Unmasking USAID Pakistan's Elite Stakeholder Discourses
Towards an Evaluation of the Agency's Development Interventions

Anum Pasha,
MSc in Media, Communication and Development

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[Anum Pasha]

ABSTRACT

This study pursued an exploration of Pakistani elite discourses that assess the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) development interventions and promotional discourses in context of a historically tense United States (U.S.) – Pakistan relationship. By interviewing USAID Pakistan's key stakeholders and employing a three-pronged conceptual framework that combined theories of discourse, power, and hegemony with a postcolonial/post-development lens, this research investigated elite perceptions that shape public opinions on American aid, amidst a "potent force" (Rizvi, 1994: 8) of anti-Americanism in Pakistan.

Findings drawn from a thematic analysis suggest that elites' perceptions of USAID Pakistan are situated within a discourse of resistance. USAID was viewed as more imperialistic than hegemonic and the agency was identified as an apparatus for exercising power through the guise of development. Unveiling a power imbalance in the donor-recipient relation, elites vehemently drew on geo-political tensions and foreign policy, identity and representation, class, culture and ideology, and religious discourses to ask a critical question: Why is the aid liaison between U.S. and Pakistan so unequal? Further, USAID Pakistan fell short of meeting elites' expectations of developmental impact. While USAID was praised for its support to Pakistan's education sector, the overall impact was considered insignificant.

Additionally, results indicate that USAID's promotional discourse increases contempt rather than consent among interviewed elites. The agency's development discourse was seen as a ploy to represent Pakistan as aid-dependent and America as the benign donor. Major historical and political tensions played out in elite narratives thus the aid discourse cannot be quarantined from broader events. Elites' apprehension of geo-politics implicates their perception of USAID and while these issues stand unresolved, the agency continues to exist in a field of resistance.

Advanced understanding of USAID Pakistan's stakeholder discourses can heighten American and Pakistani policymakers' self-reflexivity in their quest for renegotiating the troubled aid liaison. For those who dare to look at the other side of the coin, investigation of USAID's stance on these results can be valuable groundwork for further examining the U.S. – Pakistan aid liaison.

INTRODUCTION

Despite being a leading American aid recipient (Epstein and Kronstadt, 2013) Pakistan has experienced an inconsistent aid liaison with America.

Economic Advisor to Pakistan's government, Zaman (1985) explains that American economic assistance to Pakistan began in 1951, was terminated in 1977, restarted in 1978, halted in 1979 and resumed in October 1981. A historical lens indicates that the U.S. – Pakistan political relationship is closely tied to the endowment and suspension of economic assistance funds (appendix 8), disbursed through USAID.

A gap in perceptions exists regarding American economic support since Pakistanis' negative view of America has not altered despite benefitting from aid (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013). While research (Khan & Rehman, 2014; Kizilbash, 1988) has documented unfavourable Pakistani attitudes towards America irrespective of USAID's promotional efforts, there is insufficient academic attention on how Pakistani elites contribute towards the discourse.

Historical Background

The U.S. – Pakistan relationship began as early as September 1947 when Pakistan's first Governor- General Quaid-i-Azam procured arms from Washington to counter India's war threat (Husain, 1985). Washington neglected Pakistan until it gained strategic significance during the Cold War as Pakistan's role was identified in restraining communism, resulting in American aid for Pakistan (Ali, 2009).

However, "relations had attained a somewhat unsteady equilibrium" (Kux, 2001: 128) when Pakistan's General Ayub Khan expressed disapproval of American assistance to India. In 1965, President Johnson cut aid to restrain Pakistan's friendship with China. Afterwards President Carter imposed the Symington Amendment in 1979 and slashed aid because Pakistan "had been pursuing…. a nuclear option…" (Husain, 1985: 5).

Thereafter, the situation reversed in 1981 because America required Pakistan's support in curtailing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Generous aid flows were directed towards Pakistan as the "two sides worked hand in glove…in their war against the Soviet Union" (Markey, 2013: 2). Aid lasted until the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and relations between the two

countries deteriorated (Ali, 2009). Aid was cut during George Bush's administration under the 1985 Pressler Amendment (Hussain, 2005). American interest in Pakistan declined and President Clinton withheld aid under the Glenn Amendment. Pakistani intelligence agency's suspected support for the Taliban also caused "friction" (Kux, 2001: 348) with America during the 1990s.

Subsequently, America needed Pakistan to "dismantle the Taliban regime" (Ali, 2009: 252) after the 9/11 attacks. Sanctions were lifted and aid to Pakistan gradually increased (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013). Between 2001 and 2011, America spent over $8.8 billion in non-military assistance to Pakistan (Hameed, 2013). The 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) increased annual assistance by $1.5 billion between 2009 and 2013 ("GovTrack.us", n.d.). The KLB's principal purpose was to reduce distrust among Pakistanis (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011). Yet, "despite this largesse...Pakistan...appears to be more distrustful of the U.S...." (Fair, 2009: 149).

Study Significance

Against this backdrop, the research has a two-fold objective. I will investigate ÚSAID Pakistan's elite stakeholder discourses that assess the agency's development interventions, characterized as funds promoting 'economic development and welfare' ("OECED - Official development assistance – definition and coverage", n.d.) in Pakistan. The research aims to draw a canvass of Pakistani elites' perceptions of USAID against the setting of an unstable U.S. - Pakistan relationship.

Second, this research will examine how elites contest USAID's legitimizing promotional discourses including electronic and press campaigns, amidst "powerful and pervasive" (Epstein and Kronstadt, 2013: 39) anti-Americanism in Pakistan.

Further, this research aims for enhanced understanding of the complexities that underpin the aid discourse since there is an argument for rethinking the U.S. strategy towards Pakistan. The U.S. must develop understanding of Pakistan since it has been unable to strengthen a long-term relationship with Pakistan (Cohen and Chollet, 2007). This renegotiation can only occur from deeper awareness of Pakistani perceptions of USAID.

Moreover, a qualitative study of attitudes towards American support has been acknowledged as a gap. Andrabi and Das (2010) researched aid's impact on local attitudes during the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake and noted that many poor quality surveys are being conducted.

Additionally, scholarship (Alam, 2001; Rose & Husain, 1985; Wallace, 1985; Haqqani, 2013; Fair, 2010; Tahir, 1982) retains focus on U.S. military support to Pakistan. There is potential for researching in-depth stakeholder attitudes towards non-military assistance that shape the development agenda.

I have focused on the U.S. – Pakistan aid liaison since the discourse highlights a strained political relationship between both countries but not its impact on stakeholders' attitude towards aid. The U.S. has demonstrated its long-term interest in Pakistan by committing $742, 200, 000 in 2017 ("foreignassistance.gov", n.d.) despite the troubled history. This paradoxical occurrence captured my interest in USAID as the selected donor agency. However, I will not be focusing on individual projects but on the agency's overall efforts. Military aid will be beyond this study's scope.

Finally, I was previously engaged as a communications specialist at a USAID Pakistan project and felt inquisitive about the discourses that challenged the agency's interventions in an unpredictable geo-political climate. This compelled me to investigate how the agency's communication strategies are being interpreted given the growing public resentment towards America.

At the outset, I will discuss relevant theoretical literature, develop a conceptual framework and outline the research questions. Then I will explain the employed research methodology. Thereafter, findings will be presented from analysis of interviews conducted with ten Pakistani elites. Lastly, I will conclude by summarizing the core analytical insights based on this study's theoretical framework.

LITERATURE REVIEW

On Discourse

In the development aid-focused framework of this research, discourses being the "appropriate and legitimate ways of practicing development as well as speaking and thinking about it" (Grillo & Stirrat, 1997: 12) can be seen as "historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of representations or articulations through which meanings are constructed and social practices organized" (Baaz, 2005: 11).

In Foucauldian terms, discourses depart from being defined in a linguistic sense and turns towards the social and historical circumstances that give them rise (Macdonald, 2003). Similarly,

Laclau (1990) and Parker (1992) warn that since discourses are embedded in their historical formations, analysts must not disconnect themselves from discourse history. Since discourses can be traced to their historical, social and political circumstances, discourse theory can identify how historical and political circumstances resonate in elites' aid discourses.

Furthermore, drawing from Foucault, Baaz (2005) combines the intricacies of identity with aid discourse to argue that "discourses are…open-ended and related to each other" (ibid: 11) making it possible to discuss several discourses as they influence each other. Baaz's (2005) contribution is significant for theoretical enquiry of association between tensions in the discourse on U.S. – Pakistan relationship and aid - and for the understanding that aid discourse, like any other discourse, is embedded in past events.

Thus, Foucault's discourse framework encourages an investigation of the relationship "between discourses and the broader forms of socio-political change in which they arise" (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 48), akin to exploring how discourses on the geo-political facet of the U.S. – Pakistan relation inform the aid discourse.

Additionally, Foucault's discourse theory entails 'discursive conditions of possibility' that Hall (1997) notes "govern the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about…" (ibid: 44). Discourses possess the power to limit what can be known (McHoul & Grace, 1993), giving some discourses significance and rendering others invisible, to exercise symbolic power and influence perceptions (Bourdieu, 1990; Thompson, 1995).

In a similar vein, Purvis and Hunt (1993) capture Hall's theorization of the influential capacity of discourse and explain that he understands it as "frameworks which limit what can be experienced… and thereby influence what can be said and done" (ibid: 485) by powerful individuals, elites and institutions. In this sense, discourses, especially those generated by powerful individuals and institutions, influence wider perceptions.

Discourse on U.S. – Pakistan Relations

The discourse on U.S. – Pakistan relations is predominantly positioned on continuing tensions between both countries. Qazi (2012) considers American aid as a complex subject which has become debatable because relations have deteriorated. He observes the chaotic aid disbursement as a cause and contends that USAID has not had enough influence. Meanwhile, Fair (2009) has

noted that Pakistani elites also consider America as untrustworthy, warranting a closer look at their role in shaping discourse.

Elite Discourse

Dijk (1993) emphasizes how elite discourses reproduce the practice of racism by acknowledging elites' role in politics, media and education as producers of wider discourses through their "influential text and talk" (ibid: 8) as they "manufacture the consent needed for the legitimation of their own power" (ibid: 8). This supports the hypothesis that Pakistani elites who "manage public opinion" (Dijk, 1993: 8) shape broader public perceptions.

On Power, Knowledge and Development

Foucault (1978) conceptualizes power through a power-knowledge-discourse nexus by arguing that "it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together" (Hurley, 1978: 100). Discourse and knowledge constitute power and when exercised in practice over subjects (Foucault, 1980), legitimize what is being said to influence the subjugated, shape perceptions and regulate practices (Hall, 1992). While discourses organize action, they also enable people to become aware of certain things and speak about them. Thus, Foucault's conceptualization of knowledge constituting power to influence is critical for understanding how dominant discourses determine perceptions.

In contrast, Thompson (1990) does not consider discourse theory as an "approach to the fundamental links between knowledge and power" (Macdonald, 2003: 41).

For Foucault (1978), power does not exist in a top-down power relation – instead, "power is everywhere…" (ibid: 93) and determines the relation between actors. Foucault is more interested in how power is contested between actors rather than locating its "author" (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 21), serving as a critical approach for determining how power is installed, exercised and channelled between actors to "produce the truths we live by" (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 58). In contrast, a coercive model of power has been adopted in the Marxist tradition by Weber (1947), even though Marxist-inspired thinkers including Althusser and Gramsci re-conceptualized it (Macdonald, 2003).

Further, since Foucault's account of power has been applied to a range of fields including 'medicine', 'sexuality' and 'feminism', its flexibility allows practicality in 'development' even though his work has been criticized for its Euro-centric focus (Escobar,1984). Foucault's knowledge-discourse-power paradigm has been employed as an analytical tool for studying development practices by enabling a "critical deconstruction of the totalizing discursive formation of 'aid', the constellations of power it gives rise to, and its concrete impacts on North–South relations" (Rossi, 2004: 7).

Drawing on Foucault, Escobar (1995) conceptualized development as a process by "which poor countries are known, specified, and intervened upon" (ibid: 45). Thus, Foucauldian approaches to power offer a valuable framework for examining the aid liaison between North-South actors and the dominant development discourses that reinforce uneven power relations.

American Hegemony: Winning Hearts and Minds

Gramsci (1971) pioneered the concept of hegemony as different from coercive power. Drawing from Gramsci, Hall (1977) conceives hegemony as "winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural" (Hebdige, 1979: 16). Dominant groups in society must win pervasive consent of those they wish to rule through legitimization (Howarth, 2000).

By contrast, while Althusser's (1989) concept of 'Ideological State Apparatus' (ISA) complements Gramsci, it works through institutions including the mass media to propagate ideologies and does not leave room for resistance (Durham & Kellner, 2001), unlike Gramsci's hegemony that functions more subtly and accounts for counter-hegemonic forces.

Further, Gramsci's notion of hegemony has been widely associated with America's ascent to global domination. Gramsci was concerned with the rise of American dominance and enquired about 'Americanism's' impact on Europe. He saw America's capital accumulation as a "process of hegemony" (Fonseca, 2016: 84) and argued that elites moulded individuals' lifestyles (Antonio & Bonanno, 2000).

Moreover, Nuechterlein (2005) comprehensively documents the evolution of American hegemony beginning with the 1948 Marshall Plan for containment of communism. According to Nuechterlein (2005), "unlike the imperial roles exercised by Britain and France, however,

'hegemony' was a more appropriate term for America's exercise of its power…" (ibid: 4). America's ascent of hegemonic influence, akin to the Gramscian perspective, involved 'indirect influence' through "political, economic and military aid" (Nuechterlein, 2005: 4).

While scholarship has theorized hegemony in relation to America's superpower status, there has been limited discussion about the hegemonic influence of American aid and its contestation in Third World countries. Clark (1972) reiterates USAID's significance, considering the agency as an important vehicle for building consent. His analysis appears naïve because he assumes that the "respect built up over time through effective aid relationships in turn leads naturally to a more sympathetic hearing for other U.S. concerns" (ibid: 79). This is debatable since in countries like Pakistan where aid disbursement is high, America's negative image perseveres.

Reviewing Essex's (2013) Development, Security and Aid, Bhungalia (2016) notes, "USAID is one of the more deeply internationalized institutions…and thus offers a key site through which to examine the historical and evolving nature of U.S. hegemony…" (ibid: 88). Jadallah (2014) argues that American aid advances American foreign policy by "convincing states to stay in the U.S. orbit" (ibid: 6). Essex (2013) concludes that USAID aims to intervene in developing countries to "bring them under the umbrella of American hegemony" (ibid: 86). While USAID is a cornerstone of North-South relations, there is insufficient literature on American aid's hegemonic influence on the attitudes of people in aid-receiving countries.

Additionally, 'winning hearts and minds', a term which gained popularity in 2009 to legitimate American interventions in Afghanistan (Valeyre, 2011), is also appropriated in USAID's campaign for countering extremism and influencing perceptions (Cohen, 2007) through media rhetoric and development initiatives. Appropriating Gramsci's cultural hegemony framework is useful here for its emphasis on how media asserts "broader socio-political domination" (Durham & Kellner, 2001: 6). This is a critical challenge for USAID since anti-American sentiments are more serious than before (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011). While America has stressed on branding its projects with the USAID logo, it is fairly weak in making an impact (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011).

Andrabi and Das's (2010) study on the impact of American assistance during the 2005 Kashimir Earthquake on local attitudes concludes that "winning hearts and minds in the region is now more than ever seen as a legitimate…aim of providing bilateral foreign assistance…" (ibid: 2). While some studies (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010) evaluate the effectiveness of aid programs in winning hearts and minds in context of Afghanistan, there is

inadequate scholarly attention on how Pakistani experts are interpreting USAID's consent-winning strategies that shape public attitudes towards America and U.S. aid.

Contesting American Hegemony: Anti-Americanism in Pakistan

In a Gramscian sense, Hall's (1988) conceptualization of counter-hegemony as "resistance to the agenda of the dominant hegemony" (Carroll, 2009: 20) has been applied frequently to international relations (Deak, 2005). Gramsci's counter-hegemonic framework is valuable for understanding the alternative discourses that confront popular discourses authenticating American cultural values, ideology and interventions in Pakistan. In this regard, scholars have theorized antiAmerican discourses as counter-hegemonic in relation to how American interventions and ideological values are resisted in Pakistan.

For example, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2015) paint a dismal picture of anti-Americanism in Pakistan and suggest that the discourse is a result of nationalist and religious-based ideological aversions, based on 'difference' that can produce negative perceptions of America. From the nationalist perspective, they argue that events such as drone strikes are unpopular in Pakistan.

Further, they conclude that elite narratives play a vital role in fostering anti-Americanism in the public discourse, which demands an enquiry into elites' understanding of anti-Americanism in relation to U.S. – Pakistan liaison. Similarly, Reetz (2006) explains that anti-Americanism is fuelled by nationalist and anti-Indian camps bolstered by military and civil-bureaucratic elites. He argues that elites "are among the main torch-bearers of Pakistan anti-Americanism, feeding on … the unreliable partnership with the United States" (ibid: 189).

In sum, scholarship has scrutinized the sources of anti-Americanism discourses in Pakistan, but there is inadequate research on anti-Americanism in relation to aid and its impact on perceptions that are mostly curated by elites.

Pakistan in Western Development Discourse

For Escobar (1995), development discourses determine the West's neo-colonial construction of the Third World in order to legitimize its developmental interventions and exercise power. In this process "certain representations become dominant and shape the way in which reality is imagined and acted upon" (ibid: 5). Likewise, Cornwall and Eade (2010) argue that language constructs

perceptions and has a hegemonic influence on development policy. Through visual and text-based development discourse including media campaigns, the West has acquired hegemonic dominance that does not need force (Faille, 2011) to win consent. Escobar's (1995) theorization of development in relation to the discourse it is embedded in enables insight into development practices as a semblance of hierarchical North-South power relations.

In a similar vein, Banda (2004) suggests that the Third World is a construct rather than reality by drawing attention towards discourse as an apparatus for promoting Western ideology through development aid and positioning the West as a superior yardstick for poor countries to measure their performance against. Likewise, Ziai (2013) argues that the development discourse should be discarded because of its Euro-centric style. She argues that the West is usually "referred to as developed, i.e. as mature and complete in contrast to other societies…these are framed linguistically as lacking, backward, and inferior" (ibid: 128) to permit ideological penetration of aid and justify systematic intervention.

Escobar's grave concern about the Third World's discursive production that legitimates the West's developmental interventions to regulate poor countries, colonize their reality and silence marginalized voices lies central to the study of Pakistan's construction in Western aid discourse. It calls attention towards the representational discourses on U.S. assistance as dominated by an American view that "corruption is endemic to South Asia and to Pakistan in particular" (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013: 35). Pakistan is mainly associated with corruption issues as the stumbling block for successful implementation of USAID programs (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013). Miller (2015) considers "Islamabad's failings and betrayals" (pg. 116) as an obstacle towards American interests. Pakistan is typically defined in Washington as 'double-dealing' and 'dupliticious' (Qazi, 2012). Haqqani (2013) writes, "Americans see Pakistan as the ungrateful recipient" of aid. The development discourse is thus owned by Washington, where policymakers find Pakistan's corruption, ingratitude and unwillingness to cooperate as reasons behind the ineffectiveness of aid.

Deconstructing aid discourse evokes an interest in how the West's development terminology is being challenged in Pakistan. Escobar (1995) draws from Foucault to argue that when the West launches a demeaning discursive construction of the Third World, alternative discourses from Third World leaders and intellectuals resist to safeguard their own interests. In this context, we are still unable to hear of Pakistani leaders' response to Western discourses. One wonders if governing Western development discourses leave Third World elites any form of agency. If yes,

how do elites exercise agency to challenge these discourses? This context encourages to draw from Foucault (1980b) and give "voice to those de-legitimized sources so thoroughly disqualified from predominant discourse" (Hook, 2001: 25) for a recovery of Pakistani voices drowned in the noise of American discourse.

Aid from a Postcolonial Lens

Postcolonial theory developed as a reaction to inequalities that persisted after states were decolonized in the 20th century and progressed in "reaction to pitfalls of modernization" (Martin, 2015). The theoretical tradition sought to unmask the Third World's unequal power relationship with the West, drawing attention towards a "dominant discourse that labours continuously to suppress the 'other'...or multiple 'others'" (Hall, 1985 in Sosale, 2002: 5).

Postcolonial theorists express their frustration with the development project's paternalistic stance that only the West can resolve South's development problems. To address the gap between postcolonial theory and the development sector, Kothari (1996) asks: "Why is that most development academics and practitioners have never heard of Said, Spivak, Bhabha and Fanon...?" (ibid: 13).

In an attempt to bridge postcolonial theory with development, Kapoor (2008) theorized the aid discourse in his seminal book, The Postcolonial Politics of Development. Drawing from Derrida's (1992) conceptualization of 'gift' as associated with an expectation of reciprocity, he argues that the aid discourse enabled by an act of gift-giving to underdeveloped nations introduces a dichotomous relationship between the aid-giver and receiver – framing the former as generous and the latter as subordinate.

Kapoor (2008) also examines USAID's representational discourses that work to establish a positive image of the West and "position the Other – the recipient to subordinate, less worthy, under-developed" (ibid: 86) portrayals. Kapoor (2008) further examines the aid discourse in relation to the 'flag-waiving' practices of donor countries as a desire to publicize their image as superior to others. Such practices including "flags on grain sacks, insignias on equipment, sponsor names on NGO literature – all aim at designating the nation's gift and publicizing it..." (Kapoor, 2008: 87). The danger of these representational regimes has been articulated by Spivak (1999) who argues that the Third World's discursive production as inferior naturalizes Western dominance.

Closely linked with representation, Said's (1978) conceptualization of 'orientalism' offers critical insight into aid discourses that describe the recipient as 'lesser' as a mechanism for exercising power over the beneficiary and sustaining Western dominance. His definition of 'orientalism' as a "Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the orient" (ibid: 3) can explain why development communication has adopted an approach that allows Western donors ('occident') to paint Southern communities ('orient') in rigid frames. These descriptions are laden with the "will to power" (Kapoor, 2008: 6) and signalize an 'orientalist' attitude that postcolonial writers have been suspicious of. Similarly, Hall (2001) emphasizes that media representations and popular culture produce difference in an effort to extend a colonial legacy for sustaining power relations. Thus, unsymmetrical North-South power relations are concealed by the way donor agencies' media representations take shape in text and visuals.

Conceptual Framework and Research Questions

The reviewed literature has exposed many anxieties in the U.S. – Pakistan paradox that frame this research. While scholarly attention has been granted to geo-political complications, limited research has undertaken investigation of the Pakistani elite discourses that evaluate American economic assistance. Even less academic attention has been given to Pakistani elites' counter-discourses towards the hegemonizing strategies of consent adopted by USAID in its promotional discourses. The literature review has evoked many questions: How are prevailing U.S. – Pakistan tensions reflected in the agency's elite stakeholders' narratives? How do local elites contest American hegemonic influence that transfuses through USAID's communication efforts? How are elites interpreting USAID's development interventions given the complications marked in the literature?

In light of the theoretical interests that have guided this research, a three-pronged conceptual framework has been designed.

First, Foucault's concept of 'discursive formations' has been hand-picked to explore the depth of elite narratives on American assistance. This concept relates to Foucault's preoccupation with the "external or social conditions within which discourses are formed..." (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 490) and is a probing tool in research that requires insights into human communication, behaviour and knowledge. By using Foucault's critical preoccupation with discourse formation

through nondiscursive practices including political and historical conditions, I seek to explore elite discourses that examine American aid in relation to broader events.

Second, Gramsci's theorization of 'counter-hegemony' as forces which seek to "overthrow the existing hegemony" (Durham & Kellner, 2001: 5) has been selected since the concept has garnered significant attention in hypothesizing American hegemonic influence on peripheral countries. Contestation of American hegemonic influence infiltrated through USAID's publicity rhetoric as an attempt to erect the world-views of Pakistanis has the potential to be further studied.

Third, a combined postcolonial and post-development lens will seek to identify how USAID's development discourse is being interpreted in Pakistan. This lens is valuable for analysing the aid discourse and brings forth a bundle of concepts including representation, 'othering', 'orientalism' and power/knowledge. Finally, postcolonial theory is not only a suitable instrument for analysing the unequal power relations enabled from discursive framing of Southern aid recipients by Western donors, it also allows decolonizing development discourse and inspires a reading of the Third World's alternative discourses that interrogate popular claims.

By relying on this conceptual framework and reviewed literature, the objectives of this research as outlined before are:

i) To investigate Pakistani elite perspectives of American aid in relation to geo-political and historical events that underpin the U.S. – Pakistan relationship and;

ii) To identify elite discourses which contest USAID's consent-winning promotional efforts.

By probing into Pakistani elite perceptions, this research aims for enhanced understanding of the discussions underlining the U.S. – Pakistan strategic development roadmap. This leads me to asking the following question:

Research Question

- What kinds of discourses do USAID Pakistan's elite stakeholders call on to evaluate the agency's development interventions?

The research question was broken into sub-questions:

- How are Pakistani elites' discursive perceptions of American aid being formed under the conditions of a historically tense U.S. - Pakistan relationship?
- How do Pakistani elites contest the hegemonizing strategies of consent adopted by USAID in its promotional discourse?

METHODOLOGY

An epistemology of qualitative elite interviews was appropriated because it permitted collection of extremely sought-after information from elites working at the heart of Pakistan's policy-making process. Given the sensitive nature of this research, the methodology seemed suitable to "probe deeply elite attitudes, values, and beliefs" (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002: 675). The elite interviewing methodology as an enquiry that focuses on extracting specialized information deserving of "non-standardized treatment" (Dexter, 1970: 5) is under-theorized because elites are difficult to access (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001). However, its significance for comprehending the social world has been reiterated by scholars (Wax, 1971; Whyte, 1984). Tansey (2007) recommends the elite interviewing methodology as part of a researcher's toolkit because it allows learning about the debates involved in elites' decision-making that influences society.

Rationale for Pakistani Elite Interviews

To suit this study's framework, Dexter's (1970) broad definition of 'elite' was applied: "A group of individuals who hold…a privileged position in society and…are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public" (ibid: 7). This was combined with a small yet meaningful definition by Kezar (2003) who considers elites as "persons in power" (ibid: 395).

Pakistani elites are central to the development sector and perform a key role in framing the public discourse on Pakistan's complex relationship with America. Kaltenthaler, Miller and Fair's (2012) study on Pakistani public attitudes towards American drone strikes assigns elite discourse its due significance in shaping public opinion. They argue that Pakistanis' attitude towards drone strikes is determined by which elites they trust. Consequently, in-depth conversations with Pakistani elites can draw me closer towards their beliefs to explain the gap in public perceptions of American assistance.

Since this study's core objective is gaining insight into elite opinion, the merits of elite interviewing were carefully reviewed. This study's reliance on primary data collection and extremely sensitive information necessitated elite interviewing. Further, there was a particular interest in looking beyond secondary sources such as press releases and reports that have limited information due to government confidentiality or private decision-making processes (Davies, 2001).

Research Approach

A semi-structured interview approach that "allows more opportunity for probing and gives the respondent considerable freedom..." (Peabody et al., 1990: 452) was undertaken because the style has been extensively used in elite interviews (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987). Zuckerman (1972) traced her experience of interviewing Nobel Laureates and concluded that elites "resent being encased in the straitjacket of standardized questions" (ibid: 167). A flexible approach was thus employed to engage the interviewees in a free-flowing conversation.

Other research methodologies including questionnaires and focus groups were also reviewed. Questionnaires were rejected for not giving elites an opportunity to articulate their opinions at length. Also, elites are not expected to openly provide information in public settings such as focus groups since those tend to be shaped by group dynamics. Although "collective wisdom" (Dexter, 1970: 4) is obtained, elites do not provide personal narratives in group settings. Focus groups also seemed laborious to coordinate due to elites' busy schedules.

Further, methodological challenges and guidelines for elite interviewing were noted. First, elite interviewing involves issues related to power and control (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001) because they often try to regulate the interview (Harvey, 2011). Second, interviewing elites can be pressurizing because enriching information has to be extracted in limited time from individuals who are not keen on giving time that can be devoted elsewhere (Zuckerman, 1972). Since this study commanded elite interviewing, the methodology was appropriated despite the above-mentioned challenges.

Sample Recruitment and Access

Following ethical approval, I selected individuals based on the following criteria. First, respondents must have decision-making influence in policy and development planning. Second,

respondents should have knowledge of USAID and political awareness of U.S. – Pakistan relations. Third, respondents' work should entail public engagement.

I aimed for maximum male-female representation and selected respondents from diverse fields including academia, military intelligence, bureaucracy and journalism since the objective "is not counting opinion or people, but rather exploring the range of opinions..." (Gaskell, 2000: 41). For a detailed account of respondent profiles, see appendix 4.

Moreover, I appropriated a snowball sampling technique in which "one subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third..." (Vogt, 1999 in Atkinson & Flint, 2001) to access elites. The method has been used frequently for elite interviewing since trust is needed to initiate contact through referrals (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). I combined this method with using personal contacts to remove bureaucratic blockades (Harvey, 2010). To gain respondents' full consent for an interview, it was imperative to build rapport months in advance. Trust was established by frequent email exchanges with respondents about the nature of my research.

Topic Guide

A fairly flexible topic guide (appendix 3) was developed to serve as a guide for keeping myself on track during the interview. The topic guide was categorized into themes in accordance with theoretical interests. This approach was designed to maintain overall consistency, retain a focus and revert to questions that were unanswered (Berry, 2002). Further, the topic guide focused on broad, open-ended questions that were later narrowed down to personal and specific questions to ensure that participants feel comfortable.

Interviews

A total of ten interviews were conducted in Pakistan between March and April, 2016. Seven interviews were conducted in person whereas three were completed via Skype due to interviewees' physical non-availability.

Before travelling to Pakistan, I scheduled some interviews through personal contacts whereas the rest were arranged through referrals from interviewees. All face-to-face interviews were recorded on my iPhone because I was worried that a recording device could make respondents feel

uncomfortable while divulging inner-most thoughts. Also, I was conscious of the interview location because it can impact the kinds of information respondents are willing to reveal (Harvey, 1984). Most interviews were conducted at interviewees' office or home according to their preference. In addition, travel arrangements were made to Islamabad for interviewing one participant at his residence.

Further, questions asked were open-ended and theoretical references were avoided. I asked general questions in the beginning to seek spontaneous responses. For instance, I asked: 'What do you think about donor agencies' media campaigns?' to observe whether the respondent brought up USAID on their own before I directly asked about USAID's campaigns. Contrary to my expectations that elite interviews are time-constrained, each interview lasted long enough between one and two hours. However, the direction and pace of interviews was generally controlled by interviewees.

Reflexivity and Ethical Considerations

Interviewees were requested to sign an informed consent form which outlined the study's purpose, research procedures, confidentiality statement, and participation rights. Interviewees were reassured about confidentiality if they chose to maintain anonymity, which is crucial when interviewing high-profile elites who are easily identifiable due to their prominence (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001). Four respondents wanted to remain anonymous and consequently their profiles have been altered.

Furthermore, I was apprehensive of a potential sample bias because some interviewees were accessed through personal contacts. Although the aim was to acquire a genuinely representational sample, I was unable to get hold of a religious party leader who could have plausibly added a unique perspective since many of the opinions about America are "coloured by a religious discourse" (Fair & Watson, 2015: 18). Also, the sample was geographically limited to two cities due to personal travel constraints.

Finally, my role as a female researcher in this study's social context must be reflected upon, since Pakistan is a patriarchal society (Kidwai, 2001). Feminist scholarship has placed significance on power differentials between the male elite and the female interviewer (Abels & Behrens, 2009). Since six interviewees were males, I was particularly conscious of gender-related issues but did not observe anything indicative of a gender bias.

