

CFSP WATCH 2003

NATIONAL REPORT GREECE

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1. Basic views on CFSP/ESDP

CFSP/ESDP has been one of the aspects of EU life given great importance in Greece, both in public debate and within the political process. For several years now, successive Eurobarometer (as well as local polls) findings show constant support for the extension of foreign policy, security and even defence competencies of the EU with positive rates over 70%. Political parties representing even higher percentages of the electorate - at least since the late Eighties – have been expecting the support of CFSP mechanisms to help Greece in major foreign-policy issues the country has faced throughout the Nineties. Greece is the only country where the debate about CFSP ranges to a demand for “common defence for common borders”: such has been the official Greek negotiating position for Greece in the IGC that led to Nice; it has also been present in the Convention.

Greece has shown its commitment as one of the staunchest supporters of deeper integration by participating in the Euro-zone and Schengen. In line with its attachment to the aim of the EU' s political Union, Greece has called for more frequent common positions and deeper cooperation in the field of CFSP/ESDP and for the extension of the community method in these areas.

Greece's vision for the future focuses heavily on the development of a CFSP/ESDP, especially through the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty of the Union¹.

Furthermore, it is important to note that both the government and the largest opposition party share the community-based vision of Europe. In addition, both parties are concerned with ensuring that the deepening and widening of the EU is not undertaken at the expense of the interests of smaller member states. There is a genuine consensus that

a European foreign and security policy should be promoted, in order for Europe to acquire its own identity in foreign and security policy.

2. National perceptions

- **Perceived success/failure of CFSP/ESDP**

The recent Iraqi crisis (that Greece had to deal with, as Presidency) has added emphasis and poignancy to the need for a credible CFSP/ESDP. The Iraqi crisis has also helped to bring to the surface the underlying truth that despite declarations, presidency conclusions, memoranda, reports and political commitments to the contrary, Europe speaks with a multitude of voices in matters of foreign and security policy.

Greek attitudes towards the CFSP/ESDP edifice reflect the perception that the EU reacts rather than acts and that on the basis of the lowest common denominator. The recent debacle over Iraq and the near failure to produce a common position and address issues of international significance, underlines the fact that current and perspective members of the Union view the CFSP framework as ineffectual and slow and opt for a discussion of major security issues on euro-atlantic institutions or on an intergovernmental level, rather than European ones. Case in point the agreement reached between Turkey, the United States and Great Britain on the issue of use of NATO assets in ESDP operations on which no EU institution was consulted². Furthermore the recent crisis over the Perejil/Leila islet between Spain and Morocco highlights the inability of Europeans to act coherently in matters of foreign policy, even in the face of threat to the territorial integrity of one of its member-states, underlying the fact that since the Imia crisis of 1996 not many things have changed in the field of political expediency³. The prevailing view in Greece seems to point towards taking steps to remedy the situation rather than abandoning the CFSP framework altogether.

¹ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece's Strategic Objectives in the Convention on the Future of Europe, online article

² Agence Europe, Document on use of NATO capacity under CFDP is unacceptable, 30/01/2003

³ Eduard Soler I Lecha, Aznar's Spain and EU foreign Policy: Risky Bet or Adaptation to a Changing Europe, EU Policy Network, online article

The new security agenda in the post 9/11 environment⁴ demands effectiveness, swiftness and coherence in foreign policy. Europe cannot address these challenges without reconfiguring its foreign policy/security architecture. The missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and the Democratic Republic of Congo, although undoubtedly steps in the right direction, seem to indicate that the CFSP/ESDP process is going through its childhood illness phase, faced with budgetary and other concerns.

- **Position towards NATO**

Greece welcomes the reaching of agreement on the Berlin plus agenda, which cleared the way for the assumption of initial operational capability by the military leg of the ESDP⁵. Greece is anxious to avoid an overlapping of institutions, assets, command structures and mandates as well as a transatlantic rift. Nobody wishes an antagonistic relation between the EU and NATO. Greece's vision on that score is one of complementarity and equality-based partnership. It is clear, however, that in the short to medium term, there will be times when the UN or NATO or OSCE will be unwilling or unable to intervene in crises unfolding in Europe's periphery. In these cases the ESDP provides a useful policy instrument for dealing with these crises.

The hard lessons taught by the Iraqi crisis-which found Greece at the helm of the Presidency, bringing much frustration to the Greek diplomatic apparatus – may have changed a deeply rooted mistrust towards NATO. The preference for a “European defence option” has not been enough to make Greece participate in the BE-F-DE-L initiative, notwithstanding initially positive noises to that effect.

