



## State of the Art Report October 2004

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## Executive Summary

FORNET seeks to make an original and valuable contribution to the study of European Foreign Policy through answering the questions: what is it, who makes it and how? There are no straight answers to these questions because there is a vibrant, on-going debate across Europe about what European foreign policy is, and the purpose of FORNET is to both nurture and cultivate that debate. FORNET aims to engage in the debate and offer a new perspective on these central questions, principally by bringing together for the first time a network of researchers that span the existing EU membership and the accession states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The geographical breadth of Europe is represented in FORNET and through the critical engagement of all participants European foreign policy will be tackled from a truly *European* perspective. Key issues such as defence, immigration and regional security will radically change in nature after the Enlargement of the EU, at which point the external borders of the EU will become a much starker divide between prosperity and security on one side and scarcity and insecurity. The FORNET project seeks to act in preparation for this radical change and represents the foundations of a wider academic community that will shape the debate on European foreign policy for the coming years. The debate will also be cultivated through the cross-fertilisation of ideas that will result from the sharing of ideas between, and showcasing of new work by, the FORNET partners. FORNET's aims is to connect theory to practice and students to practitioners, both through working groups and plenaries and through the vehicle of its website.

### *i. The Approach of FORNET*

FORNET has three principal aims in its contribution towards furthering the debate on European foreign policy. This first is to modernise the debate by modernising the approach taken to research across the EU and the accession states. Modernisation is taking place through the application of new technology and improving the coordination and distribution of existing research and FORNET intends to harness the opportunities of technology which allow research progress in new ways. 'Technology' is taken to mean computers and the Internet, and the Internet site dedicated to the FORNET project ([www.fornet.info](http://www.fornet.info)) is intended to become the primary reference point for gaining information on European foreign policy on the World Wide Web. The design of the website includes core curriculum and reading lists, as well as the introduction of 'virtual study' modules where debate on specific topics will be on going. However, FORNET intends to modernise the research process in a second way by using the Internet and electronic mail to coordinate and disseminate research in five specific policy areas (see below) between partners that are spread across Europe. Thus FORNET aims to pursue a research

agenda that can progress swiftly through the exchange of information between partners to facilitate more rapid results and make that information and research available to a wider audience as soon as it is ready. FORNET aims to build a reputation for its usefulness not only on the quality of its content but the speed at which it is put there and therefore its relevance.

The second aim is to deepen the mutual understanding of research into European foreign policy. Deepening will take place in new policy areas that remain under-studied at present and are in constant flux, such as the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is also the aim of FORNET to connect theorists with historians and political sciences in order to apply new theoretical approaches (such as constructivism) to existing policy areas, thus creating new understandings that complement existing knowledge. The project of deepening mutual understanding has produced a large research agenda that would ordinarily be over-ambitious if it were not for the modernisation of the debate mentioned above. Through the use of Internet communication FORNET will be able to pursue this large research agenda via a division of labour between partners that nevertheless will remain a coherent body of knowledge through the frequent coordination and exchange of information through the network. The overall aim is to create a permanent and sustainable structure for exchanging scientific research in a wider Europe.

The final aim is to widen participation in the academic debate over European foreign policy by welcoming in new members to the research community. The widening will take place in two dimensions, one geographical and the other generational. FORNET has twenty-five partners across Europe from both EU states and accession states and is designed to allow scholars from both sides to meet and exchange ideas in preparation for the enlarged Europe of 2004. FORNET also has a number of working groups that will be held around Europe in various institutions and will offer established experts in the field the opportunity to travel and address research communities across Europe. FORNET aims not only to bring researchers together, but also to take the debate over European foreign policy out into the member states and the accession states to audiences that might not otherwise be able to participate directly through working group forums, which will be a major contribution to managing the civic and societal dimension of Enlargement. This leads on to the second dimension of widening, which is generational and the efforts by FORNET to involve younger researchers from across Europe in the project. This is done on two levels, firstly but working with young academics in various states and also by encouraging graduate students or recently qualified doctoral students to contribute to the various FORNET forums, be they working group presentations, discussion papers, the website bulletin board or in the electronic journal of the project, CFSP Forum. ([www.fornet.info/CFSPforum.html](http://www.fornet.info/CFSPforum.html)) FORNET is also concerned with encouraging the recent trend of younger female researchers becoming ever more

engaged in the study of international relations and of European foreign policy, and the network will provide opportunities for consolidating this development. In conclusion, these efforts to modernise, deepen and widen the debate of European foreign policy are the principal way FORNET is 'adding value' to the existing state of the art.

## *ii. Role of the working groups*

There are five specific areas in which FORNET has divided its members into working groups that will focus on narrowly defined working agendas. These groups cover both theoretical approaches and the empirical studies of the current areas of highest salience.

### *Group 1: Theories and Approaches on CFSP*

Theoretical and conceptual approaches need to be discussed and tested against the background of recent developments, since theory alone is of little use unless it is applied to answer questions. As new questions arise in response to the changing nature of European politics, it is an opportunity to test the limits of existing theory and put new theory to the test. The central issue around which many of these questions revolve is how we are best able to grasp the EU as an international actor and which approach is suited to describe, analyse and explain its international role.

### *Group 2: The Evolution and Democratic Accountability of CFSP Institutions*

One of the central concerns of the European project has been the attempt to legitimise the EU in the eyes of its citizens, and concern for this has never been greater given the failure to agree a new EU Constitution and treaty reform. As the EU is simultaneously increasing its military competences in the field of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, there is more need than ever to make the CFSP institutions accountable to the citizens of Europe, who will be expected to contribute the soldiers for this enterprise. An important consideration in this field is the issue of legitimacy and democratic accountability, and the willingness of Europeans to support military interventions around the world for the maintenance of European values.

### *Group 3: CFSP and Enlargement*

The dimension of enlargement plays a central role in defining the EU as an international actor and as a regional actor. Enlargement will have international implications for the European security

scene in which NATO, the USA and Russia are all also involved. As the EU develops relations of a new kind with NATO alongside the building up of the Common Security and Defence Policy, a broader dialogue and exchange of views with European partner institutes and academics is necessary.

#### *Group 4: The Evolution of ESDP*

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can be regarded as a major issue in the imminent future from an institutional and a practical perspective. ESDP represents a more ambitious task than the CFSP and its evolution must be observed and theorised. The central question which guides both tasks is whether the ESDP will become a 'pillar within the pillar', or whether it will be smoothly integrated into the existing CFSP norms and procedures.

#### *Group 5: CFSP in a Regional Perspective: Dialogue, Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution*

In keeping with some of the issues raised above, the identity of the EU as an international actor has shaped the objectives of the CFSP into a more pronounced role of solving conflicts and contributing to stability in and around Europe, but also as a supporter of UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Crisis management, early warning and conflict prevention lie at the heart of this policy field with regard to the EU's immediate geographical neighbourhood in South Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Further afield, the EU is working to improve cooperation with the UN, both on a military operation level and in post-conflict reconstruction.

#### *iii. Conclusions*

FORNET is working to take the emerging discipline of European foreign policy studies forward in a new and exciting way. It is building on an established framework of literature, approaches and experts, but represents a new chapter in the on-going debate about the role of Europe in the world. This new chapter represents the coming together of many particular events, including the forthcoming Enlargement, the advent of new technological advances and an exciting research agenda that is brimming with numerous opportunities. At a time when the East and the West of Europe are coming together and trying to understand their new role in the world, it would be easy for the two halves to turn inwards and engage only within each group about the common direction; FORNET is leading the way in uniting the two academic communities under one research programme that will foster closer relations and more productive research into our common future.

The theoretical dimension to FORNET's work is the continued refinement of theories and approaches to the study of the CFSP and ESDP that grasp the complex relationships between (1) the member states of the EU and their collective identity as the EU; (2) the role the EU does play in world politics and the role that the wider world considers it should play; and (3) the opportunity of the EU to change, or re-mould, the world political system, and its ability to do so.

