Europeanisation as a consensus building process: the case of Polish-German Relations

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This outline consists of extracts drawn from my PhD, hence, its rather disjointed nature. The arguments presented attempt to draw out the East Central European debate on Europeanisation, which is seen as a normative process of consensus-building between former adversaries. The key purpose of this outline is to introduce a new dimension of Europenisation. Hence, the arguments presented should be seen as merely ideas for discussion.

Introduction

German-Polish relations have often proved to be Europe's political barometer. Whenever there has been a major development in Polish-German relations it has had resonance beyond the boundaries of the two states. There are numerous examples illustrating this point, the most prominent being the beginning of the Second World War. Less spectacular, but equally important, was the connection which became apparent between the Oder-Neisse border dispute and the overall dynamics of the Cold War. Furthermore, there was Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, which through easing tensions with Warsaw contributed to broader *détente* in East-West relations.

The broad significance of German-Polish relations prompted politicians and practitioners alike throughout the latter half of the twentieth century to promote the idea of anchoring the relationship within a European context, a move which, it has been suggested, would

serve the security of the wider Europe.[1] The implications of such a notion remain far from being clearly defined, though it is possible to identify its most crucial facets, which, as they appear in academic and political debates, concern domestic democratisation and integration with West European and Atlantic structures.

It is widely believed that the democratisation of West Germany and its entry into international institutions after the end of the Second World War secured peace and stability in Western Europe,[2] and consequently that with the end of the Cold War a similar 'anchorage to the West' needs to be extended to include East Central Europe, in order that Germany, Poland and other countries of the region may establish new and consensus-based relations. Significantly, the idea of Europe, or more specifically of 'Europeanisation', was routinely positioned at the centre of these calls.[3]

The purpose of this paper is to define this understanding of the notion of 'Europeanisation' and what it means for German-Polish relations. To meet this objective the paper is divided into two principal parts. The first section introduces the notion of *'Europeanisation'*. The paper then moves on to present a summary of literature review

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[1] See: Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Polen und Deutschland in Europa an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts' in Hans Adolf Jacobsen und Mieczyslaw Tomala (Hrsg.) *Bonn-Warshau 1945-1991, Die Deutsch-Polnischen Beziehungen, Analyse und Dokunetation* (Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik: Köln, 1992)*,* pp. 518-523. Willy Brandt, 'Der Knifall von Warschau' in Friedbert Pflüger/Winfrried Lipscher (Hg.) *Feinde werden Freunde* (Bouvier: Bonn, 1993), pp. 51-60, esp. 53-54,59. Helmut Schmidt, *Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn* (Siedler: Berlin, 1990) pp. 513-514. Gerhadr Schröder, Jerzy Buzek, 'Wspolna przyszlosc ma na imie Europa' *Rzeczpospolita*, 18.11.2000.

[2] For example see: Simon Bulmer and William Paterson , 'West Germany's Role in Europe: 'Man-Mountain' or 'Semi-Guliver?,'' *Journal of Common Market Studies* XXVIII (1989): 95-117. Adrian Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU* (Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York, 2000). Peter J.Katzenstein, 'United Germany in an Integrating Europe,' in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Tamed Power, Germany in Europe* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997). Simon J. Bulmer, 'Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power', in Katzenstein, *Tamed Power,* 1-49.

[3] Although these appeals have not necessarily used the word 'Europeanisation' they were relating to 'Europe' as a framework for the promotion of peaceful relations. See: Bronislaw Geremek, Joshka Fischer, 'Polscy i Niemcy u progu nowego tysiaclecia' *Rzeczpospolita*, 17.02.2000/ 'Deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen – Schlüssel zum Aufbau einer stabilen Europäischen Union', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 17.02.2000. Gerhard Schröder, Jerzy Buzek, 'Wspolna przyszlosc ma na imie Europa' *Rzeczpospolita*, 18.11.2000. Friedbert Pflüger, 'Polen-unser Frankreich im Osten', in W. Schäuble/R. Seiters , (Hg.) *Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert. Die Tesen der Jungen Außenpolitiker* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1996), pp. 183-92.Artur Hajnicz, *Ze Soba czy Przeciw Sobie* (Presspublika: Warszawa, 1995, pp.190-215.

on Polish-German relations (with some reference to IR approaches) and defines conditions for the 'Europeanisation' of the relationship.