- **EU crisis management**

At the level of crisis management, the main aim of the Greek government is to support a comprehensive approach integrating the capabilities and operational framework

⁴ See Javier Solana, A secure Europe in a better World, Report to the European Council, Thessaloniki 20/06-2003

⁵ Joint Press Conference of G. Papantoniou and J. Solana following the informal Meeting of the EU Ministers of Defence, Athens 15/03/2003

in all four areas (police, rule of law, civil protection, public administration). The military and civil aspects of ESDP should be developed on a parallel and equal basis given that they are integrated in a unified action plan. Special emphasis should be given to politico-military coordination, financing participation of third countries and cooperation with international and regional organizations and NGOs⁶.

This comprehensive approach is the fundamental difference between EU and NATO crisis management and sets the basis for the autonomy of these two organizations⁷. Greece contributes to the military leg of ESDP a force of 4700 men, 46 aircraft and 13 warships. Greece participates in the European on-call police force with 180 police officers, 20 of which are assigned to the rapid deployment police force⁸. Greece is also taking part in the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU has already considerable experience and some successes in the field of conflict prevention. The EU's preventive diplomacy has a great scope for extending its action on the basis of international legitimacy and UN Resolutions. This action would be more effective if the EU coordinates its voice in international organisations further. The EU as the biggest donor of aid can further coordinate all its external actions to serve the aims of preserving and extending democratic practices, good governance and respect for Human Rights. Furthermore, the EU's greatest leverage in the field of conflict prevention is that the EU is perceived by its periphery and third countries as an area of security, rule of law, accountable democratic public institutions and protection for minorities⁹. Greece feels that EU conflict prevention efforts must be focused in specific volatile regions such as the Balkans and the Euro-Med area¹⁰.

The recent use of “Europe” as leverage for a peaceful solution of such long-time conflicts implicating Greece, especially so in Greek-Turkish relations or the Cyprus issue, has been an eye-opener for Greek public opinion. It is true that the heavy-duty vehicle of accession to the EU (or the path towards accession) is not part of CSFP; but

⁶ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Priorities of the Greek Presidency, online article

⁷ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The European Security and Defence Policy, online article (in greek)

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Bruno Coppieters and others, European institutional models as instruments of conflict resolution in the divided states of the european periphery, CEPS working document no.195, July 2003

¹⁰ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Priorities of the Greek Presidency, online article

foreign-policy considerations permeate this matter. It is in a EU foreign policy setting that the Helsinki package deal (Cyprus unimpeded accession, Turkish road to accession, Greek-Turkish conflict to be solved at the Hague) and the Copenhagen compromise (with the Kofi Annan Plan for Cyprus in the background) were formed. And it is in a foreign policy way that accession to the EU has been approached, e.g. by the US as an applied conflict-resolution exercise.

- **Impact of Enlargement on CFSP/ESDP**

Greece considers enlargement as a leap towards European integration and under no circumstances should it be allowed to create new dividing lines.

Greece's aim is that enlargement serves as a point of departure for building stronger relations in the wider European space from Russia to the Mediterranean, based on common values and economic interests. Alongside the arduous process of negotiating and implementing conformity with the *acquis*, there is a wider political condition relating to respect of democratic values, minority protection and resolution of outstanding border disputes.

It is the prevailing view in Greece's academia that the parallel processes of EU and NATO enlargement, although conducive to increasing stability security and democracy, particularly in southeastern Europe¹¹, increase difficulties in decision-making and policy coordination. In this light, enlargement was not a matter of choice but one of necessity.

On the other hand, enlargement is heightening tensions in transatlantic relations, since it is becoming apparent that the EU and the United States have divergent world views and do not see eye to eye on issues of international importance such as Iran or the Middle East Peace Process. At the same time, some of the new member-states of the EU have over the past decade formed a close working relationship with the United States, as well as an affinity with American goals and aspirations, which they are unwilling to give up. These countries have (genuine or perceived) security concerns that need to be

¹¹ Andreas Kintis, CFSP/ESDP: The atrophy of the non-military aspect of crisis management, ELIAMEP Yearbook 2002 (in greek)

addressed. Many countries have joined (Finland, Greece) or are joining the EU for security related as well as economic reasons¹². If the EU does not match the security guarantees provided by NATO and the US for these countries, through a credible CFSP/ESDP, then it will be marginalized resembling a debating society rather than a council of ministers and new member-states will continue discussing important issues outside the EU framework. So the stage is set for more friction between Old and New Europe especially in the light of the emerging security threats and the shift of American focus towards the Asia- Pacific rim and away from European affairs. The US wants a NATO with global reach while the European allies have a more regional approach.