Different theoretical approaches are required to grasp the three different relationships. The first is concerned with the internal relationship between the states and the Union, and the various approaches span the range from rational-choice models of bargaining, through to constructivist investigations into the formation of collective identity. (Moravcsik and Jeffrey T Checkel 2001) All have in common the fact that they are 'middle-range' theories that address the issue of EU political cooperation, but do not assert that they are applicable beyond the EU into the international system. A similarly wide range of approaches (from rationalist to constructivist) could be used to explain and (or) understand the second relationship, between the EU and the wider world. One approach to this, (Bretherton and Vogler 1999) is to interview and correlate opinions of diplomats and civil servants from third countries that deal with the EU on a regular basis. (Similarly, investigations into the opinions of businesses and Non-governmental organisations would extend the scope to the global economic and transgovernmental spheres.) From this one gains insight into the impact of the EU in the world from the perspective of outsiders. One could also investigate the behaviour of the EU in international politics, (as a bilateral negotiator and as a multilateral negotiator in the UN and in the WTO) and determine its interests, its values and the success at which it achieves its policy goals. Once again, this is a middle level theory that does not try to explain how states come together to cooperate and negotiate, but rather once they are there, to examine what happens. The final perspective concerns challenging the underlying principles of how states behave in the international system. In this respect it requires a distinctive theoretical approach, since it is inherently concerned with the whole system – rather than a part of it. However, unlike other traditional systemic theories, (such as neo-realism) the objective is not to prescribe maxims which govern the working laws of the system, but to question the assumptions concerning the basic principles of the system: the actors (how significant are non-state actors?); the nature of interaction (does cooperation lead to changes in foreign *and* domestic policy?); the criteria for action (what else, besides state survival?). The identification of the EU's concern for human rights encapsulates the thrust of this area of study, since it calls into question whether international politics can be concerned with human welfare, whether humanitarian grounds are sufficient justification for invading a sovereign territory, and whether the pursuit of these concerns are becoming the new normative practices of international affairs. Theorising the EU as an actor requires consideration of all of these angles.

The empirical challenge that awaits FORNET, (and all other investigations into the EU's foreign policy) is to link theory to practice. The empirical study of the EU as an international actor provides insights into which theories are useful and which are not, what things they miss out and what needs to be reconsidered. It also illustrates where new theory needs to be developed, because the existing repertoire does not provide the referential frameworks necessary to understand and explain the all actions of the EU. Empirical study is necessary; above all, because the EU is continually developing and the existing theory might or might not be useful in the future, depending on the course the EU follows. The current agenda empirical research focus on the impact of Enlargement, the drafting and finalisation of the Constitutional Treaty with the new provisions for an EU Foreign Minister spanning the role of External Relations DG and Secretary General of the Council. The creation of this post opens up new possibilities of action for the EU, and empirical research explores the course of action, becoming informative through the analysis of trends and then capable of explanatory power through theoretical modelling. In the past, the ratification of the St Malo agreement between Britain and France in December 1998 led to the development of the ESDP in the Cologne IGC the following June, which in turn developed the possibility of the EU becoming a military actor, (although limited to humanitarian and non-aggressive tasks). Keeping abreast of the evolution of the EU is the main task of FORNET's empirical work, and that dovetails neatly with its network of theorists who are then able to develop a greater understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor; both its character and the nature of the foreign policy.

## Part 1: The Field of Study

Today's debate about European foreign policy contains a number of central themes running through it that have evolved over many years. In this section the central themes are first identified, then contextualised in a historical framework before finally being presented as an evolution of a new area of EU study.

### *i. Defining foreign policy in the EU*

To define foreign policy in the EU there are a number of questions to consider that help to focus on the relevant issues involved.

- i. Which policy areas constitute foreign policy? Should it be narrowly defined as political relations, or broadly defined to include economic and social relations, with external actors?
- ii. Is foreign policy defined by the procedures through which decisions are made, or the result of actions 'on the ground'?
- iii. Is the character of the EU an important influence over the type of policy produced?

These questions recur throughout the discussion of the EU as an international actor, but set out below is a cursory outline of the issues involved with each point. Considering firstly the question of scope, and the areas, which fall under the heading of 'foreign policy', the definition of foreign policy in the EU is a contentious one. National governments have foreign ministries to coordinate relations between the national (internal) political arena and wider world (the external environment). In the modern world the role of the foreign ministry is changing, from its traditional job of sole conduit to one of coordinator, as an ever-increasing number of government and non-government actors have contact abroad. The member states of the EU choose to conduct a significant proportion of their international relations with other states in the wider world through the institutions of the EU. Some of these are long-established practices that have created a marked impression in world affairs – a good example is EC trade representation and the significant economies of scale, both in resources and in influence, that come from working together. At the other end of the spectrum are newly instigated mechanisms to coordinate a common asylum and refugee policy across the EU. Therefore, in common with many other nation-states, the member states of the EU are cooperating internationally in areas which are not handled by foreign ministries. However, in national governments foreign ministries still retain their traditional roles in diplomacy and the representation of national interests abroad. The EU does not have a foreign ministry in the same way that national governments do; in its place is the External Relations



DG of the European Commission which handles the relations between the EU and third states in areas of Community policy that contain an external dimension, and an institutional framework designed to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states so that they act consistently with one another. This framework is known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and is situated in the second pillar of the EU structure. (The following section contains a historical explanation of how this came into existence). More recently, the CFSP was complemented by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and as such these two institutions are an attempt to replicate at the EU-level the 'traditional' role performed by foreign ministries. Therefore, when asked whether foreign policy in the EU should be broadly or narrowly defined, there are inevitably mixed answers. For many years the EU (and before it the EC) conducted its 'external relations' with states outside the EU in policy areas that were not considered foreign policy, and thus not referred to by name. Simultaneously, the EU has been building up its capabilities to perform some of the actions undertaken by states through their foreign policies for over 30 years. The question of what constitutes EU foreign policy is linked to the more basic question of what constitutes foreign policy? (Hill 2002)

The second question to consider is whether foreign policy can be defined by the way it is made, or whether it is about the impact that it has. This question comes about as a direct consequence of the previous point raised. If it is becoming increasingly difficult to say with any certainty what constitutes foreign policy when it is defined by its subject matter, then an alternative line of enquiry is to link the definition of foreign policy in the EU to the method by which it is created. Since the EU is based upon the Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments, the CFSP represents the location from which foreign policy originates, and moreover, the treaties clearly state the mechanisms through which decisions must be made. The alternative approach to take is similar to that used by Hazel Smith, who argued that the real measure of the effectiveness of a foreign policy is the impact that it makes around the world. (Smith 2002) Adopting this approach rejects the distinctions between pillars, and rejects the separation of economic and political policies into external relations and foreign policy. In 1977 Gunnar Sjöstedt proposed a similar method to measure the degree to which the EC was becoming an international actor, but rejected it because he considered it to be too broad a task at the time. However, he agreed with the assertion that there should be no distinction between economic and political policies in their contribution to foreign policy, and questioned too whether there was a legitimate distinction between internal and external policy. 'There is perhaps no use in making any distinction at all between foreign policy and other aspects of the activities of the EC.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.25)

The final question asks whether the character of the EU influences its foreign policy. There are three broad strands to the case made asserting this, and each emphasises a different aspect of the

EU's character as being influential. The first concentrates on how the material capabilities of the EU influence the sorts of foreign policies it advocates and the sort of policy instruments it uses. The EU is widely accepted to be a powerful economic actor that achieves significant leverage through the single market and the regulation of goods and services into it. It is also the leading donor of Official Development Aid (ODA) and exerts considerable influence over many states in the developing world. (Smith 1997; Smith 1998; Ginsberg 2001; Holland 2002; Smith 2002) The EU has used its presence in the international economic system to attach conditionality clauses to its commercial and overseas development assistance programmes to promote economic and political reform, including the promotion of human rights. As recent research by Karen E. Smith shows, the EU very rarely applies sanctions and prefers instead to induce cooperation through extending incentives. (Smith 2003) This has led to the labelling of the EU as a 'civilian power' because it pursues its foreign policy through economic means, (and preferably through 'carrots' rather than 'sticks'), rather than through the threat or actual use of military force. The second way in which the character of the EU has influenced its foreign policy is through the promotion of values as ends in themselves, and not simply as prerequisites for economic assistance.<sup>1</sup> (Manners 2002) Manners' argument is based on a reading of the legal treaties of the EU and on the references made in them to the rule of international law, the upholding of the UN Charter and the conduct of international relations in accordance to it, which leads him to conclude that the EU is a 'normative power'. The final characteristic singled out for its influence over foreign policy is the institutional structure of the EU. Richard Whitman suggests that the formalised *internal* relations between EU states based on international treaties has led the EU to conduct its *external* relations in a similar manner, by attempting to export its principles (Whitman 1998). In effect, the way the EU makes its foreign policy influences the output from the process too – although this is principally attributable to the success of the EU at creating a strong and stable polity based on international law.