1. The Idea of Europeanisation

1.1. Contrasting Conceptions

The term 'Europeanisation' has been floating around in political and academic debates since the late 1980s. The persistence of the idea derives from two main processes. Firstly, the impact of European integration upon domestic politics of EU and, secondly, the ending of the Cold War which recast Europe's political significance. However, in spite of its frequent usage there is no unanimity amongst scholars as to the precise meaning and scope of Europeanisation.[4] There are at least three distinctive 'Europeanisation' debates, each of which has its own characteristics. These three are:

- In political science and economics the term is mobilised to refer to the impact of EU level policies and politics upon domestic developments in member states.[5] This debate will be called here 'domestic Europeanisation'.

- The discussion that equates 'Europeanisation' with the political and economic transformation of East Central Europe. This is seen here as a 'normative debate' and will be called either 'Europeanisation' or 'normative Europeanisation'.

- An anthropological debate which identifies the emergence of a homogeneous European culture.[6]

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[4] For a review of the Europeanization debate see: Claudio M. Radaelli, 'Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change', *European Integration Online Papers* (EioP) Vol.4 (2000) No.8; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-oo8a.htm

[5] See: Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, 'When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change' *European Integration online Papers* (EIoP) Vol. 4 (2000) N° 15; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm

The most striking feature about these three debates is how quite unrelated and different they are both in substance and form to each other. Whereas the *domestic Europeanisation* has been more or less established as a discernible research field in political and economic sciences, the *normative Europeanisation* debate, which is mostly focused on East Central Europe, remained largely just a matter of political discourse. In addition, whilst the *domestic Europeanisation* debate is about dynamics that exist, or are claimed to exist the normative debate sees *Europeanisation* as a desirable development and a good in itself. As it is concerned chiefly with the 'transformation' of Polish-German relations the paper will refer mostly to the *normative Europeanisation* debate. However, the phenomenon of *domestic Europeanisation* will also come to have a significant impact upon Polish-German relations in the context of EU enlargement and will therefore also be outlined below together with the normative conception.

1.1.1. Domestic Europeanisation

Domestic Europeanisation has been identified as a multifarious process of the EU shaping or even determining the internal politics and policies of Member-States. This conception has been applied to a broad range of areas from regional policies[7] through immigration,[8] to economic modernisation.[9] Despite this burgeoning research agenda the meaning of what *domestic Europeanisation* really is and what it 'does' remains open to

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[6] John Bornemann and Nick Fowler, 'Europeanization', *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 1997, 26: 487-514.

[7] Thomas Conzelmann ,'Europeanisation' of Regional Development Policies? Linking the Multi-Level Governance Approach with Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change, *European Integration online Papers* (EIoP) Vol. 2 (1998) N° 4; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-004a.htm

[8] Adrian Favell, The Europeanisation of immigration politics, *European Integration online Papers* (EIoP) Vol. 2 (1998) N° 10; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-010a.htm

[9] Kostas Lavdas, *The Europeanization of Greece:Interest Politics and Crisis of Integration* (Macmillan:Basingstoke, 1997).

interpretation.[10] It appears that there are two broad ways of defining *Europeanisation* as a process impacting upon the domestic level of policy-making.

- As an independent variable that has a direct impact upon domestic policies. Here *domestic Europeanisation* is seen as the 'emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalises interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative rules'.[11] Some other scholars referred to this process as 'Europeification'.[12]

- As an intervening variable; a process which may bring about change at the domestic level. Here *domestic Europeanisation* depicts: 'Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules. Procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of the EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies'.[13]

In spite of their differences both these definitions remain predominantly, if not exclusively, preoccupied with the EU, in that that they argue that the policies made at the European level are capable of changing domestic interests and the overall environment at which the governments make their decisions. It is thus clear that investigating *Europeanisation* at the domestic level is limited here to the analysis of dynamics between Brussels and Member-States. In this particular instance, as long as Poland remains outside the EU, the policies made in Brussels could affect Polish-German relations only

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[10] For example see the divergent interpretations of the Europeanisation concept in the works of Radelli, 'Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change' and the paper by Börzel and Risse, 'When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and domestic Change'.

[11] A definition by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (*Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change*; forthcoming 2001). Here quoted after: Börzel and Risse. When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and domestic Change',p. 3.

