'From low-conflict polity to democratic civil peace: Explaining Zambian exceptionalism', *African Studies* 64(2): 107-33.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Wimmer, Andreas and Min, Brian. 2010. 'Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis', *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Central Statistical Office (CSO). 1973. *Census of population and housing 1969 : Final Report Volume I – Total Zambia*. Lusaka: CSO.

Central Statistical Office (CSO). 1985. *1980 Population and Housing Census of Zambia: Analytical Report Volume III*. Lusaka: CSO.

Central Statistical Office (CSO). 2003. *Zambia 2000 Census Report, Volume 10*. Lusaka: CSO.

Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 1999. *Africa Works. Disorder as political instrument*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. 'What is ethnic identity and does it matter?' *Annual Review of Political Science* 9(1): 397-424.

Cheeseman, Nic and Hinfelaar, Marja. 2010. 'Parties, Platforms and Political Mobilization: The Zambian Presidential Elections of 2008', *African Affairs* 109(434): 51-76.

Chikulo, Bornwell. 1996. 'Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Third Republic, 1991-1994', in Owen Sichone and Bornwell Chikulo (eds), *Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic*. Harare: Sapes Books.

Chikulo, Bornwell C. 2000. 'Corruption and Accumulation in Zambia', in Hope R. Kempe and Bornwell C. Chikulo (eds), *Corruption and Development in Africa. Lessons from Country Case-Studies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chisala, Victoria, Geda, Alemayehu, Dagdeviren, Hulya, McKinley, Terry, Saad-Filho, Alfredo, Oya, Carlos and Weeks, John. 2006. *Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Power Reduction: Case Study of Zambia*. Lusaka: UNDP.

Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-95.

Cramer, Christopher. 2006. *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing. Accounting for violence in developing countries*. London: Hearst & Co.

Craig, John R. 2001. 'Putting privatisation into practise: the case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(3): 389-410.

DiJohn, Jonathan and Putzel, James. 2009. 'Political Settlements', *GSDRC Issues Paper*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, International Development Department.

Dogan, Mattei and Higley, John. 1998. 'Elites, Crises, and Regimes in Comparative Analysis', in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), *Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Dresang, Dennis. 1974. 'Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case', *American Political Science Review* 68(4): 1605-17.

Dresang, Dennis and Young, Ralph. 1980. 'The public service', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Administration in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Duverger, Maurice. 1959. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen.

Englebert, Pierre. 2005. 'Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance', *Africa Spectrum* 39(1): 29-59.

Erdmann, Gero. 2007. 'Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation – an African Case: Zambia', *GIGA Working Paper* 45, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Erdmann, Gero and Simutanyi, Neo. 2003. 'Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic', *Konrad Adenauer Foundation Occasional Papers*, Lilongwe: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Fearon, James and Laitin, David. 2003. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Gerring, John. 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gertzel, Cherry. 1984a. 'Dissent and authority in the Zambian one-party state', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gertzel, Cherry. 1984b. 'Western Province: tradition, economic deprivation and political alienation', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gertzel, Cherry and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. 'Politics in an African urban setting: the role of the Copperbelt in the transition to the one-party state 1964-1973', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gertzel, Cherry, Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. 'Introduction: The making of the one-party state', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gordon, David. 2008. 'Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill.

Gould, Jeremy. 2007. 'Zambia's 2006 elections: the ethnicization of politics?' News from the Nordic Africa Institute. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Government of Zambia (GOZ). 2007. *Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates*, March 30, 2007, Lusaka: GOZ.

Government of Zambia (GOZ). Various years a. *Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates*. Lusaka: GOZ.

Government of Zambia (GOZ). Various years b. *Zambian Government Gazette*. Lusaka: GOZ.

Government of Zambia (GOZ). Various years c. *Economic Report*. Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, GOZ.

Government of Zambia (GOZ). Various years d. *List of Permanent Secretaries*. Lusaka: Cabinet Office, GOZ, unpublished.

Haantobolo, Godfrey. 2008. 'Civil Control of the Military in Zambia',,unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Hall, Richard 1976. *Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period*. London: Longman.

Harden, Blaine. 1990. *Dispatches from a Fragile Continent*. New York: Norton.

Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew. 2003. 'Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management', *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318-32.

Hauge, Wenche and Ellingsen, Tanja. 1998. 'Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 35(3): 299-317.