Analysis

All interviews were transcribed verbatim and thematic analysis was used for data interpretation due to its compatibility across diverse research approaches (Braune & Clarke, 2006). AttrideStirling's (2001) practical guide for unearthing and summarizing salient themes to present them in a thematic network was employed. The thematic network enables extraction of data into 'basic themes' which merge into 'organizing themes' that amalgamate into a core 'global theme'.

Following Attride-Stirling's (2001) model, a coding framework based on theoretical interests was devised according to which interview data was read and re-arranged into segments. The first trial involved summarizing key issues in the data followed by abstracting themes. Themes were refined in the coding framework and illustrated into a thematic network (appendix 1) constituting 'basic themes', 'organizing themes' and a 'global theme'. The deduced themes were then explored in relation to each other and thematic patterns were identified to answer the research question.

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

Set as the core reflection of interview data, the 'global theme' emerging from analysis is: 'Resistance against USAID's imperialism', encapsulating respondents' discursive perceptions of the agency against the setting of a strained U.S. – Pakistan political relationship.

At the heart of the aid discourse, Pakistani elites articulated their struggle against aid imperialism, understood as an instrument for pushing economic and geo-political interests of American hegemony (Veltmeyer, 2005). Since discourses are formed in "historical context" (Hall, 2001: 74) and are correlative, anxieties of the U.S. – Pakistan discourse were highly visible in elites' discussions as they critiqued U.S. power tactics, challenged American foreign policy and USAID, and contested unequal aid relations because "resistance is concomitant with the process of subjectification" (Pickett, 1996: 458) in the Foucauldian sense.

I will first outline the empirical results by describing the thematic network (appendix 1) constituting 'organizing themes': 'hating America', 'identity and representation', 'unequal partnership' and 'hegemonic power', then explore the 'basic themes' and finally connect these to the 'global theme' of resistance followed by a discussion of how these findings inform my theoretical interests.

Findings

Hating America

Respondents' accounts predominantly reflected anxieties of an anti-American discourse demonstrating that aid cannot be evaluated in isolation of public hatred against America. Elite respondents argued that increasing U.S. aid cannot restrain anti-Americanism because American policy is negatively construed:

> **Ghulam Ali (GA):** American bashing exists and aid is not reducing it. Even if there is no aid, bashing will continue as it's related to perception of U.S.

Upon being asked about aid's role in anti-Americanism, most respondents agreed that it does not directly impact anti-Americanism. One respondent expressed scepticism of USAID's success in influencing perceptions:

> **Nadia Naviwala (NN):** I don't think anti-Americanism in Pakistan has anything to do with aid because the amount is really insignificant. It doesn't trickle down or have an impact or is visible to the ordinary citizen.

In contrast, a former USAID contractor drew an association between USAID's hegemonic practices, promotional efforts and anti-Americanism, suggesting a severe power imbalance:

> **Saadia Khan (SK):** Aid is nurturing anti-Americanism even if it's not doing it directly. Just by branding strategies and imposing themselves they are not doing anything to suppress it.

When probed further about anti-Americanism and aid, responses focused on the following 'basic themes':

Superpower Policy

Eight respondents discussed American foreign policy as a determinant of anti-Americanism citing that aid is perceived as poor compensation for the harsh American political stance towards Pakistan. Main events mentioned in this context were: Soviet-Afghan war, Global War on Terror (GWOT), 2011 NATO attack on Salala, CIA agent Raymond Davis incident, 2011 Bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, drone warfare and Pakistan's nuclear status.

Senior bureaucrat Dr. Nasir Javed (DNJ) argued against American foreign policy during our discussion on the Government of Punjab's (GOP) decision to disengage with USAID:

> Anti-American sentiments are strong because of American policies. People are being killed and their properties destroyed. How can you compensate people who are being killed? We've killed you but we can pay your laundry bill now that we've dirtied your clothes!

Additionally, all respondents agreed that American aid has a power agenda which creates colossal distrust and the perception that American interventions are based on a logic of domination. Former Director General Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) Senator Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf (GJA) explained:

> So Americans have their own political and superpower agenda. They have become very arrogant and have destroyed many countries in the process.

> **Sigbhatullah Sabwari (SS):** Keep in your view that they are an imperialist power and we have to work with them.

Scapegoating

Four respondents narrowed down anti-Americanism to Pakistanis' habitual blaming of America for Pakistan's internal problems. This is a unique perspective of looking at public consciousness contrary to the narrative that America is resented because of its superpower status and policy regime:

> GA: U.S. is an international scapegoat for problems in the global South.

Another distinct perspective pointed towards a notion of hypocrisy:

> SS: As Jahangir Tareen said when he was accused by the press, as his political party was going belligerent against USAID because he had taken money from us for the Mango program, he summed it up really well saying: "Americans are bad but their dollars are good!"

> **Dr. Faraz Islam (DFI):** On one hand we want to immigrate to America and we hate American values.

Religion

Six interviewed elites discussed events such as the Soviet War, GWOT and drone strikes to attribute a religiosity factor to groups mobilized for safeguarding the Muslim interest in Pakistan. When asked about religion's role in evoking hostility towards America and aid, one respondent explained that America's intrusion is a perceived threat to Islam's ideological values. Two respondents mentioned a 'fundamentalist mindset' that triggers rage from the traumatic humiliation of Muslims. From GJA's response, a clear Muslim-American divide emerged:

> Anti-Americanism has nothing to do with aid. It is based on American policies regarding Muslims. It influences minds because Pakistanis are generally religious-minded. So they hear about American atrocities on Muslims. It creates hatred for the Americans and sympathy for Muslims, the victims.

When asked about the aid's influence on religious extremism, one respondent expressed doubt about USAID's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) goal:

> **NN:** You can't really talk about impact of CVE because what do you really look for when you talk about impact in terms of reducing extremism in Pakistan? Are you going to measure individuals and ask them if they are less extremist now?

> **DNJ:** It's interesting that USAID projects were in South Punjab and ironically terrorism is also concentrated there.

While NN is uncertain of USAID's success in countering extremism, DNJ's belief that terrorism and aid are interlinked evokes potential research interest.

Always the Grieving Party

Respondents saw themselves as the grieving party based on their personal experience with the U.S. government and USAID. Some respondents drew on a historical context as they mentioned feeling abandoned by America and perceived American support as unreliable. DFI stated:

> Americans are very fickle-powered. When the 1965 war happened, they left us. In the 1971 war they didn't side with us. Every time we have required them to commit they have left us.

For one respondent whose 'company x' had been awarded project funding which was terminated due to alleged corruption charges, resentment is based on personal suffering and loss:

> **SK:** For me it was not just a business thing, it was a personal thing which included a death. It included spoiling our name and that is all we had. We suffered a death, we suffered so much work.

From Victim to Key Ally

Discussing Pakistani public perceptions of USAID, respondents voiced two key thoughts:
  i)   Self-perception of Pakistanis as marginalized victims
  ii) ii) Allies of America as aid recipients

> **SS:** There is this weird general Pakistani mind-set that everything that happens to us is because of America and America now needs to give us money to fix it.

Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) conceptualization of antagonism is pertinent here as individuals struggle for their identities "because they construct an 'enemy' who is deemed responsible for this 'failure'" (Howarth, 2000: 105).

> **GA:** Whenever USAID has opened offices in Pakistan it comes as a desire to improve relationships and reopening of offices after 9/11 was an indicator.

By contrast, GJA believed that positive accounts of USAID came from those who profited from the agency, indicating that aid serves unequally:

> Aid is impacting only the NGOs and the few who have benefited and they praise USAID.

USAID's Questionable Legitimacy

Critiques flowed when respondents were requested to assess USAID's development efforts. Respondents interrogated USAID's legitimacy by drawing attention towards the limited scale of projects, funds wastage, corruption, excessive American intrusion, CVE, development sector dependence, limited institutional support, ostracisation of the government and aid conditionality:

> **NN:** USAID has not had impact in Pakistan on a large scale. Period. I am very sceptical of CVE work and grants to civil society. So I don't think there is any reason to believe that there has been any scaled impact.

Five respondents explained that USAID's legitimacy in Pakistan, particularly in Punjab province, is severely constrained by the agency's inability to align itself with GOP's objectives. Some pointed out that it was difficult to assess the agency's impact since USAID had zero stakes in mainstream government initiatives. DNJ spoke from GOP's perspective:

> The scope and project identification are limited. For most projects success is evaluated on input indicators, so we really don't see the outcome and how people have benefitted.

While DNJ's response captures GOP's take on USAID's initiatives to some extent, it drives the analysis towards a compelling point: USAID Pakistan's legitimacy is tied to government ownership.

Transparency was also a key concern because aid was perceived to be profiting corrupt groups. Some respondents mentioned that aid committed under KLB was channelled back to American contractors, confirming the widespread belief that USAID's interventions did not have transformative impact. GJA reported:

> KLB was supposed to be one hell of a big favour to Pakistan, but one billion dollars was spent in the construction of the U.S. embassy and CIA centre in Islamabad and it is our 'so-called' money with which they are building a huge complex. A senior U.S. embassy representative himself remarked when I said, "You got a new house… brand new house? He said thanks to you!"

> **Interviewer:** I see

> **GJA:** I said yes, thanks to us you are spending our KLB fund and he said well that is right. So you know they do these clever things!

Other cynical respondents reported that project outcomes were not visible enough:

> **SK:** I mean what's the impact? Where are these educated children? Where are the schools? Where are those American flag USAID schools?

Respondents also expressed their concern about the development sector's aid dependency, complementing theoretical critiques of aid (Bauer, 1982; Tandon & Mkapa, 2008; Moyo, 2009). Most respondents believed that aid promotes instability and discourages innovation, making the development sector reliant on intermittent assistance:

> **NN:** NGOs are dependent on it, people are dependent on it and everyone wants to keep making this money so it provides an alternative to doing meaningful work. It's kind of co-opted.

> **SK:** The only impact is on creating jobs for consultants and it's making the Pakistani development sector extremely, umm, lazy and you know dependent on such funding.

On the contrary, Dr. Saeed Shafqat (DSS) positively assessed USAID's impact on Pakistan's education sector:

> You can take the case of Pakistan Administrative Staff College that was supported by USAID. Then look at the evolution of Lahore University of Management Sciences - USAID was an important contributor…

Identity and Representation

Another prevalent theme was related to respondents' "sense of who they are in relation to others" (Howarth, 2011: 2) – their identity and representation. A few respondents felt that the American discourse 'othered' Pakistan because the rhetoric framed Pakistanis in homogenous mounts that were 'different' from Americans' self-perceptions. This is supported by Baaz (2005) who warns about the issue of identity and Tanzanian development aid from a postcolonial standpoint by stating, "The image of an open, trustworthy, organized and committed Danish aid worker self in opposition to an implicit image of the Tanzanian partner as unreliable, uncommitted and disorganized" (ibid: 2). In this context, some respondents actively contested American development discourse by pointing towards the following 'basic themes':

Dependency: A Western Discursive Construct

Upon being asked to share their thoughts on aid dependency, eight respondents denied the mainstream narrative which constructs Pakistan as dependent on American aid. The responses proved to be fascinating in contrast to the discourse on Pakistan's inherent dependency on America, oft-cited in media reports and academic literature (Mehmood, Hasan & Sarwar, 2015; Ahmed & Khan, 2007). Respondents reported that Pakistan's dependency is a Western discursive construction of knowledge that seeks to justify domineering American aid interventions:

> **DFI:** American intrusion has been excessive, the problem is the articulation of the idea that they are giving us aid and we are dependent on it.

> **Interviewer:** What do you think about aid dependency?

> **DNJ:** Government is not dependent on civilian aid.

In contrast, NN specified Pakistanis' portrayal of themselves as aid-dependent:

> So I think what Pakistanis do is that they paint themselves as an aid-dependent society.

The above comment can be viewed from the perspective of Said's (1978) extension of 'orientalism' as 'self-orientalism' because the 'orient' reflexively mirrors itself to reinforce the Euro-American construction of Third World's image (Dirlik, 1996).

Culture, Ideology and Difference

Respondents were questioned about their opinions on American ideological values in relation to aid and a majority viewed American culture as 'different' and permeating the agency's practices. DNJ's counter cultural-hegemonic stance against the infiltration of American values through aid is observable:

> What democracy? What ideology? Do you think Iraq is much better off with democracy? Did people invite America? It's all drama... Aid projects just want to promote these American values we all know that.

Two respondents emphasized on the cultural difference between Americans and Pakistanis as a cause of misunderstanding in the aid liaison. These views invite the notion of cultural stereotyping and an 'us and them' divide - in this case, the Americans' culture as 'they' are perceived 'different' from Pakistanis. SS also pointed towards Americans' self-representation as benevolent aid-givers:

> It's all baseball! You can't play cricket with USAID! They also point out that they give money here. We need to understand the way Americans approach things and they need to understand local cultural nuances.

SK stressed on her personal effort to resist the penetration of American culture into projects:

> Again our own project, it was very American ideologically. We are different in Pakistan...we were fighting for a traditional chunk in the program and wanted to do something with Pakistani traditions.

Another respondent demonstrated acute awareness of Pakistanis' 'subjectification' (Heller, 1996) to American hegemonic culture as a practice rooted in colonial history:

> **GA:** Let's be honest. I mean we live by a lot of it okay? And we're a Third World country. We are extremely impressed because of being under the British rule and the 'yes sir mentality' and that's why we are in this position.

Some respondents showed concern for dominant representations painting Pakistanis as 'deprived' and 'lacking' to reinforce an asymmetrical power relationship that sums up the American donor-Pakistani recipient nexus. Discussing Pakistan's portrayal in the agency's media discourse, one respondent explained:

> **DFI:** So what comes through is the idea that oh we're giving to the locals of the deprived world.

Class

Most respondents believed that aid does not benefit all societal classes and favours certain elite groups whose identities are concealed under a pretence of being the movers and shakers of Pakistani society:

> **DFI:** It hasn't benefitted the bottom of these societies but has a direct transfer to upper middle class, contractors and government departments.

> **DNJ:** It has just benefitted donors more than recipients. The consultants and bureaucrats have benefitted…the heavy consultancy fee…. the foreign trips… I being part of that 'mafia'… I myself have benefitted.

These responses were unanticipated because the respondents belong to a privileged class and identify themselves as elites. Yet, there was a frank self-awareness of the problem.

GJA narrated his personal experience of confronting USAID to address class-related corruption:

> My director's husband has benefited immensely. He was very popular with the USAID all the time. Every year he gets the contract for teacher training …he is a crook. So the agency is benefitting people like that. This is not correct. I pointed it all out to them. I didn't leave them.

Unequal 'Partnership'

 A prime theme emerged to capture respondents' articulation of the donor-recipient matrix that sustains an unequal 'partnership' aided by discourse. Pickard (2007) argues that the partnership discourse works to create an ambivalent image of Northern development agencies and reinforces unequal power relations in the South. Words such as 'partnership' and 'ownership' infer an equal donor-recipient relationship concealed beneath imperialist ideologies among donors (De Waal, 2006; Baaz, 2005; Escobar, 1995 as cited in Olesen, 2011).

Stakeholder Relationship

Most respondents saw USAID's presence in Pakistan constrained by limited stakeholder engagement with beneficiaries, contractors, and government. While many believed that stakeholder consultation was restricted due to short project life cycles, a former contractor stated that USAID's top-down approach is designed to assign Pakistani stakeholders subordinate positions and sustain dominance and control. Hira and Parfitt (2004) use the term 'top-down' to describe how this approach adopted by donor agencies "is antithetical to the qualities of flexibility and local initiative required for a more effective development" (ibid: 65). SK reported her experience:

> We applied as they had requested us so it was very dictated. I feel that our project was dictated from day one I mean they came to us, they told us to apply, we applied, we got selected and there was no pre-qualification of companies. In that selection letter, they dictated us that we have to be the lead and 'company Y' has to be a sub-contractor…

SK's awareness of the asymmetrical power relations around which the donor-stakeholder 'partnership' orbits is evident. From stakeholders' standpoint, USAID's dictatorial form of governance excludes them from taking the lead in projects, a complexity reported in literature on aid inequalities. Robb (2005) succinctly describes the paradox of aid given from the rich to the poor: "By its very definition, it is a manifestation of inequality" (ibid: 22).

Discussing the dynamics of donor-government collaboration, Kakande (2004) explains that donors' funds can be associated with power as they try to control the agenda, leading to an

imbalance. In this context, one respondent shed light on the government's dissatisfaction with USAID:

> **GA:** The government is not happy with USAID as they don't see them doing things under their direct supervision or involvement.

GJA's experience with USAID exposes the government's contestation of USAID's domineering and exclusionary practices:

> During my time I had forced them to be involved with the Federal Government...

Political and Bureaucratic Regime

In relation to USAID's objectives in Pakistan, most respondents steered the conversation towards U.S. strategic and political interests. All respondents believed that economic aid served America's geo-political interests rather than Pakistan's developmental needs:

> **DFI:** It feels these projects are more to fulfil the strategic interests of the donor agency rather than interests of the people.

> **Yasmeen Al (YA):** Americans are great players of realpolitik. By funding Pakistan they keep alignment with South Asia open and they can hedge their bets.

In a different vein, one former USAID employee denied USAID's political objectives, indicating that the issue is debatable:

> GA: USAID wants betterment of people. It sounds political but when it comes to the ground, it is development for development.

Hegemonic Power

Countering U.S. Hegemonic Influence

A final organizing theme 'hegemonic power' captured the respondents' perceptions of USAID's promotional discourses. Most respondents thought that USAID's media campaigns reflected "American narcissism" (Nederveen, 2004: 138) and were counterproductive in fostering a

positive influence on public perceptions. Some respondents felt it encouraged resistance against America's chauvinistic superpower image that was cultivated through media rhetoric.

Discussing USAID's hegemonic influence in Pakistan, respondents argued that the foremost purpose of the agency's developmental interventions was to promote a positive image of America in Pakistan. There was also consensus on the opinion that USAID's media discourse was designed to sustain the agency's imperialist prestige in international development, raise awareness about projects and build consent in Pakistan. Respondents' critiques emphasized:

i)   Mistrust of campaign objectives;

ii)   USAID's failure to curb anti-Americanism through campaigning;

iii) 'Jarring' and 'in-your-face' advertisements/branding and;

iv) A problematic representational discourse.

Respondents elaborated on USAID's ineffective branding and promotional strategy:

> **GA:** So obviously when something is logoed by America, there is always distrust in Pakistan.

> **YA:** USAID's promotional campaigns force American assistance down our throats. The balance is unbalanced but it could have been subtle. They should not be self-praising.

Some respondents commented on USAID's over-jarring campaigns as forcefully 'American'. Others saw media campaigning as a cultural hegemonic instrument that authenticates and promotes American culture from a Gramscian perspective:

> **SK:** Very American, their marketing strategies are becoming stringent every year, left right, up and down. The flag has to be there. The advertisements always promote Pakistanis as poor and illiterate...

> **SK:** So they would put the complete American content and dub it. There would be a five-minute cultural section which would be very American...Now in Pakistan we resisted it.

NK pointed towards muted beneficiary 'voices' in USAID's promotional testimonials:

> It would be more believable if USAID's testimonials were coming from the farmers themselves it has to be coming from the horse's mouth.

The concept of 'voice' is fundamental to postcolonial theory, predominantly in Spivak's (1988) contributions which determine that "the subaltern cannot speak" (ibid: 308). Couldry (2010) emphasizes voice by arguing that agency is removed if people are denied the opportunity to voice their narratives – "the result is a crisis of voice under neoliberalism" (ibid: 2).

One respondent explained that mistrust of American foreign policy and the anti-American sentiment resulted in USAID's promotional activities becoming counter-productive:

> **DFI:** It's giving the impression that America is throwing pieces and on one hand it is bombing Afghanistan and destabilizing Pakistan.

DNJ's interpretation of USAID's promotions divulges his antagonism because he sees the media tactics as threatening to the government's limelight:

> In terms of their propaganda and marketing...people think only USAID is doing all the work and no one else is.

Another respondent drew attention towards the extreme public distrust which is complemented by fear of being associated with American branding:

> **SS:** One individual said to me: "Why don't you put up a bulls eye here? So that they can fire a missile on what I am doing. We are already so exposed and on top of that you add a banner!"

In sum, the unpacked findings formulate a thematic network (appendix 1) constituted by the global theme, 'resistance against USAID's imperialism', that broadly depicts elites' struggle against USAID. Elites' discursive resistance circles around i) anti-Americanism ii) American hegemony and counter-hegemony iii) identity and representation-related complexities and iv) an unequal partnership.

An exploratory analysis of the data reveals the relationship between these 'organizing themes' as they absorb each other. For example, many anxieties within the anti-Americanism discourse are associated with resilience towards American domination and hegemony which seek to reinforce an unequal U.S. – Pakistan 'partnership'. This imbalanced power relation is sustained by a disempowering development discourse which misrepresents Pakistan's identity as crucially dependent on USAID. The discursive distortion of identity then serves the donor's hegemonic, ideological and commercial interests over the recipients' interests to justify all systematic interventions. Elites also attempted dismantling of western development narratives and contested American cultural values that infiltrate the agency's media discourses. Ultimately, interviewed elites' discursive practices become an act of resistance towards the agency's coercive and non-coercive practices.

Discussion

Empirical results both complement and contradict the theoretical interests framing this research. Since findings amalgamate into a central theme of USAID Pakistan's key stakeholders calling on discourses of resistance against aid imperialism, it is crucial to first theorize 'aid imperialism' and 'resistance' from the vantage point of findings.

Marxist-inspired Hayter (1971) conceptualized aid as the "smooth face of imperialism" (ibid: 7) to argue that it is an instrument for superpowers to continue exploitation of weaker nations. Veltmeyer (2005) understands development imperialism as an American agenda that enforces hegemonic influence and reinforces power hierarchies between donor and recipient. Results suggest that interviewed elites have joined Hayter (1971) and other aid critics (Moyo, 2009; Easterly, 2006; Feldman, 1967) to contend that USAID is a vanguard agency of contemporary imperialism. On the contrary, Warren and Sender (1980) contradict the interview data arguing that aid is not imperialistic and completes its task of development. Paragg (1980) also argues that Canadian aid is not imperialistic by nature.

Moreover, elites' resistance towards aid as a draconian project exists in plurality and takes many forms, since in the Gramscian sense there is always room for resistance and in the stronger Foucauldian sense, "wherever there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 1978: 95). From a postcolonial and post-development standpoint, Kapoor (2008) brings forth the notion of struggle by groups which "resist, publicly interrogate…" (ibid: 7) the domineering nature of development agencies.

Data analysis shows that respondents generally desire to break free from the shackles of America's monolithic power. While literature on U.S. - Pakistan relations draws on politics to argue that the two countries form a "union of unequals" (Kux, 2001: 361), interestingly findings suggest that the aid relationship is also viewed as 'unequal'. Data exemplified respondents' interrogation of the inequitable alliance between USAID, GOP and other stakeholders. Most respondents believed that inequality arises from America's political domination of Pakistan, supporting the hypothesis that development partnerships are constituted by an imbalanced relation "where the donor sets up the rules of the game…" (Baaz, 2005: 22).

Furthermore, elites' narratives make the power imbalance governing the USAID – Pakistan nexus more visible than ever. Elites' discourses of resistance confirm Fair and Watson's (2015) assertion that Pakistanis view America as an "aggressively interventionist power" (ibid: 221). Comparably, Kakande (2004) argues that the North-South divide is reflected in donor-recipient relations since "stakeholders are starting from very unequal relations" (ibid: 88). Respondents, especially government bureaucrats and military intelligentsia, appear violated by dictated aid policies and seem disgruntled based on their belief that USAID's authoritarian and intrusive administration style is the root cause of nurturing inequalities.

Additionally, with the exception of one respondent, there was a shared perception that aid is an instrument to fulfil American political interests and sustain a dictatorial regime that forbids Pakistan to take the lead. Kapoor's (2008) thesis is fitting here as he argues that the most aid is "received by politically and strategically important countries" (ibid: 85).

Moreover, most respondents doubted USAID Pakistan's developmental impact. The question of USAID's legitimacy loomed large for several reasons. First, aid was seen as undependable support. Browne (2006) discusses how Pakistanis felt abandoned by America after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (mentioned by several respondents) to explain how countries feel neglected when U.S. strategic interests alter.

Second, most respondents demonstrated suspicion of funds allocation and believed that it deepened corruption by benefitting a certain class. Rizvi's (1994) study makes a parallel case by arguing that criticism stems from the lavish lifestyles pursued by American diplomats. Astonishingly, elites positioned themselves as aid's benefactors, deliberated on class inequality

and engaged in fierce self-reflexivity to confess that they were part of the 'mafia' which profits from perks.

Third, respondents were unable to see a tangible impact of USAID's development projects and were uncertain whether the inputs yielded real results (Ridell, 2014). While some respondents praised USAID's contribution to Pakistan's education sector and a former employee denied aid's politicization, the overall impact was construed as limited, 'petty' and unneeded.

Another unique finding that sets itself apart from prior research is that respondents did not view Pakistan as economically dependent on American assistance, contrary to the Western discourse which embraces the view that Pakistan would be unable to survive without aid. Jones (2013) emphasizes Pakistan's dependency by stating, "...One out of every fifteen Pakistanis had at least one full meal a day because of...U.S. food aid" (ibid: 14). Cohen (2004) argues that "Pakistan absolutely needed international economic support to remain viable" (ibid: 86). Notably, one government official reiterated that Pakistan will be better off economically if aid is denied. It appears that elites' denial of dependency on American help is a mechanism for reclaiming their agency and identity as independent and sovereign.

Further, elites' discourses drew me closer to the depth of anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. Anti-American discourse was reflected strongly in elites' narratives as they critically grappled with the concept in relation to aid. While respondents refrained from considering themselves as anti-American, their discourse denoted a cautious and resilient attitude towards American assistance. Respondents discussed USAID in light of the resistance against America's hegemonic power, based on factors such as religion and foreign policy. This may be supported by scholarship that treats anti-Americanism as an ideological antipathy aligned with religious interests and the perception of U.S. as a "powerful, global bully that abuses Pakistan..." (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015: 228). These perceptions kindle resistance, which from Foucault's vantage point can be seen as always present in the subjectification of individuals (Pickett, 1996).

Contrary to most respondents' belief that development aid does not promote anti-Americanism, Rizvi (1994) argues that criticism arises in relation to aid's perks for military and bureaucratic elites. While respondents discussed class benefit generally, they refrained from deliberating on how their own class benefitting from aid causes anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, respondents' discourses frequently immersed in the subject of anti-Americanism, confirming that the anti-Americanism discourse directly implies the aid discourse.

Another fascinating finding emerged as some respondents spoke about a hypocritical sense of anti-Americanism on the part of individuals who benefitted from aid but still opposed Americans. Comparably, Kux (2001) argues that while American policy is condemned, children are sent to American schools and the American lifestyle is appropriated in Pakistani society. The analysis also brought forward another unexampled finding – 'scapegoating' and 'self-orientalism'. Two respondents explained that Pakistanis conform themselves to 'orientalist' representations and begin seeing themselves as 'victims' to blame Pakistan's problems on America.

Further, USAID's promotional efforts were argued against for several reasons. Respondents predominantly demonstrated a critical awareness of the representational problems in USAID's colonizing development discourse (Escobar, 1995), claiming that it works to:

i)   Promote America as a benevolent donor;
ii) Paint Pakistan as dependent on American assistance and;
iii) Render beneficiaries voiceless.

Respondents challenged the problematic American-centric discourse from a desire to retrieve their identity that was being distorted by USAID's media representations. Thus elites' discursive resistance constituted destabilizing the development discourse which they believed defines the asymmetrical U.S. – Pakistan relation and is an inherent characteristic of USAID's discursive power over Pakistan in line with the neo-Gramscian perspective that aid organizations are a "locus" of international hegemony (Hattori, 2003: 153).

Along these lines, respondents demonstrated understanding of how "development texts are written in a representational language" (McEwan, 2008: 121) to shape an image of Pakistanis as the subordinate 'orient'– the 'others' needy of aid, characterizing the mainstream knowledge that allows America to practice domination and "worlding" (Spivak, 1999: 114) of Pakistan. Interestingly elites presented ruptures in USAID's "system of representation" (Hall, 1992: 186) by arguing that Pakistanis are depicted as highly aid-dependent in the agency's media narratives. Most respondents saw these binary misrepresentations as a propaganda tactic to promote America's self-image as righteous - a "contrasting image, idea" (Said, 1978: 98) from the Third World to sustain the superpower's hegemonic influence and allow USAID to justify interventions as per "the idea of the West" (Hall, 1992: 223).

It is understandable why USAID's development discourse increases contempt rather than consent among respondents as it naturally offends by positioning Pakistan as the recipient and USAID as the donor under "hierarchical ordering" (Nair, 2013: 631). Finally, elites' interpretation of USAID's promotions as aggressive and 'jarring' leads me to ask a critical question by applying Gramsci's conception of hegemony as subtle rather than coercive: Is it possible that because USAID's media strategy is so overwhelming, it fails to conceal a coercive agenda and thus is not genuinely 'hegemonic', unable to garner persuasive consent?

Further, Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony is pertinent to elites' argument that USAID's media discourse aims to steadily legitimize American cultural values and build ideological consensus. Three respondents argued that Pakistanis have been 'colonized' to the extent that they subjugate themselves to American lifestyle resulting in Pakistan's permanent subordinate position. Similarly, Reetz (2006) argues that many Pakistanis especially elites harbour admiration for American culture. However, my findings contradict Reetz (2006) because while respondents bluntly acknowledged American cultural infusion, their discourse demonstrates resistance against cultural control to safeguard Pakistani culture from getting contaminated because there is a deep realization that their "own values are threatened" (Macdonald, 2003: 24).

Also, analysis makes it evident that past geopolitical tensions echo powerfully in elites' deliberation of U.S aid to Pakistan, confirming the contours of Foucault's discourse methodology as "historical" (Macdonald, 2003: 16). When elites talk about USAID Pakistan, their narratives are solely in context of the historical and political events. Thus 'aid' cannot be isolated from these factors. There is a strong implication of discourses of politics, of security, of American strategic objectives, of anti-Americanism, of religion, of culture and of class among others on elites' discourse of resistance against USAID's imperialism. This drives the analysis to a critical juncture: Since discourses are correlated in Foucauldian terms, unless the weight of geo-political tensions between America and Pakistan is strategically lifted, the aid liaison will exist in a domain of resistance.

Contradictory to these findings, Reetz (2006) notes that Pakistani elites view resistance against America as futile. His view can be critiqued for being naïve because he only sees resistance from the perspective of Islamist ideological struggle, not accounting for other points of resistance stemming from culture, representation, identity, and power imbalance.

To summarize, elite discourses collide head-on with USAID as a frontline of American supremacy and hegemonic influence in Pakistan. While findings both challenge and supplement reviewed literature, their implications on U.S. - Pakistan relations will be discussed in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to unmask USAID Pakistan's elite stakeholder discourses that assess the agency's development efforts against the background of a fluctuating aid liaison and deepening U.S. – Pakistan geo-political anxieties. Theories of discourse, power and hegemony, literature on development aid and U.S. – Pakistan relations and a postcolonial/ development lens, all combined to frame the research question: What kinds of discourses do USAID Pakistan's elite stakeholders call on to evaluate the agency's development interventions? The research question was broken into sub-questions: How are Pakistani elites' discursive perceptions of American aid being formed under the conditions of a historically tense U.S. - Pakistan relationship? How do Pakistani elites contest the hegemonizing strategies of consent adopted by USAID in its promotional discourse?