3. European Convention: reform of EU external relations, CFSP/ESDP

Greece has submitted proposals in the context of the European Convention for the reform of the decision making process in the Council and the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the Treaty¹³. In the context of the convention proceedings Greece has declared its intention to support recommendations that will further the process of European integration. Greek representatives have endorsed in no uncertain terms the over-arching objective of strengthening and consolidating the CFSP/ESDP. The Union's policy on immigration, asylum and the management of external borders is one of the most important priorities of the Greek government.

Greece is in favour of the other working group recommendations such as the creation of a European Diplomatic Service, a European Diplomatic Academy and

¹² Stelios Stavridis, "Militarising" the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited, *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXVI no.4, December 2001

¹³ At the stage of the initial Draft Treaty, the positions of P. Avgerinos (representative of the Greek Parliament to the Convention) and of P. Ioakimidis (alternate representative of the Greek Government) were submitted as CONV 443-2/12/2002. Earlier on, a paper from P. Ioakimidis summarised Greek Government positions on CFSP/ESDP (CONV 319 – 7/11/2002). At the same stage, M. Giannakou (representative of the Greek Parliament from the ranks of the Opposition) submitted extensive written positions on Defence Policy (*Bulletin of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies* No 10, p. 29, ff). Little before the end of the Convention's work, Greek PM C. Simitis gave an evaluation of the Draft Constitution – where foreign policy was afforded a special mention – to the Socialist Party/PASOK Conference "Greece, the EU and the Future of Europe", Athens 12/5/03. Some days later Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou spoke to the Convention, putting forward the proposal for an elected President of the Council, also for foreign relations reasons.

common representation in third countries and international organisations¹⁴. The opposition New Democracy Party has also put on the table the idea of the creation of a European Coast Guard¹⁵ as well as the creation of a unified framework for the EUFOR, EUROMARFOR, and EUROCORPS initiatives within the ERDF framework¹⁶.

Furthermore Greece is a strong proponent of European Space Cooperation as another facet of ESDP¹⁷.

- **External representation**

With regards to the institutional arrangements, Greece has declared itself, after considerable soul-searching, in favour of double hatting. This is the case for the external representation of the Union, where Greece argues that the posts of the High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged¹⁸. On this issue, it should be noted that the opposition New Democracy party is in favour of continuing the rotating presidency system.

Greece is favourable towards the European foreign minister idea: this has been stated by PM. C. Simitis at the post-Thessalonica Summit joint press conference with VGE and R. Prodi. Equally favourable to a President of the Council, to the point of (FM G. Papandreou's) supporting popular election of the latter.

- **Decision-making**

Greece is not in favour of a rebalancing of the votes in the Council¹⁹ but is in favour of extending qualified majority voting in all areas, including CFSP with the exception of the military aspects of CFSP/ESDP²⁰. Still, this position which finds

¹⁴ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The European Convention and the Future of Europe, online article (in greek)

¹⁵ Kostas Karamanlis, The Future and the Borders of the European Union (in greek), 23/5/2003

¹⁶ Yannis Valinakis, The European Security and Defence Policy (in greek) 13/3/2003

¹⁷ Giannos Papantoniou, European Security and Defence Policy: The Greek Presidency address delivered at the conference on The Security and Defence dimensions of Space: Challenges for the EU, Athens, 08/05/2003

¹⁸ Ruby Gropa, Greece and the Convention on the Future of Europe, ELIAMEP Opinions, April 2003

¹⁹ George Papandreou, The Future of Europe, online article

²⁰ Ruby Gropa, Greece and the Convention on the Future of Europe, ELIAMEP Opinions, April 2003

constant public opinion support (over 75% in successive Eurobarometers) should be always seen in conjunction with equally steady support to keeping the veto safety valve. The establishment of a mechanism of enhanced cooperation on ESDP matters along the lines of the EMU arrangement is viewed as beneficial to the Union's interests, especially ever since the divisive experience of the Iraq issue. Greece is not opposed to forms of enhanced cooperation in matters of CFSP/ESDP given that they don't disrupt the unity or the coherence of the Union, as this is the only practical way the new enlarged Union can maintain its positive momentum with regards to the deepening of integration.

- **Crisis management**

In the field of crisis management, Greece supports the updating of Petersberg Tasks to include tasks that require military resources²¹. The existing description of Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty covers a great range of missions, both quality and quantity wise. However the post 9/11 environment has shifted radically European threat perceptions and defence requirements. The Petersberg Tasks description should be amended to include new requirements such as conflict prevention, disarmament, dispatching of military advisors abroad to provide training as well as post-conflict stabilisation and assisting government authorities in combating terrorism.

- **Defence**

Greece has for many years advocated the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the treaty as the basic tenet for the whole ESDP framework²². Creation of a Europe where citizens enjoy two distinct security standards is a non-starter.