Hegre, Havard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gates, Scott and Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 2001. 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992', *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 33-48.

Hegre, Havard and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. 'Sensitivity Analysis of empirical Results on Civil War Onset', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4): 508-35.

Hulterstrom, Karolina. 2004. *In Pursuit Of Ethnic Politics: Voters, Parties and Policies in Kenya and Zambia*. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1995. 'From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 29(1): 1-25.

Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). Various years. *Annual Report*. Lusaka: INDECO.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Various years. *The Military Balance*. London: Routledge.

Jarstad, Anna K. and Nilsson, Desirée. 2008. 'From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(3): 206-23.

Johns, Sheridan. 1980. 'The parastatal sector', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kaplan, Robert D. 1994. 'The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet', *Atlantic Monthly* 73(2): 44-76.

Khan, Mushtaq H. 2000a. 'Rents, efficiency and growth', in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (eds), *Rents, rent-seeking and economic development. Theory and evidence in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khan, Mushtaq H. 2000b. 'Rent-seeking as process', in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (eds), *Rents, rent-seeking and economic development. Theory and evidence in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lamb, David. 1982. *The Africans*. New York: Random House.

Langer, Arnim. 2005. 'Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire', *Oxford Development Studies* 33(1): 25-45.

Langer, Arnim. 2007. 'The Peaceful Management of Horizontal Inequalities in Ghana', *CRISE Working Paper* 25, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.

Larmer, Miles. 2005. 'Reaction & Resistance to Neo-liberalism in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy* 32(103): 29-45.

Larmer, Miles. 2006a. 'Zambia's Mineworkers and the Labour Movement's Resistance to the One-Party State, 1973-1981', *South African Historical Journal* 56(1): 154-76.

Larmer, Miles. 2006b. 'The Hour Has Come at the Pit: The Mineworkers' Union of Zambia and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 1982-1991', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32(2): 293-312.

Larmer, Miles. 2008. 'Enemies within? Opposition to the Zambian one-party state, 1972-1980', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill: 98-128.

Larmer, Miles and Fraser, Alastair. 2007. 'Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 Election', *African Affairs* 106(425): 611-37.

Larmer, Miles and Macola, Giacomo. 2007. 'The Origins, Context and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40(3): 471-96.

Lindemann, Stefan. 2008. 'Do inclusive elite bargains matter? A research framework for understanding the causes of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Crisis States Discussion Papers Series* 15, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein. 1967. *Party systems and voter alignments. Cross-national perspectives*. New York: The Free Press.

Lonsdale, John. 1981. 'States and social processes in Africa: a Historiographical Survey', *African Studies Review* 24(2-3): 139-225.

Macola, Giacomo. 2008. 'Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill: 17-44.

Marnham, Patrick. 1979. *Fantastic Invasion: Dispatches from Africa*. New York: Penguin.

Marshall, Monty G. and Jaggers, Keith. 2005. *Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Dataset Users' Manual*. Arlington, VA: George Mason University.

Menzies, Peter. 2009. 'Counterfactual Theories of Causation', in Edward N. Zalta (ed), *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/.

Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). Various years. *MINDECO Mining Yearbook*. Lusaka: MINDECO.

Molteno, Robert. 1974. 'Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics: a study in sectionalism', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Momba, Jotham C. 1989. 'The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in Zambia: The Case of Southern Province', *African Affairs* 88(352): 331-57.

Moore, Mick. 2004. 'Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing countries', *International Political Science Review* 25(3): 297-319.

Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). 2008. *National Executive Committee Members*. Lusaka: MMD Secretariat, unpublished.

Mphaisha, Chisepo. 1996. 'Retreat from democracy in post one-party state Zambia', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 34(2): 65-84.

Nathan, Laurie. 2003. 'The frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics: A critique of Collier and Hoeffler on causes of civil war', *Crisis States Working Papers Series 1* 11, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

North, Douglas C., Wallis, John J. and Weingast, Barry R. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Osei-Hwedie, Bertha. 1998. 'The Role of Ethnicity in Multi-Party Politics in Malawi and Zambia', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 16(2): 227-47.

Østby, Gudrun. 2008. 'Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 143-62.

Pettman, Jan. 1974. 'Zambia's Second Republic – The Establishment of a One-Party State', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 12(2): 231-44.

Phiri, Bizeck J. 2002. 'Civil control of the Zambian Military since Independence and its Implication for Democracy', in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams (eds), *Ourselves to Know. Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies.