More questions will be raised during the course of this report, looking at the nature and extent of cooperation between member states in the EU and how common positions and joint actions are made. Another issue that will be tackled in due course is the action of member states acting alone, in the context of their bi-lateral relations with states outside the EU, and how these relations fit into the jigsaw of EU foreign policy.

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<sup>1</sup> The five principal values are: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. There are four 'minor' norms too: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.

## *ii. Historical Heritage and New Challenges*

In 1969 at the Hague Summit, the issue of the imbalance between the EC's economic and political power was addressed. The document produced by the six members urged 'paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and missions'.<sup>2</sup> The meeting commissioned a report from the Belgian Political Director Vicomte Davignon that has become referred to as the Luxembourg Report of 1970. The report outlined the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC) that would be used to further the EC's political position in the world. In it, it stated:

The objectives of this co-operation are as follows:

- to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems;
- to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of their views, the co-ordination of their positions, and, where it appears possible and desirable,
- common actions.<sup>3</sup>

The process grew throughout the 1970s with successive reports (the Copenhagen Report in 1973 and the London Report in 1981) that incrementally increased the ties between the foreign offices of the EC members and through this gradual socialisation process instilled a cooperative instinct between members. From the outset EPC was separate from the decision-making process of the EC. The role of Commission officials was minimal, and the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) staff that assisted EC Foreign Ministers in their business in the General Affairs Council of the EC were not involved in EPC. Instead, a separate support staff under the leadership of the Political Directors assisted the Foreign Ministers when they undertook EPC business. By 1986, political cooperation and economic cooperation were officially brought under the same treaty, the Single European Act (SEA), although the articles referring to political cooperation were under a different Title (III) and referred to the member states as 'high contracting parties' in order to emphasize their sovereignty and thus set the precedent of retaining an intergovernmental decision-making process for foreign policy decision-making. This also emphasised the reduced role of the Commission, effectively removed any opportunity for the European Parliament to become involved in foreign policy decision-making and stressed the complete separation

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<sup>2</sup> Communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community (The Hague Summit Declaration), The Hague, 2 December 1969. Paragraph 1, cited from Hill, C. and K. E. Smith (2000). European foreign policy : key documents. London ; New York, Routledge.

<sup>3</sup> First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community (The Davignon or Luxembourg Report), Luxembourg, 27 October 1970. Part 2, paragraph 1, *Ibid*.

of foreign policy from European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup> This original formulation can be seen today in an evolutionary form in the three-pillar structure of the EU, where the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs are separate from the Community.

The EPC was replaced in the Maastricht Treaty by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although the CFSP remained outside of the supranational 'Community method' of decision-making like its predecessor, it represented a fundamental shift in expectations towards foreign policy in the (newly formed) EU. The Commission was fully involved with the decision-making process, having the co-right to initiate proposals and with the previously separate EPC Political Directors becoming integrated into the COREPER system. The prominence of the CFSP as the second 'pillar' of the EU's three-pillar structure reiterated the belief that member states would be able to act coherently to project the EU as an international actor. This was not because there had been fundamental changes to the decision making process, but because the EU was emerging into a new world order in which it was no longer sandwiched between two superpowers and living in the shadow of an arms race. Relations with the East and the West were in the process of transition, as were the internal dynamics of the Union. To the East the EU established itself as the primary actor coordinating the economic development of the states that were previously under Soviet influence, of Central and Eastern Europe and those in former USSR,<sup>5</sup> while to the West it was seen by some to represent the most natural counterweight to the unipolar power of the USA, and thus a potential superpower in the making. Inside the EU the traditional balance of power between France and West Germany was altered by the reunification process and the greatly increased size of Germany. In response to fears that this would destabilise the EU, the integration process was speeded up two areas, firstly in the CFSP and later with the adoption of the single currency.

Despite being part of a new world order, the EU encountered difficulties in trying to become a coherent actor in international politics, seen most prominently in its efforts to end the detracted war and oversee a peace process in the Balkans. The revision of the Maastricht treaty at the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was an attempt to make the CFSP more effective. Changes were made to the decision-making procedure and to the instruments of foreign policy. The most important procedural change was the new job description handed to the Secretary-General of the Council – to become the High Representative for the CFSP and act on behalf of the Council in international affairs.

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<sup>4</sup> The European Parliament is now required to agree on the EC budget and on all association and accession agreements so has leverage over some aspects of EU foreign policy that are outside the CFSP.

<sup>5</sup> The EU worked with the along with the OSCE (promoting security cooperation, conflict prevention and resolution) and NATO (promoting security and defence in the region).

This was coupled to a reform of the Troika system<sup>6</sup> and the setting up of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) within the Council secretariat in order to make the CFSP more proactive and less reactive to crisis situations. Turning to the definition of instruments, four categories were defined in Article J2 of the TEU.

- *Principles and Guidelines:* 'The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.' *Art J.3 para. 1 (TEU)*
- *Common Strategies:* 'The European Council shall decide upon common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.' *Art. J.3 para. 2 (TEU)*
- *Joint Actions:* 'The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.' *Art. J.4 para. 1 (TEU)*
- *Common Positions:* 'The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.' *Art. J.5 (TEU)*

The CFSP decision-making procedure was altered in the Amsterdam Treaty, to allow qualified majority voting in areas where a Common Strategy had (unanimously) been agreed by the European Council first, and introduced the a 'constructive abstention' to areas where unanimity is still required for action.

'Decisions under this Title shall b taken by the Council acting in unanimity. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept the decision commits the Union.' *Art. J.13 para. 1 (TEU)*

The EU became a more coherent military actor after Britain and France signed the St Malo declaration (1998) and paved the way for the incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU as the defensive component in the 1999 Cologne IGC. For a full discussion of the EU as a military actor, see Part 3, section ii.

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<sup>6</sup> The old Troika system comprised of the Past, Present and Future EU Presidencies, with the Commission, while the new Troika comprised of the Present and Future EU Presidencies, the Council Secretary General and the Commission.

There are many challenges that lie ahead for the CFSP in particular, and for European foreign policy in general. Already mentioned is the planned enlargement for May 2004, which will not only change the future direction of EFP, but is argued by some to be an *existing instrument* of EFP today. The reason for this is that the promise of EU membership was an incentive for the neighbouring Central and Eastern European states to push through extensive and potentially destabilising economic and political reform, and thus constituted the promotion of domestic (EU) values abroad, which is a classical definition of foreign policy. Now that the reform process is near completion and the EU will grow from 15 to 25 states, there is a whole new set of issues to address. Some concern the procedural working of EFP with so many more states around the negotiating table. Another issue to be addressed is whether Enlargement will continue to be used as an instrument of foreign policy, either because the most recently joined members are reluctant to continue the process, or because the geographical size of the EU has reached a limit. A second area where new challenges lie is in the field of global governance. Economic integration and the growth of trade mean that globalisation is taking place rapidly in the market but less rapidly in the social sphere. The EU wishes to embrace multilateral governance (see COM(2003) 526 and the December 2003 EU Security Strategy: *A Secure Europe in a Better World*) but must become a more coherent actor within the institutions of the United Nations, which will mean more coherent representation by the EC in its spheres of competency, and greater coordination between member states in the areas where the EU relies on its members to represent it (in the continued absence of a legal personality). Another challenge for the European foreign policy will be making it accountable to the citizens of Europe. As the EU chooses to engage in more military activities under the central guidance, the decisions being made in the Council will need to become more transparent, either through less secretive diplomacy or through the greater involvement of the European Parliament.

### *iii. Conclusion: EFP comes into its own field*

The culmination of the work done in all of the areas of European foreign policy outlined above demonstrates that the field of EFP is a vibrant intellectual area in which new theory is being created, and it is being informed by many other disciplines such as law, politics, economics, sociology, history and international relations. The development of new theory means that there is less need to rely on the two previous sources of theoretical frameworks, comparative politics of the EU and International Relations (IR). Many of the theories that will be discussed over the coming pages are testimonies to the diverse field of scholarship that has found itself engaged in understanding and explaining the foreign policy of the European Union. This is a reflection on both the vast breadth of activities that the EU engages in across the world, and the fact that it is a *sui generis* actor that is challenging both the norms of the international system and the norms of nation-state democracy.