Empirical evidence suggests that interviewed elites have waged a struggle against USAID's perceived imperialistic and hegemonic power in Pakistan. Elites conceived USAID's interventions as more domineering than subtly hegemonic and their narratives sought to unravel the densely unsymmetrical power relations that position Pakistan hierarchically as 'junior' and America as 'senior' in the aid liaison. The result is elites' defiance towards a power regime against which they adversely perceive USAID and contend that it has little transformative impact on development and counter-insurgency in Pakistan, a hotbed for anti-American sentiments.

Second, akin to studies on Third World development discourse, elites vigorously contested the 'orientalist' portraits of Pakistanis as emasculated aid dependents in contrast to the glaring representations of American counterparts as generous donors in USAID's promotional discourse. Elites' counter-narratives asserted their agency to repel permeation of American cultural hegemonic influence through aid projects. This drives the analysis to two compelling points: Elites' interrogation of their representational portrayals indicates that they will not settle for an unfavourable manufacturing of Pakistani identity. Elites' nationalist interests empower them to stand against cultural contamination.

Third, results show that elites' discourse of resistance is shaped by geo-political events, such as the drone program and 2011 Salala incident. From a Foucauldian perspective, it can be argued that since the U.S. – Pakistan aid discourse is sculpted in relation to these historical events, perceptions of USAID can only ameliorate if anxieties underpinning the U.S. – Pakistan relation are addressed. This provides American policymakers a golden opportunity to address key concerns, initiate an equitable partnership with Pakistan, revise USAID's promotional strategy and renegotiate the aid liaison for aid to work better.

Most significantly, results can hopefully trigger interest among Pakistani and American policymakers to engage in self-reflexivity for re-strategizing the future of American aid to Pakistan, strengthening relations and bridging the donor-recipient divide. Also, results can draw policymakers closer to understanding the gap in public perceptions of America and USAID. Knowledge of the voices of Pakistani elites at the heart of development planning now permits American policymakers an in-depth insight into the complexities which underscore the aid discourse and subsequently enables USAID and U.S. government to reconsider its relationship with Pakistan.

Further, scholarship suggests two extreme remedies for the complexities that have risen in findings. Moyo (2009) proposes an unrealistic, radical aim of living in an "aid-free world" (ibid: 76) whereas Gilani (2006) contends that enhancing American economic assistance can increase Pakistanis' trust. However, evidence now suggests that merely multiplying aid is unlikely to influence perceptions. Only an overhaul in American approach towards Pakistan can herald a change at this critical juncture.

To further advance these findings for new academic work, limitations and opportunities need to be discussed. First, a small elite sample was undertaken but it would be lucrative to enlarge the data corpus for corroborating results and comparing perspectives of diverse elite strata. Second, interview data also elicited elites' recommendations for enhancing USAID's development impact. These results were beyond the study's scope but can be a fruitful research avenue for scholars and practitioners examining how aid outcomes can be enhanced. Third, this study extrapolated opinions of an elite class which for Spivak is "blind to Third World subaltern" (Kapoor, 2004: 630) voices. In the development context, Easterly (2006) asks, "Why not give the poor voices on whether aid is reaching them?" (ibid: 332). Thus, a qualitative investigation of beneficiaries' perceptions can be undertaken to gain a sense of continuities and ruptures in overall perceptions.

Finally, this study can come full circle if future scholars use it to investigate another side of the story – USAID's counter-argument to this study's findings of elite discourses in their geo-political and historical context.

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Appendix 1: Thematic Network

Appendix 2: Basic to Organizing to Global Themes

Basic themes	*Organizing themes*	*Global Theme*
▪ Culture, Ideology and Difference Class ▪ Pakistan's Aid ▪ Dependency – A Western discursive Construct	Identity and Representation	
▪ Superpower Policy ▪ Religion ▪ Scapegoating ▪ From Victim to Key Ally ▪ Always the Grieving Party ▪ USAID's Questionable Legitimacy	Hating America	**Resistance Against USAID's Imperialism**
▪ Stakeholder Relationship ▪ Political and Bureaucratic Regime	Unequal 'Partnership'	
▪ Hegemonic Power		
	Countering Aid's Hegemonic Influence	

Appendix 3: Topic Guide

Introductory Questions

- Name/Occupation?
- How long have you been working at your current occupation?
- Could you please describe your role/ professional background?
- Which fields/sectors are you most interested to in?
- Are you involved with the development sector?
- Tell me a bit about your experience in development and what you perceive as the best and worst aspects of local development?
- Have you worked/coordinated with donor agencies before? If yes how was the experience? (Probe for USAID).
- Do you know about the geo-political history of U.S. and Pakistan?
- How do you feel about the current relationship between U.S. and Pakistan?

Aid Effectiveness and Impact / Legitimacy

- Which donor agencies are you aware of that are functioning in Pakistan? (Probe for USAID if not mentioned spontaneously)
- What do you know about the work donor agencies are doing in Pakistan? 🎬What do you feel about the work of donor agencies in Pakistan?
- How do you evaluate donor agencies' contribution to Pakistan's development?
- What do you think about USAID Pakistan's work in local development?
- What do you feel about USAID projects' contribution in job creation and incomes?
- What do you think about USAID's work in your specific field?

Stakeholder Engagement and Aid Allocation

- What do you feel about USAID's work in social, political, and economic spheres of Pakistan?
- What do you think about the stakeholder involvement in USAID Pakistan's projects?
- Can you tell me about your personal experience as a stakeholder working with USAID?
- What do you think about the manner in which aid is spent in Pakistan?
- Do you think USAID has served all sections society equally well?
- What do you feel about relationship between the Pakistani government and USAID?

Aid Dependency

- What do you feel about aid dependency in general?
- What do you think about Pakistan's economic dependency on aid?

U.S. – Pakistan Relations and Foreign Policy

- What do you think about U.S. and Pakistan's relationship?
- What do you think about U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan?
- How do you feel about the geo-political tensions between U.S. and Pakistan?
- What do you think is essentially being demonstrated about both countries through the U.S.-Pakistan aid relationship?
- What do you think are the economic, political and social objectives of U.S. in giving aid to Pakistan?
- What do you feel about development assistance in relation to foreign politics?
- Do you think aid has resulted in conflict or has it promoted peace in the region?

American Values and Ideology

- What do you feel about American values and ideology?
- What do you feel about American values and culture in relation to aid?

Media and Branding

- What do you think about donor agencies' media campaigns in Pakistan?
- Do you know about any donor organization's media campaigns in Pakistan?
- Which campaign can you recall?
- What do you think about the way donor agencies in Pakistan brand and market themselves?
- What do you think about USAID's media campaigns?
- What do you think of USAID's branding? 🎬What are some of the prominent themes that you can recall from USAID's media campaigns on TV/radio and newspapers?
- How does USAID's publicity material influence your perceptions of the agency?

Anti-Americanism and Aid

- What do you think about the public perceptions of American aid?
- What are your views about anti-Americanism in Pakistan?
- What do you think about the notion of anti-Americanism in relation to aid?
- Do you think aid has nurtured or suppressed anti-Americanism in Pakistan?
- Do you take into account these notions and belief systems while designing programs aimed at local people?

Appendix 4: Respondent Profiles

Name	Professional Background
Senator Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf (GJA)	◈ Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency ◈ Former Federal Secretary: Ministry of Science and Technology Former Federal Minister: Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Ports and Shipping, and Ministry of Education ◈ Chairman, Defence Committee of the Senate Pakistan
Saadia Khan (SK)	◈ Chief Operating Officer at a local company x
Yasmeen Ali (YA)	◈ Lawyer, academic and political analyst ◈ Author of '*A Comparative Analysis of Media and Media Laws in Pakistan*'. She tweets @yasmeen_9
Dr. Nasir Javed (DNJ)	◈ Chief Operating Officer, Urban Unit, Lahore, Pakistan ◈ Senior bureaucrat, Government of Punjab (GOP). He has wide experience in various government departments.
Dr. Saeed Shafqat (DSS)	◈ Founding Director of Center for Public Policy and Governance, Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan. ◈ Internationally-acclaimed academic, scholar and consultant with over 25 years' experience in teaching, consulting and research. His interests are: South Asia, globalization, U.S.- South Asia/Muslim world, International Relations and Public Policy
Sibghatullah Sabzwari (SS)	◈ Senior director at a development project
Nadia Naviwala (NN)	◈ Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
Ghulam Ali (GA)	◈ Former employee at a donor agency
Dr. Faraz Islam (DFI)	◈ Director Research at a policy thinktank
Natasha Kamal (NK)	◈ Media & Communication Specialist

Appendix 5: Informed Consent Form

<div align="center">

Consent to Participate in Research
Stakeholders' Evaluation of USAID Pakistan's Development Interventions

</div>

Introduction and Purpose
My name is Anum Pasha. I am a postgraduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I am pursuing MSc Media, Communication and Development. I would like to invite you to take part in my research which concerns the investigation of stakeholders' evaluation of USAID's development interventions in Pakistan. This research is being conducted for my dissertation.

Procedures
If you agree to participate in this research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location of your choice. The interview will involve questions about aid legitimacy and impact, USAID branding and communication, aid dependency and aid allocation in Pakistan. The interview should last around one hour. With your permission, I will audio-record and take notes during the interview to accurately record the information that you provide. Recording will be used for transcription purposes only.

I expect to conduct only one interview with you. However, follow-ups may be needed for added clarification. If so, I will contact you by email/phone to request this.

Risks/Discomforts
The research questions are broad and open-ended so you may interpret them in any way possible. You are free to decline to answer any questions you don't wish to.

Confidentiality
Your data will be handled as confidentially as possible. If results of this study are published or presented, your name will not be used unless you give explicit permission.

Rights
Participation in research is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to take part in the research.

<div align="center">

CONSENT

</div>

If you wish to participate in this research, please sign below:

_____   _____
        Participant's Name and Signature   Date

[Optional]

If you agree to allow your name or other identifying information to be included in all final reports, publications, and/or presentations resulting from this research, please sign below:

Participant's Name and Designation _____

Participant's Signature _____

Appendix 6: Sample Interview Transcript

Senator Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf (GJA)

Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Ex- Minister for Education, Government of Pakistan

Date and Place:	April 7, 2016. Islamabad
Interview Structure:	Semi-structure, face-to-face
Participants:	1

Interviewer: Hello! How are you today?

GJA: Very well thanks!

Interviewer: Thank you for having me here today.

GJA: My pleasure… you've travelled quite a long journey you must be tired.

Interviewer: Yes, it was a long journey but I'm fine.

GJA: Great! So what is your research about? Are you studying at LSE?

Interviewer: Yes… I'm studying MSc Media, Communication and Development at LSE.

GJA: Ahan great!

Interviewer: Yes, my research is on stakeholders' evaluation of donor agencies in Pakistan.

GJA: Great, which agencies are you looking at?

Interviewer: I'm concerned more with the USAID and how its key stakeholders assess the agency's development interventions basically. So that's what I'm interested in looking at the different emerging perspectives given the current geo-political scenario and U.S. – Pakistan relationship.
GJA: Okay. Let me tell you a little about myself first and my background before we begin.

Interviewer: Sure definitely please! Let me please switch on the recorder, I hope you will be okay with it? As I mentioned before I will be recording this and won't be taking hand-written notes.

GJA: Sure.

Interviewer: Okay.

GJA: As far as education is concerned it so happens that I have been an instructor in almost all the military institutions, bit different to general education but as an instructor I had a lot of experience. I was an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy, I was an instructor at the artillery school, instructor at the Command and Staff College Quetta, I was an instructor at the War Course, and I was an instructor at the National Defense Academy and United Defense now university so I had a lot of

instructional experience as it is. Initially of course in the Musharraf government I had been handling Ministries of Communication, Ministries of Railways, Ministries of Port and Shipment etc. etc. Then in 2006 … when what was it 2004 I think…

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: When Shaukat Aziz became the Prime Minister he requested the President he said I want some dynamism in education sector because Zubaida Jalal who was my predecessor was a good lady but that's about all she was not effective, she was not assertive and she used to get scared of the *maulvis* (religious clerk) and actually *maulvis* were a big pressure group in the Assembly in those days and she had one disadvantage of being a female and secondly her background was from the rural area of Baluchistan so she used to get overawed by these guys so could not take any drastic steps in the education reforms and all that. So the aid agencies also took advantage of that and started totally ignoring the Ministry. So my first impression as I came in to the Ministry of Education was that I came to know that the projects being run under the USAID or the British…

Interviewer: Okay. Hmm right interesting…

GJA: They had never consulted the Ministry. You know the Federal Ministry was totally ignored. They used to select the projects themselves, get them signed from the Ministry of Development at the Federal Level, finance had a representative of Education Ministries sitting in in the education projects. It should have been the other way around, they should have signed the projects with us and have a representative of the Finance Ministry sitting in but it was the reverse. They used to sign the projects with the Ministry of Finance who knew nothing about education and who didn't care and that the Ministry used to send some deputy secretary some low level type who never opened his mouth so virtually the aid giving agencies had it all on their own, whatever they want to do and then I came to know about certain projects which were being run very badly or which were not needed. Now initially to come to efficacy of USAID and I'll take USAID in particular because that is your subject, the first time I saw the … a U.S. embassy representative invited me to accompany a … to come and have a look at a project of USAID and I asked her I said "what is the project?" and she said

(Recording interrupted abruptly)

And I said "Is this a project?" and they said yes we are spending x amount of millions of dollars on this project. I said look this project we could have done ourselves! Whitewash could have done by our own children, we didn't need the Americans to come and do the whitewash for us, things like that, but anyway out of politeness I kept quiet and I praised and I said well very good you have done a damn fine job and you are helping us, can I have a look at all the other projects that you have? So the ambassador showed me …

Interviewer: Which year was this?

GJA: Yes?

Interviewer: Which year was this?

GJA: This was 2004. So the USAID head was told to come and brief me on all the projects. It was a lady. She came and briefed me on all the projects that were being done and some projects straight away struck me as virtually airy fairy type projects for example one was democratizing the Pakistani schools. And I said what is this? How come democracy or dictatorship is coming as far as the schools are concerned? She said no it's a very useful project and what we do is we have some very good

educationalists in United States we call them over and they come and run the courses over here for Pakistani teachers.

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: I said okay what is the teaching about? What is the course? Then they explained that you know they teach the teachers that in the school all the problems should be solved in a democratic way, there should be school councils, there should be student unions and if the students have a dispute, there should be no fight. It should be done through a democratic manner through voting … majority and everything. I said listen for this you need instructors from the United States to come and tell this? I said… you tell me I will issue a circular tomorrow to the school that in future all disputes should be resolved by majority vote and that's the end.

Interviewer: Hmm right very interesting…

GJA: This is the total outcome of your course! Then I had gone on a visit to United States and when I went to Pakistan embassy the Ambassador complained to me and he said "Sir what sort of idiotic boys you have selected for the training over here?" I said which boys are you talking about? He said the teachers I said I have not sent any teachers he said no but there are very unsavory characters roaming around with long beards and *shalwars* (trousers) tucked up and they have been sent to America for teacher training courses. So I said please check up who has sent them and found out that the USAID has sent them and the Ministry doesn't even know about it. So I came back and I called the USAID and I said "Who are these teachers in George Washington University?" She said well we are running courses you know to train your teachers and these are the trainers who will train your teachers then, so these are the teacher's trainers that we have sent.

Interviewer: Hmm the teacher trainers, yeah.

GJA: Yes. It is their course and it's a six month course out of which the first two months they learn English and the remaining four months they are taught various methods of how best to deal and all that. I said you tell me why are you wasting two months on English training? Why don't you select from here boys who already know English? Why waste this money? Secondly why send all these boys to America to learn? I will give you space! I have space in the … over here sufficient space and you get the teachers from there. That way we will be able to run much more courses and train much more people, you just bring the trainers over here and we will run continuous courses throughout the year. It could be much more useful. Why send … you are spending so much money on every student! I mean you are wasting money! They wouldn't agree to that. First they said well you know security problem, I said no problem I will give a 24 hour guard at the school. They will be guarded, they will be looked after. We will give them accommodation, we will give them food. We will take care of your teachers! Bring them here!

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: They were not prepared to do that. Then I came to know what the system of selection is, I said where have all those teachers gone? And from where did you pick them up? They said well we have done it through an NGO. I said then what is the use? Because it is the government who is running the teacher training institutes, it is the government who employs the teachers who will further train the teachers and the government doesn't even know who has got this training. You are doing through some NGO. The NGO is selecting people and the NGO is sending and they come and then they go back to their schools and colleges and we are gaining nothing out of this training. It was very funny. So I went further into the depth of this I said checkup about this NGO. So I came to know that one of

the ladies in the Ministry of Education, one of the directors, she was hand in glove with the USAID and her husband was running an NGO. So this contract was given to that husband of hers and that husband … what he was doing was charging students money for getting selected for this training. That charge was being pocketed. Okay give me 10,000 I will send you to America so the students who wanted to have a joyride to America

Interview: Hmm Hmmm

GJA: They would apply and get selected and they would go and then obviously there was no utilization because they came and dispersed to wherever they are from. And then the ticketing was also being done by the NGO so he was also pocketing the commissions for the tickets and in this the people working in the USAID were hand in glove with them, obviously they were probably getting their cut.
So I had a look at all these various projects I had a look and I was very disappointed I said … they said we can't finish these, we can't modify these, and these have been approved by your Ministry of Finance and so on. So when I went to the United States for strategic dialogue I let the Americans have it. Their secretary of education was sitting there, their rep from State Department, a rep for VITA for strategic dialogue and I said look … actually how I then got a little more upset was when the USAID World Director, the overall…

Interviewer: Rajiv! I think at that time was …

GJA: No at that time it was not Rajiv it was somebody else in 2004, **Interviewer:**

Oh okay okay.

GJA: He said you know we follow the principle of Marshall Plan, General George Marshall, I said yes I know I am a military man and they said that we gave Marshall Plan to Europe but we didn't tell them what to do they told us what they wanted us to do and we did that. So that is our principle for USAID, I said I am sorry that's not true. In my country, what you are doing is you are not even asking us what we want, you are doing what you want and we are getting no benefit out of USAID. I said I don't know as Education Minister what projects you are running and why you are running them. And I said I will give you some examples so I gave the example of these democratic schools, I gave the example of the whitewash of the schools and I gave the example of this teacher training and I said these are three examples that I want to quote before you. Now you tell me do I want this trend? I don't want it. And I said now please listen to me, my suggestion, stop all these small penny projects. We don't need it.

Interviewer: Hmm… Interesting

GJA: What we need is capabilities. I said don't give us fish teach us how to fish. I said in India you gave them IIT, Institute of Technical Training and I said that institute has been the base for their revolution, their computer revolution, their IT revolution and India today is number one in IT because of IIT institute given by you, I said you have not given us any! You have given four to India! I said I want an IIT. And I said I want an IIT in every provincial headquarter, one for every province and one for Islamabad so five IITs, you divert all your money into that, give us what we really need, it is we want to produce technologists. We want technical people to come up. I said we can't get jobs without knowing technology today. Our students are suffering, our boys who are trained because their training is substandard, they do not have quality education and therefore they cannot compete with the Indians, they cannot compete in the world market so we want quality education in technology.

Give us IITs. I said the second thing I want to tell you is I don't see any signature projects of United States in Pakistan. All your money of USAID you tell us we've spent so many billions in Pakistan, I said it's worth zero. Nobody appreciates it, nobody knows it except the help you gave to LUMS and IBA. It is just these two and I said that these are the two best institutions as far as management is concerned in Pakistan because USAID actually helped us set it up but these were in 60s. After that you have given us nothing! Zero!

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: I said what you have done is flitter away the USAID on projects like whitewashing our walls. We can whitewash them ourselves. Give me technical institutes. "Okay we will think about it" they never gave. For three years I kept pressing them, they did not come up. I said look Sweden gave us only one institute of technical training at the lower level. It is known as Swedish Technical Training Centre. They train electricians, plumbers this that. Our boys go there, they train in that and they get very good jobs in the country and outside and I said everybody says that I want to go to Swedish Institute. I said Sweden is getting a good name although this is the only investment they have done about twenty years back. I said as far as you are concerned I don't see any American Institute of Technology, you are not giving us anything worthwhile so nobody even talks about you. Let's have American Institute of Technology Islamabad, American Institute of Technology Lahore. It will give you a good name, create goodwill. We will gain, we will be happy with USAID. I am not happy with your USAID at all at present. So everybody was shocked, they said well a very blunt man and undiplomatic well that's the way I am. Anyway, so for three years I kept pressing them and the only outcome … good outcome of that meeting was that as soon as I came back the USAID director and number two and the American Ambassador were all in my office with their charts and projects and everything …

Interviewer: To present?

GJA: To present! And they said you can cut out any and you can… (Laughing)

Interviewer: (Laughing)

GJA: Yes but no change as far as the strategy is concerned. They wanted to do this … because they thought that they were earning the goodwill of most people by going way down and mainly they were working with the provinces. Now what is wrong with the USAID as far as the provinces is concerned? One is the problem which I have highlighted, it is the selection of projects which they do. Some are mala fide some are useless, and some maybe good but then the main issue lies in the capacity of our own provincial education departments. That is where the problem is. We have the worse bureaucracy in the education sector compared to others.

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: The reason is that as far as Sindh and Baluchistan are concerned their education standard is extremely low, their certificates are fake, and their degrees are fake.

Interviewer: Hmm. Their degrees are fake. Right.

GJA: But they are stuffing the Ministries and they don't know anything themselves. How can they check USAID? So they say, Okay fine. They are very happy with it or an odd dinner given to them or a gift given to them.

Interviewer: I have a question to ask you here you say they didn't keep the Ministry in loop and at the Federal level right?

GJA: That's right

Interviewer: So why is that?

GJA: It could have been because frankly my predecessor was incompetent, never bothered to ask them that what projects are you running and why are you running them but after I had used my stick they were coming then regularly to me and you know seeking permission for the projects and all that so they were coordinating but where I say they have mala fide intentions I told them listen this NGO for example which is sending the teacher training thing is a fake NGO. It is a one man NGO. The man is sitting in an office and he is earning money because you want to keep good relations with his wife who is a director in the Ministry of Education and she was virtually the real Minister because the Minister was incompetent so this lady was running the Ministry.

Interviewer: I see

GJA: So her husband was being obliged by USAID. So I said this is corruption by all of you. Now as far as the other NGOs are concerned I said again you are giving projects to NGOs of your choice and you say well…we will run the USAID through NGOs we don't want to give anything to the government. I said fine you think government is inefficient and corrupt, don't give it but NGOs have to be genuine. Not one room NGOs. I said let's do one thing that we carry out an analysis appraisal of all the NGOS, what activities they have done? What are their resources? How many people they employ? What buildings? What offices etc. they have, what is their capacity… people that they employ what are their qualifications and we carry out … and then we list the NGOs according to their capabilities and then we will give you that appraisal and you pick up NGOs out of that appraisal on your own. We will not give this contract to NGO X or give it to NGO Y. They didn't agree.
Interviewer: Oh

GJA: They said no no no this is our choice whom to give, we don't want Ministry coming in. I said Ministry is not going to tell you whom to pick but we will carry out an appraisal for you and they said no no we will do on our own. This is the problem… the problem was at both hands, you see in the Ministry there was incompetency. Nobody was asking…Until I came and because I was from the military I am used to pushing things and getting a result and I went with that and they were not prepared for it.

(Brief conversation about food)

GJA: Please have this, it's for you.

Interviewer: No I'm honestly not very hungry

GJA: Doesn't matter, please take some you've travelled. Have some *kebab* or *mithai* (sweets) or cold drink.

Interviewer: Thank you!

GJA: So I was talking about the provinces. Baluchistan and Sindh had these problems, now what was the problem with Frontier and Punjab? The Ministry of Education and Federal … I came to know that the Federal Ministry had very incompetent people and I realized that they had all been recruited during Zia days. Ministry of Education had been reserved by Jamaat-e-Islami and Dr. Fazal

ur Rehman or somebody was the Education Minister. They made rules that nobody from outside can come and serve in the Ministry of Education

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: And they recruited down from clerk upwards and they were the people who were now Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries and they were all Jamaat-e-Islami members so much so that in the curriculum wing, people who were there to monitor the curriculum and suggest changes etc. and revision none of them was a science person. Physics, MA Arabic, Chemistry MA Political Science, Mathematics, MA Islamiat. I said how the hell do you check anything at all, they said well whenever anything comes we get a professor from the local college and he does it for us. I said alright, I think that it is better if that local professor should be here and you should be there so they said you can't … when I tried to get them … throw them out they said you can't because the rules framed in Zia's days are that in the Ministry of Education the outsiders can't come and these are the people who will be here. You can change within the Ministry. Within the Ministry were the same people. So then I got the rules changed and I got the approval of Musharraf that thirty percent people can be inducted from outside. So straightaway I cleaned these curriculum wings. I sent all these unwanted people to go and teach Islamiat and Arabic over there and I got Physics and Chemistry professors to come in. Over here in the Ministry the problem was it was all Jamaat-e-Islami and so ruling the curriculum.

Interviewer: Of course.

GJA: In Punjab and Frontier the problem was extremely low caliber of people came to the Ministry of Education. Good people would not come, good officers would not come. Governing education was considered a backwater thing and everybody wanted to go to some… **Interviewer:** Other ministry…?

GJA: … good ministry or a ministry where they could make money and you know communications and this that. They thought what is there in education even though in Sindh they make a lot of money in education, the entire process of teacher recruitment is false, all…

Interviewer: Ghost schools and what not…

GJA: Ghost schools and unwanted teachers. I surveyed it all … of complete schools and we found out how much the enrollment is, actual enrollment, how many ghost schools exist and where they are … locations. Then we surveyed *madrassas* (Islamic religious school), total statistics … the only education census done in Pakistan ever was in 2006 which I got conducted.

Interviewer: After that none were carried out?

GJA: None! Not even before that, not even after it. It's the only one available.

Interviewer: Was this your first Ministry appointment?

GJA: No no, before this I had been the Minister of Railways and the Minister of communications. I had been the Minister for Port and Shipping, Minister for postal development…

Interviewer: So education was your most sort of problematic or …

GJA: No I had problems in every Ministry, I was given the Ministries which were problematic to sort out because in the army I had developed a reputation of sorting out the worst institutions. So there was this reputation that he sorts things out. I sorted out ISI, ISI was in bad shape for over three

years. I used my stick and put it as a real fine Intelligence Agency. Well and I was given railways when it had just stopped running and I made it into a running institution and took it into profit from a huge loss, then handed it over in 2002 when the politicians came in and then they took it back into pit again but anyway similarly communications … I threw out a lot of contractors, cancelled the contracts which were mala fide including Bhayandar of Turkey and so on and I won the cases against them, saved a lot of federal funding. This education was Shaukat Aziz's idea because Musharraf wanted to give me Interior, he said no he is fit for Interior we have to sort out these terrorists and this that. Shauqat Aziz said sir education is in a very bad shape. I want him for education so he convinced Musharraf so I came into education. A new curriculum was given. Unfortunately the government finished and the new curriculum … a new curriculum takes a long time to enforce, to be introduced. The books are revised, the curriculum is revised but the books are published by the boards in the provinces and they are not ready to give up that authority because they make money in that. So they had to publish books and get them written and now to get new books written our people … they don't have really the expertise. The current people what they do is they take old books and jumble up the paragraphs, they jumble up the chapters and that's how it's done. **Interviewer:** And that's how it is updated?

GJA: Here now on a new curriculum a new book had to be written so the pace was very slow. And then came this eighteenth amendment in which they said that every federal ministry is abolished and all education to provinces including curriculum now every province can have its own curriculum so the curriculum that we had given for introduction at some places it was started, in some subjects it was introduced and in some places the provinces are sitting idle so you know it is in a bad state I feel very sorry because we were going to introduce it in 2007 and it's 2016 now. Nine years. By now every child coming out would have been on the new curriculum, a much more learned student coming out with no hate literature. I had taken Islamiat out of all books and put it into subject of Islamiat only in the new curriculum.

Interviewer: What was it doing in the other subjects?

GJA: Zia had put them in all subjects. These Urdu medium schools … the curriculum in them, it is in science as well. Islamiat is everywhere. So with the provinces the problems was that they had some similar complaints about USAID. The USAID complaints were that they used to come and say that the provinces don't deliver, they don't run the projects properly. They are incapable, inefficient etc. etc. The provinces said that the USAID doesn't care about us, they do what they please. **(Brief pause)**

GJA: So what I had started doing was… every alternate month I would call a conference in which I would call the Education Ministers of the provinces along with the Education Secretaries and there would discuss with them all the points that I wanted to convey to the provinces and what the provinces wanted to convey and in that I would pick up … one of the permanent subject was the interaction with development agencies so I would tell them the complaints of the USAID etc. and you know they would tell us their complaints.

Interviewer: So what was that experience like? What were the main issues?

GJA: The main issues were that the USAID used to complain that there is no delivery, that people don't take them seriously. For example, there was a project of USAID to issue computers to schools.

Interviewer: In Punjab?

GJA: In all provinces. They year marked some funds for computer education for each province in that one of the items was the issuance of x amount of computers, two year program. They funded for the first year, the next years funding was depended on the progress report. When the progress report came, and this will show you exactly the interest of each province towards education, it's a true picture. Frontier province had completed the two year project in one year using partly US funds partly their own funds and they asked that the second year funds which they have sent from their funds should be reimbursed but the projects stands completed in one year. Punjab… one year's project completed, computers issued now waiting for funds to start the second year's projects so they were demanding funds for second year. Sindh government funds issued first year, not utilized, lying over there and zero progress as far as the project is concerned and they were asking for extensions. Baluchistan government had not even bothered to draw the money for the first year. (Laughing)
Interviewer: Okay! Very interesting!

GJA: So the USAID said this is the reason why we deal with the NGOs and we don't deal with the government and they were right in that way but then the provinces heads said the NGOs select their own schools, their own favorites and issue the computers to them and the government schools are those which are not connected to that particular NGO they get neglected. So both sides had their genuine points. These types of problems arise and need to be resolved between them. But as it is the problem was very poor bureaucracy in the education sector in all provinces which was a problem we also faced at the federal level and the USAID and other development agencies also faced.

Interviewer: But what is the situation now?

GJA: I am sure that the complaints must be the same as they were at that time … which was that they neglect us… they neglect us and they go to the NGOs and they prefer to deal with the NGOs and I can tell you that, I can quote you one example of corruption of USAID that…

Brief pause

GJA: One is of course at the cost of these funds we have marked for Pakistan, they actually oblige their own contracts, their own institutions and so on like this teacher training they were obliging the U.S. institution, they were obliging the experts of U.S., like the democratic schools also. Experts being called from the U.S., calling in their own acquaintances and you know they earned the money. It was Pakistan's money, the money for Pakistan was going back like that. So the real worth of USAID is less than fifty percent that we actually receive

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: The rest goes back similarly through consultants, through reports etc. I will give you another example of this **Interviewer:** Okay

GJA: They told me that they have set up a joint project with UNESCO with local country Director of UNESCO and that they have set a project and they are going to prepare a report and this and that. Now they had not ask me, they had not taken us into confidence about whether this should or should not be done and they went ahead. The project was that an ex-employee of UNESCO who had served in Pakistan was being called to come and prepare the report and was to be assisted by an ex-employee of USAID who had gone back to the US so they paid for both these guys to come they stayed here, daily expenditure, daily whatever, a lot of money given to them and in the project they purchased vehicles and they renovated offices so the UNESCO Country Directors office became grand and he got a new four wheeler you know and similarly the USAID got a vehicle. Now they prepared some bloody report, which we could have even done otherwise ourselves, there was not

much worth of that report I think it was on literacy rates or something like that I said I can give you that in this booklet, the literacy rates. Anyway when the project finished it took three months to prepare that report so for three months they were utilizing that money and they had marked ten million dollars or something like that for this project *(pause)* at the end of this project one of my staff officers came and informed me about the project details and so on and I said this money is supposed to be about money for Pakistan isn't it? And he said yes. I said then the vehicles they have purchased out of this money where have they gone?