Phiri, Bizeck J. 2006. *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic*. Trenton, NJ: Africa Research & Publications.

Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rakner, Lise. 2003. 'Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001', Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Rasmussen, Thomas. 1969. 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 7(3): 407-24.

Roberts, Andrew D. 1976. *A History of Zambia.* London: Heinemann.

Rotberg, Robert L. 1967. 'Tribalism and Politics in Zambia', *Africa Report* 12(9): 29-35.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004a. 'What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814-58.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004b. 'Poverty and the organization of political violence: A review and some conjectures', in Susan M. Collins and Carol Graham (eds), *Brookings Trade Forum 2004*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

Scott, Ian. 1978. 'Middle Class Politics in Zambia', *African Affairs* 77(308): 321-34.

Sichone, Owen and Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. 'The Ethnic and Regional Questions, Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Zambia: The Case of Barotseland 1964-1994', in Owen Sichone and Bornwell C. Chikulo (eds), *Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic*. Harare: Sapes Books: 173-96.

Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. 'The politics of structural adjustment in Zambia', *Third World Quarterly* 17(4): 825-39.

Stewart, Frances. 2000. 'Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities', *Oxford Development Studies* 28(3): 245-62.

Stewart, Frances. 2002. 'Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development', *CRISE Working Paper* 1, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.

Stewart, Frances (ed.). 2010. *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Szeftel, Morris. 1982. 'Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia – the State as a Resource in Itself', *Review of African Political Economy* 9(24): 4-21.

Szeftel, Morris. 2000. 'Eat With Us: Managing Corruption and Patronage Under Zambia's Three Republics, 1964-99', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18(2): 207-224.

Tangri, Roger. 1999. *The Politics of Patronage in Africa: parastatals, privatization and private enterprise*. Oxford :James Currey.

Tordoff, William. 1980. 'Introduction', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert. 1974a. 'Introduction', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert. 1974b. 'Government and administration', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tordoff, William and Scott, Ian. 1974. 'Political parties: structures and policies', in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

United National Independence Party (UNIP). Various years. *Annual Report*. Lusaka: UNIP.

Van Donge, Jan K. 1995. 'Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba. Enduring patterns of political culture', in John A. Wiseman (ed.), *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa.* London: Routledge.

Van Donge, Jan K. 2009. 'The Plundering Resources of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba and his Friends: A Case Study of the Interaction between National Politics and the International Drive towards Good Governance', *African Affairs* 108(430): 69-90.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wele, Patrick. 1987. *Kaunda and Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story*. Lusaka: Multimedia Publications.

Wele, Patrick. 1995. *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents. From Mushala to Luchembe.* Solwezi: PMW.

Wimmer, Andreas, Cederman, Lars-Erik and Min, Brian. 2009. 'Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set', *American Sociological Review* 74: 316-37.

World Bank. 2009. *World Development Indicators*. Manchester: ESDS International, University of Manchester.

Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). Various years. *Annual Report*. Lusaka: ZCCM.

Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). Various years. *Annual Report*. Lusaka: ZIMCO.

Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA). 2006a. *Zambia Privatisation Agency Status Report as at 30th November, 2006*. Lusaka: ZPA.

Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA). 2006b. *Privatisation Transaction Summary Sheets, 1992-2005*. Lusaka: ZPA.

Annex 1: List of interviews

Name & Function of interviewee	Location & date of interview
(1) Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former Member, MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 4 July 2008
(2) Dr. Katele Kalumba ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Health (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Health (under Chiluba) ▪ Member, MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ National Secretary, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 10 July 2008
(3) Wilfrid Kupelelwa Mwamba ▪ Governance Advisor, Department for International Development (DFID), British High Commission, Lusaka	Lusaka, 14 July 2008
(4) Guy Scott ▪ Former MMD Minister of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries (under Chiluba) ▪ Vice-President, Patriotic Front (PF)	Lusaka, 15 July 2008
(5) Mike Mulongoti ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Defence (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Information & Broadcasting Services (under Mwanawasa) ▪ MMD Minister of Works & Supply ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 15 July 2008
(6) Vernon Mwaanga ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Foreign Affairs ▪ Former MMD Minister of Foreign Affairs (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Information & Broadcasting Services (under Mwanawasa)	Lusaka, 15 July 2008
(7) Prof. Bizeck J. Phiri ▪ Professor of History, Department of History, University of Zambia	Lusaka, 16 July 2008
(8) Dr. Peter Matoka ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Information & Postal Services ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Health ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Works ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government & Housing ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Development Planning ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Economic & Technical Cooperation ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)	Lusaka, 16 July 2008