[12] See: Svein S Andersen and Kjell A Eliassen,' *Making Policy in Europe, The Europeification on National Policy Making* (Sage Publications: London-New Delhi,1993) pp.3-18.

[13] See: Radelli, 'Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change', p.3.

indirectly. Despite this, the term *Europeanisation* has figured prominently in post-Cold War international relations, particularly in East-Central Europe. However, as suggested earlier, it came to symbolise a very different kind of debate from the more political science-based one as introduced above.

1.1.2. Normative Europeanisation and the 'Return to Europe'

In the wake of the end of the Cold War 'Europeanisation' became a popular slogan in East-Central Europe, encapsulating the very essence of the political and economic transformation of the region and setting the standard for nurturing of democracy, opening the economy and the radical re-direction of foreign policies. Unlike in the *domestic Europeanisation* debate outlined above, the EU was not initially a main point of reference here, although European integration was often mentioned as a practical realisation of what 'Europe' was about.[14] Predominantly, however, 'Europe' was not a concrete entity but rather a political and cultural construction, which as East-Central Europeans believed, had determined the pace of developments in western Europe after 1945 and which, therefore, they wanted to emulate and be a part of.[15]

The exceptional popularity of the idea of 'Europe' during the watershed of 1989 and its aftermath can be explained by two fundamental factors. Firstly, for many East-Central Europeans 'Europe' meant Western Europe from which they felt that they were artificially excluded by the non-European Soviet Union.[16] Thus the notion of 'Europe'

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[14] For example see the following speeches: 'Belonging to Europe' given by Taduesz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 30 January 1990' in the collection of documents edited by Adam Daniel Rotfeld and Walther Stützle, *Germany and Europe in Transition* (Sipri: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp.131-4; Addresses by Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia, given to a meeting of the leaders from three neighbouring countries at Bratislava Castle on April 9, 1990 and in the Council of Europe in Stasbourg on May 10.1990: www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990.

[15] ibid.

[16] Two most famous expressions of this line of thinking are an article by Milan Kundera 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', *New York Review of Books*, 26.04.1984 and a book by György Konrád, *Antipolitics: An Essay* (London : Quartet, 1984). For a recent reassessment of the Central European notion see an article by Judy Batt and Kataryna Wolczuk, 'Keep an eye on the east', *Financial Times* (International Edition) 23.02.2001.

carried with it a very clear political message and one that was pro-western and anti-Soviet. Secondly, the idea of European integration had come to enjoy exceptionally high prestige in dissident circles in East-Central Europe, particularly since the late 1970s.[17]

Therefore, after 1989 it was self-evident to the former dissidents, who overnight turned into statesmen, that their internal reforms and foreign policies would be guided by the principle of *Europeanisation* and the 'Return to Europe'. The practical implications of this grand strategy meant that these countries embarked on a number of internal reforms aimed at emulating the polices and standards of 'core Europe'. These ideas also set the foreign policy priorities of East-Central European states, all of which applied for membership in the EU, the Council of Europe and NATO.

This process of *Europeanisation* also proved to have a profound effect upon the general 'style' of foreign policies in the region, which, excluding the former Yugoslavia, have been marked by consensus-seeking and a preference for solving interstate conflicts by diplomatic means. In this context, it is important to note that in political discourse the term has often been used as a synonym for modernisation at home and benign behaviour and co-operation abroad.[18] In this context *Europeanisation* has been presented as an alternative to *Balkanisation*, with the latter notion symbolising conflict and violence.[19]

Thus, clearly, *Europeanisation* as 'Return to Europe' continues to act as a strong normative force, in the sense that those states which are labelled as *European* are seen as 'good' states. This debate, however, remains almost completely undefined in academic literature. In opposition to the domestic-western *europeanisation*, which, as pointed out

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[17] See: 'Niemcy i Polska', *Kultura*, Lipiec/Sierpien 1978, pp.123-129; Also published in German: 'Polen und Deutschland', *Osteuropa,* Februar 1979, pp.101-105. Jiri Dienstbier, *Sneni o Evropie*, (Lidove Noviny: Praha, 1990).