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: They are using them I said no tell them that these are project vehicles they should come to the Ministry. Now the project belongs to us, they did it on our behalf without asking us so tell them alright at least deposit the vehicles. First they said no this cannot be our rules … then I said alright then I am going to take it up with the U.S. with your headquarters, they came and deposited the vehicles. The UNESCO guy also … I told him I don't subscribe to you keeping our vehicle, he said no I am authorized to keep it I said okay I will take it up with the UNESCO Director General I am going next month to Paris I will take it up with him, he also returned the vehicle, so both those vehicles were then lying in the Ministry. I didn't use them but they were attached to the Ministry so this is the type of corruption that goes on. Money is in our name (pause) Money is … supposedly has been given to Pakistan but who is benefiting? The Americans, the USAID officials **Interviewer:** I see!

GJA: Contractors, consultants who are all coming in. You may have an excellent Pakistani sitting over here knowing the subject better than the guy but some *gora* (white man) will come from George Washington University or University of XYZ and… **Interviewer:** Ahan.

GJA: Yes, so these were the problems we usually ran into with USAID and at the provincial level complaints against them were mostly these that we don't know anything and they work through NGOs and that they have their own favorite NGO and their favorite schools.

Interviewer: Okay… and what about at the provincial Punjab level?

GJA: Punjab people are comparatively more aware. So they catch them in Baluchistan **Interviewer:**

Definitely definitely definitely!

GJA: So they catch them, in Baluchistan they can do whatever they want because over there is only corruption. There is zero progress on ground, all the money is pocketed. Whatever you give them!

Interviewer: And in Sindh?

GJA: In Sindh it is also the same. Rural Sindh is nothing but corruption and inefficiency and ghost schools. I think I will … maybe this will help the picture for you. I will just show you the things in this what we were doing in this. This was the National Education Census, the one that I was telling you about.

Interviewer: Hmm. Hmmm. Hmmm. The one you did in 2006.

GJA: This big booklet it is available in the Statistic Division and in an academy, the Academy of Education which still exists although the Ministry has finished. Then there was the new scheme of studies which we introduced for class one to twelve in which we said firstly add early childhood education for little kids in which we introduced language experience block, heritage block,

environmental block these were new things which were introduced and then I had an idea and I said all schools in Pakistan will be dual medium. English and Urdu! English in class one for all schools. Zia had by order made all schools Urdu medium in the government sector as a result our students have suffered very badly. They start to learn English in class six, ABC. In class ten the student cannot sit in a computer course, he cannot use it. In foreign countries computer has been introduced in class three so I said introduce English in all schools in Pakistan. We immediately got a changeover in the Army.

All Army schools… English Urdu compulsory from class one. All Islamabad schools which were under my control compulsory! Ten schools immediately in Frontier, ten in Punjab, ten in Sindh and five in Baluchistan were converted. The rest were to be converted gradually. Then what we did was that Urdu, English and Math along with General Knowledge will be taught from class 1-3. Islamiat will be taught as a compulsory subject from class three to twelve. Islamiat was compulsory everywhere even up till Masters and Bachelors as well. **Interviewer:** Hmm

GJA: I tried to take it out but that was not in my hands. It was in the Higher Education Commission's power Dr. Atta-ur-Rahman was scared, he didn't want to annoy the *maulv*is. No controversial hate sectarian material will be included in Islamiat such as Hindus are unclean **Interviewer:** in History books?

GJA: This was in History, Urdu and Islamiat, in all three of them. Removed it from all of them. Moral values and *Haqooq-ul-ibad* (duties towards mankind) alongside *Haqooq-Allah* (duties towards God) will be taught to students as part of Islamiat, before that Islamiat was all *Haqooq-Allah* I said no in this fifty percent will be *Haqooq-ul-Ibad* which is how to be a good citizen, good moral practices… **Interviewer:** Hmmm

GJA: Good … I mean all that… morality! I brought all that in. Advance Islamic studies will be offered in class ninth and tenth and eleventh as an elective subject. I said keep Islamiat basic over there for the rest. The Islamiat which has been brought in between everything, make it a separate elective. Whoever wants to be a religious scholar he can select, the rest should be free to choose whatever. So they did that. Ethics and morality will be taught to non-Muslim students instead of Islamiat so one new subject was introduced. Selective portions from all religions were included in that and I said they will not be made to …

Interviewer: So why was this just for non-Muslim students?

GJA: No because for Muslims we included morality in Islamiat.

Interviewer: Ahan

GJA: because at that point Islamiat was compulsory for non-Muslims students.

Interviewer: Oh.

GJA: We gave them an alternate subject instead of Islamyiat. Okay. General science will be compulsory from class four to class eight. All students must learn some science. Curriculum of social studies will include the concept of civics and citizenship, science and social studies will be taught as separate subjects in class four and five. History and geography will be taught as compulsory subjects in class six to eight. The current history curriculum starts from Mohammad bin Qasim, I said what about the earlier history so I said no we will study history so what if it the history of Hindus and Buddhists? It is of our area!

Interviewer: Right... I see

GJA: Yes! It finished. I said no class six will be pre-Muslim period in Indo-Pak subcontinent which is one country. Ashoka, Chandragupta Maurya… **Interviewer:** Yes!

GJA: Teach the children it all and then class seventh Muslim period, class eight British period and struggle for Pakistan. Pakistan will be made by the end of class eighth. In class ninth and tenth there won't be history, there will be social studies. Social studies won't be there before that, before that history will be taught. Social studies in ninth and tenth will be the current Pakistan, in eighth Pakistan was made, in ninth and tenth teach them about the current Pakistan's geography, natural resources, rivers, dams, economic situation etc. etc. They should know their country by ninth and tenth so we did that. And we introduced elective subjects like drawing, which had gone out.

Interviewer: There was no art before?

GJA: There was no art. I brought it back and then home economics, agriculture … now they are not there. And I brought regional languages in class six to eighth at that time they had Arabic as compulsory. I said no Arabic will be an elective. For regional and modern languages what we did was whichever language had a teacher availability they can learn that language. It could be Persian, Arabic, German and French whatever! So we put that there. Computer science will be an elective subject in class ninth and tenth [so] those kids who were going to pursue Computer science can take it at this level early on.

Interviewer: So why wasn't this compulsory?

GJA: Computer study is compulsory, this is computer science.

Interviewer: Oh okay.

GJA: You see teaching of computer literacy applied hands on will be compulsory for class six to eight and then it goes on to …

Interviewer: oh

GJA: Separate. Because over there pre-medical, pre-engineering and pre-computer science… it becomes three fields. Pakistan Studies is compulsory till class ten and not after that, not in eleven or twelve. After that there are electives if someone wants to take them. Elective subjects for Humanities will be offered as suitable combinations of three subjects etc. etc.

Interviewer: Hmm hmmm

GJA: Foreign students may opt for history and geography of Pakistan in lieu of compulsory Urdu. Foreign students don't have to take Urdu, they can take history and geography. New groups - computer science and medical technology groups will be offered in class ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth. That was done.

Interviewer: So what became of this then?

GJA: Books had to be written. The curriculum was passed, notification was sent, and the curriculum was ready only the books had to be written. That's because … the Federal Government couldn't write the books, as per of the constitution the provinces are competent to write it. The provinces were unable to write them until I left.

Interviewer: Right

GJA: When I left then the stick was no longer there so they got slow and now after the 18th amendment it is the provinces' choice to follow or not. That's the pity of education.

Interviewer: So this is what became of it?

GJA: Yes here it is (turning the page). The adoption of dual medium school systems, English Urdu compulsory, Science will be in English humanities will be in Urdu so students will be dual language… knowing both, uniform academic sessions even that I changed I said from now on sessions will start from September. For two years it worked, but later they went back to April. Accessibility of education, National Education Management information ….

Interviewer: I see

GJA: The problem was the 18th amendment that was passed in the Constitution. What they did in that was to take all powers from the Federal Government and give all powers to the provinces so they finished the Federal Ministry of Education. When the Ministry had finished then who would pursue these subjects, who will push them? **Interviewer:** Hmmm

GJA: With this booklet you will get some data also. Internal financing of education… the amount of expenditure on education 1999 onwards, percentage and GDP, external resource mobilization amount. **Interviewer:** What was the role of donors?

GJA: That is also in this, donors' contributions, who are the donors and how much they contributed, the subjects they did.

Interviewer: Can you comment on the role of donors in the education sector?

GJA: Here it is, what I was telling you, number of institutions enrollment in teaching staff, public institutions missing facilities like without water, without electricity, without latrine, without buildings, the total schools like these in which provinces. Then by medium of instruction, how many are Urdu medium, how many are English medium, how many are Sindhi medium and others. The total of public and private sector, the comparative summary of enrollment information in the total country, in Punjab, in Sindh etc. etc. 2000-2003 increase 2005 increase, stage wise enrollment by sector and gender, preprimary, mosque, primary, middle how many girls, how many boys, enrollment by gender and education, vocational and technical…

Interviewer: Right. I will be asking you some particular questions pertinent to the research please. May I ask those sir?

GJA: Sure.

Interviewer: So the questions are divided into basically three or four broad categories and you can give … I mean you would obviously talk from your own experiences and whatever you know. The first section is more about aid effectiveness and you know generally the legitimacy and then I am going to ask you some questions on…

GJA: Just go and ask the questions! (Laughing) Don't tell me what you are going to ask!

Interviewer: Okay!

Interviewer: What do you feel about the work of donor agencies in Pakistan?

GJA: USAID!

Interviewer: Yes…

GJA: I think about thirty percent of the intent is not a huge impact because there are no signature projects, they are not helping us develop the… as it is skill development or technology where we are lacking. That's not being done. A lot of money is being wasted on petty projects which we could do without…which reduces the aid effectiveness. Instead if they had given us some good institutes the aid effectiveness would have been tremendously improved.

Interviewer: What do you feel about USAID project's contribution in job creation and incomes?

GJA: The jobs are created if people have skills and if people know technology. The jobs are available in those sectors. An electrician will always get a job but a graduate will not get a job. We have thousands and thousands of graduates and matric-qualified and high school graduates running around with no job at all. So what is USAID doing? They are helping out in these schools, they are not helping out in creating technology centers from where the graduates could get jobs. This is precisely my point that they are not helping us in creating technically-qualified man power.

Interviewer: Right…What do you think about USAID Pakistan's work in local development?

GJA: In farming there is one project which is good, that too they just started, with the mangoes. Which is to help the mango farmers to improve their exportability. The conditionality are in such a way that only big farmers…

Interviewer: Commercial farmers?

GJA: …The people with links, only they are befitted. Jehangir Tareen is a very clever man, if there are good cows coming in he would go after cows, if something else then he goes after that. He is a very sharp guy and he stays linked with them so he benefits but this mango project has also not been widely distributed for example my son in law's family in Rahim Yar Khan are the biggest mango orchid owners in the district. They have not been given any U.S. help to improve. I told him I said USAID has a project … he replied saying that I applied there but they don't respond.

Interviewer: Hmm right

GJA: That is why I said that not more than thirty percent!

Interviewer: Impact?

GJA: Impact! Not more than thirty percent!

Interviewer: So what do you think about these projects, whether they maybe in education, health or energy, how should projects be assessed given these complexities?

GJA: Well you see the selection of the project itself, first is that, you have to take the user into confidence and go along with the user, second is that the projects should be focused for example you create institutions from where thousands will benefit not just train a few individuals. Give the institution not individuals and then like the impact on agriculture these should be widespread, they should be for example they could make a project of seed improvement and have a good distribution system whereby the impact can go around to every farmer. Our crops yield is decreasing whereas in advance countries and India also it is increasing. Why can't the USAID come into that? Set up a seeds farms for example for us and technical help to improve the productions? They don't do this. If you help two or three Jehangir Tareens then the impact is going to be limited. So the impact is limited, as I said the planning is bad. I am not happy with that.

Interviewer: What do you say the impact is limited?

GJA: it's minimal.

Interviewer: How?

GJA: Because it is not widespread. It is impacting only the NGOs and the few ones who have benefited. Aid is impacting only the NGOs and the few ones who have benefited and they praise USAID. With them impact is positive but with general public it does not exist.

Interviewer: Can you elaborate on your comment on the NGOs' benefitting?

GJA: The reason for that is trust deficit, because there are thousands of NGOs. Everyone who retires he takes the name of an NGO and he just needs a one room office and he goes and registers himself with USAID and UK and this and says I am an NGO give me a contract so obviously the government doesn't like this type of business. There are some very good NGOs who are running schools, very fine schools are being run by NGOs. Hospitals and all! And this is why I said please allow us to make a list of credible NGOs and you give contracts to those NGOs but they insist no and they give the contracts to NGOs like the husband of the female director.

Interviewer: Based on their contacts?

GJA: Based on their contacts. This is what annoys the government also.

Interviewer: Right. So what do you feel about other stakeholders? What do you think about the stakeholder involvement in USAID Pakistan's projects?

GJA: In fact I found that the best NGO was… **Interviewer:**

Which one?

GJA: The German.

Interviewer: GIZ?

GJA: GIZ. They were the best! GTZ! They were the most helpful. They would come and say tell us where is your problem how can we help you? That is actually the approach which is required.

Interviewer: okay.

GJA: Yes. They work, they deliver. They helped us in preparing of curriculum, they asked us what help can we give. I said look curriculum development is not every teacher's job. We have selected people who can, who will be working on this curriculum, they are the teams now so I need you to train them on the curriculum development. They said okay so they spend their money and trained them on how to prepare the curriculum. So this type of thing. They said tell us how we can help you and their aid is more useful.

Interviewer: So what do you feel about stakeholders' involvement with donor projects? For example government, academia, civil society.

GJA: Well wherever there is personal benefit is coming in there they get very intimately involved. They are very 'pally' with the USAID people and they … like Jehangir Tareen's farm.

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: He is personally benefitting so he would be very intimately involved but if they are going around to let's say whitewashing our schools and things like that then there is…Okay you can do it since you are doing it, its fine, we could have done that ourselves but since you are doing it welcome! They have to show statistics that show how many schools they have done, so they are doing that.

Interviewer: So what do you think about the government's involvement with USAID's development work?

GJA: Currently I have no idea about what happened after the 18th amendment because it is now directly with the provinces. Federal government more or less is out now but during my time I had forced them to be involved with the Federal Government.and Federal Ministry but now with provincial government… and even the provincial government has the same complaints that they ignore us and work with NGOs.

Interviewer: So what is the best possible solution to these issues?

GJA: The best possible is what their own director general said that how do you want us to spend this money and where do you want us to spend the money and we spend it wherever it is your requirement. Take the requirement from the user, which they don't they thrust their own agenda that is what makes it unwanted. Now if you look at… well not in the USAID sense but something higher than that or maybe the USAID is part of it now which is the Kerry-Lugar Bill…

Interviewer: Okay… hmm

GJA: KLB was supposed to be one hell of a big favor to Pakistan, but one billion dollars was spent in the construction of the U.S. embassy and the CIA center in Islamabad and it is our 'so-called' money with which they are building a huge complex

Interviewer: Here?

GJA: Yes… Here in Islamabad, the biggest U.S. embassy in the world is being constructed in Islamabad along with the biggest CIA center outside the U.S. in Islamabad all with the Kerry-Lugar fund.

Interviewer: I see.

GJA: I knew about this because a senior representative of the U.S. embassy himself remarked you know when I said you got a new house… brand new house? He said… thanks to you!

Interviewer: I see

GJA: I said yes thanks to us, you are spending our Kerry-Lugar fund, and he said well that is right, so you know they do these clever things with us then how do they expect to be popular and why do except that we should be grateful? We are not grateful for it, we are not grateful for the things they do in our name.

Interviewer: I will come to more questions related to this but for now tell me you mentioned that only one group benefits… some particular people…

GJA: Well the people who have linkages with the U.S. embassy/USAID and interact closely with them, they help those people mostly.

Interviewer: So has any particular group benefited more than others?

GJA: My director's husband has benefited immensely. He was very popular with the USAID all the time. Every year he gets the contract for teacher training …he is a crook. So the agency is benefitting people like that. This is not correct. I pointed it all out to them. I didn't leave them.

Interviewer: Do you think there is an aspiration to change these circumstances?

GJA: No they don't want to change, they were polite enough to listen because I was very rude and very harsh with them.

Interviewer: So umm… a little on the US-Pak bilateral relations. What do you think about U.S. and Pakistan's relationship?

GJA: I think this aid relationship, if correctly spent and correctly used, would have created tremendous goodwill for the U.S. It has not. As I said the impact is around thirty percent only and they haven't given us any long lasting worthwhile projects which people could remember and relate to the U.S. help. Their help is very fleeting and it disappears very soon, its impact is gone. I advised them to create signature projects they didn't agree to do that. They didn't refuse but they didn't do it either. **Interviewer:** What do you mean by signature projects?

GJA: Signature projects is like the Swedish Institute of Technology like the IIT in India, like LUMS in Lahore. These types of projects which people would relate to you for generations to come and say U.S. has helped us. US has given us this institute.

Interviewer: Right…

GJA: Like China is doing! China is… all our big factories are because of China. China has helped. This is the difference between USAID and China. China gives us the capability USAID doesn't give us any capability. You see. They will say alright we will train ten electricians for you and say we have done job creation, China will give us the equipment to train the technicians so we can train not ten electricians but one thousand electricians.

Interviewer: Okay. And could you elaborate a little more on your opinion of the U.S. –Pakistan aid relation? What does it reflect?

GJA: The problem with Pakistan was that either Pakistan was not forceful enough or the U.S. was too arrogant to listen to Pakistan. So they continued to do it their way and it's acknowledged world-over that the impact of USAID is not even fifty percent and most of it goes back anyway. Now the one billion dollar that they spent on the embassy, it went back to them.

Interviewer: Hmm right

GJA: Or when they take our teachers and train them in America the money went back.

Interviewer: In terms of these educational projects what do you have to say?

GJA: Fulbright is a good program. It started when I was the Minister, I mean restarted, it had shut down before and in that initially they were not willing to give us science subjects, we fought with them, we said what joke is this? We don't just have to produce professors for universities, we want some PhDs in science subjects, management skills, technology skills. Then they agreed, even then

they are not giving us things in subjects like anything related to nuclear or missile or something. Those subjects they don't give. But we are still happy that some of our students go and do PhD, they go and study there, so we are happy.

Interviewer: Ok interesting… My next question is… What do you think are the economic, political and social objectives of U.S. in giving aid to Pakistan?

I think their main objective is to create goodwill for U.S., create more acceptability unfortunately they are not meeting this. It's not for any … to help us really! It's not out of goodwill that they want to help Pakistanis, it is their national objective, they want to create the American influence, and they want to influence the minds of the public in a favourable way towards the U.S. because when they train people, when they come up sometimes they are of great use to them.

Interviewer: How?

GJA: Well I think they create, since I am from the ISI (laughing) some people when they were in the U.S. the Americans found them more amenable ad when they came back the Americans kept a linkage with them and they got into higher positions and the Americans then were keeping close relations with them, inviting them to the embassy and getting them to influence things in Pakistan in a pro- American way.

Interviewer: Right… ahan

GJA: I have seen it they try to influence the military also, a lot of us go for training to America. They used to go, a lot of them used to go, now it's quite less.

Interviewer: Okay…. So…What do you think about American aid's role in relation to policy?

GJA: I don't think there is much influence as far as the national policy is concerned of this aid. The aid that matters I mean, I'm talking about USAID now but the aid that matters to Pakistan is one is the economic aid, that's separate, economic aid through which we finance the budget or some other grant that they give us.

Interviewer: I see…

GJA: Ninety percent aid that America gives is through World Bank and IMF. We take a loan from them, and when we take a loan we are dependent on them. Then we accept the dictates of IMF. IMF says, do it our way and Pakistan has to do it because we are accepting their aid. We had eliminated this at the time of Musharraf, these bloody chaps came back and again went with a begging bowl to them.

Interviewer: Hmmm ok

GJA: Our debt at the end of Musharraf's reign, that was doubled by Zardari and Sharif doubled that further in his first two years even though we had told IMF that thank you very much we don't need your help anymore but, these guys, they are running their governments on aid which is why they are dependent on IMF and World Bank and indirectly on the United States because over there U.S. is the dictating path. They are the biggest voting strength. So, as far as military aid is concerned, it is to the extent that they give us the aid with many tantrums and conditions **Interviewer:** Could you elaborate on the military aid aspect?

GJA: The military aid that is being talked about is the…. what is it called… there's a special name for it, this is being given to us to fight the terrorists.

Interviewer: Yes.

GJA: What happens is, that we are using our own money and our own resources too for this fighting for the last six, seven years, so they marked a fund against the Taliban and the terrorist in this area, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ninety percent was given to the Afghan government and the Afghan army to train and raise them. But ten percent was year marked to reimburse us for what we have spent and that reimbursement was also given in installments. But as it is, the fight is in our own interest, we spend our own to fight with them.

Interviewer: Right…

GJA: Yes, we were living peacefully, they didn't have to come in but they came in and they created all this, all these refugees came into Pakistan, when they hit Al-Qaeda, they all came into our tribal area. So we inherited this mess. Now it is an existential threat to us. So we are fighting it.

Interviewer: Absolutely, right… I see.

GJA: We are now fighting it. Now, fighting it is in our own natural interest but part of that expenditure, we are getting from the Americans.

Interviewer: I see

GJA: But look at the sacrifices, the lives we are giving, our young officers are being killed.

Interviewer: Yeah…

GJA: Yes, that was created by the Americans, but now they say, well and on top of that they blame us for this (laughing).

Interviewer: hmm yeah

GJA: Actually what was happening was they were getting a beating in Afghanistan, so their military commanders, when they got beat up they did not want to look inefficient, so they said that they come from Pakistan, so they would throw the blame on us just to find an excuse. That is now no longer true because, in this area, we have cleared all men. Before, Taliban were located here, Afghans were here, it was very difficult for us, they asked us to attack Haqqani network.

Interviewer: Hmmm

GJA: Haqqani had very cleverly captured three provinces of Afghanistan for the past twenty years, so his fighters were there but he kept his families in North Waziristan, now when Americans asked us to attack the Haqqani network, it is in your area, so it was his families. How can we attack his families and get the enemy from Afghan for centuries? If we had killed their families, tomorrow if they had more power, they would have cleared us out so we never wanted to attack. The Americans kept getting annoyed and we did not do it. Not because we wanted that there is a terrorist launch, they were already sitting there and the Americans knew it, but they deliberately used to say this to pressurize us.

Interviewer: I see…

GJA: Now, when we cleared North Waziristan, first we asked Haqqani that please remove your families from here, now we are going to go in operation, we are going to use our air force and now if your families get killed then it will not be our fault. So, they removed them. Then, we have gone in a big way, now Americans are very happy that North Waziristan has been cleared but still, at times, they say that oh, but we don't know, you know **Interviewer:** Hmmm

GJA: It happens from here these people come from Pakistan. They don't come from Pakistan, they are not here anymore.

Interviewer: Right…

So, So Americans have their own political and superpower agenda. They have become very arrogant and have destroyed many countries in the process.Then our geopolitical situation…
Interviewer: Could you elaborate on that?

GJA: Look at the way we are. Four nuclear powers are bordering us. Five nuclear powers in this area. Then, for China the only linkage into this area is through us or through Iran. These are the two routes into the Middle East and to go to Iran, he has to come through central Asia, then Afghanistan, then Iran, but with us there is a direct border which suits China too. India cannot trade with the west, countries to the west, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia unless we allow them to pass. We are the block in between. India has to go through the ocean to go to Kazakhstan.

Interviewer: Hmmm

GJA: So, this is the big trump card in our hand which is why I create fuss whenever Nawaz Sharif etc. say that we should allow India with this trade. Why should we do it? This is our trump card, the only thing which hurts India. And for this card they negotiate with us otherwise they wouldn't even talk to us. They are physically in occupation of Siachen. Why would they talk to us? They have almost all of Kashmir. This forces them, because through this their trade can straight away double if we allow them to do that. We are sitting on it. The military doesn't allow it otherwise Nawaz Sharif would do it tomorrow.

Interviewer: So given these conflicting situations – what do you think of the relation between aid and these conflicts? Do you think aid has resulted in conflict or has it promoted peace in the region?

GJA: Neither.

Interviewer: Neither?

GJA: Neither. It has not created any conflict and it has not created peace, it is by itself. It has been partially beneficial.

Interviewer: Okay!

GJA: And we don't mind if it continues because some benefits do accrue even if in limited, to limited people and so on but it is beneficial.

Interviewer: What do you feel about aid dependency in general?

GJA: We are not dependent on their aid. Even if they shut down tomorrow, it will not matter.

Interviewer: Could you please explain that a bit more?

GJA: For example government is not dependent more on the loans that they take.

Interviewer: Oh, yeah on loans. Right

GJA: Loans they are getting through world bodies and world bodies are controlled by America. So, if this aid relationship ends, then it ends with the world bodies as well. So, because this government has made itself so bankrupt, so dependent on the loans that they can't do without it.

Interviewer: Hmm right

GJA: We have to get out of this dependency that we tried to become independent in the Musharraf era. We shouldn't come under so much debt. If tomorrow World Bank asks us to return the loans, and we can't, then they might put sanctions against us. America will put sanctions against us, and the sanctions were placed on Iran as well but they were able to sustain it because they had the oil well.

Interviewer: Right…

Interviewer: So, my next few questions are about American ideology and values. What do you feel about American values and ideology?

GJA: American ideology is just another word for their hegemony which obviously I don't like it and I would rather have a more balanced world than a unipolar world.

Interviewer: Can you elaborate on that?

GJA: I mean, when it was a bipolar world like U.S. and Russia, both then they used to balance each other out and the Americans were not so hegemonic and not so dictatorial after they have become unipolar. They have become very arrogant and they have destroyed many countries in the process in the Middle East. The balance now would be created if they were these second poles coming up which are Russia and China.

Interviewer: You speak about American hegemony. What are your thoughts on anti-hegemony in relation to U.S.?

GJA: Well we could talk about anti-Americanism.

Interviewer: Yes what do you think of the notion of anti-Americanism in relation to aid?

GJA: Anti-Americanism has nothing to do with aid. It is based on American policies regarding Muslims. It influences minds because Pakistanis are generally religious-minded. So they hear about American atrocities on Muslims. It creates hatred for the Americans and sympathy for Muslims, the victims.

Interviewer: Right.

Interviewer: So what do you think about this and its relation to aid? Can aid counter it?

GJA: It does not counter in any way. I don't think so. Aid is separate by itself.

Interviewer: But they say that they are countering extremism through aid?

GJA: We also say that yes absolutely, you are doing it so that we keep getting the money! (Laughing)

Interviewer: Right…!

GJA: There is no harm in getting this money! Let it come. But in reality it does minimal influence.

Interviewer: Okay…

GJA: It could be more effective if it was more focused. It would have created goodwill but they do not believe in this. They think this way they are spreading it wide but they are actually losing impact.

Interviewer: Ok… my next two to four questions are about donors' media campaigning and branding. You must have seen ads on television and stuff like that? What do you think about these promotions?

GJA: Yes, USAID runs their VOA program and people switch off, people change the channel.

Interviewer: I see. Why?

People change the channel, in truth.

Interviewer: Really?

GJA: In truth, people do change the channel.

Interviewer: Why do you say that?

GJA: Because the programs are worthless (laughing)

Interviewer: Why?

GJA: Because there is nothing much in these programs, nothing really special happens. Our people are glued to two things, one is the dramas on our channels, second is the TV talk shows.

Interviewer: Hmm, the political shows?

GJA: Yes, so, these are the two things which are most popular with our viewers, so on VOA they show American news, American visits, so people are not interested in what is going on in America.

Interviewer: Right… So what do you think of USAID's branding and slogans?

GJA: Instead of writing 'From the American People', if there is IIT, then there will be an impact which these people don't understand. Now, Swedish institute of technology has been giving goodwill to Sweden from the last twenty years although Sweden has not given anything to it, no effort, no aid, and no nothing. There is just that institute which is producing technicians and people are very happy, they praise Sweden.

Interviewer: So, what do you think of the way USAID's campaigns are publically perceived?

GJA: There is anti-Americanism. The English speaking people who are more liberal and who are friendlier towards America and all are very few. The rest don't like it.

Interviewer: I see. And how do you think USAID's publicity material influences your perceptions of the agency?

GJA: Oh, no. I know them too well. It doesn't at all. For three years I have worked with CIA, you know, as DG ISI, so I know what they are and what they do.

Interviewer: Right… Could you elaborate on your experience working as a stakeholder?

GJA: In that period of time, it was very difficult to work with them because we had double sanctions on us and Afghan war was over and they did not need us anymore. So, they were being very nasty with us, demanding, return this, and return that, things they had given us during the Afghan war and also trying to pressurize us that you will not make a nuclear bomb, you are doing this, every day they had been sending their demand, they used to try and pressurize us and we had to stand very firm against their pressure and we successfully did that.

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: And in that I would give credit to also Benazir Bhutto, because Benazir was the Prime Minister and she was a sensible lady. She would keep Americans happy too but without taking pressure, and where it would matter, there she would put her foot down and say no.

Interviewer: Hmmm

GJA: And she used to take us into confidence and we all had a very nice interaction. The army chief, myself, and Benazir, we had decided that we will coordinate on every issue with the Americans. Whatever the Americans had said to Benazir, the moment they came out of her office, she would call me up and say that they were saying this and that and how I answered to them so I would be prepared. Similarly, I would ring up General Waheed and tell him that this happened. So, when Americans came out and came to me and to General Waheed, we had similar approach and they couldn't create fishers in our replies especially on the nuclear program, so, we had to resist the pressure.

Interviewer: Right… thank you for your detailed views**.** Do you want to add anything else in relation to this subject?

GJA: I think I have told you whatever I know about it. I have very good relations with Americans, even now, the American ambassador, whoever comes, every ambassador has been to my house for a meal or something like that, I keep in touch with them and always welcome their aid and I say you must give aid to Pakistan, we are your friends, this and that.

Interviewer: So, what kind of relationship do you have with them?

GJA: Yes, I always advise them but they have been very nasty and stubborn on this. I've always told them that USAID is not effective. Create signature projects with them and I tell them that the Chinese have given us the capability to do things on our own. I said, we needed tanks, they said, why do you want to buy tanks? We will give you a tank factory, produce your own. They gave us a tank factory and now we produce our own. Now, we are even willing to sell.

Interviewer: Yes… Right.

GJA: Similarly, aircraft factory was given to us and we made our own aircrafts as well. So, I said, you guys don't even give us a factory for the spare part! They are not even allowing us to do this on our own. You want to retain us and dependent on you so see for yourself which party would I like. A party which enables to stand on my feet or a party which keeps me by? Then, they don't even provide us with the technology to produce the spare parts.

Interviewer: Right… Interesting.

GJA: Yes. This is what it is, and this is what I used to tell the U.S. embassy representatives that we are not some idiots that you think we don't understand why aren't you providing us with these and then I said don't expect us to be grateful to you as compared to China.

Interviewer: Right… Well thank you so much for your time and comments. I have taken a lot of your time and will be ending the discussion now.

GJA: No worries, it was good speaking with you on this topic I hope it is useful for you. If you would like more information you can also email or call me anytime.

Interviewer: Sure, I will definitely keep in touch. Thank you once again.