## Part 2: Theoretical perspectives

This section looks at the progress made towards understanding what a European foreign policy is, in terms of how it is created, how decisions are made within it and what effects it causes – in the change of behaviour of EU members, in the change of behaviour of other (third) states and finally change to the international system itself. None of the theories here answer all of these questions, but each one contributes something to one, and often more than one, of them.

### *i. Comparative Politics Based Models*

Comparative politics based models build upon the understanding that politics belongs within the realm of the state, and that the EU is best understood as being a construction with its foundations in the member states. The core concerns begin with making the EU appear legitimate in the eyes of the citizens of Europe, since the EU is regarded as a political project for the purpose of improving the security and prosperity of the population of member states. The many institutions of the EU are built in two directions from the citizens of Europe. The first direction is horizontally across them, in the form of the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which are EU institutions with a direct linkage to the citizenry, either through direct suffrage or the direct right of appeal. The second direction is vertically above them, in the form of the Council and the Commission which act through the governments and civil services of the member states to give a higher (supranational or intergovernmental) plane of coordination. These institutions remain indirectly accountable to the citizens of Europe through their national parliaments and through the EP.<sup>7</sup> Three competing ideas will be contrasted from this school of theory emphasising the roots of the EU in the democracies of the member states.

The first is the classical integration theory of neo-functionalism, as originally expounded by Haas and Lindberg among others. (Haas 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) The theory was developed in the 1950s and 1960s during a period of rapid European integration but fell out of favour during the 1970s and 1980s when the tidal flow of integration appeared to have ebbed. During the late 1980s and 1990s a new impetus for economic integration was found with the completion of the single economic market and the creation of the single currency, and once again attention has been turned towards closer political integration, firstly through the CFSP and later through the ESDP. The principal explanatory tools of the theory are the logic of *spill-over* and *linkages*, which predict that beginning the

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<sup>7</sup> This reference to the citizens of the EU is very important because in the following section it will be contrasted to the perspective taken in IR, which is to make the state or the international system the primary subject of the study.

integration process in less salient economic areas leads over time to further political integration as it becomes necessary and desirable to incorporate more policy areas into the supranational structure. 'The spillover effect may take three different forms: functional (referring to technical pressures leading towards further sector integration), political (as a result of intensive levels of elite socialisation and of gradual convergence of interests/expectations) and cultivated (through the active role of the central bureaucracy as agent of integration).' (Chrysochoou 2001 p.54) Neofunctional theory emphasises that European integration is based on a policy-making procedure (the Community Method) that is a *process*, through which the European polity continually develops. Neofunctional theory predicts the creation of a European foreign policy for two reasons. The first is that internal political cooperation has linkages to external political cooperation, where within one particular policy area coordination is increased over time through new levels of cooperation. An example of this can be found in the field of environmental policy where coordination has led to the EU having a greater role in international climate negotiations. The second reason why spillover occurs is that policy coordination in one area makes coordination in another area more likely. An example of this is may be seen in the EU's growing concern for coordinating EU Official Development Aid (ODA) (presently donated variably by member states and by the Commission from the EC budget) into a more coherent policy. A coherent development policy could be integrated more easily with the EU's trade policy, and lead to improvements in the effectiveness of both. The pressure to coordinate comes from the asymmetry between the EC's trade competency and the mixed competency of development policy. However, while neofunctional theory illustrates the existence of a process, this process is not leading to the creation of a single European state.

Neofunctionalist thinking assumed that the scope and level of integration are mutual reinforcements: the more you bring new areas of policy action into the common framework, the greater the involvement and, subsequently, the influence of supranational institutions. But consequent amendments to the original treaties point in the opposite direction. ... Doubtless both [TEU and Amsterdam] treaty revisions added to the dynamics of 'ever closer union,' a preambular clause that still remains poorly defined, but not to the formation of a federal political system or some sort of regional state, whose constitutional properties present a direct threat to the sovereignty of the component state polities. (Chrysochoou 2001 p.56-57)

In summary, 'neo-functionalism represented the first systematic attempt to offer a general theory of regional integration, remaining to this day an indispensable referent not only for theorising the European experience, but also for the comparative study of other regional unions or processes of regionalisation.' (Chrysochoou 2001 p.58)

Rational choice is the basis of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory of Andrew Moravcsik and others. (Moravcsik 1993) The EU is at its heart an intergovernmental process because the member



states have their hands on the reins that control the Union. Furthermore, the purpose of the EU is clear – to deliver a higher level of utility to the constituents of the member states than would not be possible if the states worked alone – and therefore it is in the national interest to belong and cooperate in the EU, provided that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of membership. As states become more used to calculating their national utility through their shared interests in the EU, they become willing to forgo total control in some areas (such as those in pillar one where decision-making follows the Community method) because they begin to calculate long-term strategies where net gains are assumed to be greater than losses. In this approach to understanding the EU domestic political support is very important because it emphasises for whom the whole project is for. Unlike neofunctional theory, there is no inherent logic that predicts established practices in one policy area will spill over to another. The same rational understanding of the interests of the member states can be used to explain why there is less cooperation in the CFSP. Firstly, the national gains are less clear; secondly the process is younger and has yielded few gains; thirdly, as a result there is little confidence that it is a productive area to share decision making responsibilities because there is no evidence that a long-term strategy will yield long-term benefits. (Gordon 1997) With this conclusion, Liberal Intergovernmentalism falls into a common trap associated with rational choice models, namely that the state preferences that determine rational choices are fixed and there is no opportunity to challenge the existing logic that EU states cannot gain from a CFSP.<sup>8</sup>

The third type of theory looks at how the different institutions in the EU work together to form a new form of political structure that is neither a totally separate European level of government as in the neofunctionalist model nor strictly national as in Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The background of this theoretical perspective is the close study of the institutional framework of the EU, and its analysis in the classical political science manner through the division of competencies, between the legislative, the executive and the judicial. The judicial component is the European Court of Justice, while the Council along with the European Parliament act as the legislators, and the Commission as the executive. However, in the Commission there are a number of levels of coordination between the Commission representatives and Permanent national representatives from COREPER, where decisions are 'filtered' through a number of committee stages at which national representatives and Commission staff agreed many technical issues and leave only the most politically salient issues for the Council to decide upon.<sup>9</sup> The issue of primary concern is that this is not a clear division of powers and the member states are

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<sup>8</sup> The Commission's sole right of initiation of legislation in Pillar 1 breaks the cycle of fixed national interests by proposing new opportunities that achieve positive gains beyond that envisaged by the static appraisal assumed in LI.

<sup>9</sup> Directly beneath the Council is the COREPER, the Council of Permanent Representatives. This is split into COREPER II and beneath it COREPER I, and it is estimated that 70% of business takes place at COREPER I or lower, in numerous committee meetings. Of the remaining 30% at COREPER II, 15-20% is sent for a 'rubber-stamp' by Council Ministers and the remainder is negotiated by the top-level politicians.

acting in both the executive and the legislative bodies. Yet rather than see this as a misrepresentation of the national model, political theorists have posited that this is a new form of political representation through a new form of policy-creating mechanism, as seen in Wessels' fusion thesis. (Rometsch and Wessels 1996) The system is between the national and the European level and has come about as a result of the high level of collusion between the Commission and national representatives. The most important aspect of this system is that it has been observed in formation for many years but appears to have reached a plateau and has become established as the accepted policy-making system, to the point where new member states are being socialised into it.