[18] For example see: Bronislaw Geremek, Joshka Fischer, 'Polscy i Niemcy u progu nowego tysiaclecia' *Rzeczpospolita*, 17.02.2000/ 'Deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen – Schlüssel zum Aufbau einer stabilen Europäischen Union', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 17.02.2000. An interview with Stanislaw Stomma, 'Porzadkowanie Europy', *Rzeczpospolita*, 02.05.2000. Interview with Joshka Fisher, 'Boimy sie wielkich Niemiec', *Rzeczpospolita*, 13.10.1995. An unpublished version of the paper by Judy Batt and Kataryna Wolczuk, 'The tragedy of Central Europe moves eastwards' – for the thrust of the paper's argument see its edited and published version 'Keep an eye on the east', *F T,* 23.02.2001.

[19] Marek Garztecki, 'Balkanizacja przed europeizacja', *Rzeczpospolita*, 08.01.1994.

above, has been preoccupied with identifiable policies (i.e. where the EU affects domestic arrangements), the post-Cold War debate on the *Europeanisation* of East-Central Europe remains predominantly a politically driven range of objectives. This clearly poses the question as to whether *Europeanisation* can be researched as a political 'reality', rather than merely as a set of ideas and aspirations.

However, it is manifestly clear that aspirations for *Europeanisation* in the region have shaped the nature and pace of reforms in the region. This has inspired some scholars to define *Europeanisation* as an actual political process. For example, Attilla Agh defined *Europeanisation* as a process of introducing pluralism in politics and privatisation in the economy .[20] Geoffrey Pridham spoke about *Europeanisation* of political parties in East Central Europe as influenced by either a conscious emulation of the western-style polity or by the conditionality of EU membership criteria.[21] Both Agh and Pridham regard *Europeanisation* as being to do mostly with domestic political issues and Agh posits a notion of *Europeanisation*, which is a 'measurable' phenomenon. Based on his argument, if a state has successfully implemented political pluralism and privatisation in the economy then it has been *Europeanised.* This focus on post-communist domestic transformation, although important for international relations, is of limited utility for the study of the *Europeanisation* of Polish-German relations. Therefore, some tentative suggestions for a framework of analysis will be discussed in the next section.

1.2. Europeanisation in the Context of Polish-German Relations

The *Europeanisation* of international relations in East-Central Europe can mean different things depending on the particular circumstances of the countries concerned. For

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[20]   See the following publications by a Hungarian political scientist Attila Agh: *Democratization and Europeanization in Hungary* (Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 1995. *Europeanization through privatizing and pluralization in Hungary* (Glasgow : University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1993).
[21]   See: Geoffrey Pridham, 'Patterns of Europeanisation and transnational party cooperation:party development in Central and Eastern Europe', ECPR paper, Manheim, March 1999.

example, an argument about *Europeanisation* of Hungary's relations with Romania or Slovakia would concentrate on the question of the Hungarian minority in these countries and their freedom to express their ethnic distinctiveness .[22] In the case of Austrian-Czech relations it seems that a major hurdle on the way to *Europeanise* them is the question of the Czech nuclear plant at Temelin that Prague insensitively decided to locate close to the border with Austria, thus causing a major dispute between these two countries.[23] In both these cases the complaining parties referred to *European* rules and regulations, as defined by the EU and Council of Europe, to support their arguments and to mitigate existing or emerging conflicts.[24]

It seems, therefore, that in its broad foreign policy sense *Europeanisation* means **convergence** in inter-state relations and that **international institutions** also play a key role in bringing this notion about. Moreover, *Europeanisation* is not only an outcome of states having become more ready to agree with each other, but it is also the very process that leads to greater harmony amongst them. For example, should Romanians consciously apply European minority standards, as enshrined in various declarations and conventions of the Council of Europe and OSCE their relations with Hungary would be less problematic and in effect more *European*. In addition, Romania's chances to join the EU would be enhanced as one EU membership criterion points specifically to the issue of human rights.