GJA: You're welcome

(Recording paused)

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Unmasking USAID Pakistan's Elite Stakeholder Discourses
Towards an Evaluation of the Agency's Development Interventions

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Unmasking USAID Pakistan's Elite Stakeholder Discourses
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[Anum Pasha]

ABSTRACT

This study pursued an exploration of Pakistani elite discourses that assess the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) development interventions and promotional discourses in context of a historically tense United States (U.S.) – Pakistan relationship. By interviewing USAID Pakistan's key stakeholders and employing a three-pronged conceptual framework that combined theories of discourse, power, and hegemony with a postcolonial/post-development lens, this research investigated elite perceptions that shape public opinions on American aid, amidst a "potent force" (Rizvi, 1994: 8) of anti-Americanism in Pakistan.

Findings drawn from a thematic analysis suggest that elites' perceptions of USAID Pakistan are situated within a discourse of resistance. USAID was viewed as more imperialistic than hegemonic and the agency was identified as an apparatus for exercising power through the guise of development. Unveiling a power imbalance in the donor-recipient relation, elites vehemently drew on geo-political tensions and foreign policy, identity and representation, class, culture and ideology, and religious discourses to ask a critical question: Why is the aid liaison between U.S. and Pakistan so unequal? Further, USAID Pakistan fell short of meeting elites' expectations of developmental impact. While USAID was praised for its support to Pakistan's education sector, the overall impact was considered insignificant.

Additionally, results indicate that USAID's promotional discourse increases contempt rather than consent among interviewed elites. The agency's development discourse was seen as a ploy to represent Pakistan as aid-dependent and America as the benign donor. Major historical and political tensions played out in elite narratives thus the aid discourse cannot be quarantined from broader events. Elites' apprehension of geo-politics implicates their perception of USAID and while these issues stand unresolved, the agency continues to exist in a field of resistance.

Advanced understanding of USAID Pakistan's stakeholder discourses can heighten American and Pakistani policymakers' self-reflexivity in their quest for renegotiating the troubled aid liaison. For those who dare to look at the other side of the coin, investigation of USAID's stance on these results can be valuable groundwork for further examining the U.S. – Pakistan aid liaison.

INTRODUCTION

Despite being a leading American aid recipient (Epstein and Kronstadt, 2013) Pakistan has experienced an inconsistent aid liaison with America.

Economic Advisor to Pakistan's government, Zaman (1985) explains that American economic assistance to Pakistan began in 1951, was terminated in 1977, restarted in 1978, halted in 1979 and resumed in October 1981. A historical lens indicates that the U.S. – Pakistan political relationship is closely tied to the endowment and suspension of economic assistance funds (appendix 8), disbursed through USAID.

A gap in perceptions exists regarding American economic support since Pakistanis' negative view of America has not altered despite benefitting from aid (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013). While research (Khan & Rehman, 2014; Kizilbash, 1988) has documented unfavourable Pakistani attitudes towards America irrespective of USAID's promotional efforts, there is insufficient academic attention on how Pakistani elites contribute towards the discourse.

Historical Background

The U.S. – Pakistan relationship began as early as September 1947 when Pakistan's first Governor- General Quaid-i-Azam procured arms from Washington to counter India's war threat (Husain, 1985). Washington neglected Pakistan until it gained strategic significance during the Cold War as Pakistan's role was identified in restraining communism, resulting in American aid for Pakistan (Ali, 2009).

However, "relations had attained a somewhat unsteady equilibrium" (Kux, 2001: 128) when Pakistan's General Ayub Khan expressed disapproval of American assistance to India. In 1965, President Johnson cut aid to restrain Pakistan's friendship with China. Afterwards President Carter imposed the Symington Amendment in 1979 and slashed aid because Pakistan "had been pursuing…. a nuclear option…" (Husain, 1985: 5).

Thereafter, the situation reversed in 1981 because America required Pakistan's support in curtailing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Generous aid flows were directed towards Pakistan as the "two sides worked hand in glove…in their war against the Soviet Union" (Markey, 2013: 2). Aid lasted until the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and relations between the two

countries deteriorated (Ali, 2009). Aid was cut during George Bush's administration under the 1985 Pressler Amendment (Hussain, 2005). American interest in Pakistan declined and President Clinton withheld aid under the Glenn Amendment. Pakistani intelligence agency's suspected support for the Taliban also caused "friction" (Kux, 2001: 348) with America during the 1990s.

Subsequently, America needed Pakistan to "dismantle the Taliban regime" (Ali, 2009: 252) after the 9/11 attacks. Sanctions were lifted and aid to Pakistan gradually increased (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013). Between 2001 and 2011, America spent over $8.8 billion in non-military assistance to Pakistan (Hameed, 2013). The 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) increased annual assistance by $1.5 billion between 2009 and 2013 ("GovTrack.us", n.d.). The KLB's principal purpose was to reduce distrust among Pakistanis (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011). Yet, "despite this largesse…Pakistan…appears to be more distrustful of the U.S…." (Fair, 2009: 149).

Study Significance

Against this backdrop, the research has a two-fold objective. I will investigate ÚSAID Pakistan's elite stakeholder discourses that assess the agency's development interventions, characterized as funds promoting 'economic development and welfare' ("OECED - Official development assistance – definition and coverage", n.d.) in Pakistan. The research aims to draw a canvass of Pakistani elites' perceptions of USAID against the setting of an unstable U.S. - Pakistan relationship.

Second, this research will examine how elites contest USAID's legitimizing promotional discourses including electronic and press campaigns, amidst "powerful and pervasive" (Epstein and Kronstadt, 2013: 39) anti-Americanism in Pakistan.

Further, this research aims for enhanced understanding of the complexities that underpin the aid discourse since there is an argument for rethinking the U.S. strategy towards Pakistan. The U.S. must develop understanding of Pakistan since it has been unable to strengthen a long-term relationship with Pakistan (Cohen and Chollet, 2007). This renegotiation can only occur from deeper awareness of Pakistani perceptions of USAID.

Moreover, a qualitative study of attitudes towards American support has been acknowledged as a gap. Andrabi and Das (2010) researched aid's impact on local attitudes during the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake and noted that many poor quality surveys are being conducted.

Additionally, scholarship (Alam, 2001; Rose & Husain, 1985; Wallace, 1985; Haqqani, 2013; Fair, 2010; Tahir, 1982) retains focus on U.S. military support to Pakistan. There is potential for researching in-depth stakeholder attitudes towards non-military assistance that shape the development agenda.

I have focused on the U.S. – Pakistan aid liaison since the discourse highlights a strained political relationship between both countries but not its impact on stakeholders' attitude towards aid. The U.S. has demonstrated its long-term interest in Pakistan by committing $742, 200, 000 in 2017 ("foreignassistance.gov", n.d.) despite the troubled history. This paradoxical occurrence captured my interest in USAID as the selected donor agency. However, I will not be focusing on individual projects but on the agency's overall efforts. Military aid will be beyond this study's scope.

Finally, I was previously engaged as a communications specialist at a USAID Pakistan project and felt inquisitive about the discourses that challenged the agency's interventions in an unpredictable geo-political climate. This compelled me to investigate how the agency's communication strategies are being interpreted given the growing public resentment towards America.

At the outset, I will discuss relevant theoretical literature, develop a conceptual framework and outline the research questions. Then I will explain the employed research methodology. Thereafter, findings will be presented from analysis of interviews conducted with ten Pakistani elites. Lastly, I will conclude by summarizing the core analytical insights based on this study's theoretical framework.

LITERATURE REVIEW

On Discourse

In the development aid-focused framework of this research, discourses being the "appropriate and legitimate ways of practicing development as well as speaking and thinking about it" (Grillo & Stirrat, 1997: 12) can be seen as "historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of representations or articulations through which meanings are constructed and social practices organized" (Baaz, 2005: 11).

In Foucauldian terms, discourses depart from being defined in a linguistic sense and turns towards the social and historical circumstances that give them rise (Macdonald, 2003). Similarly,

Laclau (1990) and Parker (1992) warn that since discourses are embedded in their historical formations, analysts must not disconnect themselves from discourse history. Since discourses can be traced to their historical, social and political circumstances, discourse theory can identify how historical and political circumstances resonate in elites' aid discourses.

Furthermore, drawing from Foucault, Baaz (2005) combines the intricacies of identity with aid discourse to argue that "discourses are...open-ended and related to each other" (ibid: 11) making it possible to discuss several discourses as they influence each other. Baaz's (2005) contribution is significant for theoretical enquiry of association between tensions in the discourse on U.S. – Pakistan relationship and aid - and for the understanding that aid discourse, like any other discourse, is embedded in past events.

Thus, Foucault's discourse framework encourages an investigation of the relationship "between discourses and the broader forms of socio-political change in which they arise" (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 48), akin to exploring how discourses on the geo-political facet of the U.S. – Pakistan relation inform the aid discourse.

Additionally, Foucault's discourse theory entails 'discursive conditions of possibility' that Hall (1997) notes "govern the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about..." (ibid: 44). Discourses possess the power to limit what can be known (McHoul & Grace, 1993), giving some discourses significance and rendering others invisible, to exercise symbolic power and influence perceptions (Bourdieu, 1990; Thompson, 1995).

In a similar vein, Purvis and Hunt (1993) capture Hall's theorization of the influential capacity of discourse and explain that he understands it as "frameworks which limit what can be experienced... and thereby influence what can be said and done" (ibid: 485) by powerful individuals, elites and institutions. In this sense, discourses, especially those generated by powerful individuals and institutions, influence wider perceptions.

Discourse on U.S. – Pakistan Relations

The discourse on U.S. – Pakistan relations is predominantly positioned on continuing tensions between both countries. Qazi (2012) considers American aid as a complex subject which has become debatable because relations have deteriorated. He observes the chaotic aid disbursement as a cause and contends that USAID has not had enough influence. Meanwhile, Fair (2009) has

noted that Pakistani elites also consider America as untrustworthy, warranting a closer look at their role in shaping discourse.

Elite Discourse

Dijk (1993) emphasizes how elite discourses reproduce the practice of racism by acknowledging elites' role in politics, media and education as producers of wider discourses through their "influential text and talk" (ibid: 8) as they "manufacture the consent needed for the legitimation of their own power" (ibid: 8). This supports the hypothesis that Pakistani elites who "manage public opinion" (Dijk, 1993: 8) shape broader public perceptions.

On Power, Knowledge and Development

Foucault (1978) conceptualizes power through a power-knowledge-discourse nexus by arguing that "it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together" (Hurley, 1978: 100). Discourse and knowledge constitute power and when exercised in practice over subjects (Foucault, 1980), legitimize what is being said to influence the subjugated, shape perceptions and regulate practices (Hall, 1992). While discourses organize action, they also enable people to become aware of certain things and speak about them. Thus, Foucault's conceptualization of knowledge constituting power to influence is critical for understanding how dominant discourses determine perceptions.

In contrast, Thompson (1990) does not consider discourse theory as an "approach to the fundamental links between knowledge and power" (Macdonald, 2003: 41).

For Foucault (1978), power does not exist in a top-down power relation – instead, "power is everywhere…" (ibid: 93) and determines the relation between actors. Foucault is more interested in how power is contested between actors rather than locating its "author" (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 21), serving as a critical approach for determining how power is installed, exercised and channelled between actors to "produce the truths we live by" (McHoul & Grace, 1993: 58). In contrast, a coercive model of power has been adopted in the Marxist tradition by Weber (1947), even though Marxist-inspired thinkers including Althusser and Gramsci re-conceptualized it (Macdonald, 2003).

Further, since Foucault's account of power has been applied to a range of fields including 'medicine', 'sexuality' and 'feminism', its flexibility allows practicality in 'development' even though his work has been criticized for its Euro-centric focus (Escobar,1984). Foucault's knowledge-discourse-power paradigm has been employed as an analytical tool for studying development practices by enabling a "critical deconstruction of the totalizing discursive formation of 'aid', the constellations of power it gives rise to, and its concrete impacts on North–South relations" (Rossi, 2004: 7).

Drawing on Foucault, Escobar (1995) conceptualized development as a process by "which poor countries are known, specified, and intervened upon" (ibid: 45). Thus, Foucauldian approaches to power offer a valuable framework for examining the aid liaison between North-South actors and the dominant development discourses that reinforce uneven power relations.

American Hegemony: Winning Hearts and Minds

Gramsci (1971) pioneered the concept of hegemony as different from coercive power. Drawing from Gramsci, Hall (1977) conceives hegemony as "winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural" (Hebdige, 1979: 16). Dominant groups in society must win pervasive consent of those they wish to rule through legitimization (Howarth, 2000).

By contrast, while Althusser's (1989) concept of 'Ideological State Apparatus' (ISA) complements Gramsci, it works through institutions including the mass media to propagate ideologies and does not leave room for resistance (Durham & Kellner, 2001), unlike Gramsci's hegemony that functions more subtly and accounts for counter-hegemonic forces.

Further, Gramsci's notion of hegemony has been widely associated with America's ascent to global domination. Gramsci was concerned with the rise of American dominance and enquired about 'Americanism's' impact on Europe. He saw America's capital accumulation as a "process of hegemony" (Fonseca, 2016: 84) and argued that elites moulded individuals' lifestyles (Antonio & Bonanno, 2000).

Moreover, Nuechterlein (2005) comprehensively documents the evolution of American hegemony beginning with the 1948 Marshall Plan for containment of communism. According to Nuechterlein (2005), "unlike the imperial roles exercised by Britain and France, however,

'hegemony' was a more appropriate term for America's exercise of its power…" (ibid: 4). America's ascent of hegemonic influence, akin to the Gramscian perspective, involved 'indirect influence' through "political, economic and military aid" (Nuechterlein, 2005: 4).

While scholarship has theorized hegemony in relation to America's superpower status, there has been limited discussion about the hegemonic influence of American aid and its contestation in Third World countries. Clark (1972) reiterates USAID's significance, considering the agency as an important vehicle for building consent. His analysis appears naïve because he assumes that the "respect built up over time through effective aid relationships in turn leads naturally to a more sympathetic hearing for other U.S. concerns" (ibid: 79). This is debatable since in countries like Pakistan where aid disbursement is high, America's negative image perseveres.

Reviewing Essex's (2013) Development, Security and Aid, Bhungalia (2016) notes, "USAID is one of the more deeply internationalized institutions…and thus offers a key site through which to examine the historical and evolving nature of U.S. hegemony…" (ibid: 88). Jadallah (2014) argues that American aid advances American foreign policy by "convincing states to stay in the U.S. orbit" (ibid: 6). Essex (2013) concludes that USAID aims to intervene in developing countries to "bring them under the umbrella of American hegemony" (ibid: 86). While USAID is a cornerstone of North-South relations, there is insufficient literature on American aid's hegemonic influence on the attitudes of people in aid-receiving countries.

Additionally, 'winning hearts and minds', a term which gained popularity in 2009 to legitimate American interventions in Afghanistan (Valeyre, 2011), is also appropriated in USAID's campaign for countering extremism and influencing perceptions (Cohen, 2007) through media rhetoric and development initiatives. Appropriating Gramsci's cultural hegemony framework is useful here for its emphasis on how media asserts "broader socio-political domination" (Durham & Kellner, 2001: 6). This is a critical challenge for USAID since anti-American sentiments are more serious than before (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011). While America has stressed on branding its projects with the USAID logo, it is fairly weak in making an impact (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011).

Andrabi and Das's (2010) study on the impact of American assistance during the 2005 Kashimir Earthquake on local attitudes concludes that "winning hearts and minds in the region is now more than ever seen as a legitimate…aim of providing bilateral foreign assistance…" (ibid: 2). While some studies (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Bradbury & Kleinman, 2010) evaluate the effectiveness of aid programs in winning hearts and minds in context of Afghanistan, there is

inadequate scholarly attention on how Pakistani experts are interpreting USAID's consent-winning strategies that shape public attitudes towards America and U.S. aid.

Contesting American Hegemony: Anti-Americanism in Pakistan

In a Gramscian sense, Hall's (1988) conceptualization of counter-hegemony as "resistance to the agenda of the dominant hegemony" (Carroll, 2009: 20) has been applied frequently to international relations (Deak, 2005). Gramsci's counter-hegemonic framework is valuable for understanding the alternative discourses that confront popular discourses authenticating American cultural values, ideology and interventions in Pakistan. In this regard, scholars have theorized antiAmerican discourses as counter-hegemonic in relation to how American interventions and ideological values are resisted in Pakistan.

For example, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2015) paint a dismal picture of anti-Americanism in Pakistan and suggest that the discourse is a result of nationalist and religious-based ideological aversions, based on 'difference' that can produce negative perceptions of America. From the nationalist perspective, they argue that events such as drone strikes are unpopular in Pakistan.

Further, they conclude that elite narratives play a vital role in fostering anti-Americanism in the public discourse, which demands an enquiry into elites' understanding of anti-Americanism in relation to U.S. – Pakistan liaison. Similarly, Reetz (2006) explains that anti-Americanism is fuelled by nationalist and anti-Indian camps bolstered by military and civil-bureaucratic elites. He argues that elites "are among the main torch-bearers of Pakistan anti-Americanism, feeding on … the unreliable partnership with the United States" (ibid: 189).

In sum, scholarship has scrutinized the sources of anti-Americanism discourses in Pakistan, but there is inadequate research on anti-Americanism in relation to aid and its impact on perceptions that are mostly curated by elites.

Pakistan in Western Development Discourse

For Escobar (1995), development discourses determine the West's neo-colonial construction of the Third World in order to legitimize its developmental interventions and exercise power. In this process "certain representations become dominant and shape the way in which reality is imagined and acted upon" (ibid: 5). Likewise, Cornwall and Eade (2010) argue that language constructs

perceptions and has a hegemonic influence on development policy. Through visual and text-based development discourse including media campaigns, the West has acquired hegemonic dominance that does not need force (Faille, 2011) to win consent. Escobar's (1995) theorization of development in relation to the discourse it is embedded in enables insight into development practices as a semblance of hierarchical North-South power relations.

In a similar vein, Banda (2004) suggests that the Third World is a construct rather than reality by drawing attention towards discourse as an apparatus for promoting Western ideology through development aid and positioning the West as a superior yardstick for poor countries to measure their performance against. Likewise, Ziai (2013) argues that the development discourse should be discarded because of its Euro-centric style. She argues that the West is usually "referred to as developed, i.e. as mature and complete in contrast to other societies…these are framed linguistically as lacking, backward, and inferior" (ibid: 128) to permit ideological penetration of aid and justify systematic intervention.

Escobar's grave concern about the Third World's discursive production that legitimates the West's developmental interventions to regulate poor countries, colonize their reality and silence marginalized voices lies central to the study of Pakistan's construction in Western aid discourse. It calls attention towards the representational discourses on U.S. assistance as dominated by an American view that "corruption is endemic to South Asia and to Pakistan in particular" (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013: 35). Pakistan is mainly associated with corruption issues as the stumbling block for successful implementation of USAID programs (Epstein & Krondstadt, 2013). Miller (2015) considers "Islamabad's failings and betrayals" (pg. 116) as an obstacle towards American interests. Pakistan is typically defined in Washington as 'double-dealing' and 'dupliticious' (Qazi, 2012). Haqqani (2013) writes, "Americans see Pakistan as the ungrateful recipient" of aid. The development discourse is thus owned by Washington, where policymakers find Pakistan's corruption, ingratitude and unwillingness to cooperate as reasons behind the ineffectiveness of aid.

Deconstructing aid discourse evokes an interest in how the West's development terminology is being challenged in Pakistan. Escobar (1995) draws from Foucault to argue that when the West launches a demeaning discursive construction of the Third World, alternative discourses from Third World leaders and intellectuals resist to safeguard their own interests. In this context, we are still unable to hear of Pakistani leaders' response to Western discourses. One wonders if governing Western development discourses leave Third World elites any form of agency. If yes,

how do elites exercise agency to challenge these discourses? This context encourages to draw from Foucault (1980b) and give "voice to those de-legitimized sources so thoroughly disqualified from predominant discourse" (Hook, 2001: 25) for a recovery of Pakistani voices drowned in the noise of American discourse.

Aid from a Postcolonial Lens

Postcolonial theory developed as a reaction to inequalities that persisted after states were decolonized in the 20th century and progressed in "reaction to pitfalls of modernization" (Martin, 2015). The theoretical tradition sought to unmask the Third World's unequal power relationship with the West, drawing attention towards a "dominant discourse that labours continuously to suppress the 'other'…or multiple 'others'" (Hall, 1985 in Sosale, 2002: 5).

Postcolonial theorists express their frustration with the development project's paternalistic stance that only the West can resolve South's development problems. To address the gap between postcolonial theory and the development sector, Kothari (1996) asks: "Why is that most development academics and practitioners have never heard of Said, Spivak, Bhabha and Fanon…?" (ibid: 13).

In an attempt to bridge postcolonial theory with development, Kapoor (2008) theorized the aid discourse in his seminal book, The Postcolonial Politics of Development. Drawing from Derrida's (1992) conceptualization of 'gift' as associated with an expectation of reciprocity, he argues that the aid discourse enabled by an act of gift-giving to underdeveloped nations introduces a dichotomous relationship between the aid-giver and receiver – framing the former as generous and the latter as subordinate.

Kapoor (2008) also examines USAID's representational discourses that work to establish a positive image of the West and "position the Other – the recipient to subordinate, less worthy, under-developed" (ibid: 86) portrayals. Kapoor (2008) further examines the aid discourse in relation to the 'flag-waiving' practices of donor countries as a desire to publicize their image as superior to others. Such practices including "flags on grain sacks, insignias on equipment, sponsor names on NGO literature – all aim at designating the nation's gift and publicizing it…" (Kapoor, 2008: 87). The danger of these representational regimes has been articulated by Spivak (1999) who argues that the Third World's discursive production as inferior naturalizes Western dominance.

Closely linked with representation, Said's (1978) conceptualization of 'orientalism' offers critical insight into aid discourses that describe the recipient as 'lesser' as a mechanism for exercising power over the beneficiary and sustaining Western dominance. His definition of 'orientalism' as a "Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the orient" (ibid: 3) can explain why development communication has adopted an approach that allows Western donors ('occident') to paint Southern communities ('orient') in rigid frames. These descriptions are laden with the "will to power" (Kapoor, 2008: 6) and signalize an 'orientalist' attitude that postcolonial writers have been suspicious of. Similarly, Hall (2001) emphasizes that media representations and popular culture produce difference in an effort to extend a colonial legacy for sustaining power relations. Thus, unsymmetrical North-South power relations are concealed by the way donor agencies' media representations take shape in text and visuals.

Conceptual Framework and Research Questions

The reviewed literature has exposed many anxieties in the U.S. – Pakistan paradox that frame this research. While scholarly attention has been granted to geo-political complications, limited research has undertaken investigation of the Pakistani elite discourses that evaluate American economic assistance. Even less academic attention has been given to Pakistani elites' counter-discourses towards the hegemonizing strategies of consent adopted by USAID in its promotional discourses. The literature review has evoked many questions: How are prevailing U.S. – Pakistan tensions reflected in the agency's elite stakeholders' narratives? How do local elites contest American hegemonic influence that transfuses through USAID's communication efforts? How are elites interpreting USAID's development interventions given the complications marked in the literature?

In light of the theoretical interests that have guided this research, a three-pronged conceptual framework has been designed.

First, Foucault's concept of 'discursive formations' has been hand-picked to explore the depth of elite narratives on American assistance. This concept relates to Foucault's preoccupation with the "external or social conditions within which discourses are formed…" (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 490) and is a probing tool in research that requires insights into human communication, behaviour and knowledge. By using Foucault's critical preoccupation with discourse formation

through nondiscursive practices including political and historical conditions, I seek to explore elite discourses that examine American aid in relation to broader events.

Second, Gramsci's theorization of 'counter-hegemony' as forces which seek to "overthrow the existing hegemony" (Durham & Kellner, 2001: 5) has been selected since the concept has garnered significant attention in hypothesizing American hegemonic influence on peripheral countries. Contestation of American hegemonic influence infiltrated through USAID's publicity rhetoric as an attempt to erect the world-views of Pakistanis has the potential to be further studied.

Third, a combined postcolonial and post-development lens will seek to identify how USAID's development discourse is being interpreted in Pakistan. This lens is valuable for analysing the aid discourse and brings forth a bundle of concepts including representation, 'othering', 'orientalism' and power/knowledge. Finally, postcolonial theory is not only a suitable instrument for analysing the unequal power relations enabled from discursive framing of Southern aid recipients by Western donors, it also allows decolonizing development discourse and inspires a reading of the Third World's alternative discourses that interrogate popular claims.

By relying on this conceptual framework and reviewed literature, the objectives of this research as outlined before are:

i) To investigate Pakistani elite perspectives of American aid in relation to geo-political and historical events that underpin the U.S. – Pakistan relationship and;

ii) To identify elite discourses which contest USAID's consent-winning promotional efforts.

By probing into Pakistani elite perceptions, this research aims for enhanced understanding of the discussions underlining the U.S. – Pakistan strategic development roadmap. This leads me to asking the following question:

Research Question

- What kinds of discourses do USAID Pakistan's elite stakeholders call on to evaluate the agency's development interventions?

The research question was broken into sub-questions:

- How are Pakistani elites' discursive perceptions of American aid being formed under the conditions of a historically tense U.S. - Pakistan relationship?
- How do Pakistani elites contest the hegemonizing strategies of consent adopted by USAID in its promotional discourse?

METHODOLOGY

An epistemology of qualitative elite interviews was appropriated because it permitted collection of extremely sought-after information from elites working at the heart of Pakistan's policy-making process. Given the sensitive nature of this research, the methodology seemed suitable to "probe deeply elite attitudes, values, and beliefs" (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002: 675). The elite interviewing methodology as an enquiry that focuses on extracting specialized information deserving of "non-standardized treatment" (Dexter, 1970: 5) is under-theorized because elites are difficult to access (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001). However, its significance for comprehending the social world has been reiterated by scholars (Wax, 1971; Whyte, 1984). Tansey (2007) recommends the elite interviewing methodology as part of a researcher's toolkit because it allows learning about the debates involved in elites' decision-making that influences society.

Rationale for Pakistani Elite Interviews

To suit this study's framework, Dexter's (1970) broad definition of 'elite' was applied: "A group of individuals who hold...a privileged position in society and...are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public" (ibid: 7). This was combined with a small yet meaningful definition by Kezar (2003) who considers elites as "persons in power" (ibid: 395).

Pakistani elites are central to the development sector and perform a key role in framing the public discourse on Pakistan's complex relationship with America. Kaltenthaler, Miller and Fair's (2012) study on Pakistani public attitudes towards American drone strikes assigns elite discourse its due significance in shaping public opinion. They argue that Pakistanis' attitude towards drone strikes is determined by which elites they trust. Consequently, in-depth conversations with Pakistani elites can draw me closer towards their beliefs to explain the gap in public perceptions of American assistance.

Since this study's core objective is gaining insight into elite opinion, the merits of elite interviewing were carefully reviewed. This study's reliance on primary data collection and extremely sensitive information necessitated elite interviewing. Further, there was a particular interest in looking beyond secondary sources such as press releases and reports that have limited information due to government confidentiality or private decision-making processes (Davies, 2001).

Research Approach

A semi-structured interview approach that "allows more opportunity for probing and gives the respondent considerable freedom…" (Peabody et al., 1990: 452) was undertaken because the style has been extensively used in elite interviews (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987). Zuckerman (1972) traced her experience of interviewing Nobel Laureates and concluded that elites "resent being encased in the straitjacket of standardized questions" (ibid: 167). A flexible approach was thus employed to engage the interviewees in a free-flowing conversation.

Other research methodologies including questionnaires and focus groups were also reviewed. Questionnaires were rejected for not giving elites an opportunity to articulate their opinions at length. Also, elites are not expected to openly provide information in public settings such as focus groups since those tend to be shaped by group dynamics. Although "collective wisdom" (Dexter, 1970: 4) is obtained, elites do not provide personal narratives in group settings. Focus groups also seemed laborious to coordinate due to elites' busy schedules.

Further, methodological challenges and guidelines for elite interviewing were noted. First, elite interviewing involves issues related to power and control (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001) because they often try to regulate the interview (Harvey, 2011). Second, interviewing elites can be pressurizing because enriching information has to be extracted in limited time from individuals who are not keen on giving time that can be devoted elsewhere (Zuckerman, 1972). Since this study commanded elite interviewing, the methodology was appropriated despite the above-mentioned challenges.

Sample Recruitment and Access

Following ethical approval, I selected individuals based on the following criteria. First, respondents must have decision-making influence in policy and development planning. Second,

respondents should have knowledge of USAID and political awareness of U.S. – Pakistan relations. Third, respondents' work should entail public engagement.

I aimed for maximum male-female representation and selected respondents from diverse fields including academia, military intelligence, bureaucracy and journalism since the objective "is not counting opinion or people, but rather exploring the range of opinions..." (Gaskell, 2000: 41). For a detailed account of respondent profiles, see appendix 4.

Moreover, I appropriated a snowball sampling technique in which "one subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third..." (Vogt, 1999 in Atkinson & Flint, 2001) to access elites. The method has been used frequently for elite interviewing since trust is needed to initiate contact through referrals (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). I combined this method with using personal contacts to remove bureaucratic blockades (Harvey, 2010). To gain respondents' full consent for an interview, it was imperative to build rapport months in advance. Trust was established by frequent email exchanges with respondents about the nature of my research.

Topic Guide

A fairly flexible topic guide (appendix 3) was developed to serve as a guide for keeping myself on track during the interview. The topic guide was categorized into themes in accordance with theoretical interests. This approach was designed to maintain overall consistency, retain a focus and revert to questions that were unanswered (Berry, 2002). Further, the topic guide focused on broad, open-ended questions that were later narrowed down to personal and specific questions to ensure that participants feel comfortable.

Interviews

A total of ten interviews were conducted in Pakistan between March and April, 2016. Seven interviews were conducted in person whereas three were completed via Skype due to interviewees' physical non-availability.

Before travelling to Pakistan, I scheduled some interviews through personal contacts whereas the rest were arranged through referrals from interviewees. All face-to-face interviews were recorded on my iPhone because I was worried that a recording device could make respondents feel

uncomfortable while divulging inner-most thoughts. Also, I was conscious of the interview location because it can impact the kinds of information respondents are willing to reveal (Harvey, 1984). Most interviews were conducted at interviewees' office or home according to their preference. In addition, travel arrangements were made to Islamabad for interviewing one participant at his residence.

Further, questions asked were open-ended and theoretical references were avoided. I asked general questions in the beginning to seek spontaneous responses. For instance, I asked: 'What do you think about donor agencies' media campaigns?' to observe whether the respondent brought up USAID on their own before I directly asked about USAID's campaigns. Contrary to my expectations that elite interviews are time-constrained, each interview lasted long enough between one and two hours. However, the direction and pace of interviews was generally controlled by interviewees.

Reflexivity and Ethical Considerations

Interviewees were requested to sign an informed consent form which outlined the study's purpose, research procedures, confidentiality statement, and participation rights. Interviewees were reassured about confidentiality if they chose to maintain anonymity, which is crucial when interviewing high-profile elites who are easily identifiable due to their prominence (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001). Four respondents wanted to remain anonymous and consequently their profiles have been altered.

Furthermore, I was apprehensive of a potential sample bias because some interviewees were accessed through personal contacts. Although the aim was to acquire a genuinely representational sample, I was unable to get hold of a religious party leader who could have plausibly added a unique perspective since many of the opinions about America are "coloured by a religious discourse" (Fair & Watson, 2015: 18). Also, the sample was geographically limited to two cities due to personal travel constraints.

Finally, my role as a female researcher in this study's social context must be reflected upon, since Pakistan is a patriarchal society (Kidwai, 2001). Feminist scholarship has placed significance on power differentials between the male elite and the female interviewer (Abels & Behrens, 2009). Since six interviewees were males, I was particularly conscious of gender-related issues but did not observe anything indicative of a gender bias.