## *ii. International Relations Theory Based Models*

As mentioned in section (2.i.), International Relations (IR) based theories look at the EU from the opposite perspective from comparative politics based approaches. Rather than seeing the EU as a higher level of political cooperation above and across the states of Europe, IR based theories see the EU as a form of cooperation between states. The difference can be summarised as being a bottom-up approach in the former case, and a top-down approach in the latter case. Theories of IR contest the nature of the relations between states and the theories can be differentiated by the assumptions they make concerning the nature of the international system. The principal division between theories are those that assume that cooperation is possible between states, (rationalist, liberals, institutionalists) and those that do not, (realists). Common to all approaches is the acceptance of the fact that there is no world government based on a coercive authority above sovereign states, and that the international system is fundamentally different from any domestic, state-based, political system.<sup>10</sup> IR theory is premised on this internal order finishing at the borders of states and beyond those border there is no authority. This leads to one of the most significant differences in the creation of theories between the two camps. The comparative politics based approach sees the policies of the state that are concerned with relations with other states as deriving from the internal domestic political process, while many IR theory based approaches see the relations between states as being derived from structural pressures of the international system. In relation to the question of European foreign policy, IR theories try to explain why the member states have come together in a strong political union that remains voluntary, insofar as each member retains its sovereignty and is responsible for defending itself in the event of war. Until such a time as the EU becomes a state and takes its place in the international system, it remains a collection of states that work closely together through legally binding contracts that remain un-enforced

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<sup>10</sup> The modern state, as defined by Max Weber, as an authority with the legitimate monopoly of means of organised violence within a geographical terrain. The quintessential political theory text that demonstrates the distinction between the state of nature (where there is no authority) and a modern state is Hobbes' *Leviathan*, where the Leviathan represents sovereign authority.

by a hegemonic authority.<sup>11</sup> IR theories therefore regard the EU as either a collection of states or as a *sui generis* actor in the international system that is more than the contractual sum of its parts.

The realist and neorealist schools of IR became established most solidly in the United States through the leadership of scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, and one of the leading scholars applying it to the European situation is Alfred Pijpers. Realism is based on three assumptions; anarchy in the international system, a state's prerogative for survival and the natural tendency for power to be balanced to preserve order in the system. The assumptions of realism prevent any change within the system taking place, since any move that would lead away from anarchy – such as the rise of a hegemonic power capable of creating a world government – would be opposed through the balance of power and thus render the theory static and ahistoric. The application of realist theory to the EU is problematic because the EU is not a state but a collection of states that have agreed to work together for more reasons than simply that of self-preservation. Depending on which of the three assumptions is prioritised, the explanations of realism as to why the EU exists and has a foreign policy differ. On one hand realism suggests that the EU is a collection of states that remain focused on their primary national interest of national security and that the intergovernmental structure of the CFSP does not bind their hands in any meaningful way that compromises their ability to act individually when they so choose. An alternative explanation is that the EU is becoming an international actor to rival the hegemonic dominance of the United States and is behaving in accordance to the international system's structural maxim of the balance of power, as illustrated by the gradual move towards establishing a EU military force. The difference between the two theses stems from realism's difficulty in conceptualising the EU as an actor existing between the level of the state and the international system. In the first approach, EU cooperation was seen as a hindrance on member states' ability to react to the structural pressures of the international system, while in the latter case the EU *is a response* by the states to the structural pressures of the international system through the creation of a new power block.

Realism has been challenged not only by the complex *sui generis* actor that is the EU, but by the numerous other international organisations that are built upon cooperation between states through mutual agreements and international laws in a world where there is no authority to force compliance. (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1986; Keohane 1989) Regime theory developed during the 1980s as a theory that addressed the apparent failures of realism to explain how increasing interdependence between states was leading to increasing regulation between them. The transition from realism to rational choice theories that explain the creation of regimes begin by relaxing of one key realist assumption – that

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<sup>11</sup> 'Hegemonic authority' refers to an equivalent authority to that of a government (with its institutions of courts, police and prison) in the international system.

states will not enter into cooperative agreements even when international common goods are attainable that would not be so without cooperation because a state's priority is the preservation of the hierarchical order of power. A cooperative agreement between two states, (X and Y) will rarely benefit both equally, and if an agreement should benefit Y more than X, state X's position in the hierarchy of states will be worsened relative to state Y, which will either close the gap on X if it is weaker, or increase it if it is stronger. Thus the *relative* gains made by states are deemed more important than the *absolute* gains made. Such calculations are based on an assumption of a zero-sum equation. (For a reassertion of realist concerns for relative and absolute power, and as an answer to regime theories, see Grieco (Grieco 1988)). Regime theory relaxes this assumption, emphasising that states may prioritise the gains made possible through cooperation more than the outcome of relative gains, or that certain cooperative agreements lead to gains that cannot be measured in terms of power relations. Regime theorists continue to assume that the state is a rational unitary actor and apply rational choice theory to explain the behaviour of states within cooperative regimes. However, while regime theory breaks the static cycle of realism by assuming positive gains, it assumes that the interests of states are constant and has difficulty explaining how regimes evolve through time. Thus behavioural models can explain how the EU (or EC as it was) came into existence as a group of unequal states behaving as equals, because of its focus on comparative not absolute gains. Yet the theory has difficulty explaining why the members pursued ever-closer integration due to the fact that their national interests are assumed to be fixed.

Setting out these theories along a continuum between structure and agency illustrates where they lie in relation to each other and in relation to other theories here. Realism provides a structure-centric approach to understanding the international system which can only understand the role of the EU as an international actor if it is subsumed into its structural model of international politics. Regime theory relaxes structural assumptions that allow states to enter into international organisations and therefore attributes some agency to the states in their initial decision to form a united Europe, but still makes the behaviour of states explicable through the permanent tension between cooperating for specific ends and the likelihood of the regime failing to yield the desired returns that compensate for the costs of association. Before moving on to look at the application of these approaches to the study of the foreign policy of the EU (Section iv), the next section will briefly sketch out the wider horizon of current IR theory.

### *iii. IR theory beyond agency and structure*

International Relations theory has moved on from the structure and agency debate in two ways. The first way looked to sociology and how the debate there had progressed, while the second way was

to draw on radical critiques of positivist approaches to social science research that have focused on the underlying epistemological assumptions, such as the difficulty of objectively postulating that particular factors are more important than others. Let us consider both in turn. There a number of sociological works that have informed the IR discipline, and one of the most widely used is Anthony Giddens' structuration theory.<sup>12</sup> For Giddens, both structure and agency are mutually reinforcing, since the parameters of agency are continually bounded by structure, yet structure alone is not permanent but needs to be continually reinforced through the actions of agents being bound by it. Therefore, agency defines structure, (i.e. what is and is not possible), yet agency is limited by the structure that it has carried forward. This means that over time, the gradual expansion and contraction of agents' spheres of action will lead to the evolution of structure. This argument was brought forcefully to the fore in IR when it was used to interpret the end of the Cold War. The structure of the international system (bi-polar superpowers) ended very quickly, because one of the agents responsible for maintaining this structure collapsed, and thereby broke the pattern through which the structure had been maintained.

The second area in which International Relations theory has moved beyond the issue of agent and structure has been through a thorough critique of the assumptions made by mainstream International Relations. It is only really possible to define this diverse group of 'critical' theories together by saying that they criticise or reject central assumptions regarding either the ontology of the discipline – what we can say about states in the world, or its epistemology – what we can know about states in the world. Critical theorists, such as Robert Cox, argue that it is necessary to look at the underlying power relations in the world system, and to understand how these relations came into effect, how they are persevered through the maintenance of the status quo, and how they might be changed in the future, (through counter-hegemonic movements). Critical theory builds on Marxist theory (Cox is influenced by Antonio Gramsci) in three ways. (Cox 1987) The first is the incorporation of a historical dimension into its understanding of the world, because the study of the history of the material manifestations of power exposes the reality that the current situation in the world is the product of human action, and can therefore be changed by action in the future. In this respect, critical theory challenges realism head-on in the contestation over whether history repeats itself (the permanence of an anarchical world system of states) or is a continual process. From a critical theory perspective, realism is a theory of the hegemonic powers, because it suggests that the current arrangement of political power is permanent, and thus reinforces the global *status quo*. This leads to the second way in which critical theory builds on

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<sup>12</sup> One (of the many) lineages of this work into IR is its impact on John G. Ruggie's work on international institutions, which eventually led to the writing in 1987 of an article with Kratochwil, (reprinted in Chapter 3 in the volume below) which is regarded by many as one of the first constructivist texts of IR. Constructivism subsequently developed during the 1990s until the present day, when it has currently many strands of inquiry. Ruggie, J. G. (1998). Constructing the world polity : essays on international institutionalization. London, Routledge.