In contrast to the cases outlined above the *Europeanisation* of Polish-German relations is considerably more complex. The process of achieving convergence in Polish-German relations is dependent on an exceptionally complex set of issues. This is a result of the difficult history of these relations and of direct geographical proximity. In addition, many years of communist propaganda made the Poles one of the most anti-German

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[22] See: George Schöpflin 'Hungary and its Neighbours' in *Nations, Identity, Power* (Hurst: London 2000), pp.378-410, esp. 389-390. Daniel Nelson, 'Regional Security and Ethnic Minorities' in Aurel Braun and Zoltan Barany, *Dilemmas of Transition - The Hungarian Experience* (Rowman & Littlefield: Maryland, 1999), pp. 301-323.
[23] See: 'Ekolodzy czekaja na opine ekspertow' *Rzeczpospolita*, 18.12.2000.
[24] See:'Spor o elektrownie zalogodzony', *Rzeczpospolita*, 14.12.2000.

nations in Europe whilst the Germans developed a strong contempt for Polish unruliness which inspired the pejorative saying *'Polnishe Wirtshaft'*.[25]

On the other hand, the Polish-German *Europeanisation* debate did not start only in 1989, but began with the reconciliation movement in the mid-1960s and developed further in the wake of West Germany's new *Ostpolitik*.[26] In particular two policies stand out as clear manifestations of promoting convergence: firstly, the call for reconciliation which was issued by the Polish bishops in 1965, and, secondly, the provisional recognition of the Oder/Neisse border line by the West German government in 1970.[27] Willy Brandt's policy towards Poland rested on the assumption that it could not be conducted separatly from the Federal Republic's broader *European* policy. This, Brandt suggests in his memoirs, led him to recognise the Oder/Neisse border and inspired his famous *kneefall* at the monument of the Warsaw ghetto.[28] The link between *Europapolitk* and *Ostpolitik* was further advanced by Brandt's successor, Helmut Schmidt, who argued that the Federal Republic's deeper integration with the European Community and Poland's co-operation with it were in the both countries' interest. Furthermore, Schmidt argued that the future of European peace rested on Germany's co-operation with both France and Poland.[29]

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[25] For the German sterotypes about the Poles see the following articles from the volume *,Germany and Eastern Europe, Cultural Identities and Cultural Differencies* (Yearbook of European Studies – 13, Amsterdam – Atlanta, GA 1999): Jürgen Lieskounig, 'Brannteintriekende Wilde' Beyond Civilization and Outside History The Depiction of the Poles in Gustav Freytag's 'Soll und Haben',p. 133-148; Voller R. Berghahn,'Germans and Poles, 1971-1945',pp.15-37; Thomas C. Fox, 'Imagining Eastern Europe in East German literature', pp. 284-304 . Also see: Stefan Garsztecki, 'Obraz Polakow w Niemczech: stare i nowe stereotypy' in Dieter Bingen i Krzysztof Malinowski (eds.), *Polacy i Niemcy na drodze do partnerskiego sasiedztwa* (Instytut Zachodni: Poznan 2000), pp.48-65. For the Polish strotypes about the Germans see: Jan Jozef Lipski, 'Das Bild des Deutschen in den Augen der Polen. Historische Skizze' in *Wir Müssen uns Alles Sagen* (Deutsch-Polnischer Verlag: Warszawa 1996), pp.172-185. Danuta Berlinska ' Stary i nowy obraz Niemca w Polsce' in Bingen i Malinowski, *Polacy i Niemcy na drodze do partnerskiego sasiedztwa*, pp. 27-48.
[26] See: part 2 of the volume edited by Pfüger and Lipscher, *Feinde Werden Freunde.*, pp. 145-289.
[27] For the importance of the 1965 address of the Polish episcopate see: Jan Jozef Lipski, 'Polen, Deutsche und Europa' in *Wir Müssen uns Alles Sagen*, pp. 253-264. Hanna Suchocka, 'Znaczenie oredzia biskupow polskich z 1965 r. dla budowania tozsamosci nowej Europy', *Przeglad Zachodni*, Styczen – Marzec 1996, pp. 17-29.
[28] See: Willy Brandt, 'Der Kniefall von Warschau' in   Pfüger und Lipscher, *Feinde Werden Freunde.* pp. 51-60.
[29] See: Helmut Schmidt, 'Schwieriger Besuch in Warschau 1966', ibid.,p.49-50.

Indeed, after 1989, the successful Franco-German relationship was often flagged as a point of comparison and a potential model for the *Europeanisation* of Polish-German relations.[30] Two similarities were pointed out in this context, both of which were strongly related to issues of **convergence** and Western **institutional integration.** Firstly, as was the case between Germany and France, it was argued that the deep divergences that existed in Polish-German relations could only be overcome through the emergence of exceptionally intimate links. One of the main advocates of this thesis, Friedbert Pflüger, illustrated this connection by saying that Poland and Germany 'could not be just casual friends but they must be like a married couple'.[31] Secondly, it was suggested that the best way to achieve such an intimate convergence was to co-operate through multilateral channels, preferably through the EU, in a way resembling the Franco-German axis.