▪ Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Zambia	
(9) Mulima Kufekisa-Akapelwa ▪ Executive Director, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR)	Lusaka, 16 July 2008
(10) Prof. Jotham C. Momba ▪ Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Zambia	Lusaka, 18 July 2008
(11) Dr. Bright Chungu ▪ Former Advisor to President Kaunda	Lusaka, 18 July 2008
(12) Tienf Kahenya ▪ Secretary General, United Party for National Development (UPND)	Lusaka, 21 July 2008
(13) Dr. Webby S. Kalikiti ▪ Lecturer, Department of History, University of Zambia	Lusaka, 22 July 2008
(14) Lee M. Habasonda ▪ Executive Director, Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD)	Lusaka, 24 July 2008
(15) Mark C. Chona ▪ Former Advisor to President Kaunda	Lusaka, 25 July 2008
(16) Mbambo M. Sianga ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Tourism ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Legal Affairs ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Higher Education ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Development Planning ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of General Education, Youth & Sports ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC) ▪ Lecturer, Department of Law, University of Zambia	Lusaka 25 July 2008
(17) Dr. Patrick Manda ▪ Research Officer, House of Chiefs	Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(18) Dr. Mabel Milimo ▪ Gender Advisor, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Lusaka	Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(19) Mbita Chitala ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former Member, MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Finance (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy at the Vice President's Office (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Local Government & Housing (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Finance & National Planning (under Mwanawasa)	Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(20) Njekwa Anamela ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Office ▪ Vice-President, United National Independence Party (UNIP)	Lusaka, 30 July 2008
(21) Tentani Mwanza	Lusaka, 30 July 2008

▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former President, National Democratic Party (NDP)	
(22) Grieve Sibale ▪ Former Managing Director, National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD)	Lusaka, 31 July 2008
(23) Dr. Godfrey H. Haantobolo ▪ Deputy Chief Research Officer, National Assembly	Lusaka, 31 July 2008
(24) Reverend Foston Sakala ▪ Reformed Church of Zambia ▪ Former President, Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)	Lusaka, 1 August 2008
(25) Rueben Lifuka ▪ President, Transparency International Zambia	Lusaka, 1 August 2008
(26) Samuel Mulafulafu ▪ Director, Caritas Zambia, Zambia Episcopal Conference	Lusaka, 2 August 2008
(27) Sakwiba Sikota ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), United Liberal Party (ULP) ▪ President, United Liberal Party (ULP)	Lusaka, 6 August 2008
(28) Hakainde Hichilema ▪ President, United Party for National Development (UPND)	Lusaka, 6 August 2008
(29) Dr. Markus Nuding ▪ Senior Advisor, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)	Lusaka, 7 August 2008
(30) Gen. Malimba Masheke ▪ Former Zambia Army Commander (under Kaunda) ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Defence ▪ Former UNIP Prime Minister ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC) ▪ Former Board Member, Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO)	Lusaka, 7 August 2008
(31) Robert Liebenthal ▪ Former World Bank Economist ▪ National Coordinator, Millennium Challenge Account-Zambia (MCAZ)	Lusaka, 12 August 2008
(32) Peter J. Henriot ▪ Director, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR)	Lusaka, 12 August 2008
(33) Newton Isaiah Ng'uni ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Education (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training ▪ Secretary General, Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) ▪ Deputy Secretary, National Constitutional Conference (NCC)	Lusaka, 13 August 2008
(34) Simon Zukas ▪ Former Board Member, Industrial and Development Corporation (INDECO) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister at the Vice President's Office (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 13 August 2008