Analysis

All interviews were transcribed verbatim and thematic analysis was used for data interpretation due to its compatibility across diverse research approaches (Braune & Clarke, 2006). AttrideStirling's (2001) practical guide for unearthing and summarizing salient themes to present them in a thematic network was employed. The thematic network enables extraction of data into 'basic themes' which merge into 'organizing themes' that amalgamate into a core 'global theme'.

Following Attride-Stirling's (2001) model, a coding framework based on theoretical interests was devised according to which interview data was read and re-arranged into segments. The first trial involved summarizing key issues in the data followed by abstracting themes. Themes were refined in the coding framework and illustrated into a thematic network (appendix 1) constituting 'basic themes', 'organizing themes' and a 'global theme'. The deduced themes were then explored in relation to each other and thematic patterns were identified to answer the research question.

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

Set as the core reflection of interview data, the 'global theme' emerging from analysis is: 'Resistance against USAID's imperialism', encapsulating respondents' discursive perceptions of the agency against the setting of a strained U.S. – Pakistan political relationship.

At the heart of the aid discourse, Pakistani elites articulated their struggle against aid imperialism, understood as an instrument for pushing economic and geo-political interests of American hegemony (Veltmeyer, 2005). Since discourses are formed in "historical context" (Hall, 2001: 74) and are correlative, anxieties of the U.S. – Pakistan discourse were highly visible in elites' discussions as they critiqued U.S. power tactics, challenged American foreign policy and USAID, and contested unequal aid relations because "resistance is concomitant with the process of subjectification" (Pickett, 1996: 458) in the Foucauldian sense.

I will first outline the empirical results by describing the thematic network (appendix 1) constituting 'organizing themes': 'hating America', 'identity and representation', 'unequal partnership' and 'hegemonic power', then explore the 'basic themes' and finally connect these to the 'global theme' of resistance followed by a discussion of how these findings inform my theoretical interests.

Findings

Hating America

Respondents' accounts predominantly reflected anxieties of an anti-American discourse demonstrating that aid cannot be evaluated in isolation of public hatred against America. Elite respondents argued that increasing U.S. aid cannot restrain anti-Americanism because American policy is negatively construed:

> **Ghulam Ali (GA):** American bashing exists and aid is not reducing it. Even if there is no aid, bashing will continue as it's related to perception of U.S.

Upon being asked about aid's role in anti-Americanism, most respondents agreed that it does not directly impact anti-Americanism. One respondent expressed scepticism of USAID's success in influencing perceptions:

> **Nadia Naviwala (NN):** I don't think anti-Americanism in Pakistan has anything to do with aid because the amount is really insignificant. It doesn't trickle down or have an impact or is visible to the ordinary citizen.

In contrast, a former USAID contractor drew an association between USAID's hegemonic practices, promotional efforts and anti-Americanism, suggesting a severe power imbalance:

> **Saadia Khan (SK):** Aid is nurturing anti-Americanism even if it's not doing it directly. Just by branding strategies and imposing themselves they are not doing anything to suppress it.

When probed further about anti-Americanism and aid, responses focused on the following 'basic themes':

Superpower Policy

Eight respondents discussed American foreign policy as a determinant of anti-Americanism citing that aid is perceived as poor compensation for the harsh American political stance towards Pakistan. Main events mentioned in this context were: Soviet-Afghan war, Global War on Terror (GWOT), 2011 NATO attack on Salala, CIA agent Raymond Davis incident, 2011 Bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, drone warfare and Pakistan's nuclear status.

Senior bureaucrat Dr. Nasir Javed (DNJ) argued against American foreign policy during our discussion on the Government of Punjab's (GOP) decision to disengage with USAID:

> Anti-American sentiments are strong because of American policies. People are being killed and their properties destroyed. How can you compensate people who are being killed? We've killed you but we can pay your laundry bill now that we've dirtied your clothes!

Additionally, all respondents agreed that American aid has a power agenda which creates colossal distrust and the perception that American interventions are based on a logic of domination. Former Director General Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) Senator Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf (GJA) explained:

> So Americans have their own political and superpower agenda. They have become very arrogant and have destroyed many countries in the process.

> **Sigbhatullah Sabwari (SS):** Keep in your view that they are an imperialist power and we have to work with them.

Scapegoating

Four respondents narrowed down anti-Americanism to Pakistanis' habitual blaming of America for Pakistan's internal problems. This is a unique perspective of looking at public consciousness contrary to the narrative that America is resented because of its superpower status and policy regime:

> GA: U.S. is an international scapegoat for problems in the global South.

Another distinct perspective pointed towards a notion of hypocrisy:

> SS: As Jahangir Tareen said when he was accused by the press, as his political party was going belligerent against USAID because he had taken money from us for the Mango program, he summed it up really well saying: "Americans are bad but their dollars are good!"

> **Dr. Faraz Islam (DFI):** On one hand we want to immigrate to America and we hate American values.

Religion

Six interviewed elites discussed events such as the Soviet War, GWOT and drone strikes to attribute a religiosity factor to groups mobilized for safeguarding the Muslim interest in Pakistan. When asked about religion's role in evoking hostility towards America and aid, one respondent explained that America's intrusion is a perceived threat to Islam's ideological values. Two respondents mentioned a 'fundamentalist mindset' that triggers rage from the traumatic humiliation of Muslims. From GJA's response, a clear Muslim-American divide emerged:

> Anti-Americanism has nothing to do with aid. It is based on American policies regarding Muslims. It influences minds because Pakistanis are generally religious-minded. So they hear about American atrocities on Muslims. It creates hatred for the Americans and sympathy for Muslims, the victims.

When asked about the aid's influence on religious extremism, one respondent expressed doubt about USAID's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) goal:

> **NN:** You can't really talk about impact of CVE because what do you really look for when you talk about impact in terms of reducing extremism in Pakistan? Are you going to measure individuals and ask them if they are less extremist now?

> **DNJ:** It's interesting that USAID projects were in South Punjab and ironically terrorism is also concentrated there.

While NN is uncertain of USAID's success in countering extremism, DNJ's belief that terrorism and aid are interlinked evokes potential research interest.

Always the Grieving Party

Respondents saw themselves as the grieving party based on their personal experience with the U.S. government and USAID. Some respondents drew on a historical context as they mentioned feeling abandoned by America and perceived American support as unreliable. DFI stated:

> Americans are very fickle-powered. When the 1965 war happened, they left us. In the 1971 war they didn't side with us. Every time we have required them to commit they have left us.

For one respondent whose 'company x' had been awarded project funding which was terminated due to alleged corruption charges, resentment is based on personal suffering and loss:

> **SK:** For me it was not just a business thing, it was a personal thing which included a death. It included spoiling our name and that is all we had. We suffered a death, we suffered so much work.

From Victim to Key Ally

Discussing Pakistani public perceptions of USAID, respondents voiced two key thoughts:
   i)   Self-perception of Pakistanis as marginalized victims
   ii) ii) Allies of America as aid recipients

> **SS:** There is this weird general Pakistani mind-set that everything that happens to us is because of America and America now needs to give us money to fix it.

Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) conceptualization of antagonism is pertinent here as individuals struggle for their identities "because they construct an 'enemy' who is deemed responsible for this 'failure'" (Howarth, 2000: 105).

> **GA:** Whenever USAID has opened offices in Pakistan it comes as a desire to improve relationships and reopening of offices after 9/11 was an indicator.

By contrast, GJA believed that positive accounts of USAID came from those who profited from the agency, indicating that aid serves unequally:

> Aid is impacting only the NGOs and the few who have benefited and they praise USAID.

USAID's Questionable Legitimacy

Critiques flowed when respondents were requested to assess USAID's development efforts. Respondents interrogated USAID's legitimacy by drawing attention towards the limited scale of projects, funds wastage, corruption, excessive American intrusion, CVE, development sector dependence, limited institutional support, ostracisation of the government and aid conditionality:

> **NN:** USAID has not had impact in Pakistan on a large scale. Period. I am very sceptical of CVE work and grants to civil society. So I don't think there is any reason to believe that there has been any scaled impact.

Five respondents explained that USAID's legitimacy in Pakistan, particularly in Punjab province, is severely constrained by the agency's inability to align itself with GOP's objectives. Some pointed out that it was difficult to assess the agency's impact since USAID had zero stakes in mainstream government initiatives. DNJ spoke from GOP's perspective:

> The scope and project identification are limited. For most projects success is evaluated on input indicators, so we really don't see the outcome and how people have benefitted.

While DNJ's response captures GOP's take on USAID's initiatives to some extent, it drives the analysis towards a compelling point: USAID Pakistan's legitimacy is tied to government ownership.

Transparency was also a key concern because aid was perceived to be profiting corrupt groups. Some respondents mentioned that aid committed under KLB was channelled back to American contractors, confirming the widespread belief that USAID's interventions did not have transformative impact. GJA reported:

> KLB was supposed to be one hell of a big favour to Pakistan, but one billion dollars was spent in the construction of the U.S. embassy and CIA centre in Islamabad and it is our 'so-called' money with which they are building a huge complex. A senior U.S. embassy representative himself remarked when I said, "You got a new house... brand new house? He said thanks to you!"

> **Interviewer:** I see

> **GJA:** I said yes, thanks to us you are spending our KLB fund and he said well that is right. So you know they do these clever things!

Other cynical respondents reported that project outcomes were not visible enough:

> **SK:** I mean what's the impact? Where are these educated children? Where are the schools? Where are those American flag USAID schools?

Respondents also expressed their concern about the development sector's aid dependency, complementing theoretical critiques of aid (Bauer, 1982; Tandon & Mkapa, 2008; Moyo, 2009). Most respondents believed that aid promotes instability and discourages innovation, making the development sector reliant on intermittent assistance:

> **NN:** NGOs are dependent on it, people are dependent on it and everyone wants to keep making this money so it provides an alternative to doing meaningful work. It's kind of co-opted.

> **SK:** The only impact is on creating jobs for consultants and it's making the Pakistani development sector extremely, umm, lazy and you know dependent on such funding.

On the contrary, Dr. Saeed Shafqat (DSS) positively assessed USAID's impact on Pakistan's education sector:

> You can take the case of Pakistan Administrative Staff College that was supported by USAID. Then look at the evolution of Lahore University of Management Sciences - USAID was an important contributor...

Identity and Representation

Another prevalent theme was related to respondents' "sense of who they are in relation to others" (Howarth, 2011: 2) – their identity and representation. A few respondents felt that the American discourse 'othered' Pakistan because the rhetoric framed Pakistanis in homogenous mounts that were 'different' from Americans' self-perceptions. This is supported by Baaz (2005) who warns about the issue of identity and Tanzanian development aid from a postcolonial standpoint by stating, "The image of an open, trustworthy, organized and committed Danish aid worker self in opposition to an implicit image of the Tanzanian partner as unreliable, uncommitted and disorganized" (ibid: 2). In this context, some respondents actively contested American development discourse by pointing towards the following 'basic themes':

Dependency: A Western Discursive Construct

Upon being asked to share their thoughts on aid dependency, eight respondents denied the mainstream narrative which constructs Pakistan as dependent on American aid. The responses proved to be fascinating in contrast to the discourse on Pakistan's inherent dependency on America, oft-cited in media reports and academic literature (Mehmood, Hasan & Sarwar, 2015; Ahmed & Khan, 2007). Respondents reported that Pakistan's dependency is a Western discursive construction of knowledge that seeks to justify domineering American aid interventions:

> **DFI:** American intrusion has been excessive, the problem is the articulation of the idea that they are giving us aid and we are dependent on it.

> **Interviewer:** What do you think about aid dependency?

> **DNJ:** Government is not dependent on civilian aid.

In contrast, NN specified Pakistanis' portrayal of themselves as aid-dependent:

> So I think what Pakistanis do is that they paint themselves as an aid-dependent society.

 The above comment can be viewed from the perspective of Said's (1978) extension of 'orientalism' as 'self-orientalism' because the 'orient' reflexively mirrors itself to reinforce the Euro-American construction of Third World's image (Dirlik, 1996).

Culture, Ideology and Difference

Respondents were questioned about their opinions on American ideological values in relation to aid and a majority viewed American culture as 'different' and permeating the agency's practices. DNJ's counter cultural-hegemonic stance against the infiltration of American values through aid is observable:

> What democracy? What ideology? Do you think Iraq is much better off with democracy? Did people invite America? It's all drama… Aid projects just want to promote these American values we all know that.

Two respondents emphasized on the cultural difference between Americans and Pakistanis as a cause of misunderstanding in the aid liaison. These views invite the notion of cultural stereotyping and an 'us and them' divide - in this case, the Americans' culture as 'they' are perceived 'different' from Pakistanis. SS also pointed towards Americans' self-representation as benevolent aid-givers:

> It's all baseball! You can't play cricket with USAID! They also point out that they give money here. We need to understand the way Americans approach things and they need to understand local cultural nuances.

SK stressed on her personal effort to resist the penetration of American culture into projects:

> Again our own project, it was very American ideologically. We are different in Pakistan…we were fighting for a traditional chunk in the program and wanted to do something with Pakistani traditions.

Another respondent demonstrated acute awareness of Pakistanis' 'subjectification' (Heller, 1996) to American hegemonic culture as a practice rooted in colonial history:

> **GA:** Let's be honest. I mean we live by a lot of it okay? And we're a Third World country. We are extremely impressed because of being under the British rule and the 'yes sir mentality' and that's why we are in this position.

Some respondents showed concern for dominant representations painting Pakistanis as 'deprived' and 'lacking' to reinforce an asymmetrical power relationship that sums up the American donor-Pakistani recipient nexus. Discussing Pakistan's portrayal in the agency's media discourse, one respondent explained:

> **DFI:** So what comes through is the idea that oh we're giving to the locals of the deprived world.

Class

Most respondents believed that aid does not benefit all societal classes and favours certain elite groups whose identities are concealed under a pretence of being the movers and shakers of Pakistani society:

> **DFI:** It hasn't benefitted the bottom of these societies but has a direct transfer to upper middle class, contractors and government departments.

> **DNJ:** It has just benefitted donors more than recipients. The consultants and bureaucrats have benefitted...the heavy consultancy fee.... the foreign trips... I being part of that 'mafia'... I myself have benefitted.

These responses were unanticipated because the respondents belong to a privileged class and identify themselves as elites. Yet, there was a frank self-awareness of the problem.

GJA narrated his personal experience of confronting USAID to address class-related corruption:

> My director's husband has benefited immensely. He was very popular with the USAID all the time. Every year he gets the contract for teacher training ...he is a crook. So the agency is benefitting people like that. This is not correct. I pointed it all out to them. I didn't leave them.

Unequal 'Partnership'

 A prime theme emerged to capture respondents' articulation of the donor-recipient matrix that sustains an unequal 'partnership' aided by discourse. Pickard (2007) argues that the partnership discourse works to create an ambivalent image of Northern development agencies and reinforces unequal power relations in the South. Words such as 'partnership' and 'ownership' infer an equal donor-recipient relationship concealed beneath imperialist ideologies among donors (De Waal, 2006; Baaz, 2005; Escobar, 1995 as cited in Olesen, 2011).

Stakeholder Relationship

Most respondents saw USAID's presence in Pakistan constrained by limited stakeholder engagement with beneficiaries, contractors, and government. While many believed that stakeholder consultation was restricted due to short project life cycles, a former contractor stated that USAID's top-down approach is designed to assign Pakistani stakeholders subordinate positions and sustain dominance and control. Hira and Parfitt (2004) use the term 'top-down' to describe how this approach adopted by donor agencies "is antithetical to the qualities of flexibility and local initiative required for a more effective development" (ibid: 65). SK reported her experience:

> We applied as they had requested us so it was very dictated. I feel that our project was dictated from day one I mean they came to us, they told us to apply, we applied, we got selected and there was no pre-qualification of companies. In that selection letter, they dictated us that we have to be the lead and 'company Y' has to be a sub-contractor…

SK's awareness of the asymmetrical power relations around which the donor-stakeholder 'partnership' orbits is evident. From stakeholders' standpoint, USAID's dictatorial form of governance excludes them from taking the lead in projects, a complexity reported in literature on aid inequalities. Robb (2005) succinctly describes the paradox of aid given from the rich to the poor: "By its very definition, it is a manifestation of inequality" (ibid: 22).

Discussing the dynamics of donor-government collaboration, Kakande (2004) explains that donors' funds can be associated with power as they try to control the agenda, leading to an

imbalance. In this context, one respondent shed light on the government's dissatisfaction with USAID:

> **GA:** The government is not happy with USAID as they don't see them doing things under their direct supervision or involvement.

GJA's experience with USAID exposes the government's contestation of USAID's domineering and exclusionary practices:

> During my time I had forced them to be involved with the Federal Government...

Political and Bureaucratic Regime

In relation to USAID's objectives in Pakistan, most respondents steered the conversation towards U.S. strategic and political interests. All respondents believed that economic aid served America's geo-political interests rather than Pakistan's developmental needs:

> **DFI:** It feels these projects are more to fulfil the strategic interests of the donor agency rather than interests of the people.

> **Yasmeen Al (YA):** Americans are great players of realpolitik. By funding Pakistan they keep alignment with South Asia open and they can hedge their bets.

In a different vein, one former USAID employee denied USAID's political objectives, indicating that the issue is debatable:

> GA: USAID wants betterment of people. It sounds political but when it comes to the ground, it is development for development.

Hegemonic Power

Countering U.S. Hegemonic Influence

A final organizing theme 'hegemonic power' captured the respondents' perceptions of USAID's promotional discourses. Most respondents thought that USAID's media campaigns reflected "American narcissism" (Nederveen, 2004: 138) and were counterproductive in fostering a

positive influence on public perceptions. Some respondents felt it encouraged resistance against America's chauvinistic superpower image that was cultivated through media rhetoric.

Discussing USAID's hegemonic influence in Pakistan, respondents argued that the foremost purpose of the agency's developmental interventions was to promote a positive image of America in Pakistan. There was also consensus on the opinion that USAID's media discourse was designed to sustain the agency's imperialist prestige in international development, raise awareness about projects and build consent in Pakistan. Respondents' critiques emphasized:

i)   Mistrust of campaign objectives;
ii) USAID's failure to curb anti-Americanism through campaigning;
iii) 'Jarring' and 'in-your-face' advertisements/branding and;
iv) A problematic representational discourse.

Respondents elaborated on USAID's ineffective branding and promotional strategy:

> **GA:** So obviously when something is logoed by America, there is always distrust in Pakistan.

> **YA:** USAID's promotional campaigns force American assistance down our throats. The balance is unbalanced but it could have been subtle. They should not be self-praising.

Some respondents commented on USAID's over-jarring campaigns as forcefully 'American'. Others saw media campaigning as a cultural hegemonic instrument that authenticates and promotes American culture from a Gramscian perspective:

> **SK:** Very American, their marketing strategies are becoming stringent every year, left right, up and down. The flag has to be there. The advertisements always promote Pakistanis as poor and illiterate…

> **SK:** So they would put the complete American content and dub it. There would be a five-minute cultural section which would be very American…Now in Pakistan we resisted it.

NK pointed towards muted beneficiary 'voices' in USAID's promotional testimonials:

> It would be more believable if USAID's testimonials were coming from the farmers themselves it has to be coming from the horse's mouth.

The concept of 'voice' is fundamental to postcolonial theory, predominantly in Spivak's (1988) contributions which determine that "the subaltern cannot speak" (ibid: 308). Couldry (2010) emphasizes voice by arguing that agency is removed if people are denied the opportunity to voice their narratives – "the result is a crisis of voice under neoliberalism" (ibid: 2).

One respondent explained that mistrust of American foreign policy and the anti-American sentiment resulted in USAID's promotional activities becoming counter-productive:

> **DFI:** It's giving the impression that America is throwing pieces and on one hand it is bombing Afghanistan and destabilizing Pakistan.

DNJ's interpretation of USAID's promotions divulges his antagonism because he sees the media tactics as threatening to the government's limelight:

> In terms of their propaganda and marketing...people think only USAID is doing all the work and no one else is.

Another respondent drew attention towards the extreme public distrust which is complemented by fear of being associated with American branding:

> **SS:** One individual said to me: "Why don't you put up a bulls eye here? So that they can fire a missile on what I am doing. We are already so exposed and on top of that you add a banner!"

In sum, the unpacked findings formulate a thematic network (appendix 1) constituted by the global theme, 'resistance against USAID's imperialism', that broadly depicts elites' struggle against USAID. Elites' discursive resistance circles around i) anti-Americanism ii) American hegemony and counter-hegemony iii) identity and representation-related complexities and iv) an unequal partnership.

An exploratory analysis of the data reveals the relationship between these 'organizing themes' as they absorb each other. For example, many anxieties within the anti-Americanism discourse are associated with resilience towards American domination and hegemony which seek to reinforce an unequal U.S. – Pakistan 'partnership'. This imbalanced power relation is sustained by a disempowering development discourse which misrepresents Pakistan's identity as crucially dependent on USAID. The discursive distortion of identity then serves the donor's hegemonic, ideological and commercial interests over the recipients' interests to justify all systematic interventions. Elites also attempted dismantling of western development narratives and contested American cultural values that infiltrate the agency's media discourses. Ultimately, interviewed elites' discursive practices become an act of resistance towards the agency's coercive and non-coercive practices.

Discussion

Empirical results both complement and contradict the theoretical interests framing this research. Since findings amalgamate into a central theme of USAID Pakistan's key stakeholders calling on discourses of resistance against aid imperialism, it is crucial to first theorize 'aid imperialism' and 'resistance' from the vantage point of findings.

Marxist-inspired Hayter (1971) conceptualized aid as the "smooth face of imperialism" (ibid: 7) to argue that it is an instrument for superpowers to continue exploitation of weaker nations. Veltmeyer (2005) understands development imperialism as an American agenda that enforces hegemonic influence and reinforces power hierarchies between donor and recipient. Results suggest that interviewed elites have joined Hayter (1971) and other aid critics (Moyo, 2009; Easterly, 2006; Feldman, 1967) to contend that USAID is a vanguard agency of contemporary imperialism. On the contrary, Warren and Sender (1980) contradict the interview data arguing that aid is not imperialistic and completes its task of development. Paragg (1980) also argues that Canadian aid is not imperialistic by nature.

Moreover, elites' resistance towards aid as a draconian project exists in plurality and takes many forms, since in the Gramscian sense there is always room for resistance and in the stronger Foucauldian sense, "wherever there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 1978: 95). From a postcolonial and post-development standpoint, Kapoor (2008) brings forth the notion of struggle by groups which "resist, publicly interrogate…" (ibid: 7) the domineering nature of development agencies.

Data analysis shows that respondents generally desire to break free from the shackles of America's monolithic power. While literature on U.S. - Pakistan relations draws on politics to argue that the two countries form a "union of unequals" (Kux, 2001: 361), interestingly findings suggest that the aid relationship is also viewed as 'unequal'. Data exemplified respondents' interrogation of the inequitable alliance between USAID, GOP and other stakeholders. Most respondents believed that inequality arises from America's political domination of Pakistan, supporting the hypothesis that development partnerships are constituted by an imbalanced relation "where the donor sets up the rules of the game..." (Baaz, 2005: 22).

Furthermore, elites' narratives make the power imbalance governing the USAID – Pakistan nexus more visible than ever. Elites' discourses of resistance confirm Fair and Watson's (2015) assertion that Pakistanis view America as an "aggressively interventionist power" (ibid: 221). Comparably, Kakande (2004) argues that the North-South divide is reflected in donor-recipient relations since "stakeholders are starting from very unequal relations" (ibid: 88). Respondents, especially government bureaucrats and military intelligentsia, appear violated by dictated aid policies and seem disgruntled based on their belief that USAID's authoritarian and intrusive administration style is the root cause of nurturing inequalities.

Additionally, with the exception of one respondent, there was a shared perception that aid is an instrument to fulfil American political interests and sustain a dictatorial regime that forbids Pakistan to take the lead. Kapoor's (2008) thesis is fitting here as he argues that the most aid is "received by politically and strategically important countries" (ibid: 85).

Moreover, most respondents doubted USAID Pakistan's developmental impact. The question of USAID's legitimacy loomed large for several reasons. First, aid was seen as undependable support. Browne (2006) discusses how Pakistanis felt abandoned by America after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (mentioned by several respondents) to explain how countries feel neglected when U.S. strategic interests alter.

Second, most respondents demonstrated suspicion of funds allocation and believed that it deepened corruption by benefitting a certain class. Rizvi's (1994) study makes a parallel case by arguing that criticism stems from the lavish lifestyles pursued by American diplomats. Astonishingly, elites positioned themselves as aid's benefactors, deliberated on class inequality

and engaged in fierce self-reflexivity to confess that they were part of the 'mafia' which profits from perks.

Third, respondents were unable to see a tangible impact of USAID's development projects and were uncertain whether the inputs yielded real results (Ridell, 2014). While some respondents praised USAID's contribution to Pakistan's education sector and a former employee denied aid's politicization, the overall impact was construed as limited, 'petty' and unneeded.

Another unique finding that sets itself apart from prior research is that respondents did not view Pakistan as economically dependent on American assistance, contrary to the Western discourse which embraces the view that Pakistan would be unable to survive without aid. Jones (2013) emphasizes Pakistan's dependency by stating, "…One out of every fifteen Pakistanis had at least one full meal a day because of…U.S. food aid" (ibid: 14). Cohen (2004) argues that "Pakistan absolutely needed international economic support to remain viable" (ibid: 86). Notably, one government official reiterated that Pakistan will be better off economically if aid is denied. It appears that elites' denial of dependency on American help is a mechanism for reclaiming their agency and identity as independent and sovereign.

Further, elites' discourses drew me closer to the depth of anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. Anti-American discourse was reflected strongly in elites' narratives as they critically grappled with the concept in relation to aid. While respondents refrained from considering themselves as anti-American, their discourse denoted a cautious and resilient attitude towards American assistance. Respondents discussed USAID in light of the resistance against America's hegemonic power, based on factors such as religion and foreign policy. This may be supported by scholarship that treats anti-Americanism as an ideological antipathy aligned with religious interests and the perception of U.S. as a "powerful, global bully that abuses Pakistan…" (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015: 228). These perceptions kindle resistance, which from Foucault's vantage point can be seen as always present in the subjectification of individuals (Pickett, 1996).

Contrary to most respondents' belief that development aid does not promote anti-Americanism, Rizvi (1994) argues that criticism arises in relation to aid's perks for military and bureaucratic elites. While respondents discussed class benefit generally, they refrained from deliberating on how their own class benefitting from aid causes anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, respondents' discourses frequently immersed in the subject of anti-Americanism, confirming that the anti-Americanism discourse directly implies the aid discourse.

Another fascinating finding emerged as some respondents spoke about a hypocritical sense of anti-Americanism on the part of individuals who benefitted from aid but still opposed Americans. Comparably, Kux (2001) argues that while American policy is condemned, children are sent to American schools and the American lifestyle is appropriated in Pakistani society. The analysis also brought forward another unexampled finding – 'scapegoating' and 'self-orientalism'. Two respondents explained that Pakistanis conform themselves to 'orientalist' representations and begin seeing themselves as 'victims' to blame Pakistan's problems on America.

Further, USAID's promotional efforts were argued against for several reasons. Respondents predominantly demonstrated a critical awareness of the representational problems in USAID's colonizing development discourse (Escobar, 1995), claiming that it works to:

i)   Promote America as a benevolent donor;
ii) Paint Pakistan as dependent on American assistance and;
iii) Render beneficiaries voiceless.

Respondents challenged the problematic American-centric discourse from a desire to retrieve their identity that was being distorted by USAID's media representations. Thus elites' discursive resistance constituted destabilizing the development discourse which they believed defines the asymmetrical U.S. – Pakistan relation and is an inherent characteristic of USAID's discursive power over Pakistan in line with the neo-Gramscian perspective that aid organizations are a "locus" of international hegemony (Hattori, 2003: 153).

Along these lines, respondents demonstrated understanding of how "development texts are written in a representational language" (McEwan, 2008: 121) to shape an image of Pakistanis as the subordinate 'orient'– the 'others' needy of aid, characterizing the mainstream knowledge that allows America to practice domination and "worlding" (Spivak, 1999: 114) of Pakistan. Interestingly elites presented ruptures in USAID's "system of representation" (Hall, 1992: 186) by arguing that Pakistanis are depicted as highly aid-dependent in the agency's media narratives. Most respondents saw these binary misrepresentations as a propaganda tactic to promote America's self-image as righteous - a "contrasting image, idea" (Said, 1978: 98) from the Third World to sustain the superpower's hegemonic influence and allow USAID to justify interventions as per "the idea of the West" (Hall, 1992: 223).

It is understandable why USAID's development discourse increases contempt rather than consent among respondents as it naturally offends by positioning Pakistan as the recipient and USAID as the donor under "hierarchical ordering" (Nair, 2013: 631). Finally, elites' interpretation of USAID's promotions as aggressive and 'jarring' leads me to ask a critical question by applying Gramsci's conception of hegemony as subtle rather than coercive: Is it possible that because USAID's media strategy is so overwhelming, it fails to conceal a coercive agenda and thus is not genuinely 'hegemonic', unable to garner persuasive consent?

Further, Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony is pertinent to elites' argument that USAID's media discourse aims to steadily legitimize American cultural values and build ideological consensus. Three respondents argued that Pakistanis have been 'colonized' to the extent that they subjugate themselves to American lifestyle resulting in Pakistan's permanent subordinate position. Similarly, Reetz (2006) argues that many Pakistanis especially elites harbour admiration for American culture. However, my findings contradict Reetz (2006) because while respondents bluntly acknowledged American cultural infusion, their discourse demonstrates resistance against cultural control to safeguard Pakistani culture from getting contaminated because there is a deep realization that their "own values are threatened" (Macdonald, 2003: 24).

Also, analysis makes it evident that past geopolitical tensions echo powerfully in elites' deliberation of U.S aid to Pakistan, confirming the contours of Foucault's discourse methodology as "historical" (Macdonald, 2003: 16). When elites talk about USAID Pakistan, their narratives are solely in context of the historical and political events. Thus 'aid' cannot be isolated from these factors. There is a strong implication of discourses of politics, of security, of American strategic objectives, of anti-Americanism, of religion, of culture and of class among others on elites' discourse of resistance against USAID's imperialism. This drives the analysis to a critical juncture: Since discourses are correlated in Foucauldian terms, unless the weight of geo-political tensions between America and Pakistan is strategically lifted, the aid liaison will exist in a domain of resistance.

Contradictory to these findings, Reetz (2006) notes that Pakistani elites view resistance against America as futile. His view can be critiqued for being naïve because he only sees resistance from the perspective of Islamist ideological struggle, not accounting for other points of resistance stemming from culture, representation, identity, and power imbalance.

To summarize, elite discourses collide head-on with USAID as a frontline of American supremacy and hegemonic influence in Pakistan. While findings both challenge and supplement reviewed literature, their implications on U.S. - Pakistan relations will be discussed in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to unmask USAID Pakistan's elite stakeholder discourses that assess the agency's development efforts against the background of a fluctuating aid liaison and deepening U.S. – Pakistan geo-political anxieties. Theories of discourse, power and hegemony, literature on development aid and U.S. – Pakistan relations and a postcolonial/ development lens, all combined to frame the research question: What kinds of discourses do USAID Pakistan's elite stakeholders call on to evaluate the agency's development interventions? The research question was broken into sub-questions: How are Pakistani elites' discursive perceptions of American aid being formed under the conditions of a historically tense U.S. - Pakistan relationship? How do Pakistani elites contest the hegemonizing strategies of consent adopted by USAID in its promotional discourse?