Gramsci's work. It emphasizes the role of ideas in the world system. Historical investigation can uncover the real nature of power-relations, but critical theory must also argue against the way global political relations are portrayed by the hegemonic blocs, because it is in the blocs' interests to perpetuate their advantageous situation through the perpetuation of the *status quo*. Ideas, in the form of widely held beliefs about the way the world works, help the hegemonic blocs consolidate and maintain the mechanisms which they control the world system through, mechanisms which are the product of history and circumstance. Realism has already been mentioned, and another example of a theory that critical theorists challenge is that of neo-liberal economics.<sup>13</sup> The third aspect of critical theory is its application to the politics of counter-hegemonic movements. Critical theory is able to construct an agenda for changing the current political order in the world by uncovering the historical roots of the present, and by challenging the arguments made for its preservation. By doing both of these things, it presents the material and ideational steps required to achieve change in the global system.

Criticism of the prevailing assumptions in International Relations theory has also been made from a gender perspective. While critical theory challenges the underlying assumptions concerning the nature of power relations vis-à-vis historical forces and material and ideational preservation, the study of gender in international relations claims to expose the bias towards male imagery in the language and conceptual tools used to explain the world. One of the leading theorists in this field is Cynthia Weber. (Weber 1995; Weber 1999) Gender perspectives on international relations highlight a number of ways in which gender issues are overlooked, from the predominance of men in positions of political power and in military institutions, (and therefore the tendency to define international politics as a male sphere) to the presumption of behavioural patterns between states which are more frequently associated with masculine behavioural patterns. This latter trend can be seen in the frequent referral to analogies between *man* in the state of the nature and the *state* in an anarchical system, most often in realist thought from Hobbes' *Leviathan* to the references to Rousseau's Stag Hunt in Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State and War*.<sup>14</sup> These works illustrate how the struggle for survival of a philosophically abstract ahistorical man is used as an analogy for the state in an anarchical world, legitimising war as a natural form of behaviour for the preservation of individuals (or groups of individuals in the form of states) in a system in which they are permanently under threat. The impact the gender dimension has had on IR

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<sup>13</sup> Neo liberalism emphasizes the autonomy of the market as a self-regulating mechanism, and for that reason it is outside the sphere of public control, i.e. it is the stronghold of the private sector. For an excellent investigation into the parallels between the role of the 'invisible hand' in the market and the balance of power in the anarchical system of sovereign states, see Rosenberg, J. (1994). The empire of civil society : a critique of the realist theory of international relations. London ; New York, Verso.

<sup>14</sup> This latter work could be argued to illustrate how gendered language permeates the discipline, in which man is used as a synonym for humans.

theory is through the illustration of gender value-laden assumptions and concepts. Gender theory has also been extended into the field of conflict resolution, where the argument has been advanced that in confrontational situations, warfare is a masculine response while dialogue and mediation leading to the peaceful resolutions of disputes is a feminine response. This position is disputed, however, since it is argued that this represents a reversal of the stereotypical images that are prevalent throughout IR, and that the role of gender studies in IR is to remain critical of all assumptions based on gender. How would this agenda be applied to the EU context. At present there is little research in this field, however the growing body of literature developing the idea that the EU is a different sort of international actor, one that seeks to use normative and civilian forms of power instead of military power, might be a starting point from which to engage with gender informed IR theory. Does the greater emphasis on cooperation and persuasion found in these approaches to EU foreign policy suggest that the EU is contesting the male-dominated images that have come to be associated with international politics?

The final way in which the structure and agency debate has been moved on most radically is in the rejection of a positivist research agenda, and with it the rejection of any objective knowledge about the world around us. Following from the post-positivist school of philosophy, the central position advocated is that it is not possible for a student of IR to step outside the object of study and gather a list of observations of the world and privilege them with greater significance by making them the basis of a theory. Because there is no Archimedean position from which to observe the world from the outside, we cannot establish a hierarchy of information about the world (which in positivist language is regarded as facts), and therefore any set of observations is the equal of any other. Post-positivist theory therefore talks about *narratives*, emphasising that they do not proclaim themselves to be true, (or rather, no more truthful than any other narrative), and that they are particular because they have been generated by a person who has a unique set of experiences in their life, and therefore sees the world around them in a unique way. The person's narrative is therefore particular to them. David Campbell and R.J.B. Walker are notable among those who have brought post-positivist insights to IR.

The field of IR theory is clearly much broader than simply the areas that have provided the most frequent theoretical foundations for the study of the EU. As the sociological, critical, gender and post-positivist literature grows, more work will undoubtedly be done to link the insights gained at the international level to the questions of the EU internal organisation and its role in the world. However, in the absence of that work at the present, this report moves on to the fourth section on theoretical perspectives in which specific theories of CFSP represent an attempt to create new theory specifically for the understanding of European foreign policy and the role of the EU in the world.

#### *iv. Theories of a European Foreign Policy*

The first approach that looks specifically at the creation of foreign policy in the EU is the work done in adapting Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to a European level. (Hill 1996; Stavridis and Hill 1996; White 2001; Hill 2002) This approach is based on the IR school of FPA which began as an effort to break the grip of structuralist accounts of the state as an actor in the international system, such as realism. Structuralist theories reduce the actions of politicians and diplomats to little more than the pawns of great world forces, as well as sever the domestic interests of a state from its actions in the world. FPA aimed to put politicians back into an equation that understood the work of a state in the world, by conceiving of national interests beyond state survival and strategies to engage in the world beyond rigid structural pathways. The FPA approach has been used for many years to track the progress of foreign policy cooperation in Europe by observing the foreign policies of the member states and looking for signs of convergence and areas where convergence remains problematic. This approach remains focused primarily on the member states and makes a distinction between foreign policy that is convergent at the EU level, (a common foreign policy) and foreign policies that remain un-coordinated. However, FPA has recently been adapted to widen its focus beyond the state to the European level. Brian White's European foreign policy system is based on changing two premises of traditional FPA. The first reiterates that FPA was originally developed to emphasize the role of agency, and became focused on the state *but it need not be exclusively state-centric if agency exists at other levels too*. The second changed premise refers to government as the creator of policy because of FPA's tie to the state, for which White suggests that 'governance' can be a suitable substitute should the agency in the system be larger than one state. The result of this is a systematic approach to European foreign policy which exists on three sub-system levels within the system: EC, EU and national foreign policy. The EC sub-system is concerned with the external relations of the EU handled through the first pillar of the Union and are of mixed or EC competency. The second EU sub-system refers to the diplomatic work, the common position and the joint actions taken through the institutions of the CFSP and as a representation of the EU through its member states. The final sub-system is that which is not coordinated at the EU level and constitutes the bilateral relations between member states and third countries. This is an important extra dimension because it represents areas where no common positions have been reached, and thus represent the limit of the CFSP. However, just because these foreign policies are bilateral in nature, the member states involved are nonetheless still associated with the EU on the world stage. Thus the differences in French and British positions in the Security Council concerning the war in Iraq are interpreted as a division between two EU members, rather than as two separate sovereign states. This modified FPA approach is based on three centres of agency for the creation of European foreign policy, rather than one as in the traditional, state-centric version of FPA.



These three centres represent the three policy-making bodies that together constitute the multi-level governance system of Europe. The way in which decisions are made in the three centres of governance is based on institutional relations that are fixed (and therefore structural), but through the institutions reflect the connection between the domestic, the European and the international in making policies.<sup>15</sup>

A second approach has been built from the work done on social constructivism in sociology and brought into the International Relations discipline in the 1990s. The FPA approach incorporated agency and structure jointly as co-variables (as opposed to approaches that prioritise one over the other such as realism), while constructivism incorporates the two in a dialectical relation, where one influences the other, and through that influence sets about another cycle of influence, leading to a continual process of definition and re-definition. This approach has been applied to two specific areas of European foreign policy. The first is in the policy-creation process at the national level, where it has been suggested that 'socialisation' has taken place. 'Socialisation' occurs when the agents of a policy-making institution, such as a foreign ministry, become influenced by new ideas through contact with other agents. These ideas lead to the creation of new practices and policies that lead in turn to the opportunity for new ideas to be incorporated into the institution, and this process leads on. Constructivists argue that structures are not given over time but are created by agency, and more importantly, *are perpetually reinforced by agency until such time as agency redefines the structure*. In the very concrete case of small states in the EU, Tonra argued that close cooperation between foreign ministries through the institutions of the CFSP (and importantly in its predecessor EPC) led to a reflexive action to determine the national interest in the context of the European interest. (Tonra 2001) The structure of cooperation led to the actors within the policy-making sphere thinking about the creation of policy in terms of cooperation, and thus became more dependent upon the structures, which fostered increased cooperation in the future. The central posit of constructivism is therefore that neither ideas nor material structures come into existence in a vacuum, and that the two are continually reinforced by the other.