To sum up, the purpose of this section was to identify some common denominators for *Europeanisation* in international politics which, as pointed out above, would appear to be to do with 'convergence' and the presence of some degree of 'multilateral integration'.

Conditions for the Europeanisation of Polish-German Relations

This section summarises the findings of a literure review (a full version is available in my PhD thesis) on the subject of Polish-German relations with a view to construct a framework for study of the consensus-building process.

The summary suggests that the four factors discussed below: conducive international environment, democratic government, western integration and reconciliation, must be in place for the emergence of consensus in the relationship.

The juxtaposition of the findings of the literature review with key questions drawn from literature in IR reveals the highly eclectic nature of the concepts underpinning writing on the Polish-German relationship. Some of the arguments seem to confirm a rather realist thesis of the importance of structural factors - all authors agree that without the profound

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[30] See : Friedbert Pflüger, 'Polen – unser Frankreich im Osten' in W. Schäuble und R. Seiters (Hgg) *Aussenpolitik im 21 Jahrhundert. Die Thessen der Jungen Aussenpolitiker* (Bouvier Verlag: Bonn, 1996), p.183-192.
[31] See: Pflüger,'Polen – unser Frankreich im Osten', p.183.

change in the international system of 1989, Polish-German rapprochement would not have come about. On the other hand there are arguments that point to the impact of Germany's membership in Western institutions and Poland's aspirations to join the EU and NATO as decisively shaping the relationship, which would seem to uphold a liberal thesis. There are also accounts that refer to domestic sources of foreign policy or point out issues of political culture, for example, the reconciliation process that seems to endorse a liberal-ideational perspective.

Significantly, the majority of authors did not, in their analysis, discriminate between structural international or domestic sources of conflict and convergence and stressed the significance of **both** in relations between Poland and the Federal Republic. In effect, then, the literature tends to uphold the view that the causes of developments between Poland and (West) Germany came from more than one singular determinant and, moreover, that they were interrelated. On the whole, as far as convergence-related factors are concerned, the literature identifies the following issues: change in the international structure, domestic democratisation, western integration and reconciliation. These will be briefly summarised in the section below.

International - Structural

The review suggests that the international balance of power had considerable importance for developments between Poland and (West) Germany. As a result of post-war changes in the international system Poland and Germany found each other involved in a deep territorial conflict over the Neisse-Oder border. The dawning of the Cold War and the division of Germany subsequently strengthened this antagonism. These changes, neither of which were initiated or even decidedly influenced by either of the two parties, defined the key features of the relationship until the end of the Cold War. None of the accounts in the review argue against this thesis that in their relations before 1989 West German and Polish interests were mainly determined externally.

The end of the Cold War resulted both for Poland and Germany with the return of their sovereignty and the abatement of superpower domination in their foreign policies. This has meant that German-Polish relations have since been far less determined by structural factors exogenous to both countries. Current discussions on the importance of Russia in Germany's foreign policy clearly has implications for international relations in the region, however, in these debates both Poland and Germany are clearly not objects of structural change but rather key actors with the ability to shape and determine it.

Domestic Democratisation

Domestic democratisation is seen as another important factor with formative qualities for the relationship. In particular, it has often been regarded as the process capable of mitigating conflict in Polish – (West) German relations. Astonishingly this kind of argument was already put forward in 1946 by Edmund Osmanczyk, a Polish independent expert on Germany, who also argued against further weakening of defeated Germany.[32] Similar arguments were posited in the mid-1950s by Stanislaw Stomma, one of the first advocates of Polish-German rapprochement, who considered the Federal Republic's domestic liberalisation and its *Westbindung*, 'anchoring with the west', as favourable from the point of view of Poland's security.[33]

Dieter Bingen argued that the fact that the Federal Republic established a democratic and Western oriented government stimulated an intellectual breakthrough that for the first time in the last two centuries led to Germany's recognition that Poland would continue to exist.[34] Bingen also argued that for the same reasons, the Federal Republic pledged never to use force to solve its territorial disputes with Warsaw since. Finally, it was argued that the Federal Republic's domestic democratisation actively served to constrain its post