Empirical evidence suggests that interviewed elites have waged a struggle against USAID's perceived imperialistic and hegemonic power in Pakistan. Elites conceived USAID's interventions as more domineering than subtly hegemonic and their narratives sought to unravel the densely unsymmetrical power relations that position Pakistan hierarchically as 'junior' and America as 'senior' in the aid liaison. The result is elites' defiance towards a power regime against which they adversely perceive USAID and contend that it has little transformative impact on development and counter-insurgency in Pakistan, a hotbed for anti-American sentiments.

Second, akin to studies on Third World development discourse, elites vigorously contested the 'orientalist' portraits of Pakistanis as emasculated aid dependents in contrast to the glaring representations of American counterparts as generous donors in USAID's promotional discourse. Elites' counter-narratives asserted their agency to repel permeation of American cultural hegemonic influence through aid projects. This drives the analysis to two compelling points: Elites' interrogation of their representational portrayals indicates that they will not settle for an unfavourable manufacturing of Pakistani identity. Elites' nationalist interests empower them to stand against cultural contamination.

Third, results show that elites' discourse of resistance is shaped by geo-political events, such as the drone program and 2011 Salala incident. From a Foucauldian perspective, it can be argued that since the U.S. – Pakistan aid discourse is sculpted in relation to these historical events, perceptions of USAID can only ameliorate if anxieties underpinning the U.S. – Pakistan relation are addressed. This provides American policymakers a golden opportunity to address key concerns, initiate an equitable partnership with Pakistan, revise USAID's promotional strategy and renegotiate the aid liaison for aid to work better.

Most significantly, results can hopefully trigger interest among Pakistani and American policymakers to engage in self-reflexivity for re-strategizing the future of American aid to Pakistan, strengthening relations and bridging the donor-recipient divide. Also, results can draw policymakers closer to understanding the gap in public perceptions of America and USAID. Knowledge of the voices of Pakistani elites at the heart of development planning now permits American policymakers an in-depth insight into the complexities which underscore the aid discourse and subsequently enables USAID and U.S. government to reconsider its relationship with Pakistan.

Further, scholarship suggests two extreme remedies for the complexities that have risen in findings. Moyo (2009) proposes an unrealistic, radical aim of living in an "aid-free world" (ibid: 76) whereas Gilani (2006) contends that enhancing American economic assistance can increase Pakistanis' trust. However, evidence now suggests that merely multiplying aid is unlikely to influence perceptions. Only an overhaul in American approach towards Pakistan can herald a change at this critical juncture.

To further advance these findings for new academic work, limitations and opportunities need to be discussed. First, a small elite sample was undertaken but it would be lucrative to enlarge the data corpus for corroborating results and comparing perspectives of diverse elite strata. Second, interview data also elicited elites' recommendations for enhancing USAID's development impact. These results were beyond the study's scope but can be a fruitful research avenue for scholars and practitioners examining how aid outcomes can be enhanced. Third, this study extrapolated opinions of an elite class which for Spivak is "blind to Third World subaltern" (Kapoor, 2004: 630) voices. In the development context, Easterly (2006) asks, "Why not give the poor voices on whether aid is reaching them?" (ibid: 332). Thus, a qualitative investigation of beneficiaries' perceptions can be undertaken to gain a sense of continuities and ruptures in overall perceptions.

Finally, this study can come full circle if future scholars use it to investigate another side of the story – USAID's counter-argument to this study's findings of elite discourses in their geo-political and historical context.

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Appendix 1: Thematic Network

Appendix 2: Basic to Organizing to Global Themes

Basic themes	Organizing themes	Global Theme
● Culture, Ideology and Difference Class ● Pakistan's Aid ● Dependency – A Western discursive Construct	Identity and Representation	
● Superpower Policy ● Religion ● Scapegoating ● From Victim to Key Ally ● Always the Grieving Party ● USAID's Questionable Legitimacy	Hating America	**Resistance Against USAID's Imperialism**
● Stakeholder Relationship ● Political and Bureaucratic Regime	Unequal 'Partnership'	
● Hegemonic Power	Countering Aid's Hegemonic Influence	

Appendix 3: Topic Guide

Introductory Questions

- Name/Occupation?
- How long have you been working at your current occupation?
- Could you please describe your role/ professional background?
- Which fields/sectors are you most interested to in?
- Are you involved with the development sector?
- Tell me a bit about your experience in development and what you perceive as the best and worst aspects of local development?
- Have you worked/coordinated with donor agencies before? If yes how was the experience? (Probe for USAID).
- Do you know about the geo-political history of U.S. and Pakistan?
- How do you feel about the current relationship between U.S. and Pakistan?

Aid Effectiveness and Impact / Legitimacy

- Which donor agencies are you aware of that are functioning in Pakistan? (Probe for USAID if not mentioned spontaneously)
- What do you know about the work donor agencies are doing in Pakistan? ▣What do you feel about the work of donor agencies in Pakistan?
- How do you evaluate donor agencies' contribution to Pakistan's development?
- What do you think about USAID Pakistan's work in local development?
- What do you feel about USAID projects' contribution in job creation and incomes?
- What do you think about USAID's work in your specific field?

Stakeholder Engagement and Aid Allocation

- What do you feel about USAID's work in social, political, and economic spheres of Pakistan?
- What do you think about the stakeholder involvement in USAID Pakistan's projects?
- Can you tell me about your personal experience as a stakeholder working with USAID?
- What do you think about the manner in which aid is spent in Pakistan?
- Do you think USAID has served all sections society equally well?
- What do you feel about relationship between the Pakistani government and USAID?

Aid Dependency

- What do you feel about aid dependency in general?
- What do you think about Pakistan's economic dependency on aid?

U.S. – Pakistan Relations and Foreign Policy

- What do you think about U.S. and Pakistan's relationship?
- What do you think about U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan?
- How do you feel about the geo-political tensions between U.S. and Pakistan?
- What do you think is essentially being demonstrated about both countries through the U.S.-Pakistan aid relationship?
- What do you think are the economic, political and social objectives of U.S. in giving aid to Pakistan?
- What do you feel about development assistance in relation to foreign politics?
- Do you think aid has resulted in conflict or has it promoted peace in the region?

American Values and Ideology

- What do you feel about American values and ideology?
- What do you feel about American values and culture in relation to aid?

Media and Branding

- What do you think about donor agencies' media campaigns in Pakistan?
- Do you know about any donor organization's media campaigns in Pakistan?
- Which campaign can you recall?
- What do you think about the way donor agencies in Pakistan brand and market themselves?
- What do you think about USAID's media campaigns?
- What do you think of USAID's branding? 🎬What are some of the prominent themes that you can recall from USAID's media campaigns on TV/radio and newspapers?
- How does USAID's publicity material influence your perceptions of the agency?

Anti-Americanism and Aid

- What do you think about the public perceptions of American aid?
- What are your views about anti-Americanism in Pakistan?
- What do you think about the notion of anti-Americanism in relation to aid?
- Do you think aid has nurtured or suppressed anti-Americanism in Pakistan?
- Do you take into account these notions and belief systems while designing programs aimed at local people?

Appendix 4: Respondent Profiles

Name	Professional Background
Senator Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf (GJA)	☙ Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency ☙ Former Federal Secretary: Ministry of Science and Technology Former Federal Minister: Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Ports and Shipping, and Ministry of Education ☙ Chairman, Defence Committee of the Senate Pakistan
Saadia Khan (SK)	☙ Chief Operating Officer at a local company x
Yasmeen Ali (YA)	☙ Lawyer, academic and political analyst ☙ Author of '*A Comparative Analysis of Media and Media Laws in Pakistan'*. She tweets @yasmeen_9
Dr. Nasir Javed (DNJ)	☙ Chief Operating Officer, Urban Unit, Lahore, Pakistan ☙ Senior bureaucrat, Government of Punjab (GOP). He has wide experience in various government departments.
Dr. Saeed Shafqat (DSS)	☙ Founding Director of Center for Public Policy and Governance, Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan. ☙ Internationally-acclaimed academic, scholar and consultant with over 25 years' experience in teaching, consulting and research. His interests are: South Asia, globalization, U.S.- South Asia/Muslim world, International Relations and Public Policy
Sibghatullah Sabzwari (SS)	☙ Senior director at a development project
Nadia Naviwala (NN)	☙ Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
Ghulam Ali (GA)	☙ Former employee at a donor agency
Dr. Faraz Islam (DFI)	☙ Director Research at a policy thinktank
Natasha Kamal (NK)	☙ Media & Communication Specialist

Appendix 5: Informed Consent Form

<div align="center">

Consent to Participate in Research
Stakeholders' Evaluation of USAID Pakistan's Development Interventions

</div>

Introduction and Purpose
My name is Anum Pasha. I am a postgraduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I am pursuing MSc Media, Communication and Development. I would like to invite you to take part in my research which concerns the investigation of stakeholders' evaluation of USAID's development interventions in Pakistan. This research is being conducted for my dissertation.

Procedures
If you agree to participate in this research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location of your choice. The interview will involve questions about aid legitimacy and impact, USAID branding and communication, aid dependency and aid allocation in Pakistan. The interview should last around one hour. With your permission, I will audio-record and take notes during the interview to accurately record the information that you provide. Recording will be used for transcription purposes only.

I expect to conduct only one interview with you. However, follow-ups may be needed for added clarification. If so, I will contact you by email/phone to request this.

Risks/Discomforts
The research questions are broad and open-ended so you may interpret them in any way possible. You are free to decline to answer any questions you don't wish to.

Confidentiality
Your data will be handled as confidentially as possible. If results of this study are published or presented, your name will not be used unless you give explicit permission.

Rights
Participation in research is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to take part in the research.

<div align="center">

CONSENT

</div>

If you wish to participate in this research, please sign below:

_____   _____
       Participant's Name and Signature   Date

[Optional]

If you agree to allow your name or other identifying information to be included in all final reports, publications, and/or presentations resulting from this research, please sign below:

Participant's Name and Designation _____

Participant's Signature _____

Appendix 6: Sample Interview Transcript

<div align="center">

Senator Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf (GJA)

Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Ex- Minister for Education, Government of Pakistan

</div>

Date and Place:	April 7, 2016. Islamabad
Interview Structure:	Semi-structure, face-to-face
Participants:	1

Interviewer: Hello! How are you today?

GJA: Very well thanks!

Interviewer: Thank you for having me here today.

GJA: My pleasure… you've travelled quite a long journey you must be tired.

Interviewer: Yes, it was a long journey but I'm fine.

GJA: Great! So what is your research about? Are you studying at LSE?

Interviewer: Yes… I'm studying MSc Media, Communication and Development at LSE.

GJA: Ahan great!

Interviewer: Yes, my research is on stakeholders' evaluation of donor agencies in Pakistan.

GJA: Great, which agencies are you looking at?

Interviewer: I'm concerned more with the USAID and how its key stakeholders assess the agency's development interventions basically. So that's what I'm interested in looking at the different emerging perspectives given the current geo-political scenario and U.S. – Pakistan relationship.
GJA: Okay. Let me tell you a little about myself first and my background before we begin.

Interviewer: Sure definitely please! Let me please switch on the recorder, I hope you will be okay with it? As I mentioned before I will be recording this and won't be taking hand-written notes.

GJA: Sure.

Interviewer: Okay.

GJA: As far as education is concerned it so happens that I have been an instructor in almost all the military institutions, bit different to general education but as an instructor I had a lot of experience. I was an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy, I was an instructor at the artillery school, instructor at the Command and Staff College Quetta, I was an instructor at the War Course, and I was an instructor at the National Defense Academy and United Defense now university so I had a lot of

instructional experience as it is. Initially of course in the Musharraf government I had been handling Ministries of Communication, Ministries of Railways, Ministries of Port and Shipment etc. etc. Then in 2006 … when what was it 2004 I think…

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: When Shaukat Aziz became the Prime Minister he requested the President he said I want some dynamism in education sector because Zubaida Jalal who was my predecessor was a good lady but that's about all she was not effective, she was not assertive and she used to get scared of the *maulvis* (religious clerk) and actually *maulvis* were a big pressure group in the Assembly in those days and she had one disadvantage of being a female and secondly her background was from the rural area of Baluchistan so she used to get overawed by these guys so could not take any drastic steps in the education reforms and all that. So the aid agencies also took advantage of that and started totally ignoring the Ministry. So my first impression as I came in to the Ministry of Education was that I came to know that the projects being run under the USAID or the British…

Interviewer: Okay. Hmm right interesting…

GJA: They had never consulted the Ministry. You know the Federal Ministry was totally ignored. They used to select the projects themselves, get them signed from the Ministry of Development at the Federal Level, finance had a representative of Education Ministries sitting in in the education projects. It should have been the other way around, they should have signed the projects with us and have a representative of the Finance Ministry sitting in but it was the reverse. They used to sign the projects with the Ministry of Finance who knew nothing about education and who didn't care and that the Ministry used to send some deputy secretary some low level type who never opened his mouth so virtually the aid giving agencies had it all on their own, whatever they want to do and then I came to know about certain projects which were being run very badly or which were not needed. Now initially to come to efficacy of USAID and I'll take USAID in particular because that is your subject, the first time I saw the … a U.S. embassy representative invited me to accompany a … to come and have a look at a project of USAID and I asked her I said "what is the project?" and she said

(Recording interrupted abruptly)

And I said "Is this a project?" and they said yes we are spending x amount of millions of dollars on this project. I said look this project we could have done ourselves! Whitewash could have done by our own children, we didn't need the Americans to come and do the whitewash for us, things like that, but anyway out of politeness I kept quiet and I praised and I said well very good you have done a damn fine job and you are helping us, can I have a look at all the other projects that you have? So the ambassador showed me …

Interviewer: Which year was this?

GJA: Yes?

Interviewer: Which year was this?

GJA: This was 2004. So the USAID head was told to come and brief me on all the projects. It was a lady. She came and briefed me on all the projects that were being done and some projects straight away struck me as virtually airy fairy type projects for example one was democratizing the Pakistani schools. And I said what is this? How come democracy or dictatorship is coming as far as the schools are concerned? She said no it's a very useful project and what we do is we have some very good

educationalists in United States we call them over and they come and run the courses over here for Pakistani teachers.

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: I said okay what is the teaching about? What is the course? Then they explained that you know they teach the teachers that in the school all the problems should be solved in a democratic way, there should be school councils, there should be student unions and if the students have a dispute, there should be no fight. It should be done through a democratic manner through voting … majority and everything. I said listen for this you need instructors from the United States to come and tell this? I said… you tell me I will issue a circular tomorrow to the school that in future all disputes should be resolved by majority vote and that's the end.

Interviewer: Hmm right very interesting…

GJA: This is the total outcome of your course! Then I had gone on a visit to United States and when I went to Pakistan embassy the Ambassador complained to me and he said "Sir what sort of idiotic boys you have selected for the training over here?" I said which boys are you talking about? He said the teachers I said I have not sent any teachers he said no but there are very unsavory characters roaming around with long beards and *shalwars* (trousers) tucked up and they have been sent to America for teacher training courses. So I said please check up who has sent them and found out that the USAID has sent them and the Ministry doesn't even know about it. So I came back and I called the USAID and I said "Who are these teachers in George Washington University?" She said well we are running courses you know to train your teachers and these are the trainers who will train your teachers then, so these are the teacher's trainers that we have sent.

Interviewer: Hmm the teacher trainers, yeah.

GJA: Yes. It is their course and it's a six month course out of which the first two months they learn English and the remaining four months they are taught various methods of how best to deal and all that. I said you tell me why are you wasting two months on English training? Why don't you select from here boys who already know English? Why waste this money? Secondly why send all these boys to America to learn? I will give you space! I have space in the … over here sufficient space and you get the teachers from there. That way we will be able to run much more courses and train much more people, you just bring the trainers over here and we will run continuous courses throughout the year. It could be much more useful. Why send … you are spending so much money on every student! I mean you are wasting money! They wouldn't agree to that. First they said well you know security problem, I said no problem I will give a 24 hour guard at the school. They will be guarded, they will be looked after. We will give them accommodation, we will give them food. We will take care of your teachers! Bring them here!

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: They were not prepared to do that. Then I came to know what the system of selection is, I said where have all those teachers gone? And from where did you pick them up? They said well we have done it through an NGO. I said then what is the use? Because it is the government who is running the teacher training institutes, it is the government who employs the teachers who will further train the teachers and the government doesn't even know who has got this training. You are doing through some NGO. The NGO is selecting people and the NGO is sending and they come and then they go back to their schools and colleges and we are gaining nothing out of this training. It was very funny. So I went further into the depth of this I said checkup about this NGO. So I came to know that one of

the ladies in the Ministry of Education, one of the directors, she was hand in glove with the USAID and her husband was running an NGO. So this contract was given to that husband of hers and that husband … what he was doing was charging students money for getting selected for this training. That charge was being pocketed. Okay give me 10,000 I will send you to America so the students who wanted to have a joyride to America

Interview: Hmm Hmmm

GJA: They would apply and get selected and they would go and then obviously there was no utilization because they came and dispersed to wherever they are from. And then the ticketing was also being done by the NGO so he was also pocketing the commissions for the tickets and in this the people working in the USAID were hand in glove with them, obviously they were probably getting their cut.
So I had a look at all these various projects I had a look and I was very disappointed I said … they said we can't finish these, we can't modify these, and these have been approved by your Ministry of Finance and so on. So when I went to the United States for strategic dialogue I let the Americans have it. Their secretary of education was sitting there, their rep from State Department, a rep for VITA for strategic dialogue and I said look … actually how I then got a little more upset was when the USAID World Director, the overall…

Interviewer: Rajiv! I think at that time was …

GJA: No at that time it was not Rajiv it was somebody else in 2004, **Interviewer:**

Oh okay okay.

GJA: He said you know we follow the principle of Marshall Plan, General George Marshall, I said yes I know I am a military man and they said that we gave Marshall Plan to Europe but we didn't tell them what to do they told us what they wanted us to do and we did that. So that is our principle for USAID, I said I am sorry that's not true. In my country, what you are doing is you are not even asking us what we want, you are doing what you want and we are getting no benefit out of USAID. I said I don't know as Education Minister what projects you are running and why you are running them. And I said I will give you some examples so I gave the example of these democratic schools, I gave the example of the whitewash of the schools and I gave the example of this teacher training and I said these are three examples that I want to quote before you. Now you tell me do I want this trend? I don't want it. And I said now please listen to me, my suggestion, stop all these small penny projects. We don't need it.

Interviewer: Hmm… Interesting

GJA: What we need is capabilities. I said don't give us fish teach us how to fish. I said in India you gave them IIT, Institute of Technical Training and I said that institute has been the base for their revolution, their computer revolution, their IT revolution and India today is number one in IT because of IIT institute given by you, I said you have not given us any! You have given four to India! I said I want an IIT. And I said I want an IIT in every provincial headquarter, one for every province and one for Islamabad so five IITs, you divert all your money into that, give us what we really need, it is we want to produce technologists. We want technical people to come up. I said we can't get jobs without knowing technology today. Our students are suffering, our boys who are trained because their training is substandard, they do not have quality education and therefore they cannot compete with the Indians, they cannot compete in the world market so we want quality education in technology.

Give us IITs. I said the second thing I want to tell you is I don't see any signature projects of United States in Pakistan. All your money of USAID you tell us we've spent so many billions in Pakistan, I said it's worth zero. Nobody appreciates it, nobody knows it except the help you gave to LUMS and IBA. It is just these two and I said that these are the two best institutions as far as management is concerned in Pakistan because USAID actually helped us set it up but these were in 60s. After that you have given us nothing! Zero!

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: I said what you have done is flitter away the USAID on projects like whitewashing our walls. We can whitewash them ourselves. Give me technical institutes. "Okay we will think about it" they never gave. For three years I kept pressing them, they did not come up. I said look Sweden gave us only one institute of technical training at the lower level. It is known as Swedish Technical Training Centre. They train electricians, plumbers this that. Our boys go there, they train in that and they get very good jobs in the country and outside and I said everybody says that I want to go to Swedish Institute. I said Sweden is getting a good name although this is the only investment they have done about twenty years back. I said as far as you are concerned I don't see any American Institute of Technology, you are not giving us anything worthwhile so nobody even talks about you. Let's have American Institute of Technology Islamabad, American Institute of Technology Lahore. It will give you a good name, create goodwill. We will gain, we will be happy with USAID. I am not happy with your USAID at all at present. So everybody was shocked, they said well a very blunt man and undiplomatic well that's the way I am. Anyway, so for three years I kept pressing them and the only outcome … good outcome of that meeting was that as soon as I came back the USAID director and number two and the American Ambassador were all in my office with their charts and projects and everything …

Interviewer: To present?

GJA: To present! And they said you can cut out any and you can… (Laughing)

Interviewer: (Laughing)

GJA: Yes but no change as far as the strategy is concerned. They wanted to do this … because they thought that they were earning the goodwill of most people by going way down and mainly they were working with the provinces. Now what is wrong with the USAID as far as the provinces is concerned? One is the problem which I have highlighted, it is the selection of projects which they do. Some are mala fide some are useless, and some maybe good but then the main issue lies in the capacity of our own provincial education departments. That is where the problem is. We have the worse bureaucracy in the education sector compared to others.

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: The reason is that as far as Sindh and Baluchistan are concerned their education standard is extremely low, their certificates are fake, and their degrees are fake.

Interviewer: Hmm. Their degrees are fake. Right.

GJA: But they are stuffing the Ministries and they don't know anything themselves. How can they check USAID? So they say, Okay fine. They are very happy with it or an odd dinner given to them or a gift given to them.

Interviewer: I have a question to ask you here you say they didn't keep the Ministry in loop and at the Federal level right?

GJA: That's right

Interviewer: So why is that?

GJA: It could have been because frankly my predecessor was incompetent, never bothered to ask them that what projects are you running and why are you running them but after I had used my stick they were coming then regularly to me and you know seeking permission for the projects and all that so they were coordinating but where I say they have mala fide intentions I told them listen this NGO for example which is sending the teacher training thing is a fake NGO. It is a one man NGO. The man is sitting in an office and he is earning money because you want to keep good relations with his wife who is a director in the Ministry of Education and she was virtually the real Minister because the Minister was incompetent so this lady was running the Ministry.

Interviewer: I see

GJA: So her husband was being obliged by USAID. So I said this is corruption by all of you. Now as far as the other NGOs are concerned I said again you are giving projects to NGOs of your choice and you say well…we will run the USAID through NGOs we don't want to give anything to the government. I said fine you think government is inefficient and corrupt, don't give it but NGOs have to be genuine. Not one room NGOs. I said let's do one thing that we carry out an analysis appraisal of all the NGOS, what activities they have done? What are their resources? How many people they employ? What buildings? What offices etc. they have, what is their capacity… people that they employ what are their qualifications and we carry out … and then we list the NGOs according to their capabilities and then we will give you that appraisal and you pick up NGOs out of that appraisal on your own. We will not give this contract to NGO X or give it to NGO Y. They didn't agree.
Interviewer: Oh

GJA: They said no no no this is our choice whom to give, we don't want Ministry coming in. I said Ministry is not going to tell you whom to pick but we will carry out an appraisal for you and they said no no we will do on our own. This is the problem… the problem was at both hands, you see in the Ministry there was incompetency. Nobody was asking…Until I came and because I was from the military I am used to pushing things and getting a result and I went with that and they were not prepared for it.

(Brief conversation about food)

GJA: Please have this, it's for you.

Interviewer: No I'm honestly not very hungry

GJA: Doesn't matter, please take some you've travelled. Have some *kebab* or *mithai* (sweets) or cold drink.

Interviewer: Thank you!

GJA: So I was talking about the provinces. Baluchistan and Sindh had these problems, now what was the problem with Frontier and Punjab? The Ministry of Education and Federal … I came to know that the Federal Ministry had very incompetent people and I realized that they had all been recruited during Zia days. Ministry of Education had been reserved by Jamaat-e-Islami and Dr. Fazal

ur Rehman or somebody was the Education Minister. They made rules that nobody from outside can come and serve in the Ministry of Education

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: And they recruited down from clerk upwards and they were the people who were now Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries and they were all Jamaat-e-Islami members so much so that in the curriculum wing, people who were there to monitor the curriculum and suggest changes etc. and revision none of them was a science person. Physics, MA Arabic, Chemistry MA Political Science, Mathematics, MA Islamiat. I said how the hell do you check anything at all, they said well whenever anything comes we get a professor from the local college and he does it for us. I said alright, I think that it is better if that local professor should be here and you should be there so they said you can't … when I tried to get them … throw them out they said you can't because the rules framed in Zia's days are that in the Ministry of Education the outsiders can't come and these are the people who will be here. You can change within the Ministry. Within the Ministry were the same people. So then I got the rules changed and I got the approval of Musharraf that thirty percent people can be inducted from outside. So straightaway I cleaned these curriculum wings. I sent all these unwanted people to go and teach Islamiat and Arabic over there and I got Physics and Chemistry professors to come in. Over here in the Ministry the problem was it was all Jamaat-e-Islami and so ruling the curriculum.

Interviewer: Of course.

GJA: In Punjab and Frontier the problem was extremely low caliber of people came to the Ministry of Education. Good people would not come, good officers would not come. Governing education was considered a backwater thing and everybody wanted to go to some… **Interviewer:** Other ministry…?

GJA: … good ministry or a ministry where they could make money and you know communications and this that. They thought what is there in education even though in Sindh they make a lot of money in education, the entire process of teacher recruitment is false, all…

Interviewer: Ghost schools and what not…

GJA: Ghost schools and unwanted teachers. I surveyed it all … of complete schools and we found out how much the enrollment is, actual enrollment, how many ghost schools exist and where they are … locations. Then we surveyed *madrassas* (Islamic religious school), total statistics … the only education census done in Pakistan ever was in 2006 which I got conducted.

Interviewer: After that none were carried out?

GJA: None! Not even before that, not even after it. It's the only one available.

Interviewer: Was this your first Ministry appointment?

GJA: No no, before this I had been the Minister of Railways and the Minister of communications. I had been the Minister for Port and Shipping, Minister for postal development…

Interviewer: So education was your most sort of problematic or …

GJA: No I had problems in every Ministry, I was given the Ministries which were problematic to sort out because in the army I had developed a reputation of sorting out the worst institutions. So there was this reputation that he sorts things out. I sorted out ISI, ISI was in bad shape for over three

years. I used my stick and put it as a real fine Intelligence Agency. Well and I was given railways when it had just stopped running and I made it into a running institution and took it into profit from a huge loss, then handed it over in 2002 when the politicians came in and then they took it back into pit again but anyway similarly communications … I threw out a lot of contractors, cancelled the contracts which were mala fide including Bhayandar of Turkey and so on and I won the cases against them, saved a lot of federal funding. This education was Shaukat Aziz's idea because Musharraf wanted to give me Interior, he said no he is fit for Interior we have to sort out these terrorists and this that. Shauqat Aziz said sir education is in a very bad shape. I want him for education so he convinced Musharraf so I came into education. A new curriculum was given. Unfortunately the government finished and the new curriculum … a new curriculum takes a long time to enforce, to be introduced. The books are revised, the curriculum is revised but the books are published by the boards in the provinces and they are not ready to give up that authority because they make money in that. So they had to publish books and get them written and now to get new books written our people … they don't have really the expertise. The current people what they do is they take old books and jumble up the paragraphs, they jumble up the chapters and that's how it's done. **Interviewer:** And that's how it is updated?

GJA: Here now on a new curriculum a new book had to be written so the pace was very slow. And then came this eighteenth amendment in which they said that every federal ministry is abolished and all education to provinces including curriculum now every province can have its own curriculum so the curriculum that we had given for introduction at some places it was started, in some subjects it was introduced and in some places the provinces are sitting idle so you know it is in a bad state I feel very sorry because we were going to introduce it in 2007 and it's 2016 now. Nine years. By now every child coming out would have been on the new curriculum, a much more learned student coming out with no hate literature. I had taken Islamiat out of all books and put it into subject of Islamiat only in the new curriculum.

Interviewer: What was it doing in the other subjects?

GJA: Zia had put them in all subjects. These Urdu medium schools … the curriculum in them, it is in science as well. Islamiat is everywhere. So with the provinces the problems was that they had some similar complaints about USAID. The USAID complaints were that they used to come and say that the provinces don't deliver, they don't run the projects properly. They are incapable, inefficient etc. etc. The provinces said that the USAID doesn't care about us, they do what they please. **(Brief pause)**

GJA: So what I had started doing was… every alternate month I would call a conference in which I would call the Education Ministers of the provinces along with the Education Secretaries and there would discuss with them all the points that I wanted to convey to the provinces and what the provinces wanted to convey and in that I would pick up … one of the permanent subject was the interaction with development agencies so I would tell them the complaints of the USAID etc. and you know they would tell us their complaints.

Interviewer: So what was that experience like? What were the main issues?

GJA: The main issues were that the USAID used to complain that there is no delivery, that people don't take them seriously. For example, there was a project of USAID to issue computers to schools.

Interviewer: In Punjab?

GJA: In all provinces. They year marked some funds for computer education for each province in that one of the items was the issuance of x amount of computers, two year program. They funded for the first year, the next years funding was depended on the progress report. When the progress report came, and this will show you exactly the interest of each province towards education, it's a true picture. Frontier province had completed the two year project in one year using partly US funds partly their own funds and they asked that the second year funds which they have sent from their funds should be reimbursed but the projects stands completed in one year. Punjab… one year's project completed, computers issued now waiting for funds to start the second year's projects so they were demanding funds for second year. Sindh government funds issued first year, not utilized, lying over there and zero progress as far as the project is concerned and they were asking for extensions. Baluchistan government had not even bothered to draw the money for the first year. (Laughing)
Interviewer: Okay! Very interesting!

GJA: So the USAID said this is the reason why we deal with the NGOs and we don't deal with the government and they were right in that way but then the provinces heads said the NGOs select their own schools, their own favorites and issue the computers to them and the government schools are those which are not connected to that particular NGO they get neglected. So both sides had their genuine points. These types of problems arise and need to be resolved between them. But as it is the problem was very poor bureaucracy in the education sector in all provinces which was a problem we also faced at the federal level and the USAID and other development agencies also faced.

Interviewer: But what is the situation now?

GJA: I am sure that the complaints must be the same as they were at that time … which was that they neglect us… they neglect us and they go to the NGOs and they prefer to deal with the NGOs and I can tell you that, I can quote you one example of corruption of USAID that…

Brief pause

GJA: One is of course at the cost of these funds we have marked for Pakistan, they actually oblige their own contracts, their own institutions and so on like this teacher training they were obliging the U.S. institution, they were obliging the experts of U.S., like the democratic schools also. Experts being called from the U.S., calling in their own acquaintances and you know they earned the money. It was Pakistan's money, the money for Pakistan was going back like that. So the real worth of USAID is less than fifty percent that we actually receive

Interviewer: Hmm hmm

GJA: The rest goes back similarly through consultants, through reports etc. I will give you another example of this **Interviewer:** Okay

GJA: They told me that they have set up a joint project with UNESCO with local country Director of UNESCO and that they have set a project and they are going to prepare a report and this and that. Now they had not ask me, they had not taken us into confidence about whether this should or should not be done and they went ahead. The project was that an ex-employee of UNESCO who had served in Pakistan was being called to come and prepare the report and was to be assisted by an ex-employee of USAID who had gone back to the US so they paid for both these guys to come they stayed here, daily expenditure, daily whatever, a lot of money given to them and in the project they purchased vehicles and they renovated offices so the UNESCO Country Directors office became grand and he got a new four wheeler you know and similarly the USAID got a vehicle. Now they prepared some bloody report, which we could have even done otherwise ourselves, there was not

much worth of that report I think it was on literacy rates or something like that I said I can give you that in this booklet, the literacy rates. Anyway when the project finished it took three months to prepare that report so for three months they were utilizing that money and they had marked ten million dollars or something like that for this project *(pause)* at the end of this project one of my staff officers came and informed me about the project details and so on and I said this money is supposed to be about money for Pakistan isn't it? And he said yes. I said then the vehicles they have purchased out of this money where have they gone?