The second area in which constructivist theory is applied is in the area of the EU-as-an actor in the world, such as in Bretherton and Vogler's adoption of a social constructivist theory to explain why the EU is an actor in the international system while not having the classical state attribute of sovereignty. (Bretherton and Vogler 1999) Their argument is based on the interaction between ideas and material structures but is applied to the EU in the world, rather than within the EU between the

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<sup>15</sup> The FPA model bridges the gap between structure and agency by incorporating an appreciation of decision-making and the actors who engage in it and an appreciation of the institutional formation of the EU, which when studied too rigidly leads to a narrow definition of 'foreign policy' as being solely that which comes from the CFSP mechanism. In this case, 'structure' refers to institutional policy making in the EU, and should not be confused with the issue of 'structure' in realism, which refers to the international system and its principles of order.

member states. The ideational component of their work is the perception of the EU as an actor in the eyes of third countries in the world. They argue that being seen as an actor is as important as having the sovereign credentials of an actor, and that the visibility of the EU as actor in the areas of trade, development and the environment (as well as in security and peacekeeping but to a lesser degree) is enormously important in the foreign policies of the majority of the states in the world and this gives the EU *presence* in the world. The material or structural component of the work is the degree to which the EU is given the *opportunity* to act. As the EU is seen as being a larger presence in the world, it is in the interests of the EU and third states to give the EU more opportunities to become involved in decision-making forum and in particular the multilateral system (where many of the fields in which the EU is strongest are internationally regulated). By taking these opportunities to act, the EU increases its *capabilities* as an actor and makes itself more important. By increasing its importance, it has more presence in the world and the cyclic process begins again. Bretherton and Vogler argue that the limits to what the EU can do in the world are not set by concepts such as sovereignty, which was the traditional necessity to act in the international system. Instead, the other members of the international system decide the 'rules' by deciding if they are willing to interact with an actor. As third countries choose to see the EU as an international actor, and by the EU taking advantage of these opportunities and furthering its presence, the structure of the international system is determined by the actions of its members. Agency and structure are continual motion and continually redefining each other.

While the use of constructivist theory is relatively new in its application to IR, similar approaches have been used to study the EU for a long time. In 1977, Gunnar Sjöstedt asked the question: how does one measure the degree to which the EC is an international actor? Not only is this question similar to those asked above, the answers which were given are strikingly similar to the constructivist approaches developed two years later. Sjöstedt posited that the evolution of the EC as an international actor was a process that involved internal and external change, stating that 'the growth of a new international actor probably is an extremely complex process, influenced both by the processes of integration between the nations involved and by the interaction of the integrating group with the external world.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.4) Sjöstedt attempted to model the variables necessary to determine whether the EC was *becoming* an international actor, and chose to focus on the internal evolution of the EC, rather than its impact in the external environment, which he judged to be too complex a task. Instead, the measure of actorness chosen was 'actor capability', which Sjöstedt defined as behaviour 'actively and deliberately in relations to other actors in the international system.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.16) Actor capability was in turn operationalised through a set of 'structural prerequisites' and 'actor behaviour', which he went on to define in detail. 'Actor behaviour should always be thought of as a transaction going from the Community to some recipient in the outside world. A transaction, in turn, means that some object is

transferred from the Community to the recipient.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.21) Not only did Sjöstedt conceptualise the concept of actorness in relation to the EC/EU in the international system, but he also stated clearly early on that 'there is perhaps no use in making any distinction at all between foreign policy and other aspects of the activities of the EC.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.25)

### Part 3: Empirical Application

Theoretical approaches to conceptualising European foreign policy are only useful when questions are asked about real events. The purpose of theory is to make the answers to questions better because they set out a framework in which to fit all the relevant pieces of information in. In this section five areas are considered and they represent the issues about which the majority of questions are asked.

#### *i. National Foreign Policy*

Since efforts to coordinate the foreign policies of the European states began with EPC in 1970, academics have pursued an empirical research agenda that has tried to witness EPC in action and measure the areas in which it was successful and the rate of progress. Given that the point of departure of this study was six autonomous national foreign policies, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) of the member states constitutes the first area in which empirical studies were made, and Hill was among the forerunners in this field. (Hill 1983) This area of study made two significant contributions to the future direction that EFP studies would take. The first was the identification of a 'European' level of foreign policy that represented areas of each national policy that were considered by the national governments to be productively handled at the European level, (an example of which is the sanctions against South Africa during the apartheid era). How these areas came about is explained by the second significant contribution to the science made by the original FPA studies. The often-cited COREU telex system that was introduced to coordinate information between European Foreign Offices also began a process of socialisation in which state officials began sharing information between governments, as well as also sharing their responses and possible plans of action. (Regelsberger 1997 p.69) Through socialisation areas of common interests were identified and thus common positions became possible. These two contributions constitute the basic starting points for both theoretical approaches outlined in 2(iii), with constructivism looking at the way EU states define their common interests their policy responses, while the European foreign policy system looks at the way the different levels of policy-making have crystallised into three distinct sub-systems. The empirical study of the national foreign policies of the member states remains as important as ever in the study of EFP and the recent work edited by Manners and Whitman demonstrates how this field is as relevant today as twenty years ago. (Manners and Whitman 2000)

## *ii. Civilian Power*

The doctrine of the EU as a civilian power dates back to Francois Duchêne in 1972 when he suggest that Europe's relative military weakness would become less detrimental to its ability to project its power because its strength in trade and economy was becoming more important in a world where the structural balance between hard and soft power was tilting in favour of the latter.<sup>16</sup> The central core of the thesis was that the preferred foreign policy instruments for wielding influence in the international system would shift against the continued use of military power. Given that this structural shift was underway, Europe was in a position to increase its influence on world politics through the changing international system, that seemed to favour the existing strengths of the EC (or EU today) and mitigate against its weaknesses. This argument continues to find favour thirty years on where the EU is increasingly anxious to influence world affairs and through the logic of its own integration process has developed its civilian credentials more thoroughly than its military ones. Therefore the foreign policy instruments at its disposal are often civilian-type instruments and re-emphasize the EU's position as a more coherent civilian actor than military actor. However, over time the civilian power thesis has been developed beyond a prescriptive formula for choosing the instruments of policy towards a more holistic agenda for an actor's interests in the international system. In the EU's case this means promoting a number of normative values in the international system, such as the promotion of international justice, multilateralism, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, as well as economic 'values' such as open markets, liberalised trade practices and regional economic integration. Increasingly often the EU promotes these normative values through its civilian power, as conditionality clauses on its development aid programme and to trade agreements.

The civilian power question is an important gateway into a number of topics raised in previous sections. It is an understanding of the EU as an international actor in the broadest definition, emphasising firstly that many of the EU's most powerful foreign policy instruments lie inside its first pillar and that foreign policy is not simply limited to a procedural mechanism. In this regard, the distinction is often made between 'external relations' and 'foreign policy', where the former concerns EU relations with the world coordinated through the first pillar while the latter concerns relations with the world coordinated through the CFSP second pillar. The civilian power thesis posits that the structure of the international system is becoming increasingly based on interdependence, and that disrupting the links of

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<sup>16</sup> Duchene's article was contested in the strongest way in 1983 by Hedley Bull, saying that without a credible military dimension the EU would not become an actor in international affairs. For a fuller account of this and of civilian power, see Manners. Manners, I. (2002). "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 235-258.

interdependence is a more effective tool of persuasion than the recourse to military force. Therefore the civilian power thesis lends credence to advocates of a wide definition of foreign policy, and to those who argue that the international system is not static but subject to the influence of actors upon it. This is demonstrated in both the relative demise of military power as a useful foreign policy tool and the increased prominence of normative values and economic concerns in the creation and implementation of foreign policy.