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[32] See: Edmund Osmanczyk, 'Niemcy w roku 1945', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, nr.3/1946. 'O bezpieczenstwie zachodniej granicy', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, nr.28/1946; Both articles quoted in: Anna Wolf-Poweska, 'Poszukiwanie Drog Dialogu', in Wolf-Poweska, *Polacy wobec*, p. 371.
[33] See: Stanislaw Stomma i Stefan Kisielewski, 'Dwuglos o idealizmie i realizmie w polityce', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, nr. 1/1956. Stanislaw Stomma, *Poscig Za Nadzieja* (Paryz: 1991).
[34] Bingen, *Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenuer bis Kohl,* p.1.

1989 behaviour in East Central Europe and shaped Bonn's determination to stabilise the region through its advocacy of EU and NATO enlargements.[35]

The significance of the democratisation of Poland after 1989 and its choice of a pro-western course is also discussed in the literature. For example, Malinowski points to the ideational aspects of the post-1989 Polish-German relations. He posits that Germany and Poland embarked on a course of 'good neighbourly relations' - *'dobre sasiedztwo'*, not only due to changes in the international environment but also in the wake of the establishment of democratic governance in Poland. In partricular an aspect of Poland's domestic politics that remained of specific importance for Bonn was the establishment of extensive minority rights for ethnic Germans in Poland.[36] According to Bingen, it was the Mazowiecki government's recognition of the German minority and his subsequent pledge to implement European minority standards that proved the government's democratic credentials and made rapprochement possible.[37]

Western Integration

Most authors that write about post-1989 developments in Polish-German relations relate to West European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, though on a much smaller scale, these issues are also seen as having importance for the improvement of the relationship prior to 1989. For example, a number of authors underline that the FRG's *Westbindung* proved crucial for revising the formerly held perception of East Central Europe as Germany's power base and that this in turn enhanced Bonn's credibility in Warsaw. This was manifested in parts of the Polish opposition's stance that supported the unification of Germany long before 1989 which was often premised on Bonn's positive record of membership in Nato and the EC since the 1950's.[38]

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[35] Tewes, 'The Emergence of Civilian Power'.
[36] Malinowski, 'Asymetria Partnerstwa',p. 281.
[37] Bingen, *Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenuer bis Kohl*, p. 274.
[38] 'Niemcy i Polska', *Kultura*, pp.123-129 / 'Polen und Deutschland', *Osteuropa,* pp.101-105. .

However, generally as regards the relationship before 1989, western integration is rarely perceived of as an explanatory variable in the course of Polish - West German relations. In contrast to this it is often seen as a significant causal factor in the analysis of the post-1989 relationship. In fact, it is possible to say that whilst bipolarity remains the most common explanation of pre-1989 developments, it is the notion of European and Euro-Atlantic integration which is seen as a dominant cause of German-Polish rapprochement after the end of Cold War.[39] It was after all the prospect of integration with the West which encouraged or even inspired Poland to embark upon a programme of 'domestic Europeanisation' (i.e. minority rights, democratisation and economic liberalisation).[40] Crucially, both Bonn's and Warsaw's changing policies towards the German minority in Poland is often related to the Federal Republic's support for Poland's membership in the EU.[41]

Reconciliation

With few countries has Germany had such a heavy burden of past relations to address, as has been the case with Poland. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the reconciliation question is often underlined as one of the major issues in the relationship.[42] For example, it is often pointed out that Adenauer's general lack of historical sensitivity in relations with Poland was one of the major reasons explaining the failure of the short-lived Polish-West German rapprochement in the late 1950s.[43] In contrast to this, the fact that *Ostpolitik* of the SPD/FDP government was morally and historically grounded, as manifested in Brandt's famous *kneefall* in Warsaw, is often seen as pathing the way for a breakthrough in the relationship.

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[39] See: Bingen, *Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenuer bis Kohl.* Malinowski, 'Asymetria Partnerstwa,'. Pflüger, 'Polen-unser Frankreich,'. Pflüger, 'Poland and the European Union'.

[40] See the volume edited by Karl Cordell, *Poland and the European Union* (Routledge: London and New York 2000).