Greek Defence Minister Y. Papantoniou took strongly positive positions on the institutionalisation of a Council of Defence Ministers and on joint armaments planning and procurement. The insertion in the Treaties of an automatic solidarity clause in case of

²¹ Agence Europe, Kostas Simitis calls for Political Union and decentralized federalism and stresses importance of social cohesion, 04/02/2002

²² Marietta Giannakou Koutsikou, The European Security and Defense Policy (in greek) 13/03/2003

aggression, as well as of a concept of common borders, is a recurring theme of Greek positions in successive IGCs.

Existing solidarity arrangements call for solidarity among member-states on a political level. This should be amended to include solidarity also on a military level along the lines of relevant articles of the NATO or WEU charters. Furthermore solidarity provisions should cover not only conventional attack on EU territory by a third country, but also new asymmetrical threats that pose a danger for international security such as terrorism, organised crime and even illegal migration. On that score the opposition New Democracy party is also proposing the inclusion of an article similar to article 10 of the WEU charter which calls for peaceful resolution of disputes²³.

The creation of a European Armaments Policy and a European Armaments Agency is one of the core issues for the fruition of ESDP since it is inextricably linked to that of European defence spending. Member-states should be encouraged to harmonise defence requirements in the light of emerging security threats and Petersberg Tasks operational needs. In order for a viable European Defence Industry to exist, member-states should be encouraged to cooperate in a two-fold way: Increase in defence spending (especially R&D) and streamlining of projects to avoid overlapping. A regulatory role should be given to a European Armaments Agency to serve the needs of both the ERDF and the armed forces of member-states²⁴.

Greece has expressed considerable sympathy and support for the initiative of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg for deeper cooperation in defence policy²⁵, provided that a dialogue with the US were initiated concurrently and measures were taken to make it as inclusive as possible. This implies that the “4” are not sufficient for a “hard core” European defence. Nevertheless, in case the IGC does not provide an impetus for the ESDP, it should be expected that a number of member states might proceed to an enhanced cooperation initiative. According to Y. Papantoniou²⁶, in such a case Greece would be among those states.

²³ Valinakis, The European Security and Defence Policy (in greek), 13/3/2003

²⁴ Marietta Giannakou Koutsikou, The European Security and Defense Policy (in greek) 13/03/2003

²⁵ Speech in Parliament by PM Simitis on 27/3/2003. Nea Demokratia’ s President C. Karamanlis was also enthusiastically supportive.

4. Activities in CFSP-related research

- **Institutions**

1. *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy-ELIAMEP*

49, Vasilissis Sofias Ave., 106 76 Athens, Greece

Tel: +30 210 7257110,

Fax: +30 210 7257114, website: www.eliamep.gr

The Hellenic Institute for European and policy/ELIAMEP, headed by Profs. Th. Couloumbis and Th. Veremis – an earlier Director General was Y. Valinakis, presently Foreign Affairs aide to the main opposition party /Nea Dimocratia leader, C. Karamanlis – also deal with CSFP/ESDP matters, publishing a highly regarded Yearbook and occasional papers.

2. *Hellenic Center for European Studies-EKEM*

1, G Prassa and Didotou Street, 106 80 Athens, Greece

Tel.: + 30 210 36 36 880

Fax: + 30 210 36 31 133, website: www.ekem.gr

Alternate representative of the Greek Government to the Convention Prof. P. Ioakimides heads the Hellenic Centre for European Studies, which has organized a number of seminars on the Convention and has been publishing monthly Bulletins on this issue converting also CSFP/ESDP.

3. *Greek Centre of European Studies & Research (EKEME)*

6, Kriezotou Street, GR-106 71 Athens

Tel.: + 30 210 362 68 88, + 30 1 360 73 20

Fax: + 30 210 363 16 31

EKEME, headed by N. Frangakis and Prof. Arg. Fatouros, is the Greek member of TEPSA and as such has participated in the Enlargement-Watch and Convention-Watch. It

²⁶ Answer to a question from the audience, during his “Y. Kranidiotis Memorial Lecture” on 16.9.03.

hosted the TEPSA/EKEME Presidency Seminar on November 2002, which was mainly centred on CSFP/ESDP matters.

4. *Panteion University, Institute of International Relations-IDIS*

3-5 Hill Street, 105 58 Athens, Greece

Tel.: + 30 210 33 12 325/7

Fax: + 30 210 33 13 575, website: www.idis.gr

President: Prof. D. Konstas.

5. *Defence Analysis Institute*

17, Valtetsiou str., 106 80 Athens, Greece

Tel.: +30 210 36 32 902

Fax: +30 210 36 32 634, website: www.iaa.gr

President: Prof. G. Sotirelis.