### *iii. Military Power*

In 1983, Hedley Bull responded to Francois Duchêne's suggestion of civilian power by stating that power needed to be premised on military strength. (see footnote 13). Bull concluded that there was little chance that the EC would be an actor in international politics because at the time the possibility that the EU would develop its own military forces seemed fanciful. During the Cold War military coordination was predominantly through NATO, (with a small role for the Western European Union), and Europe could neither contemplate its existence outside the NATO alliance, nor imagine itself as becoming a rival superpower. The end of the Cold War led to the structural change in the world system that allowed the newly formed EU to reconsider its role in the world. The end of superpower patronage networks throughout the world meant that the EU could construct a coherent foreign policy concerning the developing world (through its trade and aid policies) and in Central and Eastern Europe (see the following section). In the military sphere the reduced threat of attack from the Soviet Union, the questioning of NATO's continued role and the pressure from the US to withdraw from Europe meant that for the first time the EU had to consider becoming a military actor. The change in perception that led to the EU contemplating its military power was partly due to the US wishing to reduce its military presence in Europe after the threat from the USSR reduced, and partly because the EU saw the opportunity to play a greater role in maintaining regional security without having to rely on the United States.

Britain and France are the main military powers within the EU and were in disagreement about the future direction of an EU military capability until the St Malo Declaration of 1998. It stated in its second paragraph: '[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to military crises'. It continues: 'the Union must be given the appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capacity for relevant strategic planning, without necessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU'. (para. 3) At the Intergovernmental Conference in Cologne, June 1999, the Western European Union (WEU) was incorporated into the EU, and with it, the tasks that the WEU had been

specifically mandated to perform since 1992, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks including peacemaking. These roles were set out in the Petersberg Declaration and became known as the Petersberg tasks. Six months later at the Helsinki IGC the conclusions stated that the Council had agreed that 'cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50000-60000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.' (para. 28) Thus with a military component at its disposal, the EU has set about creating a formalised policy for its utilisation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

#### *iv. Institutional and Legal Developments*

The study of the institutional structure of the EU and the legal developments within it is primarily concerned with two things. The first is to identify trends in the evolution of the legal constitution and the structural design of the EU to ascertain the changing roles of the various parts of the Union, including principally the Council, the European Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. The second is to suggest how the changes taking place will effect the decision-making processes, the policy outputs and the instruments used in the future in CFSP. A lot of work has been done on the evolution of European Political Cooperation (EPC) detailed above, its incorporation into the Single European Act in 1987 and its metamorphosis into the CFSP. Authors such as Simon Nuttall focus on the *longue duree* and question whether the legacy of the EPC and its intergovernmental structure that has been carried into the CFSP is best suited for the task it is charged with. 'EPC was designed to coordinate national foreign policies; the Union, as its tenets announce, is expected to have a common foreign and security policy. This is difficult to achieve by the intergovernmental method.' (Nuttall 1997 p.19) Fraser Cameron has detailed the gradual increase in the role of the Commission in the foreign policy of the EU, charting the incorporation of the Commission in the CFSP decision-making apparatus in order to 'preserve the overall coherence of the Union's external relations (Article C, TEU). Increasingly, foreign policy is inextricably linked to economic trade, development, and interior policy. In this sense, the Commission plays a powerful role in ensuring coherence between the different pillars of the Treaty on European Union.' (Cameron 1997 p.100)

Other contributions to this field include the work by Regelsberger on the procedure by which the EPC mechanism was modified to become a CFSP instrument. Prior to the Maastricht treaty, the foreign ministers of the EC met in two forums, firstly as the General Affairs Council of the EC and were assisted by the COREPER Permanent Representatives, while in the guise of EPC were known as 'the Twelve' and supported by an administrative and diplomatic staff based around Political Directors. These two

bodies were merged, along with the significant number of working groups reporting to the two, and this can be seen as an extremely important moment in the re-direction of the EU. (Regelsberger 1997) In the broader context of the role of the institutions in the foreign policy of the EU, the evolution from EPC to CFSP has led to the question of who pays for joint actions? When funds are drawn from the EC budget, the European Parliament (EP) becomes involved in the process because it is able to scrutinise the budget, while in broader foreign policy areas the EP has right of co-decision in the area of development policy and 'pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty as amended, the assent of the European Parliament is now required for association agreements with third countries and organisations if: they establish a specific institutional framework, or they have important budgetary implications, or they entail amendment of an act adopted under the co-decision procedure.' (Grunert 1997 p.121)

The final approach that will be considered in this section is a more critical appraisal of these trends. David Allen has coined the phrase 'Brusselsisation' to describe a tendency to relocate decision-making in particular fields in the institutions of the EU. 'The "Brusselsisation" of foreign policy – the steady enhancement of Brussels-based decision-making bodies – shows no sign of abating.' (Allen 1998 p.42) However, while the transference of power made be steady, the bodies that gain from the relocation of power do not do so evenly, but in competition with each other – namely the Commission and the Council. This reflects the long-term dichotomy that characterises the EU as a division between economic and political representation, but Allen chooses to frame it in a different way, dating back from the creation of EPC. His 'central argument is that the determination to preserve national foreign policies is ultimately at odds with the ambition to create a European foreign policy. This clash of objectives is reflected in the emergence of two "cultures" competing for control of the policy-making process, institutionally-based in the Council and the Commission.' (Allen 1998 p.42) The EU cannot have a common foreign policy without first establishing a European state which would be 'capable of identifying, selecting and implementing a coherent set of objectives that could be legitimised as being in the European interest.' (Allen 1998 p.47) The recent efforts made by the EU to become a more consistent foreign policy actor by bringing the Commission and the Council closer together has led to more power being accumulated in Brussels, and left the two institutions spoiling over it. 'In the struggle for control of Union external policy, the winner of this current round seems likely to be the Council and its Secretariat'. (Allen 1998 p.55) Thus the institutional structure of the EU is seen as a dynamic struggle over power, and one which can be seen as part of a longer process of political change within the EU.



## *v. Enlargement and its possible consequences*

Enlargement will present a number of challenges to the EU and to European foreign policy, many of which are as yet still unknown. However, there are three main issues that will be briefly mentioned here. The first is the question of decision-making in an enlarged EU of 25 members. While a number of modifications to the procedures within the second pillar were made in the Amsterdam and Nice treaties (and more were suggested in the European Draft Constitution), it remains to be seen how effective CFSP can be if the principle of unanimity is substantially retained. In recent months the 'new' states of the EU have shown themselves to be confident and forceful in making a contribution to the decision-making process and any thoughts that there would be a period in which the accession states would shadow existing positions could prove unfounded. A likely area of division in Europe will be between the 'Europeans' and the 'Atlanticists' over the role of the United States in the continued security provision for Europe through NATO and the development of a EU armed force. In the build up to the Iraq War of April 2003 many of the states that had recently joined NATO supported US-UK military actions and acted as a counter-weight to the traditional Franco-German core that has traditionally shaped EU policy positions. The second issue is directly related to this and concerns the security of the EU. In the words of Antonio Missiroli, 'The Enlargement of the European Union is a security policy in itself.'. (Missiroli p.62) The enlargement expands the area over which the EU's norms and values are practiced, and the capabilities the EU has for external action. However, new difficulties will arise too. The states that had previously acted as the 'buffer zone' around the EU will soon become members and extend the border many hundreds of kilometres east, thus establishing the boundary between the enlarged prosperous EU zone with poorer neighbours and putting extra pressure to the newest, least wealthy members to provide the internal security of the EU. As the EU grows and promotes income creation within it, it is also expanding and exaggerating the income inequality on its borders, which will lead to changing priorities in European foreign policy towards these neighbours. For in-depth surveys of the perspectives of the new members on this issue, see *Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP? The View from Central Europe*, (OP34, April 2002) edited by Antonio Missiroli at the European Union Institute for Security Studies. The occasional paper is available at <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ34.pdf>.

The final issue concerns the direct linkage between enlargement and foreign policy. Enlargement has been argued to be an instrument of foreign policy because it acted for many years as an open-ended promise to encourage radical economic and political reforms in the EU's neighbouring states. These reforms were dictated by the EU and designed to make the accession states more stable neighbours that could one day join the EU – in the classic definition of foreign policy the EU projected its

own values abroad and into the national political systems of third states. However, now that this instrument has been used once, the question arises of whether it will be used again, and if so, to which countries and for how much longer? It is directly related to the question of where the EU ends, to which Zielonka responds that while the EU as an idea is limitless, the EU as a material reality must have a physical border to prevent itself being spread too thin and risk collapsing. (Zielonka 1998) A resource providing a lot more information on the liberty and security within the EU and the role of the external border in promoting both of these values can be found on the website of the *ELISE: European Liberty and Security*, which looks at security issues, social cohesion and institutional development of the European Union at: [http://www.eliseconsortium.org/article.php3?id\\_article=28](http://www.eliseconsortium.org/article.php3?id_article=28)

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