▪ Former MMD Minister of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Works & Supply (under Chiluba)	
(35) Emily Sikazwe ▪ Executive Director, Women for Change Vincent Akamandisa ▪ Field, Animator, Women for Change	Lusaka, 15 August 2008
(36) Roger Chongwe ▪ Former MMD Minister of Legal Affairs (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 9 September 2008
(37) Dipak Patel ▪ Former MMD Minister of Commerce, Trade & Industry (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Commerce, Trade & Industry (under Mwanawasa)	Lusaka, 9 September 2008
(38) Philip Chilimo ▪ Chairperson, Zambia Indigenous Business Association (ZIBA)	Lusaka, 10 September 2008
(39) Reverend Suzanne Matale ▪ General Secretary, Council of Churches in Zambia	Lusaka, 11 September 2008
(40) Gerd Botterweck ▪ Resident Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zambia Kathy Banda Sikombe ▪ Programme Coordinator, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zambia	Lusaka, 11 September 2008
(41) Birgit Pickel ▪ Counsellor, Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Lusaka	Lusaka, 12 September 2008
(42) Haswell Mwale ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Works ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister for Central Province ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister for Power, Transport & Works ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Office ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Public Works ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Works & Supply ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC) ▪ Former Board Member, Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO)	Lusaka, 15 September 2008
(43) Dr. Chileshe Mulenga ▪ Researcher, Institute of Economic and Social Research (INESOR)	Lusaka, 16 September 2008
(44) Kaputo M. Chenga ▪ Senior Expert, German Technical Corporation (GTZ)	Lusaka, 18 September 2008
(45) Bob Sichinga ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Local Government and Housing (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 18 September 2008
(46) Dr. Neo Simutanyi ▪ Executive Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue	Lusaka, 22 September 2008
(47) Patricia Palale	Lusaka, 23 September 2008

▪ Public Sector Management Specialist, The World Bank, Lusaka	
(48) Dr. Cosmas Musumali ▪ Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research	Lusaka, 23 September 2008
(49) Dr. Gilbert Mudenda ▪ Director, Institute for Policy Studies	Lusaka, 24 September 2008
(50) Murray & Eva Sanderson ▪ Zambia Institute for Public Policy Analysis	Kitwe, 29 September 2008
(51) Austin C. Muneku ▪ Director Economic and Research, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)	Kitwe, 30 September 2008
(52) 'Mama' Kankasa ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)	Lusaka, 2 October 2008
(53) Sikota Wina ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government & Housing ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Information, Broadcasting & Tourism ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC) ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 4 October 2008
(54) Dr. Siteke Mwale ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Foreign Affairs ▪ Special Envoy and National Co-ordinator for Great Lakes Region	Lusaka, 6 October 2008

Crisis States Working Papers – Series 2

WP1 James Putzel, 'War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme' (September 2005)
WP2 Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities', (June 2006)
WP3 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Gabi Hesselbein and James Putzel, 'Political and Economic Foundations of State making in Africa: understanding state reconstruction', (July 2006)
WP4 Antonio Giustozzi, 'Genesis of a Prince: the rise of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, 1979-1992' (September 2006)
WP5 Laurie Nathan, 'No Ownership, No Peace: the Darfur Peace Agreement', (September 2006)
WP6 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, 'The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984' (September 2006)
WP7 Antonio Giustozzi, "Tribes" and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005' (September 2006)
WP8 Joe Hanlon, Sean Fox, 'Identifying Fraud in Democratic Elections: a case study of the 2004 Presidential election in Mozambique'
WP9 Jo Beall, 'Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century', (February 2007)
WP10 Dennis Rodgers, 'Slum Wars of the 21st Century: the new geography of conflict in Central America', (February 2007)
WP11 Antonio Giustozzi, 'The Missing Ingredient: non-ideological insurgency and state collapse in Western Afghanistan 1979-1992', (February 2007)
WP12 Suzette Heald, 'Making Law in Rural East Africa: SunguSungu in Kenya', (March 2007)
WP13 Anna Matveeva, 'The Regionalist Project in Central Asia: unwilling playmates', (March 2007)
WP14 Sarah Lister, 'Understanding State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan', (June 2007)
WP15 Pritha Venkatachalam, 'Municipal Finance Systems in Conflict Cities: case studies on Ahmedabad and Srinagar, India', (July 2007)
WP16 Jason Sumich, 'The Illegitimacy of Democracy? democratisation and alienation in Maputo, Mozambique', (September 2007)
WP17 Scott Bollens, 'Comparative Research on Contested Cities: lenses and scaffoldings', (October 2007)
WP18 Debby Potts, 'The State and the informal in sub-Saharan African economies: revisiting debates on dualism', (October 2007)
WP19 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Tatiana Acevedo and Juan Manuel Viatela, 'Violent liberalism? State, conflict, and political regime in Colombia, 1930-2006: an analytical narrative on state-making', (November 2007)
WP20 Stephen Graham, 'RoboWar ™ Dreams: Global South Urbanisation and the US Military's 'Revolution in Military Affairs'', (November 2007)
WP21 Gabi Hesselbein, 'The Rise and Decline of the Congolese State: an analytical narrative on state-making', (November 2007)
WP22 Diane Davis, 'Policing, Regime Change, and Democracy: Reflections from the Case of Mexico', (November 2007)
WP23 Jason Sumich, 'Strong Party, Weak State? Frelimo and State Survival Through the Mozambican Civil War: an analytical narrative on state-making', (December 2007)
WP24 Elliott Green, 'District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda', (January 2008)
WP25 Jonathan DiJohn, ' Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature', (January 2008)
WP26 James Putzel, Stefan Lindemann and Claire Schouten, 'Drivers of Change in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Rise and Decline of the State and Challenges For Reconstruction - A Literature Review', (January 2008)
WP27 Frederick Golooba Mutebi, 'Collapse, war and reconstruction in Uganda: An analytical narrative on state-making', (January 2008)
WP28 Frederick Golooba Mutebi, 'Collapse, war and reconstruction in Rwanda: An analytical narrative on state-making', (February 2008)
WP29 Bjørn Møller, 'European Security: the role of the European Union', (February 2008)
WP30 Bjørn Møller, 'European Security: The Role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe', (February 2008)
WP31 Laurie Nathan, 'Anti-imperialism Trumps Human Rights: South Africa's Approach to the Darfur Conflict', (February 2008)
WP32 Ben Moxham, 'State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili, Disintegration in Timor-Leste', (February 2008)
WP33 Kripa Sridharan, 'Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: comparing ASEAN and SAARC', (March 2008)