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: They are using them I said no tell them that these are project vehicles they should come to the Ministry. Now the project belongs to us, they did it on our behalf without asking us so tell them alright at least deposit the vehicles. First they said no this cannot be our rules … then I said alright then I am going to take it up with the U.S. with your headquarters, they came and deposited the vehicles. The UNESCO guy also … I told him I don't subscribe to you keeping our vehicle, he said no I am authorized to keep it I said okay I will take it up with the UNESCO Director General I am going next month to Paris I will take it up with him, he also returned the vehicle, so both those vehicles were then lying in the Ministry. I didn't use them but they were attached to the Ministry so this is the type of corruption that goes on. Money is in our name (pause) Money is … supposedly has been given to Pakistan but who is benefiting? The Americans, the USAID officials **Interviewer:** I see!

GJA: Contractors, consultants who are all coming in. You may have an excellent Pakistani sitting over here knowing the subject better than the guy but some *gora* (white man) will come from George Washington University or University of XYZ and… **Interviewer:** Ahan.

GJA: Yes, so these were the problems we usually ran into with USAID and at the provincial level complaints against them were mostly these that we don't know anything and they work through NGOs and that they have their own favorite NGO and their favorite schools.

Interviewer: Okay… and what about at the provincial Punjab level?

GJA: Punjab people are comparatively more aware. So they catch them in Baluchistan **Interviewer:**

Definitely definitely definitely!

GJA: So they catch them, in Baluchistan they can do whatever they want because over there is only corruption. There is zero progress on ground, all the money is pocketed. Whatever you give them!

Interviewer: And in Sindh?

GJA: In Sindh it is also the same. Rural Sindh is nothing but corruption and inefficiency and ghost schools. I think I will … maybe this will help the picture for you. I will just show you the things in this what we were doing in this. This was the National Education Census, the one that I was telling you about.

Interviewer: Hmm. Hmmm. Hmmm. The one you did in 2006.

GJA: This big booklet it is available in the Statistic Division and in an academy, the Academy of Education which still exists although the Ministry has finished. Then there was the new scheme of studies which we introduced for class one to twelve in which we said firstly add early childhood education for little kids in which we introduced language experience block, heritage block,

environmental block these were new things which were introduced and then I had an idea and I said all schools in Pakistan will be dual medium. English and Urdu! English in class one for all schools. Zia had by order made all schools Urdu medium in the government sector as a result our students have suffered very badly. They start to learn English in class six, ABC. In class ten the student cannot sit in a computer course, he cannot use it. In foreign countries computer has been introduced in class three so I said introduce English in all schools in Pakistan. We immediately got a changeover in the Army.

All Army schools… English Urdu compulsory from class one. All Islamabad schools which were under my control compulsory! Ten schools immediately in Frontier, ten in Punjab, ten in Sindh and five in Baluchistan were converted. The rest were to be converted gradually. Then what we did was that Urdu, English and Math along with General Knowledge will be taught from class 1-3. Islamiat will be taught as a compulsory subject from class three to twelve. Islamiat was compulsory everywhere even up till Masters and Bachelors as well. **Interviewer:** Hmm

GJA: I tried to take it out but that was not in my hands. It was in the Higher Education Commission's power Dr. Atta-ur-Rahman was scared, he didn't want to annoy the *maulv*is. No controversial hate sectarian material will be included in Islamiat such as Hindus are unclean **Interviewer:** in History books?

GJA: This was in History, Urdu and Islamiat, in all three of them. Removed it from all of them. Moral values and *Haqooq-ul-ibad* (duties towards mankind) alongside *Haqooq-Allah* (duties towards God) will be taught to students as part of Islamiat, before that Islamiat was all *Haqooq-Allah* I said no in this fifty percent will be *Haqooq-ul-Ibad* which is how to be a good citizen, good moral practices… **Interviewer:** Hmmm

GJA: Good … I mean all that… morality! I brought all that in. Advance Islamic studies will be offered in class ninth and tenth and eleventh as an elective subject. I said keep Islamiat basic over there for the rest. The Islamiat which has been brought in between everything, make it a separate elective. Whoever wants to be a religious scholar he can select, the rest should be free to choose whatever. So they did that. Ethics and morality will be taught to non-Muslim students instead of Islamiat so one new subject was introduced. Selective portions from all religions were included in that and I said they will not be made to …

Interviewer: So why was this just for non-Muslim students?

GJA: No because for Muslims we included morality in Islamiat.

Interviewer: Ahan

GJA: because at that point Islamiat was compulsory for non-Muslims students.

Interviewer: Oh.

GJA: We gave them an alternate subject instead of Islamyiat. Okay. General science will be compulsory from class four to class eight. All students must learn some science. Curriculum of social studies will include the concept of civics and citizenship, science and social studies will be taught as separate subjects in class four and five. History and geography will be taught as compulsory subjects in class six to eight. The current history curriculum starts from Mohammad bin Qasim, I said what about the earlier history so I said no we will study history so what if it the history of Hindus and Buddhists? It is of our area!

Interviewer: Right... I see

GJA: Yes! It finished. I said no class six will be pre-Muslim period in Indo-Pak subcontinent which is one country. Ashoka, Chandragupta Maurya… **Interviewer:** Yes!

GJA: Teach the children it all and then class seventh Muslim period, class eight British period and struggle for Pakistan. Pakistan will be made by the end of class eighth. In class ninth and tenth there won't be history, there will be social studies. Social studies won't be there before that, before that history will be taught. Social studies in ninth and tenth will be the current Pakistan, in eighth Pakistan was made, in ninth and tenth teach them about the current Pakistan's geography, natural resources, rivers, dams, economic situation etc. etc. They should know their country by ninth and tenth so we did that. And we introduced elective subjects like drawing, which had gone out.

Interviewer: There was no art before?

GJA: There was no art. I brought it back and then home economics, agriculture … now they are not there. And I brought regional languages in class six to eighth at that time they had Arabic as compulsory. I said no Arabic will be an elective. For regional and modern languages what we did was whichever language had a teacher availability they can learn that language. It could be Persian, Arabic, German and French whatever! So we put that there. Computer science will be an elective subject in class ninth and tenth ^{so} those kids who were going to pursue Computer science can take it at this level early on.

Interviewer: So why wasn't this compulsory?

GJA: Computer study is compulsory, this is computer science.

Interviewer: Oh okay.

GJA: You see teaching of computer literacy applied hands on will be compulsory for class six to eight and then it goes on to …

Interviewer: oh

GJA: Separate. Because over there pre-medical, pre-engineering and pre-computer science… it becomes three fields. Pakistan Studies is compulsory till class ten and not after that, not in eleven or twelve. After that there are electives if someone wants to take them. Elective subjects for Humanities will be offered as suitable combinations of three subjects etc. etc.

Interviewer: Hmm hmmm

GJA: Foreign students may opt for history and geography of Pakistan in lieu of compulsory Urdu. Foreign students don't have to take Urdu, they can take history and geography. New groups - computer science and medical technology groups will be offered in class ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth. That was done.

Interviewer: So what became of this then?

GJA: Books had to be written. The curriculum was passed, notification was sent, and the curriculum was ready only the books had to be written. That's because … the Federal Government couldn't write the books, as per of the constitution the provinces are competent to write it. The provinces were unable to write them until I left.

Interviewer: Right

GJA: When I left then the stick was no longer there so they got slow and now after the 18th amendment it is the provinces' choice to follow or not. That's the pity of education.

Interviewer: So this is what became of it?

GJA: Yes here it is (turning the page). The adoption of dual medium school systems, English Urdu compulsory, Science will be in English humanities will be in Urdu so students will be dual language… knowing both, uniform academic sessions even that I changed I said from now on sessions will start from September. For two years it worked, but later they went back to April. Accessibility of education, National Education Management information ….

Interviewer: I see

GJA: The problem was the 18th amendment that was passed in the Constitution. What they did in that was to take all powers from the Federal Government and give all powers to the provinces so they finished the Federal Ministry of Education. When the Ministry had finished then who would pursue these subjects, who will push them? **Interviewer:** Hmmm

GJA: With this booklet you will get some data also. Internal financing of education… the amount of expenditure on education 1999 onwards, percentage and GDP, external resource mobilization amount. **Interviewer:** What was the role of donors?

GJA: That is also in this, donors' contributions, who are the donors and how much they contributed, the subjects they did.

Interviewer: Can you comment on the role of donors in the education sector?

GJA: Here it is, what I was telling you, number of institutions enrollment in teaching staff, public institutions missing facilities like without water, without electricity, without latrine, without buildings, the total schools like these in which provinces. Then by medium of instruction, how many are Urdu medium, how many are English medium, how many are Sindhi medium and others. The total of public and private sector, the comparative summary of enrollment information in the total country, in Punjab, in Sindh etc. etc. 2000-2003 increase 2005 increase, stage wise enrollment by sector and gender, preprimary, mosque, primary, middle how many girls, how many boys, enrollment by gender and education, vocational and technical…

Interviewer: Right. I will be asking you some particular questions pertinent to the research please. May I ask those sir?

GJA: Sure.

Interviewer: So the questions are divided into basically three or four broad categories and you can give … I mean you would obviously talk from your own experiences and whatever you know. The first section is more about aid effectiveness and you know generally the legitimacy and then I am going to ask you some questions on…

GJA: Just go and ask the questions! (Laughing) Don't tell me what you are going to ask!

Interviewer: Okay!

Interviewer: What do you feel about the work of donor agencies in Pakistan?

GJA: USAID!

Interviewer: Yes…

GJA: I think about thirty percent of the intent is not a huge impact because there are no signature projects, they are not helping us develop the… as it is skill development or technology where we are lacking. That's not being done. A lot of money is being wasted on petty projects which we could do without…which reduces the aid effectiveness. Instead if they had given us some good institutes the aid effectiveness would have been tremendously improved.

Interviewer: What do you feel about USAID project's contribution in job creation and incomes?

GJA: The jobs are created if people have skills and if people know technology. The jobs are available in those sectors. An electrician will always get a job but a graduate will not get a job. We have thousands and thousands of graduates and matric-qualified and high school graduates running around with no job at all. So what is USAID doing? They are helping out in these schools, they are not helping out in creating technology centers from where the graduates could get jobs. This is precisely my point that they are not helping us in creating technically-qualified man power.

Interviewer: Right…What do you think about USAID Pakistan's work in local development?

GJA: In farming there is one project which is good, that too they just started, with the mangoes. Which is to help the mango farmers to improve their exportability. The conditionality are in such a way that only big farmers…

Interviewer: Commercial farmers?

GJA: …The people with links, only they are befitted. Jehangir Tareen is a very clever man, if there are good cows coming in he would go after cows, if something else then he goes after that. He is a very sharp guy and he stays linked with them so he benefits but this mango project has also not been widely distributed for example my son in law's family in Rahim Yar Khan are the biggest mango orchid owners in the district. They have not been given any U.S. help to improve. I told him I said USAID has a project … he replied saying that I applied there but they don't respond.

Interviewer: Hmm right

GJA: That is why I said that not more than thirty percent!

Interviewer: Impact?

GJA: Impact! Not more than thirty percent!

Interviewer: So what do you think about these projects, whether they maybe in education, health or energy, how should projects be assessed given these complexities?

GJA: Well you see the selection of the project itself, first is that, you have to take the user into confidence and go along with the user, second is that the projects should be focused for example you create institutions from where thousands will benefit not just train a few individuals. Give the institution not individuals and then like the impact on agriculture these should be widespread, they should be for example they could make a project of seed improvement and have a good distribution system whereby the impact can go around to every farmer. Our crops yield is decreasing whereas in advance countries and India also it is increasing. Why can't the USAID come into that? Set up a seeds farms for example for us and technical help to improve the productions? They don't do this. If you help two or three Jehangir Tareens then the impact is going to be limited. So the impact is limited, as I said the planning is bad. I am not happy with that.

Interviewer: What do you say the impact is limited?

GJA: it's minimal.

Interviewer: How?

GJA: Because it is not widespread. It is impacting only the NGOs and the few ones who have benefited. Aid is impacting only the NGOs and the few ones who have benefited and they praise USAID. With them impact is positive but with general public it does not exist.

Interviewer: Can you elaborate on your comment on the NGOs' benefitting?

GJA: The reason for that is trust deficit, because there are thousands of NGOs. Everyone who retires he takes the name of an NGO and he just needs a one room office and he goes and registers himself with USAID and UK and this and says I am an NGO give me a contract so obviously the government doesn't like this type of business. There are some very good NGOs who are running schools, very fine schools are being run by NGOs. Hospitals and all! And this is why I said please allow us to make a list of credible NGOs and you give contracts to those NGOs but they insist no and they give the contracts to NGOs like the husband of the female director.

Interviewer: Based on their contacts?

GJA: Based on their contacts. This is what annoys the government also.

Interviewer: Right. So what do you feel about other stakeholders? What do you think about the stakeholder involvement in USAID Pakistan's projects?

GJA: In fact I found that the best NGO was… **Interviewer:**

Which one?

GJA: The German.

Interviewer: GIZ?

GJA: GIZ. They were the best! GTZ! They were the most helpful. They would come and say tell us where is your problem how can we help you? That is actually the approach which is required.

Interviewer: okay.

GJA: Yes. They work, they deliver. They helped us in preparing of curriculum, they asked us what help can we give. I said look curriculum development is not every teacher's job. We have selected people who can, who will be working on this curriculum, they are the teams now so I need you to train them on the curriculum development. They said okay so they spend their money and trained them on how to prepare the curriculum. So this type of thing. They said tell us how we can help you and their aid is more useful.

Interviewer: So what do you feel about stakeholders' involvement with donor projects? For example government, academia, civil society.

GJA: Well wherever there is personal benefit is coming in there they get very intimately involved. They are very 'pally' with the USAID people and they … like Jehangir Tareen's farm.

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: He is personally benefitting so he would be very intimately involved but if they are going around to let's say whitewashing our schools and things like that then there is…Okay you can do it since you are doing it, its fine, we could have done that ourselves but since you are doing it welcome! They have to show statistics that show how many schools they have done, so they are doing that.

Interviewer: So what do you think about the government's involvement with USAID's development work?

GJA: Currently I have no idea about what happened after the 18th amendment because it is now directly with the provinces. Federal government more or less is out now but during my time I had forced them to be involved with the Federal Government.and Federal Ministry but now with provincial government… and even the provincial government has the same complaints that they ignore us and work with NGOs.

Interviewer: So what is the best possible solution to these issues?

GJA: The best possible is what their own director general said that how do you want us to spend this money and where do you want us to spend the money and we spend it wherever it is your requirement. Take the requirement from the user, which they don't they thrust their own agenda that is what makes it unwanted. Now if you look at… well not in the USAID sense but something higher than that or maybe the USAID is part of it now which is the Kerry-Lugar Bill…

Interviewer: Okay… hmm

GJA: KLB was supposed to be one hell of a big favor to Pakistan, but one billion dollars was spent in the construction of the U.S. embassy and the CIA center in Islamabad and it is our 'so-called' money with which they are building a huge complex

Interviewer: Here?

GJA: Yes… Here in Islamabad, the biggest U.S. embassy in the world is being constructed in Islamabad along with the biggest CIA center outside the U.S. in Islamabad all with the Kerry-Lugar fund.

Interviewer: I see.

GJA: I knew about this because a senior representative of the U.S. embassy himself remarked you know when I said you got a new house… brand new house? He said… thanks to you!

Interviewer: I see

GJA: I said yes thanks to us, you are spending our Kerry-Lugar fund, and he said well that is right, so you know they do these clever things with us then how do they expect to be popular and why do except that we should be grateful? We are not grateful for it, we are not grateful for the things they do in our name.

Interviewer: I will come to more questions related to this but for now tell me you mentioned that only one group benefits… some particular people…

GJA: Well the people who have linkages with the U.S. embassy/USAID and interact closely with them, they help those people mostly.

Interviewer: So has any particular group benefited more than others?

GJA: My director's husband has benefited immensely. He was very popular with the USAID all the time. Every year he gets the contract for teacher training …he is a crook. So the agency is benefitting people like that. This is not correct. I pointed it all out to them. I didn't leave them.

Interviewer: Do you think there is an aspiration to change these circumstances?

GJA: No they don't want to change, they were polite enough to listen because I was very rude and very harsh with them.

Interviewer: So umm… a little on the US-Pak bilateral relations. What do you think about U.S. and Pakistan's relationship?

GJA: I think this aid relationship, if correctly spent and correctly used, would have created tremendous goodwill for the U.S. It has not. As I said the impact is around thirty percent only and they haven't given us any long lasting worthwhile projects which people could remember and relate to the U.S. help. Their help is very fleeting and it disappears very soon, its impact is gone. I advised them to create signature projects they didn't agree to do that. They didn't refuse but they didn't do it either. **Interviewer:** What do you mean by signature projects?

GJA: Signature projects is like the Swedish Institute of Technology like the IIT in India, like LUMS in Lahore. These types of projects which people would relate to you for generations to come and say U.S. has helped us. US has given us this institute.

Interviewer: Right…

GJA: Like China is doing! China is… all our big factories are because of China. China has helped. This is the difference between USAID and China. China gives us the capability USAID doesn't give us any capability. You see. They will say alright we will train ten electricians for you and say we have done job creation, China will give us the equipment to train the technicians so we can train not ten electricians but one thousand electricians.

Interviewer: Okay. And could you elaborate a little more on your opinion of the U.S. –Pakistan aid relation? What does it reflect?

GJA: The problem with Pakistan was that either Pakistan was not forceful enough or the U.S. was too arrogant to listen to Pakistan. So they continued to do it their way and it's acknowledged world-over that the impact of USAID is not even fifty percent and most of it goes back anyway. Now the one billion dollar that they spent on the embassy, it went back to them.

Interviewer: Hmm right

GJA: Or when they take our teachers and train them in America the money went back.

Interviewer: In terms of these educational projects what do you have to say?

GJA: Fulbright is a good program. It started when I was the Minister, I mean restarted, it had shut down before and in that initially they were not willing to give us science subjects, we fought with them, we said what joke is this? We don't just have to produce professors for universities, we want some PhDs in science subjects, management skills, technology skills. Then they agreed, even then

they are not giving us things in subjects like anything related to nuclear or missile or something. Those subjects they don't give. But we are still happy that some of our students go and do PhD, they go and study there, so we are happy.

Interviewer: Ok interesting… My next question is… What do you think are the economic, political and social objectives of U.S. in giving aid to Pakistan?

I think their main objective is to create goodwill for U.S., create more acceptability unfortunately they are not meeting this. It's not for any … to help us really! It's not out of goodwill that they want to help Pakistanis, it is their national objective, they want to create the American influence, and they want to influence the minds of the public in a favourable way towards the U.S. because when they train people, when they come up sometimes they are of great use to them.

Interviewer: How?

GJA: Well I think they create, since I am from the ISI (laughing) some people when they were in the U.S. the Americans found them more amenable ad when they came back the Americans kept a linkage with them and they got into higher positions and the Americans then were keeping close relations with them, inviting them to the embassy and getting them to influence things in Pakistan in a pro- American way.

Interviewer: Right… ahan

GJA: I have seen it they try to influence the military also, a lot of us go for training to America. They used to go, a lot of them used to go, now it's quite less.

Interviewer: Okay…. So…What do you think about American aid's role in relation to policy?

GJA: I don't think there is much influence as far as the national policy is concerned of this aid. The aid that matters I mean, I'm talking about USAID now but the aid that matters to Pakistan is one is the economic aid, that's separate, economic aid through which we finance the budget or some other grant that they give us.

Interviewer: I see…

GJA: Ninety percent aid that America gives is through World Bank and IMF. We take a loan from them, and when we take a loan we are dependent on them. Then we accept the dictates of IMF. IMF says, do it our way and Pakistan has to do it because we are accepting their aid. We had eliminated this at the time of Musharraf, these bloody chaps came back and again went with a begging bowl to them.

Interviewer: Hmmm ok

GJA: Our debt at the end of Musharraf's reign, that was doubled by Zardari and Sharif doubled that further in his first two years even though we had told IMF that thank you very much we don't need your help anymore but, these guys, they are running their governments on aid which is why they are dependent on IMF and World Bank and indirectly on the United States because over there U.S. is the dictating path. They are the biggest voting strength. So, as far as military aid is concerned, it is to the extent that they give us the aid with many tantrums and conditions **Interviewer:** Could you elaborate on the military aid aspect?

GJA: The military aid that is being talked about is the…. what is it called… there's a special name for it, this is being given to us to fight the terrorists.

Interviewer: Yes.

GJA: What happens is, that we are using our own money and our own resources too for this fighting for the last six, seven years, so they marked a fund against the Taliban and the terrorist in this area, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ninety percent was given to the Afghan government and the Afghan army to train and raise them. But ten percent was year marked to reimburse us for what we have spent and that reimbursement was also given in installments. But as it is, the fight is in our own interest, we spend our own to fight with them.

Interviewer: Right…

GJA: Yes, we were living peacefully, they didn't have to come in but they came in and they created all this, all these refugees came into Pakistan, when they hit Al-Qaeda, they all came into our tribal area. So we inherited this mess. Now it is an existential threat to us. So we are fighting it.

Interviewer: Absolutely, right… I see.

GJA: We are now fighting it. Now, fighting it is in our own natural interest but part of that expenditure, we are getting from the Americans.

Interviewer: I see

GJA: But look at the sacrifices, the lives we are giving, our young officers are being killed.

Interviewer: Yeah…

GJA: Yes, that was created by the Americans, but now they say, well and on top of that they blame us for this (laughing).

Interviewer: hmm yeah

GJA: Actually what was happening was they were getting a beating in Afghanistan, so their military commanders, when they got beat up they did not want to look inefficient, so they said that they come from Pakistan, so they would throw the blame on us just to find an excuse. That is now no longer true because, in this area, we have cleared all men. Before, Taliban were located here, Afghans were here, it was very difficult for us, they asked us to attack Haqqani network.

Interviewer: Hmmm

GJA: Haqqani had very cleverly captured three provinces of Afghanistan for the past twenty years, so his fighters were there but he kept his families in North Waziristan, now when Americans asked us to attack the Haqqani network, it is in your area, so it was his families. How can we attack his families and get the enemy from Afghan for centuries? If we had killed their families, tomorrow if they had more power, they would have cleared us out so we never wanted to attack. The Americans kept getting annoyed and we did not do it. Not because we wanted that there is a terrorist launch, they were already sitting there and the Americans knew it, but they deliberately used to say this to pressurize us.

Interviewer: I see…

GJA: Now, when we cleared North Waziristan, first we asked Haqqani that please remove your families from here, now we are going to go in operation, we are going to use our air force and now if your families get killed then it will not be our fault. So, they removed them. Then, we have gone in a big way, now Americans are very happy that North Waziristan has been cleared but still, at times, they say that oh, but we don't know, you know **Interviewer:** Hmmm

GJA: It happens from here these people come from Pakistan. They don't come from Pakistan, they are not here anymore.

Interviewer: Right…

So, So Americans have their own political and superpower agenda. They have become very arrogant and have destroyed many countries in the process.Then our geopolitical situation…
Interviewer: Could you elaborate on that?

GJA: Look at the way we are. Four nuclear powers are bordering us. Five nuclear powers in this area. Then, for China the only linkage into this area is through us or through Iran. These are the two routes into the Middle East and to go to Iran, he has to come through central Asia, then Afghanistan, then Iran, but with us there is a direct border which suits China too. India cannot trade with the west, countries to the west, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia unless we allow them to pass. We are the block in between. India has to go through the ocean to go to Kazakhstan.

Interviewer: Hmmm

GJA: So, this is the big trump card in our hand which is why I create fuss whenever Nawaz Sharif etc. say that we should allow India with this trade. Why should we do it? This is our trump card, the only thing which hurts India. And for this card they negotiate with us otherwise they wouldn't even talk to us. They are physically in occupation of Siachen. Why would they talk to us? They have almost all of Kashmir. This forces them, because through this their trade can straight away double if we allow them to do that. We are sitting on it. The military doesn't allow it otherwise Nawaz Sharif would do it tomorrow.

Interviewer: So given these conflicting situations – what do you think of the relation between aid and these conflicts? Do you think aid has resulted in conflict or has it promoted peace in the region?

GJA: Neither.

Interviewer: Neither?

GJA: Neither. It has not created any conflict and it has not created peace, it is by itself. It has been partially beneficial.

Interviewer: Okay!

GJA: And we don't mind if it continues because some benefits do accrue even if in limited, to limited people and so on but it is beneficial.

Interviewer: What do you feel about aid dependency in general?

GJA: We are not dependent on their aid. Even if they shut down tomorrow, it will not matter.

Interviewer: Could you please explain that a bit more?

GJA: For example government is not dependent more on the loans that they take.

Interviewer: Oh, yeah on loans. Right

GJA: Loans they are getting through world bodies and world bodies are controlled by America. So, if this aid relationship ends, then it ends with the world bodies as well. So, because this government has made itself so bankrupt, so dependent on the loans that they can't do without it.

Interviewer: Hmm right

GJA: We have to get out of this dependency that we tried to become independent in the Musharraf era. We shouldn't come under so much debt. If tomorrow World Bank asks us to return the loans, and we can't, then they might put sanctions against us. America will put sanctions against us, and the sanctions were placed on Iran as well but they were able to sustain it because they had the oil well.

Interviewer: Right…

Interviewer: So, my next few questions are about American ideology and values. What do you feel about American values and ideology?

GJA: American ideology is just another word for their hegemony which obviously I don't like it and I would rather have a more balanced world than a unipolar world.

Interviewer: Can you elaborate on that?

GJA: I mean, when it was a bipolar world like U.S. and Russia, both then they used to balance each other out and the Americans were not so hegemonic and not so dictatorial after they have become unipolar. They have become very arrogant and they have destroyed many countries in the process in the Middle East. The balance now would be created if they were these second poles coming up which are Russia and China.

Interviewer: You speak about American hegemony. What are your thoughts on anti-hegemony in relation to U.S.?

GJA: Well we could talk about anti-Americanism.

Interviewer: Yes what do you think of the notion of anti-Americanism in relation to aid?

GJA: Anti-Americanism has nothing to do with aid. It is based on American policies regarding Muslims. It influences minds because Pakistanis are generally religious-minded. So they hear about American atrocities on Muslims. It creates hatred for the Americans and sympathy for Muslims, the victims.

Interviewer: Right.

Interviewer: So what do you think about this and its relation to aid? Can aid counter it?

GJA: It does not counter in any way. I don't think so. Aid is separate by itself.

Interviewer: But they say that they are countering extremism through aid?

GJA: We also say that yes absolutely, you are doing it so that we keep getting the money! (Laughing)

Interviewer: Right…!

GJA: There is no harm in getting this money! Let it come. But in reality it does minimal influence.

Interviewer: Okay…

GJA: It could be more effective if it was more focused. It would have created goodwill but they do not believe in this. They think this way they are spreading it wide but they are actually losing impact.

Interviewer: Ok… my next two to four questions are about donors' media campaigning and branding. You must have seen ads on television and stuff like that? What do you think about these promotions?

GJA: Yes, USAID runs their VOA program and people switch off, people change the channel.

Interviewer: I see. Why?

People change the channel, in truth.

Interviewer: Really?

GJA: In truth, people do change the channel.

Interviewer: Why do you say that?

GJA: Because the programs are worthless (laughing)

Interviewer: Why?

GJA: Because there is nothing much in these programs, nothing really special happens. Our people are glued to two things, one is the dramas on our channels, second is the TV talk shows.

Interviewer: Hmm, the political shows?

GJA: Yes, so, these are the two things which are most popular with our viewers, so on VOA they show American news, American visits, so people are not interested in what is going on in America.

Interviewer: Right… So what do you think of USAID's branding and slogans?

GJA: Instead of writing 'From the American People', if there is IIT, then there will be an impact which these people don't understand. Now, Swedish institute of technology has been giving goodwill to Sweden from the last twenty years although Sweden has not given anything to it, no effort, no aid, and no nothing. There is just that institute which is producing technicians and people are very happy, they praise Sweden.

Interviewer: So, what do you think of the way USAID's campaigns are publically perceived?

GJA: There is anti-Americanism. The English speaking people who are more liberal and who are friendlier towards America and all are very few. The rest don't like it.

Interviewer: I see. And how do you think USAID's publicity material influences your perceptions of the agency?

GJA: Oh, no. I know them too well. It doesn't at all. For three years I have worked with CIA, you know, as DG ISI, so I know what they are and what they do.

Interviewer: Right… Could you elaborate on your experience working as a stakeholder?

GJA: In that period of time, it was very difficult to work with them because we had double sanctions on us and Afghan war was over and they did not need us anymore. So, they were being very nasty with us, demanding, return this, and return that, things they had given us during the Afghan war and also trying to pressurize us that you will not make a nuclear bomb, you are doing this, every day they had been sending their demand, they used to try and pressurize us and we had to stand very firm against their pressure and we successfully did that.

Interviewer: Hmm

GJA: And in that I would give credit to also Benazir Bhutto, because Benazir was the Prime Minister and she was a sensible lady. She would keep Americans happy too but without taking pressure, and where it would matter, there she would put her foot down and say no.

Interviewer: Hmmm

GJA: And she used to take us into confidence and we all had a very nice interaction. The army chief, myself, and Benazir, we had decided that we will coordinate on every issue with the Americans. Whatever the Americans had said to Benazir, the moment they came out of her office, she would call me up and say that they were saying this and that and how I answered to them so I would be prepared. Similarly, I would ring up General Waheed and tell him that this happened. So, when Americans came out and came to me and to General Waheed, we had similar approach and they couldn't create fishers in our replies especially on the nuclear program, so, we had to resist the pressure.

Interviewer: Right… thank you for your detailed views. Do you want to add anything else in relation to this subject?

GJA: I think I have told you whatever I know about it. I have very good relations with Americans, even now, the American ambassador, whoever comes, every ambassador has been to my house for a meal or something like that, I keep in touch with them and always welcome their aid and I say you must give aid to Pakistan, we are your friends, this and that.

Interviewer: So, what kind of relationship do you have with them?

GJA: Yes, I always advise them but they have been very nasty and stubborn on this. I've always told them that USAID is not effective. Create signature projects with them and I tell them that the Chinese have given us the capability to do things on our own. I said, we needed tanks, they said, why do you want to buy tanks? We will give you a tank factory, produce your own. They gave us a tank factory and now we produce our own. Now, we are even willing to sell.

Interviewer: Yes… Right.

GJA: Similarly, aircraft factory was given to us and we made our own aircrafts as well. So, I said, you guys don't even give us a factory for the spare part! They are not even allowing us to do this on our own. You want to retain us and dependent on you so see for yourself which party would I like. A party which enables to stand on my feet or a party which keeps me by? Then, they don't even provide us with the technology to produce the spare parts.

Interviewer: Right… Interesting.

GJA: Yes. This is what it is, and this is what I used to tell the U.S. embassy representatives that we are not some idiots that you think we don't understand why aren't you providing us with these and then I said don't expect us to be grateful to you as compared to China.

Interviewer: Right… Well thank you so much for your time and comments. I have taken a lot of your time and will be ending the discussion now.

GJA: No worries, it was good speaking with you on this topic I hope it is useful for you. If you would like more information you can also email or call me anytime.

Interviewer: Sure, I will definitely keep in touch. Thank you once again.

GJA: You're welcome

(Recording paused)

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