[41] Malinowski, 'Asymetria Partnerstwa,'.

[42] For example see: Lily Gardner Feldman, The Principle and Practice of 'Reconciliation 'in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic', *International Affairs,* Vol.75, No2/April 1999, pp.333-357. Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name, Germany and Divided Continent* (Jonathan Cape: London, 1993), pp. 228-300. Adrian Hyde-Price 'Building a stable peace in Mitteleuropa: The German-Polish Hinge'in http://www.bham.ac.uk/IGS/DiscussionPapers.htm.

[43] Bingen, *Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenuer bis Kohl,* pp. 41-78.

With the reconciliation process gaining new momentum after the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the final recognition of the Oder/Neisse border line by Bonn, the relationship advanced impressively both on the official as well as at a societal level. This, for example, has been reflected in the changes in the Polish public's view of Germany, which has improved dramatically since 1991, marking the literal disappearance of the fear of German military aggression from the public discourse.[44] The common history and especially its bitter episodes are carefully remembered, but at the same time they have ceased to divide Warsaw and Bonn/Berlin. Instead, acts of reconciliation have come to signify the convergence–related political developments.

Conclusion

The end of the Second World War saw the emergence of bipolarity and led the international politics of East Central Europe to be determined by the external interests of the victorious superpowers. German-Polish relations, which had already been severely scarred during the war were additionally burdened by new post-war arrangements and most crucially by the Soviet 're-drawing' of East Central European borders. Subsequently, Poland's loss of more then a third of its pre-war territory on behalf of the Soviet Union was 'compensated' for by her take-over of the Eastern parts of Germany up to the rivers Neisse and Oder. In the wake of these decisions and following the beginning of the Cold War, Communist Poland and the Federal Republic found each other engaged in a conflict so severe that until 1970 they were unable even to maintain diplomatic relations. On the other hand, in spite of its inherent conflictuality the Cold War produced the longest period of peaceful coexistence in Europe in the 20th century. Subsequently,

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[44] According to public opinion polls the Polish society's disposition towards reconciliation with Germany has been constantly growing since 1990. In 1999 73 % thought that reconciliation with Germany was possible and desirable whilst 26 % had opposing views. See: 'Polacy o mozliwosciach pojednania z Niemcami i Ukraina – Komunikat z Badan (Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS), Warszawa, 06.1999), p. 2.

when the Berlin wall collapsed, Europe found itself confronted with a democratic Federal Republic rather than a belligerent and unpredictable Germany.

As the literature review demonstrated it is generally perceived that since the end of the Cold War the substance of German-Polish relationship has changed fundamentally. German and Polish interests are no longer seen as antagonistic and are depicted as being more congruent than ever. A key aspect of this, as it is often referred to, the 'German-Polish community of interests' embodies the shared objective to see this relationship firmly embedded in a Euro-Atlantic context. In other words, it is hoped that just as the Federal Republic's post-war *Westbindung* prompted the Franco-German friendship and secured peace on the continent, Poland's anchoring to the West should have a positive impact for post-Cold War German-Polish relations and consequently for Europe too.

This post Cold-War radical change in German-Polish relations poses a challenge to both experts on Germany and Poland and theorists of International Relations. Concerning the latter, the key question is how to conceptualise the new post-1989 make-up of the relationship and how to compare it with former co-operation under the Cold War's overlay. Which factors have proved crucial to determining this relationship; the changing international structure? The democratisation of Poland? Poland's increasing anchoring within western institutions? Or maybe all of these elements should be considered together? Finally, is it useful to apply the same theoretical framework to analyse German-Polish relations regardless of whether is it before or after the end of the Cold War? As indicated in the literature review an understanding of the relationship prior to 1989 was generally regarded as being best understood with reference to structural factors, whilst analysis of post-Cold War relations it has been the impact of domestic arrangements and international institutions that is far more prominent.

The review of literature on Polish-(West) German relations indicated that in this particular instance *Europeanisation* remained based on the composition of structural and domestic elements with varying importance of its individual elements depending on a specific time period. The other key outcome of the review is the underlying importance

of western international institutions in achieving convergence between Bonn/Berlin and Warsaw. Therefore, the key question to be answered now is how the consenus-building process ('Europenisation' in East Central European discourse) is being affected by the forces of European integration (Europeanisation in western discourse).