WP34 Monica Herz, 'Does the Organisation of American States Matter?' (April 2008)
WP35 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, 'Creole and Tribal Designs: Dar es Salaam and Kampala as Ethnic Cities in Coalescing Nation States
WP36 Adam Branch, 'Gulu Town in War and Peace: displacement, humanitarianism and post-war crisis' (April 2008)
WP37 Dennis Rodgers, 'An Illness called Managua' (May 2008)
WP38 Rob Jenkins, 'The UN peacebuilding commission and the dissemination of international norms' (June 2008)
WP39 Antonio Giustozzi and Anna Matveeva, 'The SCO: a regional organisation in the making' (September 2008)
WP40 Antonio Giustozzi, 'Afghanistan: transition without end' (November 2008)
WP41 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, 'At the Sources of Factionalism and Civil War in Hazarajat' (January 2009)
WP42 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, 'Divide and Rule: state penetration in Hazarajat, from monarchy to the Taliban' (January 2009)
WP43 Daniel Esser, 'Who Governs Kabul? Explaining urban politics in a post-war capital city' (February 2009)
WP44 Francisco Gutierrez et al, 'Politics and Security in Three Colombian Cities' (March 2009)
WP45 Marco Pinfari, 'Nothing but Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts' (March 2009)
WP46 Anna Matveeva, 'The Perils of Emerging Statehood: civil war and state reconstruction in Tajikistan' (March 2009)
WP47 Jennifer Giroux, David Lanz and Damiano Sguaitamatti, 'The Tormented Triangle: the regionalisation of conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic' (April 2009)
WP48 Francisco Gutierrez-Sanin, 'Stupid and Expensive? A critique of the costs-of-violence literature' (May 2009)
WP49 Herbert Wulf and Tobias Debiel, 'Conflict Early Warming and Response Mechanisms: tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organsations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARG and PIF' (May 2009)
WP50 Francisco Gutierrez Sanin and Andrea Gonzalez Pena, 'Force and Ambiguity: evaluating sources for cross-national research- the case of military interventions' (June 2009)
WP51 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, 'The Dissipation of Political Capital amongst Afghanistan's Hazaras: 2001-2009' (June 2009)
WP52 Juergen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, 'Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: a comparative analysis' (July 2009)
WP53 Pascal Kapagama and Rachel Waterhouse, 'Portrait of Kinshasa: a city on (the) edge', (July 2009)
WP54 William Freund, 'The Congolese Elite and the Fragmented City', (July 2009)
WP55 Jo Beall and Mduduzi Ngonyama, 'Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: the case of Greater Durban, South Africa' (July 2009)
WP56 Bjorn Moller, 'Africa's Sub-Regional Organisations: seamless web or patchwork?' (August 2009)
WP57 Bjorn Moller, 'The African Union as Security Actor: African solutions to African problems?' (August 2009)
WP58 Francisco Gutierrez Sanin, 'The Quandaries of Coding & Ranking: evaluating poor state performance indexes' (November 2009)
WP59 Sally Healy, 'Peacemaking in the Midst of War: an assessment of IGAD's contribution to regional security' (November 2009)
WP60 Jason Sumich, 'Urban Politics, Conspiracy and Reform in Nampula, Mozambique', (November 2009)
WP61 Koen Vlassenroot and Karen Büscher, 'The City as Frontier: urban development and identiy processes in Goma', (November 2009)
WP62 Antonio Giustozzi, 'The Eye of the Storm: cities in the vortex of Afghanistan's civil wars', (November 2009)
WP63 Kristof Titeca, 'The Changing cross-border Trade Dynamics of north-western Uganda, north-eastern Congo and southern Sudan', (November 2009)
WP64 Neera Chandhoke, 'Civil Society in Conflict Cities: the case of Ahmedabad', (November 2009)
WP65 Gonzalo Vargas, 'Armed Conflict, Crime and Social Protest in South Bolivar, Colombia (1996-2004), (December 2009)
WP66 Talatbek Masadykov, Antonio Giustozzi, James Michael Page, 'Negotiating with the Taliban: toward a solution for the Afghan conflict' (January 2010)
WP67 Tom Goodfellow, 'Bastard Child of Nobody?': anti-planning and the institutional crisis in contemporary Kampala' (February 2010)
WP68 Jason Sumich, 'Nationalism, ,Urban Poverty and Identity in Maputo, Mozambique', (February 2010)

WP69 Haris Gazdar, Sobia Ahmad Kaker, Irfan Khan, 'Buffer Zone, Colonial Enclave or Urban Hub? Quetta: between four regions and two wars' (February 2010)
WP70 Azmat Ali Budhani, Haris Gazdar, Sobia Ahmad Kaker, Hussain Bux Mallah, 'The Open City: social networks and violence in Karachi' (March 2010)
WP71 Neera Chandhoke, 'Some Reflections on the Notion of an 'Inclusive Political Pact': a perspective from Ahmedabad' (March 2010)
WP72 Sean Fox and Kristian Hoelscher, 'The Political Economy of Social Violence: theory and evidence from a cross-country study' (April 2010)
WP73 Chris Alden, 'A Pariah in our Midst: regional organisations and the problematic of Western-designated pariah regimes – the cases of SADC/Zimbabwe and ASEAN/Myanmar' (May 2010)
WP74 Benedito Cunguara and Joseph Hanlon, ' Poverty is not being Reduced in Mozambique' (June 2010)
WP75 Jonathan DiJohn, 'Political Resilience Against the Odds: an analytical narrative on the construction and maintenance of political order in Zambia since 1960' (June 2010)
WP76 Stefan Lindemann, 'Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: the case of Uganda' (August 2010)

These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com), where an up-to-date list of all our publications including Discussion Papers, Occasional Papers and Series 1 Working Papers can be found.

LSE

Crisis States Research Centre

The Crisis States Research Centre aims to examine and provide an understanding of processes of war, state collapse and reconstruction in fragile states and to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in these processes. Through rigorous comparative analysis of a carefully selected set of states and of cities, and sustained analysis of global and regional axes of conflict, we aim to understand why some fragile states collapse while others do not, and the ways in which war affects future possibilities of state building. The lessons learned from past experiences of state reconstruction will be distilled to inform current policy thinking and planning.

Crisis States Partners

Ardhi University
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Collective for Social Science Research
Karachi, Pakistan

Developing Countries Research Centre (DCRC)
University of Delhi
Delhi, India

Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences
University of Cape Town
Cape Town, South Africa

Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI)
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Bogotá, Colombia

Makerere Institute of Social Research
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda

Research Components

Development as State-Making

Cities and Fragile States

Regional and Global Axes of Conflict

Development Studies Institute (DESTIN)
LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6844
Email: csp@lse.ac.uk
Web: www.crisisstates.com